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Salazar's 'New State': The Paradoxes of Hybridization in the Fascist Era

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Introduction

In inter-war European conservative circles, particularly those of the Catholics and those close to Action Française, António de Oliveira Salazar's New State was praised as an example of a 'good dictatorship': one that avoided most of the totalitarian and pagan elements of Mussolini and Hitler. Salazar's dictatorship and its political institutions have been the subject of wide-ranging interpretive debate and some dimensions challenge common assumptions about inter-war fascism. The first concerns its relatively long duration, surviving the 'era of fascism' and much of the Cold War, ending only some years after the natural and peaceful death of its dictator in the 1970s. The second and most important concerning its ability to adapt institutions that, while inspired by certain aspects of Italian Fascism, were shaped by the armed forces, the Catholic Church and other institutions.

This chapter will analyse the process of consolidation of Salazarism and its political institutions, noting how the regime was shaped by several models of inspiration, and explore the cleavages and main protagonists of its institutionalization, especially some segments of the conservative elites, the Catholic Church and the armed forces. We also pay particular attention to the process of political diffusion of models and institutions by the European authoritarian right during the inter-war period and how they shaped some of the main institutions of Salazar's dictatorship.

The transition to Salazar's New State

On 28 May 1926 a military coup put an end to Portugal's parliamentary republic. Between the end of the republic and the institutionalization of Salazar's New State there were seven unstable years of military dictatorship; however, it is worth noting the project for a new constitution that the leader of the military uprising, General Manuel de Oliveira Gomes da Costa, presented to

the dictatorship's first government one month after the coup: 'A new constitution based on the following principles: national representation by direct delegation from the municipalities, the economic unions and the educational and spiritual bodies, with the absolute exclusion of individualist suffrage and the consequent party representation.'[1] Other projects were discussed during the years that followed, but this example demonstrates the importance of authoritarian and corporatist political alternatives in Portuguese anti-democratic elite political culture: namely, in sections of the armed forces, conservative parties and interest groups.

The republican revolution of 1910 was a precocious political phenomenon that brought the dilemmas of democratization and mass politics of the early 20th century to Portugal.[2] Secularization, democratization and republicanism marked the main cleavages within the republican regime implanted in 1910 in a backward country and which accentuated the differences between rural society and the small politically mobilized urban world. Although unstable almost from the outset, the republican parliamentary regime suffered considerably with Portugal's participation in the First World War.[3] Republicans pushed for the country to enter the war on the side of the Allies, primarily out of a fear the British would negotiate peace with the Germans at the expense of Portugal's colonies in Africa, although other goals of regime legitimation, such as patriotic mobilization, were also certainly important. Shaken by working-class social mobilization and the differences between republican parties about participation in the European war, the young republican regime almost immediately succumbed to a *coup d'état*. Portugal entered the war in 1916 and a few months later a discreet, uniformed conservative, Sidónio Pais, seized power with the support of a negative and vague coalition, the goal of which was to get Portugal out of the war.

Although he used his military background to achieve power, the charismatic leader of the *coup d'état* was a member of the conservative elite. A professor at Coimbra University and a member of parliament, he had been ambassador to Berlin and out of active military service for a number of years; however, following the coup he began wearing the uniform again, albeit one designed especially for him. While the support of the conservative parties was decisive in his rise to power, Sidónio established a dictatorial regime based around his own person. After some programmatic hesitations, he exiled a part of the republican elite, broke with the 1911 constitution and sought to institutionalize a plebiscitary presidential dictatorship. Only the monarchists and Catholics were represented in parliament with the National Republican Party (PNR – Partido Nacional Republicano). The former supported the regime and were re-established within many institutions, including the military; while the latter supported Sidónio to the very end as a result of his intention to revoke the more radical anti-clerical legislation and to re-establish relations with the

Vatican. This dictatorial experiment was short-lived, however. Sidónio was assassinated by an anarcho-syndicalist in 1918 and, following the defeat of a royalist uprising, the liberal republican regime was restored in 1919.

The most appropriate way to analyse the fall of the republican regime is to examine civil–military relations.[4] Appeals to the military were a constant feature of post-war Portuguese politics. Conservative-republican parties and economic interest groups had become accustomed to using extra-parliamentary means to gain power. The radicalization of the small conservative republican parties was a key factor in the fall of the republic: it led them to appeal to the military when the Democratic Party won the elections of 1925. The military coup of 1926 co-opted part of the liberal regime's political elite, which, like many in the military, sought the establishment of a reformed constitutional order. The coup was also supported by the disloyal opposition that sought to remove the dominant party from power.[5] As soon as the republican regime was overthrown, the military dictatorship found solutions for some of the problems troubling the conservative bloc. The Democratic Party, the dominant party of the previous regime, was ousted from power and its leaders exiled, the working class lost its right to strike and the unions were legally restricted. The Catholic Church blessed the 1926 coup and, while suspicious of republican officers and civilians in the regime, immediately volunteered lay supporters for ministerial positions.[6]

The military regime established in 1926 could be described as a 'dictatorship without a dictator'. It emerged from a tentative, military-brokered compromise and experienced contradictory phases until the consolidation of authoritarianism under Salazar. Between 1926 and 1930 it was the target of several attempted *coups d'état* led by the republican opposition as well as by the far-right.[7] The conservative republicans, the Catholics and the far-right tried to convert young officers, who were a parallel power in the barracks; their position was strengthened by the appointment of officers to local administrative posts. At the cabinet level, a more cohesive group of conservative generals consolidated around General Óscar Carmona. In the wake of a major financial crisis, Salazar was named finance minister, subsequently gaining powers over the other ministries.

Salazar's New State was born out of a military dictatorship beset by a succession of conspiracies, palace coups and revolutionary attempts: signs of the battle for leadership within the vast, pro-dictatorial, conservative coalition. The consolidation of the authoritarian regime met with difficulties because of the political diversity of the conservative bloc and its ability to penetrate the armed forces. Curiously, it was under the military dictatorship that the fascists gained some influence through the young officer cadre. They attempted to create independent organizations and played a role in driving republicans out of the ranks of the military. This military-mediated, limited and self-devouring pluralism was overcome only by Salazar.

Salazar played no part in the 1926 coup, nor was he listed as a candidate during the last years of the parliamentary regime. He was the son of a poor rural family from Vimieiro, a village in central Portugal. Salazar had a traditional Catholic upbringing and completed most of his intellectual and political education before the First World War.[8] He attended a seminary but abandoned his ecclesiastical studies on the eve of the fall of the monarchy in order to study law at Coimbra University. A reserved and brilliant student, he led the best-known Catholic student organization at the university, the Christian Democracy Academic Centre (CADC – Centro Académico de Democracia Cristã). His friendship with the future cardinal patriarch of Lisbon, Manuel Cerejeira, dates from this period. He pursued a university career as a professor of economic law, and his only political activity under the liberal republic took place within the strict limits of the social-Catholic movement. He was one of the leaders of the Portuguese Catholic Centre (CCP – Centro Católico Português), a Catholic political party, and was elected a deputy for them in the early 1920s.[9]

Salazar's expertise in finance and his membership of the CCP made him a natural candidate for the post of finance minister immediately after the 1926 coup, and it was in that capacity he joined the military dictatorship in 1928. His rise in government was possible because of the powers he negotiated on his arrival at the finance ministry.

The image Salazar cultivated was that of a reserved, puritanical and provincial dictator. It was an image that held sway until his death, and one he never attempted to change. Salazar was an academic dictator who closely followed international politics and the ideas of the times. He was ideologically and culturally traditionalist, anti-liberal and Catholic in a context of secularization. He was ultra-conservative in the most literal sense of the term. He steadfastly defended his rejection of democracy, favouring an organic vision of society based on traditional, Catholic foundations. The systematic, Cartesian nature of his speeches provide a good indication of his political thought. He always addressed the elite and rarely succumbed to populist mass appeals. He was a professor of finance and had clear ideas about the management of a state's balance sheet. As a strong dictator, he rarely decentralized decisions and relied on a docile administration.

The regime institutionalized by Salazar was admired by many on the fringes of the European radical-right, but above all by those of Maurrasian and traditional Catholic extraction, given the political background of the dictator and the cultural and institutional configuration of the regime.

The challenge of Preto's National Syndicalism

Paradoxically, it was the military dictatorship that facilitated the organization of a fascist movement in Portugal. As in other processes of transition to

authoritarianism that took place during the 1930s, one of the challenges facing the institutionalization of the New State from above came from below and from the right. In 1932, a well-known member of Portugal's radical right succeeded in unifying many of his peers within a clearly fascist organization. Rolão Preto was to become the charismatic leader of the National Syndicalist Movement (MNS – Movimento Nacional-Sindicalista) and, consequently, one of Salazar's main rivals at the beginning of the 1930s.[10]

Fascism developed in Portugal towards the end of the 1920s, and attempted to cut across the right-wing spectrum. Several young military officers with influence in the barracks gave Preto their support. Portuguese fascism also inherited the small militias that had been hurriedly established by the military barons, and began to mobilize sections of the working class in the context of an unstable dictatorship already dominated by the Catholic financial dictator. As an organized movement, MNS was a latecomer attempting to open some political space within Salazar's authoritarian order.

Portuguese fascism was ideologically and politically influenced by Lusitanian Integralism (IL – Integralismo Lusitano), an elitist new-monarchist group created under the powerful influence of Action Française on the eve of the First World War. Although the post-war crisis produced other movements that were not influenced by IL, the movement's ability to present a new reactionary ideological programme was decisive. This package was legitimate in the Portuguese cultural context. IL's ideological vigour and its capacity to permeate the elites thus conditioned fascist development in Portugal. As a Portuguese sociologist said, 'At a time when Italian Fascist and Nazi models assumed "world-historical" importance, those most predisposed to learn from and emulate them were all grounded in the teachings and intellectual style of the IL.'[11] Indeed, almost all attempts to establish fascist parties — the last and most successful of which was MNS – were shaped by IL.

Integralism created durable foundations for a new reactionary nationalism in Portugal: it reinvented the tradition of an organic and corporatist society based on a vision of a medieval Portugal destroyed by imported 19th-century liberalism. IL presented corporatism as the alternative to liberalism, acting as a launch pad for the restoration of the monarchy. Efforts to legitimate historically, and to develop the theoretical foundations of corporatism, however, were more than a reflection of Integralism's anti-liberalism: this is apparent in the erudite studies published by its leaders. IL constructed a coherent political and intellectual alternative, codified into a political programme. A vision of a nation organized hierarchically according to tradition was held up in opposition to the notion of popular sovereignty. The idea of universal suffrage was replaced by a vision of the corporatist representation of the family, the city and town councils and the professions. Parliament was rejected in favour of an advisory national assembly representing the nation's *forças vivas* (vital forces).

Rolão Preto was the youngest of Integralism's founders. Born in central Portugal in 1896, he was only 17 when he became managing editor of Integralism's first publication – one of many to be established by Portuguese emigrant students in France and Belgium who were influenced by Action Française. Although they were from different generations, Preto always acknowledged his debt to the two writers who most inspired him: Georges Sorel and Georges Valois. The exile and the adventure of war enabled Integralism's youngest leader to forge close links with French intellectual pro-fascism and, in a rare – perhaps even unique – case for any of Integralism's founders, with the Italian pre-fascism of Corradini and the *Idea Nazionale* (National Idea).

Preto attempted, during the brief leadership of General Gomes da Costa in June 1926, to create a militia that, in association with junior military officers, would support the new regime. It was during this period Preto came closest to exercising real political power, standing as he did in the shadow of the old general. Following Gomes da Costa's overthrow in a palace coup in July of that same year, the most radical wing of the Integralist family gambled upon the establishment of a fascist party through which the military dictatorship could be controlled. The first steps towards the organization of MNS took place during the summer of 1932. It was built around Preto, who brought together pre-existing groups dominated by Integralism. In other words, the party was created around a personality and a core of 'political entrepreneurs' associated with him, and local groups were created or reorganized to ensure loyalty to this leadership. Initially, the party's structure was fluid and dispersed. Several parallel links of solidarity inherited from previous political experiences and conspiracies remained strong, affecting the party's internal workings. Preto's authority was challenged on several occasions, albeit in a disguised form. Despite this, the leader remained the focal point of the organization.

The hierarchy of the Catholic Church and the CCP – key political elements within the dictatorship – was an important obstacle to fascist development. Although they shared part of the Integralist programme, differences between Catholics and Integralists during the inter-war period developed into open animosity between the two groups. The church began to criticize the fascist and Integralist doctrines developed during the 1920s, and after the 1926 coup Portuguese Catholicism increased pressure against militia-style parties that promoted an exaggerated nationalism. The church ultimately feared that power holders, and the military in particular, might support the fascists. From the autumn of 1932 onwards, these attacks increased in number and intensity: MNS positions were denounced as anti-Catholic for exacerbating old quarrels. Fascist leaders deliberately ignored their critics and continued to proclaim their loyalty to Catholicism.

Salazar maintained a prudent distance between himself and MNS, and lost no opportunity to emphasize the differences between his views and those of Preto

and his followers. He condemned the appeal of totalitarianism, a doctrine that 'tends towards a pagan Caesarism, and which will lead to a "New State" that does not know the limits of moral or judicial order'. While Preto's supporters were in Braga on 26 May 1933, where they were commemorating the anniversary of the 1926 coup by holding military-style parades, Salazar was denouncing their 'feverish, excited discontent . . . [as when] faced with the impossible, continue to shout: More! More!'[12] The following September, Salazar decided to act: the regime offered to officially recognize MNS, but on the condition Preto and his lieutenants were removed from their positions of leadership. This officially backed schism was ultimately unsuccessful, as those who had been tempted by Salazar's offer failed in their attempt to remove Preto. Since his relationship with several important military leaders remained tense – and given that he remained dependent upon the president's support – Salazar avoided any direct confrontation. It was not until the following year he felt confident enough to ban MNS and force its leaders into exile in Spain.

In September 1935, the MNS, in alliance with several other groups opposed to Salazar, rose up in a failed coup against the regime. Unlike previous conspiracies in which MNS members had played only a secondary role under military command, this time Preto planned the conspirators' political programme. MNS led this conspiracy, and its defeat represented the end of the movement. Some former National Syndicalists joined the regime, especially following the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936. Nevertheless, this process of integrating former fascists into Salazar's New State was deliberately weak, and bore all the hallmarks of the regime elite's bureaucratic caution.

Salazar and the New State's political institutions

In 1932 public opinion was presented with a project for a new constitution that was approved by plebiscite in 1933. The constitution of the New State drew on three ideological foundations: conservative-republican liberalism, integralism and social-Catholicism. Anti-parliamentarism was the meeting point that brought these apparently irreconcilable forces together, over which the state cast something of a spell, which gave absolute prominence to the dictator. As Norberto Bobbio reminds us, the main target of the New State, and therefore of its constitution, was not so much socialism or Marxism, but rather liberalism, which was held to be responsible for undermining the authority of the state, which therefore had to become more anti-individualistic.

The 1933 constitution established the political institutions of the New State and heralded an early compromise with the conservative republicans. Its liberal principles were weak and its corporatist and authoritarian elements strong. Rights and liberties were formally maintained but were actually eliminated by government regulation. *De jure* freedom of association existed, but parties

were eliminated by regulation. According to the new constitution, 'sovereignty resides in the nation and has as its organs the head of state, the national assembly, the government and the courts'.[13] The three classic powers thus ceased to exert mutual controls and to limit the power of the state, and were instead brought together to create a single source of power: the unitary and corporatist state.[14]

It was no accident that the Portuguese presidency of the council – which, as in the case of Italy, ceased to be *primus inter pares* and acquired an absolutely dominant position within the government – lost its relationship of trust with the parliament. Thus, the 1933 constitution stipulated that the national assembly could be 'freely convoked and dissolved by the president of the republic' since the 'government is based exclusively on confidence in the presidency of the republic and its hold on power does not depend on the fate of any bills or votes proposed by the national assembly'.[15]

The new constitutional order was based on the rejection of parliament – which ceased to be the congress of the republic with a chamber of deputies and a senate, and was renamed the national assembly – and on the concentration of power in the executive branch, which, as in Italy, then prevailed over the other two powers. The government controlled the single-party, the National Union (UN – União Nacional), together with the civil governors and the interior ministry;[16] the single-party controlled the entire representative recruitment process.

In addition to being nominated by the government and deprived its freedom of opinion, the New State's national assembly also lost its powers of self-convocation, as its sittings were limited to 'three months that cannot be postponed'.[17] But the constitution went even further: it established that the 'president of the republic should respond directly and exclusively to the nation for actions undertaken in the course of his duties, and the exercise of the latter and his magistracy are free of any vote by the national assembly'.[18]

As noted above, the power of the judicial and legislative branches was articulated by the executive. The head of state nominated the president of the council of ministers which – and this is another paradoxical aspect of the hierarchies of the New State – became the central link in the material constitution,[19] and at the same time was the only body that did not require plebiscitary legitimization by the Portuguese people. Again, this reveals the proximity between the New State, the Italian Fascist regime and other inter-war dictatorships.[20]

The 1933 constitution explicitly excluded the national assembly from having any influence on the formation of the government, which became 'the exclusive attribute of the presidency of the republic, the preservation of whose power does not depend on the fate of any bills or votes in the national assembly'.[21] The government, as represented by the president of the council, thus concentrated both legislative power by directly controlling the recruitment of

deputies, and legislating power as it could make extensive use of decree laws without the prior consent of the national assembly. In this way, the presidency of the council became a kind of exceptional legislative organ.[22]

Composed of functional representatives, the corporatist chamber was to be an auxiliary and consultative body. Consisting of 109 procurators, whose meetings were held in private, the corporatist chamber remained a consultative body for both the government and the national assembly. Despite the great majority of procurators representing functional interests, a small group of administrative interests were nominated by the corporatist council led by the dictator and which constituted the chamber's elite. In practice, these political procurators, making up an average of 15 per cent of all procurators, controlled the chamber. An analysis of a large number of the corporatist chamber's advisory opinions during the first decade of its operation allows us to conclude that its function within the framework of the dictator's consultation system, 'permitted it a first hearing of the impact of public policies and to make suggestions about the implications of the measures to be adopted'.[23] Finally, it also underlined its subordinate character compared to the national assembly, given that its advisory opinions were not necessarily taken into account during debates in that chamber.[24] Although no corporations were created to represent the organic elements of the nation in the corporatist chamber until the 1950s, no intermediate organizations emerged either. The distance between the constituencies and members of the chamber was maintained. The procurators were chosen by the corporatist council, which consisted of Salazar and the ministers and secretaries of state of the sectors involved, such as the economics ministry.

The constitution maintained the presidency of the republic, elected by direct suffrage, as well as the presidency of the council of ministers, and Salazar was responsible only to the former. During the early years of Salazar's rule, the president posed the only constitutional challenge to his authority.[25] The president of the republic was always a general, given the legacy of the military dictatorship, and this was to cause Salazar some problems after 1945. In short, to use a phrase of the time, the regime was a constitutionalized dictatorship.

The New State inherited and strengthened the repressive apparatus of the military dictatorship. Although inherited from the military dictatorship, the functions of the Censor's Office (DGSCI – Direcção Geral dos Serviços da Censura) had been completely overhauled in 1933 and its leaders made responsible directly to Salazar.[26] The duties of the DGSCI were now to defend both the regime's positions and the idea that 'what exists politically is only what is known to exist'. It was also responsible for ensuring there was no opportunity for the opposition to make its message public, and, third, was an instrument for the internal and external regulation of the regime's elite. Censors devoted their attention both to the left-wing opposition and, for a short time, to the fascist minority led by Rolão Preto.[27]

The autonomy of the political police increased as a result of successive decrees until they were answerable only to Salazar, just as the instructions to the censor were checked by Salazar each day.[28] The State Defence and Vigilance Police (PVDE – Polícia de Vigilância e Defesa do Estado) was reorganized and used with remarkable rationality. Apart from repressing the clandestine opposition, controlling access to the public administration was of central importance. Mechanisms to control the judicial branch increased. Political crimes were placed under the jurisdiction of special military courts and special judges were nominated and the PVDE was given extensive powers to determine prison sentences. All this was done from above. It was a process that depended more on generals and colonels than on lieutenants, and more on the interior ministry than on the mob. By 1934 liberalism had been eliminated and the old republican institutions replaced.

One important problem remained: relations with the military. This was the institution Salazar feared most, yet the movement to co-opt and control the military elite was central to the consolidation of Salazarism.[29] The subordination of the military hierarchy to the regime was a fact by the eve of the Second World War, but the process was slow and fraught with tension. Salazar's speech at an officers' rally in 1938 symbolically marked the victory of 'a civilian police dictatorship' over the old military dictatorship of 1926.[30]

This process of establishing control lasted from the time Salazar took control of the war ministry in mid-1936 to the reform of the armed forces in 1937 – which General Carmona resisted. After taking charge of the war ministry, Salazar could have the final – albeit tentative – word on all senior promotions and transfers. Despite the temporary nature of his position, Salazar remained war minister until the end of the Second World War, and it was in this capacity that he presented his reform bill for the armed forces in 1937. This reform provoked the most significant reduction in the size of the armed forces since the First World War: the officer corps was reduced by 30 per cent. Already significantly affected by resignations and the transfer to the reserves of those implicated in the dozens of attempted coups and revolutions, the number of officers reached 'the lowest levels registered since 1905'.[31] Besides this control from above, a number of legislative measures were introduced that strengthened political control over the armed forces. These measures heralded the political hegemony of the undersecretary of state, Captain Santos Costa, whose power went unchallenged until the late 1950s.

General Carmona, the president of the republic, who was the other pole of the dictatorship diarchy of the 1930s, enjoyed a dull, administrative military career. A half-hearted republican, he served as a minister in a liberal conservative government during the 1920s. Member of the 1926 military junta, he was the least *caudillist* and least radical of the generals leading the coup, and transformed himself into a sympathetic complement to the consolidation of Salazar.

For someone who had risen to the position of head of state and of government, his progressive removal could have been difficult. But it was not. Carmona was happy to be the nation's symbolic head, retaining the formal position conferred by the constitution while voluntarily choosing not to get involved in any decision-making.

Salazar's single-party: the UN

The first political institution to be created by the dictatorship was the single-party, the UN. Created by Salazar in 1930, this accompanied the dissolution of all other political parties – including the CCP. The impetus for its formation came from Salazar and the government, with decisive aid from the state apparatus, especially the interior ministry and its local delegations. Both in the UN's manifesto and in Salazar's inaugural speech to it in 1930, the future dictator's intention was already clear as he announced the 'creation of the social and corporatist state that would closely follow the natural constitution of society'.[32]

The UN was a variant of dominant or single-parties Juan J. Linz has called unified parties, generally representing a 'coalescence, from the top, of various elements to create a new political entity', obliging other forces either to integrate or to be excluded.[33] The important factor here is that these parties were already created in an authoritarian situation, where political pluralism was already absent or severely restricted. In Portugal and Spain parties of this type had precedents; they were modelled on those that had thrived under Sidónio Pais and Primo de Rivera, respectively.[34] Similar and more or less successful projects had also been promoted in the 1930s in Austria, Hungary and Poland.[35] The impetus for their formation came from the government, with crucial aid from the state apparatus. In general, their establishment entailed varying degrees of compromise on the part of other parties or pressure groups participating in the winning coalition.

Salazar created the UN in 1930 when he was emerging as the military dictatorship's main political leader. Its aims and membership criteria, however, were only vaguely stated. The UN welcomed all the dictatorship's sympathizers, whether republican, monarchist or Catholic, and for the first two years it was entirely dependent on the interior ministry.[36] District governors were influential in the establishment of local committees; the interior minister was initially responsible for replacing local leaders, who normally depended on the district governor.[37] The UN, on the other hand, took on the political task of obtaining the adherence and support of conservative republicans at the local level.

State dependency marked the life of the party. Contrary to what one might expect, its lethargy was notorious in the 1930s, when the single-parties of other regimes were more active, from Italy's National Fascist Party (PNF – Partito Nazionale Fascista) to Spain's Falange (Falange Española Tradicionalista),

Once its leaders had been appointed, its statutes established and its national assembly representatives chosen, the UN practically disappeared. In 1938, the dictator himself recognized that the UN's activity had 'progressively diminished to near-vanishing point'.[38] Its internal structure was weak and it lacked the propaganda, ideological, socio-professional and cultural departments of other single-parties. Salazar established state departments for propaganda, the Portuguese Youth (MP – Mocidade Portuguesa) and the National Foundation for Happiness at Work (FNAT – Fundação Nacional para a Alegria no Trabalho) the Portuguese equivalent of Italy's National Recreation Club (OND – Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro), but these were not linked to the party. Only occasionally did the state turn to the party network, and only then to carry out limited tasks. The single-party was not very important in the formation of Salazarism's political elite:[39] it did, however, strengthen Salazar's authority and limit the organization of blocs and pressure groups, as well as allow for a certain technocratic pluralism.

The first parliamentary elections in 1934 had clear legitimating aims. Elections were held regularly, but were not organized to achieve 99 per cent participation.[40] Civil servants were mobilized and, despite the already restricted number of registered voters, electoral rolls were manipulated. Salazar governed over and through the administrative apparatus, relegating the truly political institutions to secondary positions. The UN's key role was therefore to control central and local administration, to unify the diverse political factions that supported the regime and to supply the system with political officials – especially at the local level.

The corporatist apparatus

Corporatism was one of the central legitimizing elements of the New State's institutional reform. It was written into the constitution and given a central role in determining institutional structures, ideology, relations with organized interests and the state's economic policy.[41]

Salazarism did not give the corporatist sector a monopoly on representation, despite pressure from the radical right to do so. Elections were held but, as stressed above, the corporatist chamber retained merely consultative status in a powerless National assembly. The Portuguese corporatist edifice was never completed. Its influence on economic policy or its capacity to act as a buffer against social conflict, however, are worth detailed examination. The linchpin of the corporatist structure was the 1933 National Labour Statute (ETN – Estatuto do Trabalho Nacional). Although tempered by the New State's strong Catholic leanings, the ETN owed a great deal to Italy's Carta del Lavoro (Labour Charter).[42] The statute, approved in September 1933, sought to establish a synthesis of the Italian model and the ideals of social-Catholicism. The founder of the

Portuguese corporatist system, Pedro Teotónio Pereira, was a former Integralist who united young radical right-wingers as well as social-Catholic civil servants within his department.

Once the ETN was established and the appropriate control mechanisms created, the organization of labour was undertaken. The government gave the unions two months either to accept the new system or to disband. Substantially weakened after the 1926 coup, the unions accepted the new legislation, albeit by a slight majority.[43] The most important unions were simply dissolved when they rejected the legislation. In January 1934 a general strike took place to protest the 'fascistization' of the unions, (to use the words of the clandestine Communist Party and the anarcho-syndicalists); these were then recreated from the top down by officials from within the corporatist apparatus.

The new unions were controlled by the National Institute of Labour and Welfare (INTP – Instituto Nacional do Trabalho e Previdência). Their governing statutes and prospective leaders were submitted to state approval and if they diverged from the ETN they were summarily dissolved. Even members' dues came under official scrutiny. National representation was not permitted, so as to keep them weak and ineffectual.

The rural world was represented by the *casas do povo* (community centres).The regime did not recognize social stratification in a rural society overseen by associate protectors, actually *latifundistas*. The old rural unions were simply abolished, particularly in the *latifundia*-dominated south. To ensure the working classes were culturally provided for, FNAT, a clearly Italian Fascist and Nazi-inspired organization, was created.[44]

The importance of the corporatist system becomes clearer when examining state economic intervention from 1930 onwards. The pre-corporatist institutions that could ensure smooth relations between the state and the emerging corporatist institutions, such as the organizations of economic coordination, were maintained. According to official rhetoric, they were to disappear gradually over time as the corporatist edifice neared completion. In practice, however, they became central features of the regime, gaining total control over the *grémios* (guilds) in the agricultural sector, the weaker industrial areas and the agro-food export sector.

The integration of the old *grémios* into the new corporatist system was asymmetrical, especially when compared with labour organizations. Decrees governing *grémios* sought to reorganize employers and the liberal professions, but in a more moderate and prudent fashion. The employers' associations remained tentatively active. Although supposedly transitional, some of them lasted as long as the regime itself. The *grémios* were led by the state in the name of national economic interests. Economic intervention strategies, rather than corporatist coherence, determined their organization. Those in the more modern economic sectors enjoyed greater autonomy, but *grémios* in agriculture

and associated trade sectors (wine, olive oil and cereals), as well as milling and agro-industry, were rapidly forced to consolidate in the framework of the corporatist system.

Militia and youth organizations

Students of the New State have stressed the impact the electoral victory of the Spanish Popular Front and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War had on Portugal. In response to the 'red threat' of the Popular Front in Spain, the regime developed a new political discourse and paramilitary symbolism, and set up two militia organizations.

Until the Spanish Civil War, Salazar had refused to create a militia-type organization. During the military dictatorship, a number of attempts to create such bodies had failed. In 1934, the same year Salazar had crushed Preto's MNS, the first youth organization, the School Action Vanguard (AEV – Acção Escolar Vanguarda), backed by António Ferro, the philo-fascist propaganda chief, was disbanded.[45] In 1936, however, the regime created a paramilitary youth organization, the MP, and allowed the formation of a fascist-style militia, the Portuguese Legion (LP – Legião Portuguesa).

The LP was founded in September 1936 in the wake of an anti-communist rally organized by the national unions. It emerged from the genuine pressure exerted by fascist sectors of the regime. Salazar authorized its formation and decreed its strict submission to the government. As was his custom, he moderated its declaration of principles and put the military in charge, avoiding the selection of officers who had been prominent in the radical right and MNS.[46] Relations between the LP and the other regime institutions were not peaceful. This was particularly true with the UN. Salazar separated the MP from the LP and rejected all proposals to place it under the control of the UN. Meanwhile, the single-party, ever suspicious of militia organizations, continued to dominate local administration and to constitute the principal channel of communication between the state and society. Yet there was no formal link between the UN and the MP.

Similar pressures led to the foundation of the MP. The education ministry drew up plans for various projects aiming to unite different youth sectors in a paramilitary organization to replace the moribund AEV. Between May and September 1936, in response to the victory of the Popular Front in Spain, the MP indiscriminately accepted new members. Membership was voluntary, and the children of the lower middle-class, white-collar workers and labourers could sign up. During its first months the MP's social base approximated that of the MNS.[47] The youth movement, however, was rapidly curtailed with the transfer of non-student volunteers to the LP. From then on, the MP accepted only school-age members. Participation became compulsory and the MP became

dependent on a strengthened education ministry. In response to criticism from the Catholic hierarchy, the MP was rapidly Christianized and encouraged to interact with other essentially Catholic youth organizations, contrary to the more evident tensions between the Italian Fascist organizations and Catholic Action.

Certain differences between the LP and the MP are worthy of note. The MP was quickly depoliticized and Christianized, whereas the LP was vigorously politicized: its discourse, organizational structure and social composition were more typical of a fascist militia. Both groups were more modest in scale, and more dependent on the state apparatus than their counterparts in other European authoritarian and fascist regimes. Their presence on the political scene, moreover, was only fleeting, and in choreographic terms (that is, in terms of rallies, parades and the like), they were never as fully developed.

Salazar was put under pressure by the heads of the LP to maintain it after the Spanish Civil War. The LP claimed that 'there is still much to do for our patriotic reinvigoration, and the Legion thus believes that its mission should not be terminated'.[48] Salazar did not dissolve the LP, but the organization nevertheless went into irreversible decline. The new international arena, even with the rapid development of the Cold War, was not favourable to militias associated with inter-war fascism.

Manufacturing consent

In Portugal propaganda was seen primarily as an elite affair, and there was no propaganda organization until September 1933. Consensus-building during the first year of the regime was the responsibility of the interior ministry, which controlled the dissemination of information, for the most part through censorship, control over financing and repression.

The concepts of consensus and public opinion had a prominent place in the national constitution. Although article 8 established freedom of expression and thought, the subsequent article limited those freedoms through special laws to prevent their abuse.[49] But the next chapter of the constitution, specifically dedicated to the formation of public opinion, established that it is the task of the state to exert tutelage over public opinion, determining what is and what is not true. Article 21 subordinated the press to the interest of the state, transforming the former into an instrument of public utility in accordance with existing censorship rules.[50]

It was only after the birth of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda (RMVP – Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda) that the nature of the debate in Portugal about propaganda practices shifted. The impact of German Nazism is clear in the wording of the decree

creating the National Propaganda Secretariat (SPN – Secretariado da Propaganda Nacional), the introduction of which notes that propaganda was so crucial that 'in certain countries, even a ministry has been established' – clearly a reference to the Nazi ministry, which was the only one existing at the time.[51] Portugal followed a path similar to Italy's propaganda secretariat, which was directly dependent on the presidency of the council of ministers.[52]

At that point Salazar appointed the journalist António Ferro – a New State political elite outsider – to be director of the SPN.[53] In the eyes of UN leaders, Salazar's choice was a humiliating blow, not least because Ferro henceforth became a member of the UN propaganda commission by virtue of his appointment. Ferro was a cosmopolitan journalist connected to Futurist and other modernist avant-garde circles who had admired Italian Fascism since the 1920s.[54] He enjoyed the dictator's confidence and Salazar invited him to create a propaganda machine that, in the end, greatly exceeded the needs of Salazar's image management. Although he had little to do with the leader's provincial traditionalism, or perhaps precisely because of this, Ferro provided the regime with a cultural project that skilfully combined elements of modern aestheticism with a reinvention of tradition.

The SPN co-ordinated the regime's press and organized sporadic mass demonstrations, as well as leisure activities for the popular classes (in close association with the corporatist apparatus). It also organized numerous activities for the elites, and promoted cultural relations with foreign countries.[55] The SPN skilfully recruited intellectuals and artists, thanks to Ferro's modernist links. Like other authoritarian regimes, Salazarism's cultural project sought the systematic restoration of traditional values.

The relationship between power and propaganda in Portugal lacked the strength of its Italian and German counterparts.[56] More specifically, the director of the SPN could not issue decrees or participate in the meetings of the council of ministers, and was often completely subordinated to the New State hierarchy. Censorship remained in the hands of the interior ministry; control of the radio was a task shared with the public works ministry; and the newspapers were free to decide whether to publish SPN releases or not, as the national propaganda body did not have powers to coerce the press in this regard.

The SPN was meant to be the driving force in the nation's moral development. The decree-law establishing it called on it to organize and promote a spirit of unity. The SPN was charged with organizing extensive propaganda activities among the various public service organizations, which in turn were called upon to supply the SPN with the information necessary for it to carry out its work effectively.[57] However, the central question – one that Ferro repeatedly brought up – was the absence of coercive powers, which made it more difficult for the SPN to impose itself, and indeed it was gradually forced to downgrade its ambitions.

In contrast with Fascist Italy, the link between the single-party and propaganda did not undergo any significant evolution: Ferro remained in his position until 1949, with relations between the SPN and the UN marked by continuous conflicts and tensions, and was under Salazar's direct control.[58]

The selective nature of censorship reflected the organic ideal of a conflict-free society. Because conflict had theoretically been abolished, nothing was published that might testify to its existence. The censors were ruthless when it came to compulsory social peace. The regime did not ban or systematically dissolve opposition publications – they survived throughout the 1930s – but they reached only an isolated or reduced intellectual readership that was allowed to engage in debates about the social significance of art or the German–Soviet pact, as long as such debates stayed strictly inside Lisbon's cafes and well away from the working class. Salazar did not have to worry about his rural and provincial bastions because he trusted traditional structures and institutions, such as the church, local notables and the bureaucracy.

Conclusions

Salazar once said to Henri Massis that his aim was to make Portugal live by habit. This *maître-mot*, which so delighted his French supporter, perfectly sums up the traditionalism of the New State. It would be a mistake, however, to confuse Salazar's regime with a pragmatic dictatorship, particularly between 1933 and 1945. Salazarism officially instituted an organic vision of society and deployed all the ideological and social instruments of administrative, corporative, educational and propagandistic control, as well as the elite, the state and the church, to make that vision a reality. On the other hand, it reinforced the presence of the state in the economy, limited the autonomy of the economic elites and disciplined them with an iron hand.

Nevertheless, of all the European dictatorships that emerged in the 1920s, Salazar's New State proved the most thoroughly institutionalized and durable. Had severe international constraints not hindered many of those dictatorships on Europe's southern and eastern periphery they would probably have survived with quite similar features. The regimes of Pilsudski in Poland, Smetona in Lithuania and Dolfuss in Austria encountered external rather than internal factors that halted their institutionalization, leaving the process of political engineering unfinished. Salazar's neutrality during the Second World War, his military concessions to the United Kingdom and the United States and the rapid onset of the Cold War ensured the survival of his regime in an unfavourable international climate post-1945, but its main institutions and core-value system did not change much.

The new authoritarian order in Portugal, as in many other inter-war regimes, was established on the heels of a traditional *coup d'état*. They represented a

compromise between civilian and military conservatives with limited available political space for fascist parties; they established single-party or dominant party political systems; and the fascists were either minor partners in the coalitions that took power or were entirely absent. The result was a dictatorship headed by a prime minister, and a national assembly dominated by the UN through non-competitive elections. To avoid any loss of power, even to a parliament dominated by the government party, the executive was made almost completely autonomous. The president, General Carmona, was re-elected to guarantee military interests.

Salazarist ideology was based on the four-part doctrine of 'God, Fatherland, Family and Work'. The values of resignation and obedience, as well as the concepts of an organic conflict and a politics-free society, dominated the new legitimacy and institutions of the dictatorship, namely the corporatist apparatus, both as a new frame for labour relations and political representation. Christianization was another official obsession that affected everything from classroom decorations to state rituals.

It is difficult fully to comprehend the political system and the ideological foundations of the New State without taking into account the determining influence of traditional Catholicism. The church affected all major texts and institutions, including the constitution and the declaration of corporatist principles. Its influence explains the weakness of the paramilitary organizations, as well as the nature of the regime's propaganda. The Portuguese Catholic Church contributed to the Salazar regime's value system. Not only did the regime use Catholic symbolism with the explicit approval of the church hierarchy, but it also maintained an actual policy of Christianizing institutions and the school system. As Salazar himself said, the New State gave the church 'the possibility to reconstruct . . . and recover . . . its leading position in the formation of the Portuguese soul'. Pope Pious XII held Portugal up as a model: 'the Lord has provided the Portuguese nation with an exemplary head of government'.[59] This dimension was perhaps the most striking in conditioning the fascist nature of some of Salazar's institutions: in particular the militias and propaganda. Moreover, it was also due to the development of the international situation in neighbouring Spain with the victory of the left and the communist threat that opened this political space for the radical right in Portugal.

Although the elites and political movements that were the foundation of Salazar's New State were influenced by Italian Fascism to varying degrees, the similarities should not be overstated. The most paradigmatic case is without doubt that of its leader's propaganda, and certainly of all those in the Salazarist hierarchy, António Ferro was the one who identified most with Italian Fascism. If on the one hand we read his speeches and observe the projects developed by the SPN, we could be tempted to believe it indicated the New State was evolving

in a more fascistic manner; however, the great majority of these projects, as Ferro himself acknowledged, were never put into practice. The same can be said about the militias and youth organizations, the LP and MP. In these cases the mission and inspiration of Italian Fascism, and even of German National Socialism, is an empirical fact. The institutionalization of Salazar's New State out of the military dictatorship in the 1930s is an example of the process of diffusion of institutions created by Italian Fascism, particularly in relation to propaganda, militias and youth organizations. As one would expect, the dictatorship's elites and institutions adapted and were limited and altered in terms of the ideological dimensions, internal and external tensions and the dynamics of Salazarism's institutionalization.

Furthest from the Italian Fascist model was the institutionalization of the single-party, which was much closer to the situation in Primo de Rivera's regime in Spain in 1923. Created from above, with limited access to society and governmental decision-making, the UN had an elitist character. But in this case Salazar was in the company of the great majority of dictatorships in the inter-war period.

In the mid-1930s, with the regime consolidated and its institutions functioning, Salazarism, ironically, began to be seen by many ideologues of the conservative and Christian right as a dictatorial 'third way' between democracy and fascism. In fact, many contemporary observers, anticipating without knowing the concepts of 'transfer', 'transnational' and 'diffusion', identified the mark of Salazar and Dolfuss in many of the dictatorships of the 1930s.

Notes

1. A. Madureira, *O 28 de Maio: Elementos para a sua compreensão*, Lisbon, Presença, 1978, p. 243.
2. For an interpretation of the Portuguese republican elite as a group of 'intellectuals working for democratic revolution', see C. Kurzman, *Democracy Denied, 1905–1915*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2008. For an overview of the First Republic as a 'revolutionary' regime, see R. Ramos, *A segunda fundação*, vol 6 of J. Mattoso, ed., *História de Portugal*, Lisbon, Estampa, 2002.
3. See N. S. Teixeira, *O poder e a Guerra: Objectivos Nacionais e Estratégias Políticas em Portugal, 1914–18*, Lisbon, Estampa, 1996.
4. A. C. Pinto, 'Portugal: Crisis and early authoritarian takeover', in D. Berg-Schlosser and J. Mitchell, eds, *The Conditions of Democracy in Europe, 1919–1939*, London, Macmillan, 2000, p. 31. See also J. M. Ferreira, *O Comportamento Político dos Militares: Forças Armadas e Regimes Políticos em Portugal no Século XX*, Lisbon, Estampa, 1992.
5. J. J. Linz and A. Stepan, eds, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, Baltimore, MA, Johns Hopkins University Press.
6. A. C. Pinto and I. Rezola, 'Political Catholicism, crisis of democracy and Salazar's New State in Portugal', *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, no. 2, 2007, pp. 353–368.

7. L. Farinha, *O Reviralho: Revoltas Republicanas Contra a Ditadura e o Estado Novo, 1926–1940*, Lisbon, Estampa, 1998.
8. See F. Ribeiro de Menezes, *Salazar: A Political Biography*, New York, Enigma, 2009.
9. Unlike in other Western and Southern European countries, the Portuguese Catholic movement did not establish itself strongly, remaining an elitist phenomenon despite the accentuation of the fractures between the church and the state in the wake of the 1910 revolution. M. B. da Cruz, *As Origens da Democracia Cristã e o Salazarismo*, Lisbon, Presença, 1980.
10. A. C. Pinto, *The Blueshirts: Portuguese Fascism in Interwar Europe*, New York, SSM-Columbia University Press, 2000.
11. H. Martins, 'Portugal', in S. Woolf, ed., *European Fascism*, New York, Random House, 1969.
12. A. de O. Salazar, *Discursos e Notas Políticos*, vol. 1, Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1934, p. 225.
13. Comissão Internacional para História das Assembleias de Estados e dos Parlamentos, Secção Portuguesa, *Constituição Política da República Portuguesa (Promulgada em 22 de fevereiro de 1933 e referendada em 19 de março de 1933)*, Lisbon, Assembleia da República, 1992, article 7, p. 257.
14. Ibid., article 5, p. 243.
15. Ibid., article 107, p. 267.
16. R. Ramos, 'O Estado Novo Perante os Poderes Periféricos: O Governo de Assis Gonçalves em Vila Real', *Análise Social* XXII (90) 1986, pp. 109–135.
17. Commissão Internacional, *Constituição Política*, article 94, p. 264.
18. Ibid., article 78, p. 258.
19. According to the Italian constitutionalist Costantino Mortati, there are two ways of interpreting the constitution: the first is the formal constitution as it is written, the second is the material constitution as it is applied. This lets Mortati explain how the PNF came to be regarded to all intents and purposes as a constitutional body, despite it not being mentioned in the Albertine Statute. C. Mortati, *La Costituzione in Senso Materiale*, Milan, A. Giuffré, 1940.
20. G. Adinolfi, 'O constitucionalismo perante o regime fascista', in F. P. Martinho and F. Limoncic, eds, *Intelectuais e Anti-liberalismo na Primeira Metade do Século XX*, Rio de Janeiro, Civilização Brasileira, 2009, pp. 347–375.
21. Commissão Internacional, *Constituição Política*, article 111, p. 268.
22. M. B. da Cruz, *O partido e o estado no Salazarismo*, Lisbon, Presença, 1988, p. 98.
23. N. Estevão, 'A câmara corporativa no estado novo: Composição, funcionamento e influência', doctoral dissertation, University of Lisboa Institute of Social Science, Lisbon, 2009.
24. J. M. Tavares Castilho, *Os Procuradores à Câmara Corporativa, 1935–1974*, Lisbon, Texto, 2010.
25. A. C. Pinto, ed., *Os Presidentes da República Portuguesa*, Lisbon, Temas e Debates, 2000.
26. J. C. Fialho, 'A censura na ditadura militar e no Estado Novo (1926–1939)', master's dissertation, ISCTE, Lisbon, 1997, p. 54.
27. G. Adinolfi, *Ai Confini del Fascismo: Propaganda e Consenso nel Portogallo Salazarista (1932–1944)*, Milan, FrancoAngeli, 2007, pp. 141–146.
28. The paradox was that the censor controlled articles produced by the SPN, which were not published unless they were authorized at a higher level. Adinolfi, *Ai Confini*, p. 143.
29. T. Faria, *Debaixo de Fogo: Salazar e as Forças Armadas, 1933–1947*, Lisbon, Cosmos, 2001.

30. J. M. Ferreira, *O Comportamento Político dos Militares: Forças Armadas e Regimes Políticos em Portugal no Século XX*, Lisbon, Estampa, 1992, pp. 175–202.
31. M. Carrilho, *Forças Armadas e Mudança Política em Portugal no Século XX*, Lisbon, Estudos Gerais, p. 422.
32. Salazar, *Discursos*, p. 87.
33. J. J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 2000.
34. Sidónio's single-party was the National Republican Party (PNR – Partido Nacional Republicano), while that during Primo de Rivera's regime was the Patriotic Union (UP – Unión Patriótica).
35. In Hungary, the Party of National Unity (NEP – Nemzeti Egység Pártja), in Poland the Camp of National Unity (OZN – Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego).
36. Circular from the interior minister to the presidents of the UN district commissions, 29 December 1931, Folder 452, Box 5, Arquivo Geral do Ministério do Interior (AGMI)/Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (ANTT).
37. Arquivo Oliveira Salazar, Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, AOS/CO/PC-4.
38. Cruz, *O partido*, p. 140.
39. N. Estevão, R. A. Carvalho and A. C. Pinto, 'The empire of the professor: Salazar's ministerial elite 1932–44', in A. C. Pinto, ed., *Ruling Elites and Decision-Making in Fascist-era Dictatorships*, Boulder, CO, Social Science Monographs, 2009, pp. 119–136.
40. J. R. Santos, *Salazar e as Eleições: Um Estudo sobre as Eleições Gerais de 1942*, Lisbon, Assembleia da Republica, 2012.
41. P. C. Schmitter, *Do Autoritarismo à Democracia*, Lisbon, Instituto de Ciências Sociais, 1999.
42. M. Ivani, *Esportare il Fascismo: Collaborazione di Polizia e Diplomazia Culturale tra Italia Fascista e Portogallo di Salazar (1928–1945)*, Bologna, Clueb, 2008.
43. F. Patriarca, *A Política Social do Salazarismo*, Lisbon, Imprensa Nacional, 1995.
44. J. C. Valente, *Estado Novo e Alegria no Trabalho: Uma História Política da FNAT (1935–1958)*, Lisbon, Colibri, 1999.
45. A. C. Pinto and N. A. Ribeiro, *A Acção Escolar Vanguarda (1933–1936)*, Lisbon, História Crítica, 1980.
46. L. N. Rodrigues, *A Legião Portuguesa*, Lisbon, Estampa, 1996.
47. S. Kuin, 'A Mocidade Portuguesa nos anos trinta: Anteprojectos e instauração de uma organização paramilitar de juventude', *Análise Social* 122, no. 28, 1993, pp. 155–188.
48. Cited in Rodrigues, *A Legião Portuguesa*, p. 34.
49. *Political Constitution of the Portuguese Republic*, 'Freedom of expression and thought in all of its forms', article 8, paragraph 4, and 'Special laws will regulate the exercise of freedom of expression, preventively impeding and repressing the perversion of public opinion in its function as a social force, while safeguarding the moral integrity of citizens', article 20, paragraph 1, Lisbon, National Assembly, 1936.
50. Ibid., 'Public opinion is a fundamental element of the politics and administration of the country; it shall be the duty of the state to protect it against all those agencies which distort it contrary to truth, justice, good administration and the common welfare', article 21, and 'The press exercises a function of a political nature, by virtue of which it may not refuse to insert official notices issued by the government in matters of national interest', article 23.
51. A. Kallis, 'Nazi propaganda decision-making: The hybrid of "modernity" and "neo-feudalism" in Nazi wartime propaganda', in Pinto, *Ruling Elites*, pp. 83–118.
52. Decree-Law 23054, 25 September 1933. For more details about the relations between Fascist Italy and Salazarist Portugal, see M. Ivani, 'Il Portogallo di Salazar e l'Italia Fascista: Una comparazione', *Studi Storici* 46, no. 2, 2005, pp. 347–406, and

G. Albanese, 'Comparare i fascismi: Una analisi storiografica', *Storica* 43–45, 2010, pp. 313–343.
53. E. C. Leal, *António Ferro: Espaço Político e Imaginário Social (1918–32)*, Lisbon, Cosmos, 1994.
54. J. R. de Ó, *Os Anos de Ferro: O Dispositivo Cultural Durante a 'Política do Espírito'*, Lisbon, Estampa, 1999.
55. M. Acciaiuoli, *As Exposições do Estado Novo 1934–1940*, Lisbon, Horizonte, 1998.
56. G. Adinolfi, 'The institutionalization of propaganda in the fascist era: The cases of Germany, Portugal and Italy', *The European Legacy* 17, no. 5, 2012, pp. 607–621.
57. Decree-law 20054, 25 September 1933, Article 6.
58. Adinolfi, *Ai Confini*, p. 74.
59. Ibid, p. 83.