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The Coming of the Dollfuss–Schuschnigg Regime and the Stages of its Development

Gerhard Botz

'Austrofascism is back'.[1] This is the opening statement of two young Viennese scholars, F. Wenninger and L. Dreidemy, in a recent collected volume dealing with the Dollfuss–Schuschnigg regime, and refers to the observation that 'since the 1980s the era of National Socialism' has dominated historical research on Austria's 20th century at the expense of other topics.[2] A tell-tale sign of the sometimes confusing state of research and historiography on the (still politically disputed) Dollfuss–Schuschnigg dictatorship (1933–38) is the inability of the 18 authors of this multifaceted book to agree on a name for their subject: authoritarian, *(berufs)ständisch* (corporatist) or Austrofascist (with or without quotation marks) are used. The latter term has been most commonly used by pre- and post-war social democratic and leftist authors and is still used today,[3] while conservatives had preferred *ständisch* or *Ständestaat* and other historians have applied the names of the two rulers to label their regime or classify it as authoritarian.[4]

By contrast, *Christlicher Ständestaat* (Christian corporatist state) was the term favoured by Dollfuss and his successor, Kurt Schuschnigg: alternatively both referred to their form of government in more abstract terms as an authoritarian state or a *Fuehrerstaat*. Heimwehr leaders in their turn, taking their cue from Mussolini's *stato totalitario*, tended to include a reference to the principle of totality, or spoke of authoritarian rule. A similar conceptual confusion haunts many historians and political scientists both in Austria and elsewhere in their research on the chameleon-like Dollfuss–Schuschnigg regime.

In contrast to this, the analysis first introduced by the German-American political scientists E. Fraenkel and F. Neumann of the Nazi regime's composite character and radicalizing dynamics has so far been only rarely extended to Austria.[5] Their explanatory model stipulated the interaction of a normative and a prerogative principle in the Nazi dictatorship. This distinction continues to be fruitful to this day for research into fascist and other dictatorial regimes

in Europe in the 1930s. The concept with its emphasis on regime-internal heterogeneity has been expanded into a cultural-history term, 'parafascism', by Roger Griffin.[6] It is also at the root of recent theories concerning the 'hybridization' of dictatorial praxis as proposed by the editors of this volume.[7]

In line with the present author's earlier concept of the fluid heterogeneity of the Dollfuss–Schuschnigg regime,[8] the aim of this chapter is to describe that regime as a hybrid comprising different elements and theoretical models in an ever-shifting mixture. While the focus is on the regime's step-by-step evolution, this neither postulates a nature-like development nor does it exclude the possibility of a reversal of the hitherto observed trend towards radicalization and fascistization. In the Austrian case such an explanatory tableau is additionally complicated by the role played by two fascist powers both outside and within Austria and the double pressure they exerted on a small, then newly democratized and as yet unstable country. All this was crucial for Austria during the 1930s, both in terms of the form its regime was taking and for later collective memories.[9]

Historical background

This author's point of departure is that ultra-conservative, authoritarian and fascist phenomena in Austria are embedded in and derived from particular segments of the existing socio-political culture.[10] A process called pillarization elsewhere, whose origins in Austria lie in the late 19th century, resulted in three political camps – with a political party (or parties in Austria's third camp) and its distinct ideology forming the core to which supportive social, cultural and other interest organizations attached themselves and provided strong intermediary networks for their followers 'from the cradle to the grave'.[11] The trenches surrounding these camps were deepened by the increasingly confrontational political conflicts of the First Republic (1918–33).[12]

Political conflicts exacerbated the differences and led the camps to set up paramilitary defence organizations.[13] A comparison with the multiply fractured political culture of the Weimar Republic shows that the Austrian three-camp structure was more coherent and long-lived than simple political milieus. In many ways, the resulting structure survived into the Second Republic after 1945 in certain aspects of Austria's main political parties and in the system of social partnership. In the 1930s it was the precondition for and, in a vicious circle, the result of, heated domestic conflicts leading to two civil war interludes: the socialist uprising in February 1934 and the Nazi (SS-SA) putsch in July 1934.

While not undisputed,[14] the camp theory is best suited to capture the fragmented political culture of Austria's inter-war period.[15] The main actors, either as opponents or as supporters of anti-democratic tendencies, in the political arena of the period of fascism and authoritarianism were:

- The large and powerful Social Democratic Workers' Party of Austria (SD – Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Österreichs). Based in Vienna and industrial centres outside the capital, it had as its logical constituency the industrial working classes. Its explicitly left-wing ideology, Austromarxism, left little or no room for a communist party. SD leaders opposed anti-Semitism, but the same cannot be said about their rank and file. In general elections the SD repeatedly polled as much as 36–41 per cent of the vote and with its affiliated organizations it can be considered the prototype of a class-based camp.[16] Outside of its strongholds, this did not exclude the possibility of forming various coalitions with their political competitors, but SD supporters proved to be the most resistant to fascism and political authoritarianism before the Great Depression struck, sapping Austromarxism's organizational strength.
- The almost as large Christian Social Party (CS – Christlichsoziale Partei) was strongly linked to the Catholic Church and attracted large sections of the rural population, the self-employed middle-classes, industrialists and what survived of the traditional upper classes as well as a section of Catholic workers. The devotion of its followers to the practice of Catholic rites and cultural events (weekly or daily church attendance, participation in processions, observing periods of fasting, confession etc.) enabled them to bridge all kinds of social and class gaps.[17] Anti-Judaism was common and a certain adherence to the Habsburgs and nostalgia for the old Austrian empire was strong among peasants in general and especially in the east and in the Alpine regions while in the western regions a kind of peasant democracy dominated in the early 1920s. The CS, the Christian labour unions and the governing CS political elites were supported by networks of priests and laymen in a predominantly Catholic country and political Catholicism constituted the Catholic-conservative camp in the strict sense.[18] Since 1920 the CS had ruled in coalition with the moderate German nationalist parties so that one spoke of the dominant bourgeois bloc. Finally, the CS provided the backbone for the Dollfuss–Schuschnigg regime, and, together with the German nationalist political grouping it created space for the development of the composite (and in part camp-crossing) Heimwehr movement.
- The remaining segment, the smallest in electoral and weakest in organizational terms, the so-called third camp, occupied the space between those two camps. Its constituency was made up of state bureaucrats, civil servants, private-sector employees, liberal professionals and mid-sized farmers in a political spectrum ranging from bourgeois liberals to (ultra-)conservative nationalists. It was present in rural regions as well as in Vienna and at its strongest in mid-sized towns. There is a remarkable correlation with still existing Protestant minorities. (Protestants had been oppressed by the counter-reformation and by pro-Habsburg Catholicism, which inclined

them to feel sympathetic to Protestant Prussia.) The major actors in this third camp were the Greater German People's Party (GVP – Großdeutsche Volkspartei), the small pro-German Peasants' Union (LB – Landbund) and the Nazis, who kept their own counsel and tended to stay away from coalitions with their political neighbours.

Internally fragmented, this camp derived what common denominator it had from a strong reliance on German nationalism and its striving for *Anschluss* (union with Germany). Thus German nationalism ranged from radical anti-democratic pan-German factions (including the student fraternities – *Burschenschaften*) to moderate democratic nationalists and Catholic nationals. Special attention must be paid to a grouping calling itself *Gesamtdeutsche* (all-embracing Germans),[19] who sought to revive the pre-national vision of a German Holy Reich somehow presided over by Austria.[20] Anti-Semitism in its secular, modern form was rife among them.[21] Taken as a whole, the so-called third camp was the breeding ground for Austrian Nazism.

- Left-leaning liberalism as a separate factor has been weak in Austria since the late 19th century and was under permanent attack from anti-Semites of all kinds. To a high extent it drew intellectual support from the Vienna-based Jewish liberal bourgeoisie,[22] but the liberal party, which had dominated Austria (and Vienna) since 1867, declined in the early1920s and ceased to be represented in parliament. Many of its Jewish members were ultimately expelled or murdered by the Nazis. (Pre-Nazi Austria had a Jewish minority of around 200,000.) Mainly outside Vienna there were pockets of liberal sentiment mostly in combination with German nationalism; liberalism formed strange hybrids with anti-Semitism there, which became even more of a staple in the third camp during the 1920s.

In such a fragmented political structure there was little room for the development of fascist forces before the Great Depression unleashed its destructive effects.[23] The establishment of dictatorial rule in Italy and the seductive effects of Hitler's seizure of power in Germany created a totally different political situation; Austria became sandwiched between two powerful fascist regimes to the north and the south. This development made itself felt in contradictory ways that included the Heimwehr's (albeit) limited success, the delay in the rise of Nazism and the growth of anti-democratic tendencies within the existing Catholic-conservative camp. Already in the mid-1920s the CS had begun to revitalize anti-republican and anti-modern traditions inherited from the Habsburg period.

An important factor for defining the political space in which fascist movements were able to recruit followers in many other European states was the perception of national identities.[24] In this respect, inter-war Austria resembled Belgium, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. After 1918, the

majority of the German-speaking citizens of the newly established republican state resorted to a shared German identity and wanted to call their new country German-Austria, a wish they were denied by the victorious Entente. It is therefore crucial to keep in mind that most Austrians sought union (*Anschluss*) with Germany. Even if no one pursued this goal more ardently than the factions in the German nationalist camp, the GVP, LB and the originally marginal group of National Socialists, the fact remains that this agenda was shared, with differing degrees of conviction and for different reasons, by all major political groups. Under the pretext of a union with a socialist German republic, even the internationalist SD came out in favour of *Anschluss*. The majority of the CS, particularly in the east and in Vienna, displayed continuing loyalty to the Habsburgs and Catholic Austrian patriotism. While *Anschluss* was the number-one issue for the German nationalists in the third camp, the other two camps hedged their bets. Under the rising pressure from Hitler's Germany in the early 1930s the SD removed union with Germany from its party programme.[25] The CS adopted an ambiguous position by paying lip service to the Nazified German nationalists' ideas while adhering to an anti-German line (at least until 1936).

The national question in the First Republic must also be seen against the backdrop of the varieties of pro-Austrian sentiment. The CS alone was split into subgroups defined along the lines of religious observance. Groups of active, church-going believers and members of the highly developed Catholic organizations existed side-by-side with the majority of semi-secularized Catholics. A multitude of Reich ideologies fascinated Catholic intellectuals, ranging from the simple restoration of the Habsburg Empire, which would continue to perform its historic mission of civilizing the south-east within the overall framework of an all-embracing German Reich, to a conservative Catholic Central Europe or even a federalist pan-Europe.[26]

Obviously this was an indication of the persisting trauma caused by the breakdown of the order of the old monarchy and the demise of the Habsburg Empire; pre-modern, autocratic traits and anti-democratic practices were still lurking in the Austrian mindset and in the country's shattered economic and social structures after 1918.

Landed or office aristocrats, leading bureaucrats, military officers and other members of the old ruling classes retained largely the same societal position as before 1918 or were reinstalled in that position through the CS's reversal of policy (from the acceptance of the republic to sceptical positions) during the early 1920s.[27] The SD was not strong enough even after the Austrian 'revolution' of 1918–19 to prevent the persistence and strengthening of these reactionary forces. Austria's traditional political elites were familiar with the principle of government without parliament based on the notorious paragraph 14 of the constitution of 1867, which had frequently been applied

either to overrule democratic decision-making processes in the multi-national Reichsrat (the democratically elected second house of parliament) or to overcome the Reichsrat's increasingly common deadlock. During the First World War rule by extra-parliamentary emergency legislation and police decrees increased. The War Economy Enabling Law (KWEG – Kriegswirtschaftliches Ermächtigungsgesetz) of 1917 expanded extra-democratic legislation to a wide range of economic and provisioning issues. Rule from above characterized pre-1918 Austria as a practically half-constitutional state and a breeding ground for authoritarianism.

All this had not been forgotten by contemporaries and was considered a (legitimate) way for the old ruling classes to deal with economic and political crises, as was the case from 1932 on.[28] This is an important but often neglected factor that helps explain the coming of the Dollfuss regime, especially in a time of emerging dictatorships in nearly all of Central, Southern and Eastern Europe. Mutual imitation became a widely shared principle of government.

Two (proto-)fascist movements

The two fascist movements in Austria – National Socialism and the Heimwehr – had clearly non-fascist beginnings. Both movements developed either in a mutually entangled or in a complementary way, and both influenced either as counterparts or agents of transfer of ideas and support for the authoritarian regime the formation of the Dollfuss–Schuschnigg regime.

National Socialism first emerged in the ethnically mixed German-Czech areas of northern Bohemia, a region riven by nationalist conflict. In 1903, German-speaking employees and workers on the railways and in public service and mine supervisors established the German Workers' Party (DAP —Deutsche Arbeiterpartei) as an offspring of Georg von Schönerer's radical *völkisch* and anti-Semitic pan-German Party. Initially the DAP served as the political arm of the German nationalist unions. Its programme was the protection of German-speaking 'elite workers' against Czech competitors and 'Jewish capital' by promoting nationalistic protectionism as a substitute for internationalist socialism and class struggle.[29] At this stage the DAP resembled a centre-left party in favour of socialism, 'moderate' anti-Semitism and *Anschluss*. A similar fusion of nationalist and socialist demands had already led the Czech National-Social Party to secede from the Czech Social Democrats in 1897.

Before and during the First World War, the appeal of nationalist socialist ideas spread to those living in the German-speaking areas of what was to become the Austrian republic, prompting the DAP to change its name to German National Socialist Workers' Party (DNSAP – Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei). As a parliamentary force, it never outgrew the status of a splinter

group; however, it became the embryo of the later Nazi party in Austria.[30] (Indeed, Hitler joined its Bavarian namesake party in 1919;[31] it soon modified the acronym inherited from its Austrian predecessor to NSDAP.)

The Heimwehren (at this stage it is appropriate to use the plural, given their regionalist character and lack of a unified organization) originated from the many groups of vigilantes, peasants and rightist petit-bourgeois, who sought to defend order and protect their property both against looting by soldiers of the disbanded Habsburg army and against the perceived revolutionary threat emanating from Béla Kun's Soviet Hungary, revolutionary Bavaria and the SDs' short-lived workers' councils in and around Vienna. It was not long before these bands of vigilantes were dominated by demobilized officers, provincial intellectuals, conservative dignitaries and younger members of the politically disenfranchised aristocracy.

In the southern provinces the Heimwehren were involved in border skirmishes as part of an undeclared defence war with Slovenes. They can be compared to the Bavarian Home Guards (Einwohnerwehren) and the Upper Silesian and the East Prussian Free Corps (Freikorps), both of which played similar roles in the formation of early fascist organizations in Germany. The Heimwehren soon established contacts with both German organizations and received funds from post-revolutionary Bavaria.

During the relatively politically stable mid-1920s, both the NSDAP and the Heimwehren declined to little more than armed paramilitary bands in the service of conservative and German nationalist parties. To justify their existence they claimed to be the logical counterparts to the paramilitary Republican Defence League (RS – Republikanischer Schutzbund), founded by the SD in 1923.

In 1927 the Heimwehren were able to exploit renewed fears of the 'red threat' in the wake of the July 15 riots in Vienna; the Palace of Justice was set on fire and 89 people died. Member numbers rose again, as did the political, financial and material support from Austrian conservatives and industrialists and from Mussolini's Italy. Ignaz Seipel, the Catholic prelate who, as the virtual leader of the CS, was twice federal chancellor, supported in the pursuit of his anti-democratic programme of 'true democracy' the ideas and activities of the Heimwehren to keep Austromarxism at bay.

While the Heimwehren still remained only loosely organized, they were able to recruit young farmers, farm labourers and industrial workers from outside the capital in considerable numbers. They repeatedly claimed an attendance of more than 150,000 at their meetings and propaganda marches. In the late 1920s they even planned to imitate Mussolini's example by marching on Vienna. In addition to their original common denominator, anti-Marxism, they adopted more and more ideological elements and concepts from Fascism,

a development that was boosted by financial and armament subsidies from Italy.

In 1929, demands put forward by the bourgeois parties and the Heimwehren included the call for an amendment of the Federal Constitution of 1919. Corporatist and authoritarian traits were to be introduced to satisfy rising rightist critique of democratic procedure. That the SD was able to see off most of these demands at the time was owed at least partly to the fact that the international environment was not yet favourable for such sweeping changes. However, the power of the federal president was strengthened at the expense of parliament and the president was granted the right to govern through limited emergency decrees; the example for this had been set by the constitution of the Weimar Republic. In 1933, when authoritarian rule was introduced, it was in fact ushered in through a different door: the KWEG, which had not been annulled while this was still possible, served Dollfuss as an effective lever for the elimination of democracy.[32]

In an attempt to create a more united movement, the leaders of the regional Heimwehr organizations pledged allegiance to a heterogeneous programme in a ceremony that has gone down as the Korneuburg Oath of 18 May 1930.[33] Its demands included a call for the reconstruction of the state along authoritarian and corporatist lines. The Heimwehr, like almost all other political strands in Austria up to 1933, implicitly treated commitment to the *Anschluss* as a foregone conclusion. (Austria had been forbidden the *Anschluss* since the peace treaties of 1919/20.) When its leaders openly declared their will to seize power, create the people's state of the Heimwehr and make the nation subservient to the well-being of its people, it seemed unnecessary to clarify what nation they had in mind. The concept of an Austrian identity, then, was associated first and foremost with a strong regional patriotism; Austrians were primarily Tyroleans, Styrians, etc. The feeling of belonging to a 'community of the German people' differed only in terms of the union with the German Reich. The only Heimwehr organizations where demands for the *Anschluss* were openly voiced were in Styria.[34]

The Korneuburg Oath served the different Heimwehr groups during the following years as a rallying cry. It had been formulated by Walter Heinrich, a close collaborator of a Viennese professor of philosophy, Othmar Spann, the most influential early ideologist of universalism, corporatism and the anti-democratic true state.[35] It was at this stage that the ardent anti-Marxism in word and deed of the loosely unified Heimwehr entered into an amalgamation with Führer and other authoritarian principles, voluntaristic actionism, and assorted anti-capitalist, anti-liberal, anti-parliament concepts of the kind that were swirling around in Europe at the time. Anti-Semitism was there, but it was not accorded the priority it had with National Socialists. There was also a latent legitimistic (pro-Habsburgs) sentiment, which was not shown in public out of

consideration for anti-Habsburg sentiment among neighbouring countries and the Western powers.

The Heimwehr programme reflected the various currents existing within it, ranging from the traditional, peasant-oriented wing represented by the Lower Austrian Heimwehr and the consensus-inclined groups in Upper Austria to corporatist (*ständisch*)-minded supporters typically found in more strictly Catholic milieus and the openly fascist views prevalent in the Tyrol and Styria. Even the official names they chose for their appearances in public were different: Heimatwehr, Heimatschutz, Heimatblock, Selbstschutzverband and others were alternative terms. The platform of 1930 was flexible enough to include members of the GVP and the LB, as well as the radical pro-German Heimwehr groups in southern Austria; the latter had developed early affinities with Nazism and was crucial for the breach in 1931–32 between National Socialism and Heimwehr fascism.[36]

1930 was also a year of general elections, the last, it turned out, in the First Republic. The majority of regional Heimwehren formed a separate party, the Heimatblock, which to their great disappointment netted only 227,000 votes or 6 per cent of the ballot. Apparently the Heimwehr leaders had failed to take into account that their candidacy constituted a real threat to the bourgeois parties, which campaigned explicitly against them. In the wake of their electoral defeat, they lost many sympathizers who had formerly taken part in their extra-parliamentary activities.

Another sign of the decline of Heimwehr influence was the miscarriage of a minority government with which the Heimwehr in concert with the CS proposed to circumvent parliament in the autumn of 1930. This episode was the first of its kind. Inspired by the mastermind of the rising anti-democratic tendencies among the CS, Ignaz Seipel, it was brought down after 60 days by the united opposition of the SD and the German national camp parties, only to be renewed successfully under weakened democratic circumstances two years later.[37]

A putsch carried out by the Styrian Heimwehr leader Walter Pfrimer on 13 September 1931 collapsed and raised hopes among democrats in and outside the country that this version of Austrian fascism had gone into terminal decline. Nevertheless, in 1932 its remains were to have a crucial influence on the formation of the Dollfuss regime.

Austrian Nazism developed in a similarly phase-delayed manner. Initially competing with the Heimwehren, the Nazis did not hesitate to make common cause with them when convenient. They subsequently went on to attract many former Heimwehr supporters. During the period of hyperinflation and the even more stressful restructuring of the nearly bankrupt Austrian state by means of the internationally guaranteed Geneva loan granted in 1922, Austria had witnessed the social decline of its middle classes and had helplessly sat by

as its young men turned openly anti-democratic and violent. In occupational sectors that lost their traditional fields of administration, transport and business owing to the breakdown of the multi-national empire in 1918, unemployment was rife among public and private employees.[38]

The rise of Hitler in Bavaria in 1923 exerted an increasing influence on the Nazi organization in Austria, which led to disputes and secessions that took a considerable toll on membership. This provided the remaining members with the opportunity to adopt the name, organizational model, leadership and programme of Hitler's NSDAP.

From 1931 onwards, the effects of the Great Depression were felt more and more keenly in Austria, providing additional fertile ground for Nazism. Having polled only 3 per cent of the vote in the 1930 national elections, it was now set to gain steadily in popularity. The reason for its delayed growth in Austria compared to Germany was largely the existence of a still powerful SD and the rival Heimwehr. While in the late 1920s the Nazis recruited members mainly from among the middle classes, they now sought to become attractive also for farmers and industrial workers, with only limited success. In 1931, half a decade after the formation of the SA in Austria, the SS was established as an extremely violent factor and at the hands of one of Hitler's German emissary the NSDAP underwent rigid reorganization in line with the German blueprint.[39]

Late democratic beginnings of the Dollfuss government (May 1932–March 1933)

In the shadow of the economic crisis, which was to culminate in 1932–33, the domestic political situation in Austria deteriorated ever further. The coalition governments formed by two or three bourgeois parties that had been the norm from 1920 onwards had ceased to be an option. This meant that no help was available when the Credit-Anstalt bank collapsed in 1931. Austria's overburdened financial system was in imminent danger of collapse as well. This turned up the heat on the leaders of the CS, forcing them in the end to take the unpopular decision to seek foreign financial assistance through the Lausanne Protocol (signed on 15 July 1932). The protocol guaranteed a badly needed loan. As in the comparable situation in 1922, the loan was linked in Austria to a renewal of the unpopular prohibition of the *Anschluss*. Aware of the danger it faced in this situation from the Nazis overtaking it on the right, the GDV, the moderate German nationalist party in the third camp, left the CS-dominated government and joined the opposition.

The April 1932 regional elections in Vienna, Lower Austria, Salzburg and Vorarlberg six months later resulted in what was a landslide by Austrian standards: in the four provinces (*Länder*), which accounted for two-thirds of the Austrian population, the NSDAP gained 16 per cent of the votes. Even if this

result lagged behind developments in Germany, where Hitler had achieved 18.3 per cent in 1930 and was to poll 37.3 in July 1932, it shattered the existing party system in Austria. A great part of the former following of the GVP and the LB and the pro-German wing of the Heimwehr in southern Austria were soaked up by the NSDAP.[40] The Nazis also began making considerable inroads into the CS and SD camps.[41]

At this point Engelbert Dollfuss, an as yet little-known figure in parliament, who had made his mark as a consensus-oriented director of the chamber of agriculture, took on the task of forming a centre-right government in May 1932. As a representative of the powerful agricultural lobby within the CS, he steered his party into a coalition with the LB and the Heimwehr, allowing the latter a disproportionate weight. The balance of power within the coalition was tilted in favour of the representatives of agrarian interest, including anti-democratic aristocrats. This gave a boost to the idea of a reorganization of society and state along corporatist lines and to concepts calling for the restriction of parliamentary rights and the increase in presidential and executive authority that, while by no means new, had been ubiquitous in Europe since the 1920s.[42]

The new government continued to face strong opposition and calls for early elections from the strong SD and the NSDAP, which was now represented in four regional parliaments. As Dollfuss had only a precarious majority in parliament, he was understandably unwilling to call early general elections. Plans were therefore put forward to allow him to overrule parliament and the SD as well as the Nazis.

Having considered but postponed the introduction of emergency rule already in October 1932, Dollfuss availed himself of a procedural crisis in the Nationalrat on 4 March 1933. He claimed that since 'parliament had eliminated itself' he had no choice but to rule with emergency power. While this was to the liking both of the Heimwehr in Austria and of Mussolini in Italy, it also pleased many within the CS. His resort to the KWEG of 1917, which involved bending the law, even received hidden support from Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, who had been sent to Vienna as the country's League of Nations-appointed financial controller for the Lausanne loan.

The international political situation was not favourable for democracy in Austria in the early 1930s. Concepts, suggestions, philosophical constructs and ideas of political and economic salvation travelled long distances across different political and *weltanschauliche* milieus. Terms like 'corporatist' (*ständisch*) or 'corporatist state' (*Ständestaat*),[43] 'authoritarian',' true democracy', 'new state', 'Reich', 'new man', 'single-party',[44] 'Führer state', 'dictatorship', 'totalitarian', even 'Fascism' or 'National Socialism', were very much part of the new political discourse and pointed in the same direction, despite the differences in their meaning. They were transported along different channels – intellectual, economic or by threat of force – and changed their meaning chameleon-like en

route. Thus, these *concepts nomads* could be used nearly universally and applied to widely differing – including even leftist – political contexts.[45] They helped blur the profiles of existing liberal and democratic ideological currents, which had started out as widely apart from each other.[46] Many of these concepts and practical examples of politics were absorbed by Austria's political right in the largest sense.

In the early 1930s Austria's neighbours were, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, either governed by fascist, authoritarian or monarchist regimes, or, as in Heinrich Brüning's Germany, by a government that sought to limit or abandon democracy. In Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia and other Eastern European states, democracy was either absent or in decline. In Southern Europe Portugal was ruled by Salazar's authoritarian regime.[47]

The Mussolini and Horthy regimes in Italy and Hungary offered models of dictatorial rule that proved attractive to Austria. Both provided, or promised to provide, financial and even military assistance to authoritarian movements such as the Heimwehr. These regimes viewed, and tried to influence, Austria as a bridge for their revisionist foreign policy.[48] In Germany, with its growing drive for financial and economic expansion to the south-east (and the revival of *Anschluss* tendencies), Heinrich Brüning, a representative of the Centre Party (Zentrum), was head of a centre-right coalition that ruled by presidential emergency decrees.[49] The German example was widely admired by Austria's Catholic political elite and the country's intellectuals. Germany, Austria's major cultural, economic and political reference point, had therefore given up parliamentary rule even before Hitler's seizure of government on 30 January and his victory in the Reichstag elections of 5 March 1933.

Every Austrian party, with the exception of the SD, saw the rise in their midst of ideologies promoting the restriction of parliamentary rights and the strengthening of presidential and executive authority. Clearly this was at least partially the result of the spread of ideas and of pressure emanating from the Heimwehr. The idea of a reorganization of society along *berufsständisch* (corporatist) principles and a nostalgic view of pre-modern society had their most committed advocates in Catholic and monarchist circles. They were also constitutive elements in the self-image of peasants in traditional rural regions like the one Dollfuss came from. The concept was almost ubiquitous within the Catholic-conservative camp and it became amalgamated with the myth of a universal Reich and with sentimental attachment to the ousted Austrian Kaiser.[50]

The situation was similar among supporters of the German nationalist camp, particularly within the LB. There was, however, one crucial difference: the term 'Reich' meant something different to radical German nationalists: for them since 1871 it had referred to a nation state under Prussian monarchs. For the SD and for the thinning ranks of national democrats and liberals, 'Reich' was

linked with the German Weimar Republic. Catholic politicians and intellectuals, imbedded as they were in a totally different *Weltanschauung*, reduced their interest in the *Anschluss* rather than giving it up altogether. Since they had been socialized during the late Habsburg monarchy and in the First World War as the 'front generation' they welcomed the destruction of democracy.[51] As should become apparent from what has been said so far, many different and differently accentuated versions of Reich ideologies that merged Catholic conservatism and German nationalism – from backward-looking *Gesamtdeutsche* (all-embracing German) utopias to ideologies that tried to blend plain Nazism with Catholicism – were swirling around in the cauldron of political discourse in the early 1930s.[52]

Authoritarian rule and fascistization (March 1933–February 1934)

Dollfuss did not have a detailed plan for establishing a non-democratic regime, nor did he need one; he simply took advantage of an opportunity that, from his point of view, was too good to miss. After parliament had stalemated itself on a point of due procedure, Dollfuss declared it had become unworkable and set about abolishing constitutional rights, guarantees of political action and the freedom of the press. Making use of bureaucratic acts and pseudo-legal decrees deriving from his formal powers as state chancellor, he took care to avoid the open impression of breaking the law, preferring to erode the legal status quo in a series of small steps.

This pragmatic approach to ousting democracy paralyzed the SD. Their endeavour to stop it through constitutional and legal measures proved in vain. The threat of calling a general strike that might have redressed the balance in more normal circumstances had been blunted by mass unemployment. The only weapon left was the paramilitary violence of the RS. The rhetoric with which the SD had warned of the coming of a 'bourgeois dictatorship' in the party programme of 1926 was often repeated in public and complemented by the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' as the *ultima ratio* of an otherwise thoroughly reformist party. The trade unions were increasingly confined to the sidelines, the party's representation in regional and local governments was on the wane and its paramilitary defence organization was banned at the end of May 1933.

The communist party, which had never amounted to much in any case, was banned and this was followed on 16 May 1933, by the banning of the NSDAP, the SS, SA and the Styrian Heimatschutz. The NSDAP had orchestrated a series of murderous attacks on representatives of the Dollfuss regime.[53]

March 1933 marks the beginning of the second phase of Dollfuss's authoritarian regime. Authoritarianism had initially been considered an instrument with which to secure the regime's majority in parliament, now tentative plans

to gradually remodel society came to the fore. Dollfuss's ideal seems to have been a society conceived along the lines of an idealized tradition-bound peasant family, where everyone, from the *pater familias* down to the lowliest servant, sits under the crucifix at the same table and eats from the same bowl.[54] Dollfuss promoted this view in the Trabrennplatz speech he delivered in Vienna on 11 September 1933, in which he outlined the programme for a new crusade 250 years after Vienna's liberation from the siege of the Turks. This time the crusade was to be directed against socialism, Nazism, democracy and liberalism in support of a corporatist order based on professional groups.[55]

For the time being, the main elements of Dollfuss's power base were the state bureaucracy, the judiciary, the police apparatus, organizational and personal networks of the old CS and other stakeholders such as unions, economic and cultural associations and the powerful organization of Catholic student and alumni fraternities (CV – Cartellverband). Dollfuss received support from the industrialists' association. Unemployment amounted to more than 25 per cent. Here was an opportunity to attack the SD trade unions and reduce labour costs.

In May 1933 Dollfuss founded the Fatherland Front (VF – Vaterländische Front) as an all-embracing party representative of the entire Catholic-conservative camp. As initially membership was open both to individuals and organizations loyal to the regime – where loyalty was interpreted to mean not in alignment with either the SD or the (banned) Nazi party – membership figures soared to half a million within seven months.[56]

On taking office, Dollfuss was saluted by the terminally ill Ignaz Seipel,[57] who had orchestrated the Catholic anti-democratic turn from 1927 onwards, when, in the wake of the Vienna workers' riot and the burning of the Palace of Justice, he started to exploit anti-Marxist fears. After he had started on his anti-democratic course, Dollfuss could also count on the goodwill of the Catholic hierarchy and of many Catholic lay organizations with their deep-rooted suspicion of democracy.[58] The concordat concluded with the Holy See in June 1933 became an integral element of the *Christliche Ständestaat*.

Dollfuss had served as a front-line officer in the First World War and was able to count on the loyalty of the officer corps of the First Republic's small army, which, after a brief interlude of socialist dominance, had been turned around politically during the 1920s.

Despite the relative success of the VF, Dollfuss was forced to share power. The problem was not so much the LB, whose politicians felt increasingly uncomfortable with Dollfuss' authoritarian and anti-German course and ultimately walked out of the coalition in 1933, but the Heimwehr, which was at the same time his main ally and chief rival. Several Heimwehr leaders, such as Emil Fey, had to be appointed to important positions in government, the police and the security apparatus.

The continuing role played by former high-ranking bureaucrats in ministries is remarkable. Most were former CS members and/or Catholic academics organized in the CV. Seipel, Dollfuss, Schuschnigg and many members of the government belonged to one of the student fraternities. New appointees belonged to a relatively younger (front) generation – which included Dollfuss himself and the justice minister (since 1932) Kurt Schuschnigg – but that was the only change in the ruling conservative group. Only the Heimwehr leadership represented a socially new and even younger element. The key posts in the first authoritarian governments went to the former members of the CS, Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, to the Heimwehr's 'strong man' Fey, who was appointed to the post of vice-chancellor in September 1933, and to the Heimwehr warhorse and long-standing leader, Rüdiger von Starhemberg, then aged 34.

The fact that Starhemberg was a descendant of Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg, the legendary liberator of Vienna (1638–1701), inspired Dollfuss to use the 250th anniversary of the city's liberation from the Turks in 1683 as a link with 'Austria's glorious past' and to put himself and the organization he led at the centre of many of the commemorative events in September 1933. Dollfuss' and Starhemberg's agenda now featured the liberation of Austria from godless socialism and the miseries attending modernity and a class society and the installation of a backward-looking corporatist order. What kind of *Ständestaat* they and other supporters of corporatism envisaged was left to interpretation. Dollfuss may have had his idealized peasant family in mind: the aristocrats and the members of the old (military) elite of the Habsburg Monarchy no doubt had other reasons to seek to reverse the course of history.[59] Functionaries of organized agricultural and forestry interests argued strongly in favour of agrarian corporatism,[60] and from the 1920s on many industrialists voiced their preference for some kind of crisis government that would roll back the inroads labour organizations and democracy had made into their territory.[61]

The Heimwehr embraced the theory of the true state that had been developed by the influential Viennese social philosopher Othmar Spann, the source of inspiration for the Korneuburg Oath. Spann sought to systematize Mussolini's corporatist structure into a variant suited for Austria.[62]

In 1933, an as yet little-known Heimwehr leader, Odo Neustädter-Stürmer, and the Austrian Catholic theologian Johannes Messner elaborated divergent theories that in 1933 and 1934 helped a former democratic CS politician from Vorarlberg, Otto Ender, formulate the constitution of the Austrian *Ständestaat*.[63] Also important for the constitution was the papal encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* issued in May 1931.[64] The social theory of a Catholic, classless, corporatist order, which was supposed to harmonize capital and labour and employers and employees in the most important professional sectors, had first been formulated by 19th-century social-Catholicism and the encyclical *Rerum Novarum* of 1891. The call advanced here for subsidiary co-operation was primarily intended to

structure society, not necessarily the political order. Implementation, it was claimed, would, against all likelihood, be possible without the use of force. The 1931 encyclical became highly influential among Catholics throughout Europe, mainly in Austria, southern Germany, Poland and Southern Europe. This channel of transfer of ideas worked less via diplomatic contacts than through the diffusion of social-Catholicism's subsidiary and corporatist theories communicated through priests and religious writings.[65] Catholic corporatist social doctrine thus found its way from the Vatican to Austria, whereas Rome's Fascism and its use of corporatism provided attractive examples of right-wing politics suspending democracy, class struggle and the left, according a radical nationalistic movement with conservative power holders in early Fascism.

In addition to this, Mussolini and his admirers in the Heimwehr exerted direct political pressure on Dollfuss to abolish what remained of the democratic constitution of 1920–29 and the last remaining SD footholds.[66] This task was effectively completed in the wake of the bloody defeat of the SD uprising of 12–15 February 1934.[67]

Hybrid 'half-fascist' authoritarian dictatorship (February 1934–35)

Civil war quickly put an end to a workers' revolt that, born of despair, broke out in Vienna and in several industrial regions. Fighting took a heavy toll in the form of about 300 deaths; several hundred combatants and bystanders were wounded on both sides. Nine death sentences were carried out.[68] Several thousands of socialist (and communist) militants and activists were imprisoned or interned in Wöllersdorf and other detention camps.[69] Those who escaped internment experienced routine discrimination at their workplace, office and places of study or suffered 'soft' repression, such as excommunication by the Catholic Church, and acts of public humiliation.[70]

Next in line to the military and the police, the Heimwehr had played a decisive role in crushing the uprising: for this they were rewarded with even more influential government posts. During the following months a remarkable shift in the regime's internal tetragon of power – Dollfuss, Schuschnigg, Fey, Starhemberg – occurred. While both Heimwehr leaders were tightening their grip on power, Fey, the acclaimed victor over the socialists, fell behind Starhemberg, who succeeded him as vice-chancellor. The ideologue of corporatism, Odo Neustädter-Stürmer, was also rewarded with a ministry. Nevertheless, by mid-1934 internal rivalries appear to have provided Dollfuss the opportunity to halt the further advance of the radical Heimwehr fascists.

In May 1934 Dollfuss, Mussolini and Horthy concluded the Rome Protocols, an economic and political alliance intended to keep British and French influence out of the Danube basin and to protect Austria against increasing Nazi influence, both from within the country and from Germany.

In view of Nazi Germany's threat to annexe Austria, Dollfuss and his supporters redoubled their efforts to establish a specific Austrian identity. The ingredients they hit upon were patriotism, Catholicism, social compromise and corporatism, with a reference to Austria's German character thrown in for good measure. Dollfuss is often credited with having conceived an Austrian national identity after the break-up of the multi-national Habsburg Empire. In all probability this overstates his case. His composite concept, which sought to define Austria as the better of the two German states, was probably stillborn or at least it did not survive the first four years of its life. This first attempt to invent and propagate a (rump-) Austrian national identity suffered from its ambiguity and limited political support; it met with hostility from the banned socialists (and the outlawed Nazis). It could not provide the regime with the kind of ideological support it needed for its battle for Austria's continuing independence.[71]

As leader of the VF, Dollfuss made Starhemberg his deputy in 1934; after Dollfuss' assassination only a few months later, Starhemberg stayed in that position until 1936. He was followed by Schuschnigg, who finally succeeded in uniting in his person the leading positions in the state and in the VF. It is on purely formal grounds that the term 'strong dictator', which António Costa Pinto developed in his analysis of Salazar's dictatorship, can be applied to Dollfuss and Schuschnigg.[72] Standing at the head of a regime that has correctly been described as a 'chancellor dictatorship', their power was in fact neither secure nor total in any real sense.[73]

That this was indeed the case is made obvious by the fact their short-lived regime never developed in any reasonable sense a unified formal and practical power structure. The regime was always having to make do with improvisations, compromises, parallel institutions, unions and membership organizations. This is the upshot of the most recent systematic analysis by the political scientist E. Tálos.[74] As it was struggling towards institutionalization, which in any case it never achieved, the regime produced a succession of ever-changing agglomerations of personnel, interests and projected organizations rather than hard-and-fast corporatist structures. Therefore the sociologist Juan Linz has described its character, in contrast to the ideal-type of totalitarianism, as a regime with limited pluralism.[75] Its chaotic character was a by-product of the innate construction principle of corporatism, which allowed its bodies only the right to invoke and advise a superior authority, not to take collective decisions on specific issues, in blatant contravention of *Quadragesimo Anno*'s subsidiarity principle. Thus the chain of command usually ended with the *Staatsführer* or sub-leaders in competition with him. This hypothesis applies both to the party and the state: two entities that were frequently entangled.

The VF was given formal status in May 1934. Set up in imitation of the monopoly party organizations in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, it was

intended to be the sole political basis of the Dollfuss regime. Its goal was 'the political aggregation of all citizens who are based in an independent, Christian, German, federal state organized in a corporatist manner'.[76] It aimed to create a common ground – and the consciousness that there was such a thing as common ground – for everyone who accepted the idea of an independent Christian, corporatist Austrian state. Theoretically this excluded German nationalists and Nazis, but in practice any exclusiveness that might initially have been present soon evaporated. The VF did not encourage former members of the SD to join, but it certainly did not bar Jews, Protestants or people without any religious affiliation even if it could do nothing to protect them against prejudice and societal disadvantages. VF members were required to acknowledge Dollfuss and his possible successor as leaders. Already the VF's second-in-command while Dollfuss was still alive, Starhemberg was installed as its leader by Schuschnigg immediately after Dollfuss's death, only to be ousted two years later.

The VF retained the monopoly for every political, propagandistic or organizational activity.[77] Founded in the spring of 1933, membership of this state-controlled party shot up to 2 million by 1936 and to nearly 3.3 million by March 1938 – almost half the country's population. Such explosive growth was never permitted in either Italy's National Fascist Party or in Germany's NSDAP. Membership in these fascist parties was a matter for individuals, not collectives; it was also supposed to bear the mark of a voluntary decision. Even if, in addition to its mobilizing function, the NSDAP was also a gigantic fundraiser, its total membership was limited by statute to a maximum of 10 per cent of the German population to shore up its elitist pretences. The VF had no such inhibitions.[78] It too was significant as a fundraiser, but served also as a launching board for individual careers. It was no wonder that the incidence of opportunists and self-serving 'patriots' was high. By March 1938 quite a few VF members were wearing NSDAP party insignia on the underside of their lapels.

During the five years of its existence the VF created several organizations for special-interest groups. There was Austrian Youth (OJ – Österreichisches Jungvolk) to take charge of 6–18 year-olds, while the interests of women and mothers were looked after by the Mothers' Protection Agency (MVF – Mutterschutzwerk Vaterländische Front). Both were merely superficial copies of related institutions set up by the Fascists in Italy and the Nazis in Germany and were designed to underline that Austria was keeping up with its neighbours in societal developments. In the symbolic realm, the VF's cross potent was in direct competition with the Nazi swastika.

More complicated was the situation created by the friendly, and at the same time adversarial Heimwehr. The Heimwehr (with Starhemberg at its head) was able to retain some independence, at least for a time. Using delaying tactics,

it tried to shake off the stranglehold of the VF while competing with other officially sanctioned 'patriotic' paramilitary organizations – e.g. Schuschnigg's Austrian Storm Troops (OS – Ostmärkische Sturmscharen) and the Christian workers' Freedom Union (FHB – Freiheitsbund). All these quasi- or paramilitary organizations and the numerous remaining Heimwehr units were united under the umbrella of what was at first called the Defence Front (WF – Wehrfront) before changing its name to Front Militia (FM – Frontmiliz), which was under Starhemberg's command until 1936.[79]

Other sub-organizations of the FV, such as the Workplace Communities (WGS – Werkgemeinschaften) and the Social Working Group (SAG – Soziale Arbeitsgemeinschaft), were designed to address the problem of political dissent on both the left and the right. The unified, state-controlled Federation of Trade Unions of Workers and Employees (Gewerkschaftsbund) was to represent the working class.[80] Based on a mixture of appointed and elected shop stewards, this organization did not conform to the corporatist principle and by 1938 it had enlisted 401,000 members. The short-lived *Aktion Winter* initiated by Vienna's (third) deputy mayor, Ernst Karl Winter, was the only unbiased attempt to explore what – if any – common ground former SD workers and the regime shared.[81]

In June 1937, when the Austrian regime was already beginning to cave in to Nazi Germany, the VF established national-political departments (*Volkspolitische Referate*) in a bid to integrate Austria's German nationalists. As far as the Nazis were concerned, this bid was unsuccessful. Sharing the innate ambiguity of the VF's other integrative instruments, the *Volkspolitische Referate* were exploited by the Nazis as a semi-legal arena for anti-regime activities.

A number of Nazis involved in criminal and terrorist activities had been forced to flee to Germany, while those remaining in the country continued to erode the regime's power base. It is contended, therefore, that the VF is a somewhat anaemic copy of the much more robust, fully-fledged fascist regimes in Italy and Germany. It was even forced to borrow its symbols, organizational patterns and rituals from them.[82]

On 1 May 1934 a new constitution was adopted. It invoked 'God almighty' and the notorious emergency law of 1917 (KWEG), upon which authoritarian rule had been based since March 1933.[83] In order to produce the impression of legal continuity the paradoxical necessity arose to briefly resuscitate a rump version of the supposedly unworkable lower chamber of parliament (Nationalrat) and to get it, on 30 April, to pass the federal law on extraordinary measures regarding the constitution (Bundesverfassungsgesetz über außerordentliche Maßnahmen im Bereich der Verfassung). Conceived in imitation of Hitler's Enabling Act of 23 March 1933, it amounted to no less than the transfer of the competences formerly held by the two chambers of parliament to the federal government.

The constitution ostensibly provided 'patriotic' citizens – by definition this excluded members of the SD and, at least initially, Nazis – with civil and juridical rights. In practice these were reduced by a series of regulations and orders in contravention of the norms of a constitutional state. In collusion with one another, the legislative and executive powers were concentrated in the person of the federal chancellor who was granted authority to define the general line of policy.

Far from being a factor in a system of checks and balances, the federal president, Wilhelm Miklas, a conservative member of the CS who had been appointed to that position in 1928, was in fact no more than a puppet. It was the chancellor who was vested with the power to decide nearly all important matters at various levels even in the provinces (Bundesländer), to the detriment of Austria's strong confederative structures.

Dollfuss and the regime claimed that this accumulation of power was provisional in nature and would be rescinded once the corporatist state was in place. Given that no end to this project was in sight in 1938, the Christian Ständestaat of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, as conceived by Othmar Spann and the Heimwehr, was in flagrant contradiction to *Quadragesimo Anno* and remained largely a Potemkin village. Instead of growing from the grassroots upwards, the corporatist order tended to be imposed by the state in an autocratic and formalist way from above.

Utterly detached from reality, the May 1934 constitution stated that legislative power was vested almost completely in the new federal diet (Bundestag). However, the Bundestag legislation, which was in any case confined to accepting or rejecting bills prepared by the government, was in fact in the hands of the government-appointed members of the four pre-consultant councils: the State Council (Staatsrat), which can be regarded as the direct materialization of the top-down authoritarian principle; the Federal Cultural Council; the Federal Economic Council; and the Länder Council. The latter three councils owed, at least theoretically, their origin and function to the vision of corporatist self-government.

To these four collective bodies established according to meritocratic, cultural-religious or federal principles the constitution added the Federal Economic Council (Bundeswirtschaftsrat), half of whose 80 members were employers, while the other half were employees. It was intended to give focus to the corporatist idea. The delegates were supposed to be deputed from the *Berufsstände* (occupational corporations); in reality, they were appointed jointly by the federal chancellor and the president. Of the seven *Berufsstände* outlined in the constitution, only two had in fact materialized by 1938: for those active in agriculture and forestry and for public sector employees. The five remaining occupational corporations were supposed to have represented industry

and mining, trade, commerce and transport, finance and insurances, and the professions.

None of the state's organs were legitimized through general elections, and there was only ever a vague promise of a referendum. The *Berufsstand* for agriculture and forestry was the only one capable of holding elections; its organization and members were virtually identical with the pre-dictatorial CS farmers' association (Bauernbund).[84] This is an indication that the *Berufsstände* system could start working only where pre-existent networks eligible for renaming and transfer could at least be used as nuclei by the new system.

As the 'non-patriotic' part of the population was excluded, the Ständestaat can be viewed as the autocratic rule of the CS, the VF and the Heimwehr. It is no surprise that extensive personal unions and the accumulation of senior organizational positions are also typical of other important players formerly affiliated to the CS, such as Julius Raab and Leopold Figl (both federal chancellors in the Second Republic) and Josef Reither (governor of Lower Austria in both the First and the Second Republic).[85] It seems that most leading members of the former CS and its organizational network remained in place throughout the period 1934–38, closing ranks against newcomers of the younger generation.

While the Heimwehr constituted a special case, it is quite clear that the Dollfuss–Schuschnigg regime, taken as a whole, was far from a fascist regime of the kind we associate with Hitler or Mussolini. By contrast to the Ständestaat, these regimes relied on a youthful following and on a ruling caste of 'new elites'.

An understanding of the true nature of the Ständestaat seems to involve the following three features that can be gathered from the existing literature:

1. Formation of personal unions: this systemic feature can be observed clearly on the level of the state government, where, historically speaking, it was a remnant of the austerity governments from 1923 and 1932 onwards; it was dominant also in the sphere of corporations, (non-labour) interest associations and the remains of 'patriotic' political organizations from the pre-1933 period. But these unions, given the sloppy collusion in political practice, never became full amalgamations of the apparatuses of parallel institutions and offices as was the case with the 'new' party-state institutions and the radicalizing 'commissioners' in the Nazi regime. Particularly in the security and police apparatuses, *Kommissare* and *Kommissariate* often exerted a disastrous effect of uncertainty and informal control.
2. Authoritarian relocation of decision-making to ever higher levels: while this anti-democratic principle reflects an essential aspect of the regime's self-perception and is also in evidence in the way Austria's top politicians styled themselves as Führer in blatant imitation of the Duce and Hitler, the position of the leaders in the Ständestaat did not resemble those of either Mussolini

or Hitler. When Schuschnigg said in August 1934 that 'authority should not blindly come from above but remain rooted in the people . . . , just as the perfect authority of Mussolini is based on the overwhelming majority of the Italian people', his message for his countrymen was that the people's possibility and right to co-determine and co-operate had to be structured according to the (envisioned) *Stände* structure.[86]

3. Recursivity of authorization: a case in point is the (planned) appointment modus of the federal president. From a shortlist compiled by the federal diet containing three candidates, a majority of the mayors of more than 3,000 Austrian communes, irrespective of size (from Vienna to the smallest village) was to have elected the president. One has to bear in mind that both many of the mayors and all members of the federal diet had been appointed and not elected.

   In addition to this, the legislative process in the federal diet took account of the (as yet incomplete) corporatist state structure only in a minority of cases and was mostly performed according to the Law of Empowerment by Dollfuss and/or Schuschnigg himself.[87] Internally, the government admitted it was mainly fear of the loss of control over the desired outcome of any electoral process that was responsible for such an authoritarian policy process. Thus one can agree with the Austrian historian H. Wohnout who, correcting his earlier characterization of the authoritarian regime as a 'government dictatorship', has recently used the more accurate term 'chancellor dictatorship'.[88]

Dollfuss did not live to reap whatever benefits this government-centred constitution might have yielded: he was murdered during the attempted Nazi putsch on 25 July 1934. The SS attacked government buildings in Vienna and the SA launched an uprising lasting six days mainly in the southern provinces. Austria's armed forces with some support from the Heimwehr emerged victorious after several days of heavy fighting and the death of about 220 on the two sides.[89] After Dollfuss's intended removal Hitler had counted on being able to take Austria by force with one blow.[90] The failure of this attempt infuriated the Führer and the decisive moment came when Mussolini hastened to declare his support for Austria and moved Italian troops to the border.

In the aftermath of the failed putsch, the Heimwehr leaders demanded – and obtained – an even greater share of power. The security apparatus came down hard on Nazi militants and their families. More than 4,000 Nazis were imprisoned alongside detainees from the political left in Wöllersdorf and in other internment camps. In the wake of the ban of the NSDAP in 1933 and the failure of the putsch some 10,000 Nazi activists fled Austria for Germany, where an 'Austrian legion' was preparing them for the day when they would seize power in their homeland.[91] This produced a slowdown in the rise of Nazism in

Austria, which was reversed after Schuschnigg's agreement with Nazi Germany in July 1936.[92]

To the extent he may be in fairness be credited with having had any genuine charisma, Dollfuss may be said to have appealed primarily to marginalized Austrians from a background similar to his own.[93] Despite his croaky voice, his diminutive stature and unimpressive outward appearance, he had the 'charisma of the underdog'. In this, he reflected a mood that prevailed in Austria after the break-up of the Habsburg Empire. At the head of a small state he seems to have inspired intense loyalty in some and tried – not entirely unsuccessfully – to restore to Austrians their self-esteem and to stem the rising tide of pro-*Anschluss* sentiment. He did so with flawed or at least deeply ambiguous means.

Ambiguity, however, was not exorcised by his death. Elevated to the status of martyr, he had a song dedicated to him by the VF under Schuschnigg, containing the lines: 'Close ranks, youngsters, a dead man is leading us. He gave his blood for Austria, a truly German man.'[94]

Unbelievably, the text chosen resembled the Horst-Wessel song, the NSDAP's battle hymn. Churches were named after Dollfuss, crosses erected and a raft of commemorative books appeared.[95] His 'canonization' was interrupted by Austria's annexation and the war, but was continued in 1945 by the conservative Austrian People's Party (ÖVP – Österreichische Volkspartei).[96]

Bureaucratization and signs of the de-fascistization of the Schuschnigg regime (1936–March 1938)

Engelbert Dollfuss was succeeded on his death by his deputy, Kurt von Schuschnigg, a Catholic intellectual with a background of military ability. While his public appearance differed from Dollfuss, he continued his predecessor's policy of seeking to strike a balance between the different factions within the regime. He tended to favour officers of the former Habsburg army over CS politicians and was careful to avoid Dollfuss's strident patriotism.[97] While refusing to yield cultural primacy to Berlin – Austria was, in his view the better of the two German states – Schuschnigg's all-embracing German Reich sympathies made him less effective in resisting Hitler's pressure at the notorious meeting at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938.

Two years earlier he had succeeded in ousting paramilitary organizations, including the Heimwehr, from key positions within the regime, and managed to transfer the remains of the Heimwehr, first into the VF's militia and in 1937 into the Austrian army.[98]

Thus the quasi-revolutionary element of fascism, the Heimwehr, was first weakened, then eliminated from the political power structure, while pro-Austrian militantism, which had been strong towards the end of Dollfuss' life,

declined at the same time. As in other European dictatorships of the late 1930s, the influence of the military was very much in evidence in the government hierarchy, uniforms and public rituals.[99] This transfer of ideas did not necessarily depend on Catholicism, as Protestant and Orthodox churches also served as mediators.

Surprisingly, the Austrian Ständestaat displayed an interest in preparing a German translation of the Salazar's Estado novo only as late as 1936. It seems as if Dollfuss and Austrian conservative Catholics perceived themselves as being in the centre of the Catholic world, and therefore did not look with any interest beyond its borders, except gazing at the traditional intellectual focus points, mainly Berlin and Rome, but also at Budapest, Prague, Munich and Warsaw. The Catholic Church, which had profited from the privileges it had gained under Dollfuss, stood squarely behind Schuschnigg.

By now it is difficult to define which impulses the Austrian Ständestaat exercised on other anti-democratic regimes in Europe. As the French historian Paul Pasteur found out, Estonia's Konstantin Päts and Latvia's Kārlis Ulmanis took a similar line to gain power as Dollfuss, Latvia obviously imitated Dollfuss' and Schuschnigg's corporatist chamber model and their concentration of power. The VF observed even a 'posthumous' imitation in Béla Imrédy's Hungarian Front and Monsignor Tiso's Catholic authoritarian Ständestaat in Solvakia in 1938.[100]

A disconcerting matter was that Schuschnigg, in contrast to Dollfuss, toyed with the idea of giving Otto Habsburg a political role in Austria; the latter was made an honorary citizen in many communes and the anti-Habsburg law of 1919 was repealed. This set off alarm bells, particularly in France and Czechoslovakia, and above all for Hitler. It is an open question whether under Schuschnigg legitimism began to play a more influential role or not in Austria.[101]

The uncontrolled growth of corporations and semi-official organizations, associations and groups seems to have boosted practical pluralism within the regime, features described as typical of authoritarianism by Juan Linz.[102] This also strengthened the *ständisch* quasi-bureaucracies and led to an inefficient mix and overlap of organizations and institutions. This was a strong indicator of the growing militarization and bureaucratization of the Schuschnigg regime, which also took place – albeit under different circumstances – in the Franco regime during its final stages.

Without in any way wishing to play down the dictatorial character of the Schuschnigg regime and its ongoing persecution of political adversaries, particularly on the left, this author has interpreted this regime-internal process as the beginning of the de-fascistization of the hybrid Dollfuss–Schuschnigg regime.[103] At least it was the elimination of its Austrofascist component as

represented in the Heimwehr. It was not yet Nazification but an unwitting preparation for it.

This shift within the regime coincided with the Duce consigning Austria and the Danube basin to the German sphere of interest in the wake of his Abyssinian neo-colonialist war of conquest. The Austro-German agreement of July 1936 marked the beginning of Austria's path towards ever-closer relations with Germany,[104] a path that culminated in the 1938 *Anschluss*.

Time was running out for Schuschnigg's efforts to find a feasible alternative policy for securing Austria's independence either by turning towards the Western European powers or to the oppressed left-wing domestic opposition. This is true even if the chances for success of such a change of foreign and domestic policy would have been minimal.

The internal dynamics of the Christian Ständestaat had petered out by the time Schuschnigg attempted to mobilize his followers for a decisive plebiscite that the regime had steered away from in the past, fearing an anti-regime outcome. Instead of averting the invasion of the Wehrmacht and a Nazi uprising, the plebiscite planned for 12 March 1938 propelled the showdown. Hitler immediately ordered the Wehrmacht to invade Austria, which triggered uprisings by groups of Austrian Nazis particularly in the south of the country and in Vienna. Thus the *Anschluss* was not only an occupation by the German army and SS-police forces, but also a seizure of power from below (rapturous street demonstrations, spontaneous acts of violent persecutions of Jews and political opponents) and a take-over from positions the Nazis had already gained inside the state apparatus of the doomed Schuschnigg government.

Notes

1. The author is indebted to Heinrich Berger, Kurt Bauer, Lucile Dreidemy, António Costa Pinto and Otmar Binder for valuable hints and support, the latter also for his translation and discussion of this text, and to the LBIHS, Vienna, for financial and material support.
2. F. Wenninger and L. Dreidemy, 'Einleitung', in F. Wenninger and L. Dreidemy, eds, *Das Dollfuss–Schuschnigg-Regime 1933–1938: Vermessung eines Forschungsfeldes*, Vienna, Böhlau, 2013, p. 7; interestingly, another recent study also displays the same oscillation between diverse conflictive corner points. See I. Reiter-Zatloukal, C. Rothländer and P. Schölnberger, eds, *Österreich 1933–1938: Interdisziplinäre Annäherungen an das Dollfuß-/Schuschnigg-Regime*, Vienna, Böhlau, 2012. For spelling the name of Dollfuss I use the version in his baptism certificate (before the orthographic reform of 1901).
3. The most comprehensive and systematic monograph is now E. Tálos, *Das Austrofaschistische Herrschaftssystem: Österreich 1933–1938*, Vienna, Lit-Verl, 2013, pp. 71–78; E. Tálos and W. Neugebauer, eds, *Austrofaschismus: Politik, Ökonomie, Kultur 1933–1938*, 5th ed., Vienna, Lit-Verl, 2005. In contrast to this normative-typological approach of a prominent Austrian political scientist compare the

terminological variety in many of other historiographic studies on this topic, see note 4. For a balanced account see T. Kirk, 'Fascism and Austrofascism', in G. Bischof, A. Pelinka and A. Lassner, eds, *The Dollfuss–Schuschnigg Era in Austria: A Reassessment*, New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction, 2003, pp. 10–31. For left interpretations see G. Botz, 'Austro-Marxist interpretation of fascism', *Journal of Contemporary History* 11, no. 4, 1976, pp. 129–156.

4. R. J. Rath, 'The Dollfuss ministry: The intensification and the drift toward authoritarianism', in *Austrian History Yearbook* 30, Minneapolis, MN, Center for Austrian Studies, 1999, pp. 65–101; Bischof, Pelinka and Lassner, *The Dollfuss–Schuschnigg Era*; G. Enderle-Burcel, ed., *Protokolle des Ministerrates der Ersten Republik, 1918–1938*, sections 8–9 [Kabinette Dr. Engelbert Dollfuß and Dr. Kurt Schuschnigg], Vienna, Österreich 1984–2000; W. Goldinger, ed., *Christlichsoziale Partei: Protokolle des Klubvorstandes der Christlichsozialen Partei: 1932–1934*, Vienna, Geschichte u. Politik, 1977; H. Wohnout, *Regierungsdiktatur oder Ständeparlament? Gesetzgebung im autoritären Österreich*, Vienna, Böhlau, 1993; G Jagschitz, 'Der Österreichische Ständestaat 1934–1938', in E. Weinzierl and K. Skalnik, eds, *Österreich 1918–1938: Geschichte der Ersten Republik*, vol. 1, Graz, Styria, 1983, pp. 497–515.
5. E. Fraenkel, *The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1941; F. L. Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*, London, Gollancz, 1942. On Austria for the first time see E. Holtmann, 'Autoritätsprinzip und Maßnahmengesetz', in *Die Österreichische Verfassung von 1918–1938: Protokoll des Symposiums in Wien am 19. Okt. 1977*, Vienna, Geschichte u. Politik, 1980, pp. 210–212.
6. For instance, J. J. Linz, 'Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes', in F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby, eds, *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 3: *Macropolitical Theory*, Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 1975, pp. 175–411; M. Broszat, *Der Staat Hitlers: Grundlegung und Entwicklung seiner inneren Verfassung*, 15th ed., Munich, dtv, 2000; H. Mommsen, *Der Nationalsozialismus und die Deutsche Gesellschaft: Ausgewählte Aufsätze*, Reinbek bei Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1991; S. G. Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945*, London, UCL, 1995; R. O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, London, Allen Lane, 2004, pp. 119 ff., 153 ff. For recent overviews see R. Griffin with M. Feldman, eds, *Fascism: Critical Concepts in Political Science*, 5 vols, London, Routledge, 2004; A. A. Kallis, ed., *The Fascism Reader*, London, Routledge, 2003; R Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*, London, Routledge, 1993, pp. 120–128.
7. See A. A. Kallis, ' "Fascism", "para-fascism", and "fascistization" ', *European History Quarterly* 33, no. 3, 2003, pp. 219–250; A. C. Pinto, ed., *Rethinking the Nature of Fascism: Comparative Perspectives*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 1–9. A similar but more concrete approach is proposed in most contributions in S. Reichardt and W. Seibt, eds, *Der Prekäre Staat: Herrschen und Verwalten im Nationalsozialismus*, Frankfurt am Main, Campus, 2011.
8. For the 'four phases model' see G. Botz, 'Faschismus und "Ständestaat" vor und nach dem 12 Februar 1934', in E. Fröschl and H. Zoitl, eds, *Februar 1934: Ursachen, Fakten, Folgen*, Vienna: Wiener Volksbuchhandlungen, 1984, pp. 311–332; G. Botz, *Gewalt in der Politik: Attentate,Zusammenstöße, Putschversuche, Unruhen in Österreich 1918–1938*, 2nd ed., Munich, Fink, 1983, pp. 234–246.
9. For the following sections and for additional notes see G. Botz, 'The short- and long-term effects of the authoritarian regime and of Nazism in Austria: The burden of a "second dictatorship" ', in J. W. Borejsza and K. Ziemer, eds, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes in Europe*, New York, Berghahn, 2006, pp. 188–208.

10. F. L. Carsten, *Fascist Movements in Austria: From Schönerer to Hitler*, London, Sage, 1977; R. Eatwell, *Fascism: A History*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1997; M. Mann, *Fascists*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
11. See G. Sandner, 'From the cradle to the grave: Austromarxism and cultural studies', *Cultural Studies* 16, no. 6, 2002, pp. 908–918.
12. Originally from A. Wandruszka, 'Österreichs politische Struktur: Die Entwicklung der Parteien und politischen Bewegungen', in H. Benedikt, ed., *Geschichte der Republik Österreich*, 2nd ed., Vienna, Gesch. u. Politik, pp. 291–293. See also D. Lehnert, 'Das Lagerkonzept – und seine Alternativen', in E. Tálos, H. Dachs, E. Hanisch and A. Staudinger, eds, *Handbuch des Politischen Systems Österreichs: Erste Republik 1918–1933* (Vienna: Manz 1995), pp. 431–443; E. Hanisch, *Der Lange Schatten des Staates: Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20.Jahrhundert*, Vienna, Ueberreuter, 1994, pp. 117–152. See also several contributions in G. Bischof and A. Pelinka, eds, *Austro-Corporatism: Past – Present – Future*, New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction, 1996. For a recent formulation see A. Pelinka, 'Anti-Semitism and ethno-nationalisms as determining factors for Austria's political culture at the *fin de siècle*', in H. Tewes and J. Wright, eds, *Liberalism, Anti-Semitism, and Democracy: Essays in Honour of Peter Pulzer*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 63–75, particularly pp. 66–67.
13. Even the waves and distribution of political violence mirrored the camp structure. G. Botz, *Gewalt in der Politik: Attentate, Zusammenstöße, Putschversuche, Unruhen in Österreich 1918–1938*, 2nd ed., Munich, Fink, 1983, pp. 300–308.
14. For a critical account see J. Thorpe, 'Austrofascism: Revisiting the "authoritarian state" 40 years on', *Journal of Contemporary History* 45, no. 2, 2010, pp. 315–343.
15. This is true provided the following modifications are made: in 1934 90 per cent of the Austrian population were baptized Catholics, only four per cent were Protestants and the country's national identity was largely German as a consequence of the break up of the old multinational Empire; thus, none of these two features as such provided distinctions in Austria's political culture, only the degree mattered. Class cleavages and the centre–periphery distinction were strong but did not determine the country's political landscape.
16. N. Leser, *Zwischen Reformismus und Bolschewismus: Der Austromarxismus als Theorie und Praxis*, 2nd ed., Vienna, Böhlau, 1985.
17. E. Weinzierl, 'Kirche und Politik', in K. Skalnik and E. Weinzierl, eds, *Österreich 1918–1938: Geschichte der Ersten Republik*, vol. 1, Graz, Styria, 1983, pp. 438–496; G. Stimmer, *Eliten in Österreich: 1848–1970*, vol. 1, Vienna, Böhlau, 1997, pp. 668–717.
18. E. Hanisch, 'Das system und die Lebenswelt des Katholizismus', in Tálos et al., *Handbuch*, pp. 444–453.
19. The word *gesamt* has been often translated in a misleading manner as 'pan-German' (see Thorpe, 'Austrofascism', p. 318). In the use of political Austrian historiography it refers to a very wide and rather vague pro-German orientation, as opposed to the rigid programme of Georg Ritter von Schönerer (see A. G. Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools: Georg Ritter von Schönerer and Austrian Pan-Germanism*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1975) and his followers who called themselves, and are called in German language literature, *alldeutsch* (*all-* as translated by pan- [see the literature in the following note]).
20. E. Bruckmüller, *Nation Österreich*, 2nd ed., Vienna, Böhlau, 1993, pp. 276–315; F. Heer, *Der Kampf um die Österreichische Identität*, 3rd ed., Vienna, Böhlau, 2001, pp. 115–210. See in general H. Lutz and H. Rumpler, eds, *Österreich und die Deutsche Frage im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Probleme der Politisch-Staatlichen und*

Soziokulturellen Differenzierung im Deutschen Mitteleuropa, Vienna, Gesch. u. Politik, 1982; K. Bauer, ' "Heil Deutschösterreich!" Das deutschnationale Lager zu Beginn der Ersten Republik', in H. Konrad and W. Maderthaner, eds, *Der Rest ist Österreich: Das Werden der Ersten Republik*, Vol. 1, Vienna, Gerold, 2008, pp. 261–280.

21. P. G. Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria*, London, Halban, 1988.
22. S. Beller, *Vienna and the Jews, 1867–1938: A Cultural History*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989; A. Lichtblau, 'Antisemitismus – Rahmenbedingungen und Wirkungen auf das Zusammenleben von Juden und Nichtjuden', in Tálos et al., *Handbuch*, pp. 454–471; I. Oxaal, M. Pollak and G. Botz, eds, *Jews, Antisemitism and Culture in Vienna*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987.
23. J. J. Linz, 'Political space and fascism as a late-comer', in S. U. Larsen, B. Hagtvet and J. P. Myklebust, eds, *Who were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism*, Bergen, Forlaget, 1980, pp. 153–189.
24. Payne, *A History of Fascism*, chapter 8.
25. See the chapters by H. Konrad, H. Maimann and J. Weidenholzer in H. Konrad, ed., *Sozialdemokratie und "Anschluß": Historische Wurzeln. Anschluß 1918 und 1938. Nachwirkungen*, Vienna, Europa, 1978.
26. See among others R. N. von Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Europa Erwacht!*, Zurich, Paneuropa, 1934.
27. Stimmer, *Eliten in Österreich*, vol. 1, pp. 442–454, vol. 2, pp. 668–732.
28. Comprehensive for history and for 1933 use of the KWEG, see H. Leidinger and V. Moritz, 'Das Kriegswirtschaftliche Ermächtigungsgesetz (KWEG) vor dem Hintergrund der österreichischen Verfassungsentwicklung', in Wenninger and Dreidemy, *Dollfuss–Schuschnigg-Regime*, pp. 449–470. See also G. D. Hasiba: *Das Notverordnungsrecht in Österreich (1848–1917): Notwendigkeit und Mißbrauch eines "staatserhaltenden instrumentes"*, Vienna, Österr. Akad. d. Wiss., 1985; J. Redlich, *Österreichische Regierung und Verwaltung im Weltkriege*, Vienna, Hölder-Picher-Tempsky, 1925). For the example of the war censorship office see T. Scheer, *Die Ringstraßenfront: Österreich-Ungarn, das Kriegsüberwachungsamt und der Ausnahmezustand während des Ersten Weltkrieges*, Vienna, BMLVS, 2010. Still enlightening for 1933, see P. Huemer, *Sektionschef Robert Hecht und die Zerstörung der Demokratie in Österreich*, Munich, Oldenbourg, 1975.
29. G. Botz, 'The changing patterns of social support for Austrian National Socialism (1918–1945)', in Larsen, Hagtvet and Myklebust, *Who were the Fascists?*, pp. 202–224; M. Wladika, *Hitlers Vätergeneration: Die Ursprünge des Nationalsozialismus in der k.u.k. Monarchie*, Vienna, Böhlau, 2005; K. Bauer, *Nationalsozialismus: Ursprünge, Anfänge, Aufstieg und Fall*, Vienna, Böhlau, 2008, pp. 46–48.
30. B. F. Pauley, *Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis: A History of Austrian National Socialism*, London, Macmillan, 1981.
31. I. Kershaw, *Hitler*, vol. 1: *1889–1936: Hubris*, London, Longman, 1998, chapter 4.
32. W. Brauneder, *Österreichische Verfassungsgeschichte*, 11th ed., Vienna, Manz, 2009; B. Skottsberg, *Der Österreichische Parlamentarismus*, Gothenburg, Elanders, 1940.
33. K. Berchtold, ed., *Österreichische Parteiprogramme 1868–1966*, Vienna, Gesch. und Politik, 1967, pp. 402 ff. Many recent scholars have viewed the Heimwehr from this point as fascist, but there are doubts whether this is appropriate and if the fascist label can even be applied to the Heimwehr as a whole at any point during its existence. For a respectable account see W. Wiltschegg, ed.,

Die Heimwehr. Eine unwiderstehliche Volksbewegung?, Vienna, Verl. f. Geschichte u. Politik, 1985 Wiltschegg, *Heimwehr*, pp. 47, 267–270. The current author tends towards a nuanced, phase-wise account in contrast to my original typification of the Heimwehr as fascist, see G. Botz, 'Introduction', in Larsen, Hagtvet and Myklebust, *Who were the Fascists?*, pp. 192–201; H. Mommsen, 'Theorie und Praxis des österreichischen Ständestaats 1934 bis 1938', in P. Heintel et al., eds, *Das gesitige Leben Wiens in der Zwischenkreigszeit*, Vienna, Österreich Bunbdesverlag. 1981, p. 182.

34. Wiltschegg, *Heimwehr*, p. 263 and for the whole section: passim. See also Hanisch, *Der lange Schatten des Staates*, pp. 287–294; Botz, *Gewalt in der Politik*, pp. 161–230.
35. K.-J. Siegfried, *Universalismus und Faschismus: Das Gesellschaftsbild Othmar Spanns: Zur politischen Funktion seiner Gesellschaftslehre und Ständestaatskonzeption*, Vienna, Europa, 1974; J. Haag, 'Marginal men and the dream of the Reich: Eight Austrian national-Catholic intellectuals', in Larsen, Hagtvet and Myklebust, *Who were the Fascists?*, pp. 239–256. See also H. Mommsen, 'Theorie und Praxis des österreichischen Städnestaats 1934 bis 1938', in P. Heintel et al., eds, *Das geistige*, p. 182.
36. B. F. Pauley, *Hahnenschwanz and Swastika: The Styrian Heimatschutz and Austrian National Socialism 1918–1934*, Vienna, Europa, 1972.
37. C. A. Gulick, *Austria: From Habsburg to Hitler*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1980, chapter 21.
38. F. Butschek, *Österreichische Wirtschaftsgeschichte: Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*, 2nd ed., Vienna, Böhlau, 2011, pp. 182–218.
39. G. Jagschitz, 'Von der "Bewegung" zum Apparat', in E. Talós et al., eds, *NS-Herrschaft in Österreich: Ein Handbuch*, Vienna, öbv and hpt, 2002, pp. 88–122; C. Rothländer, *Die Anfänge der Wiener SS*, Vienna, Böhlau, 2012, pp. 21–333; Pauley, *Hitler*, chapters 3–5.
40. C. Klösch, 'Zerrieben zwischen Nationalsozialismus und Austrofaschismus', in Wenninger and Dreidemy, *Dollfuss–Schuschnigg-Regime*, pp. 87–105.
41. Botz, 'Changing patterns', pp. 210–215. A comprehensive electoral analysis has been made by D. Hänisch, *Die Österreichischen NSDAP-Wähler: Eine Empirische Analyse ihrer Politischen Herkunft und ihres Sozialprofils*, Vienna, Böhlau, 1998; U. Burz, *Die Nationalsozialistische Bewegung in Kärnten (1918–1933): Vom Deutschnationalismus zum Führerprinzip*, Klagenfurt, Kärntner Landesarchivs, 1998, pp. 177 ff.
42. For a compact overview see U. Kluge, *Der Österreichische Ständestaat 1934–1938: Entstehung und Scheitern*, Munich, Oldenbourg, 1984 pp. 51–60 and passim. See also P. Berger, *Kurze Geschichte Österreichs im 20. Jahrhundert*, Vienna, WUV, 2007; G. Jagschitz, 'Engelbert Dollfuß 1892 bis 1934', in F. Weissensteiner and E. Weinzierl, eds, *Die Österreichischen Bundeskanzler: Leben und Werk*, Vienna, Österreich Bundesverlag, 1983, pp. 190–216.
43. I am indebted to Laura Cerasi, who allowed me to use her unpublished innovative conference paper 'Corporatisme/Corporation/Corporativismo' presented as part of 'Nomadic concepts in the social sciences' conference at the school of history, classics and archaeology, Newcastle University, 14 March 2012.
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45. O. Christin, 'Introduction', in O. Christin, R. Barat and I. Moullier, eds, *Dictionnaire des Concepts Nomades en Sciences Humaines*, Paris, Métaillié, 2010, pp. 11–23. There are also many other examples. See A. C. Pinto, 'Introduction: Fascism and the other "isms" ', in Pinto, *Rethinking the Nature of Fascism*, pp. 1–9.

46. R. Kriechbaumer, *Die großen Erzählungen der Politik: Politische Kultur und Parteien in Österreich von der Jahrhundertwende bis 1945*, Vienna, Böhlau, 2001, pp. 470 ff.
47. P. Pasteur, *Les États autoritaires*, Paris, Armand Colin, 2007; E. Oberländer, ed., *Autoritäre Regime in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa 1919–1944*, Paderborn, Schöningh, 2001.
48. L. Kerekes, *Abenddämmerung einer Demokratie: Mussolini, Gömbös und die Heimwehr*, Vienna, Europa, 1966; A. Suppan and K. Koch, eds, *Außenpolitische Dokumente der Republik Österreich*, 8 vols, Vienna, Österr. Akad. d. Wiss, 1993–2009, especially volumes 7 and 8.
49. H. Mommsen, *Die Verspielte Freiheit: Der Weg der Republik von Weimar in den Untergang 1918 bis 1933*, Frankfurt am Main, Ullstein, 1990, pp. 443–547.
50. P. Eppel, *Zwischen Kreuz und Hakenkreuz: Die Haltung der Zeitschrift 'Schönere Zukunft' zum Nationalsozialismus in Deutschland 1934–1938*, Vienna, Böhlau, 1980.
51. Heer, *Kampf um die österreichische Identität*, pp. 115–210.
52. G. Heiss, 'Pan-Germans, better Germans, Austrians: Austrian historians on national identity from the First to the Second Republic', *German Studies Review* 16, 1993, pp. 411–433; H. Bußhoff, *Das Dollfuß-Regime in Österreich: In geistesgeschichtlicher Perspektive unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der 'Schöneren Zukunft' und 'Reichspost'*, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1968; J. Haag, 'Marginal men and the dream of the Reich: Eight Austrian national-Catholic intellectuals', in Larsen, Hagtvet and Myklebust, *Who were the Fascists?*, pp. 239–248.
53. Botz, *Gewalt in der Politik*, pp. 215–218; H. Schafranek, 'Österreichische Nationalsozialisten in der Illegalität 1933–1938: Ein Forschungsbericht', in Wenninger and Dreidemy, *Dollfuss–Schuschnigg-Regime*, pp. 105–137.
54. See *Unser Staatsprogramm: Führerworte*, Vienna, Bundeskommissariat f. Heimatdienst, 1935, p. 69.
55. Berchtold, *Österreichische Parteiprogramme*, pp. 427–433.
56. Tálos, *Das austrofaschistische Herrschaftssystem*, pp. 147–152; I. Bohunovsky-Bärnthaler, *Die Vaterländische Front: Geschichte und Organisation*, Vienna, Europa, 1971.
57. K. von Klemperer, *Christian Statesman in a Time of Crisis*, Princetown, NJ, Princetown University Press, 1972.
58. E. Hanisch, *Die Ideologie des Politischen Katholizismus in Österreich, 1918–1938*, Vienna, Geyer, 1977; E. Weinzierl, *Die Österreichischen Konkordate von 1855 und 1933*, Vienna, Geschichte und Politik,1960.
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60. E. Langthaler, 'Ein brachliegendes Feld: Forschungen zur Agrargeschichte Österreichs in den 1930er Jahren', in Wenninger and Dreidemy, *Dollfuss–Schuschnigg-Regime*, p. 336. See also E. Bruckmüller, E. Hanisch and R. Sandgruber, eds, *Geschichte der österreichischen Land- und Forstwirtschaft im 20. Jahrhundert, vol. 1: Politik, Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft*, Vienna, Ueberreuter, 2002.
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62. Eatwell, *Fascism*, pp. 74–80.

63. H. Rumpler, 'Der Ständestaat ohne Stände', in R. Krammer, C. Kühberger and F. Schausberger, eds, *Der Forschende Blick: Beiträge zur Geschichte Österreichs im 20. Jahrhundert*, Vienna, Böhlau, 2010, pp. 229–245; P. Melichar, 'Ein Fall für die Mikrogeschichte? Otto Enders Schreibtischarbeit', in E. Hiebl and E. Langthaler, eds, *Im Kleinen das Große suchen. Mikrogeschichte in Theorie und Praxis: Hanns Haas zum 70. Geburtstag*, Innsbruck, Studien 2012, pp. 185–205.
64. See Pius XI, *Litterae Encyclicae Quadragesimo Anno*, www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno_lt.html (accessed 20 February 2012). Remarkably, the encyclical's vague Latin terminology was shifting between *collegia seu corpora* and *ordines* and left crucial leeway for its translation into German, probably co-worded by Ignaz Seipel. In German texts it appeared often as '(berufs-)ständisch' (see Pius XI, *Weltrundschreiben über die gesellschaftliche Ordnung [. . .]. Authentische dt. Übertragung*, Berlin, 1931, pp. 27–30) and this was prone to be used by German-speaking adepts for the propagation for their specific *ständisch* conceptions.
65. P. Pasteur, 'Der Ständestaat, ein autoritärer Staat wie die anderen oder ein Modell?', in F. S. Festa, E. Fröschl, T. la Rocca, L. Parente and G. Zanasi, eds, *Das Österreich der dreißiger Jahre und seine Stellung in Europa: Materialien der internationalen Tagung in Neapel, Salerno und Taurasi (5. – 8. Juni 2007)*, Frankfurt am Main, Lang, 2012, pp. 196–120.
66. W. Maderthaner and M. Maier, eds, *'Der Führer bin ich selbst': Engelbert Dollfuß – Benito Mussolini, Briefwechsel*, Vienna, Löcker, 2004.
67. See the detailed contributions in Fröschl and Zoitl, *Februar 1934*.
68. W. R. Garscha, 'Opferzahlen als Tabu: Totengedenken und Propaganda nach Februaraufstand und Juliputsch 1934', in Reiter-Zatloukal, Rothländer and Schölnberger, *Österreich 1933–1938*, pp. 111–128; Tálos, *Das Austrofaschistische Herrschaftssystem*, pp. 288–293.
69. G. Jagschitz, 'Die Anhaltelager in Österreich', in L. Jedlicka and R. Neck, eds, *Vom Justizpalast zum Heldenplatz*, Vienna, Österreich Staatsdruckerei, 1975, pp. 128–151; P. Schölnberger, '"Ein leben ohne freiheit ist kein leben": Das "anhaltelager" wöllersdorf 1933–1938', in Reiter-Zatloukal, Rothländer and Schölnberger, *Österreich 1933–1938*, pp. 94–107.
70. For example, socialists who had left the Catholic Church were forced to crawl up church staircases on their knees (oral report by by Arne Haselbach, SD director of *Volkshochschule* Vienna-Brigittenau, to the author 2004). Left-wing as well as Nazi activists with family were forced by police and Heimwehr to clean their graffiti from walls and streets (oral report by Josef Toch, the head of *Tagblatt-Archiv*, Arbeiterkammer Vienna to the author in 1967); and O. R. von Rohrwig, *Der Freiheitskampf der Ostmark-Deutschen: Von St. Germain bis Adolf Hitler*, Graz, Stocker, 1942.
71. See A. Staudinger, 'Zur Österreich-Ideologie des Ständestaates', in L. Jedlicka and R. Neck, eds, *Das Juliabkommen von 1936: Vorgeschichte, Hintergründe und Folgen*, Vienna, Geschichte und Politik, 1977, pp. 198–240; A. Staudinger, 'Austrofaschistische "Österreich"-ideologie', in Tálos and Neugebauer, *Austrofaschismus*, pp. 29–52.
72. A. C. Pinto, *Salazar's Dictatorship and European Fascism: Problems of Interpretation*, Boulder, CO, Social Science Monographs, 1995, p. 170.
73. H. Wohnout, 'Die Verfassung 1934 im Widerstreit der unterschiedlichen Kräfte im Regierungslager', in Reiter-Zatloukal, Rothländer and Schölnberger, *Österreich 1933–1938*, pp. 17–30.

74. See Tálos, *Das Austrofaschistische Herrschaftssystem.*
75. Linz, 'Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes', pp. 271, 307–313.
76. Cited from Tálos, *Das Austrofaschistische Herrschaftssystem*, p. 152.
77. I. Bohunovsky-Bärnthaler, *Die Vaterländische Front*; R. Kriechbaumer, ed., *Österreich! und Front Heil! Aus den Akten des Generalsekretariats der Vaterländischen Front: Inneanansichten eines Regimes*, Vienna, Böhlau, 2005; Tálos, *Das Austrofaschistische Herrschaftssystem*, p. 172.
78. It is misleading not to consider the regime-typical causes of the VF's much higher membership rate than the NSDAP or the Italian Fascist Party. Thorpe, 'Austrofascism', p. 322.
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80. P. Pasteur, *Être syndiqué(e) à l'ombre de la croix potencée: Corporatisme, syndicalisme, résistance en Autriche, 1934–1938*, Rouen, Centre d'Études et de Recherches Autrichiennes, 2002, pp. 89–139.
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