The End of an Old Regime: Visions of Political Reform in Late Imperial Austria

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Recent contributions to the historiography and social analysis of the Austrian Second Republic have analyzed the extraordinary evolution of an Austrian "national" consciousness, before and especially after 1955.1 Historians have charted the mythological and ritualistic assumptions of this process, including the coordination between "permanent neutrality" and Austrian public identity. Such work underscores a perennial problem in Austrian history: can the Austrian state be viewed as a state—that is, a locus of organized public power—apart from, or in distinction to, a discrete national community? Is it possible, in historical and cultural terms, to conceive of the Second Republic as a continuing part of German Central Europe; or will it prove both inevitable and necessary to view modern Austrian history from the perspective that Austria has and will continue to endure, as Gerhard Botz has suggested, an early nineteenth-century conjunction between new democracy and new nationality, a century and a half after the fact?2

To the extent that Austria has now seemed to resolve the turmoil of the First Republic, it may be argued that the events of 1945–55 did constitute a true (and perhaps the only true) revolution in Austrian history. Austrians now possess both a state and a nation that they accept and find legitimate, in contrast to the First Republic, when many seemed skeptical about their Germanness sans Germany and where, as Eric Voegelin noted, Austria was a democracy without a demos.3 The Second Republic has

prospered, therefore, from a state- and nation-building process, and it may well be that the first was more important than the second. Unlike the First Republic, a "state" that no one wanted, the Second has become the self-evident consensus-based home to which all accord loyalty.

This historic shift in the political self-identity of Austrians raises questions relating to the continuities and discontinuities in the history of the Austrian state over the longue durée; and, particularly, the ways in which the events of the last decades of the Empire may be seen, at least from the perspective of the Austro-Germans, as constituting models or opportunities for (or against) responsible action after 1918 and after 1945. Has the Austrian state been simply the discontinuous product of external compulsion and arbitrary and discordant imposition—1867, 1918, 1934, 1938, 1945—or can one impute to the process of Austrian state building endogenous and persistent themes that provide it with a semblance of continuity? Equally important, does the watershed of Austrian history fall irrevocably in 1918 or in 1938? Or are perhaps the less evident "brackets" of 1907 and 1945 more compelling watersheds in a century of Austrian history? Should the modern history of Austria be written forward from the past—as a state whose political traditions cannot be comprehended without the nineteenth century—or will it be written backward from the present, as a state (or series of "states") divorced from the web of its own history? Does the apparent discontinuity of the Austrian "nation" necessitate an equivalent discontinuity of the Austrian state?

I

By 1918 the collapse of the Monarchy called into question the very idea of a distinct, Austrian state, and the political history of the First Republic is unintelligible without a sense of the profound disorientation, the chaos of 1918 lingering throughout the period up to 1934. Writing in October 1918 during the last, desperation-filled weeks of the Monarchy’s existence, Ignaz Seipel offered an eloquent defense of imperial rule that sought to reconcile past and future—European absolutism with American Wilsonianism. Seipel argued that dynasticism could be integrated into democratic systems of governance by repudiating the traditions and power structures of the Josephist Verwaltung. For Seipel the essence of Hapsburg imperialism had always been the defense of cultural and popular freedom (the Emperor as Anwalt und Schützer of the freedom of the people). What had obscured the institution of monarchy in the nineteenth century was its linkage to and co-optation by an oppressive bureaucratic system. Seipel criticized the arbitrary hegemony of this bureaucratic system, whose Germanness was an accident of history: "It is not true that the German nation ruled the other Austrian national groups; what is true, however,
is that the Germans as well as the other national groups groaned under the weight of a bureaucracy which just happened to be German, but which did not act oppressively simply because it was German. The postwar world, in contrast, might combine self-determining national democracy with populistic dynasticism to the apparent exclusion of bureaucratic hegemony.

Seipel may have been wrong in implying a disinterest in or a lack of acceptance of cultural or political hegemony by the Germans, but his comments on the intimate and eventually fatal collusion of the Germans with the state and especially the state administrative apparatus touched upon a critical factor in that community’s fate. The Austro-Germans were by 1918 not the victors over the state but, rather, its victims. The first task of the historian as well as the statesman of 1918 was to comprehend the tragic history of the Austro-Germans not in terms of hegemony, but in terms of self-entrapping illusions and degradation. Indeed, the state itself had become a victim of its own bureaucratic power. Seipel’s desire to retain a vestigial “great” Austria led him into a half-hearted acceptance of a “small” Austria, and his loyalty to dynasticism created suspicions of disloyalty to republicanism. In late 1918 controversies over state form worked against the conditions of state function.

Otto Bauer, Seipel’s great antagonist in the First Republic, offered a radically different perspective on the dissolution of the state in October 1918. Bauer had emerged during the war as a preeminent spokesman for national autonomy on a state-political basis. As the ruins of the Empire began to settle in mid-October, he projected a new home, a new legal and moral context for the Austrian “nation,” to wit, collaboration with and eventually outright merger into the new Social Democratic German republic. Writing in the Arbeiter-Zeitung, Bauer proclaimed the end of German imperialism and militarism and, with them, the collapse of that “system of power which subjected the German people themselves to the rule of the Generals, the Junkers, the capitalists.” Bauer looked with confidence toward the imminent day when the majority of German voters would “gather in the camp of Social Democracy,” making “the Germany of tomorrow . . . a democratic Germany.”

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Bauer prudently avoided a precise description of the mode of revolutionary transformation—it might occur, he argued, in sudden stormy upheavals or in quickly paced legal reforms, but one way or another it was inexorable. The victory of democracy, because it was a victory of the proletariat, opened new vistas for Austro-Germans as well. Bauer noted that these developments in Germany were of critical importance to Austrians because “the old Austria is dead” and “we Social Democrats want to build a new one, a confederation of free peoples. But if the other nations of Austria do not want to join such a community, or if they only agree under such conditions and forms that would not protect our economic interests and right to national self-determination, then Deutschösterreich will be forced to decide whether it was not preferable to join the German Reich as a special Bundesstaat.” By reemphasizing the ineluctability of national self-determination, as Hans Mommsen notes, with a seeming adherence to the ideals of revolutionary democratic nationalism, Bauer had moved beyond the intellectual and emotional perimeters of the Monarchy.6

What is ironic about both positions—the lost monarchism and Catholic universalism of Seipel and the ardent socialist transformationalism and Anschluss mentality of Bauer—is the range of issues on which they might find agreement, if only negatively. Viewed from the perspective of 1927 or even 1934 both visions were problematic: both presumed the unacceptability of a small, German-Austrian state per se, and both sought to anchor Austro-German national consciousness in the development of a new, more universal state formation that would surpass the limited vision of the nineteenth-century ideal of one bourgeois state, one democratic nation. In Seipel’s case this came by virtually dismissing the hegemonic past of the Germans—implicitly by making them victims of their own hegemony. Bauer in contrast quickly and deftly subsumed what was left of a narrowly “Austro-German” national consciousness into the German Reich, but one that itself, Bauer hoped, would be fundamentally transformed into a new, socialist society.

Both views signaled the short-term repercussions and long-term consequences of the death of the Austrian Old Regime, necessitating a process of political decompression that would endure for at least a generation. And both positions bring forth with unusual clarity the dilemma before 1914 of what one might call “progressive” German political theorists

in east central Europe, struggling to comprehend and ultimately to defend a region of multinational and multiparty organizations.

This was the critical challenge facing Germans in the Monarchy after 1900 who sought something more than the negative, defensive attrition of the age of programs: could one protect the "Germans" as a national and ethnic group in the Monarchy not by guaranteeing to them a greater relative level of separate and discrete juridical resources or special territorially based political privileges but, rather, by strengthening the competitive and regulatory institutions of the state, seen as an independent locus of power beyond (yet based on) national prerogatives? Could one encourage the generation of a more diverse range of public policy issues distinct from the cultural interests of any nation (including the Germans), but which would inevitably allow the Germans cultural hegemony or at least competitive parity?

II

Twenty years ago one historian, Andrew Whiteside, commented that "[Austro-]German national politics after 1879 were only a postscript to the great crisis. No new policies or events significantly changed the attitudes of the leaders or the masses."7 If "German" here refers to the Sudeten tradition, this view is correct. If, however, one adopts a more capacious meaning for the adjective, one finds, especially in the period 1905–14, a variety of fascinating visions of state reform policy undertaken by or sponsored by what may fairly be called "German" political interests in the Monarchy.

It is clear that the views of Austro-Germans on their role as cultural and political hegemonists changed radically in the Monarchy between 1867 and 1918. They changed not merely in terms of the intensity of their defensiveness (which is the usual assertion about the behavior of the Germans as a collective political group). The period itself was punctuated by decisive shifts in the very constitutive framework and substance of what we must reasonably understand as defining "German" politics. After 1900 two major "German" parties emerged and tried to seize both the symbols and the organs of power in the Monarchy. Their preoccupation with German national issues was so different from anything that had preceded them as to call into question the assumption that by 1907 one can even speak of a single "German politics" or even a single German nationalism in the Hapsburg Monarchy.

Before 1900 Austro-German politics was bound up in a matrix of values of Liberals and was, as epitomized in the Whitsun Program of May 1899, a politics of language and territory on one hand and specifically defensive provincial politics on the other.\(^8\) This was a politics executed in Vienna, but it was undertaken in the spirit of the great heartland of Liberal politics—in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, and to a lesser extent, selected Alpine bastions in Styria, Salzburg, and Carinthia. While Elizabeth Wiskemann argued nearly fifty years ago that in the 1860s and 1870s “Liberal rule was to a large extent Sudetendeutsch rule,”\(^9\) it would be a mistake to argue that Austrian Liberalism was unilaterally “Sudeten” (to use an early twentieth-century term) in its cast of mind. The larger agenda of German politics, however, as epitomized in the constitutionalist period of 1861–79, in the period of linguistic and cultural retrenchment from 1879 to 1896, and finally, from 1897 to 1914, the period of activist defense, was strongly influenced by German national concerns for the northern periphery. The role of Vienna and Lower Austria in state-level Austro-Liberal politics has yet to receive a definitive account. But it is fair to say that the city was more a discursive and symbolic object than an acting subject, stranded in a no-man’s-land of pluralistic social and national interests (including an electorate composed of former Czechs as well as Germans) and surpassed in its political unorthodoxy only by the cultural immobility and religious conservatism of other Alpine crownlands like Upper Austria or Tyrol.

German nationalist politics after 1879 were victimized by the curious dialectic in the evolution of the state’s electoral and constitutional institutions. The German Liberals had designed a state and regional political apparatus that oppositionist parties like the Young Czechs and the Christian Socials used to subvert their hegemony. The Badeni Crisis of 1897–99 was the final, public act of the Germans’ devolution and isolation. The Whitsun Program of May 1899, whose modesty far exceeded the ambitious Linz Program of two decades earlier, merely confirmed the new fortress mentality of a political group who could no longer think in terms of the state as a whole, but who quite consciously now styled themselves as a particularist group seeking a minimum level of defense:


the form and aesthetics of the Whitsun Program stood in indirect rela-
tionship to its lack of imagination and its loss of nerve.

The emergence of the two great mass parties of the twentieth century
in Austria—Christian Socialism and Austrian Social Democracy—changed
these calculations drastically. The slow mobilization of political oppo-
sitionism within the German camp resulted not only from systemic
social upheavals or transformations in mass values, but also from the
siphon-like expansion of the Austrian electoral system. Each decade
significant new “actors,” with new political or electoral constituencies
holding no special consensus about former Liberal politics, were invited
into the system. Not surprisingly, they not only bit the hand that fed
them but began to cannibalize the body as well.10 The process of their
emergence encompasses detailed trends that cannot be discussed here.
Both parties emerged (in their modern form) almost simultaneously in
the 1880s, and both assumed the Viennese metropolis as the executive
and visual center of their organizations. It is also evident that both, as
much as they detested each other, also saw themselves as vanquishing
the Austro-German Liberals. Both, in spite of such claims, inevitably
assembled within their respective coalitions elements of older Liberal
values and organizational techniques. There are really only two major
Lager in modern Austrian politics, and from their inception these two
Lager have shared some remarkable affinities: Both were German parties:
this was always the case for the Christian Socials and formally the case
for Victor Adler’s cadres since 1911. Both were ultimately centralistic
in their political and administrative values, although the Christian Socials
included strong autonomistic elements, not only in the provinces but
also in Vienna itself. Each had a surprisingly subtle sense of opportunism
in regard to the nationality problem, bowing and bending to it but always
with a larger agenda of social and economic interests in mind. Each was
based, in ethos if not in form, in Vienna, and each tended to measure
victories and defeats in Vienna as constituting a prominent, if not cat-
egorical, mark of its larger legitimacy and success—each viewed the
Hapsburg political universe through the special prism of Viennese pro-
vincial cosmopolitanism, and each constituted a pattern of values in what
Hermann Broch charmingly called the “value vacuum” in fin de siècle
Vienna. Each emerged as a result of new voter enfranchisements in the
electoral system—each had, thus, a sense of venturousness and movement,

10 See the classic work of Adam Wandruszka, “Österreichs politische Struktur,”
in Geschichte der Republik Österreich, ed. Heinrich Benedikt (Vienna, 1954);
but for a criticism of Lager theory see Hermann Fritzl and Martin Uitz, “Kritische
Anmerkungen zur sogenannten Lagertheorie,” Österreichische Zeitschrift für
and was willing and could conceptually understand politics as a form not of defensive attrition but as a mode of social aggression and ideological conquest.

The major policy agenda on which both had the opportunity to act and which constituted the fundamental legitimizing act of their new existence as Imperial parties of more than peripheral or regional significance was the universal suffrage law of 1906/7. This law has been analyzed by numerous historians, but its implications have yet to be fully explored in detail from the angle of Viennese and non-Sudeten German politics. True, the bill received powerful support from various Slavic leaders and ardent support from Czech Social Democrats. Still, it is fair to say that two of the most effective and influential collective architects of the bill in the parliament were in fact the Christian Socials and German Social Democrats and particularly their leaders, Albert Gessmann and Victor Adler, and that both groups acted from interests that were not entirely dissimilar.

Albert Gessmann, the principal parliamentary leader of the Christian Social party by 1905–6, was a vigilant defender of the bill, as were Christian Social Alpinists like Aemilian Schöpfer, Josef Schraffl, and Jodok Fink. Not only did Gessmann represent the party in the critical parliamentary committee drafting the legislation, but his influence with Richard Bienerth, Baron Beck's minister of interior affairs, was significant in editorial work on the bill and for overseeing it through parliament. In July 1906 Prince Alois Liechtenstein would write to Beck requesting a Hofrat title for Gessmann because of the extraordinary service he had performed for Beck in pushing the law through committee. Spurred by an ambition to move his party beyond the provincialism of Vienna, Gessmann articulated a vision of a new Reichspartei that would unite Alpine and Viennese bürgerlich and peasant voters into a new multi-interest party grounded on a model that was in part derived from that of the German Zentrum. Moreover, with key support from Alfred Ebenhoch

11 The basic analysis is that of William Jenks, The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907 (New York, 1950).
12 The following comments are based on chap. 2 of my "Culture and Political Crisis in Vienna, 1898–1918" (1985, typescript).
and other former Catholic clerical leaders, Gessmann was able to expand this Reichspartei in June 1907 to include provinces like Upper Austria, Salzburg, and Styria as well, producing a party delegation of ninety-six, the largest in the new Abgeordnetenhaus. The final result of the reform law, as Gessmann argued in his analysis of the May 1907 elections, was to challenge bourgeois political groups of all nationalities: “For the government and for all the bourgeois parties these elections offer—as I often had the chance to argue in the parliamentary reform committee—the most serious warning to rally themselves in time, to disregard that which separates and to concentrate on that which unites.” Gessmann then insisted that “social reform of the grandest style must be launched, in order that in place of national quarrels social-political work above all will be accomplished in the great new House. Only thus can the truly menacing danger of Social Democracy be met successfully.” Secular social reform, undertaken by reformed, disciplined mass bourgeois parties would thus kill two political birds with one interest-based stone: it would bring the rival nationalities together and preempt the disequilibrating power of the Social Democrats.

The election reform law thus became for Gessmann a unique opportunity to sanction a bürgerliche Sammlungspolitik among all Austrian bourgeois parties, of which the natural leader would be the Christian Social Reichspartei. Not only did Gessmann support democratization and expansion of the national electoral system (against the wishes of some within the Rathaus faction of the party in Vienna), but he was convinced of the necessity of parliamentarizing ministerial life as well: the “people” must not only secure control of the legislature, but they must impose their will on the Verwaltung as well. When Gessmann’s sometime parliamentary ally, Josef Redlich, argued in defense of the German-Czech-Polish bourgeois coalition in 1908 that “the present political system is based on a coalition of three great national party groups. . . . This system is the correct one for Austria, because it is the only way that a truly parliamentary government in Austria can be sustained. No people in Austria—including the Germans—is strong enough to sustain by itself such a parliamentary government,” he was expressing ideals that Gessmann sought to implement in practice.

Gessmann's theoretical views of the nationality question were fragile and, like those of most of his colleagues, usually determined by political exigencies. The party contained its share of Slav baiters, and, as Monika Glettler has noted, was responsible for unseemly tactics against Czech Nationalists in Vienna. Yet the Christian Socials were among the less poisonous of the German-speaking parties on the nationality issue, if one measures their "Germanness" by active interest in or real conviction for Sudeten German territorialist schemes.\textsuperscript{17} The tradition of conciliation in the Catholic camp represented by Ignaz Seipel does not emerge out of nothing, even if Seipel himself may have felt disconsolate over the indifference with which the Viennese leadership under Richard Weiskirchner greeted his plans for national reconciliation during the war.\textsuperscript{18} It should also be noted that, prior to their merger with the Viennese Christian Socials, the Alpine-based Catholic Conservatives had manifested serious skepticism about "liberal" German nationalism, some residue of which also survived after 1907. The party under Gessmann cooperated with the German Nationalverband and mouthed much of its nationalist rhetoric, but its true tactical and strategic interests lay elsewhere. This was, in fact, critical to Gessmann's calculations in the period of the Beck and Bienert ministries: the central element of Gessmann's strategy was anti-Marxism. He hoped that Austrian political discourse could be shifted to engage a broad front of social interest issues, which would mitigate if not resolve the conundrums of nationality, at least in the short term. In order to defend the Austrian state—and the Christian Socials emerge as prime defenders of a specifically Austrian state—beyond the collision of nationalities, Gessmann had to designate an appropriate (and different) enemy of that state. Rather than scorning Gessmann, the Socialists should have honored him, for he took them far more seriously than had any major Austrian bourgeois politician before.\textsuperscript{19}

The Social Democrats were equally, if in far more theoretical terms, supportive of universal suffrage. Nevertheless, in contrast to the ambitions of the Christian Socials, for whom the logic of the law would be the creation of a new German class politics, the Social Democrats viewed the law as a desperate attempt to preserve the semblance of mass, international unity within their own party and to create a system of democratized power that would enable processes of national autonomism to evolve within the Austrian polity. Moreover, the Socialists also, as is apparent

\textsuperscript{17} Monika Glettler, \textit{Die Wiener Tschechen um 1900} (Munich, 1972).
\textsuperscript{18} See Seipel to Lammasch, January 21, 1918 and June 17, 1918, \textit{Seipel Nachlass}, Diözesanarchiv, Vienna.
\textsuperscript{19} For a brilliant socialist critique of Gessmann, see Friedrich Austerlitz, "Gessmann als Erzieher," \textit{Der Kampf} 2 (1908/9): 97–101.
in Karl Renner's work, held expectations similar to the Christian Socials’ that the law would establish a new configuration of class and economic interest politics, beyond the range of older Curial nationalist conflict. As early as 1901 Renner argued eloquently for universal suffrage in justice to the state and as a necessary precondition for the political survival of the Austrian bourgeoisie: ‘‘The bourgeoisie must learn to swim and really swim in the stream. A boat made out of legal privilege is merely a paper vessel, on which only fools would rely.’’ Only with such reforms would economic, class conflict emerge in full clarity: ‘‘Economic classes strive not for separate [national] states but for a distinct, self-advantageous arrangement of the existing state; they split up nations and bind together similar economic strata of all the peoples to political parties.’’ Lacking universal suffrage, the Austrian bourgeoisie did not view itself as an ‘‘economic class’’ but rather merely as a ‘‘supplier of civil servants.’’ The reforms were justifiable not merely for the proletariat but also for the state itself.20 Similar arguments emerged in his Grundlagen und Entwicklungsziele in 1906: with such a suffrage ‘‘the natural battle organization of the propertied classes will come into play.’’ Eventually ‘‘alliances of the progressives of all nations, of clericals, the supporters of industry, of the agrarians of all nations must take place and bridge over the antitheses of nationality.’’21

Even more radical (and more aggressively orthodox) commentators, like the young Otto Bauer, admitted that the reform was both progressive and instrumentally useful (although it could not be a definitive end unto itself). He understood that the most recent evolutionary stage in Austrian bourgeois parliamentarism—political democracy—was the product of Socialist militancy and that it accorded the Social Democrats, as the principal (and principled) opponents of bourgeois parliamentarism, timely opportunities for their critical work of ideological education. It also gave them full membership in the grid of state power, where they formed the primary opposition against an unstable bourgeois bloc.22

22 Otto Bauer, ‘‘Parlamentarismus und Arbeiterchaft,’’ Otto Bauer Werkausgabe (Vienna, 1980), 8.119–31. See also Bauer’s arguments in ‘‘Unser Nationalitätenprogramm und unsere Taktik,’’ ibid., esp. p. 76, as well as the commentary in Die Tätigkeit des Sozialdemokratischen Verbandes im Abgeordnetenhaus, p. 5.
Thus, Social Democratic support for the bill, beyond legitimate hopes for the positive consequences of opening up the system and the conciliation of national rivalries, can be read as an attempt by the Social Democrats to tolerate, if only grudgingly, the creation of a bourgeois-dominated parliamentary system, in the anticipation that some democracy was better than none and some parliamentarism better than the autocratic status quo.

Ironically, the Christian Socials and Social Democrats shared some motives on this subject (as on many other issues). For both, universal suffrage was nothing less than an institutional, etatist solvent that might reduce the tensions of nationality. Not only would these tensions be confronted with direct, democratically legitimated solutions and the parliament’s attention shifted to social and economic issues, but, equally important, the national parties would be forced to act in a responsible, independent way vis-à-vis the Verwaltung. Both sought to create a new political culture of disciplined mass parties and informed and active voters—Gessmann’s insistence on laws making voting compulsory was a crude, but effective, tactic to force the Austrian bourgeoisie into successful competition with the Social Democrats.

Unfortunately, the experiment of parliamentarism failed. One can see this in the painful theoretical puzzles of Bauer and Renner after 1907 (which Hans Mommsen has carefully surveyed), but also in the careers of the Christian Social leaders, and especially in the miserable narrative course of Austrian parliamentary politics between 1907 and 1914. Gessmann, true to his word, attempted to play the role of parliamentary Klassenkampf minister between 1907 and 1909, and was humiliated, not only by the Crown and the bureaucracy but by the inept reactions of his constituents as well. Gessmann’s bitter and disillusioning experiences as minister of public works in the Beck Cabinet between 1907 and 1908 illustrated the complexity of antinomic obstacles standing in the way of such experiments: not merely the nationality question but more secular problems involving the confrontation between forms of bureaucratic and mass political power were at issue.23

The question remains, Why did this experiment fail? Its failure is often attributed solely to the nationalities dilemma, but this interpretation is too narrow. In an essay in Der Kampf in 1909, which deserves greater attention than previously accorded, Otto Bauer argued that the future of parliamentarism (and ministerialism) in Austria had to be seen not merely in the context of the substantive struggle between Czechs and Germans or foreign policy issues facing the Monarchy, but also as involving larger structural issues between democracy and bureaucracy: “It is not a question of the struggle of Slav and German . . . but a new phase of an old

23 On Gessmann’s tenure, see Boyer (n. 12 above).
altercation, which each parliament in Europe endured, of the conflict between parliament and government, between democracy and bureaucracy, between popular control and absolutism. Our first duty is thus: we must help the people to understand that the nations of Austria must themselves secure the democratic constitution of nationalities, if they do not want to open the way for a bureaucratic Staatsstreich.\(^\text{24}\)

Gessmann’s attempt (and for that matter, Victor Adler’s) to fashion a large, independent, and bureaucratically skilled mass party across regional lines was more reminiscent of nineteenth-century American parties than of traditional Austrian conceptions of party organization and political style. It was not accidental that Josef Redlich, searching for an epithet for the Christian Social elite in Vienna, would summon the phrase “sie sind alle ‘politicians’ im amerikanischen Sinne. . . .”\(^\text{25}\) Recent analyses of the political process in nineteenth-century America have observed the peculiar semiconstitutional role that American political parties came to play in the formation of the modern American state. In the United States mass parties preceded, rather than followed, mass bureaucracy and provided the nerve centers and instruments of democratic governance that later forced independent, executive, and managerial elites to maintain a constant adherence to political norms and to decentralized state practice. Mass parties served as broad popular instruments of both vertical and horizontal interest articulation and constituency representation in the American polity. The later growth of a modern, industrial-based central bureaucracy could not displace completely the representational power (and the implicit prerogative to influence, if not unilaterally determine, policy) that the political parties enjoyed in the multinational republican empire that was late nineteenth-century America.\(^\text{26}\)

In the multinational dynastic empire that was Austria we know that the reverse obtained. An enduring tradition of bureaucratic management

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\(^{24}\) Otto Bauer, “Die Lehren des Zusammenbruchs,” Werkausgabe, 8:256.


of the state long preceded any party system. The party system that evolved between 1870 and 1900 was necessarily limited by the curial, regional-ethnic particularism and political modesty with which the Austrian Liberals defined "their" version of the state. Rather than decisively resisting the bureaucratic state, the Liberals simply co-opted its managerial elites into their own narrow range of political values, the end result being a curious melange of party and administrative visions that made it possible to speak of "Josephist" Liberalism. The nascent Czech national movements, one might argue, although formally attacking the system, also accepted many of its key assumptions—defensiveness, particularism, national hegemony—as cardinal values. The sinkholes of nationality, to which both German Liberal and Czech bourgeois parties soon fell victim, simply intensified the regional fractures and ideological narcissisms of the party system, making it seemingly impossible for mass-based interregional parties to sustain a serious hearing within the dynastic and administrative establishment.

The first decade of the Christian Social movement produced a modest change in these assumptions. Yet the experiments of 1907–11 came too late and with too little possibility of success. Each of the major parties of the late Imperial period had dozens of prominent politicians who craved the same chance that Gessmann had to establish an independent, bureaucratically reinforced base of party political operations; and Beck's Cabinet and the Bienerth and Stürgkh ministries that followed allowed no happy alternative to the failure that Gessmann endured. If the election reform expanded the scope of the political system, a single law was utterly incapable of creating instantaneous traditions of party discipline and order and of effective resistance against the blandishments of the administrative state. The various parties, when given the rare option, nominated unimaginative operators to represent them in the Cabinet who failed to establish any dominant political profile. Or they found themselves handed nationally stereotyped "representatives" from the Crown who in fact looked first to the needs of the ministerial bureaucracy (if they were not actually members of that bureaucracy) or to the material advantages of their own careers. When Franz Joseph quipped to Heinrich von Tschirschky, the German ambassador in Vienna, in 1914 that "it must be a very special pleasure to become a minister, since the Deputies have no other goal in mind," he was both alluding to the narcissistic self-service which attached itself to all Cabinets and demonstrating how such attitudes could arise in the first place.27 The emperor's cynicism,

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27 Oesterreich 70/Bd. 49, A5441, March 16, 1914, Politisches Archiv des auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn; hereafter cited as PAAA. The reference may have been to the luxurious system of pensions, on which see Schicksalsjahre, 1:88.
arbitrariness, and fondness for solid mediocrity controlled the quality of ministers who served him, few of whom had any serious interest in representing parliament as a body before the Crown.

In contrast to the Prussian system (which Jürgen Kocka, summarizing Otto Hintze, has described as the “straffe, starre, militärisch-bürokratische Struktur” of the Wilhelminian state), the cultural configuration of high-level ministerial hegemony in Austria was neither so antipluralistic nor so neofeudal that these “politicians” were even conscious of betraying the material interests of their constituents or of weakening the rationale of a sphere of political action independent of bureaucratic norms.28 The very tradition of neoliberal, Josephistic Beamten cabinets into which they were co-opted bore none of the crassly antiliberal features normally imputed to Prussian power structures to the north. A happy medium of bureaucratic hegemony and political servitude might be sustained, under forms even more insidious than in Germany for their relative ideological modernity and social universalism.

Max Weber’s insistence on a tension between political and bureaucratic modes of rule was, thus, less intelligible in Austria. Decades of the symbiotic integration of etatist and liberal values within the high ministerial service suggested that, at least on the level of norms if not also in the efficient exercise of power, the Staatsbeamtenkabinett could both “rule” and administer society. In Josef Redlich’s words, in the final decades of his reign the Emperor Franz Joseph viewed the bureaucracy as “the sole bearer of state power qualified for the direction of governmental affairs.”29


29 Josef Redlich, Österreichische Regierung und Verwaltung im Weltkriege (Vienna, 1925), p. 64. Redlich’s pessimistic evaluation to Baernreither of the negativity of the Austrian parties, especially the Bohemian Germans, is also worthy of note in this regard. See his letter of August 12, 1910, Baernreither Nachlass, Carton 47, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna; hereafter cited as HHSA. But see also the comments on the narcissism of Austrian parties in Annual Report on Austria-Hungary for 1912, pp. 36–39. After surveying the situation in parliament, the report quoted an Austrian newspaper with approval: “As each party in the Chamber exists entirely for itself, without any feeling of solidarity, the result is that the wishes of each party form an obstacle to those of the other parties. Each party places hindrances in the way of the others in order to prevent them making any faster progress than itself”; (p. 37; FO 881/10244, Public Record Office, London). By April 1914 Baron Heinold would argue, as stated by Redlich, that “mit dem Parlament des allgemeinen Wahlrechtes könne man in Österreich nicht regieren” (Schicksalsjahre, 1:227).
The crippling constraints of the Austrian political system reflected, in turn, the limited range of political choices on strategy and on structure available to mass parties in the late Imperial system after 1907. Paradoxically, a system that was designed to encourage active, participatory control of the legislative process and active policy formation by large constituent blocs soon found itself playing an exclusively retardative and defensive role. Most major national parties were capable of little more than disruptive actions against legislation that seemed to pose disequilibrating effects for them or their national allies. In their inclination toward systemic negativism all shared a destructive desire to forgo positive choices for themselves in order to make negative choices against their rivals.

Yet a parallel to this antipolitics was the promiscuity of all political parties toward specific national client groups within the middle and lower ranks of the Austrian civil service, who enjoyed a unique status as the most symbolically significant “consumers” of the patronage that the parties could eke out of the higher Verwaltung. On the one hand, this strange alliance resulted from the huge numbers of Beamten voters and from their superior interest-group organizations; on the other, from the curiously narcissistic inclination of Austrian bürgerlich parties to see “victories” in Beamten patronage as an ersatz for true parliamentary control and as a logical measure of their national and social Besitzstand within the state. Instead of viewing political power as a fluid and dynamic instrument to achieve positive legislative acts, the parties adopted the more passive, corporatist-proprietary criterion of ethnic employment rates in the civil service as a primary test of their access to the state. The language question simply intensified this issue, highlighting the value of administrative hegemony as the only salient sphere of political action. Rather than “taking” power and creating their own patronage, as the Christian Socials were able to do on the regional level, the bourgeois parties took an endless series of Trinkgelder on the state level. This process drastically narrowed the general interest representation of the parties. It also contributed to a pronounced shift in power within the central ministries toward the Ministerratspräsidium, which gradually exercised a “bureaucratic dictatorship” within the Cabinet as a whole.30 The civil service thus became both a contestant in and consumer of the “game” of patronage and the referee who set and manipulated the rules.

of that game. This viciously circular form of political hegemony, undertaken not in the name of policy activism—since the Austrian Verwaltung was little inclined to change anything in Austrian society—but on behalf of caste stabilization and conflict avoidance made it impossible for parliamentarians to develop a system of “parallel relations” under which parliament would maintain control of the bureaucracy.

Since the primary parliamentary role of an Austrian political party became the achievement of defensive attrition, rather than positive legislative cooperation, it was hardly surprising that each would measure its share of the national Besitzstand in material concessions and patronage for ethnically fragmented sectors of the Verwaltung, if possible to the disadvantage of other competing civil service groups. But lacking strong central leadership few bourgeois parties were able to confront the state as a collective unit (even on national issues), and ministries could easily encourage disruptive, fragmentary behavior that undercut party discipline. At the same time, lacking support from the state, few parties could generate central cadre control. Beck had tried to encourage more centralized forms of party discipline, one prominent result being the modern Christian Social party. But elsewhere, in other German factions and among the Slavic clubs, the idea was less fruitful. The new franchise of 1907 was a technological innovation imposed on an archaic party system, and two national elections in 1907 and 1911 were hardly sufficient to construct a new system of party organization. When Beck fell from office in late 1908, the idea went with him. Stürghk, in contrast, ultimately profited from the chaos of the parliamentary parties. Gessmann’s own decision to withdraw from ministerialism in favor of Land-level administration and politics (in Lower Austria) simply reinforced the dichotomy between centralistic Josephism and regional political autonomy that was so characteristic of the Austrian system by 1914.

The impasse in parliamentary governance in 1909–13, and its destruction by Stürghk in 1914, followed directly from this combination of weak, ill-disciplined political parties, locked in combat with a corrupt and corrupting Verwaltung, each claiming to serve the “people” but in fact each preoccupied with interest-group particularism within its own national sanctums. Ironically, the one “interest” that claimed to serve as a general representative of all society—the Austrian Verwaltung—now co-opted the parties into its own negativity and national particularism, so that by 1914 no single political agent, much less group, could rationally claim to speak for society as a whole.

III

By 1914 many Austro-German commentators recognized that the reform of 1907 had failed miserably. But if not parliamentarism, what else? The
question was frequently posed by contemporaries in 1912–14, and among the diversity of responses two other routes to state survival emerged as worthy of contemplation: administrative reform as ersatz constitutional revision, and a constitutional Staatsstreich by the Thronfolger himself. As the German ambassador in Vienna, Heinrich v. Tschirschky, viewed the shame and pessimism felt by Austrian politicians in early 1914, he naturally inquired about solutions to or ways out of the crisis. Given the problems of immobility of the bureaucracy and its deadening weight on the system, together with the entanglement of the bureaucracy in politics, it is not surprising that some political theorists considered Verwaltungsreform a necessary first step in political or constitutional reform, and in a perceptive report to Berlin, Tschirschky duly noted that one reform program on the docket was that of the Verwaltungsreformkommission.

This remarkable enterprise originated with a proposal by Josef Redlich in parliament in 1909 that the Cabinet appoint a high-level committee of distinguished experts to study the range of problems associated with the Austrian civil service—its organization, its cost effectiveness, its rules of administrative procedure, and its personnel appointment policies.\(^{31}\) In 1911 the government agreed to launch such a commission, the Imperial rescript appointing the commission charging it to propose ways by which opportune improvements in the existing administrative organization would make it more able to keep abreast of the growing needs of the population. Granted the commission’s role was advisory to the Cabinet, its broad mandate allowed it to solicit information from a diversity of political and social interest groups in the Monarchy (for which it organized a major Enquete in 1912) and to examine problems of internal structure

and administrative procedure in a fascinating series of publications. Its membership consisted of twenty-three high-ranking jurists, ex-Cabinet members, senior administrators, and distinguished university professors, of whom Edmund Bernatzik, Josef Redlich, Erwin v. Schwartzennau, and Guido v. Haerdtl were unusually active. Although the commission had high-ranking Slavic members, some of its most creative and significant work was undertaken by its German representatives. At the inaugural session of the commission on June 28, 1911 its chairman, von Schwartzennau, presented an eloquent justification for the urgency of undertaking administrative reform. In contrast to others who might see such reforms as relating only to practical questions, such as the improvement of services and the reduction of costs, von Schwartzennau saw the reforms as touching upon larger issues: the Verwaltung in the twentieth century would be called upon, along with parliament, to fashion out of the existing state a new Wohlfahrtsstaat. Only a civil service at the height of training, efficiency, and rationality could respond to the pressures and conciliate rival interests generated by modern society. The Verwaltung’s final goal—“the welfare of the state itself and of the totality organized in it”—was an appropriately Josephist vision of the constitution of modern Austrian society.32

Among the fascinating reports and recommendations generated by the commission, those by Haerdtl, Redlich, and Bernatzik were especially controversial. In their division of labor they comprehended three major issues of administrative governance in the Monarchy: the cost effectiveness and labor productivity of the civil service in the Austrian Verwaltung—the issue of civil service personnel; the efficiency and rationality of existing structures of financial administration on regional and local levels—the issue of the rationality (or irrationality) of traditional administrative organization based on centralistic principles; and the effectiveness of existing systems of administrative justice to monitor and conciliate complaints against bureaucratic action (or nonaction), the latter an issue that impinged on the viability of the 1867 constitutional disjunction between political administration and the courts.

Of the three reports Haerdtl’s was perhaps the most provocative. Shocked by the enormous growth in public expenditures for administrative services in the Monarchy (which between 1890 and 1911 increased by almost 200

percent, much of it attributable to new appointments rather than salary or benefits raises for existing personnel; tax revenues for the same period grew far more slowly) and by the crass inefficiency of university- and Mittelschul-trained Konzeptsbeamten, Haerdtl assembled some remarkable data on labor productivity of tenured juristic officials in the seven central ministries. His data demonstrated that of 370 officials in his sample, 32 percent processed on average less than one file a day, and 36 percent fewer than two files a day, whereas only a pitifully small minority actually seemed to put in a full working day (which itself was only 5.5–6 hours long). In the regional state offices, in contrast, working loads and days were both heavier and longer. When viewed in light of the fact that, according to the existing order of business one file might easily be handled by several different officials, the absurdity of the situation was undeniable. That many officials employed in these positions merited their jobs as a result of political, national, or nepotistic patronage was self-evident.33

In order to achieve a greater efficiency and economy Haerdtl proposed a carrot-and-stick approach: the number of tenured, juristic positions in the ministries should be decreased, while the clerical support staff held stable or even increased, since much of the “work” the more senior officials claimed to do could actually be handled by officials with more modest educational credentials. Further, more use should be made of contractual or per diem employees. In return for a reduction of personnel and a complete reorganization of the order of work—reducing the number of paperwork exchanges, making lines of jurisdiction clearer, eliminating multiple jurisdictional claims—average salaries of the Beamtentum might be increased. Enhanced labor productivity would result, thus, by controlling manpower levels, by imposing inter- and intraoffice rationality, and by making salary scales more attractive for those who remained.34

Josef Redlich, in contrast, produced a report that was so massively detailed and on so opaque a topic—the Austrian financial administration—

33 The preliminary results of the commission were published in three yearly reports, the first two of which were reprinted in the Wiener Zeitung (August 31, 1912; August 1, 1913). Haerdtl’s report was leaked to the press in early 1913. Compare Politische Chronik, 1913, p. 53. A detailed summary and evaluation of Haerdtl’s views is in the 1913 “Referat” (n. 31 above), accompanying a copy of the report itself. Compare also Schappacher’s summary of the report in “Wege zur Verwaltungsreform,” and the report in the Neue Freie Presse, January 21, 1913 (M), p. 7. On Haerdtl, cf. Alois Czedik, Zur Geschichte der k.k. österreichischen Ministerien, 1861–1916 (Teschen-Vienna, 1920), 4:110–17; and Mell, pp. 197–98, and n. 21, pp. 230–31.

34 Bericht der Kommission zur Förderung der Verwaltungsreform über die Steigerung der Kosten der staatlichen inneren Verwaltung in der Periode von 1890 bis 1911 und über Vorschläge in bezug auf vorläufige Reformen hinsichtlich der Zentralstellen und der politischen Landesbehörden (Vienna, 1913).
Redlich began with a survey of the existing structure of financial administration in the Monarchy, including a detailed description of its three-level hierarchy (district, province, and central ministry). Redlich identified numerous problems within the system, technical as well as political. The lines of jurisdiction between and within levels were frequently unclear, which, Redlich thought, could be traced back to the interpenetration of political and financial norms on the first and second levels. Local tax officials were subject to the sometimes arbitrary control of the political officials in the districts, which slowed collection procedures, increased paperwork, and grated on their own status consciousness. Redlich argued that the district chiefs (Bezirksheime) functioned as objects of private manipulation and influence among local notables in their districts, and thus, tax departments attached to their offices were similarly affected. Regional offices functioned better but both were unevenly staffed and usually dramatically over- or underworked: the typical workload of Lower Austrian financial officials was five times greater than that in Galicia, in income tax returns reviewed per official. Many of the smaller regional directorates had manpower allocations unjustified by the tax revenues they managed to collect: the crassest case was Dalmatia, where the government spent 2.1 Kronen in salaries and other expenses for its revenue personnel for every 1 Krone they collected in direct taxes! Equally significant, the final level of jurisdiction, the Finanzministerium in Vienna, had grown enormously in the past thirty years, since it served not merely as a higher regulatory and policy-setting agency but continued to operate in an eighteenth-century mode as an executive, interventionist authority for judgment of individual cases. Redlich also noted, in this connection, the natural attractiveness of this particular ministry for political Interventionen by individual parliamentary Deputies, a practice that he wanted to curb sharply.35

Redlich’s prescriptions for change were as drastic as Haerdtl’s. On district and provincial levels independent revenue authorities would be established, completely divorced from regular political administration. In addition to their responsibility for all direct taxes, they would also be responsible for the consumption tax and some administrative fees. The revenue inspection service, one of the most expensive and overstaffed in the whole civil service, would be divided into two administrative sections, its personnel reduced and placed under simpler administrative

35 Compare Josef Redlich, Bericht . . . über die Entwicklung und den gegenwärtigen Stand der österreichischen Finanzverwaltung sowie Vorschläge der Kommission zur Reform dieser Verwaltung (Vienna, 1913), pp. 116–91. Redlich’s proposals were adopted, with some modifications, by the commission on July 2, 1913.
controls on the local and regional level. A new scheme for distributing provincial directorates would consolidate and combine smaller provincial units (e.g., Moravia with Silesia; Lower Austria with Upper Austria and Salzburg) and accord to these supraregional units some of the elaborate appellate powers that were exercised by the ministry in Vienna. The finance ministry, in turn, would suffer a diminution of its power to adjudicate appeals and to meddle in petty investigations, and its staff would be consolidated. In the future it would concentrate its activities on a more general supervision of the revenue process and, more importantly, on exercising more elaborate controls over the state budget (which Redlich found both static and ill coordinated), including the creation of a central inspection service for evaluating and auditing ongoing expenditures. 36

The commission accepted Redlich’s views, but they were never implemented by the Cabinet. For they struck not only at the sacred cow of comfortable, procedural anarchy in the central ministry—as his earlier commentaries in parliament on the state of Austrian administration foretold, Redlich saw the Austrian ministries as wretchedly organized—but they also sought to redefine the basic purpose of central government. As Redlich stated, “The essential and fundamental difference between the central administration of a modern state and the old, customary centralistic administrative methods lies in the fact that in the former, the central instance does not dominate, but rather directs, that the actual decision-making process concerning individual cases is accomplished fundamentally by the real executive authority (whether on the local or regional level), that central authority directly observes the total administrative activity of its subordinate offices, not with the intention of domineering over them, but above all in order to gather continuously the most precise information. . . .” 37 Redlich thus sought to enhance the professional autonomy of regional administrators by freeing them from the tutelage of “Vienna” and redefined the basic purpose of “centralization” in the Austrian civil service from one of executive intervention to broad-scale inspection and supervision of delegated authority. By weakening the prerogatives of the Ministry of Finance over actual policy implementation and by undercutting the sacrosanctity of Crownland rights, the total package of reforms would have (in theory) considerably reduced the opportunities for political meddling in the revenue process, either by parliamentary deputies via the ministry or by local notables via the districts. By improving the accuracy, efficiency, and public scrutiny of the budget process, Redlich’s program would have given parliament far more power over the Cabinet. This was a kind of power, of course, which the Austrian par-

37 Ibid., p. 183.
liament, in contrast to its west European neighbors, was ill fitted to exercise. The separation of finance from the political Verwaltung was yet another feature of Redlich’s interest in encouraging administrative autonomy. Autonomy, for Redlich, was the technical, professional independence of a smaller number of more efficiently utilized revenue officials, men with an enhanced esprit de corps and improved salary levels, freed from partisan political manipulations. Like Haerdtl, Redlich viewed administrative reform as an act of modern political engineering that would improve service, reduce costs, and mobilize public confidence and sympathy for the “state” beyond the realm of explicit national confrontations. Given Redlich’s compulsive interest in economic modernization, it is also possible that he saw administrative reform as a way to link political efficiency with industrial entrepreneurialism.  

A third contribution, and intellectually one of the most complex, was that by Edmund Bernatzik, a distinguished professor of law at the University of Vienna. Bernatzik concerned himself with a critical issue in Austrian administrative law—access by petitioners to appeals against administrative decisions taken by the civil bureaucracy. Existing systems of legal control within the Austrian administration provided for methods of internal administrative review in cases where individuals, institutions, or corporate bodies complained about decisions taken by one of the three instances of administrative authority (district, province, or ministry). These procedures enjoyed the quality and consequence of “justice” only in a very limited sense, however, since they remained internal, arbitrary acts of the civil service. As Bernatzik complained in 1912, the norms that had regulated administrative review were meager, and those that did exist had the character of internal instructions from the head of state to his underlings. They did not need to be and were not to be publicized. Whether officials actually observed them was no business of the petitioners; the civil servants were accountable only to their immediate superiors in obeying or not obeying these regulations.

38 See his comments on the reform of the Beamten in ibid., pp. 190–91, as well as his discussion of the need to run the Finanzverwaltung on “das ökonomische Prinzip” on p. 189. Redlich’s speeches in parliament in 1909 and 1911 on administrative reform also dramatized his linkage of administrative and economic reform (Stenographische Protokolle [n. 16 above], Session 19, 1909, pp. 1459–74, and Session 21, 1911, pp. 1217–41).

39 Edmund Bernatzik’s major work was Rechtsprechung und materielle Rechtskraft: Verwaltungsrechtliche Studien (Vienna, 1886).

40 Edmund Bernatzik, Vorläufige Mitteilungen des zur Ausarbeitung eines Gesetzentwurfs über die Verwaltungsrechtsprechung bestellten Referenten E. Bernatzik über die allgemeinen Gesichtspunkte des von ihm ausgearbeiteten Entwurfes (Vienna, 1912), pp. 3–4. The new law is in the Entwurf eines Gesetzes
Bernatzik sought to impose more equity and openness onto the administrative system and to accord to the final determinations of the administrative review process some of the qualities of judicial decisions. He proposed the establishment of an internal, quasi-judicial review process within the bureaucracy itself, the *Verwaltungsjurisdiktion*. This was a dualistic system of half-voluntary and half-professional review panels, consisting of professional civil servants and of lay councillors (*Beisitzer*), who were in part a product of Bernatzik's admiration of the English justices of the peace and the jury system: the draft would bring into the process of administrative justice "‘an entirely independent element, an element that is related to the institution of the jury. Its members will be taken from circles who do not belong to the civil service, and will be elected by representatives of the people.'" On the level of the districts the review panel would consist of two individuals, an official of the Crown and a layman serving without pay (Bernatzik: "‘Naturally the model of the English justice of the peace asserts itself here’").

Final competitors for the position of voluntary *Beisitzer* would be selected by the provincial governor from a list of nominees prepared by the local district civil servants (thus giving the *Verwaltung* a powerful role in their designation). But the final candidate would be elected by the mayors of towns or communes in the district voting in an annual assembly. On the regional level a similar tandem would be established, and on the ministerial level a three-man panel created, where conflicting decisions would terminate (tie votes would be impossible).

Bernatzik's proposals, like those of Redlich, were remarkable both for their analytic radicalism and their political utopianism. Not only did his work challenge customary assumptions about the proper isolation of the civil service from society (and its political interests), and open up to society new modes of interlocution with the state, but it ultimately called into question the distinction between *Verwaltung* and *Justiz*. If Redlich threatened the central ministries with loss of executive authority and if Haerdtl threatened the bourgeois parties with loss of patronage, Bernatzik threatened the Social Democrats with an oligarchy of law. He admitted that the Austrian "‘gentry' did not possess a tradition of dedicated public service to the state. Yet his system of elected notables, resident in the district in unsalaried positions, might have implanted a social

*über die Einführung einer Verwaltungsjurisdiktion*, which includes a *Motivbericht* and the text of the law.

*Bernatzik, Vorläufige Mitteilungen*, pp. 3, 5. Also noteworthy about the plan was its insertion of many elements of the Code of Civil Procedure into the review process, thus making administrative justice open and prompt, in contrast to existing procedures.
oligarchy into the civil service. Moreover, in the larger cities the mayor functioned in place of the chief of the local district administration, according him prerogatives for participating in the exercise of such "justice." In Vienna this would have enhanced the Christian Social machine's role in the administrative process. Rather than reducing partisanship in the Verwaltung the ultimate effect would have been to increase it, as some of Bernatzik's colleagues on the commission duly noted.

Both the radicalism and the complexity (and resultant uncertainty) of its proposals turned the commission into a white elephant of the first order. Not only were the big political parties suspicious of its work, but the commission encountered dogged resistance within the higher ranks of the civil service itself. Certainly Karl Stürghk had neither sympathy for the commission's work nor any urgent desire to implement its recommendations. When Colonel Bardolff, Franz Ferdinand's aide, discreetly inquired of the minister-president about the status of Haerdtl's report in March 1913, Bardolff came away with the sense that Stürghk harbored serious suspicions about the whole matter. That Stürghk conciliated the political parties and traded the Dienstpragmatik for the government's Finanzplan in January 1914, in spite of sentiment on the part of some members of the commission that the Dienstpragmatik should become part of a rational and comprehensive reform of the inner service, probably demonstrated his disinterest in the project. Redlich himself admitted publicly in 1914 that key political and administrative elites were hostile to its work. By the outbreak of the war the commission was languishing, and in January 1915 it was released from further responsibilities. As one prescient Catholic commentator noted in 1915, the commission had achieved "no practical success." Not surprisingly, as Karl Brockhausen argued in 1916, on matters involving nationality—as opposed to technical administrative reforms per se—the commission's consensus usually fell apart.

IV

Tschirschky, too, thought that the commission was doomed to failure. He argued, as others would during the war, that administrative reform

42 Stürghk to Bardolff, March 12, 1913, MKFF, Carton 113, 45–1/25-2.
43 Compare the insightful comments in Paulus (n. 31 above), pp. 160–65, as well as Karl Brockhausen, Zur österreichischen Verwaltungsreform (Vienna, 1917), pp. 4–5. Redlich too may have sensed the futility of his work by 1914. Compare the comments in Die Vorschläge Prof. Redlichs zur Reform der Finanzverwaltung: Mitteilungen der Industriellen Vereinigung, Nr. 23 (Vienna, 1914), pp. 32–33, 39. For opposition from the higher civil service, see also the "Interpellation des Abgeordneten Kemetter und Genossen, betreffend Bestrebungen zur Verhinderung der Verwaltungsreform," Anhang zu den Stenographischen Protokollen, Session 21, 1912, Bd. 7, p. 9258.
within the given constitutional framework was illusory. Like many "German" commentators in Vienna in early 1914, Tschirschky was thus forced to turn back to the constitutional problems of the state and to the Thronfolger, Franz Ferdinand, who many hoped would be a deus ex machina for Austria's salvation.

The reform alternatives available to the Thronfolger were a curious melange of hyperbolic, but unfocused, friend-foe discourse and occasionally sensible policies for institutional change. Of the various collections of "plans" developed for the archduke, two of the most ambitious were those attributed to Brosch from 1910-11 and to Eichhoff from 1913-14. As different in tone and details as these scenarios for the new regime were, their similarities were more striking. Both postulated the possibility of a period of semilawlessness in which the archduke would, by negotiation or even selective military pressure, impose his constitutional supersovereignty on recalcitrant German, Czech, and Magyar politicians to achieve far-reaching structural changes in the Imperial system. Both bore an uncanny resemblance in their contempt for or ignorance of parliamentary and formal party political mechanisms. Brosch was most overt when he encouraged the archduke to view possible parliamentary anarchy resulting from the Hungarian political coup d'etat as an acceptable state of affairs, since previous interparty squabbling in the Austrian Reichsrat had proven beyond doubt that, when the national parties fought among themselves, the rights of the Crown remained undisputed. Eichhoff was more subtle,
but his draft of an Imperial manifesto contained not less than three overt or covert criticisms of political parties and the existing political process in less than five pages.\textsuperscript{46}

Both plans were also noteworthy in what they failed to address. Brosch devoted less than ten lines—in a document running thousands of words—to the Austrian nationality conflict, while offering an extremely detailed account of the necessity for new state emblems for the Austrian half of the Monarchy. A more literal and effective statement of the "emblematization" of public politics could hardly have been imagined. Was this perhaps because neither Brosch nor Bardolff and Eichhoff had any effective solutions? Bardolff soon proved himself to be an unabashed German nationalist, and Eichhoff's later chameleonic flights in constitutional praxis during the First World War hardly gave confidence in the realism of his views. At the heart of their theorizing lay serious doubts about the effectiveness of a party-based system of politics as a mode for the rational distribution of public resources. Rather, both seemed to presume a pseudohieratic conception of the state as a centralized haven of pure dynastic power, in which the Thronfolger had merely to will the corporate good, however speciously or contradictorily defined, in order to prove his constitutional superiority over other, rival political actors and values.\textsuperscript{47} Issues of concrete political management were simply irrelevant once one had beheaded the \textit{Staatsbeamtentum} and proffered a program of mystic \textit{animation} in place of parliamentary negotiation. For Bardolff administrative reform itself was not the first priority. Far more essential was the restoration of a \textit{Verwaltungsmoral} producing a mood of "discipline and order," implicitly to be inspired by the Thronfolger himself.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{46} Compare the draft of a "\textit{Manifest Seiner Majestät an die Völker des Reiches aus Anlass der Allerhöchsten Thronbesteigung}," \textit{Eichhoff Nachlass}, Carton 2.

\textsuperscript{47} A letter that Franz Ferdinand sent to Leopold Graf Berchtold in 1913 conveys this hieratic feature of his self-portrait: he defended his meddling in Austrian foreign affairs since he always acted on the basis of intense study for the sake of the Monarchy but then added that he "durch eine besondere Gnade Gottes in den letzten Jahren immer Recht behalten habe" (October 21, 1913 [copy], \textit{Berchtold Nachlass}, HHSA). A good analysis of the scope of the Archduke’s political activities is Samuel R. Williamson’s "Influence, Power and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand, 1906–1914," \textit{Historical Journal} 17 (1974): 417–34.

\textsuperscript{48} Compare the draft proposal calling for a "\textit{Sanierung der Verwaltungsmoral}," in \textit{MKFF}, Nr. 7, Carton 204, December 31, 1913. Bardolff’s views of how a minister-president should deal with both parliament and the civil service were remarkably similar to the ways a commanding officer would treat subordinates.
The *Staatsstreit* plans—even allowing for the fact that they were written for the Thronfolger and not by him—reflected a curious restatement of eighteenth-century Josephistic German administrative centralism placed in the service of corporatist, *Hochadel* reverence for a hierarchically integrated, but socially compartmentalized, world. These plans may have been written in Vienna, but their moral habitat was that of Artstetten, of Konopischt and the dozens of other islands of moral tranquility in which feudalists like Franz Ferdinand both consoled and isolated themselves and their *Stand* from the twentieth century.\(^{49}\)

As different as their goals and methods were, however, the administrative reform commission and the Thronfolger’s dossier shared some marked similarities. Both sought to confront state administrative issues not in and troop units under his command. On the semiabsolutist ethos of these plans, see G. E. Schmid, “Franz Ferdinand,” *Biographisches Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas*, 4 vols. (Munich, 1974–81), 1:532–35. Note also the views expressed in a position paper in the *Eichhoff Nachlass* (possibly by Eichhoff himself) of the parallelism between military and civil service as elite loyalists of the Crown: “Ebenso wie mit Rücksicht auf äussere Feinde über die Organe der bewaffneten Macht, müsse daher—angesichts subversiver Elemente und Strömungen im Innern—das Allerhöchste Verfügungsrecht wenigstens über einen solchen Kreis von Organen der Regierungsgewalt uneingeschränkt gewahrt werden, dass die Ausübung von Regierungsakten—ohne die Möglichkeit der Geltendmachung dienstpragmatischer Rechte—jederzeit und unbedingt sichergestellt ist. Die betreffenden Beamten müssten von jeder parteimassigen Einflussnahme freigehalten und jedenfalls durch eine eigene Gesetzesbestimmung vom Wahlrecht und der Wahlbarkeit ausgenommen werden.” *Eichhoff Nachlass*, Carton 2. Compare also Kann, *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand Studien*, p. 45, who rightly notes “dass alle föderalistischen oder Autonomiepläne des Erzherzogs in erster Linie nur einem Ziel dienten: der Stärkung der Zentralgewalt der Krone.” For the Austrian bureaucracy’s reaction to him, cf. Sieghart (n. 14 above), p. 241.\(^{49}\)

Without discounting or trivializing the role that Heinrich Lammash played in assisting Brosch in the latter’s drafting of instruments for the transition, it seems unlikely that Lammash’s personal political philosophy would have governed, either in spirit or in content, the principal policies of the new regime. In this I disagree slightly with the exemplary and judicious analysis in Kann, *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand Studien*, p. 199 ff. This says nothing about the actual role of Czernin (of whom Kann offers an extremely unflattering portrait), and Kann is doubtless correct that the archduke would have acted with more caution than that prescribed by Czernin. But at the time of archduke’s death his two closest collaborators on the *Thronbesteigung* were apparently Bardolf and Eichhoff, not Lammash. As Czernin points out in his *Im Weltkriege* (Berlin, 1919), p. 64, the archduke’s plans were not definitive. The principal value of the *Staatsstreit* plans is in their suggestive articulation of a set of cultural values and broad policy options—sketching the range of possible and desirable state acts—not in predicting the actual achievements of the new regime. For Lammash’s own account, cf. Marga Lammash and Hans Sperl, eds., *Heinrich Lammash: Seine Aufzeichnungen, sein Wirken und seine Politik* (Vienna, 1922), pp. 77–95.
the exclusive terms of the national right or national privilege of the Germans. They hoped to transcend the nationalities problem by identifying larger, systemic relationships between the bureaucracy and the political system and between the Crown and the civil society which might be redesigned. Franz Ferdinand attacked the problem of state control of society by vast constitutional changes in the relationship of Austria and Hungary, to the end of factionalizing and trivializing ordinary interest-group and nationalist politics and concentrating all moral (and military) authority in himself. Redlich and his colleagues preferred to work from within by reforming first the Verwaltung, and then worrying about its relations with the parties and the nations in Hapsburg society. The first implied a new and more powerful role for the dynasty, the second recognized that in a modern state no single level or sector of government could assume total responsibility for political imagination or administrative management.

In a stimulating analysis of alternative models of reform politics in France in the 1770s Keith Baker has suggested a theoretical triptych with which to comprehend the range of reform possibilities during the final decades of the Old Regime in France: an administrative option, represented by the work of Turgot, which sought to reform the state from within by effecting radical reforms in the efficiency, rationality, and knowledge of the bureaucracy, creating a system of local self-administration while excluding an actual sharing of political sovereignty between Crown and nation; second, a corporate-judicial model based on the high magistracies of the French judicial system in which particularistic and venal privileges would both guarantee and enhance historic national rights against uncontrolled dynastic absolutism; and finally, the political vision of Saige (and ultimately Sieyès) which superseded both judicial and administrative limitations on the Crown by imposing in their place a conception of total national sovereignty and (implicitly) electoral representation.50

If one recalls Arno Mayer's provocative designation of late Imperial Austria as a final survivor of the "Old Regime" in Europe, it is fruitful to compare these collective processes of systemic self-understanding (and self-destruction) in France and Austria.51 Albert Gessmann's conception of a parliamentarization of the Austrian polity was not unlike, in its fundamental assumptions, the "political vision" articulated by eighteenth-century French theorists, with the profound difference that issues of political right had seemingly been settled in 1907, if not in


terms of formal sovereignty, then at least in terms of the functional control of administrative power. Gessmann faced, therefore, not the need for but the consequences of a revolutionary transformation in the sharing of sovereignty; and his failure came as a result of the persistence of mass-national fragmentation in the service of prenational administrative autocracy. Karl Stürgkh symbolized the Verwaltung’s ability to profit from the conflict of nationalities to retain a base level of autocratic control. In this context, the years 1907–14 were not part of a classic Old Regime, in Mayer’s sense, but of a preliminary revolutionary period, and the failures of 1907–14 were the result of the incapacity of the Imperial system to accept the integration of a political vision of will into a pre-established system of administrative autocracy in any mode other than the continual sponsorship of national antagonisms. The reforms of 1907 gave twentieth-century political technology to a mid-nineteenth-century administrative culture riven by the absence of the one force that Saige and Sieyès might take for granted—national-cultural unity. Gessmann sought to displace the “nation” by deemphasizing it within the discourse of the Austrian Old Regime and substituting a rhetoric of anational social interest: society and not the nation would serve as a fount of legitimacy to sanction parliament’s intrusions against Crown and the Verwaltung. Although on one level Gessmann’s preoccupation with class-based rhetoric was self-defeating, on another his conception of a bürgerliche Sammlung was utterly dependent upon pluralistic competition and perpetual rivalry with Austrian Social Democracy. The prewar Christian Socials and Social Democrats were both Reichsparteien preaching totalizing social visions to control national fragmentation and to politicize a seemingly intractable administrative system, and both did so through the peculiar cosmopolitan vision of the centralistic political culture of Vienna before 1914.

Redlich and Bernatzik, too, were hardly twentieth-century versions of Turgot. Bernatzik’s scheme of lay Beisitzer who would cooperate in the civil service’s adjudication of administrative justice (and, implicitly, of public policy) at least shared with Turgot’s Mémoire sur les municipalités the conviction that the implementation of law could be divorced from explicit partisan-political values. Where both Redlich and Bernatzik differed from Turgot, of course, was their acceptance of parliamentary sovereignty as the theoretical fount of general public policy and hence as a direct expression of political will. Later work in Austrian juristic science, especially Hans Kelsen’s writings on the relationship between administration and parliament in the mid-1920s, reflected concerns similar to those of the Verwaltungsreformkommission in the view that one rational way to stabilize a democratic political system was to enhance its technical, administrative efficiency and to protect administrative officials from the arbitrary intrusions of national, cultural, or social interests based in the
regions. In this sense the administrative reformers of the late Imperial tradition did adopt an "administrative vision," not by disavowing popular sovereignty but by emphasizing salutary structural disjunctions that should stand between politics and administration, with a reformed, efficient administration, legitimated in its daily actions by technocratic nonpartisanship, coexisting with political competitors.52

The most fascinating parallel between France and Austria came, however, in the forms of conservative or corporatist authority. The political bankruptcy of the Austrian nobility after 1867 and certainly after 1907 may have been irreversible, but Franz Ferdinand represented a new statement of dynastic right and prerogative under which customary and historic justice would flow from the agency of a reformed dynastic absolutism. If, before, absolutism was the opponent of customary justice, absolutism now became the last haven of corporate privilege. Such privilege functioned as a device to mediate political partisanship and was now epitomized by the political-sacerdotal person of the dynast. The Thronfolger had, in this sense, stood Joseph II on his head: appropriately, he intended to assume his throne with the name "Franz II," recalling the reactionary, as well as the administratively modern features of the Austrian Vormärz.53

V

Having written tracts for the times that none of the major parliamentary parties—either German or Slavic—nor the Verwaltung itself would accept, the Verwaltungsreformkommission was politically sterile by 1914. If Austrian parliamentarism was undercut by administrative autocracy and national violence, attempts to modernize and depoliticize the Verwaltung were equally compromised by the anarchy of the national parties. A


53 Kann emphasizes that Franz Ferdinand "ist gegenüber seiner Familie, den Männern seines Vertrauens und den Völkern des Reiches nur von einem Gesichtspunkt aus zu verstehen, dem des Herrschers und seiner Rechte im Machtauf" (Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand Studien, p. 156).
classic standoff ensued, each side insidiously enjoying a mutually cor-
rupting status quo, all the while denigrating the other’s motives, capacities,
and intentions. The last hope for serious organizational change in peacetime
died with Franz Ferdinand in June 1914. Ironically, the individual perceived
by many to be “irrational” had become the last hope for serious internal
structural reforms in the Monarchy. So confounded and problematic was
the Austrian polity by 1914 that order hinged on therapeutic chaos and
liberalism on illiberal violence. Yet, the collapse of the Austrian Old
Regime came in spite of serious and, one must admit, honorable attempts
at political, administrative, and corporatist reform. Those who succeeded
the generation of Albert Gessmann and Victor Adler, men like Seipel
and Bauer, might draw inspiration from the political heritage of the Old
Regime, but such sustenance involved a new fusion of Klassenkampf and
Kulturkampf, coupled with an ambivalence about the efficacy of routinized
(and pluralistic) party politics. The Kulturkampf of the 1920s and 1930s
was as destructive of the Republican state as was the nationality question
of the Empire. Unlike the Imperial reformers, who for all their variations
thought in terms of state integration, assuming an anarchic and conflict-
ridden, yet pluralistic political universe, the politicians of the First Re-
public seemed to privilege polarization, dissensus, and moral exclusivity
to the ultimate victimization of the state.

Curiously, all three of the late Imperial visions implied an Austria that
was more than, yet contingently dependent upon national constituencies.
They implied, therefore, the existence of a genuinely Austrian state cer-
tainly based on national identity but not restricted to national identities.
It would be absurd to try to read the now fashionable search for an
“Austrian” identity, which fills the recent political literature of the Second
Republic, back into the last decade of the Monarchy. Yet does this mean
that we must, as some products of Zeitgeschichte seem implicitly to
suggest, tactically divorce the Monarchy from the longue durée of con-
tinuities in Austrian history? Does this not simply replicate the fatalistic
schizophrenia that informed the praxis of First Republican politics? In
the capacious ambition and occasional blindness of the various fin de
siècle reform programs lay perhaps a core of “Austrianness.” It lay not
in the self-cohering and consensus-ridden terms of the Second Republic,

54 On Seipel’s potential antidemocratism, see the judicious analysis in Klemperer
(n. 4 above), pp. 144–45, 155–56; for Bauer’s theory of the state as a “balance
of class forces,” cf. the excellent study by Anson Rabinbach, The Crisis of
Austrian Socialism (Chicago, 1983), pp. 40–45, as well as the discussion of
Bauer’s concept of “functional” as opposed to parliamentary democracy on p.
44. See also the elegant discussion of Bauer’s thought in Peter Loewenberg,
Decoding the Past: The Psychohistorical Approach (Berkeley and Los Angeles,
1985), pp. 161–204.
and certainly not in the self-denigrating terms of the First, but in the sense that overarching institutions might be constructed within the Austrian state to merit for it civic loyalty. Here a civic loyalty was cast in other than exclusively nationalist terms and justified that state as one in which “citizens” as political consumers as well as “nationalists” as ideological producers could live. All three proposals sought to preserve an Austrian state guaranteeing the possibility of multiple public roles and plural identities among its citizens. In the sense that the heroes of the “consensus revolution” of 1945 accomplished the same feat, admittedly on a nearly monoethnic social basis and using “anti-German” as opposed to class, dynastic, or technocratic referential terms, there may perhaps lie a very distant similarity between the two epochs.

Karl Renner had the good fortune to be afforded three historical lives, and the first—the period 1907–18—found an appropriate finale in the third—1945–50. Yet Albert Gessmann, too, found later imitators: Leopold Figl and Julius Raab stood much closer in ethos and spirit to Gessmann’s ideas of an alliance of peasant and bourgeois industrial constituencies based on interest group politics than to the overtly ideological politics of a Seipel or a Richard Schmitz. After 1945 reformed mass parties were reconstituted and dedicated themselves (as did their linear predecessors before 1914) to an overwhelmingly social interest agenda, surpassing national and cultural particularisms. Moreover, the Austrian state after 1945 has become a Parteienstaat above all, and recent questions about the validity of the parties’ hegemonic power suggest that Austrian political culture has learned the lessons of the Empire: rather than weak parties confronting a strong Verwaltung, now strong, disciplined parties, based on unquestioned commitment to democratic pluralism and ideological coexistence, maintain careful supervision of “neutral” bureaucratism. Finally, Redlich, a proud, brilliant, and occasionally despairing

55 Adolf Schärf’s comment that “Zusammenarbeit mit den Gegnern von einst schuf die Grundlagen des neuen Staates” in April 1945 (Österreihick Erneuerung [Vienna, 1955], p. 40) might be evaluated in this context. In his important new biography of Schärf, Karl Stadler has called attention both to Schärf’s personal relationships with the leadership of the new People’s Party and to the shift away from the heritage of the First Republic within the Socialist Party that occurred under his leadership (Adolf Schärf: Mensch, Politiker, Staatsmann [Vienna, 1982], esp. pp. 268–69, 282–83).

56 For useful characterizations of the Volkspartei’s leadership in the later 1940s, see Martin F. Herz’s reports of December 14, 1945 and December 2, 1948 in Reinhold Wagnleitner, ed., Understanding Austria: The Political Reports and Analyses of Martin F. Herz (Salzburg, 1984), pp. 71–92 and 550 ff. The publication of this valuable book was owing to the efforts of Fritz Fellner.

57 See, most recently, Fritz Plasser and Peter A. Ulram, Unbehagen im Parteienstaat (Vienna, 1982); Peter Gerlich and Wolfgang C. Müller, eds., Zwischen
Liberal, although decrying the "party book economy" and the Austrian clientele system, might find the culture of industrial and labor productivity and the maze of corporatist intermediation with which Austrian consensus democracy now chastens and keeps political partisanship in rational bounds an appropriate finale to both administrative and technocratic reform in east central Europe. This system presumes, of course, a corporatism of structural-institutional, rather than neo-feudal, terms.

If, as Fritz Fellner has demonstrated, the history of the Austrian "nation" per se is a fragile medium to afford long-range views of the Austrian

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58 See, most recently, the excellent treatment by Peter J. Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland and the Politics of Industry (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984), who argues that "Proporz has thus reinforced the decentralization inherent in all large-scale bureaucracies. . . . Politicization at the top thus voided independent political initiatives of the state bureaucracy in its relations with industrial sectors or individual firms. . . . All important initiatives of the state bureaucracy are carefully screened by an elaborate network of institutions in which Austria’s main contestants for power, who perceive themselves as both ‘partners’ who cooperate and adherents of opposing ‘camps’, are represented” (p. 76). Katzenstein also argues that “instead of a powerful state bureaucracy dominating politics and orchestrating policy, Austria has a broadly based policy network in which the state bureaucracy is only one—and by no means the most important—actor” (p. 64). This says nothing, of course, about the persistence of autocratic tendencies within the civil service in the latter’s dealings with individuals. Compare, esp., Eva Kreisky, “Bürokratie als Kultur? Über den Bürokraten in uns und neben uns,” ÖZP 13 (1984): 27–33. For a survey of recent views of modern Austrian corporatism, see Emmerich Tálos, “Sozialpartnerschaft und Neokorporatismustheorien,” ÖZP 11 (1982): 263–85.
past, do not the histories of the imposition of political will, of the subjection of administrative autocracy and the reform of administrative procedure, and of the construction of forms of corporatist intermediation constitute significant episodes of continuity in the praxis of Austrian political history? In the sense that Austrians in the forty years since 1945 have managed to move beyond the crisis of the Old Regime and to define and accept a state of citizens as well as a state of nationalists and of Kulturkämpfer, the Austrian Old Regime died not in 1918 but in 1945. And in its exploitation of traditions of state governance and state reform originating even before 1914, the history of modern Austrian politics may have to be viewed as an evolutionary process of trial and error, in the context of which 1918 is not a brick wall in the historical memory of Austria but a sieve through which that memory has ingeniously managed to flow.

59 For a powerful and eloquent statement of the “special” course of Austrian nationhood distinct from both the context of “German” history and from Austria’s own past in the Hapsburg Monarchy, which offers a very different perspective than that represented here, see Felix Kreissler, Der Österreicher und seine Nation: Ein Lernprozess mit Hindernissen (Vienna, 1984). Gerhard Botz presents an insightful commentary on the continuities of Austrian history in his “Von der Ersten zur Zweiten Republik: Kontinuität und Diskontinuität,” in Perspektiven und Tendenzen in der Sozialpolitik: Oswin Martinek zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Gerhard Botz, Karl R. Stadler, and Josef Weidenholzer (Vienna, 1984), pp. 33–58.