

NATIVE FASCISTS, TRANSNATIONAL ANTI-SEMITES

The International Activity of Legionary Leader Ion I. Moța

Raul Cârstocea

Introduction

Studies of fascism have interpreted it as either limited to the specific case of the Fascist regime in Italy or to the two established regimes in Italy and Germany, arguing that “international fascism is unthinkable, a contradiction in terms,”¹ or, alternatively, as a “global” or “universal” phenomenon.² Positioning themselves between these two opposing poles, recent studies have increasingly emphasized the transnational or international character of fascism.³ As the introduction to this volume points out, such an attempt transcends (while being inclusive of) both comparative analyses and studies that focus on the attempts of both the Italian and the German regimes to “export” their respective models, as well as the tensions ensuing due to the competition among them. Furthermore, such an approach also encompasses the diverse and complex examples of interactions and entanglements between fascist movements and regimes, revealing an international dimension to the phenomenon that could also prove relevant for the analysis of contemporary connections between far right groups, organizations, and parties.

The conceptualization of fascism as a transnational political movement is also part and parcel of the established “new consensus” in fascist studies, geared towards “taking fascist self-descriptions and self-representations more seriously than previously.”⁴ Along these lines, taking into account not only the pragmatic self-interest on behalf of the two established regimes to promote the influence of Italian Fascism and German National Socialism in Europe, but also the ideological affinities between fascist organizations that led some of these to look

for guidance or even sponsorship from Italy or Germany (or both), as well as for contacts with other non-state movements, is also helpful for emphasizing the shared features, or indeed the common core that the various attempts at defining fascism as an international phenomenon have been striving to identify.⁵ Viewed from this perspective, the self-identified similarities between what legionary commander Ion I. Moța, on whose international activity this chapter focuses, identified as “movements of national regeneration”⁶ seem to confirm the importance of the paligenetic element in fascist ideology, which is central to Roger Griffin’s definition of the phenomenon, as well as the revolutionary character of fascism, central to the “new consensus.”⁷

Outside of the thoroughly researched cases of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, cases of what had all too often been identified as “minor” or “peripheral” fascist movements—while being neither, as with the case of the legionary movement in interwar Romania—might shed light on fascism’s transnational character, and on the tension between the international links that such movements sought and the specificities related to their ultranationalist character, which eventually prevented the development of enduring connections and cooperation between them. Exploring the diversity and entanglements of the relationships between the Legion of the Archangel Michael, Romania’s interwar fascist movement (also known as the Iron Guard after 1930), and similar organizations in Europe, as well as with the regimes in Italy and Germany, would far exceed the scope of this single chapter, which will focus instead on one of the prominent leaders of the legionary movement and his personal involvement in some of the transnational connections that the organization established. The case is that of Ion I. Moța, the faithful lieutenant of Corneliu Zelea Codreanu (founder and undisputed leader of the movement), whose career was marked by international experiences, until his death fighting in the Spanish Civil War in January 1937. Characterized by unsympathetic contemporary observers of the movement as “certainly the most intelligent among the leaders of the Iron Guard,”⁸ and by the legionary author of a short biography as “the first and most perfect of the Captain’s legionaries,”⁹ Moța was one of the most influential ideologists of the movement, second only to Codreanu himself.¹⁰ He was also the Romanian delegate at the fascist congress in Montreux in December 1934, as well as the correspondent on behalf of the Legion with the *Welt-Dienst* (World Service), the international anti-Semitic news agency.

Focusing on Ion I. Moța’s international activity, I argue that members of the legionary movement were interested in transnational cooperation along the lines of combating what they perceived as common enemies

(Jews and communists, where the latter were consistently subsumed to the former), while being simultaneously keen on affirming their native character and their distinction from any purported Italian or German influence. As mentioned above, the latter feature is one that eventually accounted for the frequent breakdown of collaboration between fascist movements and regimes, and prevented the development of any stable structures for formal cooperation. The chapter will make this argument by focusing primarily on the views and statements of Moța, both published in the press articles he authored and as expressed in his correspondence and the statements he made at the Montreux conference. As such, it is important to note that this short chapter by no means attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis of the transnational connections involving the legionary movement, not dealing for example with the extent to which the movement, and especially its leader, Codreanu, represented potential models for other fascist organizations abroad.¹¹ Instead, this paper purposely limits itself to an exploration of the legionaries' own conceptualizations of their perceived need for transnational cooperation, as well as the limits they themselves saw to this project, viewed through the lens of Ion I. Moța's international activity.

Early Beginnings: Moța and Codreanu before the Establishment of the "Legion"

The "Legion of the Archangel Michael" was established on 24 June 1927 by a group of five students, who would later call themselves "The Knights of the Annunciation." The trope of the Annunciation, frequently employed by the movement in its rhetoric, departed however from its Christian connotation related to the birth of Jesus, and became associated with the heralding of the Legion's own notion of Romania's revolutionary rebirth, a distinctly fascist metaphor that was central to the ideology of the movement.¹² As one of the initial founders of the movement and Codreanu's loyal second-in-command until his death in 1937, Moța was one of the self-proclaimed "Knights," and the religious language that thoroughly permeated the movement's rhetoric was to a significant extent indebted to the contribution of one who was famed within the Legion for his piety.¹³

Born on 5 July 1902 in Orăștie, a town in Transylvania that was at the time part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Moța grew up in a very religious and nationalist family.¹⁴ His father, Ioan Moța, was an Orthodox priest, as were both his grandfathers.¹⁵ In the

year he was born, his father began editing the newspaper *Libertatea* (Freedom), a nationalist weekly that militated for the rights of the Romanians in Transylvania.¹⁶ A mainstream nationalist newspaper that would, however, take a radical turn in the 1930s and openly support the legionary movement,¹⁷ *Libertatea* was among the most popular Romanian-language newspapers in Transylvania before the war, making Father Ioan Moța into a well-known personality of the national movement.¹⁸ During World War I, Ion I. Moța moved first to Bucharest and then Iași, following his father who had traveled to the Old Kingdom of Romania in 1914 to promote the country's entering the war on the side of the Triple Entente and against the Central Powers, an activity that led to his condemnation to death by the Austro-Hungarian Empire.¹⁹ Aged fourteen at the time of Romania's entry into the war, Moța was too young for military service and consequently volunteered in agricultural work to supply the soldiers at the front.²⁰ After the war, he obtained his baccalaureate from the prestigious Gheorghe Lazăr high school in Bucharest, leaving in 1920 for the Sorbonne, to study law.²¹ The fact he was denied a state scholarship, despite his good results in the examinations, represented a profound disillusionment for him, and a personal factor that contributed to his lifelong anti-Semitism, as he believed that Jewish students benefited from preferential treatment from the Romanian state.²²

Following his return from Paris, Moța enrolled as a law student at the University of Cluj in 1921, and was at the forefront of the anti-Semitic student protests that erupted in December 1922 on all university campuses in the country.²³ It was at this time that he met Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, himself a founding leader of the anti-Semitic "Association of Christian Students" at the University of Iași, and already notorious for his violent attacks on Jewish students.²⁴ Codreanu had just returned from Germany, where he had been attending courses at the University of Berlin since autumn, but where he had left primarily "to study the organization of the anti-Semitic action undertaken by the German student body."²⁵ The two became close friends and, later, when Moța married Codreanu's sister Iridenta in August 1927, brothers-in-law.²⁶ Their personal relation was accompanied by close political cooperation. Following the establishment on 4 March 1923 of the League of National-Christian Defense (Liga Apărării Național-Creștine, LANC), the first anti-Semitic political organization in post-World War I Romania, led by the notorious anti-Semite Alexandru C. Cuza, Codreanu became the leader of its youth section at the national level.²⁷ In the course of the same year, Moța, who had himself been recently elected president of the Petru Maior student center in Cluj, founded Romanian Action (Acțiunea

Românească, AR), an organization whose very name suggests the strong influence of Action Française on the future legionary leader.²⁸ Together with a number of other small organizations established as imitations of radical right or fascist movements abroad (like the Romanian National Fascia), Acțiunea Românească later joined LANC, mostly due to the popularity of Codreanu.²⁹

This popularity was the direct result of an escalation of Codreanu's violence, whose emphasis on "direct action" and "military discipline" had led to divergences with his mentor, Cuza, ever since LANC's establishment.³⁰ Moța was from the onset an adept of Codreanu's conception of the path that the nationalist movement should follow. After translating into Romanian the infamous "Protocols of the Elders of Zion," published at his father's printing house *Libertatea* in the summer of 1923,³¹ he became part of a student plot envisaged by Codreanu to assassinate six representatives of "Jewish power" (prominent rabbis, bankers, and journalists) and six Romanian government ministers they held responsible for the voting of the 1923 Constitution,³² which had finally granted citizenship and equal civil and political rights to Jews, making Romania the last country in Europe to emancipate its Jewish population. Although the plan was unrealistic (the six students had only one revolver), the subsequent trial brought the students to fame. An intense propaganda campaign of LANC turned public opinion in their favor and eventually ensured their acquittal. While in prison, Moța shot and severely wounded Aurel Vernichescu, the student who had revealed the plot to the police, yet he was also acquitted for his attempted murder.³³

The beginnings of the legionary movement can be traced back to this first prison experience of its future founders. According to Codreanu's memoirs, it was in the prison of Văcărești that he came up with the plans for a new youth organization, functioning within LANC structures, but as a movement with different goals, "of education and combat."³⁴ Meant to be called "The Archangel Michael," this organization was to have three sections: students, rural youth, and high school pupils.³⁵ Of the three, only the last (known as "Brotherhoods of the Cross") materialized before 1927, and Moța was appointed its leader.³⁶ The activity of the "Brotherhoods" was, however, intermittent prior to 1927, as its leaders were again imprisoned following Codreanu's assassination of police prefect Constantin Manciu on 25 October 1924, and then left for Grenoble to pursue their doctoral studies following Codreanu's acquittal in May 1925.³⁷

Anti-Semitism as the impetus for transnational cooperation of Ion I. Moța and the “Legion of the Archangel Michael”

In the summer of 1925, Moța accompanied two of the senior figures of LANC, professors A.C. Cuza and Corneliu Șumuleanu, to the International Anti-Semitic Congress held in Budapest.³⁸ There, he acted as the representative of Romanian youth, and even took on the task of editing “the statutes of the world anti-Semitic youth section.”³⁹ It was at this point that Moța became directly involved in efforts at international cooperation between different nationalist, anti-Semitic movements, or, as his biographer puts it, “the first time when [he] put forth, at a global congress, the idea of the brotherhood of all Christian nations against the Jewish threat.”⁴⁰ He would later recall the very good reception that Romanian delegates enjoyed at the congress, which is quite remarkable coming from a Transylvanian who was the son of a nationalist condemned to death during the war by the Austro-Hungarian Empire and who always remained suspicious of Hungary and its revisionist claims.⁴¹ As such, this aspect demonstrates his commitment to establishing transnational links with similar organizations abroad, driven primarily by his anti-Semitism. According to Armin Heinen, this is also where he met Georg de Potterre, the notorious Banat-born anti-Semite who would later be Moța’s interlocutor in his correspondence with the *Welt-Dienst*.⁴²

Moța’s participation at this congress was prompted by his notion of the need for transnational cooperation against an alleged “Jewish threat” or “conspiracy,” to which his deep-seated anticommunism was subsumed. This was the expression of a worldview that is consistently expressed in his writings, from the early articles written in his student days up to the last letters from the Spanish front, which were subsequently published, at the explicit request of the author, in his father’s newspaper, *Libertatea*.⁴³ In line with his profound religiosity, Moța viewed this as a “Jewish criminal plan of world domination,”⁴⁴ aimed at the destruction of Christianity and the Christian Church, and as an international problem that had manifested itself from the period before the French Revolution and had culminated with the triumph of atheistic communism in Russia.⁴⁵ Consequently, his envisaged “solution” to the problem also took on an international dimension, consisting in the aforementioned cooperation of “Christian nations” in combating this threat. This orientation would increasingly become apparent after the establishment of the Legion, when emphases on the movement’s specificity and distinctness from other fascist movements

were doubled by appeals to international collaboration, primarily aimed at establishing a common anti-Semitic platform.

In turn, this feature was not a novelty of the legionary movement (despite the fact that its anti-Semitism was far more radical than the prewar varieties), but was instead coherent with the tradition of nineteenth-century Romanian anti-Semitism. Ever since the crystallization of modern anti-Semitism in Romania during the late 1870s, anti-Semitic writers and politicians had borrowed heavily from notions developed elsewhere—in Austria-Hungary, France, and Germany.⁴⁶ Moreover, prewar Romanian anti-Semites, while deploring the international pressure to emancipate the country's Jews, had themselves sought to establish links with organizations or politicians that held similar views abroad. The country had hosted an international anti-Semitic congress in 1886, and the Alliance Anti-semitique Universelle, meant to be a response to the Alliance Israelite Universelle (which had militated for the emancipation of the Jews in Romania at the Congress of Berlin), was established by A.C. Cuza in Bucharest in 1895.⁴⁷

Indeed, at least in the beginning, following its establishment as a result of a split within LANC, the Legion announced its continuity with Cuza's anti-Semitism.⁴⁸ The difference lay with the pronounced fascist character of the movement, visible from its inception and in sharp contrast with LANC, which was meant to function within the limits of parliamentary politics, as an anti-Semitic political party.⁴⁹ Also from the outset, and different from Codreanu's earlier prison plans, the movement was organized into four sections: (1) of youth (with the subsection "Brotherhoods of the Cross"); (2) of protection (by mature nationalists supporting the legionary youth); (3) of help (as clarified in a later article, by Romanian women); and (4) international.⁵⁰ The purposes of the international section, as outlined in the statutes published in *Pământul Strămoșesc* (Ancestral Land), the first legionary publication, were the following:

- (a) to bring together all the Romanians outside the borders of the country;
- (b) to preach the truth about the invasion of the Romanians' ancestral land by the Jews, through a magazine that will be printed in Paris, entitled *L'Archange Michel*;
- (c) to collect all the calumnies uttered by Jews about the Romanians [abroad] and to publish them in the country;
- (d) to establish connections with all similar organizations in the world, with the purpose of the resolution of the Jewish problem.⁵¹

As it can be clearly inferred from the presentation above, anti-Semitism was central to the purpose of the international section of the Legion. This entailed both monitoring and reporting on the articles issued in the foreign press dealing with the Jewish minority in Romania and with the

growing anti-Semitism in the country, and the “export” of Romanian anti-Semitism abroad through a French-language publication (which in the end was never issued), as well as the attempt to forge transnational links with other anti-Semitic organizations. Moreover, the permanent “foreign affairs” section in *Pământul Strămoșesc*, appearing from the fifth issue of the newspaper onward, was suggestively entitled “Anti-Semitic World News.”⁵² And while the activity of the “international section” of a movement that, in the beginning at least, could barely raise the funds needed for its domestic functioning was limited to sporadic contacts between legionary sympathizers who found themselves in other countries and local fascists, radical nationalists, and anti-Semites, it was in the last of its four “purposes” that the organization (and Moța in particular) eventually invested the most. As mentioned above, this was in line with his dualist understanding of the modern world, and Europe in particular, as the site of a Manichaeic conflict between the “Jewish spirit” and Christianity. As Philip Morgan notes, it was indeed the movement’s “claim to be an integral part of a more general life-and-death struggle between ‘civilizations,’ or between different versions of European civilization” that rendered the Legion “one of the most ‘international’ and ‘internationalist’ of European fascist movements.”⁵³

Moța clearly expressed this view in an article included in the issue of *Pământul Strămoșesc* subsequent to the one which had announced the international section of the Legion. In a “response” he gave to Lord Rothermere’s editorial “Hungary’s Place in the Sun,” published in the *Daily Mail* on 21 June 1927, which argued for the revision of the Treaty of Trianon in favor of Hungary, Moța integrated Rothermere’s advocacy with his lifelong obsession, the international Jewish conspiracy, and dubbed Rothermere—the sympathizer of both Italian Fascism and German National Socialism—a “Jew.”⁵⁴ In his interpretation of Hungarian revisionism, this was “without a doubt” nothing but “the counter-strike decreed by the supreme Zionist leadership ... to try to spoil the brotherhood of Christian peoples that was foreshadowing on the horizon.”⁵⁵ By this “brotherhood,” Moța meant the “powerful anti-Semitic movements and even attempts at international agreements for the resolution of the Jewish problem” that had recently emerged all over Central and Eastern Europe (naming Romania, Poland, and Hungary as examples, and making a reference to the anti-Semitic congress he had attended in Budapest in 1925) and that were “extremely dangerous for the Jews.”⁵⁶ His argument concluded with a statement that, while always prepared to defend themselves against Hungarian aggression, Romanian nationalists, “as good Christians,” did not wish for such a conflict; instead, Moța summed up, their desire was for

“a brotherhood with all nations against the Jews, and we will work towards accomplishing it.”⁵⁷

This chapter captures some of the most important features of the Legion’s “internationalist” impetus, as well as touching upon some of the specificities of the movement that prevented it from identifying with any of the established fascist regimes, in Italy and later in Germany. The context for the legionaries’ view of the need for cooperation among radical nationalist organizations was that of the aforementioned all-encompassing conflict between the Christian world and what they perceived as a coordinated international action of the Jews. This displacement of all existing or potential conflicts and antagonisms, either internal or external to Romania, unto the presumed agency of a “leadership” of a united “world Jewry” was the defining element that conferred legionary anti-Semitism its specific, murderous radicalism and that also prompted the movement, more than anything else, to seek like-minded allies abroad.⁵⁸ On the other hand, it is important to note that this worldview is consistently framed as a struggle involving Christianity as a religion and the Christian nations, rather than having race or geopolitics at its core.⁵⁹

Following an initial period of stagnation between 1927 and 1930, when the Legion was no match for the more established and better-funded LANC, the movement witnessed a significant increase in popularity in the early 1930s, in the context of the social, economic, and political crises affecting Romania.⁶⁰ By this time, the initial interest of the movement in Italian Fascism was doubled by increasing attention to developments in Germany. In December 1928, *Pământul Strămoșesc* reported on the “great anti-Semitic movements in Germany and Poland,” as well as in Vienna and Prague, and bestowed praise on the “German leader of the powerful anti-Semitic army.”⁶¹ In 1929, Codreanu wrote to a Romanian living in Munich in an attempt to contact Hermann Esser, editor of *Völkischer Beobachter*, and was apparently contemplating a visit to Germany to meet members of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP). There was, however, no interest on the German part in the insignificant legionary movement, and Codreanu’s visit did not take place; as Armin Heinen notes, referring to the severe shortage of funds that the movement faced at this time, “the Legion had indeed more stringent problems than a strengthening of its links with parties abroad.”⁶²

Between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany: The Legionary Movement in the 1930s

By the time of Hitler's coming to power in 1933, the situation had changed significantly. In the extremely volatile political situation in Romania, where elections were held every year between 1931 and 1933, the Legion had scored its first electoral successes, first sending Codreanu and his father to parliament in two by-elections and then obtaining five seats in the general elections of July 1932.⁶³ Police reports at this time began to take the movement much more seriously than previously, and directly identified it as a fascist organization, comparing its rhetoric and propaganda style to those employed by Mussolini and Hitler.⁶⁴ The adherence of a group of young intellectuals to the movement had given it a "voice" in the pages of three major Bucharest-based newspapers (the dailies *Cuvântul* and *Calendarul*, and the bi-weekly *Axa*), conferring the movement the intellectual prestige it had hitherto lacked. These intellectuals were quick to identify the Legion as "doubtlessly the Romanian 'representative' of Fascism and National Socialism."⁶⁵

As the Legion declared its support for German National Socialism and celebrated its victory, the accusations that the movement had close connections with Hitler and was even subsidized by Germany multiplied. However, as Armin Heinen convincingly showed, this was not the case, and the legionary movement was in fact the least preferred Romanian partner for the NSDAP at this time.⁶⁶ The concerns of the Nazis lay first and foremost with the German minority in Romania, who they believed would be better served by Cuza's party, viewed as "entirely philo-German," than by the Legion, which they saw as inclining more toward Fascist Italy than Germany, and as more intransigent toward all national minorities in Romania.⁶⁷ A report of the leadership of German youth, cited by Heinen, identified the legionary movement as the Romanian party that comes closest to fascism, while concluding that "the very probable success of Codreanu is not at all desirable in view of Germany's interest."⁶⁸

Moța's articles at this time seem to indicate that the Nazi assessment of the Legion's position was not off the mark, at least with respect to the movement's ultranationalism and its attitude toward minorities. In response to the "infamous" and "ridiculous" accusations that the movement was subsidized by Hitler in an attempt to undermine Romania, Moța wrote that in the face of such a "Hitlerist threat to our borders, nothing would be able to face it with more determination, with more élan and crushing force, than a legionary Romania, fortified in its ethnic constitution."⁶⁹ Accusing in turn the Liberal Party of

having sacrificed Romania's interests to foreign ones (French, or "pan-European"), he clarified that the Legion's "applauding of Chancellor Hitler for the destruction of Marxism and the libertarian philosophy of the French Revolution" would never entail any compromise "of Romanian realities for the sake of some *Hitlerist* international."⁷⁰ In a later article, addressing the propagation of National Socialism among ethnic Germans in Romania, Moța was very clear on his position toward national minorities in the country, whose loyalty, he argued, had to rest primarily with their host Romanian state. As such, their allegiance to a foreign leader in their kin state was inconceivable, and would transform them into traitors and enemies of the Romanian nation.⁷¹ Moța praised once again "the Führer so appreciated and esteemed by us all, up to the limit of Romanian interests," and foresaw "an accentuation of the political rapprochement of Romania and Germany in the future—and the future global resolution of the Jewish problem, as well as the fascist reconstruction of States will engender a close collaboration and brotherhood of all fascist States." However, he concluded that "without having the right to forbid Saxons a spiritual participation, limited and conditioned, to the German rebirth, yet we cannot accept a full-fledged *Hitlerism* of Saxons and Germans in Romania."⁷² These "limits and conditions" were explicitly those of Romania's interests and of the unconditional allegiance required of all its citizens to them, regardless of nationality. Thus, while drawing attention to the element of "rebirth" in National Socialism and the anticipation of a common fascist front that would address "the Jewish problem" globally, the limit of the legionary impetus toward cooperation with other fascist movements and regimes remained with the native character of the movement and its ultranationalism.

The second consideration of the aforementioned German report, that the Legion was closer to Italian Fascism, is harder to assess. In the context of the tensions between Germany and Italy in 1933–35 and of the Austrian crisis, the openings of the newly established Action Committees for the Universality of Rome (Comitati d'Azione per l'Universalità di Roma, CAUR) toward the legionary movement and the visit of Eugenio Coselschi to one of the Legion's voluntary work camps were probably the reasons prompting this assessment.⁷³ By this time, Mussolini had abandoned his earlier views that fascism was not "merchandise for export," and was much more interested in transferring the model, as long as this would occur under Italian leadership.⁷⁴ However, these contacts with the legionary movement did not develop beyond the level of sporadic mutual visits, and, from the Italian side, the centrality of anti-Semitism in legionary ideology

was a disturbing element.⁷⁵ As legionaries were keenly following the situation in Austria, the movement's person in charge of foreign affairs, Mihail Polihroniade, extensively discussed its importance for Italo-German relations, noting after the establishment of the Austrian dictatorship that, while it represented a new blow for democracy and a further success for Italian Fascism, about which the legionaries were understandably enthusiastic, the regime in Austria was not a proper fascist one. This was due to the fact that it lacked popular support, being instead an "anti-national dictatorship, unnatural ..., a police state" and, "what is worse," "a vassal of Rome."⁷⁶ These considerations show once again the interest, on the one hand, of the legionary movement in the "internationalization" of fascism, and, on the other, their contempt for any import, imitation, or adoption of the model as a result of outside pressures. Striving to accomplish their own national revolution that would transform the Romanian state into one of legionary making, legionaries were keen on establishing links with similar organizations abroad, while wary of falling under the influence of any of the two established regimes.

At the time when relations between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany had reached an all-time low after the assassination of the Austrian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß, Moța's participation in the Montreux Congress of December 1934, the first such gathering of European fascists, under Italian auspices, appears interesting, especially since the Legion had refused an earlier invitation to a congress organized by the *Welt-Dienst*, the anti-Semitic news agency sponsored by the Nazis, on 26 August.⁷⁷ It must be noted that the *Welt-Dienst* was not an official Nazi publication and that its founder's relationship with the regime was occasionally problematic and deteriorated toward the end of the 1930s. Eventually, the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the NSDAP took over the publication in 1939, removing its founder, Ulrich Fleischhauer, from his editorial position, and reissuing it in 1940 in a new format. The problematic relationship of the *Welt-Dienst* with the Nazi regime was due partly to the ambivalence of several prominent leaders of the NSDAP toward the publication and toward Fleischhauer himself, and partly to the conscious attempts by the latter to distance it from the "official" party line and conceal its support, in an attempt to make it appear more independent of the German state and thus more appealing to an international audience, particularly in the crisis years following the Nazi takeover. Nevertheless, evidence indicates that between 1933 and 1937, so at the time of Moța's correspondence with the *Welt-Dienst*, the news agency was financed by Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda, albeit not openly.⁷⁸

In his correspondence with Georg de Poterre, his interlocutor on behalf of the *Welt-Dienst*, Moța invoked the movement's "terrible poverty" as the reason for not attending the German congress, yet this was no longer the case in mid-1934, so his was primarily an excuse, all the more apparent since the *Welt-Dienst* had offered to cover all the costs for a legionary delegation.⁷⁹ The Legion would later also decline repeated invitations to other international anti-Semitic congresses (where, in addition to covering the costs, de Poterre even suggested they could "name their conditions" and set the date themselves) and to the seventh Nürnberg Nazi Party rally, in September 1935.⁸⁰ Thus, the Montreux congress was one of the extremely rare instances when a prominent legionary leader participated at an international fascist event as an official representative of the movement, rather than in a personal capacity. As such, Moța's stance at the congress, and his own reflections on his participation, expressed in the correspondence with de Poterre, appear particularly relevant for understanding his, and implicitly the legionary view of transnational cooperation between fascist movements and regimes.

Native Fascists, Transnational Anti-Semites

The congress organized by CAUR in Montreux, Switzerland, on 16–17 December 1934 brought together representatives from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Switzerland.⁸¹ Significantly for the state of Italo-German relations at this time and for the purposes of the congress, no representatives of the NSDAP were invited. This was in line with the mandate of the congress (and of CAUR generally, as its very name suggested) to export Italian Fascism as a revolutionary solution to the crises affecting Europe, adaptable to different national contexts yet firmly anchored in the idea of the corporatist state and the "universality of Rome."⁸² In the context of the rivalry between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, at a time when Mussolini derided Hitler's racism, anti-Semitism had no place on the Italian agenda, all the more so as he personally had many Jewish collaborators and "the Fascist movement itself was disproportionately Jewish—that is, Jews made up a greater proportion of the party at all stages of its history than of the Italian population as a whole."⁸³

This context was lost on Moța, who was surprised at the absence of German representatives and who, true to his own (and the Legion's) agenda, considered "the discussion of the Jewish problem ... the

essential work of this congress," having raised the issue himself.⁸⁴ In consequence, his statement had "split the congress and catapulted [him] in the position of faction chief."⁸⁵ One of the Belgian delegates, Paul Hoornaert, the Irish Eoin O'Duffy, the Portuguese Eça de Queiroz, the Greek George Mercouris, the Austrian Rinaldini, and the Italian delegation opposed his motion of adopting an "unequivocal" stance on the "Jewish issue," whereas the other Belgian representative, Somville, the Dutch Arnold Meijer, the Swiss Fonjallaz, and the Danish Clausen supported it.⁸⁶ Eventually, the statement adopted by the congress was more moderate and qualified than Moța would have preferred; nevertheless, insofar as it represented a joint statement and resolution, and thus, in his view, a step toward "the establishment of a global anti-Jewish front," which was the common goal he shared with the *Welt-Dienst*, he interpreted it as a success.⁸⁷ Reproduced upon his return by the legionary secretariat and sent to all commanders of county chapters, it opened with the statement that "the Jewish question could not be resolved by a universal campaign of hatred against the Jews," continuing, however, with a denunciation of "some groups of Jews' ... nefarious influence on the moral and material interests" of their host countries, destructive "of the idea of Patria and of Christian civilization" and concluding with a "pledge to combat them."⁸⁸ In addition, Moța had "demanded that at future reunions the Germans are no longer avoided, but invited."⁸⁹

Moța's stance at the Montreux congress confirms the primacy of anti-Semitism as the main impetus for transnational cooperation of the legionary movement. However, his correspondence with de Poterre also reveals his position on the crucial issue of racism, pointing toward the key element that differentiated legionary anti-Semitism from the Nazi one. As such, he tells his interlocutor that he avoided linking anti-Semitism to racism, leaving space for different, "spiritualist" interpretations of the Jewish issue "in the Franco-Italian manner" (one can recall Moța's admiration for Action Française), adding that "a German-Italian understanding would be easier to accomplish by avoiding the presentation of the Jewish problem as explicable only through racial doctrine, and thus by asking to indissolubly link the anti-Jewish action to the racial one."⁹⁰ He continues his letter by explaining his own position on racism, one that deserves to be cited in full: "Myself, I admit, I am a racist, but with reservations: for example, I do not accept that religion is based on the specificity of the race; a specificity that it can have in its exterior forms, its ritual; but not in its content, which is not of human but divine essence, which we acquire through revelation and not through the genius of the race."⁹¹ A lot has been made of Moța's

admission of racism, most recently in an article by Mircea Platon, which argues that his participation in the congress was meant to send “an international signal of the Legion’s commitment to racism.”⁹² Most of Platon’s conclusions—such as Moța’s belief in the necessity of establishing an international anti-Semitic front, or his conviction that the solution to the “Jewish problem” could be formulated only in the context of fascist politics, wherein lay the Legion’s main distinction from LANC⁹³—are in agreement with the argument put forth in this chapter. However, his straightforward identification of an alleged commitment of the legionary movement to racism is very problematic and unwarranted by Moța’s statement cited above, by his activity at the congress, and generally by his views as reflected in his publications, from his student days up until 1937.

To begin with, it is difficult to understand why Moța would choose to air his racism at a congress organized by CAUR, in the context of Italo-German rivalry, while refusing to attend explicitly anti-Semitic international reunions organized by the explicitly racist *Welt-Dienst*—all the more so since Cuza took part in the latter and would subsequently accuse Moța of participating in a “Masonic” event (the Montreux congress).⁹⁴ Then, if this was indeed his purpose, why would he avoid the topic of racism rather than address it directly? As such, and in line with a further statement in the same letter, once again on the topic of “our common [anti-Semitic] action” and which opens with the words “while not being a racist [*Mais tout en n’étant pas raciste*],”⁹⁵ it is more likely that Moța’s “reservations,” and primarily the religious one he mentions, were more important for him to convey to his interlocutor than his “reserved” “racism.” Indeed, as previously assessed by Armin Heinen, the entire correspondence with the *Welt-Dienst* gives the impression that Moța—who “answered intermittently, with long pauses”—was “more likely infuriated by the requests of the other [de Poterre]”⁹⁶ rather than of his subscribing to the “New European Order” of Nazi making that Platon suggests.⁹⁷

Instead, it is more likely that in the statement above Moța took the opportunity to reaffirm his belief in the primacy of religion, which is a constant in his writings and which was the main element that, in the self-identifications and self-descriptions provided by legionary leaders, which we resolved to take seriously, distinguished the movement from Italian Fascism and German National Socialism. In a statement made at his trial in 1938, Codreanu described Fascism’s preoccupation with the state as the “coat,” the exterior form; National Socialism’s racism as the “blood” and the “body”; while “legionarism” was “located ... in the soul of the individual and the nation, without neglecting either the idea

of state or that of race; however, our essential point, the root, is placed here, in the soul"; in the view of the leader of the legionary movement, this accounted for "the superiority of the legionary idea over Fascism and National Socialism."⁹⁸ As such, Platon's argument that "Moța and other Iron Guardist leaders ... did not recognize any incompatibility between their own manifest Christianity and the German brand of anti-Semitism"⁹⁹ does not appear to be supported by the available evidence. Instead, it seems more reasonable to conclude, as Armin Heinen does, that "the National Socialist racial theory was irrelevant for the legionaries. Their nationalism was not directed against the Christian heritage, but merged with the desire for a religious revival."¹⁰⁰

"In Defense of the Holy Cross"—Ion I. Moța on the Spanish Front

The final chapter of Moța's life provides yet another example of his commitment to a transnational cooperation whose aim he perceived along the lines of his lifelong obsession: the "defense of Christianity" from an alleged "Judeo-Bolshevik threat."¹⁰¹ Part of a small legionary delegation under the command of General Gheorghe Cantacuzino, Moța left for Spain on 25 November 1936. The mission of the legionary team was to be a purely symbolic gesture of support for the Spanish nationalists, presenting Colonel José Moscardó Ituarte, the defender of Alcazar, with the gift of a sword.¹⁰² In light of the fact that at this time the movement was preparing to come to power and that all eight legionaries were among its most prominent leaders, Codreanu gave specific orders to the team that they were not to exceed the term of one month and should return by 1 January 1937, and that they should not engage in active combat and put their lives at risk.¹⁰³

In an extremely rare act of defiance against a direct order from Codreanu, Moța resolved to stay on and enlist himself and the other legionaries (with the exception of General Cantacuzino, who was seventy-seven years old) in the Foreign Legion, a voluntary unit consisting mostly of Spanish nationalists but also including foreign volunteers who, in his own interpretation, had "come to fight in Spain for the defense of the Cross and the destruction of communism in the entire world."¹⁰⁴ In his letters from the Spanish front, published after his death in his father's newspaper *Libertatea*, Moța mentions meeting the Irish nationalists under the command of General Eoin O'Duffy, whom he knew from the Montreux congress, as well as the very good reception the legionaries had enjoyed from the Portuguese nationalists.¹⁰⁵ Among

the Spanish organizations fighting on the nationalist side, he was most impressed with the Falange, whose headquarters he visited and which he identified as the one that “resembles the most our Legion in Romania.”¹⁰⁶

Moreover, and most importantly for the purposes of this chapter, in all his letters from Spain Moța also elaborates extensively on his reasons for choosing to fight in the Spanish Civil War, in an attempt to explain the paradox of a nationalist fighter committing to a cause that was in all appearances foreign to the interests of Romania. In one of his most synthetic such explanations, covering all aspects of his vision of transnational cooperation between fascist movements and regimes, he states:

No power, no love, is above the Nation and cannot be fulfilled outside of the Nation—except for the power of Christ and the love for Him. When a devilish army rises to banish Christ from the world, when they attack the luminous face of the Savior with machine guns and bayonets, then all the people, of all nations, must come to the defense of the Cross! All the more so as those who attempt now to destroy Christianity in Spain will attack tomorrow the Christian and Romanian [*sic!*] order of all nations, thus also of our Romania. But if the love of Christ, the power of Christ, which is above all Nations, could bring us Romanians to fight for the Cross in the foreign land of Spain, together with the Spanish, the Germans and the Italians—this does not mean that the power of Christianity and the love of Christ remove us from our nation, alienate us from it. By defending Christianity, even on foreign soil, we defend a power that is the source of our nation’s power, and by listening to the call of our love for the Cross, we obey, here in Spain, our love for our Romanian nation.¹⁰⁷

The statement above, continued in a subsequent letter (the very last to be published) with a further explanation, that “here, we fight and we fall for the defense of *our* ancestral law, for the happiness of the Romanian nation, for its resurrection through the fight of the Legion and the new creation that the Captain brings,”¹⁰⁸ sums up synthetically Moța’s views of nationalism, of its relationship with religion, and of the palingenetic element that was central to legionary ideology, as well as of the common cause that transcended national interests and subsumed them. Unmistakably, the latter could only be justified for Moța by Christianity (and not race, nor a new European geopolitical order), the only cause he viewed as superior to the national one, which, in turn, was entirely dependent on its Christian “source.” It was according to his typically dualist understanding of the contemporary world as the site of a life and death struggle between Christianity and its mortal enemies—identified in the context of the Spanish Civil War alternatively as “the invasion of Satanic communism” and “the Jewish

dream"¹⁰⁹—that he saw a need for cooperation between the members of all (Christian) nations who shared similar views. And just as the legionary palingenesis was consistently expressed in the Christian language of “resurrection,” this key aspect in legionary ideology was the specific factor that on the one hand allowed the movement to proclaim its native version of fascism as distinct from, and superior to the Italian and German models, and on the other hand led to the radical exclusion of the Jews (on religious rather than racial grounds) from the legionary dream of a “community of faith.”

To conclude, by tracing the international activity of Ion I. Moța, legionary leader and lieutenant of Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, this chapter has shed light on his views of transnational connections between fascist movements and regimes. Due to his prominent position within the organization and his influence on its ideology, the latter can be considered as representative of the legionary perception of the need for international collaboration in combating what the movement perceived as common enemies. Identified by Moța and the Legion generally as “Jews” and “communism,” where the latter was subsumed in the former in the virulently anti-Semitic legionary ideology, it was the international and internationalist character of these “enemies” that, in the legionaries’ vision, called for transnational cooperation between the “movements of national regeneration” in Europe.¹¹⁰ As such, as its title suggests, this chapter has argued that the main impetus for international collaboration of the legionary movement was provided by its anti-Semitism, whereas the limits to such cooperation lay with the native fascist character of the movement and its specificity, conferred by the importance placed on religion within its ideology. In the search of like-minded allies abroad, particular attention was consistently devoted to the palingenetic element in the ideology of such movements, as well as to their revolutionary character, aspects which, according to the “new consensus” in studies of fascism, allow distinguishing fascist movements and regimes from other radical right or conservative authoritarian organizations. Thus, the movement’s distinctly fascist vision of both Romanian interests and international relations simultaneously led it to seek transnational links for combating the perceived enemies of a nationalist and Christian Europe, and to set itself apart, due to an ultranationalism doubled by religious fervor, from the other contemporary fascist movements and regimes.

Epilogue

On 13 January 1937, after less than two weeks of combat, Moța and another legionary commander, Vasile Marin, were killed during a Republican attack near Majadahonda.¹¹¹ However, the transnational entanglements of Moța's life were to continue even after his death, and would eventually prove fateful for the Legion. A grandiose funeral of its two "martyrs" organized by the movement in Bucharest on 13 February 1937 was attended by representatives of the German, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish diplomatic missions to Romania, despite the fact that the event was not sanctioned by the Romanian state.¹¹² Even before the funeral itself, the train that crossed all of Europe to bring back the coffins of the two legionary leaders had been honored by members of the SA and the SS (including Hitler's personal guard), by Italian *squadristi*, and by members of the Falange.¹¹³ The international support for an extremist, antiestablishment movement prompted a diplomatic crisis, and the unprecedented scale of the funeral, as well as the discipline displayed by the thousands of uniformed legionaries who had come from across Romania to attend it, spread fear in the government and deeply worried King Carol II.¹¹⁴ As a result, the king acted decisively against the Legion after the establishment of his personal dictatorship in February 1938. The persecution of the movement, culminating with the assassination of Codreanu in November 1938 and of almost the entire first-rank legionary leadership in September 1939, put an end to the constant rise in popularity the Legion had experienced in the 1930s, and ensured that when it did eventually come to power, in September 1940, it was no longer the uncompromising native fascist movement that Moța had represented, but one that was much more opportunistic and prone to foreign influences.

RAUL CÂRSTOCEA is Senior Research Associate at the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI), Flensburg, Germany. He studied History and Politics at University College London, Central European University, University of Bologna, and the American University in Bulgaria. He specializes in the history of anti-Semitism in Romania, and the Romanian interwar fascist movement, the "Legion of the Archangel Michael." Selected publications: "Breaking the Teeth of Time: Mythical Time and the 'Terror of History' in the Rhetoric of the Legionary Movement in Interwar Romania," *Journal of Modern European History* 13, 1 (2015): 79–97; "Anti-Semitism in Romania: Historical Legacies, Contemporary Challenges," *ECMI Working Paper* 81 (2014): 1–39.

Notes

1. Walter Laqueur, *Fascism: Past, Present, Future* (New York, 1996), 218. See Arnd Bauerkämper, "Transnational Fascism: Cross-Border Relations between Regimes and Movements in Europe, 1922–1939," *East Central Europe* no. 37 (2010): 216–17; and Roger Eatwell, "Towards a New Model of Generic Fascism," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* no. 4 (1992): 163–65 for further examples of authors supporting this view.
2. See Eatwell, "Towards a New Model," 170–72. For a criticism of Ernst Nolte's argument of fascism as a "metapolitical" phenomenon, which Eatwell does not discuss, see Roger Griffin, ed., *International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus* (London, 1998), 47–49.
3. Bauerkämper, "Transnational Fascism"; Constantin Iordachi, "Fascism in Interwar East Central and Southeastern Europe: Toward a New Transnational Research Agenda," *East Central Europe* no. 37 (2010): 161–213.
4. Sven Reichardt, "Violence and Consensus in Fascism," *Fascism. Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies* 1, no. 1 (2012): 59.
5. See e.g. Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (New York, 1991); Stanley Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945* (Madison, WI, 1995).
6. Ion I. Moța, *Corespondența cu "Serviciul Mondial" (1934–1936)* (Rome, 1954), 31.
7. For theoretical interpretations of fascism that emphasize its revolutionary character, see e.g. Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*; Zeev Sternhell, Mario Sznajder, and Maia Asheri, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution* (Princeton, NJ, 1994); Payne, *History of Fascism*; George Mosse, *The Fascist Revolution: Toward a General Theory of Fascism* (New York, 1999).
8. Constantin Argetoianu, *Însemnări zilnice*, vol. 1 (Bucharest, 1998), 275.
9. Andrei Ionescu, "Viața și moartea vitejească a lui Ion I. Moța," in *Almanahul Cuvântul* (Bucharest, 1941), 130.
10. Arguably, Horia Sima, the leader of the movement after Codreanu's death in 1938, could be considered more important than Moța in terms of his later impact on legionary ideology. However, during the period under consideration in this chapter (until Moța's death in 1937), Sima was only a minor, regional leader who remained virtually unknown to the central leadership of the organization.
11. Samuel Goodfellow, "Fascism as a Transnational Movement: The Case of Alsace," *Contemporary European History* 22, no. 1 (2013): 96–99.
12. Ion Țurcan, "Tabere și șantiere," *Însemnări sociologice* 2, no. 9 (1936), 22.
13. Interview with Ștefan Iacobescu, carried out by Virginia Călin, 9 March 1994, *Arhiva de istorie orală a Societății Române de Radiodifuziune* (henceforth AIOSRR), Tape C67.
14. Ionescu, "Viața și moartea," 130.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Nicolae Roșu, *Orientări în veac* (Bucharest, 1937), 255–56.
17. "Libertatea—foaie verde," *Libertatea*, 12 April 1936.

18. Nicolae Teban, "Înmormântarea lui Moța și Marin," in *Ion Moța și Vasile Marin—25 ani dela moarte* (Madrid, 1963), 218; Armin Heinen, *Legiunea "Arhanghelul Mihail": O contribuție la problema fascismului internațional* (Bucharest, 2006), 126.
19. Ionescu, "Viața și moartea," 131–32.
20. *Ibid.*, 132.
21. *Ibid.*
22. Heinen, *Legiunea*, 126; Ion I. Moța, "Răspuns (La invitația d-lui Prof. G. Bogdan-Duică)," *Pământul Strămoșesc*, 1 January 1928.
23. Ionescu, "Viața și moartea," 132.
24. Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, *Pentru legionari* (Sibiu, 1936), 60–64; "Teroarea haimanalelor din Iași," *Aurora*, 21 May 1922.
25. *Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității* (henceforth CNSAS), *Fond Penal* (henceforth Fund P), File 13207, vol. 2, 319.
26. "Nunta lui Moța," *Pământul Strămoșesc*, 1 September 1927. The couple had two children (a daughter, Gabriela, and a son, Mihai), suggestively bearing the names of the two archangels, Michael and Gabriel.
27. Codreanu, *Pentru legionari*, 123.
28. Ionescu, "Viața și moartea," 134; Constantin Iordachi, *Charisma, Politics and Violence: The Legion of the "Archangel Michael" in Inter-war Romania* (Trondheim, 2004), 35–36.
29. *Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale* (henceforth ANIC), *Fond Direcția Generală a Poliției* (henceforth Fund DGP), File 121/1924–1926, 182–83.
30. Codreanu, *Pentru legionari*, 124.
31. *Protocoloalele Înțelepților Sionului* (Orăștie, 1923).
32. CNSAS, Fund P, File 13207, vol. 2, 179–80; *Arhivele Naționale ale Republicii Moldova* (henceforth ANRM), *Fond Direcția Generală a Poliției* (henceforth Fund DGP), File 103/1933, 225–26.
33. CNSAS, Fund P, File 13207, vol. 3, 169; Francisco Veiga, *Istoria Gărzii de Fier 1919–1941: Mistica ultranaționalismului* (Bucharest, 1993), 76–77.
34. Codreanu, *Pentru legionari*, 179.
35. Gheorghe Istrate, *Frăția de cruce* (Madrid, 1952), 9.
36. *Ibid.*, 7, 14.
37. *Ibid.*, 14–21.
38. Ionescu, "Viața și moartea," 141.
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*
41. Ion I. Moța, *Cranii de lemn* (Bucharest, 1940), 81.
42. Heinen, *Legiunea*, 304.
43. See e.g. Ion I. Moța, "Cauza noastră e justă în ordinea morală și servește progresul social," *Dacia Nouă*, 23 December 1922; *idem*, "Necesitatea naționalismului radical," *Dacia Nouă*, 20 January 1923; *idem*, "Ce ne dați în locul 'cântecelor care pier'?", *Cuvântul Studențesc*, 4 March 1924; *idem*, "Înțelesul plecării noastre în Spania," *Libertatea*, 6 December 1936; *idem*, "Prezent!," *Libertatea*, 1 July 1937.
44. Moța, "Necesitatea naționalismului radical."
45. Moța, "Ce ne dați"; Ion I. Moța, "Aufruf zur Treue!—Apel la fidelitate," *Pământul Strămoșesc*, 15 November 1928.

46. Raul Cârstocea, "Uneasy Twins? The Entangled Histories of Jewish Emancipation and Anti-Semitism in Romania and Hungary, 1866–1913," *Slovo* 21, no. 2 (2009): 74–75.
47. Iulia Onac, "The Brusturoasa Uprising," in *Sites of European Antisemitism in the Age of Mass Politics, 1880–1918*, ed. Robert Nemes and Daniel Unowsky (Waltham, MA, 2014), 88.
48. Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, Ion I. Moța, Ilie Gârneață, Corneliu Georgescu, and Radu Mironovici, "Legiunea Arhanghelul Mihail," *Pământul Strămoșesc*, 15 August 1927.
49. For a clear distinction between the legion and LANC, identifying the former's specificity in its "revolutionary legionary spirit" and directly associating it with the "movements" of Mussolini and Hitler, see Ion I. Moța, "Legiunea și LANC," *Axa*, 1 October 1933.
50. Codreanu et al., "Legiunea Arhanghelul Mihail"; Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, Ion I. Moța, Ilie Gârneață, Corneliu Georgescu, and Radu Mironovici, "Organizarea Legiunii Arhanghelul Mihail," *Pământul Strămoșesc*, 1 October 1927.
51. Codreanu et al., "Legiunea Arhanghelul Mihail."
52. "Vești antisemite din lume," *Pământul Strămoșesc*, 1 October 1927 and subsequent issues.
53. Philip Morgan, "Studying Fascism from the Particular to the General," *East Central Europe* 37, nos. 2–3 (2010): 336.
54. Ion I. Moța, "O vorbă ardelenescă pentru 'lordul' Rothermere—'Ungaria mare' și planurile Jidănești," *Pământul Strămoșesc*, 1 September 1927. See also Eugen Weber, "Romania," in *The European Right*, ed. Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (Berkeley, CA, 1966), 521. For Lord Rothermere's fascist sympathies, see Bauerkämper, "Transnational Fascism," 219.
55. Moța, "O vorbă ardelenescă" (emphasis in the original). All emphases are in the original unless specified otherwise.
56. *Ibid.*
57. *Ibid.*
58. For a comprehensive overview of legionary anti-Semitism, see Raul Cârstocea, "The Role of Anti-Semitism in the Ideology of the 'Legion of the Archangel Michael,' 1927–1938," PhD dissertation (University College London, 2011).
59. For a short comment on the importance of religion for the understanding of legionary anti-Semitism, see Raul Cârstocea, "The Path to the Holocaust: Fascism and Antisemitism in Interwar Romania," *S.I.M.O.N. (Shoah: Intervention, Methods, Documentation)* 1 (2014), 1–11, available at <http://simon.vwi.ac.at/index.php/working-papers/carstocea-raul>.
60. See e.g. ANIC, *Fond Ministerul de Interne, Diverse* (henceforth Fund MI), File 9/1927, 319–20, 344. See also Horia Sima, *History of the Legionary Movement* (Liss, 1995), 62–68.
61. "Din străinătate," *Pământul Strămoșesc*, 15 December 1928.
62. Heinen, *Legiunea*, 132.
63. ANIC, *Fond Parlament* (henceforth Fund PR), File 2374/1932, vol. 2, 475, 481–84.

64. CNSAS, Fund P, File 11784, vol. 14, 80; vol. 2, 94; ANIC, Fund MI, File 4/1932, 560–61; ANRM, Fund DGP, File 107/1931, 1.
65. Mihail Polihroniade, "Rostul 'Gărzii de Fier,'" *Calendarul*, 18 July 1932.
66. Heinen, *Legiunea*, 224.
67. *Ibid.*, 228–29.
68. Cited in *Ibid.*, 229.
69. Ion I. Moța, "3-22-250 (Răspuns cifrat d-lui Titeanu)," *Axa*, 1 August 1933. The term "Hitlerism" was the most frequent one used in interwar Romania to refer to National Socialism; thus, when citing publications from the epoch, I maintain its original usage.
70. *Ibid.*
71. Ion I. Moța, "Hitlerismul germanilor din România," *Axa*, 15 October 1933.
72. *Ibid.*
73. Heinen, *Legiunea*, 223–24, 228.
74. Michael Ledeen, "Italian Fascism and Youth," *Journal of Contemporary History* 4, no. 3 (1969): 138–39.
75. Jerzy W. Borejsza, *Il fascismo e l'Europa orientale: dalla propaganda all'aggressione* (Rome, 1981), 133.
76. Mihail Polihroniade, "Dictatură în Austria," *Axa*, 19 September 1933.
77. Moța, *Corespondența cu "Serviciul Mondial,"* 13.
78. Eckart Schörlé, "Internationale der Antisemiten: Ulrich Fleischhauer und der 'Welt-Dienst,'" *Werkstatt Geschichte* 51 (2009): 59–61, 67–69.
79. Moța, *Corespondența cu "Serviciul Mondial,"* 13.
80. *Ibid.*, 26–27, 33.
81. Payne, *History of Fascism*, 229–30; Philip Morgan, *Fascism in Europe, 1919–1945* (London, 2003), 169–70; Roland Clark, "European Fascists and Local Activists: Romania's Legion of the Archangel Michael (1922–1938)," PhD dissertation (University of Pittsburgh, 2012), 259–60.
82. Eugenio Coselschi, in *Comités d'Action pour l'Universalité de Rome, Réunion de Montreux 1617 decembre 1934XIII*, (Rome, 1935), 28–42.
83. Payne, *History of Fascism*, 240.
84. Moța, *Corespondența cu "Serviciul Mondial,"* 15.
85. Mircea Platon, "The Iron Guard and the 'Modern State': Iron Guard Leaders Vasile Marin and Ion I. Moța, and the 'New European Order,'" *Fascism* 1, no. 2 (2012): 82.
86. *Ibid.*
87. Moța, *Corespondența cu "Serviciul Mondial,"* 15–16.
88. ANIC, Fund DGP, File 232/1935, vol. 2, 45.
89. Moța, *Corespondența cu "Serviciul Mondial,"* 16.
90. *Ibid.*, 15.
91. *Ibid.*
92. Platon, "The Iron Guard," 82. Philip Morgan also argues that "the Iron Guard ... adopted a xenophobic and anti-Semitic racism." Morgan, *Fascism in Europe*, 170.
93. Platon, "The Iron Guard," 85–89.
94. Moța, *Corespondența cu "Serviciul Mondial,"* 17.
95. *Ibid.*, 16.
96. Heinen, *Legiunea*, 304.

97. Platon, "The Iron Guard," 89.
98. CNSAS, Fund P, File 11784, vol. 6, 152–53.
99. Platon, "The Iron Guard," 89.
100. Heinen, *Legiunea*, 121.
101. Moța, "Înțelesul plecării noastre în Spania."
102. Vasile Marin, "Note din drumul spre frontul spaniol," *Porunca Vremii*, 12 December 1936.
103. CNSAS, Fund P, File 11784, vol. 11, 251.
104. Ion I. Mota, "Răvașe dela Legionarii Români de pe Frontul Crucii, din Spania," *Libertatea*, 1 April 1937.
105. *Ibid.*
106. Mota, "Răvașe IV," *Libertatea*, Easter [19 April] 1937.
107. Ion I. Mota, "Prezent!," *Libertatea*, 1 July 1937. Even the one mistake in the paragraph cited above is indicative of the legion's uncompromising ultranationalism.
108. Mota, "Prezent! II," *Libertatea*, 8 July 1937.
109. Mota, "Înțelesul plecării noastre în Spania.;" Ion I. Mota, "Dragostea lor de țară," *Libertatea*, 13 December 1936.
110. Moța, *Corespondența cu "Serviciul Mondial,"* 31.
111. Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, *Circulări și manifeste* (Madrid, 1951), 118.
112. See Valentin Săndulescu, "Sacralised Politics in Action: The February 1937 Burial of the Romanian Legionary Leaders Ion Moța and Vasile Marin," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, no. 2 (2007): 259–69.
113. See *Libertatea*, 11, 18, 25 March 1937.
114. ANIC, Fund MI, File 4/1937; Constantin Argetoianu, *Însemnări zilnice*, vol. 2 (Bucharest, 1999), 68–77.

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