

5 Rethinking Italian corporatism

Crossing borders between corporatist projects in the late liberal era and the Fascist corporatist state

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The Fascist corporatist regime assumed its distinctive features with the ‘syndical and corporatist laws’ enacted since 1926. When the regime’s architect and most prominent jurist, Alfredo Rocco, who in his capacity as chancellor devised the set of laws known as *leggi fascistissime* (ultra-fascist laws), had to present the rationale of his accomplishment by asserting its importance for the construction of the Fascist state,¹ he chose to highlight the significance of the syndical legislation. In his view:

The Fascist state is the state that achieves the juridical organization of the Society at its utmost strength and cohesion. And society, in the Fascist concept, is not a mere sum of individuals, but an organism that possesses its own life and aims, transcending those of individuals, and possesses its own spiritual and historical value.²

From this perspective, he argued that ‘the reform that contributed most to shape the Fascist state and to endow its actions with a solid social content was, after all, the laws on the juridical discipline of the collective labour relations’,³ which not only achieved a ‘reorganization of society based on the productive function practised by all’,⁴ but also

carried out a supreme political goal: to bring back into the state’s sphere those forces that established themselves outside it and against it. The syndical phenomenon is an inescapable aspect of modern life: the state cannot ignore it, but has to acknowledge it, rule it, and dominate it.⁵

It is with amazing clarity that Rocco introduces here the one essential feature of the Fascist corporatist state, its juridical construct being inextricably intertwined with the ideological self-representation of Italian Fascism itself. Thus it was that Rocco reveals one of its most intriguing aspects: the coexistence of tradition, through the metaphor of the organism, and modernity, by the acknowledgement of syndicalism.

The juridical basis of the corporatist state has been subject to a close scrutiny since the very beginning of historical studies on Italian Fascism. Alberto Aquarone’s seminal research on the regime’s institutional foundations, in which he

neatly outlines the connections between Mussolini's political purposes and their legislative outcomes, combined with the internal dynamics of the Fascist Party's headquarters, the monarchy and the other political and institutional decision-makers, remains unsurpassed.⁶ Aquarone's assessment of the syndical and corporatist framework, developed by examining the legislative measures enacted since 1926, had been highly influential in creating a long-lasting overview of its basic features.

They lied when they said they would acknowledge the Fascist trade unions as legal bodies, as the only organizations permitted to bargain with business and land-owner confederations and to engage in collective bargaining, which was enshrined as law. In exchange for a complete monopoly of workers organizations, the Fascist trade unions had to refrain from taking strike action and undertook to appeal to the newly-established Labour Court (*Magistratura del Lavoro*) to settle any conflicts. The Fascist trade unions, whose representatives were appointed by the Fascist Party, and the employers organizations were installed within the new corporatist framework: a set of administrative bodies within the new Ministry of Corporations and which intended to pursue the conciliation of interests and enforce the government's labour policy. A number of new institutions were created: the Labour Charter (published in 1927), which entrusted the corporations with the task of regulating the national economy in accordance with the greater national interests embodied by the Fascist state and the National Council of the Corporations, which in 1930 became a constitutional body headed by Mussolini, who appointed its members. The National Council of the Corporations was to have authority over large economic, labour and welfare matters, but its actual importance did not match the intentions, as was proven in 1932 with the sacking of the corporations' champion, Giuseppe Bottai, from the Ministry of Corporations. The establishment of the 22 official corporations in 1934, corresponding to as many economic branches, was enacted as a bureaucratic system, but when the Chamber of Deputies was replaced with the Chamber of Fasces and Corporations in 1939, the political suffrage, however plebiscitary, was eventually taken over by the ultimate form of 'representation of interests' within the corporatist state. The new chamber, which shared legislative power with the government, was made up of members drawn from the Fascist Party and the corporations, who were appointed by Mussolini.

This undeniably bureaucratic outcome of the corporatist state had been at the root of a durable distinction between the ideological momentum of corporatist design, which had never been underestimated, and the unsatisfactory effects of its implementation, its effectiveness having been ascertained rather in the labour law enforcement, particularly in the big industrial plants.⁷ If not entirely futile regarding the economy, the measures introduced by the corporatist state, such as the Institute for the Reconstruction of Industry (*IRI* 1933), which was set up to bail out the banks that defaulted as a result of the economic crisis and which pioneered increased state participation in the industrial and financial economy, were largely ineffectual in counteracting the post-1929 slump.⁸

A very productive field of study on the Italian corporatist experience focused on the juridical side, indicating the diversity of thought and theory within the

field of corporatism,⁹ as well as it being deeply ingrained within juridical reflection on the modern state,¹⁰ and which eventually assessed the totalitarian drive of corporatist thought and the novelty and suitability of some of its solutions, particularly in respect of the transition from the Fascist to the democratic state.¹¹ The importance of the corporatist issue was assessed both in the regime-building process and in terms of ideological self-advertisement. Due to the enormous importance attached to the corporatist topic, and its key part in fuelling Fascist self-representation, it is not surprising to discover that the genealogy of corporatism provided at the time by prominent Fascists should have been crucial in directing the first analytical studies along similar lines. Fascism's dual descent from the syndicalist-revolutionary and nationalist movements had been declared by prominent intellectuals on either side,¹² and was claimed by Mussolini in an entry in the *Enciclopedia Italiana Treccani*.¹³ From an ideological point of view, therefore, the importance of early nationalism in shaping state-centred Fascist corporatism is well established,¹⁴ as is the direct continuity between national syndicalism, Fascist trade unions and early corporations that favoured incorporating the Fascist trade unions into the complicated internal dynamics of forces competing for power.¹⁵

From a broader perspective, the cultural and ideological debate has been linked with the various political tendencies among the leaders of the Fascist Party.¹⁶ This perspective, which is inclined to stress the 'mythological' nature of the corporatist state as a way of scrutinizing its ideological appeal inside and outside Fascist Italy, is able to reflect the enormous political investment Fascism made in the corporatist debate: as the publicity granted the several corporatists shows,¹⁷ the corporatist issue was considered key to gaining leadership of the authoritarian and totalitarian field in Europe (and Latin America). The majority of corporatist studies at the eve of the Second World War might be enough to substantiate the point;¹⁸ but a thorough survey on the actual role played by corporatist studies in establishing new academic courses,¹⁹ publishing handbooks and generally creating a new field for selecting the Fascist ruling class is still to be done.

A new approach intended to overcome the commonplace of the Fascist corporatist state's 'failure', its mainly ideological or even 'mythical' significance, and to test how much corporatist institutions did matter in economic policy, how they were established and on which terms they entered the competition among Fascism's driving forces, and the Fascist Party in particular, has been advanced.²⁰ This brought about some renewed interest in the economic consequences of corporatism,²¹ and while bringing significant improvements to the overall understanding of the matter, further study is required to assess how the corporatist system worked outside central government, particularly given its crucial importance in the centre/periphery relationship centre/periphery,²² and on the local level where it played a role in such crucial sectorial issues as agriculture, state-funded industries and internal mobility with reference to the corporatist system.²³

The superseding of the 'ideological' approach to the corporatist question is also furthered by the view of its continuity before and after Fascism. This is not

a new issue,²⁴ but one that has been addressed by the jurist Sabino Cassese, who illustrated the mixture of old and new materials forming the Fascist corporatist state and the paradoxes of the authoritarian centralization of power (i.e. the incorporation of residual pluralistic issues within the structures of the Fascist regime).²⁵ Despite its brevity,²⁶ Cassese's book is more an agenda than a summary, and is able to suggest several research questions, such as the role of corporatism as an epitome of the paradoxes mentioned above.²⁷ This renewed approach to continuity matches recent assessments in the history of ideas,²⁸ but may also facilitate the inclusion of the Italian corporatist state into the new wave of studies on corporatism in Europe.²⁹

The European dimension of corporatism demands taking into account the role of Catholic culture and institutions. However, while most perceptive comparative investigations have advocated this approach,³⁰ in the Italian case the Catholic side of corporatism during Fascism remains to be appropriately addressed. While we will return to this issue, we must state that it is only recently it has been addressed from a non-confessional point of view.³¹

Here I intend to examine Italian corporatism from within the overall perspective of Fascist corporatism as a distinctive authoritarian response to the challenges of industrial modernity, mass democracy and state power that faced the countries of Europe (and America) during the 1930s. From this viewpoint, the Fascist corporatist experience is part of a wider and longer-lasting history of challenging the shortcomings of the liberal state and its individualistic foundations. How, and to what extent, the vast and varied debate on the corporatist reforms of the late liberal era affected Fascist corporatism remains to be assessed.

Plans for Senate reform and corporatist perspective

During the first decade of the twentieth century in Italy, plans for state reform to include new technical bodies for the representation of organized interests – that is, corporatist plans – were diverse and had different political sources and backgrounds. They generally did not intend to subvert the liberal order, but rather to stabilize it, with leanings towards more organized, corporate and hierarchical democracy. They ranged from political discussions to reform the Senate (consisting of the king's nominees) into a body consisting of the representatives of the professions, to audacious designs to achieve new forms of organic democracy, such as those conceived at the turn of the century by the prominent Catholic sociologist Giuseppe Toniolo, and which was deeply ingrained in the anti-liberal intransigent Catholic tradition. There were also debates and projects brought by reformist socialist and trade union leaders like Rinaldo Rigola, including the many proposals to enhance the newly-established Labour Council and its advisory commissions in which the socialist and trade union leaders were involved, and to turn it into a second chamber to represent economic bodies and professions.

The debate on Senate reform involved mainly jurists, academics and experienced politicians.³² Instead of seeking to change the Albertine Charter, most

proposals sought to give the Senate more authority and to bring its authority on financial matters into line with that of the Chamber of Deputies, the political importance of which had grown as a result of the extended franchise and the emergence of the Socialist Party. Under these proposals, senators would no longer be nominated by the Crown, but would instead be elected, in the belief elections would give the Senate greater legitimacy during a period of incipient democracy, which could turn it into a stronger counterbalance to democracy.

The attempt to get Senate to reform itself, which was the result of a parliamentary commission in 1909–10, failed. Senators were unable to pass a bill that would inevitably diminish their privileges. In any event, the prime minister, Giovanni Giolitti, wanted to keep the Senate weak and dependent on the executive. There was always the position of the Crown, which supported the status quo and which would have prevented any change. Nevertheless, one notable feature of the failed plan was that eligibility for Senate membership was reserved to those institutional bodies and professional categories already listed in the Albertine Charter, with the addition of industrial and commercial groups. Senate membership, therefore, was to be drawn from bodies and professional categories on a completely different basis to that of general political elections, with the intention of guaranteeing greater influence for sectors of the nation considered ‘eminent’, and to make the upper chamber representative of limited corporate interests.³³

Proposals of this kind, which intended to bring together parliamentary representation and the institutions representing social interest groups, were part of a larger pattern of conservative efforts to stabilize the relationship between the state and society by enhancing corporate bodies. They made one of post-1789 corporatism’s key points apparent: the representation of social, economic, professional or institutional bodies as an alternative to the individual representation upon which the political franchise is based. Institutional organicism was the conservative response to the political crisis of the liberal state and reflected the assumptions of the ‘realist’ French juridical school (Charles Benoist, Léon Duguit and the followers of Durkheim). A notable formulation of these concerns was contained in Santi Romano’s inaugural lecture to his course at the University of Pisa in 1909, where he highlighted the inadequacy of the state system when faced with the complexity of modern society, and pleaded for the social bodies to be legally acknowledged.³⁴

Corporatism as both a ‘modern’ and ‘traditionalist’ issue

An interesting precedent in the debate is detected in an earlier proposal for Senate reform, one advocated in 1898 by the young Catholic Marquis Antonio Malvezzi Campeggi at the height of the period of social and political crisis that marked the end of the century. It is worth recalling that the wave of strikes and protests resulting from the agricultural crisis, low wages and high bread prices that had swept across the peninsula was met with a repressive response by the right-wing liberal government. It set in motion an authoritarian plan (which failed the following year, blocked in parliament by the opposition) that sought to

abolish the political opposition (including the socialists and the Social Catholics) and to restore a strict, quasi-dictatorial and non-parliamentary interpretation of the Albertine Charter.

Malvezzi Campeggi's proposal was influenced by La Tour du Pin's views on the corporatist restoration of a Christian social order, and aimed to overcome liberal individualism by arranging a representative system based around social and professional corporations. As the 'natural' organs of society, the corporations were to elect the legislative chambers, thereby becoming the 'organic representation of social interests', to be brought into harmony within a Christian social order. More practically, the proposal confined itself to recommending universal suffrage for the lower chamber, which would consist of representatives of the organized popular classes, and called for a Senate consisting of a mixed assembly of aristocrats, royal nominees, representatives of the professions and financial and industrial entrepreneurs.³⁵

This proposal received an appreciative and committed review by Giuseppe Toniolo, a sociologist and political economist at the University of Pisa, and the most prominent Catholic Italian scholar at the time. Toniolo was very close to Pope Leo XIII, and is believed to have contributed to his 1891 encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, which was dedicated to the emergence of the 'social issue' and which condemned both liberal capitalism and socialism. The arguments employed by Toniolo in praise of Malvezzi Campeggi's plan were interesting. He agreed that changing political suffrage by creating new constituencies based on professions was a strategic tool that could advance the corporatist organization of society. In fact, Toniolo recalled the importance of the 1893 debate in Belgium on the 'multiple vote',³⁶ which granted different levels of franchise depending on social status, as part of the wider issue of social organization according to class which Toniolo considered to be the inception of the current issue of the 'organic reconstruction of society according to class' contained in the political reform of the state. Of course, in the social constitution that theoretically and practically precedes the political constitution, the latter should be reshaped according to the former. So universal suffrage ought to be tempered by the multiple vote, or a more refined form of interest representation of 'corporatist constituencies with political electoral scope'. The state should mirror the social arrangement of class and corporations and

the corporatist constitution of society ought to encompass each and every class, no-one should back out of this natural and historical organic composition ... and similarly, every political representative body (and not only one) ought to be drawn from class corporatist bodies, corresponding to just as many political constituencies.³⁷

Toniolo soon lost interest in the matter of Senate reform. It can be supposed that the proposals for reform were too conservative for his views, as they lacked the main feature that became the focus of Toniolo's view: the labour issue. In fact, the liberal-conservative corporatist plans did not possess the most important

feature of late nineteenth-century organicism, which made it a ‘modern’ as well as ‘conservative’ issue when combined with Social Catholicism and its doctrine, which acknowledged the growing role of labour in transforming the relationship between state and society. On that ground – the ground of industrial, organized, subordinate and waged labour – a network of intermediate bodies was to be reconstructed in order to reconnect a society that would no longer be ‘atomized’ with a state that was no longer ‘separate’ and ‘abstract’.

Corporatism and Christian democracy

At the turn of the twentieth century Toniolo published a set of essays advocating the promotion of organized labour. He argued that the acknowledgement of workers’ and employers’ unions (which he called corporations) should lead to the progressive rearrangement of social organization towards a Christian organicism based on labour.

In Toniolo’s view, a corporate, organic society was truly democratic in the Christian sense. He was very clear on this point, particularly in his 1900 essay ‘*Democrazia Cristiana*’ (‘Christian Democracy’) in which he states democracy is neither a specific political system nor a form of government, and nor is it a kind of suffrage – especially not ‘atomized’, individually disunited universal suffrage. Democracy, he claimed, is a definite arrangement of society: ‘the civil organization in which all social, juridical and economical energies are fully organized into a hierarchy, and are apt to proportionally cooperate for the common good, to the greater advantage of the working classes’.³⁸ This arrangement could be achieved by recasting the ancient corporations – the only institutions that emerge directly from society, because corporations were able to safeguard a plurality of organizations – and to structure them into a unitary and hierarchic framework, as in medieval Florence. During the nineteenth century the trend towards the restoration of the corporations suppressed by the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Code and the dismantling of the feudal institutions, was apparent in Europe, and particularly in industrial economies.

In his 1903 essay, ‘*Problemi, discussioni, proposte intorno alla costituzione corporativa delle classi lavoratrici*’ (‘Problems, discussions, proposals around the corporate constitution of the working classes’) Toniolo said modern corporations were different from their predecessors because they did not bring together owners and workers. In fact, modern corporations were nothing other than the trade unions, formed by the workers alone. In his opinion, this was a sociological fact to be acknowledged by bestowing them with trade union obligations. They should have to forge a working-class identity and acquire civil rights, and ensure the moral and economic advancement of the working classes. By acquiring social, juridical and economic functions, the trade unions should drop their hostile and antagonizing features and be increasingly integrated in the public sphere. The new corporatist framework should be completed by the organization of the ruling classes (landed, industrial and commercial), such as the American industrial trusts, the German agrarian leagues or the French owners’ syndicates.

Above the workers' and owners' organizations there should be a joint committee formed by representatives of the workers and owners, whose duties would be to coordinate, conciliate, arbitrate and settle any disagreements or controversies.³⁹

Although externally similar, the feature that differentiated Toniolo's organicist and corporate arrangement from that of the authoritarian corporatism introduced by the Fascist regime (notably through Alfredo Rocco's 1926 syndical and corporatist laws) was its pluralistic conception, which derived from the freedom of association. Membership of Toniolo's corporations was never to be compulsory and the state was not intended to interfere in their creation or development. The state's role was to be confined to recognizing and guaranteeing their existence. Toniolo was loyal to the principle of representative democracy, even if in a mixed model. Corporations were not to form the constituency for general political elections, but rather the corporations would grant their delegates the franchise to elect the political chamber. Corporations would thus become public authorities, rooted in the professional bodies and social classes, and would reconnect society with the state, the authority of which was diminished by making it correspond with the corporations.⁴⁰

Toniolo yearned for a new social and political system, one based on the corporations' threefold role – to form social identities, to become public bodies and to form the basis of the state. He saw corporations as a progressive event that would replace 'atomistic' political individualism with an organic framework of empowered legal social bodies. This new corporatist establishment would be rooted in the priority of labour, and would inevitably be Christian and Catholic, because only the Catholic tradition had recognized the dignity of labour and the role of professional bodies.⁴¹

While visionary and deeply ingrained in the teachings of Social Catholicism, this design raised some innovative and audacious points that were discussed at the time in terms of the debate on the 'representation of interests'. In fact, Toniolo suggested some measures that needed to be adopted immediately. In order to be able to exercise their juridical functions, the corporations (or trade unions) should be enabled to own, administrate and to stand trial, meaning they should become a legal body that could be involved in collective bargaining. Moreover, he argued trade unions ought to be represented in the consultative councils on labour issues (including the Labour Council), where they would be able to participate in the drafting of bills and laws. Introducing these changes would also contribute to reducing social tensions, strikes and conflicts.

Toniolo was aware of the international resonance of that issue. One of his most prominent disciples, Antonio Boggiano, wrote a challenging essay entitled 'Professional associations and class representation' (1903) in which he sought to develop Toniolo's views on corporatist trade unionism in juridical terms, and to make apparent its links with other important contributions, such as *L'organisation du travail* (1900) by Charles de Benoist and *Le fédéralisme économique* (1901) by Joseph Paul-Boncour.⁴² Toniolo had read Sydney and Beatrice Webb's *History of Trade Unionism*, and even cited their *Industrial Democracy*.

This was a corporatist and organic rendering of syndicalism and trade unionism, which threw an interesting light in the Italian debate at the time. Toniolo's views on corporatist trade unionism, which involved giving unions the power to draft laws, engage in collective bargaining and to be recognized as legal bodies, were not universally accepted as a desirable role for trade unions. It can be seen that Toniolo's views were, perhaps paradoxically, very advanced, because rather than fearing a corporatist society he actually wished for it.⁴³ However, for most Italian trade unionists, calls for corporatism were a problem.

Trade unionism and corporatist reform of political representation

Established in 1906, the General Confederation of Labour (CGdL – Confederazione Generale del Lavoro) had ultimate control over the Italian workers' movement. The leaders of the CGdL all belonged to the right-wing 'reformist' side of the Socialist Party. In fact, the representatives of anarcho-syndicalism, which included men such as Alceste de Ambris from Parma and Michele Bianchi from Ferrara, refused to join the CGdL, preferring to form their own group, the Italian Labour Union (UIL – Unione Italiana del Lavoro). The general secretary, Rinaldo Rigola, was inspired by the trade union tradition of high dues, and his main strategic view was always that the workers' economic organization had to be firmly independent to the party, in order to move in a different sphere of action, and to shift the balance of power on the side. The issue of the workers' political and economic representation, independent of the political parties, was at the root of its commitment. On various important occasions, he introduced several corporatist projects for the direct representation of workers within institutions – in 1909–10 with the Labour Party project; and in 1919 with the Syndical Parliament proposal – neither of which was successful.⁴⁴

At approximately the same time the CGdL was formed, two law drafts were proposed by socialist representatives. These bills sought to address the issue of the legal registration of trade unions as a condition for them to be able to sign collective contracts. It is worth noting that Italian civil law was a legacy of the Napoleonic period, and was organized along the individualistic framework of the Napoleonic civil code: that is to say, it was the product of the French Revolution, which sought the overthrow of the *Ancien régime* and its corporate system of 'states', and thus it prohibited the legal recognition of collective bodies. Therefore, in liberal Italy trade unions were private associations of individuals with no right to act as a collective body, and therefore unable to sign collective contracts that could compel all trade union members to fulfil its terms.

Luigi Murialdi, a socialist representative from Genoa, proposed a bill that called for the compulsory registration of unions as a condition of being permitted to engage in collective bargaining. His proposal was said to have been inspired by the trade union closed shop practice, through which unions charged themselves with the surveillance of their members in order to ensure the contract terms were being fulfilled, and in return, the owners agreed to hire only union

members. A collective bargaining of this type had been signed in 1906 between the Metalworkers' Federation, FION (Federazione Impiegati Operai Metallurgici) and the Itala car factory in Turin. Giuseppe Messina, a competent jurist in the field of labour law, proposed addressing this issue in a pragmatic and gradual way, preferring not to resort to the compulsory legal recognition of the union, instead accepting a lesser form of contract – a 'collective agreement', as practised in Germany.⁴⁵ The discussions came to a standstill. The Messina proposal, which was favoured by the majority of experts, including Montemartini, was perhaps too sophisticated to be successful, while Murialdi's first proposal was backed by only a few trade unionists, but which on the whole met with fairly strong disagreement. It is worth noting that compulsory registration foreshadowed the premise for the unwanted authoritarian intervention by the state in the field of labour, and that Murialdi's proposal was thus labelled corporatist. The CGdL newspaper was vocal and explicit on the point: the Murialdi proposal would tie the unions' hands and would favour the owners in the bargaining process by offering them the help of the military police.⁴⁶

Being labelled corporatist was thus a warning sign, forecasting defeat, as was the case with the Labour Party issue. A plan to elect a group of working-class deputies, who would be chosen by the CGdL and who would be independent of the Socialist Party, was outlined at the second CGdL conference in Modena in 1908. At this conference, the CGdL declared itself independent of the party, which was given a subordinate role, limited to supporting the CGdL's social legislation.⁴⁷ It published a series of articles in its newspaper over the next two years, articles calling for the creation of a proper Labour Party and for the reform of the electoral system to include the introduction of universal suffrage, a salary for deputies and a comprehensive reform of political representation, which would complement the representation of technical and professional bodies.⁴⁸ This led to a debate within the left, which generally showed the limited appeal of the Labour Party scheme, which was officially defeated at the Socialist Congress in October 1910.⁴⁹ The main criticism was based on the possibility of the 'confinement' of the Labour Party strategy within a narrow economical and 'corporatist' – that was the word – view.

The Labour Party's scheme revealed its involvement with the corporatist issue: it is worth noting that at the same time Rigola enthusiastically welcomed the establishment of the General Confederation of Italian Industry (Confindustria), which he hoped might lead to more direct bargaining between the organized interests in order to bring about comprehensive reform of political representation. Another means to further represent organized interests proposed by the reformist socialist group was the creation of new technical advisory bodies within the institutional framework in order to turn the Labour Council into a sort of second chamber.⁵⁰

Corporatist projects or corporatist state?

At the end of the liberal period there were several attempts to achieve corporatist agreements, the failure of which ought to be linked to the full restoration of state

authority following the Fascist seizure of power in 1922. My view is that the actual Fascist corporatist state, as it had emerged since 1926, did not retain any of the features of those pre-Fascist attempts.⁵¹

The most significant of those corporatist efforts took place in 1919–20, when similar agreements had been reached elsewhere in Europe. As Charles Maier shows,⁵² in Germany Walter Rathenau introduced the idea of the ‘new economy’ – of ‘organized capitalism’ under the aegis of the state (an idea largely favoured in Italy by the Nationalists).⁵³ G. D. H. Cole’s guild socialism attracted the attention of reformist socialists in Italy (especially Rigola), as did as the Webbs’ and Harold Laski’s project for transforming the House of Lords into a second chamber in which the professions are represented. The experiment with Whitley Councils in the United Kingdom was also seen as a successful means to facilitate the post-war industrial reconversion under the supervision of the state. During the Nitti government (left-wing liberal and technocratic reformist), which included such prominent industrialists as the Industry Minister Dante Ferraris, there were a number of proposals to turn the consultative Labour Council into a representative legislative assembly. These would have created a second corporatist chamber, a ‘syndical parliament’ in which existing social bodies would be represented, to replace the Senate.⁵⁴ It is worth noting these plans were supported by the CGdL, Confindustria, a section of liberals and some socialists, but that they were opposed by the right-wing liberals and the few Fascist deputies. Following the March on Rome and the Fascist seizure of power, Mussolini followed a strict free trade economic policy, and abolished all consultative bodies, including the Labour Council. Consequently, there was nothing corporatist about early Fascism.

The syndical, or labour, parliament project was cherished by reformist socialists. At different stages, draft laws were submitted by socialist or former socialist representatives, including Meuccio Ruini, Mario Abbiate and Arturo Labriola, and the official journals strongly endorsed the proposals, as did Gino Baldesi in 1919 in *Battaglie Sindacali* (Syndical Battle).⁵⁵ In Rigola’s opinion, what was valuable about the labour parliament project was that the representative function was bestowed upon the trade unions. Rigola was reluctant to part with this idea, and tried to reintroduce it in 1921 in technical arguments in the columns of his monthly newspaper *I problemi del lavoro* (The Problems of Labour). A labour parliament in which workers, professionals and owners were represented, would have a better chance of tackling the complex ‘technical’ problems that arose from post-war reconversion. Moreover, political representation was over, and the trade unions had to become the actual constituency of suffrage, overcoming the liberal order. He wrote:

The trade unions are the basis of the legislative body. . . . To have the right to place their representatives in the labour parliament, the trade unions must be legally registered. A law that grants unions electoral capacity is needed.⁵⁶

Rigola was yet again proposing that which had been discarded in 1910, and discarded precisely because it foreshadowed the corporatist solution that by 1921

had become desirable. Rigola was among the few members of the CGdL who later approved of the Fascist corporatist state, and agreed to remain in Italy to deal with it. He was one of very few former socialists allowed to publish a journal, *I problemi del lavoro*, and to keep a cultural association. This involvement with Fascist corporatism estranged Rigola and his followers from the Socialist Party in exile, and after the downfall of the Fascist regime in 1943 he remained on the fringe of the socialist world, not being allowed to participate in the establishment of the Italian General Confederation of Labour (CGIL – Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro) in 1944.

The ambiguous and dismal trajectory of the first Italian trade unionist leader should not suggest a direct link between the various pre- and post-war corporatist projects and the Fascist corporatist state. After seizing power, the Fascist government studied a set of constitutional reforms brought about by a number of official committees (the Commission of 15 and the Commission of 18, or Soloni) appointed by Mussolini and headed by famous philosopher, Giovanni Gentile. In several of their key points, the projects for parliamentary reform recalled the pre-Fascist ones.⁵⁷ It is significant that Mussolini did not like the projects, which remained ineffective, and gave the right-wing nationalist Alfredo Rocco carte blanche to construct an authoritarian state. This Rocco did, with the *leggi fascistiche* in 1925–26, which included the syndical and corporatist laws as the foundation for the corporatist state.

The main features of the corporatist state have been well established by legal historians, who have indicated that the aim of restoring the full state to full authority, which was implied in Rocco's project, was shared by a number of high-ranking jurists (including Carlo Costamagna, Guido Zanobini and Oreste Ranelletti). This authoritarian statism erased the pluralist background shared by the pre-Fascist corporatist projects. While pre-Fascist pluralist corporatism sought to enhance society's representative channels, according to law historian Bernardo Sordi, the 'corporatist metaphor' that was put into practice after 1926 was meant to restore rather than weaken the state. The crisis of the liberal state would be overcome only through the full restoration of the state and its authority, and this was at the core of the many Fascist corporatist theories, which confronted one another in the political arena while converging around the goal to strengthen the state's capacity to organize society.⁵⁸

No form of pluralism was allowed, which was precisely the reason why the Italian ruling class chose the Fascist solution to the problem of political and social unrest that was troubling Italy. The 'ruling class subversion' (*sovversivismo delle classi dirigenti*) argument developed by Antonio Gramsci might be still considered useful. By turning to Fascism when the wave of social unrest started to flow back, the Italian ruling classes (meaning the economic and political ruling classes) meant to take advantage of the shift in bargaining power between the political groups, and sought to turn the tables and establish fresh conditions for retaining power – thereby converging with Mussolini's Machiavellianism that sought to seize power by any possible means,⁵⁹ and then to settle control of it. The corporatist state was thus a by-product, one that was very

successful in its ideological effects both inside and outside Italy, but it was removed from the corporatist intermediation of organized interest.

Corporatism, organicism and Catholic tradition

If not in the pre-Fascist corporatist projects, a different kind of persistence might be traced in the organicist, solidarist, conservative tradition – the anti-enlightenment,⁶⁰ to borrow Zeev Sternhell's assessment – which looked at the restoration of traditional, pre-revolutionary societies against political individualism. The persistence of traditional and organicist features in inter-war authoritarian corporatism had been noted by political scientists, and in particular by those with a historical leaning, such as P. J. Williamson.⁶¹ A particularly provocative theory, in this perspective, was put forward by the Catholic law historian Lorenzo Ornaghi, who argued that the modern state does not have the strength to erase the legacy of the institutional representation of social bodies, and therefore, in order to represent the variety of particular, special, plural interest and the state's disposition to encompass the social bodies, has to draw a sort of pendulum between the social groups organizing themselves into the institutional framework of the state. This is a disposition that, because of the intimate impossibility for the social and political framework to wholly represent itself in the state, is designed to produce friction and conflict.⁶²

It should be noted that corporatism is very sensitive in studies on inter-war Italian Catholicism. In a recent historical synopsis, which is otherwise well informed, the question is either overlooked or addressed cursorily.⁶³ On the other hand, the close agreement between the Catholic Church and the Fascist regime is settled, their relationship being established by the Lateran Pacts between Pope Pius XI and Mussolini in February 1929, and which was strengthened through a number of shared issues, ranging from ideological agrarianism to the strengthening of family ties, from the encouragement of fertility to the sanctioning of a rigidly patriarchal society,⁶⁴ or, from an ideological and political view, was strengthened by the rejection of socialism, the protection of private property, wariness towards democracy, support for authoritarian regimes and the endorsement of Mussolini's imperialist ambitions that permeated the inter-war Catholic Church.⁶⁵

As for the Catholic Church's attitude to the corporatist question, this author is inclined to assume there are nuances that cannot be overlooked. The wide range of agreement is not in question, although it can be elaborated upon further;⁶⁶ however, from an ideological and cultural point of view, it is worth reminding ourselves that the roots of Fascist corporatism, as far as they are derived from the nationalist and revolutionary-sindicalist line, are not fixed to the Catholic tradition,⁶⁷ and neither is it based on the Social Catholicism developed by Pope Leo XIII in his encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*. It is therefore unsurprising to discover that Antonio Boggiano, author of the first extensive study on the representation of interests,⁶⁸ drawn along lines similar to Toniolo's plan to promote the corporatist development of the liberal state through the institutionalization of

trade unions, did not take part in the debate on the corporatist state during the Fascist regime. Boggiano's commitment to Toniolo's pre-war corporatist perspective was fostered with a steady involvement in the Catholic association movement, and especially with the organization of 'Catholic social weeks', at which representatives of the various Catholic intellectual milieu gathered to discuss doctrine on matters of poverty and wealth, economics, social organization and the role of the state, developed after the publication of *Rerum Novarum*. He also backed the first attempt to organize a Catholic democratic political party, the Popular Party (PP – Partito Popolare) set up by Father Luigi Sturzo, who became a deputy at the 1919 general elections. After the rise of Fascism, Boggiano followed Sturzo in leaving active politics, and returned to his law practice, where he specialized in conjugal law, and to his position at Genoa University.⁶⁹

It may be correct to assume that there had not been a direct contribution to the Fascist doctrine of the corporatist state from the Catholic side. However, once the corporatist state had been established, many of the most prominent Catholic intellectuals were keen to engage in discussion and to confront the corporatist doctrine, particularly after the Concordat that signalled the end of the estrangement between Catholic Church and Italian state, and which allowed Catholics to re-enter the political arena. The stakes were high and involved the very concept of the relationship between the state and society and the intention to trace a 'third way' between liberalism and socialism as a means of overcoming liberal democracy. Pope Pius XI's encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*, on the reconstruction of the social order (1931), pleaded for an ethically-founded society that distanced itself from both socialism and financial capitalism, and which was built upon corporate solidarity between capital, labour and government. The encyclical, which recalled the precedent of *Rerum Novarum* issued 40 years before, might be seen to be a claim of priority for Catholic corporatism, competing with the doctrine of Fascism. The efforts of the Jesuit, Father Angelo Brucculeri, are very interesting in this respect.

As a young priest, Father Brucculeri was influenced by the body of Social Catholic doctrines, attended the Catholic social weeks and shared Toniolo's views on the ethical foundations of social and economic life, with a leaning towards labour-oriented organicism. His involvement as a chaplain during the First World War shaped his acceptance of the authoritarian hierarchy. In 1920 he was ordained into the Jesuit order and immediately became a prominent contributor to the Jesuit newspaper *Civiltà cattolica*, where he discussed labour issues in an unadorned and largely accessible language that sought to establish the 'official' view on the matter. He was invited to the Malines debates by Cardinal Mercier, where he was to contribute to the drafting of the Malines Social Code (1924–26) that he also translated in Italian (1927). During the 1930s he devoted himself to elaborating the official Catholic position towards Fascist corporatism, taking account of Pope Pius XI's *Quadragesimo Anno*. Brucculeri addressed both general and educated Catholic opinion. Some of his contributions on Fascist corporatism were published in *Studium*, the journal of the Catholic Graduates' Action Movement (Movimento Laureati di Azione Cattolica),⁷⁰ in which he

advocated organic, solidarist and integral corporatism that was close to the position of the Fascist economic historian Gino Arias.⁷¹ He subsequently determined the position towards Fascist corporatism by highlighting agreements rather than differences, thus implicitly accepting government control and the role of the state in an anti-liberal and anti-socialist perspective:

This is the corporatist frame built by Fascism. Can we not detect any coincidence with the body of social doctrines and teachings encouraged by Catholicism? ... Our consideration of the similarity of Catholic corporatism and that established in Italy by the [Fascist] regime prove the truth of what eminent professor Arias asserted on his essay 'The national corporatist economics': 'We have to acknowledge', says Arias, 'that some basic concepts of current economic policies originate from the teachings of the Catholic school, which is credited for having long stood alone against the sceptical utilitarianism professed by the conceited liberal and socialist academic economics'.⁷²

After the collapse of the Fascist regime, and while still aiming to represent the 'official' explanation of Pope Pius XII's views from the pulpit of the Jesuit journal *Civiltà cattolica*, Brucculeri moved from a tempered acceptance of the Fascism regime to an instrumental and constrained acceptance of democracy,⁷³ albeit from a strong anti-socialist and anti-communist perspective.⁷⁴ He also sought to preserve some corporatist feature in the new democratic constitutional charter,⁷⁵ thus distancing himself from the Catholic democratic mainstream, which in its theoretical and political manifesto – the 1942 Camaldoli Code (Codice di Camaldoli) – rejected the Fascist corporatist experience and its institutions.⁷⁶ Brucculeri continued to participate, from a rather reactionary point of view, in the debate, but he never regained his previous influence, especially after Vatican II.⁷⁷

The scope, intensity and significance of the debate on the Fascist corporatist state among Italian Catholics is still viewed as an object of non-confessional and extensive research, although there are some very interesting developments.⁷⁸ One leading figure in this movement is Amintore Fanfani. During the 1930s, Fanfani (1908–99) was a young and gifted scholar at the newly-established Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, and was already the editor of the *Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali* (International Social Science Journal), which was founded by his mentor Toniolo and Jacopo Mazzei, a former pupil of Toniolo's, who was, like Brucculeri, close to Arias' integral corporatist theories. Fanfani also shared the ethical foundations of the corporatist economy introduced by Arias, but he did not approve of Bucculeri's attempt to emphasize the similarities between Fascist and Catholic corporatism. His plan was much more subtle: he intended to align Catholic corporatist theories with the regime's official views, at the same time carefully distinguishing between the two by making Catholic corporatism clearly recognizable. Addressing Father Agostino Gemelli, dean and founder of the university, he cunningly remarked:

I reckon that on corporatist economy matters, we ought not to publish essays other than those produced – when convenient – by ourselves. The subject bears distinctive importance and responsibility, and it is appropriate that we are not saddled with the opinions of others.⁷⁹

It was a plan Fanfani pursued both through his editorial policy, and by composing a textbook for secondary schools, *Il Significato del Corporatismo* (The Meaning of Corporatism, 1937). Moreover, he sought to lay the ‘scientific’ foundations of an economic history, the aim of which was to pave the way to overcome capitalism: the final and more advanced phase was, in his view, the corporatist one.⁸⁰ After the war, he replaced corporatism by a rendering of American neo-voluntarism, setting himself in a convenient position to steer the peculiar state-led, corporatist, under-regulated and under-governed Italian modernization.

It is acknowledged in institutional and juridical Italian history that representatives at the Constitutional Convention (1946–47) carefully avoided taking into account the corporatist legacy in preparing the new constitution.⁸¹ Indeed, throughout the political discourse the corporatist experiment was discarded as an unwanted relic of the authoritarian ‘statist monolithism’. But it is still to be examined whether a corporatist and pluralist and mainly Catholic form of interest governance re-emerged, taking shape from a governmental control of economic politics which aimed to integrate interest representation practices⁸² with the support of the Ministry of Labour headed by Amintore Fanfani (1947–50).⁸³ The question whether, and how, the Fascist corporatist experience would have left a mark in the transition to the new Republican state is a key issue that may help with a reassessment of the interpretation of inter-war corporatism as a twisted path to modernity.

Notes

- 1 P. Ungari, *Alfredo Rocco e l'ideologia giuridica del fascismo*, Brescia, Morcelliana, 1963; more recently, S. Battente, *Alfredo Rocco. Dal nazionalismo al fascismo 1907–1935*, Milan, FrancoAngeli, 2007; R. D'Alfonso, *Costruire lo Stato forte. Politica, diritto, economia in Alfredo Rocco*, Milan, FrancoAngeli, 2004.
- 2 A. Rocco, *Introduzione a La trasformazione dello Stato*, Roma 1927, in *Scritti e discorsi politici di Alfredo Rocco*, vol. III, Milan, Guiffrè, 1938, p. 778. All the translations from Italian are the author's.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 782.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 783.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 788.
- 6 A. Aquarone, *L'organizzazione dello stato totalitario*, Turin, Einaudi, 1965.
- 7 V. De Grazia, *Consenso e cultura di massa nell'Italia fascista: l'organizzazione del dopolavoro*, Rome-Bari, Laterza, 1981.
- 8 S. Cassese, ‘Corporazioni e intervento pubblico nell'economia’, *Quaderni storici delle Marche*, 9, 1968, pp. 402–457; also published in A. Aquarone and M. Vernassa, eds, *Il regime fascista*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1974, pp. 327–355; G. Toniolo, *L'economia dell'Italia fascista*, Rome-Bari, Laterza, 1980. See also R. J. B. Bosworth, *Mussolini's Italy: Life under the Dictatorship 1915–1945*, London, Penguin, 2006, p. 309.

- 9 The definitive work is due to I. Stolzi, *L'ordine corporativo. Poteri organizzati e organizzazione del potere nella riflessione giuridica dell'Italia fascista*, Milan, Guiffrè, 2007. Ground-breaking suggestions were contained in S. Cassese and B. Dente, 'Una discussione del primo ventennio del secolo: Lo stato sindacale', *Quaderni storici delle Marche*, 18, 1971, pp. 943–961.
- 10 For this distinctive perspective, see L. Ornaghi, *Stato e corporazione. Storia di una dottrina nella crisi del sistema politico contemporaneo*, Milan, Guiffrè, 1984.
- 11 I. Stolzi, 'Corporativismo autoritario e neocorporativismo: Modelli teorici a confronto', in G. G. Balandi and G. Cazzetta, eds, *Diritti e lavoro nell'Italia repubblicana*, Milan, Guiffrè, 2009, pp. 159–181.
- 12 A. Rocco, *La trasformazione dello Stato*, Rome, La Voce, 1927. On the syndicalist side the collected works of S. Panunzio, *Il fondamento giuridico del fascismo*, Rome, Bonacci, 1987 and A. O. Olivetti, *Dal sindacalismo rivoluzionario al corporativismo*, Rome, Bulzoni, 1984. See also B. Biagi, *Lo Stato corporativo*, Rome, Istituto Nazionale Fascista di Cultura, 1934.
- 13 Mussolini pointed to the pre-war anarcho-syndicalists such as Enrico Leone, Paolo Orano and Angelo Oliviero Olivetti, as 'streams which were tributaries of the great flood of fascism'. See B. Mussolini, 'La dottrina del fascismo', in *Opera omnia di Benito Mussolini*, vol. 34, Florence, La Fenice, 1961, p. 122.
- 14 Further to the above-mentioned works on Alfredo Rocco, see L. Micheli, ed., *Liberalismo, nazionalismo, fascismo*, Milan, MB Publishing, 1999; E. Gentile, F. Lanchester and A. Tarquini, *Alfredo Rocco: dalla crisi del parlamentarismo alle origini dello Stato nuovo*, Rome, Carocci, 2010.
- 15 D. Roberts, *Syndicalist Tradition and Italian Fascism*, Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina Press, 1979; F. Perfetti, *Il sindacalismo fascista: I Dalle origini alla vigilia dello Stato corporativo (1919–1930)*, Rome, Bonacci, 1988; F. Cordova, *Verso lo Stato totalitario. Sindacati, società e fascismo*, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2005; M. Pasetti, *Tra classe e nazione. Rappresentazione e organizzazione del movimento nazional-sindacalista (1918–1922)*, Rome, Carocci, 2008; F. Perfetti, *Lo stato fascista: Le basi sindacali e corporative*, Florence, Le Lettere, 2010. See also S. Lupo, *Il fascismo. La politica in un regime totalitario*, Rome, Carocci, 2000, pp. 85–98, 145–154.
- 16 The most comprehensive work is G. P. Santomassimo, *La terza via fascista. Il mito del corporativismo*, Rome, Carocci, 2006.
- 17 For the Ferrara congress see *ibid.*, pp. 141–180. For the Italo-French congress see A. Vittoria and M. Nacci, eds, *Convegno italo-francese di studi corporativi 1935*, Livorno, Dimensioni, 1986; G. Parlato, *Il Convegno italo-francese di studi corporativi, 1935: Con il testo integrale degli Atti*, Rome, Fondazione Ugo Spirito, 1990.
- 18 See A. Gradilone, *Bibliografia sindacale-corporativa (1923–1940)*, Rome, Istituto Nazionale di Cultura Fascista, 1942, which counted 12,000 bibliographical entries.
- 19 F. Lanchester, 'Dottrina e politica nell'università italiana: Carlo Costamagna e il primo concorso di diritto corporativo', *Lavoro e diritto*, 1994, pp. 49ff.; F. Amore Bianco, *Il cantiere di Bottai. La scuola corporativa pisana e la formazione della classe dirigente fascista*, Siena, Cantagalli, 2012.
- 20 A. Gagliardi, *Il corporativismo fascista*, Rome-Bari, Laterza, 2010.
- 21 An updated overview is in A. Gagliardi, 'L'economia, l'intervento dello stato e la "terza via" fascista', *Studi Storici*, 1, 2014, pp. 67–80. See also, in the same issue, C. Giorgi, 'Le politiche sociali del fascismo', pp. 93–108 and I. Stolzi, 'Fascismo e cultura giuridica', pp. 139–154. See also A. Gagliardi, 'Per rifondare lo Stato: progetti corporativi tra fascismo e antifascismo', in S. Neri Sermeri, ed., *1914–1945. L'Italia nella guerra europea dei trent'anni*, Rome, Viella, 2016, pp. 237–256.
- 22 From this point of view see P. Corner, *The Fascist Party and Popular Opinion in Mussolini's Italy*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, and P. Corner and V. Galimi, eds, *Il fascismo in provincia. Articolazioni e gestione del potere tra centro e periferia*, Rome, Viella, 2014.

- 23 A very interesting case study is in R. Parisini, *Dal regime corporativo alla Repubblica Sociale. Agricoltura e fascismo e Ferrara 1928–1945*, Ferrara, Corbo, 2006. Case studies in key state-funded shipyards are in L. Cerasi, R. Petri and S. Petrungraro, *Porti di frontiera. Industria e commercio a Trieste, Fiume e Pola fra le due guerre mondiali*, Rome, Viella, 2008. For internal mobility see S. Gallo, *Senza attraversare le frontiere. Le migrazioni interne dall'Unità ad oggi*, Rome-Bari, Laterza, 2012, and more specifically S. Gallo, 'Migrazioni interne e istituzioni', in S. Musso, ed., *Storia del Lavoro in Italia, Il Novecento, I, 1896–1945. Il lavoro nell'età industriale*, Rome, Castelvechi, 2015, pp. 161–198.
- 24 G. Giugni, *Esperienze corporative e post-corporative nei rapporti collettivi di lavoro in Italia*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1956, pp. 3ff.
- 25 S. Cassese, *Lo Stato fascista*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2010.
- 26 See, for instance, S. Cassese, 'Le istituzioni del fascismo', *Quaderni Storici delle Marche*, 4, 1969, pp. 425–437. Also by the same author, *La formazione dello Stato amministrativo*, Milan, Giuffrè, 1974, and *Il sistema amministrativo italiano*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1983.
- 27 For an appraisal of its relevance to the corporatist issue, see L. Cerasi, 'Corporativismo, Stato e fascismo', *Contemporanea*, 3, 2013, pp. 460–468.
- 28 J.-W. Müller, *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2011.
- 29 A. Mazzacane, A. Somma, M. Stolleis and V. Klostermann, eds, *Korporativismus in den südeuropäischen Diktaturen, Il corporativismo nelle dittature sudeuropee*, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 2005; M. Pasetti, ed., *Progetti corporativi tra le due guerre mondiali*, Rome, Carocci, 2008; D. Musiedlak, ed., *Les expériences corporatives dans l'aire latine*, Paris, Peter Lang, 2009; O. Dard, ed., *Le corporatisme dans l'aire francophone au XXème siècle*, Paris, Peter Lang, 2011. See now M. Pasetti, *L'Europa corporativa. Una storia transnazionale tra le due guerre*, Bologna, Bononia University Press, 2016.
- 30 T. Buchanan and M. Conway, eds, *Political Catholicism in Europe 1918–1965*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996; M. Conway, 'Catholic politics or Christian democracy? The evolution of inter-war political Catholicism', in W. Kaiser and H. Wahnout, eds, *Political Catholicism in Europe 1918–45*, vol. 1, London and New York, Routledge, 2004, pp. 235–251; G. Botz, 'The coming of the Dollfuss/Schuschnigg regime and the stages of its development', in A. Costa Pinto and A. Kallis, eds, *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe*, London, Palgrave, 2014, pp. 121–153.
- 31 For an updated assessment of the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Fascist regime, see L. Ceci, 'La Chiesa e il fascismo. Nuovi paradigmi e nuove fonti', *Studi Storici*, 1, 2014, pp. 123–137.
- 32 See M. E. Lanciotti, *La riforma impossibile. Idee, discussioni e progetti sulla modifica del Senato regio e vitalizio (1848–1922)*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1993, pp. 247–269.
- 33 See *Per la riforma del Senato. Relazione della commissione composta dai senatori Finali, presidente, Fortunato, segretario, Borgnini, Caetani, Pellegrini, Rossi Luigi, Severi, Villa e Arcolee, relatore*, Rome, Del Senato, 1911. Curiously the report was presented during the constitutional conflict in Britain, with some reference to it.
- 34 S. Romano, 'Lo Stato moderno e la sua crisi (1909)', in S. Romano, *Scritti minori*, vol. I: *Diritto costituzionale*, Milan, Il, 1990, pp. 379ff. Also in S. Romano, *Lo Stato moderno e la sua crisi*, Milan, Il, 1969, pp. 3ff.
- 35 See A. Malvezzi-Campeggi, *La costituzione del Senato e l'ordinamento di classe*, Rome, Desclée, Lefebvre e Ca, 1898.
- 36 See A. Malvezzi Campeggi, 'Rappresentanza proporzionale e rappresentanza professionale', *Rivista internazionale di scienze sociali e discipline ausiliarie (RISS)*, 20, 1899, pp. 32–56, 201–218, 349–374.
- 37 G. Toniolo, 'La riforma del Senato e l'ordinamento di classe', *RISS*, 19, no. 76, 1899, pp. 55–76.

- 38 G. Toniolo, 'La Democrazia Cristiana (1900)', in G. Toniolo, *La Democrazia Cristiana, Istituti e forme*, vol. I, Vatican City, 1951, pp. 55–60.
- 39 See G. Toniolo, 'Problemi, discussioni, proposte intorno alla costituzione corporativa delle classi lavoratrici (1903)', in G. Toniolo, *Scritti politici*, Rome, Cinque Lune, 1957.
- 40 *Ibid.*, p. 363.
- 41 G. Toniolo, 'Indirizzi e concetti sociali all'esordire del secolo XX (1900)', in G. Are, ed., *I cattolici e la questione sociale in Italia. 1894–1904*, Milan, Feltrinelli, 1963, p. 370.
- 42 See A. Boggiano, *L'organizzazione professionale e la rappresentanza di classe*, Turin, Bocca, 1903.
- 43 I have argued this point in L. Cerasi, 'Il corporativismo "normale". Giuseppe Toniolo, tra medievalismo, laburismo cattolico e riforma dello Stato', *Humanitas*, 1, 2014, pp. 82–103.
- 44 In the troubled post-war years, Rigola left the leadership of the CGdL to his deputy secretary, Ludovico D'Aragona, and devoted himself to editorial activity at *Battaglie Sindacali*, then later at *I problemi del lavoro*, where he strengthened his 'labour-inspired' views, becoming an admirer of Cole's *Guild Socialism*, which he tried to popularize in Italy. See C. Cartiglia, *Rinaldo Rigola e il sindacalismo riformista in Italia*, Milan, Feltrinelli, 1976; and P. Mattera, *Una biografia politica*, Rome, Ediesse, 2011.
- 45 See C. Vano, 'Riflessioni giuridiche e relazioni industriali fra Ottobre Novecento: alle origini del contratto collettivo di lavoro', in A. Mazzacane, ed., *I giuristi e la crisi dello Stato liberale in Italia tra Otto e Novecento*, Naples, Ligouri, 1986, pp. 126–156.
- 46 E. Gondolo, 'O registrazione . . . o carabinieri. A proposito del progetto sul riconoscimento giuridico delle associazioni', *La Confederazione del Lavoro*, 8, 2007.
- 47 Rigola said:
- Either the party will have a leadership which will act in accordance to the confederation, and in this case all will be all right, or we can say that our relationship is already over. Because socialism is not made by the socialist circles after all, but it can also be made by the economic organizations.
- (*Resoconto stenografico del X Congresso Nazionale*, Rome, Operaia, 1908, p. 38)
- 48 F. Pagliari, 'Il Partito Socialista e l'organizzazione operaia', *La Confederazione del lavoro*, 25 April 1908; R. Rigola, 'Elezioni legislative. Gli operai e le elezioni', *La Confederazione del lavoro*, 13 February 1909; R. Rigola, 'Discutendo di un Partito del Lavoro', *Avanti!*, 10, no. 24, 25 June 1910.
- 49 See G. B. Furiozzi, *Il Partito del lavoro. Un progetto laburista nell'Italia giolittiana*, Ellera Umbra, Nuova Era, 1997.
- 50 See P. Colombo, 'Progetti di riforma del Consiglio superiore del lavoro: rappresentanza professionale e trasformazioni del sistema rappresentativo-elettivo', in G. Vecchio, ed., *Il consiglio superiore del lavoro (1903–1923)*, Milan, FrancoAngeli, 1988, pp. 386–427.
- 51 I have tried to suggest a disambiguation between corporatist and corporative, referring of course to Philippe Schmitter's assessment, in my essay 'Corporatisme Corporative Corporations', in O. Christin, ed., *Dictionnaire des concepts nomads en sciences humaines*, vol. II, Paris, Metalié, 2016, pp. 127–146.
- 52 C. S. Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany and Italy in the Decade after World War I*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1975. For a recent debate, see I. Pavan, 'Alle origini dell'Europa corporatista. Attualità e storiografia in Charles Maier Recasting Bourgeois Europe', *Contemporanea*, 3, 2013, pp. 443–474.
- 53 G. Berta, *L'Italia delle fabbriche. Genealogie ed esperienze dell'industrialismo nel Novecento*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2001, p. 45.

- 54 See Colombo, 'Progetti di riforma'; and Lanciotti, *La riforma impossibile*, pp. 287ff.
- 55 G. Baldesi, 'Per un nuovo parlamento del lavoro', *Battaglie sindacali*, 6 September 1919.
- 56 R. Rigola, 'Il Parlamento sindacale', *I problemi del lavoro*, November 1921, p. 57.
- 57 See B. Uva, *La nascita dello Stato corporativo e sindacale fascista*, Assisi-Rome, Carocci, 1974; F. Perfetti, *Fascismo e riforme costituzionali*, Florence, Le Lettere, 2013.
- 58 B. Sordi, 'Corporativismo e dottrina dello Stato in Italia. Incidenze costituzionali e amministrative', in Mazzacane *et al.*, *Korporativismus*, pp. 129–146. See also Stolzi, *L'ordine corporativo*.
- 59 I'm referring here to A. Lyttelton, *The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy 1919–1929*, London, Routledge, 1973.
- 60 Z. Sternhell, *The Anti-Enlightenment Tradition*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2009.
- 61 See P. J. Williamson, *Varieties of Corporatism: A Conceptual Discussion*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, particularly for the comparison between Italy and Portugal. See also P. J. Williamson, *Corporatism in Perspective: An Introductory Guide to Corporatist Theory*, London, Sage, 1989; C. Landauer, *Corporate State Ideologies: Historical Roots and Philosophical Origins*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Institute of International Studies, 1983.
- 62 L. Ornaghi, *Stato e corporazione. Storia di una dottrina nella crisi del sistema politico contemporaneo*, Milan, Guiffrè, 1984; L. Ornaghi, 'Corporazione', in *Enciclopedia delle Scienze Sociali*, vol. 2, Rome, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1992, p. 475.
- 63 G. Battelli, *Società, Stato e Chiesa in Italia. Dal tardo Settecento ad oggi*, Rome, Carocci, 2013; G. Formigoni, *L'Italia dei cattolici. Dal Risorgimento ad oggi*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2010.
- 64 See Bosworth, *Mussolini's Italy*, pp. 249–276, and the chapter devoted to Italian Fascism in P. Ginsborg, *Family Politics, Domestic Life: Devastation and Survival, 1900–1950*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2014.
- 65 See L. Ceci, *L'interesse superiore. Il Vaticano e l'Italia di Mussolini*, Rome-Bari, Laterza, 2013. Seminal works include G. Miccoli, 'Chiesa e società in Italia dal Concilio Vaticano I (1870) al pontificato di Giovanni XXIII', *Storia d'Italia, I Documenti*, vol. 5, Turin, Einaudi, 1973, pp. 1495–1548; and G. Miccoli, *Fra mito della cristianità e secolarizzazione. Studi sul rapporto Chiesa-società in età contemporanea*, Casale Monferrato, Marietti, 1985. See also D. Menozzi, *La Chiesa cattolica e la secolarizzazione*, Turin, Einaudi, 1993 and *Chiesa, pace e guerra nel Novecento*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2008.
- 66 Ceci, 'La Chiesa'.
- 67 The earlier opponent of this view is C. Vallauri, *Le radici del corporativismo*, Rome, Bulzoni, 1971.
- 68 See Boggiano, *L'organizzazione professionale*.
- 69 After the downfall of Fascism, A. Boggiano Pico (as he became known) resumed his former political activity, becoming one of the founders of the new Catholic Democratic Party (Democrazia Cristiana) in Genoa, and a personal friend of the prime minister Alcide De Gasperi. He was elected to the Constitutional Convention in 1946 and served as a parliamentary deputy for his party until his death in 1965. See M. Belardinelli, 'Boggiano-Pico, Antonio', in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, vol. 11, Rome, Treccani, 1969.
- 70 See A. Brucculeri, 'Indirizzi corporativi ed encicliche sociali', *Studium*, XXIX, 1933, pp. 668–672, and 'Il lavoro fatto sociale', *Studium*, XXXII, 1936, pp. 268–278.
- 71 See G. Arias, *L'economia nazionale corporativa*, Rome, Libreria del Littorio, 1929.
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