

FRENCH CORPORATIVE THEORY 1789-1948

Number 577 of the

Studies in History, Economics and Public Law

EDITED BY THE

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

FRENCH CORPORATIVE THEORY, 1789-1948

A Chapter in the History of Ideas

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1966
OCTAGON BOOKS, INC.
New York

Reprinted 1966
by special arrangement with Columbia University Press

OCTAGON BOOKS, INC.
175 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10010

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 66-18050

Printed in U.S.A. by
NOBLE OFFSET PRINTERS, INC.
NEW YORK 3, N. Y.

PREFACE

THE PAST DECADE and a half has witnessed a plethora of studies on corporative theory in various totalitarian regimes—Spain, Italy, Brazil, Portugal, Germany, etc. This wealth of monographs and popular books and pamphlets has attested to the interest of scholars and the public in this subject.

The development of French corporative theory is worthy of study because it has been continuous during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, even though at times theorists were few and far between. This theory was translated into action in the twentieth century—to a limited degree under the Third Republic, and to a much greater extent under Pétain.

French corporatism is also of interest because it has differed from corporatism in other countries. The French, unlike corporatists of some of the other nationalities, never freed themselves from a romantic attachment to the guilds of the Old Regime and a hostile attitude toward the power of the State. They insisted that there was something uniquely French about their ideas which made them distinct from and superior to those of foreign theorists.

The present work is an attempt to present an historical and analytical account of French corporative theory. After a survey of the various theories current before 1870 which contributed to the formulation of a corporative doctrine in France, the development of corporative thought from 1870 to 1918 is traced. The work of La Tour du Pin and the Social Catholic school of corporatism, and the contributions of syndicalism, solidarism, pluralism, and royalism during this period are examined. Finally an anaylsis of French corporatism of the interval between the two World Wars, and a sketch of the corporative regime under Pétain are presented. However, the historical evolution of French corporatism did not end with the collapse of the Pétain regime. Recent statements of General de Gaulle have revealed leanings toward corporatism.

This work would not have been written without the direction of Professors C. J. H. Hayes, Shepard B. Clough, and Ralph H. Bowen of Columbia University. The latter two in particular guided the final stages of its production. Whatever merit, therefore, it contains, is due to their inspiration, and whatever faults or errors it includes are entirely of the author's own creation. The debt the author owes to his wife, Margaret, for her encouragement, her patience, and the long hours she has spent in typing, retyping, indexing, and proofreading is immeasureable.

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1789-1948

CHAPTER I

MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS TO CORPORATIVE THEORY BEFORE 1870

Corporatism is a contemporary phenomenon whose living importance has affected and may continue to affect people of this country. During the last two decades it seemed for a time that the twentieth century was destined to become, as one writer observed, the "century of corporatism." [1] Even though several corporative regimes—the Austrian, Italian and French—have disappeared, others still remain in Spain, Portugal and Brazil. And a leading voice in the Fourth French Republic—Charles de Gaulle—has been heard recently to enunciate doctrines strikingly similar to those of the corporatist Pétain.

Certainly the problems which corporatism endeavored to solve are still with us. The United States and a large part of the world must still wrestle with booms and slumps, unemployment, social security, inferior quality of products, and means of giving representation to economic interests in the government. Above all, the struggle between labor and capital continues.

French corporatists believed they had found the panacea for these and other political, social, and economic ills. Their theoretical system differed from that of Italy or Spain largely in the greater degree of autonomy and decentralization they bestowed upon mixed employer-employee trade associations or corporations.[2] Within such corporations, labor and management were to work together in an atmosphere of social peace for their mutual benefit, as well as that of the nation. With a minimum of state intervention, they would regulate production

1 Mihail Manoilescu, *L'Espace économique corporatif* (1934).

2 The French word "*corporation*" cannot be identified with the same American word, which signifies a joint stock company. Rather, the English term "guild" would be a closer equivalent, while the American concept of corporation must be translated into French as "*société anonyme*."

in quantity and quality, determine wages and hours, and provide for and administer various types of social insurance and technical education. Class strife, depressions, and insecurity would be phantoms of the past. All this would be accomplished without scrapping private enterprise, without reverting to an outmoded regime of laissez-faire, and without succumbing to socialism or other forms of statism. The state indeed would cease to be an oppressive leviathan, for much of its action in the economic sphere would be delegated to corporations. In turn, corporations would give counsel to the state on whatever economic-social legislation was necessary, and in this way the economic interests of the nation would secure a direct or indirect voice in the government.

The characteristic of corporations which most appealed to French theorists, which was in fact their central talking point, was their alleged ability to eliminate hostility between employers and employees. This function was to stand head and shoulders above all other corporative aims. Cooperation between classes was to replace conflict between classes. Social solidarity would supplant social disharmony. Functional organizations representing industry and professions would take the place of conflicting class unions; and within each corporation, those differences which did arise between employers and employees would be settled to the benefit of the organization as a whole.

Such a type of corporatism was preached, if not practiced, by the Vichy government. It had previously found numbers of advocates among French theorists of different political affiliation during the armistice which bridged the two World Wars of the twentieth century. Yet while French corporative theory attained its greatest significance during this century, it would be incorrect to assume that it was a full-blown creation of the present. A well-defined corporative doctrine emerged during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The growth of Marxism, of strikes, and of unemployment during this period stimulated Social Catholics, sociologists, and others to draw up cor-

porative plans which influenced their twentieth-century followers.

Although the term "corporative" was not employed in France until after 1870 and there was no cohesive body of French corporative thought before that time, certain political, social, and economic ideas espoused by various theorists later found their way into corporative doctrines. Here and there corporatists were even able to claim a writer such as Buret or Keller as one of their own. Therefore an examination of the ideas of some of these early thinkers from the point of view of what corporatists later drew from them would be profitable.

The Medieval Tradition

Corporatists reached back even further than the nineteenth century for some of their concepts. Although they protested that their system was a modern one suited to modern conditions, medieval thought and institutions held a powerful attraction for them. They quoted from St. Thomas Aquinas, and they supported their arguments for corporatism by referring to ancient guild practices and to the medieval notion of the limited state.

Among the theories which corporatists borrowed from St. Thomas Aquinas were his stewardship concept of property, with "the implication that its use should redound to the good of society, and that compulsion might be used where the owner failed in his duty," [3] and his theory of just price based upon objective value and just wage. They believed with St. Thomas that it was wrong to take advantage of another's need to exact more than the intrinsic value of a commodity, and an even greater offence to force a man in straitened circumstances to sell at a price below the intrinsic value of the object. Purchaser and seller should reap mutual advantage from any particular transaction. The cost of production was to be considered as the

3 Austin P. Evans, *The Problem of Control in Medieval Industry* reprinted from *Political Science Quarterly*, XXXVI, No. 1, December, 1921, 603-616 (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1921), p. 607.

first charge against a commodity; and its sale price was to be computed upon that basis.[4] According to the doctrine of just wage, the worker's compensation should be sufficient to support him and his family adequately as befitted his status.

More than any other aspect of medieval thought and life, the institution of the guild influenced French corporatism.[5] Membership in the guild was in practice compulsory, since the guild possessed a monopoly of the local trade in its product. Members were classified hierarchically in the categories of apprentice, journeyman, and master. Theoretically, and often in actuality, it was possible to rise from the lowest to the topmost rank, and mutual rights and duties existed between the different levels of the hierarchy.[6] Close union and cooperation prevailed between masters and workmen in the more democratic guilds. In such guilds, journeymen were often given a voice

4 Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 608.

5 The origin of medieval guilds has been the subject of a great deal of controversy. Some historians suggested that they were survivals of older institutions such as the Roman *collegia* or *scholae*, or of the monastic orders or brotherhoods. Others have maintained that each guild was a separate spontaneous creation unconnected with the past. The truth probably lies between the two theories: "There was if not a definite persistence of that which already existed, at least a survival out of the wreckage, or a development of germs, which thanks to the surrounding conditions, underwent a complete metamorphosis." Georges Renard, *Guilds in the Middle Ages* (London: U. G. Bell and Sons, 1919) translated by Dorothy Terry, introduction by G. D. H. Cole, p. 4.

Saint Omer and Valenciennes were the sites of the earliest merchant guilds in France during the eleventh century. Craft or artisanal guilds, which are more important in their influence on corporative theory, were not organized in France until the first third of the twelfth century. In 1162, and more fully in 1182, privileges were granted by the king to the butchers of Paris, and from the beginning of the thirteenth century the corporative organization was applied to the artisans as well as to the merchants of Paris. The famous Book of Trades drawn up under the authority of Etienne Boileau, Provost of Paris, presents a clear picture of the organization of the Parisian guilds. François Olivier-Martin, *L'Organisation corporative de la France d'ancien régime* (Paris: *Librairie du Recueil Sirey*, 1938), pp. 87-92.

6 Renard, *op. cit.*, p. 17, and *passim*.

with masters in the election of officials[7] and occasionally allowed to choose their own representatives in the guild council. Recent corporatists have imitated this system by proposing compulsory membership of both employers and employees in the same corporation, with employees sharing the control of at least a part, if not all, of corporative activity. Many also advocated a hierarchical organization similar to that of the guild.

Several of the functions of the medieval guild had their counterpart in the plans drawn up by recent corporatists. Guilds lessened competition, set prices and production quotas, regulated quality, settled conflicts among members, fixed wages and hours, and controlled funds. They guaranteed to the qualified worker "ownership of his job." This was accomplished through a guild system of social security providing aid to the sick and unemployed, pensions to aged members, and funeral expenses. Such services were financed out of a guild fund or "patrimony" raised from subscriptions, donations, and fines paid by members.[8] In addition to adopting many guild functions, recent corporatists annexed the terms "ownership of a job," and "patrimony."

According to medieval political philosophy, the guild, together with other associations such as the family and Church, played an important role in limiting the power of the state. They were to stand as a barrier between the individual and the state, protecting him from tyranny. Corporatists similarly thought in terms of such "intermediate" institutions as a check upon the government.

The role of the medieval guild as the representative of the trade in relations with the political state also appealed to modern corporatists. A few of these—the industrialist Mazaroz, and the sociologist Durkheim, for example—went so far as to

7 Variously entitled *jurés, gardes, prud'hommes, visiteurs* and *adjoints* depending upon the region and craft. Olivier-Martin, *op cit.*, pp. 141-144. On the general subject of French guilds see: Emile Coornaert, *Les Corporations en France avant 1789* (Paris: Gaillimard, 1941).

8 Renard, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-45.

advocate that the corporation become the fundamental political unit. This was an extension of the medieval practice of giving guild officials an important, and often dominant, position in the municipal government.

Although corporative theorists of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries drew heavily upon the guild system of the Old Regime, they did not accept it *in toto*. The local character or provincialism of the medieval guilds was condemned by many of them. Durkheim was perhaps the most emphatic in stating that since economic operations were on a national and international scale, the corporation should function on a national basis. There was little provision for inter-professional or inter-guild relations under the old system. Modern economic conditions necessitated the adjustment of the regulations of one corporation to those of the others. A national economic council or council of corporations, and a ministry of national economy or corporations were advocated by most recent theorists to coordinate the activities of all corporations in line with national economic policy. Many corporatists also realized that guilds interfered with the introduction of inventions and new industrial techniques. The nineteenth century saw the development of huge *sociétés anonymes* (corporations in the stock company sense), and the framework of the new corporative system was perforce enlarged to allow for these. Likewise, the latter portion of the century witnessed the rise of labor unions and these class organizations came to be considered as potential constituent parts of the future corporation. Social unrest, unemployment, depression, and class conflict in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reached proportions unknown to the Old Regime, and consequently recent corporative proposals have been oriented to a large degree toward the solution of these problems.

The guilds of the Old Regime were swept away in the destruction of the remnants of feudalism that accompanied the French Revolution. Their demise was made final by the law of

March 2, 1791.[9] Immediately vigorous protests arose from members of various trades and professions.[10] Horror was expressed at the lack of regulation and dire results were prophesied from the new system of laissez-faire. Those attempts to bring order into economic life which were made during the Consulate and Empire were considered ineffectual by upholders of guild organization. True, lawyers, doctors, butchers, and bakers were again organized into guilds,[11] but this only whetted the appetites of the partisans of the past.[12] The *Con-*

9 The law merely put a formal end to an institution which had long been decaying. Its immediate effect was to cause artisans and workers in certain industries to form assemblies for the purpose of extorting higher wages from employers. This in turn resulted in the Chapelier Law of June 14, 1791 which deprived artisans of the liberty of association. Etienne Martin-Saint-Léon, *Histoire des corporations de métiers* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1817), pp. 509-516.

10 Typical of the petitions to the government during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods was that of three hundred wine merchants in 1806, requesting the reestablishment of the former guilds in general, and their own guild in particular. Governed by a council of six members meeting biweekly, the guild of wine merchants would forbid the sale of diluted wine or any substitutes, and would conduct trimonthly inspections to seek out fraudulent practices. Under this plan, four years service and a registration fee of a thousand *livres* would be required for mastership. Masters would be limited to the possession of one shop and participation in the wine business only. The report of the Parisian Chamber of Commerce written by M. Vital Roux indicted all such attempts to interfere with free competition and the proposal of the wine merchants was unsuccessful. *Ibid.*, pp. 518-520.

11 Lawyers, bailiffs and notaries were organized by the laws of 27 ventose year VIII and 25 ventose year IX, the professions connected with medicine by the laws of 19 ventose and 21 germinal year XI and butchers and bakers by the decrees of 19 vendémiaire year XI and germinal years VIII and X. *Ibid.*, pp. 516-517, 520-521. P. Hubert-Valleroux, *Les Corporations d'arts et de métiers en France et à l'étranger* (Paris: Guillaumin, 1885), pp. 187-206.

12 Regnault de Saint-Jean d'Angély, member of the Legislative Body, in a report presented on the tenth germinal year XI made known his longing for the stability which the former guilds gave to work, and deplored the abuses brought about by unlimited trade. Decrying the unfair competition, the perversion of rules of apprenticeship, and the frauds of his day, he explained several proposed remedies such as the reestablishment of guilds and the creation of a national label of guarantee. However, all he could offer as a cure were the following proposals: creation of consultative chambers

seils de Prud'hommes, or industrial committees of workers and employers set up by Napoleon in 1806 to settle industrial disputes,[13] to dispense justice, and to aid in the administration of labor legislation were thought by guildists to be but a sop to their demands. Napoleon's scheme of 1815 for the election of twenty-three out of the six hundred and twenty-nine members of the Chamber of Deputies from among merchants, shipowners, and manufacturers [14] was regarded as a travesty upon the guild idea. With the Restoration hopes ran high that the guilds would be reestablished. In spite of petitions to parliament by masons, shoemakers, builders, and others, the proponents of laissez-faire ensconced in the Paris Chamber of Com-

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of manufacture, arts and trades; repression of the crime of coalition either of employers to lower wages or of workers to bring about a cessation of work or to prevent the work of others; regulation of apprenticeship. These measures became the law of germinal, year XI.

13 These *conseils* established by the law of March 18, 1806 were a step in the direction of corporatism. With minor changes, they have existed in France to the present. For an excellent account of their foundation, composition and functions see: Chester P. Higby and Caroline B. Willis, "Industry and Labor under Napoleon," *American Historical Review,* LIII, No. 3, 465-480.

14 The plan was part of the *Acte Additionnel* to the Constitutions of the Empire written by Benjamin Constant and approved by Napoleon. For the purpose of apportioning professional representatives, France was to be divided up into thirteen *arrondissements,* each including several departments and each choosing through its electoral college from one to four deputies. These deputies were to be chosen from a list of sixty eligibles for each commercial *arrondissement,* and one hundred and twenty for the *arrondissement* of Paris. The list of eligibles was to be drawn up by the Chambers of Commerce and the Consultative Chambers of Commerce of the whole commercial *arrondissement* meeting together. This list of desirable candidates should contain the names of those merchants who were most distinguished by their probity and talents, paid the highest taxes, engaged in the widest and weightiest operations in France or foreign countries, and employed the greatest number of workers. *Acte Additionnel aux constitutions de l'empire,* April 22, 1815, in *Nouvelles* (Metz: Veuve Verronais, 1815), pp. 81-92. Duguit et Monnier, *Les Constitutions de la France depuis 1789* (Paris: Pichon, 1898), pp. lxxv, lxxxvi, 197, 204, 461. *Le Moniteur universel,* April 23, 1815, pp. 460, 461.

merce and in the legislature won the day and the guilds were not revived.[15]

A number of pamphleteers of the Napoleonic and Restoration periods kept alive the guild tradition. Although their efforts for the revival of guild privileges and regulation were largely in vain, their arguments were reiterated by later corporatists. Chief among these early nineteenth century writers were: Stoupe, a publisher convinced of the necessity of restoring the printing guild and of limiting the number of printers;[16] Deseine, author of a work on the Royal Academies and pamphlets on guilds, who adulated the guilds of the Old Regime;[17] Bénard, a cloth merchant, who, decrying laissez-faire, de-

15 *Le Moniteur universel*, LVII (January 17, 1818), 74.

In 1819, M. Tritt, President of the Parisian master masons demanded the restoration of the guild of masons as essential to the interest and security of the public. Likewise the master masons, stone-cutters and carpenters at Fontaine, department of Bas-Rhin, solicited a law which would reestablish their guilds. They asserted that a great number of immigrant workers, often without knowledge of the trade, took away their jobs and that the solidity and safety of dwellings depended on guild organization. During the discussion in the Chamber of Deputies on May 1, 1817 when many of these petitions were debated, the Count of Marcellus made a vigorous defense of the guild system, characterizing it as "a profoundly useful institution and conservative of societies" which "tends to the prosperity of the social order and the stability of the monarchy." *Ibid.*, LVIX (May 5, 1819), 546.

Among the most vociferous critics of the guilds and supporters of laissez-faire were M. de Chauvelin, member of the Chamber of Deputies, M. Pillet-Will, banker, and M. Claude Costaz, pamphleteer and secretary of the Society for the Encouragement of National Industry. See: Chauvelin's reply to the Count of Marcellus in the debate of May 1, 1819, *loc. cit.*; M. Pillet-Will, *Réponse au mémoire de M. Levacher-Duplessis ayant pour titre: Requête sur la nécessité de rétablir les corps de marchands et les communautés des arts et métiers* (Paris: Chez Mongie), (Pillet-Will's pamphlet is discussed in *Le Moniteur universel*, LVII [January 1, 1818], 4); Claude Anthelme Costaz, *Corps de marchands et communautés d'arts et métiers* (Paris: Imprimerie de Mme. Huzard, 1821), 23 pp.

16 Stoupe, *Mémoire sur le rétablissement de la communauté des imprimeurs de Paris* (Paris: L'Imprimerie de Stoupe, an XII), pp. 16-29.

17 Deseine, *Mémoire sur la nécessité du rétablissement des maîtrises et corporations comme moyens d'encourager l'industrie et le commerce* (Paris: Imprimerie de Fain, 1815), p. 1.

manded letters of mastership for the exercise of a particular trade or profession;[18] and Levacher-Duplessis, a Parisian lawyer, who petitioned the government to reestablish guilds.

Of all the petitions and proposals at this period, possibly the most detailed and the most earnest one was the *Mémoire*[19] drawn up by Levacher-Duplessis, signed by four Parisian merchants, and presented to the king on September 16, 1817, supposedly in the name of the merchants and artisans of Paris. Although this document was rejected,[20] it was of importance because it contained all the arguments for a guild system current at that time, and because its later influence was great. The Social Catholics of the eighteen-eighties were particularly indebted to it, and in 1883 their magazine, *Association catholique,* reproduced it *in extenso.*[21] Large sections of the writings of the Social Catholic corporatist, La Tour du Pin, and many of the speeches of Pétain also savor of this work. In particular, they repeated its condemnation of economic liberalism, its reference to tradition, and its emphasis on morality, discipline, and order.

The *Mémoire* praised guilds, deplored the economic chaos which, it alleged, resulted from their abolition, and urged their immediate resurrection. It characterized guilds as " wise in-

18 Bénard's pamphlet itself was not available but large sections of it were quoted in: *Des Maîtrises et des corporations ou réfutation du mémoire sur le rétablissement des maîtrises et des corporations* (Paris: Librairie du commerce, 1824), 47 pp.

19 *Requête au Roi et mémoire sur la nécessité de rétablir les corps de marchands et les communautés des arts et métiers présentées à sa majesté le 16 septembre 1817 par les marchands et artisans de la ville de Paris.* In 1821 Levacher-Duplessis distributed to the chambers a pamphlet reproducing his first edition and adding an appendix.

20 Both the 1817 and 1821 pamphlets were rejected by parliament and the Paris Chamber of Commerce. The latter condemned the *Mémoire* in its sessions of October 8, 1817 and March 17, 1821. See: *Le Moniteur universel* LVI (October 16, 1817), 1142 (March 24, 1821); Martin-Saint-Léon, *op. cit.*, pp. 523-524.

21 *Association catholique,* XVI (1883), 174-208. References are to this edition of the *Mémoire.*

stitutions, in the shadow of which commerce and industry . . . long flourished." Under them, the petitioners asserted, " [we] enjoyed a fixed and peaceful status in which we were able to raise our families honorably and to leave to our children after several years of work a modest fortune. . . ." [22] The guild system was " favorable to public morality, to decent customs, to confidence, to the sentiments of patriotism, and to the family spirit whose maintenance and conservation is so important because it is the source of the finest social virtues." [23] Among its other merits, it encouraged perfect workmanship and good quality, essential to the preservation of the foreign market, and it cared for the honest merchant and artisan, victim of misfortune, as well as for the orphan, the widow, the indigent, the infirm, and the old. Worthy guild members could rise to distinction, not only in the guild, but also in the community and state, and by virtue of their position in the guild, were often called to exercise municipal functions. Furthermore, guilds helped to maintain a limited monarchy. The political philosopher, Bodin, was quoted to the effect that " just and limited sovereigns are maintained by the *médiocrité* of the guilds and [other] well-regulated communities." [24] The tyrant tried to abolish guilds, knowing that the " union of his subjects among themselves is his ruin." [25]

Since the destruction of the guilds, the *Mémoire* asserted, industrial and commercial professions had been guilty of the most shameful license. Workers without sufficient skill or capital had established themselves as artisans, and the consequent fraud and bad work had lost France the Levant trade. Bankruptcies succeeded upon bankruptcies. The discipline of workshops, the domestic authority of masters were destroyed, and engagements between workers and masters were no longer re-

22 *Association catholique, op. cit.*, p. 174.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 208.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 204. Cited from Bodin, *De la République*, Bk. III, ch. VII.

25 *Loc. cit.*

spected.[26] Although certain laws had tried to remedy the sorry situation, they had proved but imperfect substitutes for the old guilds.[27]

The *Mémoire* concluded by pleading that France restore the guilds. She should renounce systems which isolated men and hardened their hearts. Instead, she should unite those whom occupations and interests brought together and should allow them to direct and defend their common welfare. As a result "you will soon see the cold calculation of egotism replaced by sentiments of public spirit and the noble results which it alone can produce." [28]

The attempt of Levacher-Duplessis and his colleagues to turn back the clock to a neat bandbox medievalism was doomed to failure. Economic liberals pointed out that guilds which had flourished under an agrarian, feudalistic, localistic, self-sufficient economy would be an anachronism in an industrial, capitalist economy based upon division of labor, the factory system, and laissez-faire. Although its importance should not be underestimated, the medieval tradition was to be but one of several ingredients in corporatism and was shortly to be supplemented by others more in tune with the changing times.

Utopian Socialism

Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century a group of socialists whom Marx scorned as utopian dreamers, were de-

26 *Association catholique, op. cit.*, p. 175.

27 The laws referred to were the following: the law of August 12, 1803 on apprenticeship, trademarks and the mutual duties of employers and workers; the decree of December 1, 1803 compelling workers to possess a *livret* and to obtain permission from an employer before leaving a job; the law of March 18, 1806 creating *Conseils de Prud'hommes*. The latter institution was especially criticized because its members had jurisdiction over disputes involving many professions. A *prud'homme* who was a building contractor might be required to judge a dispute relative to silk stuffs. Under a guild system, guild officials would only judge issues concerning their particular trade. The execution of all the above laws was very lax, according to the *Mémoire*, but would be efficient if entrusted to the guilds.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 207.

veloping ideas which to a limited extent found their way into corporative thought. Their proposals were a response to the challenge of the economic conditions prevailing in France. During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods French foreign commerce had definitely lost ground. Although the protective system established during the Restoration perhaps brought about a favorable balance of trade with England, government tampering with statistics has led authorities such as Prof. S. Charléty to conclude that from 1814 to 1829 imports to France remained stationary and that exports actually diminished. Such a situation in foreign commerce would affect the welfare of a portion of the French working class.

The period after 1815 saw the development of the Industrial Revolution in France, although it was only after 1830 that French industry made great strides. The growth of factories in the cotton and woollen industries, the prevalence of long hours, child and woman labor, low wages and absence of strong regulation of working conditions created many problems. Depression hit France in 1826 and continued unabated until 1830. After a period of credit expansion and high prices, low prices, restricted credit and reduced business activity resulted. The suffering worker did not look with friendliness upon a government in which he saw rule of the rich predominating. It was no wonder that Utopian Socialists and Proudhon sought for remedies.

Of great significance for their effect upon corporatism were the doctrines of Saint-Simon. Like Levacher-Duplessis, he was critical of the French Revolution, regarding its character as negative and its result as anarchy. Unlike the partisans of the past, however, Saint-Simon did not wish to return to the Old Regime. Instead he welcomed with enthusiasm the industrial age which was dawning. In common with corporatists, he stressed the importance of production and producers. In his view, the new society had no room for outmoded classes such as nobles, bourgeois, or clergy. There were instead to be only

two categories—the workers and the idle, the bees and the drones; and the latter would soon disappear. Between the various categories of workers, whether banker, farmer, manufacturer, or artist, the real difference would be that resulting from different capacities.

> Industrial equality consists in each drawing from society benefits exactly proportionate to his share in the state—that is, in proportion to his potential capacity and the use which he makes of the means at his disposal, including of course his capital.[29]

Like corporatists, therefore, Saint-Simon did not favor the abolition of private property. Like many of them, he advocated a hierarchy based upon professional capacity. His anti-democratic political outlook, and his recommendation of government by the élite were endorsed by corporatists of the Third Republic including the nationalist Georges Valois (Alfred Georges Gressent).

The government, Saint-Simon thought, should administer public affairs, not control men. Economics should come first. The chief function of the government should be to defend workers from the unproductive sluggard and to maintain security and freedom for the producer. Since the activity of such a government would be primarily economic, the élite composing it should for the most part consist of persons important in industry and commerce. Thus Saint-Simon enlarged upon Napoleon's plan of 1815 for professional representation. In place of the twenty-three representatives of industry and commerce in the Chamber of Deputies proposed by Napoleon, Saint-Simon envisioned a chamber entirely recruited from the domains of commerce, industry, manufacturing, and agriculture. It should be charged with the final acceptance or rejection of legislative proposals submitted to it by the other two chambers, composed

29 Quoted in Charles Gide and Charles Rist, *A History of Economic Doctrines from the Physiocrats to the Present Day*. Authorized translation from the second edition of 1913 by R. Richards (New York: D. C. Heath), p. 206.

exclusively of savants, artists, and engineers. This whole plan of professional representation was to be characteristic of many later corporatists. For example, the scheme of government drawn up by Mazaroz in the eighteen-seventies developed this aspect of Saint-Simon's thought.

A contemporary of Saint-Simon and fellow Utopian Socialist, Charles Fourier, left a less easily discernible impression upon corporative thought. Like Saint-Simon, he emphasized production, although he stressed the encouragement of agricultural rather than industrial production.[30] He commended decentralization and in this he was followed by many French corporative theorists. In the *Phalanstère,* or consumer-producer cooperative designed by Fourier, where harmony was to be the law, class conflict between capital and labor or producers and consumers would be eliminated by welding their interests together. The worker would become a capitalist through owning shares in the cooperative. Private property would not be abolished, but would be diffused by being transformed into shares of stock. This scheme for giving workers shares of stock was advocated by certain French corporatists; and the guild life developed by Léon Harmel at the Val-des-Bois spinning factories in the eighteen-seventies, although differing in organization, bore some resemblance to the harmony and communal life and spirit which the great French Utopian Socialist wished to foster.

Another Socialist of this period whose ideas penetrated the minds of corporative theorists was Louis Blanc, famous for his scheme of social workshops or cooperative producers' societies. It is not unlikely that his plan for the organization of workshops for each branch of industry had some indirect effect upon ideas for the organization of each industry into a corporation. Also the reservation of part of the profits of the social workshop for the care of the aged, sick, and infirm revealed some similarity to the corporation's social fund. In addition,

30 Gide and Rist, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

Blanc's hostile attitude toward interest, which he hoped would eventually disappear [31] (the Saint-Simonians also denounced interest), possibly was partly responsible for the bitter opposition of certain corporatists like La Tour du Pin toward interest. But under Blanc's scheme private property, which was sacred to most corporatists, was certainly weakened. Moreover, Blanc, as a pioneer of state socialism, could not have had an appeal to most corporatists, who were anti-*étatiste.*

Blanc exerted a more direct influence upon corporatism in his role as chairman of the Luxembourg Commission of 1848. This Commission, established by the French Provisional Government on May 29, was composed of approximately an equal number of employer and employee delegates representing numerous trades. In this respect, the Commission was corporative in character. Although the life of the Commission was short, it accomplished some reforms under Blanc's direction. It arranged for the establishment of a few cooperative associations of producers; it agreed upon the abolition of *marchandage,* a form of sweated labor; and it successfully demanded that the government reduce the working day from eleven to ten hours in Paris, and from twelve to eleven hours in the provinces. Of most significance for the history of corporatism, it provided for arbitration of labor disputes, and dealt so ably with strikes that Louis Blanc remarked: " Employers come to the Luxembourg by different routes, but nearly always they leave by the same path." [32]

Proudhon

Blanc's contemporary, Proudhon, defies classification with the Utopian Socialists, or indeed with any group of theorists. " An irritating enigma to his own generation," [33] he oscillated

31 Gide and Rist, *op. cit.,* pp. 259, 260.

32 Quoted in Shepard B. Clough, *France—A History of National Economics,* 1789-1939 (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1939), p. 166.

33 J. Salwyn Schapiro, " Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Harbinger of Fascism," *American Historical Review,* L, No. 4 (July 1945), 737.

between the right and the left. His conservative outlook was reflected in his devotion to the institution of the family, his championship of the middle class, and his support of inheritance of property.[34] On the other hand, his opposition to interest, to stock exchanges, and to centralized government seem to range him against the *status quo*. In spite of, and even because of, his contradictions, Proudhon left an indelible impress upon French corporative theory. He was quoted with praise by corporatists of both right and left. Those of royalist hue, like La Tour du Pin and Maurras, and those of fascist learnings, like Pierre Lucius, hailed Proudhon. A collaborationist journal published in Paris in 1943 declared that Proudhon had found a way to resolve the economic contradictions of society.[35] Through his leftist inclinations, Proudhon directly inspired French anarcho-syndicalism and indirectly French corporatism. Certain syndicalists, like Georges Valois and Paul-Boncour, turned toward corporatism, bringing with them their legacy of Proudhonian principles. Since Proudhon shaped corporative thought from two opposite directions, those portions of his voluminous writings pertinent to corporatism require examination.

Proudhon seemed to gaze almost wistfully back at the guilds of the Old Regime. He claimed his opponents

> did not see that before '89 the worker existed . . . in the guild as the wife, child, and domestic in the family; that then, in effect, the working class did not exist in opposition to the *entrepreneur* class . . . . But since '89 the network of guilds has been shattered without equalizing the fortunes and conditions between workers and masters, without doing or providing anything for the distribution of capital, the organization of industry, and the rights of workers. Consequently, distinction arose automatically between the class of employers, owners of the instruments of production, capitalists, and great

34 *Ibid.*, p. 734.

35 *Les Nouveaux temps* (Paris: May 2-3, 1943), cited in *ibid.*, p. 737.

> proprietors, on the one hand, and that of simple wage earners on the other hand.[36]

Proudhon praised the workers of his day because they demanded

> workers' chambers and employers' chambers complementing each other, controlling each other, and balancing each other; executive syndicates and *prud'hommes,* in sum a whole reorganization of industry under the jurisdiction of all those who compose it . . . .[37]

and because they wished to reconstitute on new bases the natural work groups, that is to say, guilds.

Certainly Proudhon was unalterably opposed to class warfare and in favor of the middle class, sentiments entertained by many French corporatists. Proudhon's whole plan of a people's bank, issuing exchange notes based on commodities and charging no interest, was the result of his fight against "interest," "finance," "capitalism," "stock exchanges," and "Jewish bankers."[38] The most important corporatist thinker of the nineteenth century, René de la Tour du Pin, who wrote largely between 1870 and 1900, likewise attacked these institutions and was vehemently denunciatory of "Jewish finance." Many corporatists also agreed with Proudhon's endorsement of mutual credit and insurance societies, and other autonomous economic associations.

Of prime importance to the development of corporative thought was Proudhon's support of federalism, decentralization and a "cluster of sovereignties,"[39] concepts very prominent in

36 Pierre Joseph Proudhon, *De la capacité politique des classes ouvrières.* Vol. IV of *Oeuvres complètes* edited by C. Bouglé and H. Moysset. This volume edited by Maxime Leroy (Introduction and notes). (Paris: Librairie des sciences politiques et sociales, Marcel Rivière, 1924), p. 224.

37 *Ibid.*, pp. 122, 123.

38 Schapiro, *op. cit., passim.*

39 *Ibid.*, p. 725.

recent French political theory. Throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries corporatists and semi-corporatists paid homage to these concepts. Guild historians like Olivier Martin, members of the Pluralist school like Léon Duguit, leaders of the *Action Française* like Charles Maurras, are a few examples of the adherents to these ideas championed by Proudhon. The preamble to the law establishing the Pétain Regime stressed the importance of intermediate sovereignties such as the guild, local government, and the family. Even French Fascists rendered lip service to such sovereignties at the same time that they called for a dictator. They were thus guilty of the same contradiction as Proudhon, who was partial to the maintenance of local liberties on the one hand and to a strong leader on the other. However, most corporatists regarded local or intermediate sovereignties as an essential restraint and check upon central authority.

Social Reformers

During the period of the July Monarchy, a group of social reformers, building upon the ideas of partisans of medieval guilds, Utopian Socialists, and Proudhon, evolved principles and projects which exerted a demonstrable influence on French corporatism. Of their number, Sismondi, Villeneuve-Bargémont, and La Farelle were not entirely successful in discarding the doctrines of laissez-faire, while Buchez and Buret were more prepared to shake themselves free of the prevailing theory economic liberalism. They were all concerned with the alleviation of poverty, and felt that a new guild system constructed to harmonize with nineteenth century environment would be instrumental in achieving this end.

It is easy to understand why the attention of these writers was drawn to questions of poverty and class conflict. The industrial revolution was spreading in France, after 1830 at an accelerated pace, and leaving in its wake difficult social problems. Between 1832 and 1847 the number of steam engines grew from 525 to 4,853. The production of iron ore, coal, and

cast iron likewise increased. Important mechanical advances were made in the textile industries. The number of persons living in towns of 2,000 or more population mounted from fifteen per cent in 1830 to twenty-five per cent in 1846.

French industrial workers did not profit from this growth of industrialization and urbanization. Their real wages had not materially risen since the Restoration and had declined in the cotton textile industry. According to Agricol Perdigier, the wage of the industrial worker had been actually reduced by two thirds since 1830. The working day was eleven hours in Paris and thirteen in the provinces. Infant mortality and the number of foundlings became greater.

The worker was, moreover, helpless to ameliorate his condition. In addition to the prohibition of labor unions, the *livret,* or book containing a record of the worker's activity prevented labor organization. Despite these restrictions, some *résistance* organizations and workers' political groups were founded.

The economic crises of 1837-1839, and 1846-1847 made the workers' position worse, and the latter depression contributed to the revolutionary eruption of 1848. The failure of crops in 1846, and the accompanying deflationary process led to riots in industrial centers. Grain warehouses and bake shops were robbed. There were crises in the textile and metallurgical industries. Workers were dismissed and pauperism increased. To the solution of such problems certain writers on economic and social conditions addressed themselves.

Although Sismondi was a Swiss, and wrote his chief work on economics in 1819, his thought was so closely allied to that of French social reformers of the thirties and forties that he deserves to be classed with them. One belief which they shared was that guilds had served society well in the past. They had given the worker security, enabling him to rise easily from journeyman to master, and they had attempted to check overpopulation by restricting marriage to those who were at least journeymen and twenty-five years old. Yet Sismondi did not

wish the restoration of guilds as they had existed, criticizing their oganization as oppressive. Instead, he demanded guilds whose main functions would be the organization of a kind of compulsory assistance and the limiting of population. "It is evident," he wrote,

> that if the crafts could be organized into guilds for the purpose of charity only, and if the heads of the trade were under obligation to furnish assistance to all the poor of their trade . . . the sufferings to which the working class is exposed, the surplus of production which today ruins commerce, and the surplus of population which reduces the poor classes to despair would [all] be promptly ended.[40]

Since employers alone would bear the responsibility of social assistance to workers, they would have the right to pass on marriage applications of those whom they would aid in case of need.

> This could be a matter of difficulty; but the worker once adopted by his trade, once married with the approval of his guild, would have assured the existence of his family, his status would be a property, a heritage which would put him forever beyond anxiety and need . . . . Instead of the precarious condition to which he is today condemned, he would be shown as object of his desires, a period of rest and ease, which he could achieve through good conduct . . . .[41]

Although Sismondi did not attempt to solve the problem of guild organization (he merely remarked that legislation should vary with each district and trade), he affected corporative theory through his attack upon laissez-faire and competition, his desire for a shortening of the hours of labor, and his demand for protection for the worker in sickness, old age, and unemployment by means of modernized guilds. Both Villeneuve-Bargémont and Buret were his disciples, and both his

40 Quoted in P. Hubert-Valleroux, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

41 *Loc. cit.*

spirit and ideas seemed to permeate the "moral economic order" of Buchez.

Philippe Buchez considered himself a follower of Saint-Simon until about 1830, when he founded his own school. His economic and social ideas were predicated upon deep religious convictions and upon a belief in the importance of the family as the basis of society, and in the precedence of duties over rights.

In an article which appeared in his *Journal des sciences morales et politiques* on December 17, 1831, Buchez unfolded a plan of a corporative nature for large industry. He proposed the creation of syndicates, composed half of manufacturers and half of foremen. He wanted to give these syndicates power to fix minimum wages, to regulate apprenticeship and professional education, to found social aid institutions, and to conciliate disputes between employers and workers. They were also to correspond with each other, and to exchange information relating to the labor market.[42] For small industry, Buchez, influenced by Fourier, advocated producers' cooperatives. He advised workers in the same trade

> to combine together, to throw their tools into the common lot, and to distribute among themselves the profits which had hitherto gone to the *entrepreneur*. A fifth of the annual profits should be laid aside to build up a perpetually inalienable reserve, which would thus grow regularly every year.[43]

This scheme for small industry Buchez translated into practice by founding a cooperative of jewellers.

Villeneuve-Bargémont, one of the precursors of Social Catholicism, served an apprenticeship in administration as prefect in 1812, as councillor of state in 1828, and as a member of the national legislature in 1830. As a legitimist, he was forced to retire to private life under the July Monarchy, but during this time he visited Lille, making a thorough study of poverty there,

42 Etienne Martin-Saint-Léon, *op. cit.* (1922 edition), p. 637.

43 *Loc. cit.*

and within the next few years wrote several works on the subject. He expressed great compassion for the horrible conditions of the poor, and vigorously attacked economic liberalism and state non-intervention as largely responsible for those evils. Equipped with practical experience as an administrator and observer of conditions in the France of his day, and with a knowledge of the doctrines of contemporary social reformers, Villeneuve suggested ameliorative legislation.[44]

Among measures for the relief of poverty, Villeneuve-Bargémont proposed in his work, *Christian Political Economy,*

> the institution of guilds of workers which, without disturbing industry and having the evil consequences of the ancient guilds, would favor the spirit of association and of mutual aid, would give guarantees of instruction and of good conduct, and would replace the deplorable institution of journeymen's associations.[45]

The new guilds would not possess " privileges and regulations contrary to liberty and to the progress of industry. . . ." [46]

Villeneuve-Bargémont was very vague on the organization of these guilds. He merely stated that

> the ancient guilds should be replaced by the association of all the workers of the same profession, who would be authorized to choose syndics and to deliberate in certain circumstances on their common interests.[47]

Regarding their functions he was more specific. One of the tasks he allotted to the guild jury was the examination of workers, free of charge, at the end of their apprenticeship. If

44 *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York: Robert Appleton Co., 1912), Vol. XV.

45 Vicomte Albon de Villeneuve-Bargémont, *Economie chrétienne ou recherches sur la nature et les causes du pauperisme en France et en Europe et sur les moyens de le soulager et de le prévenir* (Bruxelles: Méline, Cans et Compagnie, 1837), p. 469.

46 *Ibid.*, p. 480.

satisfied with their elementary education and industrial capacity, the jury would deliver to the worker a certificate to be placed at the top of his *livret,* a booklet stating his qualifications and employment record. Without such a certificate, the worker would be unable to rise above the rank of apprentice.

> Preference and a higher wage being naturally the recompense of the skilled worker, the ignorant worker would be powerfully inspired to acquire the instruction necessary to obtain a certificate from the jury.[48]

Workers whose moral conduct was reprehensible would be warned and advised by the guild syndics. On the other hand, the syndics would have the right to deliver to workers who changed their residence or travelled about France, certificates of good conduct, which would recommend them to the associations of other cities. In this way, " the industrious, moral, and skillful workers would be assured of finding everywhere a favorable welcome. . . ." [49]

Like Sismondi, Villeneuve-Bargémont was troubled by the increase in the birth-rate especially among the poorer classes, and like Sismondi, he saw the guilds as means of

> obtaining from workers prudence and foresight in marriage. This great amelioration can, in our opinion, only be completely inspired by religious sentiment; but without doubt the councils of syndics would be able to prepare it with success and this would not be one of the least advantages of this institution.[50]

Other functions of the guild would include the formation of mutual aid and provident funds, the creation of temperance societies, and the establishment of schools and public lectures. The guild " would rapidly and without danger develop the

48 *Loc. cit.*

49 *Loc. cit.*

50 *Loc. cit.*

spirit of association which it is important to create and to fortify." [51]

One matter in particular which was to be outside the bounds of guild jurisdication, was consideration—even consultative—of the rate of wages. Etienne Martin-Saint-Léon, one of the leading historians of guilds and the guild idea, roundly condemned Villeneuve for depriving the guilds of their most necessary attribution, since they would be unable to arbitrate "the most serious and most frequent conflicts, those which are caused by demands for increase or refusal to accept a reduction in wages." [52]

Although he did not think guilds should be permitted even to discuss wages, Villeneuve did believe that "a just wage-rate should be the first condition of all industrial enterprise." [53] In his opinion, the wage should be adequate to provide the workman a decent existence in accordance with the requirements of his locality—that is, nourishing food, clean and durable clothes, and a ventilated dwelling affording proper protection against the rigors of the seasons. He should be able to support a family, of at least a wife and two children under fourteen years of age, and to make some provision for times of sickness and for old age.

> If the wage cannot provide all these things for the workingman it is no longer in conformity with the laws not only of nature, of justice and of charity, but even of political prudence.[54]

In his concept of just or sufficient wage, Villeneuve-Bargémont seemed to be an intellectual descendent of St. Thomas Aquinas and a theoretical forerunner of Marshal Pétain.

As in the case of Villeneuve-Bargémont, Félix de la Farelle (1800-1871) had a political career which increased his op-

51 *Loc. cit.*

52 Martin-Saint-Léon, *op. cit.* (1897 edition), p. 529.

53 Quoted in Parker T. Moon, *The Labor Problem and the Social Catholic Movement in France* (New York: Macmillan, 1921), pp. 22-23.

54 *Loc. cit.*

portunity for firsthand study of social and economic problems. A lawyer by profession, he served as magistrate until the Revolution of 1830 when, again like Villeneuve, he was obliged to resign. In 1842 he returned to public life as a member of the Chamber of Deputies for the *Arrondissement* of Alais, a post he held for six years. In 1843 he was named to the commission charged with preparing a law on the penal system, and he was an active participant in debates relating to waterways and railroads. From 1848 until his death, he lived in retirement.[55]

The theories of La Farelle were expressed mainly in two works. The first, entitled *Of Social Progress for the Benefit of the Non-Indigent Popular Classes,* was published in 1839 and won one of the Montyon prizes of the French Academy. The second work, *Plan for a Disciplinary Reorganization of the Industrial Classes of France,* was published in 1842,[56] having been awarded first prize in a contest of the Royal Society of Agriculture and Emulation of Ain. It compromised to a greater degree with economic liberalism than the earlier work. For example, the 1839 essay provided for the compulsory membership of workers in guilds,[57] while the 1842 work modified this to voluntary membership. This change in viewpoint may perhaps be accounted for by the terms of the 1841 contest sponsored by the Ain society, which required the answering of two questions —first: Has not the abolition of the guilds left workers without organization and would not trade associations help fill the gap by giving guarantees of better work, aid, security, and discipline?; and second: In the case of an affirmative answer, what would be the means of "achieving this goal without pre-

55 Pierre Larousse, *Grand dictionnaire universel du XIX^e siècle* (Paris: 1867), X, 50.

56 The edition used was that of 1847 which comprised both works bound in one volume. Félix de la Farelle, *Du Progrès social au profit des classes populaires non indigents; suivi de plan d'une réorganisation disciplinaire des classes industrielles en France* (Paris: Guillaumin, 1847).

57 *Ibid.*, pp. 295-343, and *passim.*

venting free competition. . . ?" [58] If the change in emphasis is kept in mind, the *Plan* [59] may be regarded as supplementing *Of Social Peace*, for it fills in the details lacking in the general statement of the earlier work.

La Farelle repeated all the old arguments against economic liberalism. He deplored unrestrained competition, the increase of fraud, the lack of quality, and the absence of provision for the future among both workers and producers. To counteract these evils of liberalism, he proposed associations or guilds composed of merchants, artisans, or industrial workers. Each trade or profession in each city or district was to have its own guild. Within the guild there would be a hierarchy of masters, journeymen, and apprentices. Admission to mastership would be open only to those who served apprenticeship and passed an examination. An apprentice could not become a master until he had reached his majority. In the interval between the end of apprenticeship and admission to mastership, the former apprentice would bear the title of worker or journeyman.

The guild was to be governed by a syndicate composed of those who had been masters for ten years and who had been elected by masters of at least five years standing. However, in the 1847 edition of the plan, La Farelle was willing to allow journeymen over twenty-one years of age to be represented in the general assembly of all the masters and in the governing syndicate. Those who had served on the syndicate would be eligible for election to the municipal council of their commune as well as to the Council of *Prud'hommes* of their district.

The guild's functions were to be many and varied, but were to exclude the setting of maximum or minimum prices of goods and labor. Apart from this restriction, they would be empowered to examine products and affix a guild label, settle disputes between members and between outsiders and members (excluding wage disputes), and deliver *livrets* to all workers,

58 Félix de la Farelle, *op. cit.*, p. 349.

59 *Ibid.*, pp. 457-462.

whether or not they belonged to the guild. Guilds would also act as mutual assistance societies. All guild members who paid the required tax would be eligible for sickness, old age, and unemployment benefits. Employers would contribute to the fund by means of a tax proportional to the annual profits of each, or according to the number of their employees. The fund would be managed jointly by employer and employee representatives. Decisions of guilds were to be subject to appeal to the Councils of *Prud'hommes*. These councils had existed since 1806, but La Farelle proposed to integrate them into his suggested guild system. Half their members, according to La Farelle, should be elected by and from guild officials.

Crowning the whole guild structure there was to be a permanent central bureau of commerce, of manufacturers, and of arts and crafts. It was to consist of nine members chosen by the king from among the most important manufacturers and merchants of France, who would consequently enjoy the rank of councillors of state. This bureau would have frequent and regular sessions with all embassies, consulates, and commercial institutes of the civilized world. It would publish and spread commercial news among the industrial class. Most important, the central bureau would direct national production, indicating needs and designating the most advantageous types of manufacture, and pointing out areas of demand. When the bureau observed a branch of the export industry in danger, it would propose suitable counter measures to the government. Such functions, it would seem, might interfere with the free competition which the managers of the Ain contest so ardently wished to preserve.

Finally, La Farelle devoted a section of his *Plan* to the relations between guilds and the state. This may be summarized briefly by stating that the government was to watch guild meetings and guild activity very closely. La Farelle was particularly insistent upon the point that guilds should engage in no political activities and he provided severe penalties for so doing.

In comparison to the schemes for reform of Sismondi, Villeneuve, and La Farelle, the system of Buret was a greater break with economic liberalism and more nearly akin to the plans of corporatists after 1870. Nevertheless, he was influenced by his contemporaries, particularly Sismondi, whose disciple he avowed himself. There are traces in his writings of the ideas of Villeneuve, Saint-Simon, and Fourier, as well as evidence of his familiarity with medieval guild organization.

Buret was born in Troyes in 1811 and died at the early age of thirty-one. From 1836 on he wrote for the *Courier français* a series of articles on political economy which were noted for elegance of form as well as for content. In 1840 he participated in a competition on the question of poverty sponsored by the Academy of Moral Sciences. A fragment of his two-volume work, *On the Poverty of the Working Classes in France and in England,* won the prize. He had undermined his health by overwork, and went to Algeria to recover. There, instead of resting, he devoted himself to writing a volume dealing with the reorganization of Algeria. He died a few days after his return to France.[60]

Even the opponents of Buret's doctrines praised his efforts. M. A. Cochut, one of the critics of *On the Poverty of the Working Classes,* wrote in the *Revue des deux mondes* of October 1, 1842:

> Let us begin by rendering homage to the talent of M. Buret and to his generous sympathies. A real compassion for the misfortunes of others inspired him to write pages of which clever writers could be proud.[61]

In further tribute, M. Cochut considered Buret "a steadfast mind, a warm heart whose recent loss is most regrettable." [62]

60 Larousse, *op. cit.*, II, 1421.

61 *Revue des deux mondes*, XXXII (1842), 155-156.

62 *Loc. cit.*

A large section of *On the Poverty of the Working Classes*[63] was devoted to a description of conditions of the poor in England and France based upon direct observation and research. Buret drew a vivid picture of the English workhouses, London slums, and poverty in France. For such conditions, he offered several remedies—reform of the inheritance laws, creation of a national system of credit and social insurance, and establishment of a new system of industrial organization.[64]

Like Fourier, Buret was interested in transforming laborers into small capitalists. He proposed to achieve this through the annexation by society of one quarter or one fifth of the lands bequeathed each year to heirs, and the sale of such land cheaply to peasants. Collateral bequests should be prohibited. Society should also take one-quarter or one-fifth of the shares of industrial stock owned by a deceased person, and should sell such shares cheaply to workers, who thus would become stockholders.

Buret's national system of credit bore some similarity to the ideas of Proudhon on the subject, but Proudhon thought in terms of a local and not a national credit association. According to Buret, a national bank of agriculture and industry should be created to make loans up to two-thirds of the value of land. Industrial credit would consist in advances made by the bank on goods in warehouses.

Buret mapped out a national system of social insurance, on the premise that it would be sounder financially on a national than on a local scale. Most French corporatists did not follow Buret in this view, commending instead a purely guild and trade basis for insurance or assistance. Buret himself wavered on this point, for elsewhere in his book, he desired the professional organization to act as a welfare and mutual aid society.

If all these remedies were tried, Buret claimed that

63 Eugène Buret, *De la misère des classes laborieuses en Angleterre et en France* (Paris: Paulin, 1840).

64 These remedies are discussed by Buret primarily on the following pages of his work: 361-362, 389, 390, 394-414, 441-446.

> one of the most active causes of poverty, the anarchy of production and consequently the anarchy of labor would nevertheless continue to exist. Like property, like all elements of human society, labor needs to be organized.[65]

Under the existing system, Buret declared,

> the producer is obliged to work haphazardly; he possesses no sure means of knowing the true state of the market, and that is why he so often happens to employ his capital fruitlessly, by making it produce objects for which the market is already saturated.[66]

For the evils of such irrational production and unlimited competition, and for the curse of strife between employers and employees, Buret prescribed an antidote in the form of professional or trade organizations which later generations would term corporative.

In addition to its other advantages, Buret stressed the point that his system would promote solidarity between employers and employees.

> Instead of making their grievances heard by means of revolutions and violence, workers would have through institutions, of which the present Councils of *Prud'hommes* give an idea, the facility for exposing them legally before arbitrators accepted by the two parties, workers and masters . . . . The goal of bringing about the *rapprochement* of employers and workers once frankly posited, great efforts of intelligence would not be necessary to attain it . . . . It would suffice to will it.[67]

Such arguments were used over and over again by corporative theorists later in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Buret elaborated his project in as much detail as La Farelle, but he drafted it along more democratic lines. He had no fear

65 Buret, *op. cit.*, p. 416.

66 *Ibid.*, p. 430.

67 Buret, *op. cit.*, pp. 359-360.

of allowing workers equal rights with their masters in the organization. They would both be represented in the syndical chamber or family council which was the basic council in a series ascending through cantonal councils, departmental councils, and culminating in a supreme council of national production.

At the bottom of the pyramid the family council would be endowed with a variety of functions. Chief among these was to be the fixing of wages, since Buret, unlike Villeneuve and La Farelle, had no qualms about granting his organization regulation in this respect. The council would also own a shop for common supply, and serve as a welfare and mutual benefit bureau of the profession.[68] On the second level, the cantonal council would arbitrate disputes between workers and masters, punish frauds, and facilitate direct buying and selling between different industries.[69] At the top, the supreme council would regulate the relations of national production and consumption with foreign production and consumption. Although in theory Buret advocated a low tariff, he admitted that the supreme council could levy a protective tariff if information received from the cantonal councils and other sources showed they were necessary to prevent shocks and crises in domestic production.[70]

Many aspects of Buret's thought were reproduced in the works of later corporatists. Certain of La Tour du Pin's ideas on the structure of corporations paralleled those of Buret. Both men were equally anxious to see workers obtain a limited financial interest in industry. The sociologist, Durkheim, shared Buret's concern over the evils of inherited wealth. Such twentieth century corporatists as Brethe de la Gressaye, Paul Chanson, and the sponsors of the Plan of July Ninth seemed to reflect much of the spirit and work of Buret. Marshal Pétain seems to have had an intellectual kinship to him.

68 *Ibid.*, p. 248, and *passim.*

69 *Ibid.*, p. 249, and *passim.*

70 Buret, *op. cit.*, pp. 423, 430-433.

BURET'S CORPORATIVE SCHEME, 1840



Political Theorists

While Utopian Socialists and other social reformers were devising programs for the reorganization of industry and labor which affected corporative doctrine, certain schools of political thought offered theories about the nature of society and the state which in the course of time were adopted by many corporatists. Of these schools the royalist and the positivist contributed most to corporatism.

During the Restoration, two royalist noblemen, Louis Gabriel de Bonald, and Joseph de Maistre, developed anti-individualistic and anti-egalitarian doctrines based on traditional religious principles.[71] They regarded the family and not the individual as the real unit of society. Both considered completely artificial the conception of man as an isolated being. Both were to a degree precursors of the organic theory of the state, believing that nations are born, live, and die like men, and possess a soul and moral unity. They held that representative bodies in the state should be purely consultative and should represent not individuals but interests or classes. They also laid emphasis on agriculture, landed property, custom, nationalism, and Catholicism. Such doctrines recur as a refrain through corporative thought of the post-1870 period. Even some of the identical phraseology of these royalists appears in the works of corporatists.

The Comte de Chambord, legitimist pretender to the French throne from 1836 until his death in 1884, expressed ideas very close to corporative thought. His writings were often quoted, particularly by corporatists of royalist leanings. He insisted especially upon administrative decentralization and the erection of a new guild system. Attainment of these two objectives, he argued, would bring about the alliance of authority with order and liberty. The revival of provincial administration would

71 For a brief discussion of the theories of Bonald and Maistre see: Charlotte Touzalin Muret, *French Royalist Doctrines Since the Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), pp. 10-34.

help to establish "a natural hierarchy, in conformity with the spirit of equality, that is to say of distributive justice. . . ." [72]

Claiming to be a friend of labor, the Count expounded his ideas on guild organization in his *Letter on Labor* (1865). The Revolution, which brought about the affirmation of occupational freedom and the abolition of liberty of association, was disastrous for labor, he contended.

> The individual, being left without protection for his interests, has been made a prey to unlimited competition, against which he had no recourse other than coalitions or strikes . . . . At the same time, by the development of public prosperity there was constituted a kind of *industrial privilege* which, holding in its hands the existence of workers, was invested with a kind of domination which could become oppressive and bring, by a counter-blow, terrible crises.[73]

In spite of mutual aid societies, and savings and retirement funds,

> protection is not yet sufficiently provided everywhere and the moral and material interests of the working classes are still suffering greatly.
>
> As for the remedies, here are those which principles and experience appear to dictate: to individualism oppose association, to unbridled competition the counterweight of common defense, to industrial privilege the voluntary and regulated constitution of free guilds.[74]

As far as the specific organization of the guilds was concerned, the Comte de Chambord was vague. In addition to separate unions of employers or employees, the Count proposed "mixed commissions, syndicates of employers and of em-

72 Comte de Chambord, "Lettre sur la Décentralisation" (November 14, 1862); "Lettre aux ouvriers" (April 20, 1865) in *Lettres d'Henri V depuis 1841 jusqu'à présent avec une lettre dédicatoire au Roi par Adrien Peladan* (Avignon and Nimes: Roumanille et Imprimerie Lanfare, 1874), p. 158.

73 Chambord, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-175; Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

74 Chambord, *op. cit.*, p. 175, Moon, *op. cit.*, pp. 73, 424.

ployees," [75] which could maintain good relations and prevent or settle differences. The guild he envisioned was apparently to be a kind of outer shell embracing within itself separate unions of capital and of labor.

The state was to exercise surveillance over these organizations to prevent them from being used for purposes inimical to public order. Meetings were not to be held without preliminary notice and the state would have the right of representation at any meeting. However, the government would allow entire liberty in debate and transactions, and would intervene in labor disputes only in a friendly manner, at the request of both parties, to facilitate agreement.

Toward the conclusion of the *Letter,* the Count asked:

> Who moreover does not see that the voluntary and regulated constitution of free guilds would become one of the most powerful elements of social order and harmony, and that these guilds could enter into the organization of the commune and into the bases of the electorate and of the suffrage? [76]

Here the Count seemed to imply a guild basis for suffrage or perhaps even a chamber representing guilds.

Many of the political and social doctrines of the Comte de Chambord and the royalist school bore a similarity to those of Auguste Comte, the founder of sociology and positivism. Like the royalists, Comte was a bitter critic of individualism and equality, and saw the family and the social group as the unit of society. He believed that individuals had no rights, but only duties, and that the living were always dominated by the dead.[77]

Comte attacked the economic liberalism of his day. He stressed the need for the systematization of industry, and deplored antagonism between workers and employers, farmers,

75 Chambord, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

76 Chambord, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

77 See Muret, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-229, for a brief discussion of Comte's political ideas.

manufacturers, and bankers. He felt that the state should intervene to promote harmony in economic life. Denouncing popular sovereignty and the parliamentary system, he desired a strong state with a dictator at the helm who would choose his own successor. With Bonald and Maistre, he apparently embraced an organic concept of the state and like them, he recommended a consultative, not a sovereign assembly, representing groups, not individuals. There were to be three deputies from each department, one representing agriculture, another industry, and a third commerce. All these views of Comte permeated to a greater or less degree the thoughts of all French corporatists.

One disciple of Comte who declared his indebtedness to the founder of positivism was Charles Maurras, the chief exponent of the royalist *Action Française,* which accepted corporatism. He found solace in Comte's respect for order, in his emphasis upon duty and tradition, and in his advocacy of a strong ruler.[78]

The Social Catholics

The Social Catholics, who, after 1870, were among the leading champions of corporatism, were hesitatingly wending their way toward it during the Second Empire. In an environment where laissez-faire was so predominant, it was perhaps to be expected that they should fall at least partially under its sway. The government of Napoleon III did much to foster laissez-faire through the destruction of certain existing guilds. The first Napoleon had revived the butchers' and bakers' guilds, but Napoleon III suppressed them in 1858 and 1863 respectively.

Only a few concessions were made to workers and social reformers who demanded a modification of laissez-faire. Some needed changes were effected in the Councils of *Prud'hommes* created by Napoleon I.[79] Labor and trade associations, which

78 *Loc. cit.*

79 Chester B. Higby and Caroline B. Willis, *op. cit.*, p. 480.

had been prohibited, were partially legalized in 1864, but they were fenced in by so many restrictions that their sphere of action was severely curtailed. They could not organize work stoppages or demand changes in the rate of wages. It was not until 1884 that labor unions were fully legalized.[80]

It was in such an era of economic liberalism that Frédéric le Play, eminent French engineer, economist, and sociologist, evolved his social doctrines. From the writings of Bonald and Maistre, of Comte, and of Villeneuve-Bargémont he derived his belief in the family as the keystone of society. Family manufacture and industry were prerequisites for a healthy nation. He insisted upon the inviolability of marriage, increase in the authority of the father, and restoration of freedom of bequest. The spread of organizations of mutuality to encourage thrift, and the acquisition of individual property among workers were desirable. All social reform, Le Play declared emphatically, depended upon moral reform.[81]

Le Play praised the guilds of the Old Regime but seemed to disapprove of their resurrection even in a modified form. They would destroy occupational liberty "which despite certain grave but remediable evils, is one of the rare features of superiority in our epoch of instability and antagonism."[82] He was even distrustful of labor unions.

> Among the panaceas which have been lauded in our time, labor organization is one of the most overworked . . . . These societies cannot afford . . . the same advantages as individualism or even capitalism, properly understood.[83]

80 On the industrial and labor legislation of Louis Napoleon see: Etienne Martin-Saint-Léon, *op. cit.* (1922 edition), pp. 648-653; P. Hubert-Valleroux, *op. cit.*, pp. 359-373; Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

81 Georges Jarlot, *Le Régime corporatif et les Catholiques sociaux, histoire d'une doctrine* (Paris: Flammarion, 1938), pp. 18-21.

82 Cited in Moon, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60.

83 *Ibid.*, p. 59.

Le Play's negative view on guilds and labor unions did not, however, lessen the importance of the influence of his other ideas upon corporative thought.

Another Social Catholic writer of this period who emphasized the urgent necessity of moral reform as the basis for any social reform was Charles Périn. Although Périn was a professor at the University of Louvain in Belgium, his ideas, like those of the Swiss Sismondi, became an integral part of French intellectual development, exerting a major influence on French Social Catholic thought and hence on French corporatism.

Périn had almost as much difficulty as Le Play in parting from laissez-faire. Without destroying economic liberalism, he yet wished to eradicate the evils of extreme individualism. Therefore a degree of inconsistency characterized his writings. On the particular question of guilds, Georges Jarlot, a historian of Social Catholic corporative ideas, contended that Périn wanted brotherhoods (*confrèries*) of workers and the patronage or charitable work of the employer classes.[84]

Périn's thought, however, was not static but changed with time. In his *Of Wealth in Christian Societies* published in 1869, he pronounced the impossibility of restoring the guilds of the Middle Ages which were suited to a time of small-scale industry and imperfect justice, and first fulfilled the good function of guaranteeing against abuses of liberty. Then the producers lent each other mutual support.[85] But soon guild regulations spread without intelligence and without measure and became a check to all progress. Hence their abolition was an advantage.[86] Nevertheless in the same book, he stated that "solidarity is the natural law of human nature"[87] and that Christian associations of workers should fulfill a mission of fraternal assistance.

84 Jarlot, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-29.

85 Charles Périn, *La Richesse dans les sociétés chrétiennes* (Paris: Lecoffre, 1868), I, 306-307.

86 *Ibid.*, I, 301.

87 *Ibid.*, II, 259.

In *Christian Socialism* published in 1879, Périn contended that the medieval guild did not limit free competition enough to reduce production and that if it did so later it was unfaithful to its principle.[88] In *Economic Doctrine of the Last Century* published in 1880, he asserted that all the ties of labor were broken when the guilds were suppressed, that laissez-faire created the proletariat, that of all associations the guild was the most complete and most powerful, and the one which best developed and protected man's industrial activity. There was thus a need for a return to the guild formula, but, said Périn, in liberty and as Christian charity conceived it. Wages should continue to be regulated by the law of supply and demand, but a new guild system would bring this law back to procedures of peace and equity and away from existing injustice and conflict. Examples of such a new association given by Périn were the Catholic Professional Association of Printers, Booksellers and Binders in Paris, and the guild founded by Léon Harmel at Val-des-Bois.[89]

Périn's thought thus advanced from rejection of guilds in his writings during the Second Empire to a gradual acceptance of them as indicated in his works of the Third Republic. Perhaps his increased toleration of guilds after 1870 was due in part to contact with the corporative writings of La Tour du Pin, for these two prominent Social Catholics mutually affected each other.

Less contradictory and less impregnated with economic liberalism than the works of Le Play or Périn was the book by the Social Catholic, Emile Keller, published in 1865. This volume entitled *The Encyclical of December 8, 1864 and the Principles of 1789,*[90] was avidly read by La Tour du Pin and Albert

88 Jarlot, *op. cit.*, p. 23, note 5.

89 Charles Périn, *Les Doctrines économiques depuis un siècle* (Paris: Lecoffre, 1886), p. 234, and *passim.*

90 Emile Keller, *L'Encyclique du 8 décembre 1864 et les principes de 1789, ou l'église, l'état et la liberté* (Paris: Poussielgue, 1865).

de Mun in a German prison cell during the Franco-Prussian War, and made a great impression upon these two future leaders of the Social Catholic movement in France.

Keller attacked liberalism and liberal economy. He contended that a new feudalism had replaced that of the Old Regime, namely the feudalism of financial barons. The night of August 4, 1789, had abolished political classes, but economic liberalism, by opposing capitalism to the proletariat created the class struggle. There had been a progressive concentration of financial power and a progressive proletarization of the masses. Keller deplored the monopoly engendered by free competition and bewailed strikes and permanent class war.

In all this Keller took a much stronger attitude than either Le Play or Périn. He believed that the economic system itself should be modified and that the reform should be moral, social, *and economic,* not merely moral and social.

Furthermore, Keller advocated a guild system in which there would no longer be unlimited occupational freedom, and in which employers and workers would be placed in a position of collaboration and mutual support rather than of rivalry. Guilds would build up a collective and inalienable reserve to provide for the needs of their members. This conception of "guild patrimony" or fund for the aid of members of the trade has found an important place in the doctrines of most corporatists.[91]

The Extent of Corporative Thought Before 1870

Many of the principal elements in corporative doctrine were present prior to 1870 and became a part of the pattern of corporatist theory as it developed in the ensuing years. The concept of an organization combining employers and employees regulating each industry, trade, or profession was suggested by the guilds of the Old Regime, and their advocates in the early nineteenth century, and by social reformers like Villeneuve, La

91 Keller, *op. cit.*, pp. 280-290 and *passim.*

Farelle, and Buret, and Social Catholics like Keller. Guild patrimony, ownership of a trade (*propriété du métier*), hierarchy of apprentice, journeyman, master, just price, just wage, and maintenance of quality production were further notions traceable to the same origins and adopted by corporative theorists of the period after 1870. A belief in economic and political decentralization, professional representation in the government, and encouragement of family life and morality was drawn not only from these sources but also from the writings of Utopian Socialists and Proudhon. The organic concept of the state was derived from medieval theory, Bonald, Maistre, Comte, and others.

There was thus no coherent, unified body of corporative doctrine preached by a school of corporatists before 1870. Of all the theorists before this date, Buret most closely approximated corporatism of the post-1870 era. The Social Catholics had not yet adopted it. Nevertheless, an evolution, a progression toward corporative doctrine may be discerned in the writings of the succession of theorists with corporative tendencies from 1800 to 1870. During the Napoleonic and Restoration periods the chief interest of Stoupe, Levacher-Duplessis, and others lay in restoring the guilds of the Old Regime with most of their privileges and monopolies. That they made no headway against the tidal wave of economic liberalism is understandable. The trend was away from a circumscribed medievalism and in the direction of serious study of contemporary problems. The lure of the Old Regime was not obliterated—it never really disappeared—but merely slipped into the background while new elements appeared in the foreground. The social consequences of laissez-faire industrialism, and the protests of Utopian Socialists and Proudhon led certain reformers of the July Monarchy like La Farelle, to elaborate guild schemes more adapted to their own generation than the medieval system. For the most part these theorists, like their Social Catholic successors in the Third Empire, could not tear themselves completely away from economic liberalism.

CHAPTER II

THE CORPORATIVE DOCTRINES OF LA TOUR DU PIN

The New Environment

It was not until after 1870 that the term "corporative regime" came into general usage and that a body of corporative doctrine which rejected laissez-faire developed. The economic, social and political environment became increasingly favorable to corporatism. In the last three decades of the nineteenth century most of the countries of Europe turned away from economic liberalism toward economic nationalism as evidenced by the spread of protective tariffs, social legislation and imperialist policies. A new phase of the Industrial Revolution appeared with steel and electricity supplementing, and often supplanting, iron and steam. Finance capitalism with its huge combines and cartels began to replace competitive industrial capitalism and divorce between management and labor became a common practice. Depressions grew more intense and far reaching. Labor became more self-conscious and the process of forming labor unions proceeded by leaps and bounds, while Marxism and class struggle increasingly disturbed the security of capitalism. In the political sphere, conservative parties wielded greater power, and liberal nationalism gave way to nationalism of a more aggressive type leading to national rivalries which culminated in the conflagration of 1914.

In France the period 1870-1914 saw a trend away from the free trade concepts of Napoleon III, as evidenced in the Cobden Treaty, to the protectionism of the Méline Tariff of 1892. Social legislation, particularly in the eighteen-nineties and early nineteen hundreds, and the imperialistic efforts of men such as Ferry, were further steps in the direction of economic nationalism.

French industry was affected by the new phase of the Industrial Revolution. Steel and steel alloys began to replace iron.

After 1880 French railroads substituted steel for iron rails in the existing tracks, while the new road bed construction which doubled the railroad mileage, used steel rails. Despite the loss of Alsace, the textile industry continued to grow. The rayon process was introduced. Hydroelectric power was beginning to be developed.

Along with this industrial expansion came periodic crises—the depression of 1873-79, the crash of 1882, the economic crisis of 1907. In spite of labor legislation—ten-hour day in 1900, workmen's compensation 1898, optional social insurance 1910, abolition of *livret,* 1890, safe and hygienic conditions of labor 1893, 1903, six-day week 1899, 1906, old age relief 1905, etc.—the workers did not feel secure from the changes of the business cycle nor from the demands and power of the employing class. Successful in winning the full legalization of trade unions in 1884, workers increasingly resorted to association and to strikes. With the establishment of the General Confederation of Labor in 1895, French labor formed a powerful front against the strength of employers who in turn founded an opposing organization—the General Confederation of French Production—in 1919. From 1890 on, strikes became more and more common; between 1905 and 1910 particularly there was a series of violent and bloody ones.

Disturbed by this increasing class conflict and by the threatened position of capitalism, certain theorists formulated a corporative system which they thought would remedy the social and economic ills of the France of their day. They even expected corporatism to transform the government with its cabinet crises and frequent changes into one of stability and strength. Chief among these writers was the Social Catholic La Tour du Pin, who drew together the scattered threads of French corporative doctrine and wove in the realm of thought a firm corporative system.

La Tour du Pin stands out as the foremost French corporatist of the nineteenth century by virtue of the great authority which he wielded in the corporative movement and by the indelible stamp which he laid upon it. Soldier, diplomat, landowner, social reformer, and philosopher, he devoted his active life to practicing and preaching the ideal of Christian solidarity, which he placed at the heart of his corporative system.

Career

Charles Humbert René, Comte de la Tour du Pin Chambly, Marquis de la Charce, was born on April 1, 1834 in the ancient Château of the Douglases at Arrancy-en-Laonnois. He was brought up in the traditions of the French nobility. On his mother's side he came of a family of magistrates; on his father's side of a line of soldiers. One ancestor, Pierre de Chambly, fought at Bouvines under Philip Augustus; another, Philis de la Tour du Pin, although of the fair sex, was commissioned a colonel by Louis XIV for having successfully led an army of peasants against the forces of the Duke of Savoy, invading Dauphiny in 1662;[1] yet another, Jean-Frédéric de la Tour du Pin Gouvernet, was Minister of War under Louis XVI, and spoke in favor of the Queen at her trial—a boldness which led to his arrest and death in 1794.[2]

René's early education was undertaken by his parents on the family domain of Arrancy. In later years he declared that, as a boy, he learned from his father the notion of property as a trust. Often, as he accompanied his father on the rounds of the estate, visiting all the peasants, the father would admonish: "'Always remember that you will be nothing more than the administrator of this land for the benefit of its inhabitants.'"[3]

1 M. Pennelier, *La Conception corporative de la Tour du Pin* (Paris: Editions Domat-Montchrestien, 1937), p. 11.

2 René de la Tour du Pin Chambly de la Charce, *Feuillets de la vie militaire sous le Second Empire, 1855-1870* (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1912), pp. 8-9; Leo Joubert, *Dictionnaire de Biographie depuis les temps les plus anciens jusqu'en 1870* (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1870), p. 423.

3 René de la Tour du Pin, *Vers un ordre social chrétien, jalons de route, 1882-1907* (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1929), p. 4.

It was natural that La Tour du Pin should follow in the footsteps of his father's family and embark upon a military career. At the age of eighteen, after a year of preparation at a college of Versailles, he entered Saint Cyr. There began the lifelong friendship with Bossan de Garagnol, whose daughter was to be René's companion and amanuensis during the last twenty years of his life. After Saint Cyr and the Staff School, La Tour's military life began in earnest. He became a captain at twenty-four and fought in the great campaigns of his time—in the Crimean War, in the Italo-Austrian War of 1859, in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Taken prisoner with the army of Metz, he was interned by the Germans at Aix-la-Chapelle, and it was there that his friendship with Albert de Mun was sealed. Upon his release from captivity, he participated in the suppression of the Paris Commune. In 1880, when serving in Austria-Hungary as French military attaché, he was promoted by the French War Ministry to rank of lieutenant-colonel.[4]

But a definite break with army life was soon to come. In 1881, La Tour du Pin proposed to General Billot, the Minister of War, a *coup d'état* in favor of the Comte de Chambord, the legitimist pretender. The general was unsympathetic to such a proposition and La Tour had no alternative but to offer his resignation.[5] Nevertheless, his years of military training and experience exerted a profound influence upon his thought. He devoted two books to his army experiences—*L'Armée française à Metz* (1871), and *Feuillets de la vie militaire sous le Second Empire* (1912), and his other writings often contain military allusions. Yet La Tour du Pin was not a typical militarist. He disliked compulsory military service [6] and even proposed international disarmament to reduce the French government's burden of debt. He did admire, however, the chevalier

4 Charles Baussan, *La Tour du Pin* (Paris: Flammarion, 1931), *passim.*

5 Jean Rivain, *Un Programme de restauration sociale—La Tour du Pin précurseur* (Paris: Le Livre, 1926), p. 10.

6 La Tour du Pin, *Jalons*, p. 123.

who " to the valor of the soldier added the generosity, justice, continence, and faith of the Christian," [7] and felt that war was a noble art to be practised skillfully but sparingly.

More important for posterity than La Tour du Pin the soldier was La Tour du Pin the moralist and Social Catholic corporatist. Indeed he was one of the first to use the term " corporative regime ". He first became preoccupied with the social question during his captivity at Aix-la-Chapelle. Through Father Eck, a Jesuit, La Tour and his fellow officer, Albert de Mun, made the acquaintance of Doctor Liegen (later a Center Party member of the Reichstag). The latter in turn introduced them to the Social Catholic movement in Germany inaugurated there by Kolping and Ketteler.[8]

On their return to France, La Tour du Pin and De Mun came into contact with Maurice Maignen, a lay brother who had founded a small Catholic club of young workingmen on the Boulevard Montparnasse. After attending a meeting of this club, the two officers, in cooperation with Maignen, decided to form a whole network of Catholic workingmen's clubs. Thus on December 22, 1871 the *Oeuvre des Cercles Catholiques d'Ouvriers* was born. Among the other founders were Emile Keller, deputy from the Haut Rhin and author of the book above mentioned, and Léon Gautier, Professor at the *Ecole des Chartes* and an enthusiastic admirer of the Middle Ages. This aristocratic and intellectual élite was to direct the *Oeuvre* for the benefit of its members who were workingmen. The aim of the founders was not to rouse laborers to independent action for the furtherance of their interests, but to unite them in Christian corporations with employers and to place them under the guidance of directive committees recruited from the upper classes. In addition the leaders were to formulate a clear social doctrine through their *Section d'Etudes*. This doctrine was

7 *Association catholique*, VI, 10. These words, although not composed by La Tour du Pin but by another bearing the name of La Tour, nevertheless seemed to reproduce his sentiments exactly.

8 Baussan, *op cit.*, p. 88.

propagated by means of congresses, provincial branch clubs, and a journal, *Association catholique,* which was founded in January, 1876. The number of members and of branches steadily mounted. By 1884 there were 50,000 members and 400 committees, although subsequently the organization seemed to lose some of its power.[9]

Until his retirement from the *Oeuvre* about 1893, La Tour du Pin was the moving spirit behind its doctrines. It was he who most vigorously insisted upon the corporative reorganization of society. It was he who stressed, more than any of the other leaders, the necessity for a well-prepared doctrine as the prerequisite for any social action.[10] In his numerous articles in *Association catholique* he captained the attack against liberalism in all its forms, even Catholic liberalism, and he led the defense for Christian corporatism. Although he supported numerous vain efforts of his friend, Albert de Mun, to have parliament enact a law on corporations, he had more faith in the spontaneous growth of associations, especially mixed associations of employers and workers, than he had in reforms dictated by a parliamentary government.

During these years, La Tour du Pin was instrumental in encouraging the efforts of such Social Catholics as Louis Milcent and Gailhard Bancel to form agricultural associations in the Jura, Alpine, and Dauphiny valleys. Léon Harmel's work in building at Val-des-Bois in Champagne a model spinning guild was, according to Charles Baussan, inspired to a large degree by La Tour du Pin.[11]

The years 1877-1881 were important ones for La Tour du Pin, for these were the years of his sojourn in Austria-Hungary as French military attaché. There he came into intimate association with the leaders of the Austrian Social Catholic

9 Parker T. Moon, *The Labor Problem and the Social Catholic Movement in France* (New York: Macmillan, 1921), pp. 82-85.

10 René de la Tour du Pin, "Letter to Louis Milcent" (March 2, 1877) in *Revue universelle,* March 25, 1941, p. 334.

11 Baussan, *op. cit.,* pp. 112-123.

movement—Baron Karl von Vogelsang, Rudolph Meyer, Count Blöme, and von Loewenstein. The influence of Vogelsang upon La Tour was particularly marked. Vogelsang was the director of the Social Catholic journal *Vaterland,* and wrote about problems of labor, property, and political reconstruction.[12]

La Tour's stay in Austria also permitted him frequently to visit Frohsdorf, the home of the French legitimist pretender, the Comte de Chambord. Since the Count himself was interested in guild ideas, having advocated guilds in his *Letter on Labor* of 1865, he was well disposed toward the doctrines of La Tour du Pin and the activities of the *Oeuvre des Cercles.*

After his return to France in 1881, and his subsequent retirement from the army, La Tour founded an agricultural society in his own department of the Aisne, and soon afterwards joined the *Société des Agriculteurs de France.* Throughout the rest of his life the problems of agriculture and the peasants were of special interest to him.

In May and September, 1882 there appeared in *Association catholique* articles by La Tour du Pin lauding Frédéric le Play and Wilhelm von Ketteler, Bishop of Mainz. In the first article, La Tour called Le Play founder of the " School of Social Peace ", our contemporary master, our friend.[13] Even before Le Play, wrote La Tour, Maistre, Bonald, and Blanc de Saint-Bonnet had fought " glorious " advance guard battles for the defense of " healthy " traditions. But these men had aimed too high. Le Play, on the other hand, fought the principles of 1789 with its own weapon, " scientific method ", and by this means defended the sacred rights of the Church, family, and association. In the second article, La Tour praised von Ketteler, who fifteen years before had viewed the labor question as essentially one of subsistence, and who had indicated a guild regime as a solution.[14] Again in 1883, La Tour wrote that years before the

12 *Ibid.,* p. 98.

13 *Association catholique,* XIII (May 15, 1882), 559-580.

14 *Ibid.,* XIV (September 15, 1882), 259-261.

formation of the *Oeuvre,* von Ketteler had defined the mission of just such an organization.[15]

La Tour du Pin was soon to influence the Pope himself. In 1884 he was sent by the *Oeuvre* to Leo XIII to explain its work and aims and to disprove the liberal Catholic accusation of socialism. The Pontiff is supposed to have said to La Tour: " 'My son, that is not Socialism, that is Christianity.' " [16]

On his return trip, La Tour met the Austrian Social Catholic leader, Count Blöme, and proposed to him the formation of an international federation of socially minded Catholics. Out of this suggestion grew the organization for economic and social studies known as the Catholic Union of Freiburg. The *Memorial* of this international body, presented to the Pope in 1888, directly influenced the drafting of Leo XIII's famous encyclical of May 15, 1891, *Rerum Novarum—On the Condition of Labor.*[17]

Rerum Novarum, therefore, was at least indirectly or partly inspired by La Tour du Pin. The Pope hoped to see the former guilds adapted to the requirements of the time. Workmen's societies and mixed organizations of employers and workers were recommended in the document. Especially was the idea of class conflict condemned and that of class solidarity and peace supported by the Pope.[18]

However, a year after the promulgation of *Rerum Novarum,* Leo XIII caused dismay to the monarchist La Tour du Pin by directing the French Catholics to rally to the support of the Republic. La Tour remained true to the royalist cause but his comrade-in-arms, Albert de Mun, became a *rallié,* thus making irreparable the breach which had been constantly widening between the two old friends. As a result of the schism, La Tour

15 La Tour du Pin, *Jalons,* pp. 36-37.

16 Pennelier, *op. cit.,* p. 15.

17 Moon, *op. cit.,* p. 15.

18 Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum—On the Condition of Labor* (New York: The Paulist Press, 1939), *passim.*

du Pin retired from the Oeuvre which remained in the hands of De Mun and his fellow *ralliés*. He continued to write for *Association Catholique* which in 1891 had severed its connection with the *Oeuvre*, remaining independent until 1909 when as the *Mouvement social* it became the organ of *L'Action Populaire*.[19]

The blow from Rome and the defection of many of his closest friends did not weaken La Tour's royalism. On the contrary, it made him even more royalist. Already in 1888-1889, before the *Ralliement*, La Tour had organized a counter-manifestation to the nation-wide centenary celebration of the fall of the Bastille. This manifestation consisted of the meeting of provincial assemblies, the drawing up of *cahiers* by the three estates, and the convocation of an "Estates General" at Paris.[20] La Tour's opposition to the *Ralliement* served to increase his royalist activities. In 1896 he was one of the most active participants in the Congress at Paris for the celebration of the fourteenth centenary of Clovis' baptism, and he drew up the report of the Congress, summarizing his principles of political organization.[21] The same year he helped to organize the royalist journal, *Reveil français*, and for the next ten years contributed numerous articles to it. About this time also, La Tour drew closer to Charles Maurras and after 1901 wrote several articles for the Royalist journal, *Action française*. According to Jean Rivain who knew both men at this time, Maurras

> had never ceased to render homage to La Tour du Pin for the social ideas which he [Maurras] has since propagated; and La Tour du Pin has often recognized his most fertile heritage in the doctrine of Maurras.[22]

19 Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

20 Baussan, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-136.

21 La Tour du Pin, *Jalons*, p. 421; Pennelier, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

22 Rivain, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

During all these years, La Tour had published only a book on the Army of Metz and numerous articles in *Association catholique, Reveil français,* and other journals. Finally, under the influence of Mlle. Bossan de Garagnol, the daughter of one of his oldest friends, La Tour set about collecting in one work the most important of his writings. These were published in book form in 1907 under the title *Vers un ordre social chrétian; jalons de route 1882-1907* (Toward a Christian Social Order; Landmarks Along the Way). The work was subdivided into four sections—Social Economy, Social Politics, the Counter-Revolution, the French Restoration. Within each section articles were arranged chronologically. Yet the line separating the four divisions was very thin, for some of the same subjects were discussed under each heading. La Tour himself admitted that the reader would certainly not find this book a systematic treatise, but would nevertheless observe the continuity of the major ideas.[23]

Of all the articles included in the *Jalons,* one, namely the article " Capitalism ", an attack upon usury, was the object of episcopal censure. Written in 1889, it was denied publication by *Association catholique,* and appeared subsequently in some other journal. However, La Tour refused to retract a word of this article, feeling that his views were in " full accord with St. Thomas and the doctrine of the Church ",[24] and he accordingly insisted upon including it in the *Jalons.*

Two years after the publication of the *Jalons,* another work of La Tour du Pin appeared—the *Aphorisms of Social Politics.*[25] This was a very small volume containing two series of definitions of such terms as historic right, aristocracy, property, rent, hearth, commune, corporation and others. The first series

23 La Tour du Pin, *Jalons,* p. ix.

24 Robert Guillermain, *La Doctrine sociale de la Tour du Pin* (Paris: Cercle de la Tour du Pin, 1937), p. 89.

25 *Aphorismes de politique sociale* (Paris: Nouvelle Librarie Nationale, 1909).

was written in preparation for the "Estates General" of 1889, and appeared in *Politique sociale* from 1887 to 1889, while the second series was composed in 1909.

In March 1918, when the Germans evacuated the village of Arrancy, which they had occupied,[26] the octagenarian La Tour du Pin was taken with them and found himself for a second time a prisoner in Germany. Upon his release, he settled in Switzerland, spending his last days at Lausanne on the shore of Lake Geneva. It was there that he composed an article for *Le Correspondent* in which he suggested that Frenchmen be reintegrated in the war regions not by masses but by families, and that syndicates and corporations be encouraged among these people.[27] He died at the age of ninety on December 4, 1924.

Attack on Individualism

Although La Tour du Pin occasionally reversed his opinion on a question, he was steadfast in his principle doctrines. Three general subjects seemed to run through his numerous essays and articles: his attack upon individualism, his corporative scheme, and his conception of the state.

La Tour described individualism as an abnormal state of mind—"abnormal and against nature because the nature of man is essentially social"[28]—which was increasingly prevalent and which was characterized by systematic contempt for social ties and duties. It betrayed a spirit of materialism and lust for gain inherited from the Reformation[29] and a tendency to per-

26 During the German occupation of Arrancy, until the evacuation of the inhabitants by the conquerors, La Tour du Pin defended the interests of the inhabitants against the demands of the German forces. Mlle. Bossan de Garagnol noted these efforts of La Tour in *Le Correspondant*, March 23, April 10, and April 12, 1919.

27 *Ibid.*, October 25, 1919.

28 René de la Tour du Pin, "Individualisme," *Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique* (second edition, 1914), II, 176.

29 La Tour du Pin, *Jalons*, pp. 450, 173, 99, and *passim*.

petuate the "rupture of historical continuity"[30] accomplished by the French Revolution. In particular the French Revolution was condemned for breaking away from religious society without resolving the problems of the relations of state and church; for breaking away from the monarchical constitution without achieving a firm foundation for a political state; and lastly for breaking away from "the ancient organization of property and of trades without solving the social question, nor even making progress toward a solution."[31]

La Tour regarded individualism as responsible for bringing forth liberalism and socialism. Liberalism was

> the philosophic doctrine according to which good and evil have equal rights in society. In other words, the political doctrine according to which the social power emanates from the sovereignty of the people; or the economic doctrine according to which interests are regulated by natural laws which suffice to harmonise them.[32]

These doctrines were the negation of all ties in religion, politics, economics, for all bonds were essentially constraints.

"Liberalism," wrote La Tour, "contains in germ all the doctrines of socialism"[33] which was not merely a reaction to laissez-faire but actually an extension of the principles of liberalism. Socialists, he affirmed, believed in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and in the religion of progress as much as any good liberal. They would establish economic as well as political equality. Under socialism the individual would, however, be considered as an irresponsible cog in society and would become a slave to the state. Socialism even more than liberalism destroyed the historic and natural ties which bound man to man and group to group. Therefore social conservatives opposed state socialism

30 La Tour du Pin, *Aphorismes*, pp. 20-21.

31 *Ibid.*, p. 21.

32 *Aphorismes*, p. 43.

33 *Loc. cit.*

> because they know how much the social body, being not an artificial creation but a natural one, possesses within itself varied organisms [i.e., family, commune, region, professional association, etc.] to accomplish its diverse functions.[34]

One of the many evil heads which La Tour accused the hydra of individualism of having raised was that of democracy and parliamentarianism. He particularly deplored the fact that parliament did not represent permanent forces or interests but " only the caprice of the mob." Emanating " from a more or less universal suffrage," parliamentary action " is as ephemeral and changing as are the impressions of the masses." [35] Ministerial responsibility in reality meant instability and irresponsibility. Only social conservatives realized that representative bodies should represent the various social and professional organisms existing within the nation, and that the true function of representation was consultation and acceptance or rejection of laws, *not* legislation.[36]

In addition to infecting political life individualism had attacked the very bulwark of society, the Church. The resulting secularization and liberty of conscience were to be condemned and religious dissidents should be tolerated only as foreigners. The Church alone should have the mission of teaching and the clergy should possess its own courts and judges and should be exempt from lay jurisdiction.[37]

Family society was no less menaced by individualism than religious society, attested La Tour du Pin. In accord with Le

34 *Ibid.*, p. 48.

35 La Tour du Pin, *Jalons*, p. 253.

36 *Ibid.*, *passim.*

37 *Ibid.*, pp. 69, 116, 181, 185, 213, 235, and *passim.* " Individualisme," *Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique*, II, 716-717. La Tour du Pin especially detested the influence of the Free Masons upon the political, religious, and educational life of France. To his mind, the masons wielded a pernicious power and their society, as well as other secret societies, should be suppressed. See: *Jalons*, p. 179. Such organizations were dissolved by the Pétain government which also sought to strengthen the Church.

Play, he urged that the divorce law be repealed, the freedom of bequest reestablished, and family domains reconstituted, for the family was the "primordial element of society." [38]

Individualism had also left its mark on agriculture. As in the case of the family, the compulsory division of property among heirs brought about the parcelization of domains and a decrease in the birth rate. Competition and speculation rendered the peasant's fate deplorable. To improve his lot, La Tour recommended the restoration of testamentary freedom, the inalienability of family domains, the prohibition of absentee landlordism, the establishment of high tariffs, and the encouragement of *métayage* or sharecropping. Likewise, he advised agricultural association, preferably mixed, containing proprietors, tenants, *métayers,* and agricultural workers, but he admitted that unilateral organizations were better than none. He felt that local, provincial, regional, and national syndicates possessing cooperative purchasing societies, as well as mutual credit and mutual aid societies could accomplish much toward the alleviation of the farmers' plight and the final solution of the agrarian problem. And the problem must be solved, he argued, because "history shows us the prosperity and endurance of nations in relation to their rural economy.[39]

Yet another effect of individualism which was evident to La Tour du Pin, as it had been to Deseine, Levacher-Duplessis and La Farelle, was the unrestrained industrial and commercial competition which resulted in economic waste and the manufacture of inferior products. To restrain such injurious competition, he wished to impose high tariffs and to organize guilds or corporations which would maintain a strict supervision over quality as well as a just price.[40]

38 *Dictionnaire apologétique,* II, 717; *Aphorismes,* p. 22, *Jalons,* pp. 48-71, 281-291. See the statements and decrees of Pétain regarding the family which paralleled the sentiments of La Tour.

39 *Jalons,* p. 63. On agriculture, see also: pp. 284-285, 299, 321, 362-369, 494, 48-71, 281-296, 89-91, 58, 66-69, 291. *Cf.* Pétain pronouncements and legislation concerning agriculture.

40 *Ibid.,* pp. 33, 55, 56, 327, and *passim.*

The pernicious doctrine of class struggle and the actual existence of hostility between classes were also products of individualism, according to La Tour du Pin. Under the impulse of Darwinism and socialism, the belief was propagated that class war was inevitable. Nothing could be more false, he believed, since man was by nature a social being, and any well-organized society reposed upon the solidarity of men. True, until 1884 workers were practically at the mercy of the free functioning of the "law" of supply and demand in the labor market and thus they hated employers to whose advantage the "law" operated. But the legalization of trade unions in 1884 was a step in the right direction as it helped to equalize the position of worker and employer. Nevertheless, it would remain an incomplete step until unilateral unions of workers and employers were joined together into mixed organizations or corporations. With an ardor equal to that of Buret, La Tour called for the rapprochement of employers and employees. Associations should be formed to complete, or better still, to supplant class unions, for "the principle of an organization of classes is antisocial or at least anti-Christian." [41] Moreover, "Christian social justice . . . is not possible with the absence of ties of solidarity between men united by the same social function." [42] A functional rather than a class organization would bring "agreement instead of a struggle for life." [43]

One of the worst forms which individualism had assumed, in the eyes of La Tour du Pin, was usury. Influenced by St. Thomas, La Tour considered usury an interest charged where the object loaned did not suffer deterioration. It constituted a levy on production and was one of the principle causes of the inequality of wealth which was increasing according to geometric progression.

41 *Jalons*, p. 115.

42 *Ibid.*, p. 117.

43 *Ibid.*, p. 9. "Entente pour la vie en place de la lutte pour la vie."

The chief types of usury, therefore, should be eliminated. This would entail the abolition of the *rentes d'état* (government bonds) through the diminution of the administrative and military apparatus, the levying of consumption taxes on luxury goods and on goods of foreign origin. Likewise farm-tenancy (*fermage*), another form of usury, should be eradicated through the reconstruction of inalienable hereditary family domains, the granting of privileges to proprietors who themselves exploited their lands, and the encouragement of *métayage*. Also, the *sociétés anonymes* should be reconstructed. La Tour proposed to accomplish this through the prohibition of the issuance of bonds or preferred stock, the placing of unlimited liability on common stock, the granting of shares of stock to workers, and the general corporative or guild organization of large as well as of small scale industry. Usury in the form of loans for consumption could be prevented through corporative organization providing mutual aid and credit societies, a measure reminiscent of Proudhon. Likewise speculation should be ended through legislation and corporative organization.[44]

Still one final head of the hydra of individualism remained, in La Tour's view, to be struck down, or at least rendered harmless—namely, the Jewish nation. La Tour du Pin was an anti-Dreyfusard and an admirer of Drumont. He did not refer to the Jews as a race but as a nation, as the "yellow international, that gigantic octopus whose tentacles hold all the oceans, and which renders all people tributaries of the Jewish nation."[45] The Jews, therefore, La Tour accused as the principal

44 On usury, see particularly: *Jalons*, pp. 71-105; *Aphorismes*, pp. 54-60. *Cf.* the proposals of Chanson and other interbellum corporatists for reforming the *sociétés anonymes*.

45 *Jalons*, p. 472. See also pp. 315, 317.

Robert Guillermain, one of the commentators on the *Jalons*, correctly states that La Tour du Pin was not a racialist. See Guillermain, *op. cit.*, p. 215. Many royalists of the nineteen thirties and early forties, while accepting La Tour's other doctrines, repudiated his ideas about the Jews. Roger Sémichon, *Les Idées sociales et politiques de la Tour du Pin* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1936), p. 22. La Tour's anti-semitic sentiments were, however,

usurers and propagandists of liberalism, socialism, and feminism. They should be treated as foreigners and segregated into ghettos. Further, their philosophical, political, social, and economic doctrines should be abjured and the corporative regime should be reconstructed in economic and political life "to render us independent of them and masters of ourselves." [46]

Such were the aspects of individualism which La Tour du Pin attacked and wished to eliminate. One of the chief methods which he propounded for wiping out this evil and bringing about the reign of solidarity was the establishment of a guild or corporative regime.

Corporative Plans

"Social conservatives," affirmed La Tour,

> insist on the corporative regime because of the character of stability which it communicates to the institutions of which it is the basis, and which seems to enable them to maintain social justice and social peace.[47]

This necessity for social peace and solidarity between classes was stressed repeatedly by La Tour. To him,

> the organization of labor most favorable to social peace is the corporative regime, first because it best lends itself to the amiable fixing of the conditions of labor; then because it creates resources for the time when workers are not earning; then finally because it can function as a regulator of industrial forces . . . .[48]

The corporative regime would restore the dignity and security of the worker and at the same time protect the employer in his

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shared by the royalist, Charles Maurras. The Pétain government took certain steps against the Jews, although it is difficult to determine how large a part the Germans played in inspiring its anti-semitic actions.

46 *Jalons*, p. 317.

47 La Tour du Pin, *Aphorismes*, p. 10.

48 *Jalons*, p. 209.

functions, thus maintaining a necessary, but not iron-bound social hierarchy. Likewise, it would accomplish wonders in removing many of the forms of extreme individualism such as unrestrained competition and usury. Indeed, the "corporative regime is the only way to avoid going from liberalism to socialism." [49]

In explaining his concept of a corporative regime, La Tour du Pin defined the terms syndicate, corporation, and *corps d'état.*

> We term professional association or syndicate, the society formed with the object of defending professional interests, between people of the same status and condition; corporation, the society which unites the diverse elements of the same profession, i.e., its employers, its white collar and manual workers, in a society perfect from the professional point of view; finally, *corps d'état,* the ensemble of all the workshops where the same profession is practised.[50]

The ideal corporation was one in which syndicates were mere component parts or categories of a mixed union or corporation.[51] According to such an ideal system, the corporation would be synonymous with the *corps d'état,* since there would be only one corporation in the *corps d'état,* and all members of the corps would become members of the corporation. But La Tour knew how few mixed associations were actually being formed. Moreover, he wished to conciliate those of his Social Catholic colleagues who were opposed to one corporation for each *corps d'état* and believed in a multiplicity of associations freely formed within the *corps d'état.* Therefore, while not forgetting his ideal conception, he evolved the scheme of allowing all the different existing associations, whether mixed or not, in a given *corps d'état* to send delegates to a corporative chamber.

49 *Aphorismes,* p. 10.

50 *Jalons,* p. 499.

51 *Jalons,* p. 141 and *passim.*

In 1883 La Tour sketched his ideal system of corporations, and in many subsequent articles [52] he discussed his plan for corporative chambers. The corporation of his ideal scheme would be organized by profession or industry. It would not be a purely private institution but rather "a social institution which holds a determined place in the organization of the commune and more or less directly in that of the state." [53] The corporation should not be created in detail by state decrees, but the state should give legal existence and force to pre-existing free corporations. Then

> from a free body which it ought to be in order to be formed, the corporation tends by the force of things to become obligatory, which it ought to be to exercise a political function.[54]

The corporation would comprise all the elements which constituted the profession, such as employers, clerks, and workers in large industry; masters, workers, and apprentices in the trades; proprietors, tenants, and cultivators in agriculture. In large industry, La Tour would give representation to capital as well as to management and labor. In the arts and crafts, consumers as well as masters and companions would have a voice in the governing body. La Tour insisted upon giving only one vote to each of the elements or orders in the corporative council.[55]

What, then, did La Tour du Pin consider as the functions of his ideal corporation? First, it would constitute and manage a corporative patrimony or fund. This patrimony, which had figured so largely in the schemes of Keller and earlier corporatists,

52 Such as those of 1891, 1904 and 1905.

53 *Ibid.*, p. 23.

54 *Ibid.*, p. 24.

55 He was probably influenced by the voting procedure in the Estates General of 1789.

could be raised by a tax on production.[56] In the rate to be established, an equal part could be shared by enterprise and by labor. The contribution could be measured in terms of tools and raw materials in the case of enterprise, and labor in the case of workers; or the amount could be determined on the basis of time—for example, the production of a half-day each week.

> In industrial stock corporations, there could be contributed to this reserve fund, a certain number of shares of stock, by including a sum withheld from the normal wage, which is always easy to evaluate in shares of stock. . . .[57]

Whatever the procedure might be, the system was one of a participation of the corporative fund in the prosperity of the industry. La Tour pointed out that the system already had been applied in agriculture where workers permanently employed in cultivation received a percentage of the fruits gathered. He declared: " it is only a question of capitalizing this levy instead of distributing it individually." [58] Such an indivisible, inalienable patrimony would be used for unemployment compensations, pensions, professional schools, and similar purposes.

A second major function of the corporation would be the verification and protection of professional capacity, a duty ascribed to it by earlier corporatists, particularly La Farelle. To La Tour, as to these earlier corporatists, capital was not the only form of property. " The possession of a career, of a trade can also partake of the character of property when it is guaranteed by law. . . ." [59] La Tour found the essential features of possession of a career in the system of the

56 *Jalons*, p. 27. The tax was to be levied not on the profits from production " which are a result of the commercial activity of the entrepreneur," but on the " quality " of production " evaluated at cost price."

57 *Ibid.*, p. 28.

58 *Loc. cit.*

59 *Jalons*, p. 29.

> *brevets* of professional capacity delivered according to certain rules to all the agents of production, to the engineer as well as to the worker.[60]

He would debar anyone without such a *brevet* from being an active member of the corporation, or from rising above the lowest grade of the professional hierarchy. However, the simple laborer did not really possess a trade; his forces rather than his skill were employed.[61] As soon as the manual laborer acquired a skill, he really possessed a status which "ought to be guaranteed to him by the ensemble of institutions which we understand under the designation corporative regime."[62] The worker should be able to rise in the profession, to pass from journeyman to master, through skill and good conduct as attested in the *brevet*. The same system would apply to the status of engineer in an industrial corporation. The corporation would give access to this career through professional schools,

> if not to simple workers, at least to their children, thus offering to the most humble of its members healthy and legitimate prospects of progression in social rank.[63]

The third function of the corporation would be the possession of its own jurisdiction, i.e., of legislative, judicial, and executive powers. The corporation would enact its own rules, judge disputes between its members and administer its patrimony.

In his article on capitalism published in 1889, La Tour seemed to add another function to the corporation. The *sociétés anonymes* were to be reorganized under corporative control or in a corporative direction. Workers in these companies were gradually to become part owners of the instruments of

60 *Loc. cit.*

61 La Tour believed that with mechanical progress the need for skilled labor would increase, and for unskilled labor would decrease.

62 *Loc. cit.*

63 *Jalons*, p. 30.

production.[64] La Tour's vagueness on the methods of achieving such a reform of the *sociétés anonymes* has led some commentators on his doctrine to infer that he desired ownership of the *sociétés* by the corporation.[65] In most of his other articles he supported private enterprise and conceived of the corporation as an agency to regulate but not to manage or own industries. In the article on capitalism he may have been thinking merely in terms of extensive corporative regulation of the *société anonyme* and of the constitution of a large corporative patrimony whose funds would benefit the workers of the *société*.

Such were the structure and functions of La Tour's ideal corporation. He considered his plan for a corporative chamber more realistic and easier to put into operation. In an article published in *Association catholique* in 1891, he explained that the corporative chamber for the profession or industry would contain an equal number of delegates from worker and employer associations. Its jurisdiction would be limited to the members of the professional associations constituting it, but could be extended to the whole profession if the majority of the members of the profession entered the constituent associations.

In explaining a slightly different system, namely the "corporative union", La Tour gave a specific illustration. Suppose, for example, the town of N contained two hundred carpenters forming different associations, one of forty members, one of thirty, one of twenty, while one hundred and ten carpenters remained outside of any association. Each association would send delegates to the corporative chamber in the ratio of four, three, two, making a total of nine. These delegates would establish measures and regulations and would submit them to a vote of

64 *Ibid.*, p. 93.

65 See, for example, Pierre Andreu, "Le Vrai visage de la Tour du Pin," *Esprit* (June 1, 1934), p. 410. Andreu's whole article attempts to show that La Tour was a socialist. Our studies have revealed that he was nothing of the sort. Moreover, the article on usury is only one of his many writings which should also be taken into consideration.

all members of the profession "without other distinction than that of their condition of employer or worker." [66] In an article published in 1905 in *Action française,* La Tour du Pin made clear that only members of associations would have the right to elect delegates to the corporative chamber. Later, he stated that since most of the worthy members of the profession would belong to syndicates, election to the chamber could be on the basis of an indirect universal suffrage in two stages.[67]

The functions of the corporative chamber would be to

> fix the conventions relative to work, to its method of remuneration, and to the rate of this remuneration within certain limits, in such a way as to favor the establishment of good customs of the trade and their successive modification corresponding to the industrial and economic situation.[68]

It would render justice and exercise police duty within the *corps d'état* for the observation of the rules it established. This could be done by the institution of councils of discipline of a composition analogous to that in use in the military tribunals, where all ranks were represented. It would create and administer institutions of common interest such as aid, retirement, sickness, unemployment funds, accident insurance, and cooperative societies. It would study and proclaim professional interests and "represent the *corps d'état* every time it has the right to appear or be heard." [69] Yet another duty of the corporative chamber and of the ideal corporation as well, would be the performance of a political function, in the state.

Conception of the State

La Tour du Pin defined the state as "the ensemble of the powers and forces of a nation organized for the common good,

66 *Jalons,* p. 143.

67 *Jalons,* pp. 399, 400.

68 *Ibid.,* p. 145.

69 *Ibid.,* p. 146.

which is called the national interest." [70] In his view the ideal form of government was monarchy. The king, he felt, could set himself above partisan interest and thus protect and reconcile the interests of his people. France needed a king to stem the tide of anarchy; and monarchy was in conformity with the French national tradition.[71] La Tour wanted neither an absolute king, nor a king who reigned but did not rule. The king should possess real authority but should govern according to custom and the unwritten constitution of France, and should respect the semi-autonomous character of such constituted bodies as the corporation and the commune. La Tour du Pin's royalist ideas were not very original, for he quoted from almost all the royalists from Maistre and Bonald to Blanc de Saint-Bonnet.[72]

More original was La Tour du Pin in his conception of the role of the corporation or corporative chamber in the state. He outlined what he considered a truly " representative regime ", that is a " representation of rights and interests." His system can be schematized as follows:

In later articles, La Tour du Pin made some changes and amendments. In 1898, he desired the commune in urban districts to be the first degree of professional organization. Above the commune would be the canton which would be the first degree of organization for rural districts, whether agricultural or industrial. Above these again would be the regional chambers.[73] In 1900 he proposed under the regional chambers the following circumscriptions: the department for liberal professions, the *arrondissement* for industrial professions, the canton for agri-

70 *Jalons*, p. 502.

71 La Tour was against divine right, but claimed that the king was sanctified.

72 For a more detailed analysis of La Tour's political doctrines see: Charlotte T. Muret, *French Royalist Doctrines Since the Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), pp. 200-216.

73 *Jalons*, p. 276.

DIAGRAM OF GOVERNMENT ACCORDING TO LA TOUR DU PIN (1896) [74]

PRINCE (or apparatus of government)
the ruling power

COUNCIL OF STATE
appointed by prince to prepare laws, budget; to serve as executive body to prince

SENATE OR COURT OF PEERS
appointed by prince; to arbitrate conflicts between different organs of the state; to serve as guardian of the constitution and of the principles underlying the laws of the state. (Cf. U. S. Supreme Court.)

CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
elected by mass of taxpaying families; some appointed by prince;
to consent to taxes;
to participate in establishment of budget (i.e., consent or offer recommendations);
to control use of public funds.

THE TAXPAYING FAMILY

HEAD OF FAMILY
(father or his widow has vote.)

CHAMBER OF ESTATES, OR HIGH CHAMBER
elected by regional chambers composing regional chambers of estates; some members appointed by prince (functionaries, nobles, etc.)
to deliberate on laws prepared by council of state (i.e., accept or offer recommendations).

REGIONAL OR PROVINCIAL CHAMBER OF ESTATES

Chamber of Public Bodies	Chamber of Liberal Professions	Chamber of Industrial Professions	Chamber of Agricultural Professions
(teaching societies, charitable societies, judicial bodies, universities, etc.) Composed of the heads of the societies.	elected by corporations or corporative chambers	elected by corporations or corporative chambers	elected by corporations or corporative chambers

74 *Jalons*, pp. 254-264.

cultural professions.[75] In the same article he also pointed out that the regional chambers were to elect national chambers which in turn would compose the chamber of estates.

On the question of a chamber of estates, La Tour du Pin likewise modified his plan of 1896. In 1900 he was against periodic meetings of such a body and endorsed its convocation only in a crisis.[76] In articles published in 1905 and 1906 in *Action française* and reproduced in *Jalons de route,* he decided that he did not wish such a chamber at all.

> A single chamber for all the professions would be a tower of Babel when their representatives wanted to come to agreement and would degenerate immediately into a closed field where no common interest would appear and where particular interests would be in perpetual conflict.[77]

In describing the relations between the state and individual corporative organizations, La Tour maintained that the state should give legal status to such organizations once they were formed, and should sanction their regulations provided they were not contrary to the general interest.[78] The state would thus be the great arbiter, the defender of the general welfare, the guardian of rights.[79]

La Tour du Pin desired an organic, not a mechanized, state.[80] He was constantly attracted, like so many corporatists before and after him, by the idea of states within the state, or in other words, the existence of corporative and other organizations such as the commune and the province, which would tend to limit the sovereignty of the central authority and con-

75 *Ibid.*, pp. 475-476.

76 *Ibid.*, p. 486.

77 *Ibid.*, p. 393.

78 *Jalons*, p. 144.

79 *Ibid.*, p. 182.

80 *Ibid.*, p 242.

sequently prevent centralization.[81] He persistently advocated decentralization, often quoting from the Comte de Chambord's letter on the subject.[82]

La Tour du Pin's system of government would, in his opinion, prevent Caesarism, which he classed as non-French and especially abhorrent.[83] It is not reading too much into his thought to observe that he would be critical of the totalitarian regimes of Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany.

La Tour's Place in French Corporatism

The importance of the doctrines of La Tour du Pin in the history of French corporative ideas should not be underestimated. Twentieth century French corporatism owes much to him. Among those who called themselves his disciples were: Charles Maurras who referred to La Tour as "my direct master, master, I repeat it, of our social politics, master in the same degree in general and pure politics;"[84] Firmin Bacconnier, economic expert of the *Action Française* and a leading modern exponent of corporatism; the Comte de Paris, present pretender to the French throne, who highly praised La Tour in his preface to Roger Sémichon's book on the Marquis; Robert Vallery-Radot who declared in 1934 that if the right had followed La Tour fifty years before, the C.G.T. (General Confederation of Labor) would be a chamber of trades;[85] Pierre Chaboche writing in the *Revue hebdomadaire* in 1928;[86] Pierre Andreu, in an article in *Esprit* of June 1, 1934—these

81 *Ibid.*, p. 183.

82 *Ibid.*, pp. 266, 430.

83 *Ibid.*, pp. 463, 465, and *passim.*

84 *Action française*, April 15, 1934.

85 *Revue hebdomadaire*, April 21, 1934

86 *Ibid.*, October, 1928. Chaboche advocated a corporative regime. La Tour du Pin, he asserted, reacted against the false dogmas of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and strove to protect the family and the workshop from disorganization by means of the corporative system.

are only a few of his direct followers. A *Cercle La Tour du Pin* was founded in Paris by Roger Sémichon and continued after the latter's death by Robert Guillerman. Headquarters were established at 10 Rue de Havre and lectures and courses on La Tour's doctrine were given.

Among those who also came under the influence of La Tour du Pin's ideas, but who were not his direct disciples, were Georges Valois, who combined the doctrines of La Tour and Sorel;[87] Colonel de la Rocque, one-time leader of the *Croix de Feu;* Jacques Doriot, Communist who turned Fascist; and Brethe de la Gressaye, Professor of Law. The left also felt La Tour's influence. According to Robert Vallery-Radot, Millerand when still a socialist and occupied with labor legislation, admitted that he was impressed by the theories of La Tour du Pin and saw in them "ideas of the future".[88] Déat and the Neo-Socialist school seemed to entertain notions similar to those of the Marquis.

The regime of Henri Pétain, which attempted to establish a corporative system, acknowledged the importance of La Tour du Pin. In 1941 the *Revue universelle,* published under the watchful eye of the Vichy government, reproduced the correspondence of La Tour du Pin and Louis Milcent. In their preface to this series of letters, the editors of the *Revue* thus characterized the correspondence as well as the Marquis himself:

> A life consecrated to an idea and to a work, that is the meaning of this correspondence . . . . By his essential ideas, and by the struggle he undertook against the heritage of '89—individualism, freemasonry, liberalism—by his will to bring about a professional representation, one can say that La Tour du Pin merits the title of precursor of the National Revolution.[89]

87 G. Jaspar, "Un Maestro del corporativismo christiano, René de la Tour du Pin", *Rivista internationale de scienza sociale* (January, 1928).

88 *Revue hebdomadaire,* April 21, 1934.

89 *Revue universelle,* March 25, 1941, p. 330.

CHAPTER III

THE VARYING FORTUNES OF CORPORATIVE THEORY IN THE HANDS OF THE SOCIAL CATHOLICS, 1870-1918

THE BRAND of corporatism sponsored by La Tour du Pin came to be adopted by the majority of Social Catholics in the period 1870-1918, although dissident minorities like the Social Reform and Social Democratic groups refused to accept it. Even the majority, however, did not place an equal emphasis upon corporatism throughout the whole era. In the seventies most Social Catholics were reluctant to approve corporatism; in the next two decades, they gave a prominent place to it and introduced corporative legislation in parliament. In the years preceding the first World War, while still supporting corporatism, they devoted more attention to social legislation.

FROM ECONOMIC LIBERALISM TO CORPORATISM

During the seventies and early eighties the Social Catholic movement tried to emancipate itself from the laissez-faire tendencies of Périn and Le Play. The force of Le Play's ideas was particularly strong and his disciples were well organized. In 1856 he had founded the Society of Political Economy, a learned association, and in 1872 he organized the propagandist Unions of Social Peace. Together the two societies comprised the Social Reform group which began publishing its fortnightly review, *La Réforme sociale,* in 1881. This group dominated Social Catholic thought in the early years of the Third French Republic, and continued to propagate its doctrines long after its influence had waned.[1]

Le Play's advocacy of patronage or paternalism of the upper classes, formation of friendly societies, or *confrèries,* and

1 Parker T. Moon, *The Labor Problem and the Social Catholic Movement in France* (New York: Macmillan, 1921), pp. 355-361; *Le Réforme sociale* (1913), 513-541.

Christian indoctrination of workers was strengthened by the efforts of Léon Harmel, proprietor of the Val-des-Bois spinning mills and guild. Val-des-Bois was organized into a paternalistic Christian guild. Its guild board, composed of an elective council of workingmen with an employer chairman, possessed only advisory authority on wages, shop management, social insurance, and vocational training. In paternalistic fashion, Harmel provided free medical care for workers, dowries for girls at marriage, and low cost housing. He particularly encouraged the Catholic religion among his workers. The influence of Harmel was noticeable in the early reports and congresses of the *Oeuvre des Cercles,* the Catholic labor associations which had been organized by La Tour du Pin, De Mun, and others. In 1873 Harmel joined the *Oeuvre* and encouraged it in its purpose of " devotion of the directing class to the working class," preparing a Manual setting forth the principles and describing the operation of Val-des-Bois.[2] At the congress of the *Oeuvre* in Rheims in 1875, Father Marquigney, one of the early leaders of the *Oeuvre,* defended the position of Le Play and Harmel. Accepting competition as the general law of labor, Marquigney asserted that the medieval ideal of master-worker solidarity could be retained through the encouragement of patronage on the part of the employer, and of trusting gratitude on the part of workers.[3]

The breaking away from liberalism and patronage and the evolution toward corporatism was evident in the *Avis,* or recommendations, of the *Conseil d'Etudes* of the *Oeuvre des Cercles* drafted during the years 1878-1882. These *Avis* represented the opinion of the *Conseil* on such matters as Catholic professional associations of arts and trades, occupational freedom, and duty of the state toward labor, but they were usually

2 Albert de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale, souvenir de l'oeuvre des cercles catholiques d'ouvriers, 1871-1875* (7th ed., Paris: P. Lethielleux), pp. 73, 243-246; Moon, *op. cit.,* pp. 113-120.

3 Georges Jarlot, *Le Régime corporatif et les Catholiques sociaux, histoire d'une doctrine* (Paris: Flammarion, 1938), pp. 48-51.

drafted by one or two men. In the early *Avis* the emphasis on employer organization and patronage was very marked.[4] Mixed unions were permitted but only on a voluntary and largely confessional basis, while restriction of competition was half-heartedly proposed.

With the fifth *Avis,* written in 1879, progression toward corporatism was more apparent,[5] while *Avis* number eight, written in 1882, unreservedly broke with Périn's conception of purely free and voluntary guilds. This latter *Avis* stated clearly that guilds were not to be purely voluntary and free of government control. The state was to prepare privileges for them and recognize them in law while they were reappearing in fact. Moreover, the corporation should be a political unit and vote either through direct or indirect suffrage, on questions concerning labor, property, and commerce.[6]

This change in attitude toward corporatism was evidenced in those *Avis* composed at different times by the same person. The Comte de Breda, for example, revealed in *Avis* number seven (1881) a remarkable change from the views he expressed in *Avis* number four (1878). In the latter he was chiefly concerned with patronage,[7] while in the former he demanded mixed associations, the union of similar industries on a regional basis, corporative patrimony, and arbitral tribunals.[8] In

4 For example, *Avis* No. 3, "Associations professionnelles d'arts et de métiers," written by Louis Milcent in July 1878. *Association catholique,* VI, 311-312, XI (1881), 258-260.

5 "Devoir de l'état envers le travail," *ibid.,* XI (1881), 262-264. In keeping with its title, this *Avis* was chiefly concerned with the role of the state in a corporative regime. The state was to be the protector, not the creator of corporative life. It should encourage professional associations, corporative patrimony composed of worker employer contributions, and arbitral jurisdictions and should reserve the right to examine and approve corporative statutes.

6 "Nature du travail," *ibid.,* XIII (1882), 511-555.

7 "Liberté du travail", *ibid.,* XI (1881), 260-262. In this *Avis* Breda recommended voluntary associations of employers of the same profession to limit competition and ameliorate the workers' lot.

8 "Le Principe de l'organisation du travail", *ibid.,* XI, 387-412, 548-574.

fact, in an article in 1887 in *Association catholique,* the review of the *Oeuvre des Cercles,* Breda pointed out the danger of the abuse of patronage. He felt that even the best-intentioned intervention of employers would not suffice to remedy the moral and social situation of the workers, and that only the corporative regime could accomplish this.[9]

During the eighties and nineties, the doctrines of La Tour du Pin gained supremacy over those of Le Play, Périn, and Harmel.[10] Many Social Catholics concurred in La Tour's declaration in April 1882 that Harmel's Val-des Bois was not really a guild and did not possess a genuine corporative patrimony.[11] Following the lead of La Tour, the congress of directors of Catholic worker associations voiced their unanimous conviction that the corporative regime was the sole means of counteracting the evils engendered by the "anarchical state of the times."[12] And a Manifesto in *Association catholique* of March 15, 1883 stated outright that the Social Catholics now dared to proclaim the corporative regime as the only solution to the labor question.[13]

From 1883 on corporatism held a safely established place in the pages of *Association catholique.* Contributors might argue about specific aspects of a corporative regime, such as the degree to which professions should be represented in the government, but the majority of them agreed upon the desirability of corporatism. Although in 1891 *Association catholique* was dissociated from the *Oeuvre des Cercles,* its policy remained the same, and starting from November 15, 1895 it published in front of each issue a "Program", the fundamental reform of

9 *Ibid.,* XXIII (1887), 340 ff.

10 Charles Maignen, *Maurice Maignen, Directeur du Cercle Montparnasse et les origines du mouvement social catholique en France* (Luçon: S. Pacteau, 1927, 2 vols.), *passim.*

11 La Tour du Pin, "Chronique," *ibid.,* XIII (April 1882), 475-477.

12 *Ibid.,* XV (1882), 269, 290.

13 *Ibid.,* XV (March 15, 1882), 273 ff.

which was the "corporative reorganization of society, that is, the reconstruction in modern form of the medieval organization of trades into guilds or corporations".[14]

In 1897, *Association catholique,* together with the magazines *Justice sociale, Sociologie catholique,* and *XX^e siècle,* established the corporative program of the so-called Union of Reviews. Specifically the program called for a corporative system similar to La Tour du Pin's plan of corporative chambers. Most of the elements of La Tour's scheme were included—registration of the members of each trade; encouragement of labor unions and employer associations and their representation in a corporative council; regulation of the trade by the council subject to a referendum of members of the trade and state approval.[15] Although certain individuals and groups within the Social Catholic movement disagreed with this program, it was raised as a standard to which the greater number of Social Catholics repaired.

Albert de Mun and the Struggle for Corporatism in Parliament

While a corporative doctrine was being framed under the inspiration of La Tour du Pin in the *Conseil d'Etudes* of the *Oeuvre des Cercles* and in the review, *Association catholique,* a handful of Social Catholics in the Chamber of Deputies fought a long, hard, and for the most part losing battle to get this doctrine enacted into law. The leader among these deputies and the chief Social Catholic spokesman in parliament was Count Albert de Mun.

There was a marked parallel between the careers of Albert de Mun and La Tour du Pin. Born in 1840, six years after La Tour, de Mun attended the same college of Versailles and was trained as an army officer at Saint Cyr. Upon his graduation in 1862, he was ordered to Algeria where he spent five years

14 *Ibid.,* November 15, 1895.

15 *Ibid.,* XLIX (1900), 2.

in the Third Regiment of African Chasseurs. In 1867, at the time of his marriage to Mlle. d'Andlau, he was transferred to Clermont-Ferrand and there came into contact with an *Oeuvre Catholique Ouvrière* founded by the *Conférence de Saint Vincent de Paul.*

In the Franco-Prussian War De Mun was assigned to the Army of Metz and among his fellow officers was La Tour du Pin. They even fought side by side during part of the Battle of Regonville and were both interned at Aix-la-Chapelle by the Germans. Their stay in prison cemented an erstwhile casual friendship and together they read Keller's book, *The Encyclical of December 8, 1864 and the Principles of '89,* and were attracted by its guild theories. When liberated by the Germans, both returned to France to serve on General Ladmirault's staff and to participate in the suppression of the Commune. De Mun's opinion on the causes of the Commune, as stated to a Commission of Inquiry, was that it resulted from the apathy of the bourgeoisie and a lack of moral education among workers. He believed that the treatment of the *Communards* was too harsh and would only increase social hatreds.

In 1871 De Mun, with La Tour and others, was one of the founders of the *Oeuvre des Cercles* and he became its secretary-general. In 1875 he was constrained to retire from the army; his resignation was requested on the grounds that he had made political speeches in uniform. Consequently from 1875 on, De Mun was free to devote his time entirely to politics.[16]

His election to the Chamber of Deputies in 1876 and 1878 was invalidated by the anticlericals, but in 1881 his claim to a seat was successfully established. A brilliant orator, he championed in the Chamber the Social Catholic and corporative ideas elaborated by La Tour du Pin. Until the *Ralliement* in 1892, he was an aggressive legitimist, identifying the cause of Social Catholicism with that of monarchy, but in that year he followed the Pope's direction and rallied to the support of the

16 De Mun, *op. cit., passim.*

Republic, while La Tour du Pin remained a royalist. In this respect their paths diverged, De Mun helping Jacques Piou and others to found the democratic Popular Liberal Party in 1902 and La Tour associating himself with the *Action Française.* Although their friendship cooled as a result, both continued to support corporatism and respected one another's achievements. La Tour rendered warm homage to De Mun in his introduction to the latter's autobiographical account of the early years of the *Oeuvre.* De Mun died at the beginning of the first World War, worn out by work and the strain of a weakened heart.[17]

De Mun's reputation springs not from the writing of books, but from the eloquence and zeal which he applied to the cause of corporatism. At first, like so many other Social Catholics, his guild concepts were hazy and hesitating and tinged with the ideas of Le Play, Périn, and Harmel. He was indefinite regarding the form of guilds, visualizing them largely as a center of Christian activity where antagonism between capital and labor would give way to patronage exercized in a Christian spirit and freely accepted.[18] With his entrance into politics and the general clarification of the Social Catholic stand on guilds, he began to sharpen his views. In a speech at the tenth General Assembly of the Workingmen's Clubs, May 7, 1882, De Mun described the guild as

> a community formed among employers and workers of the same profession held together, first of all by acceptance of the principle of social justice, which imposes on the former, as well as on the latter, reciprocal duties; that is the moral bond; and united by a common possession, by a corporate property arising from the voluntary sacrifices of both [classes]: that is the material bond.[19]

17 Moon, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-90 and *passim.*

18 *Association catholique,* VI, 587-593.

19 Albert de Mun, *Discours* (3rd ed., Paris: Librairie Ch. Poussielgue, 1895), I (*Questions sociales*), 403.

The guild was to be governed by an elected council composed of employers, workers, and members of the upper class—the latter in the capacity of arbiters. The council was also to administer collective property and economic institutions. "For these professional communities freely formed, raised up by private initiative," continued De Mun,

> we demand legal existence: not toleration but the sanction of law for their regulations . . . . It is not difficult to perceive how the guild, when legally existing, might in the future become the basis of a sincere, fair, and true representation of interests in the domain of politics.[20]

One of the first and most difficult tasks facing De Mun in parliament was to formulate and to voice during the debates of 1883 and 1884, the Social Catholic position on the proposed law for full legalization of trade unions. During the Second Empire, unions had been awarded a limited recognition, but subsequently agitation to remove all limitations increased.

It was with mixed feelings that De Mun and his colleagues regarded the law. On the one hand they found much in it to which they could raise objection. Article Four disturbed them as it forbade receipt of gifts or other acquisitions by unions except under onerous conditions. Further, the unions were to be organizations of private law, whereas De Mun and the Social Catholic deputies demanded institutions of public law officially recognized, having rights and privileges, enacting the law of the profession and representing the professional body before the state. They felt that the proposed law did not organize trades, but perpetuated the class struggle. It encouraged unilateral unions rather than mixed trade associations of employers and employees or even mixed councils.[21] In the debate of June 12, 1883 De Mun declared to the proponents of the bill:

20 *Loc. cit.*

21 Jarlot, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

> What is lacking in the unions as you conceive them—unions of employers or unions of workingmen, but isolated and separated from one another—is precisely what is the great want, the great social necessity of our times, and what existed at the basis of the old guild institutions, namely, personal contact, conciliation of interests, appeasement, which cannot be had except by the reconstruction of the industrial family.[22]

On the other hand, De Mun and his friends did see some positive good in the new measure. It would formally abrogate the detested Chapelier law of 1791 which prohibited labor organizations,[23] and it would encourage the formation of separate employer and employee syndicates which could be the basis of mixed professional organizations or chambers. De Mun was therefore in a dilemma. He finally arrived at the decision not to oppose the law but to attempt to secure amendment to it which would give preferential treatment to mixed syndicates. He proposed

> that the law give special determined advantages to all the mixed syndicates which might be founded . . . . We demand this privilege for the mixed syndicates and not for the separated . . . because we believe that the former alone which consecrate the common association of employers and workers, present the necessary social guarantees to merit the encouragements which we hope to attribute to them.[24]

Thus De Mun desired that such mixed syndicates, uniting employers and workers of the same or similar trades, should be empowered to receive gifts and legacies, to establish collective funds, to create institutions for insurance against sickness, unemployment, accidents, and old age, and to acquire such property as necessary for the creation of workers' lodgings, refuges for children, and hospitals for the sick. The Social Catholic amendment, in spite of the efforts of De Mun and his fellow

22 Chambre des Députés, *Débats*, 1883, pp. 1277 ff.

23 Jarlot, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

24 De Mun, *Discours*, II, 84.

deputies, De la Bassetière and Le Cour Grandmaison, was rejected and the law of 1884 was passed without giving mixed unions any special privileges. Among those who helped defeat the amendment was Georges Clemenceau who raised up fears of the Old Regime and clericalism.[25]

De Mun, however, did not lose heart at this defeat. Again and again in the Chamber he raised his voice in favor of a guild regime. On January 14, 1884 in the course of a debate on trade boards in the mining industries, he urged guild organization, combining employers and workers and containing within itself the natural means of arbitration as a true remedy for labor unrest.[26] In another debate, this time regarding the government's program for the alleviation of the labor crisis, De Mun asked the government:

> Will you study the creation of a corporative organization of labor based on the union of masters and men? We have asked you to provide the means; you refused; but we still demand them.[27]

De Mun and the Social Catholics remained ardent supporters of progressive labor legislation and social insurance laws, but they insisted, for the most part in vain, that such measures, while they should be enacted by the state and made compulsory for the nation, should be administered by guild organizations which would be better able to cope with local and trade conditions and would be more efficient than a bureaucratic state. For example, on October 20, 1884 De Mun argued that accident insurance should be based on labor organizations rather than on the administrative bureaucracy of the government. Again in the debates of 1888 on the same question, De Mun proposed accident insurance funds for each industry or group of similar industries, which should be administered by a mixed

25 Jarlot, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

26 Chambre des Députés, *Débats*, 1884, p. 190 ff.

27 *Ibid.*, p. 2076.

employer and worker council.[28] His proposal was defeated, as the law when finally passed in 1898 put the risk at the exclusive charge of the chief of enterprise and organized a national fund which, the Social Catholics claimed, took on an *étatiste* character.

However, in the law passed on June 29, 1894 on aid and retirement funds for miners, De Mun and the Social Catholics seem to have won some of their points. They desired corporative providence funds, with compulsory insurance, and the law as passed provided for funds to be collected from a levy on wages, from contributions of employers, from state grants, and from legacies and gifts. The fund was to be administered by a mixed council, one-third of its members to be designated by the employer and two-thirds by the workers.[29]

The Social Catholic fight for permanent conciliation committees and compulsory courts of arbitration failed many times. The Lockroy law, passed in 1892, provided for purely voluntary arbitration, and rejected the De Mun-Le Cour Grandmaison proposal for permanent committees of conciliation.[30]

The law of 1908 on the organization of labor councils likewise failed to satisfy the Social Catholics. The councils' functions were to enlighten the government on labor conditions, to facilitate general accords and collective contracts, and to furnish competent mediators for labor conflicts. The councils were to be elected not by syndicates and organized groups, as the Social Catholics had requested, but on a purely individualistic basis. Consequently they were denounced by the Social Catholics as amorphous, inorganic, and anti-corporative.[31]

The Social Catholics suffered another defeat in the contest over retirement funds for workers. They were extremely disappointed that the law of 1906 did not allow the professions

28 De Mun, *Discours*, IV, 21 ff., 36, 37.

29 Jarlot, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

30 Jarlot, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-119.

31 *Ibid.*, pp. 184-187.

themselves, organized on a regional basis, to manage the funds. According to Gailhard-Bancel, another of De Mun's Social Catholic colleagues in the Chamber, the law might have been the beginning of corporative organization, but instead a national fund was instituted and the state was given too much power over the retirement funds and their administration.[32]

The attempts of De Mun and his co-workers to tack guild amendments on to various pieces of legislation—in other words, to introduce a corporative regime unobtrusively and piecemeal—had for the most part failed. It remained, therefore, for the Social Catholics to bring in a bill of their own which would openly propose a corporative system instead of trying to get their ideas into existing bills. Accordingly in 1906 De Mun, Castelman, and Piou sponsored a measure on professional organization.[33]

In the preamble to the proposed law, the usual Social Catholic arguments for corporatism were presented. The need for solidarity between workers and employers was underlined and supported by a quotation from Paul-Boncour's book, *Economic Federalism,* to the effect that " there exists among members of the same profession, a solidarity more real than that between inhabitants of the same commune." [34] The sponsors of the bill felt that only a strong, rational, autonomous professional organization could achieve the social betterment of workers, and prevent the oppressive and tyrannical unity which bent all to the same regulations. Since conditions varied for different regions and different branches of the same profession, regional trade councils would be able to achieve elasticity in the application of professional or trade regulations. These organizations could relieve the state of some of its tasks. Citing the sociolo-

32 *Ibid.*, pp. 187-196; *Association catholique*, LXV (1908), 237.

33 *Proposition de loi sur l'organisation professionnelle*, presentée par MM. Léonce de Castelman, Piou, Ollivier, Le comte Albert de Mun, Deputies. Chambre des Députés, *Documents parlementaires*, 1906. Séance du 6 juillet, 1906. Annexe no. 217, pp. 768-771.

34 *Ibid.*, p. 768.

gist, Durkheim, the authors of the bill maintained that the professions themselves should take over such functions as assistance, which were in the hands of the government and private agencies.

The specific terms of the proposed law followed the general outline of the program of the Union of Reviews. In the regional trade councils to be established, members of employer, labor, or mixed associations were to enjoy a larger representation than persons not affiliated with such groups. However, legislation of the councils concerning apprenticeship, labor conditions, and vocational training would need ratification by the whole trade or profession.

The proposed law said nothing about representation of the trade councils in the government, but in the preamble the statement was made that

> perhaps we should have been able to render it [the proposed legislation] more complete by attributing to the regional union of professional councils a share of the national representation in our political assemblies . . . . We thought it was preferable not to raise too many questions at the same time and to simplify our proposition, leaving to time the care of accomplishing the work.[35]

The supporters of the measure merely contented themselves with the hope of " arriving one day at the truth and fullness of a national representation by the representation of interests in a high assembly." [36]

In spite of the valiant efforts of De Mun and his fellow deputy, Jacques Piou, and in spite of the support of the Popular Liberal Party which they had founded in 1902, the measure was not passed. Defeated in parliament, the Party continued to give voice to its demands in conventions and through the writings of its leaders.

35 *Proposition de loi sur l'organisation professionnelle, op. cit.*, p. 770.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 768.

Social Catholic Corporative Doctrine in the Early Twentieth Century

Although the Social Catholics did not cease to strive for a corporative regime in the years 1906-1914, their corporative proposals tended to be obscured by demands for social and labor legislation and professional representation in parliament. The very term "corporative" was usually avoided.

This trend may be observed in the publications of the *Action Populaire,* a central bureau of propaganda and information founded in Rheims in 1903 and allied with the Popular Liberal Party. In the pages of its periodical, *Mouvement sociale,* the former *Association catholique,* acquired and rechristened in 1909, were to be found numerous articles on industrial legislation and the organization of a professional senate. To the latter topic Eugène Duthoit, a member of the *Action Populaire* and Professor of Economics at the University of Lille, devoted a great deal of study. He believed that the Chamber of Deputies elected by universal suffrage should merely consent to taxes, while the senate chosen by electoral colleges organized by region and type of economic activity should have jurisdiction over professional and trade interests. In the case of industry, these colleges should be composed of an equal number of employer and labor delegates, but two-thirds of the membership would be reserved to syndical organizations. Duthoit provided for the distribution of seats in the senate as follows: agriculture, one hundred seats; commerce, thirty; liberal professions, twenty; constituted bodies, such as universities, institutes, magistrates, and clergy, fifty. In addition the senate itself was to choose twenty members.[37]

The decreased Social Catholic emphasis on corporatism may be gathered from the tenor of the discussions in the *Semaines Sociales,* meetings of which were held once a year from 1904

37 Eugène Duthoit, "Essai d'une organisation politique harmonisée avec un régime normal du travail," *Association catholique,* LVII (1904), 289 ff.; see also: *Le Suffrage de demain* (Paris: Perrin, 1901); *Vers l'organisation professionnelle* (Paris: Lecoffre, 1910).

to 1913. These *Semaines* were in fact national congresses of the *Action Populaire* of Rheims and brought together Social Catholics of all shades and parties, clerics and laymen, for a week of lectures and conferences on social questions.[38] Although Etienne Martin-Saint-Léon repeated the La Tour du Pin formula for mixed trade councils at the opening session,[39] *Semaines Sociales* of subsequent years devoted increasing time to questions of apprenticeship, wages, hours, and conditions of work. During the war these meetings were discontinued, but were begun again in 1919.

An equal, if not greater, interest in social legislation was shown by the Christian Democrats, a Catholic group organized in 1893 at Rheims by several young priests. They gave expression to their views in their journal, *Justice sociale,* which was condemned in 1908 by Pius X because of its modernist views.[40] During their brief existence as an organized group, the Christian Democrats, under the leadership of Abbé Naudet, sought the betterment of the working class. While on the surface they seemed to accept the general terms of the La Tour du Pin corporative plan, they placed much more emphasis upon class organizations than most Social Catholics. Certain functions such as discipline, apprenticeship, and administration of a collective patrimony were to be taken over by class syndicates rather than by a mixed corporative council. Moreover, the Christian Democrats stressed democracy and political and civil equality to a much greater degree than other Social Catholics. They refused to accept the Social Catholic concept of hierarchy. Hence in detail and in spirit their program actually differed from that of La Tour du Pin and met with criticism on the part of the majority of Social Catholics.[41]

38 Moon, *op. cit.*, pp. 340-341.

39 Semaines sociales de France, *Compte rendu,* 1904.

40 Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 373.

41 For the theories of the Christian Democrats see: Naudet, *Propriété, capital et travail,* ch. XIV " L'Organisation professionnelle et la représentation des intérêts," pp. 35 ff.; *La Démocratie et les démocrats chrétiens* (Paris, 1910).

The Legacy of Social Catholic Corporative Doctrine

In the period 1870-1914, the Social Catholics probably showed more interest in the corporative idea than any other group during this period and their writings on the subject were apparently more voluminous than those of any other school. They drew attention to the word "corporative" through their publications and proposals in parliament. Although their interest in corporatism seemed to wane somewhat during the years preceding the first World War, they had prepared a doctrine which they were to advance with increasing vigor in the interbellum years—particularly in the nineteen-thirties. In that decade the Social Catholics gave the same prominence to the corporative idea that they had given it under the leadership of La Tour du Pin and Albert de Mun in the years 1884-1906. At the same time their influence extended to other schools of corporatism; and in 1940 their doctrines helped to shape the corporative theories (although not to the same degree the practices) of the Pétain regime.

CHAPTER IV

CORPORATISM AND RELATED SCHOOLS, 1870-1918

While the Social Catholics under the leadership of La Tour du Pin and Albert de Mun were formulating and propagating a corporative doctrine, other contributions were being made to the development of corporatism in France. For the most part, these contributions came from various schools of social and political thought. There were, it is true, certain isolated corporatists who were unaffiliated with any particular group, but their number was small and their influence limited.

Mazaroz

The Parisian furniture manufacturer, Jean Paul Mazaroz, who wrote chiefly in the eighteen-seventies, was an example of an individual corporatist.[1] As measured by direct evidence, the effect of his doctrines and plans upon corporative theory was not very great. La Tour du Pin made disparaging mention of them in passing. Occasionally, his name appeared in the works of corporatists of the era after World War I. Moreover, Mazaroz' works were replete with anti-clerical tirades,[2] Masonic and Hindu terminology, and digressions on reincarnation and spiritualism.[3] Nevertheless, there is a marked parallel between

1 Mazaroz' corporative ideas were expressed mainly in the trilogy, *La Revanche de la France par le travail, les besoins et les intérêts organisés:* Vol. I, *Histoire des corporations d'art et de métiers* (2ème ed.; Paris: Germer Baillière, 1878). Vol. II, *Les Chaines de l'esclavage moderne. Guide pour les élections générales suivi de la liberté du prochain* (Paris: Imprimerie et Librairie Centrale des Chemins de Fer, 1876); Vol. III, *Les Cabales et conspirations de la politique et des politiciens laiques et religieux organisées contre les patrons et les ouvriers* (2ème ed.; Paris: privately printed, no date).

2 He encouraged Gambetta's anti-clericalism, demanded that the state religious budget be distributed among the professions for mutual aid funds, and urged that priests become lay teachers. *Ibid.*; III, 405-406, 526-536.

3 He believed in the concept of trinity existing throughout the world. The Father was fire, the Mother water, the Son the fruitful element. In another

Mazaroz' ideas on production and those of Georges Valois, and between the non-political aspects of his corporative scheme and those of earlier theorists like Buret, and later ones like the royalist Bacconnier.

In the opinion of Mazaroz, two contrary forces were at work in the world—productive force and brute force. The latter emphasized class differences and brought about revolution and civil war. Its law was Roman law, its philosophy that of individualism, the Declaration of the Rights of Man, physiocracy, and positivism. It had provided France with a governing corporation or clique which was interested in its own self-advancement and not in the welfare of the people. Economically, it replaced professional organization with laissez-faire and thus brought about an improvident proletariat, multiple bankruptcies, speculation, law suits, business dishonesty, and class struggle. Morally, it caused the disintegration of the family, and increase in juvenile delinquency, suicide, and indigence, and a decline in the physical health and vigor of the mass of French people.[4]

Productive force, on the other hand, followed the laws of nature "which have mutuality for base, solidarity for result, and reciprocity as distributive justice."[5] To these, wrote Mazaroz, a fourth characteristic could be added—order. "Productive force has on its flag conciliation and mutual protection of all interests."[6] It sought union, not conflict. Its law was the law of Christ, of the Gallo-Celts. It rejected the "serpent" individualism and the Declaration of the Rights of Man. True liberty consisted of collective liberties. Absolute equality could

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passage, he explained that the Father was labor, the Son capital, and the Holy Ghost the family. Still elsewhere, he termed Jehovah the symbol of the eternal law of production and the Son of Man organized interests. *Ibid.*, III, 196-211; II, 417; I, 441, 473. On reincarnation and spiritualism, see: III, 11, 48, 259, 261-263, and *passim*.

4 *Ibid.*, I, 9-15, 73; II, 262-269, 286, 292-293.

5 *Ibid.*, III, 245.

6 *Ibid.*, I, 13.

not exist and should be replaced by a concept of hierarchy. Fraternity was meaningless if not practiced within collectivities. Productive force, through a peaceful revolution, would overthrow the selfish governing corporation of France, which paid no taxes and contributed nothing creative, and it would replace this clique by professional interests themselves, the producers who supported the country. These would be the rightful and best rulers of France.[7] Mazaroz took the formula of the Revolutionary political philosopher, Sièyes, and changed it to read:

> What is the political profession which pays no taxes? Reply: Everything. What should it be? Reply: Nothing. What are the general professions which in France pay taxes? Reply: Nothing. What should they be? Reply: Everything.[8]

Economically, the reign of productive force would bring about professional organization and economic federalism. Workers would find security, while speculation, dishonesty, and class warfare would cease. French family life, morals, and health would steadily improve.

Like so many corporatists before and after him, Mazaroz praised the guilds of the Old Regime, but recognized their inadequacies. He objected to their closed character and to some of their exorbitant pretensions, and hence advocated a reformed and modernized guild system capable of meeting nineteenth century needs and restoring the reign of productive force. Employers and the wealthy should take the initiative in establishing such a system not on the basis of worker subordination to employer patronage, as Le Play advocated, but on the basis of true reciprocity and mutuality.[9]

According to Mazaroz' corporative plan,[10] ten large profes-

7 *Ibid.*, I, 70-74; II, 84, 107 ff., 120-121 ff.; III, 189.

8 *Ibid.*, II, 144.

9 *Ibid.*, I, 432-436; II, 12-21, 41 ff., 68, 243-247; III, 71.

10 The following summary of Mazaroz' system was condensed from: *ibid.*, I, 478-485; II, 226-229, 412; III, 351-352, 390-393, 404, 416.

sional groups would be organized under the divisions of arts, industry, commerce, science, and property, and then reapportioned into one hundred corporations. Each corporation would elect a local chamber composed of an equal number of delegates of employers on the one hand, and of representatives of workers, foremen, and clerks on the other. The local corporative chamber would in turn send its president to the departmental chamber of the corporation and the departmental chambers would be federated to form the national municipality or syndicate at the top of the whole corporative pyramid.

The functions of the corporative chambers would include establishment of prices and wages, settlement of employer-employee disputes, and administration of social insurance and technical schools. However, Mazaroz proceeded to endow the local and departmental chambers and the national municipality with broad political functions. In fact, he proposed that the corporations become the state—local corporative chambers administering city governments, departmental chambers governing the department, and the national municipality serving as the national legislature and electing the chief of state.

In thus transforming the state, Mazaroz diverged from the corporatism of the Social Catholics and twentieth century theorists. However, his scheme was in line with the Saint-Simon tradition of government by industrialists and technicians and showed some similarity to the syndicalism of Georges Sorel. The latter, while eliminating the state as such, conferred upon syndicates whatever governmental authority was still necessary.

Syndicalism—Sorel and Paul-Boncour

The syndicalist school as represented by the exponent of its revolutionary orthodoxy, Georges Sorel, and by the leaders of its moderate faction, Paul-Boncour and others, exerted an important influence on French corporatism. Syndicalist doctrine was affected by and in turn stimulated the development of trade unions. From the full legalization of unions in 1884 to

the outbreak of the first World War their growth in France was rapid. In 1895 labor unions joined to organize the *Confédération Générale du Travail* and presented a strong front against the growing unity of employers who formed the *Confédération Générale de la Production Française* in 1919.[11]

At first glance Sorel's syndicalist theories would appear to be the antithesis of corporatism. In *Reflections on Violence* (1906), he adopted a hostile attitude toward the guilds of the Old Regime which he condemned as not promoting any kind of improvement, or invention in technical matters. He envisaged the syndicate as a class organization composed only of manual workers. Employers, intellectuals, even those engaged in commerce would be excluded. Such a narrow concept was contrary to the corporatist doctrine of a guild composed of all the members of a profession or trade—whether employers, workers, intellectuals, or commercial agents. He looked upon the labor union as an instrument of class struggle, and he preached violence in the form of a general strike as the most effective means of class warfare.[12] Now the general strike

11 By 1890 organizations of employers had a membership of 93,411 which rose to 205,463 in 1903. In the latter year there were 3,634 labor unions containing 643,757 members. The number of mixed unions containing employers and employees was small, reaching only 156 in 1903, with a membership of 33,973. Etienne Martin-Saint-Léon, *Histoire des corporations de métiers* (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1922), pp. 644-800, 823; Gaëtan Pirou, *Les Doctrines économiques en France depuis 1870* (Paris, Armand Colin, 1925), p. 72; Semaines Sociales de France, *Compte Rendu* 1940, pp. 22-31.

In 1902 the *Confédération Générale du Travail* absorbed the *Fédération des Bourses* which had been founded in 1892, by Ferdinand Pelloutiec. In 1922 the Marxist branch of the C.G.T. seceded and formed the *Confédération Générale du Travail Unifié* which became affiliated with the Third International of Moscow. Catholic trade unions organized the *Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs Chrétiens* in 1919. In 1936 the name of the *Confédération Générale de la Production Française* was changed to that of *Confédération Générale du Patronat Français.* Shepard B. Clough, *France, A History of National Economics, 1789-1939* (New York: Scribner's, 1939), pp. 293-296, 469-470; Paul Marabuto, *Les Partis politiques et les mouvements sociaux sous le 4ème République* (Paris: Sirey, 1948), *passim.*

12 Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence,* translated by T. E. Hulme (New York: Peter Smith, 1941—reprint of 1915 ed.), *passim.*

whether as an actuality or as a myth (and Sorel seemed to consider the dream, desire, or goal of a general strike as more beneficial to worker class consciousness and energy than the strike itself), was anathema to the core of corporatist doctrine. The very kernel of corporatism was the doctrine of social peace, of solidarity between classes. Sorel's concept of workers' control of industry was also counter to corporatist doctrine, which upheld private enterprise and employer management of industry.

Nevertheless, certain aspects of Sorel's thought found a place in corporatism. His emphasis upon economic federalism, decentralization of administration, and hierarchy, and his condemnation of egalitarianism, economic liberalism, and parliamentarianism gave comfort to many corporatists.[13] Even his championship of labor unions reacted upon corporative thought, since corporatism sought not to destroy but to build upon and to complete syndicates. Moreover, during his later traditionalist period (1910-1917),[14] his narrow syndicalism for workers seemed to be transferred to a broader basis more closely approaching the corporative concept. M. Jean Variot, cofounder with Sorel of the review, *L'Indépendence,* declared that:

13 *Ibid., passim*; Georges Sorel, *Introduction à l'économie moderne* (Paris: Jacques, 1903), pp. 63 ff., 163, 173, 238, 243-255. In this latter work, Sorel developed his views on economic federalism. He appeared to appropriate Proudhon's ideas on mutual aid societies and popular credit funds. Like Proudhon, he advocated the establishment of warehouses empowered to issue warrants for goods deposited.

For his early anti-egalitarian and anti-parliamentarian doctrines see: Georges Sorel, *Le Procès de Socrate* (Paris: Alcan, 1889), pp. 44, 158, 184, 192, 386, and *passim.*

14 Sorel's economic and political beliefs underwent a remarkably circuitous evolution, in which syndicalism was only one phase. From 1889 to 1893 he was a traditionalist, from 1901 to 1910 a syndicalist, from 1910 to 1917 a traditionalist again, and from 1917 to his death in 1922 a supporter of the Russian Revolution. Frédéric D. Cheydleur, *Essai sur l'évolution des doctrines de M. Georges Sorel.* Thèse (Grenoble: Imprimerie Saint Bruno, 1914), pp. 30-35.

> Sorel in 1911 conceived a syndicalism which would not be exclusively concerned with workers and which would put the working class in its true place " in relation to the other classes who should also work and develop themselves." [15]

The traditionalist phase of Sorel's development furnishes evidence of his kinship with corporatism. Then, like most corporatists, he supported the family, Christian morality, and nationalism and opposed women's rights, state intervention in the industrial domain, and pacifism.[16] It was during the 1910-1917 traditionalist period that Sorel came into contact with the royalist *Action Française,* which accepted corporatism. His disciple, the corporatist Georges Valois, tried to bring Sorel into the movement, but Sorel disliked the classicism, positivism, and intellectualism of Charles Maurras, its chief theorist. For Sorel, economics came first, while the motto of Maurras was " politics first." [17] While Sorel's flirtation with the *Action Française* was of short duration, he encouraged its stress on an élite and its use of violence.

A study of the influence of Sorel upon Mussolini and the Italian corporative system is not within the scope of this work. Yet mention should be made of the fact that Mussolini was a disciple of Sorel. When Mussolini was asked whose influence was most decisive upon him, that of Nietzsche, Jaurès, or Sorel, he replied:

> That of Sorel. For myself the essential was action. But I repeat, it is to Sorel that I owe the most. He is the master of

15 *Eclair,* September 11, 1942, cited in Gaëtan Pirou, *Georges Sorel,* 1842-1922 (Paris: Marcel Rivière, 1927), p. 55, note 1.

16 Although a Dreyfusard during his Marxist and syndicalist periods, with his return to traditionalism in 1910, Sorel became anti-semitic, declaring that "the French should defend their state, their customs, and their ideas against the Jewish invaders." *L'Indépendence,* 1er mai—1er juin, 1912. Sorel's anti-semitic statements were very similar to those of the corporatist, La Tour du Pin.

17 Pirou, *op. cit.,* pp. 40-47; Perrin, Pierre-Louis-Marie-Joseph, *Les Idées Sociales de Georges Sorel.* Thèse. (Alger: Imprimerie P. Angélis, 1925), *op. cit.,* pp. 110, 174.

> syndicalism, who by his rude theories on revolutionary tactics, has contributed the most to the discipline, the energy, and the power of the fascist legions.[18]

Sorel has always been more widely read in Italy than in France. He admired Mussolini, and many of his articles were written in Italian and published in Italian journals. However, most French corporatists of the twentieth century interbellum period regarded Italian corporatism as too *étatiste*. Also, Sorel's syndicalism was fundamentally different from Mussolini's corporatism. Sorel emphasized class struggle and opposed statism, while the Italian system imposed class peace and state control.

Joseph Paul-Boncour's moderate syndicalism had an equal, if not greater, effect than Sorel's revolutionary syndicalism upon corporative doctrine. Interbellum corporatists frequently quoted his works and expressed agreement with his theories. Certainly his thought more nearly approached corporatism than that of Sorel.

Unlike Sorel, Paul-Boncour did not view syndicates as exclusively class organizations and instruments of class conflict. He denied Sorel's notion of a homogeneous working class, maintaining that the problems of workers varied according to the trade or profession. In his doctoral thesis, *Economic Federalism* (1900), he studiously avoided the term "syndicate" substituting for it "professional grouping." This he defined as an organization comprising "all or a part of the members of the profession . . . united in a goal of general professional interest," [19] and expressing a "veritable solidarity." [20] The term

18 Quoted in Pirou, *op. cit.*, p. 53. Sorel admired Mussolini and about 1914, declared of the young Italian: "This young man will be spoken about in the world." Cited in Perrin, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

19 Joseph Paul-Boncour, *Le Fédéralisme économique, étude sur les rapports de l'individu et des groupements professionnels. Préface de M. Waldeck-Rousseau* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1900), p. 3. This book was devoted primarily to a discussion of the development of professional groupings of workers, although Paul-Boncour intended to write about associations of consumers and employers in succeeding works.

20 *Ibid.*, p. 8.

applied also to consumer and employer associations and even to general organizations comprising the whole profession. Occasionally, it seemed to be a synonym for corporation.[21] Thus it was a much broader term than that of trade union and more in harmony with the corporative concept.

These "professional groupings," Paul-Boncour believed, should be endowed with many of the powers of the corporations of the Old Regime which in the past "represented the interests of all and united in compulsory organization the entrepreneur, worker, and consumer."[22] Organized on a local, regional, and national basis for each trade, they would bring about the economic decentralization of France.[23] Such economic federalism, or "*synarchie*," as Paul-Boncour named it, was already in the process of being established. Whenever an association included the majority of workers in a specific trade, it tried to make its rules apply to the entire trade, and exerted pressure on the government to this end. Since, in Paul-Boncour's view, the government was incompetent in the administration of the details of economic life, it should encourage this trend and relinquish economic sovereignty to "professional groupings." It should only intervene in the activity of these "groupings" when they interfered with national defense or public welfare or when they could not settle conflicts between themselves.[24] Paul-Boncour's whole stand on decentralization was identical with that of the Social Catholics, royalists, and most corporatists.

On the question of participation of "professional groupings" in the government, Paul-Boncour, unlike Mazaroz, remained rather vague. In the introduction to *Economic Federalism* he merely remarked that the "professional grouping" might be

21 *Ibid.*, pp. 375-376, footnote 1.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 162.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 351.

24 *Ibid.*, pp. 341-346, 354, 357-358, 360, 364.

> the germ and embryo of a grouping destined to possess the same attributes as political groupings and which sociologists have already imagined as possessing in the future jurisdiction over territorial divisions, going beyond their limits, perhaps their frontiers, and breaking the old social framework by a decentralization up to then unknown.[25]

Paul-Boncour's writings and political activities in the years subsequent to the publication of his doctoral thesis showed the evolution of his thought in the direction of corporatism. In a debate with Charles Maurras in 1903, published as *The Republic and Decentralization,*[26] and in the preface to selections from *Lamennais* published in 1928,[27] he continued to defend economic federalism. As prime minister in 1933 he attempted to put some of his ideas into effect by proposing a strengthen-

25 *Ibid.*, p. 9.

26 In this debate, Paul-Boncour declared: "To be a federalist is to desire that social groupings, both regional and corporative, become liberated from the control of the state and achieve their full autonomy." Quoted in Odette de Puiffe de Magondeaux, *Les Ententes industrielles et les corporations en France* (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1937), p. 62. See also the memoirs of Paul-Boncour, *Entre deux guerres* (Paris: 1946), I, 146-147.

27 In this work, Paul-Boncour paid his respects to Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Proudhon. To Saint-Simon he attributed fruitful ideas on political and economic organization and hierarchy; to Fourier the instigation of the cooperative movement, to Proudhon the encouragement of mutualism, hierarchy in the workshop, and order and discipline in production. He particularly admired the "solid good sense and realism of the latter." Joseph Paul-Boncour, *Lamennais* (Paris: 1925), p. 5. Paul-Boncour continued to urge in this book as he had done in 1900, the delimitation of the state's powers by professional groupings: "The strong state, following the Jacobin conception cannot remain so, if it does not incorporate in its mechanism [thus] delimiting its powers and theirs, groupings, born on the ruins of those destroyed by the Revolution, because they are the permanent and necessary frameworks of social activity....

I mean syndicates, a democratic and rejuvenated form of the old professional bond; consumers' cooperatives, a new and fruitful idea, and groupings of producers which, controlled and coordinated by the state, should reestablish between production and needs, the equilibrium destroyed by the anarchy of the present regime." *Ibid.*, p. 2.

ing of the National Economic Council which had been created in 1925. Objecting to the fact that this council had remained purely consultative and had represented only scattered organizations, he proposed to transform it into an organ having power to regulate matters and conflicts in which the political state should not intervene, and representing organized professions.[28] Although the measure was rejected and his ministry collapsed, his suggestions were partly carried out in the legislation of 1936. Paul-Boncour's interest in corporatism did not die. In his memoirs, *Between Two Wars,* published after the liberation of France in 1946, he paid homage to the ideas of Marcel Déat and the Neo-Socialist Party, only recommending that their trilogy "Order, Authority, Nation" be completed by the word democracy.[29] He praised the economic and social measures of the Vichy government, although condemning its undemocratic and dictatorial features. Certain of the principles of the Pétain regime—a strong executive, regionalism, and organized professions—he hoped to see carried out in a democratic manner by the Fourth Republic.[30]

Solidarism and Durkheim

Solidarist principles were an important ingredient of corporatism although the exact debt of corporative doctrine to the solidarist school is difficult to measure. Twentieth century corporatists praised certain principles of the solidarists, in particular those of Emile Durkheim who is often associated with the group.

The solidarist school had its origins early in the nineteenth century. Pierre Leroux, a follower of Saint-Simon, and a few of the disciples of Fourier, as well as the economist Bastiat, had comprehended something of the value of the doctrine of

28 Paul-Boncour, *Entre deux guerres,* II, 280-282, 322.

29 *Ibid.,* p. 322. He considered Déat as a "fine brain, possessing a remarkable faculty of assimilation of economic questions and an extreme richness of expression...", *loc. cit.*

30 *Ibid.,* III, 326, 304-327.

solidarity and of the appropriateness of the term. Auguste Comte had realized its possibilities in his *Discours sur l'esprit positif.*[31] In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the idea of solidarity was enlarged and elevated into a philosophy. Under the leadership of Léon Bourgeois, French politician and writer, one branch of solidarists developed a legal interpretation of *solidarisme* and encouraged the social legislation of the Radical Socialist Party with which they were associated.[32] Other solidarists under the economist, Charles Gide, strove for solidarity through advancing the cause of consumer cooperatives. Still another branch of the school sought solidarity through mutual associations. In common with corporatists they proposed the decentralization of workmen's pension schemes and other forms of state aid, which they felt should be under the jurisdiction of mutual societies.

The various groups of solidarists agreed that a fundamental solidarity existed between all members of the human race and that political, social, and economic systems should acknowledge and encourage this human solidarity. They strove to substitute the principle of " each for all " for that of " each for himself." [33] Such beliefs and aims were approved by corporatists, though they disagreed with certain solidarist methods for their realization. They regarded Bourgeois' program as leading toward statism, and claimed that mutual associations were inferior to corporations.

Solidarisme as a sociological-psychological basis for corporatism was set forth by the noted sociologist, Emile Durkheim (1858-1925). A native of Alsace, Durkheim was for many years Professor of Sociology and Education at the University of Paris. In fact, he was the first to be officially recognized as a teacher of sociology in France and for a number of years he

31 Charles Gide and Charles Rist, *A History of Economic Doctrines from the Time of the Physiocrats to the Present Day*, translated by R. Richards (New York: D. C. Heath and Co., 1915), p. 589.

32 *Ibid.*, pp. 593-607.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 614.

lectured at the Sorbonne.[34] His works, as might be expected, showed the influence of Comte, although his own contributions to sociology were of great significance. Durkheim is especially remembered as one of the leading protagonists of the idea of culture and as an outstanding investigator of the cultural group. In his *Elementary Forms of Religious Life,* for example, he studied religious conceptions as symbols of the values of a culture.

The corporative ideas of Durkheim were but a small part of his whole thought and work, but twentieth century French corporatists eagerly siezed upon them. It gave prestige to their program to count Durkheim as one of themselves. In only two out of his many works, *Le Suicide,* and *De la division du travail social,* did Durkheim present at length his solidarist arguments for corporatism and more briefly his ideas on the nature of a corporative regime.

Durkheim was particularly interested in the solidarity created by "collective consciousness," the most highly developed form of psychic life to his way of thinking. This "collective consciousness" or group mind had ideas of its own or "collective representations," existing outside the individual and possessing a coercive power over him in the nature of moral, legal, and ethical rules.[35] A feeling of solidarity with others, argued Durkheim, of participation in the "collective consciousness," of harmony in social and economic life was necessary for the individual if he were to retain mental health. The principle cause of what Durkheim termed "egotistical suicide" was neither physical infirmity nor disappointment in love, but rather a sense of social isolation.[36] Another type of

34 Roger Soltau, *French Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), p. 481, footnote 1.

35 William Montgomery McGovern, *From Luther to Hitler, the History of Fascist-Nazi Political Philosophy* (Boston): Houghton Mifflin, 1941), pp. 425-426.

36 "Suicide varies in inverse proportion to the degree of integration of the social groups of which the individual is a part." Emile Durkheim, *Le Suicide* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1897), p. 223.

suicide which Durkheim labelled as "*suicide anomique*" resulted from conflicts and disorders in economic life. An economic environment characterized by a state of war and "truces imposed by violence" was contrary to solidarist creed, which sought to subordinate the physical law of the strongest to a higher moral law.[37]

The solidarity so essential for the elimination of feelings of isolation and of economic anarchy could be most effectively encouraged by a corporative system which expressed the highest level of group consciousness. Composed of individuals who devoted themselves to the same work and who possessed interests which were "*solidaires*,"[38] the corporation would constitute a greater force for solidarity than any other social group. Other social groups could effect only an imperfect integration of the individual. The state's action upon individuals was intermittent,[39] that of modern religion was incomplete,[40] and that of the family was present during only a small part of life.[41]

> The corporation thus has all that is necessary to surround the individual, to draw him out of his state of moral isolation, and, granted the present insufficiency of other groups, it is the only one able to fulfill this indispensable function.[42]

37 *Ibid.*, p. 440; Emile Durkheim, *De la division du travail social* (5th ed.; Paris: Félix Alcan, 1926), p. iii.

38 *Le Suicide*, p. 435.

39 Only in time of national or political crisis did the state become a director of conduct.

40 Religion was unsatisfactory because it moderated the inclination to suicide only in proportion as it prevented man from thinking freely. Since the natural trend of religion was toward free thinking, it would be unfair, thought Durkheim, to return to outmoded orthodoxies.

41 "While formerly it maintained most of its members within its orbit from birth to death, and formed a compact, indivisible mass, endowed with a kind of perennity, today it has only an ephemeral duration. Hardly is it constituted than it disperses.... We can then say that during the major part of the time, the family is now reduced to a single conjugal couple and we know that it acts feebly on suicide." *Ibid.*, p. 433.

42 *Ibid.*, p. 440.

Harmony in economic life and industrial peace could be established and maintained solely by a corporative regime which would furnish "the system of rules which is at present lacking." [43] Syndicates tended to stimulate rather than to alleviate economic chaos. As private institutions they were "deprived of all regulatory power," [44] and as class institutions they fed the fires of social war. Employer and employee syndicates resembled two autonomous states of unequal force and the contracts which they concluded were merely treaties representing the respective status of the military forces of the two signatory powers. Durkheim stood on the opposite pole from Sorel in his attitude toward syndicates. He concluded they were a menace unless integrated into a corporative system.

While he was critical of the syndicates of his day, Durkheim commended the guilds of the Old Regime and bewailed their abolition.

> If from the origins of the city state to the apogee of the Empire, from the dawn of Christian societies to modern times, they [i.e., the corporations] have been necessary, it is because they satisfy durable and deep needs.[45]

Like Mazaroz, Durkheim recognized guilds' shortcomings. They were too local in character, their rules too troublesome, and their masters too preoccupied with safeguarding their privileges. Yet these defects could be remedied and a corporative system more in tune with modern France could be erected.[46]

Such a corporative system, insisted Durkheim, should be organized on a national basis better suited to the market, which

43 *De la division du travail social*, p. vi.

44 *Ibid.*, p. vii.

45 *Ibid.*, p. xi.

46 "It is not a question of whether the medieval institution exactly suits our contemporary society, but whether the needs which it answered are not eternal, although in order to satisfy them, it should be transformed according to circumstances." *Ibid.*, p. viii.

had extended its territory far beyond its municipal boundaries of medieval times.

> This unitary organization for a whole country, moreover, in no way excludes the formation of secondary organs comprising similar workers of the same region or locality . . . . Besides, between the divers corporations of the same locality or region, there will necessarily be special relations of solidarity which will demand at all times an appropriate organization.[47]

The corporation should consist "of all the agents of the same industry united and organized in the same body."[48] These "agents" would be divided into a syndicate of employers and another of employees for the purpose of electing representatives to the corporative assembly, the ruling body of the corporation.

The functions of the corporation and of the corporative assembly would include in the economic sphere regulation of production and remuneration, and settlement of conflicts between different branches of the same profession. Among the important social functions would be the administration of insurance, assistance, and retirement funds, and of technical schools. Recreational activities such as concerts and plays could be fostered by the corporation.[49] Like La Tour du Pin, Durkheim believed that these economic and social powers of the corporation would create a feeling of solidarity between different classes and would help to bring about distributive justice.

In common with most corporatists before and after him, Durkheim abhorred *étatisme*. He characterized the state as

> a heavy machine which is made only for general and simple tasks. Its action, always uniform, cannot be bent and adjusted to the infinite diversity of particular circumstances. Consequently, it is necessarily oppressive and leveling.[50]

47 *Ibid.*, pp. xxviii-xxix, xxxiii, footnote.

48 *Ibid.*, p. vi.

49 *Ibid.*, p. xxxi.

50 *Le Suicide*, p. 436.

In even more vehement terms, he declared that:

> a society composed of an infinite dust of unorganized individuals, which a hypertrophied state strives to encompass and to restrain, constitutes a veritable sociological monstrosity. For collective activity is always too complex to be expressed by the sole and unique organ of the state.[51]

Durkheim, like Paul-Boncour, found the only antidote for the leviathan state in decentralization through professional organizations.[52] He did not exclude territorial decentralization but considered it secondary in importance.[53]

In order to effect this decentralization, the state should recognize the corporation as a semi-autonomous public body and endow it with the function of diversifying the general principles of industrial legislation which it (the state) laid down.[54] However, corporations should not be allowed to become states within the state, but should be subordinated to the general action of the state which would "oppose to the particularism of each corporation the sentiment of general utility and the necessities of organic equilibrium."[55] Nevertheless, state action should not degenerate into a narrow interventionism.

Should the corporations be restricted to economic and social matters, or should they also participate in political life? Durkheim, although in less specific terms, definitely favored the latter. "Is it not legitimate," he demanded,

> to think that the corporation should also become the elementary division of the state, the fundamental political unit? Society, instead of remaining what it has today become, an

51 *De la division du travail social*, p. xxxiii.

52 *De la division du travail social*, p. xxxiii. "A nation can only maintain itself if between the state and individuals is interposed a whole series of secondary groups." See also: *Le Suicide*, p. 436.

53 *Le Suicide*, p. 449.

54 *Ibid.*, p. 436; *De la division du travail social*, p. xxviii.

55 *Le Suicide*, p. 440.

> aggregate of distinct juxtaposed electoral districts, would become a vast system of national corporations. Demands are heard from divers quarters that the electoral colleges be formed by professions and not by territorial circumscriptions, and it is certain that in this way, political assemblies would express more exactly the diversity of social interests and their relations; they would be a more faithful resumé of social life in its ensemble.[56]

In one respect, however, Durkheim tended to wander from the corporative fold. While he considered corporatism as the prime condition of other reforms, he did suggest that after the organization of the corporative system, further reforms should take place, particularly the abolition of inheritance of wealth. Then the corporation would own and transmit property, since it possessed a perpetuity equal at least to that of the family.[57] Did this proposal mean the abolition of private property to a large extent? If Durkheim implied this conclusion, then his program could be classed as guild socialist in nature, and would be contrary to that of most corporatists who desired the preservation of private ownership and enterprise. Durkheim, however, did not stress the abolition of inheritance, mentioning it only in passing, and placed his emphasis upon corporatism. Therefore, it does not seem amiss to consider him among the number of French corporative theorists. Certainly the latter have regarded him as one of themselves.

Durkheim's influence on French corporatists of the period between the two World Wars was significant and his name was often mentioned in their works. His arguments for corporatism based upon psycho-sociological *solidarisme* added grist to their mill and lent an air of scientific scholarship to the cause for which they labored.

56 *De la division du travail social*, p. xxxi.

57 *Ibid.*, pp. xxxiv-xxxvi.

Pluralism and Duguit

As in the case of solidarism, it is difficult to ascertain to what extent corporatists were influenced by pluralists or arrived at pluralist nations independently. Although interbellum corporatists quoted pluralist authors, they may also have derived pluralist concepts from medieval political theory and other sources. In any event, pluralism became an important element in French corporative thought.

The Pluralist school flourished in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries under the leadership of Maurice Hauriou, Dean of the Faculty of Law of the University of Toulouse, and Léon Duguit, Dean of the Faculty of Law of the University of Bordeaux. While these men did not originate any startlingly new ideas, they systematized various beliefs long current in French political thought. Pluralists taught that the state was merely the chief among several groups or institutions —professional associations, regions, etc.—acting as public service corporations. They divested the state of its personality, of its existence as an independent force external to society. Rather, the state was regarded as no more than an agency, an instrument through which the necessary laws were made and enforced, an authority existing *de facto* but not *de jure*.[58] This, therefore, was a direct attack upon the " Jacobin " and " totalitarian " concept of the state with its own will, consciousness, needs, and aspirations. Law was not the will of the state but the sanction of custom, of the usages of social institutions and groups. This concept of the importance of secondary autonomous institutions and the function of custom had been dear to the hearts of many nineteenth century corporatists, including La Tour du Pin, and was a legacy which twentieth century French corporatism did not hesitate to accept. It was to be found in the denunciation of *étatisme* expressed even by French Fascists like De la Rocque and in the declarations of the Pétain regime. However, these corporatists for the most part did not

58 Soltau, *op. cit.*, pp. 474-475.

go so far as to deny to the state a separate personality. The state was for them an organic being in which secondary institutions had their essential place.

Of the different pluralist writings, those of Léon Duguit had perhaps the most significance for corporatism. Duguit had known Durkheim and according to the corporatist, Gaëtan Pirou, had been profoundly influenced by this "vigorous personality." [59] He accepted several of Durkheim's solidarist concepts,[60] particularly the idea that people became more human as they participated in social groups and experienced a feeling of solidarity.[61] While Durkheim considered the corporation as the most important of these social groups, Duguit singled out the syndicate.

In Duguit's view, syndicates were instruments for solidarity both between individuals and between classes. They were not weapons to be used for class warfare but agents of social peace. He even hinted that different class syndicates might be integrated into a larger body. "There is," he stated,

> a great movement of social integration which is being extended to all classes . . . . [It] is an effort of organization of the

59 Gaëtan Pirou, "Léon Duguit et l'économie politique," *Revue d'économie politique*, XLVII (1933), 57.

60 In his *Treatise on Constitutional Law*, Duguit testified that he had read Durkheim's book *On the Division of Social Labor* and was favorably impressed by the conception of solidarity to be found in it. Léon Duguit, *Traité de droit constitutionnel* (Paris: Boccard, 1911), I, 14 ff. Also 2nd ed., 1921, I, 22.

61 "The great error of the French Revolution inspired by Rousseau, was to wish to destroy and forbid all secondary groupings. I will say that the individual is more human, the more he is socialized. I do not say with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Kant [sic], and Hegel [sic], that man is freer as the state to which he is submitted is more omnipotent. I mean only that individual activity is more intense as man takes part in a greater number of social groups. Since man is by nature a social being, capable of functioning only within a group, his activity will evidently be greater and more fruitful in proportion as he belongs to a greater number of groups." Duguit, *op. cit.*, 2nd ed., 1921, I, 509. Most of the sentiments in the second and third editions are repetitions of those expressed in the first edition of 1911.

> different social elements and especially an effort toward the organization of production. Workers' syndicates, employers' syndicates, associations of different categories of government employees, federations of these different groupings, federations of intellectual workers, agricultural associations, associations of small merchants and of small industrialists, syndicates of capitalists—all these groupings are being formed at present perhaps in a disordered manner, but all tend consciously or unconsciously to the same end, an end of social integration.[62]

Syndicates, argued Duguit, could also help transform the all-powerful "Jacobin" state into a pluralist one. They could perform certain of the economic and social functions of the state, thus bringing about a degree of decentralization. As the state became less omnipotent, and social groups more significant, a greater degree of pluralism would result.[63]

Duguit firmly believed that syndicates should have a voice in the state itself. Rejecting "the sovereignty of the numerical majority of individuals" as "contrary to social truth,"[64] he constantly pleaded for professional representation.[65] In 1908, for example, he wrote that there should be organized

62 *Ibid.*, 2nd. ed., I, 509-510.

63 According to Duguit, syndicates would not destroy national unity but would reënforce it by giving it a more complex structure. *Ibid.*, 3rd ed., II, 10.

64 *Ibid.*, p. 511.

65 Léon Duguit, "L'Election des senateurs," *Revue politique et parlementaire*, III (1895), 463; *L'Etat, les gouvernants et les agents* (Paris: 1903), pp. 329 ff.; *Droit social et droit individuel* (Paris: 1908), p. 217; *Libres entretiens*, 1910, No. 5; "La Représentation syndicale au parlement," *Revue politique et parlementaire*, July, 1911.

Duguit was only one of many to favor a professional political assembly. Charles Benoist revealed similar ideas in his *Crise de l'état moderne, l'organisation du travail*, Tome II, pp. v, vi, and *passim*. See also La Grosserie in *Revue politique et parlemetaire*, III (1895), p. 253; Carrière, *La Représentation des intérêts et l'importance des éléments professionnels dans l'évolution et le gouvernement des peuples* (Paris: 1917). Representation of interests in the government was thus a popular notion.

beside a proportional representation of parties, a professional representation of interests, i.e., a representation of divers social classes organized in syndicates and a federation of syndicates.[66]

The Action Francaise—Maurras and Valois

The criticisms of Durkheim and Duguit leveled at government centralization and the electoral system were developed in more virulent fashion by the *Action Française,* a group which did not hesitate to call itself corporatist. Organized in 1899 and converted to royalism in 1901, it found a gifted exponent of its doctrines in Charles Maurras.

Unlike the Social Catholics, Maurras, while recognizing the social utility of Catholicism, was skeptical concerning its faith and eventually suffered condemnation by the Pope. In common with many corporatists, however, he inveighed against Jews and parliamentary instability and weakness. France could be saved from the dangers of individualism, egalitarianism, and socialism only by turning to the institutions of family, commune, province, professional organization, and monarchy.[67] Decentralization was impossible under a republic and could flourish only under the king as "president by birth of all the professions or local republics which compose the nation."[68] Under him corporations would take their rightful place.

As previously mentioned, Maurras came into contact with La Tour du Pin and adopted many of his ideas. In his *Enquiry on Monarchy,* Maurras called La Tour his "direct master,"[69] while La Tour approved the declaration of principles drawn up by Maurras under the title of *Dictator and King.*[70] La Tour

66 Léon Duguit, *Droit social et droit individuel* (Paris: 1908), p. 127.

67 William Curt Buthman, *The Rise of Integral Nationalism in France: With Special Reference to the Ideas and Activities of Charles Maurras* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), *passim.*

68 Charles Maurras in *Action française,* March 24, 1908, p. 1.

69 Charles Maurras, *Enquête sur la monarchie* (Paris: 1900), p. 7.

70 Charles Maurras in *Action française,* April 14, 1934, p. 1.

contributed several articles to the *Action Française.* His approval of Maurras reached a high point in 1909 when he wrote the latter:

> You hold high the flag on which you have inscribed not only the restoration of the throne, that is to say, the liberty of the state, but all the other public liberties which have disappeared since the proclamation of individual liberty; liberty of the Church, of the province, of the commune, of the profession, of the family. In this, you show a fuller conception of the public welfare than you would have if you had demanded separately these essentially *solidaire* benefits; and . . . you have broken with the absurd and supremely antisocial principle of the sovereignty of number . . . . I perceive in your work alone the path of salvation . . . .[71]

Nevertheless, all was not harmony between the Social Catholic corporatist and the theorist of the *Action Française.* La Tour disliked the violence employed by the *Action Française* and Maurras' paganism and emphasis upon politics.

Maurras also counted among his supporters Georges Valois, a disciple of Sorel. From 1907 to 1925 Valois was connected with the *Action Française,* serving as co-director of its publishing house, the *Nouvelle Librairie Nationale,* and founding the subsidiary organization known as the *Union des Corporations Françaises.*[72] During the period 1907-1914, Valois' ideas could be classified under the heading monarchical syndicalism. In his work *Monarchy and the Working Class,* part of which appeared in 1902 and the remander in 1907, Valois affirmed the existence of classes denied by the Revolution but claimed that class differences should not cause class struggle. Above the classes, sitting as a sovereign arbitrator, regulating their conflicts would be the king, the chief of production.[73] Valois' cor-

71 René de la Tour du Pin, *Letter to Charles Maurras,* January 21, 1909.

72 Buthman, *op. cit., passim*; Georges Valois, *L'Etat syndical et la représentation corporative* (Paris: Librairie Valois, 1927), pp. ix-xxvii.

73 Georges Valois, *La Monarchie et la classe ouvrière* (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1909), pp. 43, 50-51.

poratism did not fully ripen until after the first World War when his *Economie nouvelle* was published.

Differences soon appeared between Valois and Maurras, just as they had between La Tour du Pin and Maurras, but these were of a more serious nature and led to a complete rupture between the two in 1925. By then Valois had veered toward fascism and could no longer brook what he considered the reactionary attitude and intellectualism of Maurras. Valois wanted action and it seemed to him that Maurras, leader of the *Action Française,* was opposed to action. Valois himself explained the controversy in 1927 by stating that:

> We (Valois) serve France—He [Maurras] serves the France of yesterday, and especially that of libraries—I serve the France of tomorrow, with automobiles, airplanes, and peasants working with machines. He is the theorist of a narrow, aggressive, exasperating, rational nationalism. I am the man who loves France without any reason than the fact of his birth, and who strives toward a higher formation.
>
> Maurras is a museum guard, an archivist rat; I am an organizer of factories, a road builder, and constructor of a new world. According to the vacabulary of Marinetti, Maurras is a *passéiste,* and I am a futurist.[74]

Although Maurras and the *Action Française* gave lip service to corporatism during the years preceding the first World War, their emphasis was largely on the political aspects of royalism. It was not until the era between the two World Wars that the *Action Française,* through the writings of its economic expert, Firmin Bacconnier, evolved a full-fledged corporative doctrine which drew heavily upon the works of La Tour du Pin.

Recapitulation

Corporatists who wrote in the years between the two World Wars could build upon the doctrines of various schools of thought prevalent in the period 1870-1918. Their indebtedness

74 Valois, *L'Etat syndical et la représentation corporative,* p. xviii.

to syndicalists, solidarists, and pluralists cannot be measured by exact instruments. However, the interbellum theorists repeated numerous ideas expounded by these groups and revealed an acquaintance with the works of their members. Frequently, they bestowed lavish praise upon syndicalists like Paul-Boncour, solidarists like Durkheim, and pluralists like Duguit.

Syndicalists probably encouraged most interbellum corporatists to give syndicates a place in their corporative system. Solidarists strengthened their desire for harmony and reconciliation between classes. Pluralists confirmed their belief in the importance of secondary institutions as limitations upon the state.

By interbellum corporatist standards, there were few corporatists outside of the Social Catholic school in the period 1870-1918. Mazaroz was a lone corporatist whose influence was limited; Durkheim possessed corporative ideas; Maurras gave lip service to corporatism; Paul-Boncour approached corporatism but did not commit himself. And in the years prior to the first World War, even the Social Catholics laid decreased emphasis upon corporatism. Nevertheless, the current of corporatism, strengthened by contributions from both corporative and non-corporative theorists from 1870-1914, reached flood proportions in the post World War I period.

CHAPTER V

FRENCH CORPORATISM BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS

Although corporative doctrines were being formulated in the years from 1870 to 1914 by Social Catholics and an assortment of political and social writers, the corporative movement by 1914 was still a relatively weak one compared to the growing force of socialism. Interrupted by the war, corporatism achieved new momentum in the interbellum period, breaking out in a torrent of pamphlets and propositions in the nineteen-thirties. It was then that the term "corporatism" came into general usage, appearing with or supplanting that of "corporative regime."

To a large extent this increase in the number and influence of corporatists can be explained by the mounting severity of the economic and social problems which were present in the earlier period and the existence of strains created by the first World War. After 1918 the path of capitalism became more and more thorny. It was beset by deeper economic crises, class struggle, and communism. Europe survived the period of painful adjustment and inflation after World War I only to fall into the depression of the thirties. Economic liberalism was subjected to more earnest attack. An alternative solution which would avoid laissez-faire and socialism was feverishly sought on all sides. For many, corporatism appeared to be the desired panacea.

Circumstances were thus more favorable to corporatism in the interbellum period, particularly in the nineteen-thirties, than ever before. In a passage written in 1935, Professor Gaëtan Pirou described the trend in the direction of corporatism:

> The significant observation of the present shows us that we are witnessing an evolution, visible in all countries, which is marked by the unmasking of two fundamental tendencies:

(1) The tendency to the affirmation of economic regulation to which the interested parties themselves are committed by profession and by region, and to which the minority, whether or not it is willing, must submit. (2) A tendency to the establishment of a right of general supervision by the state, as guardian of the general welfare, over the actions of professional economic groups. By this double evolution, we are gradually moving away from economic liberalism at the same time that we are moving towards a state to some extent corporatized. However, large individualistic zones remain and do not seem to disappear.

Whatever its defects, its gaps, its dangers, corporatism has a chance for adoption in the present hour of crisis when the masses of individuals, affected by the crisis, deceived by liberalism, yearn above all for discipline, from which they look for peace and safety. The circumstances of our day are thus more favorable to the advance of corporatism than were those of the nineteenth century.[1]

Beginning in 1926, many of the countries of Western Europe adopted regimes that were termed corporatist. In Italy under Mussolini, in Spain under Rivera, Portugal under Salazar, Austria under Dollfuss, the chief industries and occupational groups were constituted by government fiat as corporations, possessing "autonomous" jurisdiction over their own particular industrial spheres. "In practice, however, these 'corporations' either remained vague paper projects to be realized in some distant future," as in Portugal, "or became passive instruments for carrying out the policies dictated from above by an absolute central authority," as in Italy.[2]

1 Gaëtan Pirou, *Nouveaux aspects du corporatisme* (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1935), pp. 50-51.

2 Ralph H. Bowen, *German Theories of the Corporative State, With Special Reference to the Period 1870-1919* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1947), pp. 2-3. According to Bowen, the Nazi economic system was not corporative (*ibid.*, Ch. I, *passim*) and most French theorists held the same opinion. For a discussion of the various corporative regimes see:

The Trend Toward a Corporatist Economy in France

As in other European countries, economic and social conditions in France during the interbellum period constituted a favorable climate for the growth of corporative doctrines and to a limited degree the introduction of practices tending toward corporatism. The first World War left France in a feeble economic position characterized by the devastation of large areas, decreased industrial production, foreign and internal commerce, mounting indebtedness of the French treasury, and decline of the value of the franc. By 1926 the franc had been stabilized and by 1927 the reconstruction of devastated areas completed. Industrial production improved and the years 1928-1930 were ones of prosperity. The world wide depression hit France in 1931. Industrial activity, foreign trade, and prices declined, while the number of bankruptcies and unemployed rose rapidly. The number of those receiving unemployment relief grew from 1,000 in 1930 to 351,000 in February 1934 to 503,502 in February 1935. The Republic stood in danger of attacks from the authoritarian right which wanted to prevent class conflict by

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General: Louis Baudin, *Le Corporatisme: Italie, Portugal, Allemagne, Espagne, France* (Paris: Librairie Générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1942); R. Pré, *L'Organisation des rapports économiques et sociaux dans les pays à régime corporatif* (Paris: 1936).

Italy: G. Tassinari, *Fascist Economy* (Rome: Laboremus, 1937), *Fascist Era, Year XVII* (Rome: Fascist Confederation of Industrialists, 1939); G. L. Field, *The Syndical and Corporative Institutions of Italian Fascism* (New York: 1938); Carl T. Schmidt, *The Corporative State in Action* (New York: 1939).

Spain: J. J. Aspiazu, *El Estadu corporativo* (Pamplon: 1938).

Portugal: Odette Sanson, *Le Corporatisme au Portugal* (Paris: Librairie technique et économique, 1936); F. Cotta, *Economic Planning in Corporative Portugal* (London: 1937).

Austria: M. Stoffel, *Die Osterreichische Ständeordung* (Lachen: Switzerland, 1938).

The New World has been exposed to corporatism in Brazil. For the Brazilian system under Vargas see: K. Lowenstein, *Brazil Under Vargas* (New York: 1942).

Numerous French corporatists regarded the N.I.R.A. under Franklin D. Roosevelt as a step in the direction of corporatism.

force, and the Communist left. Dissatisfaction with economic conditions and with the corruption (as evidenced in the Stavisky Scandal), and instability of the parliamentary regime led to the riot of February 6, 1934 staged by the Fascist *Croix de Feu* and other rightist groups against the inefficiency of the Chamber. Over 2000 were wounded and several dozens killed. With the advent of Leon Blum's Popular Front government in 1936, it seemed as though social unrest, at least on the part of the left, might be eased. The franc was devalued, the munitions industry nationalized, and social legislation such as the forty-four hour week law and compulsory arbitration laws was enacted. However, the summer of 1936 witnessed large scale sit down strikes and it was with difficulty that the government reestablished industrial peace. Meanwhile the right feared Communism and objected to increasing socialization and the lowering of the work week. In 1937 the Blum government fell and the general strike of November 30, 1938 completed the destruction of the Popular Front. Daladier's attempt to lengthen the working week nad caused the C. G. T. to issue the strike call. The government broke the strike by mobilizing workers into the army and forcing them to work under military rule. The threat of a second world war further encouraged the trend toward the right.

In such an atmosphere of social conflict the movement toward corporatism is understandable. Professor Gaëtan Pirou and Charles Rist in a work published in 1939, which surveyed major trends in French economic life from 1911 to 1936, pointed to the introduction of corporatist elements into the French economy.

> The outlines of corporatism which have taken shape in certain sections of French economy . . . have found in the state an auxiliary without which the collective effort of the interested groups would not have achieved their goals. Free contract has receded in the face of legal regulation. Markets . . . have been

> 'made sane' by the public authorities who, partly by legislation and partly by giving legal force to private professional agreements, have substituted statutory imperatives for the spontaneous adaptation of supply to demand.[3]

Legal force was given to private professional agreements, particularly in the field of labor relations. The laws of 1936 on collective contracts and arbitration conferred unusual powers upon employer and employee syndicates. Specifically the law of June 24, 1936 provided for the formation of mixed commissions of employers and workers, comprising delegates of the most representative syndicates, to draw up collective contracts which could be rendered binding for the whole profession or industry. The law of December 31, 1936, supplemented by the decrees of January 16, 1937 and February 3, 1937, provided for compulsory bargaining and arbitration between employer and employee unions, although strikes were not prohibited. As in the case of the law of June 24, 1936, the "most representative unions" were to represent the profession, while the members of the highest conciliation board were to be appointed by the most representative confederations of employers and workers. Since the *Confédération Générale du Patronat Français*[4] (C.G.P.F.) and the *Confédération Générale du Travail* (C.G.T.) were recognized as the most representative confederations, their power was increased. They now possessed the right to represent in addition to their own members, individuals or organizations not associated with them.[5]

Certain administrative agencies were endowed with corporative characteristics. The *Office National du Blé,* created by the

3 Charles Rist and Gaëtan Pirou, "De la France d'avant guerre à la France d'aujourd'hui," *Revue d'économie politique* (January-February, 1939), pp. vii, ix.

4 Formerly the *Confédération Générale de la Production Française.* The name was changed in 1936. See Paul Marabuto, *Les Partis politiques et les mouvements sociaux sous le 4e république* (Paris: Sirey, 1948).

5 Roger Bonnard, *Syndicalisme, corporatisme et état corporatif* (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1937), pp. 29-36, 57-63.

law of August 15, 1936 brought about the fixing of the minimum price of wheat by producers, processors, consumers, and government representatives. Both employers and workers were represented in the personnel of the bureau.[6]

The National Economic Council set up by a decree of January 16, 1925 was another institution which represented the various economic interests of the country and included employers and employees. It was a purely advisory body.[7] In January, 1933 Paul-Boncour, prime minister at that time, presented a bill increasing the powers of the Council, basing representation more effectively on organized professions, and providing for the inclusion of a certain number of deputies and senators in its membership.[8] The project was defeated. However, a decree of July 24, 1936, though it still limited the Council to an advisory capacity, reformed the representation.[9] The Council was divided into twenty professional sections very similar to the twenty-two

6 *Ibid.*, pp. 95-97; S. B. Clough, *France, A History of National Economics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), p. 435.

The Marchendeau project of 1935 providing for industrial ententes of a compulsory nature was considered by many theorists as a move toward corporatism. The proposal concerned employers only. It did not become law. E. J. Massoubre, *Les Ententes professionnelles dans le cadre national et la doctrine ecónomique* (Paris: Editions Domat-Montchrestien, 1935), pp. 98-137 and *passim.*

7 Clough, *op. cit.*, p. 347; Odette de Puiffe de Magondeaux, *Les Ententes industrielles obligatoires et le corporatisme en France* (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1937), pp. 39-41.

The council was composed of forty-seven members representing three groups: (1) population and consumption, (2) labor, including intellèctuals and teachers, directors, wage earners, and artisans, (3) capital comprising industrial and commercial capital, real estate, banks and stock exchanges, insurance and savings institutions. The members of the economic council were to be delegated in each category by the most representative organization or organizations designated by the government.

Léon Duguit, *Traité de droit constitutionnel* (3rd ed.; Paris: Boccard, 1928), II, 763.

8 Ernest Paul, "Le Ministre Paul-Boncour et l'organisation économique de la nation," *L'Etat moderne*, April, 1933.

9 Puiffe de Magondeaux, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

Italian corporations created in 1934.[10] Each section was composed of an equal number of delegates of heads of businesses and of intellectual and manual workers.

In addition to legislative measures of a corporatist nature, there were a number of attempts in the direction of corporatism on the part of employers and workers. These were in the form of understandings or agreements and usually occurred when an industry was subject to an acute economic crisis. In 1931 and in 1935, when the French leather industry was at the mercy of Czech competition, employers and workers formed mixed com-

10 Puiffe de Magondeaux, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-52. In the left-hand column are the French sections and in the right the Italian corporations. It should be remembered that the French system was put into effect during the ministry of Léon Blum.

French	*Italian*
1. Cereals	1. Cereals
2. Viticulture	2.. Vegetable and flower raising
3. Stock-raising	3. Viticulture and wineries
4. Fruits, flowers, vegetables	4. Oil
5. Forests and fisheries	5. Beets and sugar
6. Alimentation and seafishing	6. Stock raising and fishing
7. Mining of combustibles and metals, extractive industries	7. Timber
8. Electricity, gas, water	8. Textile producers
9. Construction, public works	9. Metallurgy and mechanical engineering
10. Leathers and hides	10. Chemical trades
11. Textiles	11. Clothing trades
12. Iron-mines, foundries, metallurgy	12. Paper and printing
13. Chemical industries	13. Building trades
14. Paper, press, graphic arts	14. Water, gas and electrical supplies
15. Transports	15. Mining and quarrying industries
16. Commerce of edibles	16. Commerce of glass and potteries
17. Commerce of non-edibles	17. Professions and arts
18. Credit and banking, insurance	18. Insurance and credit
19. Arts, entertainment, liberal professions	19. Inland communications
20. Public service	20. Transport by sea and air
	21. Public entertainments
	22. Public hospitality (Hotels, etc.)

G. Tassinari, *Fascist Economy* (Rome: Laboremus, 1937), pp. 41-56; *Fascist Era, Year XVII* (Rome: Fascist Confederation of Industrialists, 1939), pp. 196-206.

mittees to set up import quotas.[11] In 1933, forest-proprietors and resin-workers in the Southwest (Forêt Landaise) organized a common front to save the industry upon which they depended for a livelihood.[12] An employer-worker alliance was formed in the fishing industry of Saint-Jean in 1934. A quasi-corporation had existed at Calais since 1923, when a collective contract, which was a veritable charter of labor, was signed by the Syndicate of Dock Workers and by the Calais Maritime Syndicate, an employers' organization.[13] A mixed committee was established to set conditions of work and to organize a system of insurance. In 1925 at Lyons an important collective contract was concluded between the Syndical Chamber of Metallurgical Industries of the Department of the Rhône, and the General Syndicate of Metal Workers. Wages were agreed upon and the delegates decided to meet each time circumstances warranted.[14] An attempt at corporative organization of theatrical business was made by Charles Martinelli, president of the *Union des Artistes.* Although a corporation of the theater was not perfected, some cooperation between various branches of the profession was achieved.[15]

The Roster of Interbellum Corporatists

This trend toward a corporative economy during the interbellum period found scores of apologists in France. While they regarded foreign corporative regimes as too *étatiste,* and the French state as far from corporatist, because among other fail-

11 Puiffe de Magondeaux, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-139; Pierre Lucius, *Une Grande industrie dans la tourmente* (Paris: Les Oeuvres françaises, 1935), pp. 148-162; Pierre Lucius, *Déchéance des bourgeoisies d'argent* (Paris: Flammarion, 1936), p. 271; Firmin Baconnier, *Le Salut par la corporation* (Paris: Les Oeuvres françaises, 1935), p. 114.

12 Bacconnier, *Salut,* p. 119; and in *Action française,* February 17, 1934, p. 3.

13 Bacconnier, *Salut,* pp. 125 ff.; Puiffe de Magondeaux, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-141.

14 Bacconnier, *Salut,* pp. 130-131; Puiffe de Magondeaux, *op. cit,* p. 142.

15 Bacconnier, *Salut,* pp. 123-124; Puiffe de Magondeaux, *loc. cit.*

ings it encouraged class organizations, they pointed to the development of corporatism as an inevitable and desirable phenomenon of the twentieth century. Borrowing from the works of nineteenth century corporatists, they argued forcefully for a French brand of corporatism more or less in the tradition of La Tour du Pin. Although representing different shades of political thought, they were united in viewing corporatism as the best method of checking the increasing menace of class warfare, depressions, statism, and communism.

A glance at the roster of the most representative of these corporatists reveals that they ranged in politics from extreme right to left of center. On the extreme right may be classed Fascists who advocated a corporative system. Jacques Doriot, an anti-militarist, anti-imperialist, communist deputy and contributor to *L'Humanité* in the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties,[16] in 1936 broke away from the communist party in order to become a fascist nationalist. In 1936 he founded the *Parti Populaire Français* and a paper, *L'Emancipation nationale,* embracing the corporative scheme.[17] During the Second World War he became a rabid pro-German.

Colonel François de la Rocque was another prominent Fascist. His organization, the *Croix de Feu,* became particularly powerful after the riots of February, 1934. In 1936, when the Popular Front government disbanded political leagues, the *Croix de Feu* was transformed into the *Parti-Social Français.* Both Doriot and De la Rocque watered down their Fascist doctrines, asserting that they wished to avoid the *étatisme* of Italian corporatism, and they paid lip-service to democracy before the defeat of France in the second World War.[18]

George Valois must be numbered among the outstanding corporatists of the extreme right during this period. An ardent

16 C. J. H. Hayes, *France, A Nation of Patriots* (Columbia University Press, 1931), p. 438.

17 Clough, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

18 François de la Rocque, *Service publique* (Paris: Grasset, 1934), pp. 213, 214; Jacques Doriot, *Refaire la France* (Paris: Grasset, 1938), *passim.*

nationalist, he gave fullest expression to his corporative theories in *L'Economie nouvelle,* published in 1919 when he was associated with the *Action Française.* By 1924, in his *Révolution nationale,* he was leaning toward fascism, while his foundation of the *Faisceau des combattants et des producteurs,* with its organ, *Nouveau siècle,* revealed him in 1925 an out-and-out Fascist. In 1933 he made a complete about-face, joining the left, and his subsequent evolution was in the direction of anarchism.[19]

René Dommange and François le Grix supported the riots of February, 1934, and expounded corporative doctrines in the pages of the *Revue hebdomadaire* during the years 1934-1939. The April 21, 1934 number of the review was devoted to Dommange's proposal for a corporative law based upon the principles of La Tour du Pin. In 1937, and again in 1938, Dommange and his fellow rightist deputies, Xavier Vallat and Philippe Henriot, presented these proposals in the Chamber. They met with the same fate as De Mun's earlier *proposition de loi.*

Royalist advocates of corporatism were also in great number. The prolific writers, Jacques Valdour and Georges Viance (or Georges Coquelle-Viance), were typical of a host of royalist corporatists. The Comte de Paris, the pretender to the throne of France, expressed his corporative views in his *Essai sur le gouvernement de demain,* (1936). The *Action française,* which was both royalist and Catholic, promoted the traditional corporatism of La Tour du Pin. The most complete and specific pres-

19 *Cf.* Valois, *La Politique de la victoire* (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1925), pp. ix, xiv, 1-4. On Valois, see Gaëtan Pirou, *Doctrines économiques en France depuis* 1870 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1925), pp. 190-195; Gaëtan Pirou, *Crise du capitalisme* (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1936), p. 143; René Gonnard, *Histoire des doctrinés économiques* (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1932), III, pp. 288-290. After 1933 Valois' schemes for economic reorganization, such as those in *Nouvel âge,* June, 1934, were not on a corporative basis.

entation of its corporative views since La Tour was made by Firmin Bacconnier, its economic expert. However, the Count of Paris, in disagreement with it, published his own paper, the *Courier royal* in 1935. Moreover, since the condemnation of the *Action française* in 1926 by Pope Pius XI many Catholics hesitated to lend it their support.

In this interbellum period, the Social Catholics continued to make significant contributions to corporatism as they had done in the late nineteenth century. Corporatism increasingly figured in the agenda of the *Semaines Sociales* whose annual meetings began again after the interruption of the first World War. In fact, the entire program of the *Semaine Sociale* of 1935, held at Angers, was devoted to the exposition of corporative schemes. Following the principles of La Tour du Pin and the encyclicals of Popes Leo XIII and Pius XI, Eugène Duthoit, President of the *Semaines,* enlarged upon his pre-war doctrines, elaborating a " moral " economy.[20] Like Duthoit, Paul Chanson, President of the Calais Maritime Employers' Syndicate, also based his corporative system on *Rerum novarum* and *Quadragesimo anno.*[21]

Among the employers supporting corporatism, Eugène Mathon and Pierre Lucius were outstanding. Both were influential industrialists who wrote in the nineteen-thirties. The former was President of the Central Committee of the Woolen Industry, wihle the latter was editor of *La Halle aux cuirs,* the organ of the leather industry. Both were traditionalists, Lucius quoting voluminously from Bonald, Chateaubriand, and La Tour du Pin, and both wished the control of the corporative system to remain in the hands of employers and to operate in their fa-

20 Eugène Duthoit, *L'Economie au service de l'homme* (Paris: Flammarion, 1932), pp. 234-235, 240 and *passim.* See also Duthoit's opening address at the *Semaine Sociale d'Angers* in *Chronique sociale,* 1935.

21 Paul Chanson, *Les Droits du travailleur et le corporatisme* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1935).

vor.[22] A more favorable attitude toward labor was to be found in the corporative schemes of the engineer, Maurice Lenormand.[23]

Another large group of corporative theorists was composed of intellectuals, chiefly professors and students of law.[24] Several of them, including Oliver-Martin, guild-historian, Gaston Boivin, pleader for corporatism in the manner of Levacher-Duplessis, and Bouvier-Ajam, author of numerous articles and books on corporatism, formed in 1935 an Institute for Corporative and Social Studies at Paris, under the presidency of Alfred Rolland, another corporative enthusiast. It published a monthly review entitled *Le Corporatisme*.[25] Gaëtan Pirou, Professor of Law at the University of Paris, definitely took a stand for corporatism in his *Crise du capitalisme*.[26] Moreover, he seemed to lean in the direction of an *étatiste* corporative system, since in his view semi-autonomous corporations were impractical. His colleague at the University of Paris, François Perroux, followed suit in developing corporative doctrines. Brethe de la Gressaye, Professor of Law at the University of Aix and a disciple of Duguit, also cast his influence on the side of corporatism. Students such as Odette de Puiffe de Magondeaux and M. Pennelier pointed out the advantages of corporative organization, although the latter recommended limitation of its jurisdiction to social functions—insurance, collective contracts, etc. In his view corporations should not be authorized to regulate production.

22 Eugène Mathon, *Crise économique et crise d'autorité* (Paris: Toumon et Cie., 1933); Lucius, *Une Grande industrie*, p. 15; Pierre Lucius, *Révolutions au XX^e siècle* (Paris: Payot, 1934), p. 328 and *passim*.

23 Maurice Lenormand, *Manuel pratique du corporatisme* (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan), *passim*.

24 In France, studies in economics are pursued under the Faculty of Law.

25 Pirou, *Nouveaux aspects du corporatisme* (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1935), p. 8; Gaston Boivin and Maurice Bouvier-Ajam, *Vers une économie politique morale* (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1937), pp. 10, 15.

26 Preface, pp. 11-13.

The signatories of the "Plan of the Ninth of July, 1934" represented still another school of corporatists. Soon after the riots of February of the same year, a group of young men desirous of reinforcing the democratic government of France with a strong executive, collaborated under the aegis of Jules Romains to formulate this plan. Among those who elaborated the program were "radicals," members of the agrarian party, the *Croix de Feu,* the *Jeunesses Patriotes,* syndicalists, socialists, and neo-socialists.[27]

One of the socialist group, Charles Spinasse, Minister of National Economy in the Blum cabinet (June, 1936-June, 1937) and the Chautemps ministry (1937-1938), as well as Minister of the Budget under Blum in 1938, joined those who demanded a corporative regime. Especially remarkable was his speech in the Chamber of Deputies on June 27, 1934 in which he proposed the "compulsory grouping of producers in each city and region and their union in central councils." [28]

In 1933 certain socialists broke away from the official socialist party, *Section Française de l'Internationale d'Ouvriers* (S.F.I.O.). Led by Marcel Déat, Adrien Marquet, B. Montagnon, and Max Bonnefous, they founded the Neo-Socialist group with a motto "Order, authority, nation." [29] In 1934 Déat wrote that "all the possibilities of rejuvenation of the state gravitate about the corporative idea." [30] Subsequently he veered further and further to the right, until as head of the National Popular Front, he became one of the leading pro-Germans in France during the second World War. Another group of dissenters from socialism dissociated themselves from the S.F.I.O. to form

27 Henri Noyelle, "Plans d'une économie dirigée," *Revue d'économie politique,* September-October, 1934, pp. 1663-1666.

28 Charles Spinasse in *Journal officiel des débats parlementaires,* No. 59. Séances ordinaires de la Chambre de Députés, 1934, 64e séance, June 27, 1934.

29 Max Bonnefous, *Néo-Socialisme* (Paris: Grasset, 1933).

30 *République,* June 19, 1934.

the *Parti Socialiste de France,* with corporatism on its program.[31] Certain syndicalists like Hyacinthe Dubreuil were also attracted by corporative ideas.[32]

An analysis of the ideas of the foregoing corporatists brings into clear relief a surprising similarity between their thought and that of their nineteenth century predecessors. While their attention was drawn more to problems which persistently plagued the twentieth century, and while they offered a greater wealth of detail in their blueprints for corporative society, they tended to follow the general lines traced by Buret, La Tour du Pin, and Durkheim.

Arguments for Corporatism

Arguments for corporatism presented by French theorists of the interbellum period were largely a repetition of those given through the nineteenth century. Except for a greater concern with the menace of depressions, strikes, statism, and Marxism, their phrases could have been composed by La Tour du Pin. As in the case of the latter, many of their arguments consisted of denunciations and criticisms of other systems of economic organization, both existing and proposed.

Economic liberalism was a favorite target for attack by corporatists in the twentieth century, as it had been in the nineteenth. This liberalism, they claimed, stemmed from the revolutionary philosophy of individualism which aimed "to direct man towards the material world, to drain him of all notion of eternity, of spiritual life, to make him a brute wanting sentiments of charity, pity, altruism." [33] Such a philosophy placed all

31 Clough, *op. cit.*, p. 311.

32 Hyacinthe Dubreuil, *La Fin des monstres* (Paris: 1938).
Dubreuil's later work, *La Chevalerie du travail* (Paris: Grasset, 1941), was dedicated to Marshall Pétain. In it he denounced class struggle and supported corporatism and solidarity between classes. He also advocated international corporatism and international cooperation on a corporative and economic basis.

33 Boivin and Bouvier-Ajam, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

its emphasis on rights and none on duties, and thus encouraged an " insatiable desire for continually mounting pleasure." [34]

According to Georges Valois, the fundamental error of liberalism in economic affairs was " the belief that liberty is the necessary condition of work, of production, of progress," [35] when as a matter of fact, such liberty had proven most unfavorable to work.[36] Like Levacher-Duplessis and La Farelle a century before, interbellum corporatists decried the production of shoddy goods in France which resulted from setting quantity rather than quality as a goal. Under economic liberalism, there were no regulations to act as a barrier to the progressive degeneration of French products.[37]

In addition to discouraging good workmanship, economic liberalism, corporatists asserted, fostered a disordered economy bringing in its wake overproduction, low prices and depression. Eugène Mathon viewed the depression of the thirties as the " natural consequence of the anarchical state of production and distribution," [38] while Pierre Lucius writing in 1935, declared that " disordered initiative tolerable in the last century has become a dangerous anachronism." [39] These sentiments were by no means new. Bénard in the early nineteenth century and Mazaroz in the latter part had bewailed overproduction, low prices, and bankruptcies, while Durkheim had seen *suicide anomique* as the inevitable result of such abominable conditions.

Lack of discipline and want of regulation were charged by Valois in 1919 with causing laziness and underproduction,

34 Maurice Clavière, " Rule of the Masses," *ibid.*, p. 30.

35 George Valois, *L'Economie nouvelle* (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1919), p. 129.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 134.

37 *Ibid.*, p. 89; Clavière, *op. cit.*, p. 30; Lucius, *Révolutions au XX^e siècle*, p. 36 and *passim.*

38 Eugène Mathon in Preface to Pierre Lucius, *Faillite du capitalisme* (Paris: Payot, 1932), p. 7.

39 Lucius, *Une Grande industrie dans la tourmente*, p. 10.

whereas most corporatists in the thirties traced to the same cause the opposite result—overproduction. A typical corporatist of the thirties, Firmin Bacconnier, urged limitation of production and tariffs to counteract the overstocking of the French markets. His arguments for tariffs in 1934 closely paralleled those of La Tour du Pin. He contended that free competition with foreign producers had ruined French agriculture and was ruining French industry. The freedom of French capital to make a profit wherever it could, was encouraging the production of the flax of Russia, the wool of Australia, the silk of China, Japan, and Burma. The law of relentless international competition converted France into a land of factories without food enough to maintain all her people. Like Italy, France should seek autarchy and should not surrender her national strength for the gold and silver of commerce.[40]

Economic liberalism was also partly responsible for the growth of class loyalty and class hatred which cut across national boundaries and even interfered with patriotism. "A working class in a state of permanent revolution, a prey to the most hate-inciting demagoguery," [41] ranged solidly against the employer class constituted an actual and even greater potential danger to the security of France. This state of affairs, although it had given rise to vague worries among certain nineteenth century corporatists, profoundly disturbed their twentieth century successors.

Perhaps the worst features of the laissez-faire economy from the corporatist point of view were the doctrines they conceived as derived from it—*étatisme* and Marxism. In face of *étatisme,* twentieth century corporatists preserved an attitude as severely disapproving as that of La Tour du Pin. Brethe de la Gressaye displayed the corporatist temper when he insisted that the ignorance of politicians and their proneness to intrigue made the

40 Bacconnier in *Action française,* March 3, 1934.

41 Clavière, *op. cit.,* p. 30.

democratic state absolutely incompetent in matters of production, so that all its attempts at regulation in this field were abortive.[42] Bacconnier adduced evidence from Brazil, where regulation of coffee production was attempted in 1926; from Canada, where wheat was subject to governmental control; from the United States and from France.[43] The state was also regarded as ineffectual in the administration of unemployment relief, accident insurance, old age pensions, and other social services.[44]

The fascist brand of *étatisme* was condemned just as much as the democratic type. Pierre Lucius, writing in 1934, accused fascism of "confounding state and society. . . . The traditional French conception of the state differs totally from that of fascism."[45] However, at the same time that Lucius and other corporatists desired the control of the economic system to remain chiefly in the hands of producers, they paradoxically demanded a strong state with a strong leader.[46]

It is understandable that the corporatist attack upon Marxism in the interbellum period should be more violent and more extensive than in the nineteenth century. With the establishment of communism in Russia, corporatists observed that the threat of Marxism increased many fold. Recognizing its appeal to the working class and identifying it as the chief rival of their doctrine at every point, theoretical and practical, they devoted

42 Brethe de la Gressaye, *Le Syndicalisme: l'organisation professionnelle de l'état* (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1930), p. 252.

43 Bacconnier in *Action française*, March 10, 1934.

44 See, for example, Hubert Ley in Boivin, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

45 Pierre Lucius, *Révolutions au XX^e siècle*, p. 348. See Eugène Duthoit, "Par une autorité corporative vers une économie ordonnée," *Chronique sociale de France*, July 1935, p. 484. The totalitarian regimes of Spain, Italy, and Germany met with particular disapproval.

46 Georges Valois, *La Révolution nationale* (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1924), pp. 124, 153, 168. Valois' desire for a strong state in 1924-1925 turned his sympathies toward fascism, although he still demanded a large degree of autonomy for corporations. See also Lucius, *Faillite du capitalisme*, p. 181.

considerable space in their writings to denying its basic tenets. Instead of elaborate arguments, a simple dogmatic rejection of Marxist principles was regarded as sufficient. Valois, for example, referring to the Marxist interpretation of history, declared: "The method of production does not determine the forms of moral, political, and intellectual life; rather, intellectual, moral and political life determines the forms of economic life." [47] Furthermore, added Valois, Marxism was based on a mistakenly optimistic view of human nature.

> They believe in the perfectibility of man . . . . They believe that the movement of history is one long story of the progressive liberation of man from restraints . . . . The Catholics, realistic and scientific, have on the contrary a pessimistic view of man. They conceive that man, undergoing the consequences of original sin, or limited by the imperfection of his nature, can only live, prosper, work, endure, if he is restrained, supported, surrounded by religious, intellectual, political, economic, and social institutions created by the experience of centuries.[48]

Valois was also vehement in his denial of Marx's theory of value, declaring that labor was not the sole creator of a surplus value which was then confiscated by the owning class. Marx overlooked the fact that inventors and managers also created value.[49]

Corporatist condemnation of the Marxist doctrine of the class struggle increased in vigor as the twentieth century advanced. Corporatists were agreed that the class struggle was not inevitable. Some, like De la Rocque, refused to acknowledge the existence of this struggle, or even of classes. In 1934 the Colonel wrote: "One thus realizes how false, artificial, fraudulent and pernicious is the doctrine of the class struggle. . . . There are no more classes. . . . But categories dissimilar to each

47 Valois, *L'Economie nouvelle*, p. 16.

48 *Ibid.*, pp. 58-60.

49 *Ibid.*, p. 112.

other do exist, according to the nature of the work that is done." [50] Other more realistic theorists, like Brethe de la Gressaye, recognized class hostility as a dangerous situation which should be corrected.[51] Both groups were united in the opinion that the class struggle, whether it represented something natural and real or not, was inimical to the welfare of France.

Revolutionary syndicalism, with its encouragement of worker syndicates as instruments of class warfare, was likewise denounced. Interbellum corporatists criticized Georges Sorel for having warned against class reconciliation in a "spirit of corporatism," [52] although they approved of his traditionalist ideas. The majority of theorists were willing to tolerate syndicates as subordinate bodies within the corporation, but Eugène Mathon and a minority renounced them altogether and refused them a role in forming the mixed corporation.[53] Many theorists demanded the dissolution of national syndical confederations as class organizations and applauded the Pétain government's outlawing of the *Confédération Générale du Travail* and the *Confédération Générale du Patronat Français*.[54]

In addition to purely negative arguments intended to destroy theories differing from their own, corporatist writers of the period between the two World Wars offered certain positive claims in behalf of a corporative system. They shared with La

50 François de la Rocque, *The Fiery Cross* (London: Lovat-Dickson, 1939), p. 106.

51 "Whatever the advance that has been made by the spirit of class, we believe that it is not too late to bring about a unity between the working class and the owning group. Only it is urgent to act and to act with good will on both sides." Brethe de la Gressaye, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

52 Hubert Ley in Boivin, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

53 Brethe de la Gressaye, *op. cit.*, p. 265, discussing the views of Mathon.

54 See for example: Georges Coquelle-Viance, *Libertés corporatives et unité nationale* (Paris: Dunod, 1937), pp. 221-222. *Proposition de loi tendant à l'organisation de la profession et de la vie économique presentée par Mm. Xavier Vallat, René Dommange, Philippe Henriot,* etc. (Chambre Des Députés, Annexe No. 1737, séance du 21 janvier, 1937), p. 49.

Tour du Pin the conception of corporatism as the balm which would heal the economic ills of France without resort to *étatisme* or Marxism. Moreover, they thought that the corporative regime would appeal to all kinds of persons—employers and workers, industrialists and farmers, nationalists and regionalists.

The argument that corporatism would transform the chaos of economic liberalism to a harmonious economy was repeated by corporatists in the twentieth century. Overproduction, unchecked competition, and ruthless price cutting would be eliminated through the regulation of production and prices by corporations. Private property would be protected and at the same time the worker would be given security of status and ownership rights in his job. The tyranny of capital would be crushed through placing the *sociétés anonymes* under the strict control of the corporation, and decentralization of French industry would be encouraged. In sum, French industry and agriculture —in fact, the whole national economy—would be greatly strengthened by the establishment of a corporative regime.

As a corrective to *étatisme* corporatism would relieve the state of tasks which it was not equipped to handle. Following the reasoning of Durkheim, Hubert Ley, a contributor to the symposium on corporatism edited by Gaston Boivin, expressed the general corporatist viewpoint when he declared that social insurance and economic regulation could be more efficiently administered by corporations than by the state.[55] Corporatism was indicated as an equally effective check to the " march of socialism and bolshevism," [56] the " spread of the Marxist menace." [57]

The capacity of corporatism to establish social peace was hailed by twentieth century corporatists as the most convincing of their arguments. " We believe that corporatism is the only remedy capable of appeasing labor conflicts." [58] These theorists

55 Hubert Ley in Boivin, *op cit.*, p. 15.

56 Mathon in Lucius, *Faillite du capitalisme*, p. 7.

57 *Loc. cit.*

58 Alfred Rolland, " Preface " to Boivin, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

quoted passages from Pius XI's *Quadragesimo Anno*, which characterized corporations as agencies of social peace.

> The goal that must be set first of all both by the state and the upper classes, the object of all their efforts, is to put an end to the conflict that divides the classes, and to effect and foster a cordial collaboration of professions. Social reform will accordingly bend all effort towards restoring the professional *corps*.[59]

Theorists insisted that a corporative regime would bring employers and employees together at the bottom of the productive process, at the very point where the two interests met, thus preventing the growth of two hostile fronts which could ruin the nation.[60]

Just as Marxists believed in the inevitability of class struggle and the victory of the proletariat, their corporatist opponents were convinced of the future triumph of corporatism. Associations of a corporative nature were growing up naturally and spontaneously—witness the organization of the metal industry, and the mines. Whenever pressure from foreign industry or agriculture became acute as in the leather, fur, fishing, lumber, and automobile industries, employers and employees drew together in a corporative organization. A trend as desirable and obvious as this should be given legal encouragement and sanction by the state.[61]

Another set of arguments were those which praised corporatism because it would restore certain traditional values. In the

59 Pius XI, *Quadragesimo Anno*, quoted in Paul Chanson, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

60 See: Lucius, *Faillite du capitalisme*, p. 176; Duthoit in *Chronique Sociale de France 1935*, p. 503; François Perroux, *Capitalisme et communauté de travail* (Paris: Sirey, 1938), pp. 3-4 and *passim*; Coquelle-Viance, *op. cit.*, p. 239; Lenormand, *op. cit.*, p. 13 and *passim*; Marcel Déat, "Corporatisme et liberté," *Archives de philosophie du droit et de sociologie juridique*, 1938, p. 65.

61 See for example: Bacconnier, *Salut*, pp. 41-42, 106-131; *Odette de Puiffe de Magondeaux*, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-146; Gaëtan Pirou, *Le Corporatisme* (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1935), pp. 24-34.

view of recent theorists, as of Levacher-Duplessis who wrote over a century earlier, corporatism, "traditional in principles and modern in application," would bring about in France the "restoration of the ancient rules of conscience that made the strength and grandeur of past centuries." [62] It would initiate a moral economy, one in accord with a hierarchy of values sanctioned by the past. Through this moral economy would be reestablished the discipline, order, and just price characteristic of Thomistic economics and the guilds of the Middle Ages.[63]

In keeping with this traditionalism was reverence for "traditional family life." The precarious position of the peasant family in modern civilization was perceived with alarm. A corporative regime would help to preserve the family [64] and corporatists welcomed the measures which the Pétain government directed toward this end.

Fortified by such arguments both negative and positive, corporative thinkers of the period which bridged the two World Wars embarked upon plans for a corporative society. That their plans were not completely utopian was demonstrated by their partial fulfillment under the Pétain regime.

Plans for Corporative Organization

The generation of corporatists which the interbellum period brought into prominence was prolific in its plans for a corporative organization of society. While on a few specific items there was sharp disagreement, the degree of unanimity among these theorists who wrote from divers points of the political compass was striking.

Regarding the definition of the term "corporation" [65] the

62 Boivin, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

63 Duthoit in *Chronique sociale de France, 1935,* pp. 528-530 and *passim.* Boivin, *op. cit., passim.*

64 See for example, Boivin, *op cit.*, p. 33.

65 Hyacinthe Dubreuil differed from most corporatists in his use of the word "syndicate" instead of "corporation." From his description of the "syndicate's" structure and functions, it was a corporation in the meaning of most corporatists.

body of opinion seemed to divide into two main camps. Adherents to the first emphasized the corporation as an association of producers,

> an organism which groups all those—employers, employees, directors, foremen, technicians—who participate in the production of the same category of products and are bound, consequently, by a common interest superior to the interests which divide them.[66]

Members of the second group stressed the relationship of the corporation to the state, regarding the former as "a trade organization to which the state has given autonomous power and the government of the professional community." [67]

There was general accord on the principle tasks which corporatists thought should be performed by the corporation. These fell into the two broad categories of social and economic functions. Some theorists wished to delegate to employers alone the right to administer the economic duties of the corporation,[68] while others, refused to make this distinction and encouraged worker participation in all phases of corporative activity.[69]

Possession of a patrimony was essential if the corporation was to fulfill its functions, particularly its role of social benefactor. The idea of a corporative patrimony was as old as the medieval guild and had descended to twentieth century theorists through the doctrines of Villeneuve-Bargémont, Emile Keller, and La Tour du Pin. Interbellum corporatists interpreted the patrimony as the collective property of all workers to be used mainly as a benefit fund. A patrimony for employers was ignored, since the latter possessed the profits of industry. Nevertheless, most theorists agreed with La Farelle and La Tour that both employers and employees should be responsible for the

66 Pierre Lucius, *Rénovation du capitalisme* (Paris: Payot, 1933), p. 303.

67 Chanson, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

68 Duthoit, Lucius, and Mathon in particular.

69 Chanson, Brethe de la Gressaye, Bacconnier, et al.

fund. Duthoit, however, proposed that it be managed by employers and accountants without collaboration of workers.[70]

A variety of methods for raising the patrimony were suggested. Dues could be collected from employers and employees or gross profits could be taxed. Some theorists contended that a combination of both methods would give the worker an interest in the prosperity of his industry and avoid the disadvantages of distributing bonuses among individuals.[71]

Both nineteenth and twentieth century theorists listed the same uses for the patrimony. Primarily, it would be applied to the payment of social insurance covering old age, sickness, disability, accident, and unemployment. Corporatists felt that private insurance companies would not have the interests of workers at heart and would boost premiums at the first opportunity, while the state was incompetent in such matters, as Durkheim had argued. Collection and disbursement of insurance funds would be less expensive under corporations than under the state. It would avoid state bureaucracy, increase the loyalty of workers to their profession, and dispel any feelings of inferiority to which workers might be subject as beneficiaries of the state. In the best Bargémont-La Tour tradition, the patrimony would be used to provide technical schools, medical care, club facilities, entertainment, and social life for the worker and his family.[72]

70 Duthoit in *Chronique sociale de France, 1935*, pp. 522-524. On the patrimony see also: Henri, Comte de Paris, *Essai sur le gouvernement de demain* (Paris: Flammarion, 1936), p. 185; Brethe de la Gressaye, *op. cit.*, p. 261; Chanson, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-182; Eugène Mathon, Preface to Pierre Lucius, *Faillite du capitalisme*, p. 338; Lucius, *Révolutions au XX^e siècle*, p. 338; Firmin Bacconnier, *Action française*, April 1, 1934; Bacconnier, *Salut*, pp. 231-232; Bacconnier, *L'A.B.C. du syndicalisme* (Autun: Imprimerie Pernot, 1927), p. 8.

71 Chanson, *op. cit.*, p. 181; Brethe de la Gressaye, *op. cit.*, p. 261 *et al.*

72 These ideas about social insurance were present in most corporatist works. See, for example, Chanson, *op. cit.*, pp. 182, 188; Bacconnier, in *Action française*, April 1, 1934; Lucius, *Révolutions au XX^e siècle*, p. 338; Brethe de la Gressaye, *op. cit.*, pp. 259, 261, 332. Lucius praised a law proposed in 1930, but not passed, which provided for regional chambers to

The corporation would also protect workers by guaranteeing them a vested interest in their trade. This concept of *propriété du métier* was hallowed by medieval guild tradition, and by nineteenth century writers such as Sismondi, De Mun, La Tour, and others. Brethe de la Gressaye was among the few interbellum theorists who charged that it would revive certain abuses of the closed corporations of the Old Regime.[73] For partisans of the principle, the outward sign of such "property" was to take the form of a certificate or *brevet* of professional capacity issued to each worker on his enrollment as a member of the corporation.

Admission to the corporation was possible only on "proof of capacity, of solvency, of morality, and of willingness to accept the discipline and regulation of the trade." [74] A few corporatists included a nationality qualification which would debar foreigners, unless exceptionally talented, from membership.[75] A worker's job would be safeguarded as long as he did not grossly violate corporative rules. If unemployed during an unusual economic crisis he would receive financial aid from the corporation, which would be obliged to find him another job or to train him for another trade where there were openings. The corporation was also responsible for the technical education of the worker both during and after apprenticeship, and was to make the same opportunity available to his children. Good conduct and efficiency were to be rewarded by promotion in the hierarchy of the trade, and the élite of workers would reach the enviable rank of employer at the top.

The position of employer in the corporative hierarchy was often left unclarified by corporatists. As a rule, a career as a worker was not required as a prerequisite to employer status,

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administer social insurance. As a substitute for a life-annuity ceasing at the worker's death, the project provided for the building up of a capital to be paid to the worker when he reached the age of thirty.

73 Brethe de la Gressaye, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

74 Bacconnier, *Salut*, p. 163.

75 Bacconnier, for example. See *ibid.*, pp. 158-160.

nor were restrictions often placed on the admission of employers to the corporation. There was considerable vagueness as to whether or not employers would need a certificate of professional capacity. Bacconnier, for example, stated:

> The certificate of professional capacity can be delivered to all the agents of production, to the engineer as well as to the worker; without this certificate no one can be an active member of the corporation or raise himself above the lowest rank of the professional hierarchy.[76]

If theorists intended to duplicate the medieval guild requirements of service as a journeyman or laborer, and of a qualifying examination as the *sine qua non* for mastership, they seldom said so in unequivocal terms.

The economic functions of the corporation were considered of equal importance with its social tasks. Pennelier took exception to the general opinion, insisting upon the confinement of corporative activities to purely "social" matters.[77] The chief economic functions which theorists considered as pertaining to the domain of corporations were the following: the settlement of working conditions including wages and hours, arbitration of employer-employee disputes, control of prices, and regulation of production both in quantity and quality. Jurisdiction over these economic concerns had existed in practice in the medieval guild and in theory in the doctrines of Buret, La Tour, Mazaroz, and Durkheim. Interbellum corporatists preferred to follow the precedent of these men rather than that set by the early nineteenth century theorists Sismondi, Villeneuve-Bargémont, and La Farelle who, infected with economic liberalism, refused corporations a voice regarding wages and prices.

Most theorists, even those who doubted the competence of workers to regulate prices and production, granted that both

76 Bacconnier, *Action française*, April, 1934.

77 Pennelier, *La Conception corporative de la Tour du Pin* (Paris: Editions Donat-Montchrestien, 1937), p. 145.

employers and employees should participate in the determination of wages and hours and other conditions of labor. They stipulated that collective contracts setting forth hours, wages, and working conditions in general should be drawn up. Wage provisions of these contracts were to conform to the concept of just wage originated in Thomistic theory and preserved by La Tour du Pin. Elaborate procedures were evolved for the adjudication of disputes. Under them either contestant could appeal from lower to higher levels of the corporative system, but should one or both parties refuse to accept arbitration, judgment would be rendered by the state's representative. The state would be the court of last appeal.[78]

Many, if not most, interbellum corporatists felt that such arbitration measures demanded the outlawing of strikes. To them strikes or the threat of strikes denoted interference with attempts to "discipline" production and an increasingly serious manifestation of class warfare. In opposing the right to strike, these corporatists outstripped their nineteenth century predecessors, thereby illustrating the extent of syndical growth and of tension in labor-capital relations. As in other cases, there were exceptions to the general pattern. Brethe de la Gressaye, more in sympathy with labor than many of his fellow theorists, did not consider the outlawing of strikes a necessity.[79]

The setting of prices, with emphasis on "just price," was confined to employer members of the corporation by these corporatists partial to this class.[80] A number of other writers allowed labor to assist in the establishment of prices.[81] A motive for price control was the decrease or elimination of competition, although Mathon and Lucius paradoxically advocated the con-

78 Brethe de la Gressaye, *op. cit.*, p. 325; Henri, Comte de Paris, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-194; *et al.*

79 Brethe de la Gressaye, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

80 Duthoit, Lucius, Mathon.

81 Chanson, Bacconnier, Brethe de la Gressaye, *et al.*

tinuance of competition simultaneously with regulation of prices and production.[82]

Limitation of production was deemed an essential item on the corporative agenda, especially by those corporatists writing after 1929. So plagued were they by the bogey of " overproduction " that some were eager for immediate limitation, even before setting up a corporative system. Lucius suggested the prompt adoption of a transitional system for the leather industry, by which each tanner would be given coupons valid for the purchase of his quota of raw materials. Quotas would be fixed by a council of the leather industry.[83]

Control of production by the corporative system proper would involve certain measures in addition to the placing of quotas. Sudden adoption of new machinery or labor-saving devices would be subject to restrictions in order to prevent technological unemployment. The corporation would seek to extend domestic markets through the establishment of high tariff walls, the development of new uses for products and the maintenance of quality.

Quality, not quantity, was one of the watchwords of corporatists during the thirties. Guided by the experience of the medieval guilds and the theories of La Farelle and La Tour, they proposed to use a corporative trade mark on all products which passed careful inspection.[84]

Georges Valois, writing in 1919 as a member of the *Action Française,* was interested not in the limitation of production, but in the manufacture of more and more goods at lower prices. He therefore sketched the following system of automatic production:

82 Lucius, *Révolutions au XX^e siècle,* pp. 336-337.

83 Lucius, *Une Grande industrie dans la tourmente,* p. 97.

84 See for example: Lucius, *Révolutions au XX^e siècle,* p. 336.

> Unions of merchants in contact with consumers and feeling their pressure, exert pressure on unions of producers to obtain lower prices; unions of technicians and labor exert pressure on unions of producers to obtain higher wages. Harrassed on all sides, the producers have only one way out—technical progress which leads to increased yield and to lower prices. In turn, they exert pressure on technicians and labor to obtain a better professional yield, or on commercial unions to obtain new or more extended markets.[85]

Theorists of the interbellum period were fascinated by the structural problems which the planning of a corporative society presented and some of them even seemed more interested in how corporations were to be organized than in what they were to do. The majority made elaborate provisions for the component parts of corporations, pyramidization, and intercorporative relationships.[86]

Most corporatists refused to sanction the destruction of existing employer-employee syndicates but desired instead their integration into the framework of the corporation.[87] The corporation was also to include syndicates of foremen, technicians, clerks, and "chiefs of services."[88] Agricultural corporations were to contain unions of farmers, sharecroppers, and farm workers.[89] Certain corporatists were willing to allow the mem-

85 Valois, *L'Economie nouvelle*, p. 184. See appendix for diagrams of this scheme.

86 See appendix for diagrams of the schemes of various interbellum corporatists.

87 "Corporative organization does not tend in any way to destroy syndicates; on the contrary it reserves to them very important functions, but it submits them to a higher authority." Brethe de la Gressaye, *op. cit.*, p. 340; see also pp. 254, 319; Bonnard, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

88 Valois, *L'Economie nouvelle*, pp. 282, 283. Most corporatists held the same view on this point. Mathon disagreed with the general opinion on syndicates and refused to give them an official standing in the corporation. Brethe de la Gressaye, *op. cit.*, p. 263, expounding the theories of Mathon.

89 For example: Bacconnier, *Salut*, p. 139; the Comte de Paris desired that the rural family should be the basis of the agricultural corporation, but was extremely vague about this point. Comte de Paris, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

bership of both non-syndicated employers and employees within the corporative structure. These would invariably suffer discrimination, since they would either be entirely deprived of the right to vote in corporative elections, or be given fewer votes than syndicate members. Brethe de la Gressaye, for example, weighted the scales heavily in favor of the latter by bestowing upon them a double vote.[90]

The problem of neatly classifying industries into corporations, largely passed over by nineteenth century theorists, drew like a magnet the attention of writers during the long truce between the two great wars. Their books abounded in drafts of vertical or horizontal corporations, the majority delineating the former. By vertical type was meant a corporation grouping all those industries involved in producing the same or similar products or utilizing the same raw material. The whole process of production, transformation and distribution was included. Lucius' leather corporation consisting of cattle raisers, tanners, shoemakers, salesmen, and all those connected with leather, and Valois' book corporation embracing the various professions and trades of writing, publishing, bookbinding, printing, papermaking, bookselling, etc. illustrate the general principle of a vertical corporation.[91]

Various ways of grouping industries into a vertical corporation were described by the Comte de Paris. Grouping " by similarity " would unite into one corporation all the trades and industries employing the same techniques and manufacturing similar products. For example, the entire automobile, motorcycle, and airplane industries would constitute a single corporation. Grouping by " convergence " would bind into one corpo-

90 Brethe de la Gressaye, *op. cit.*, pp. 255, 325.

91 Valois, *L'Economie nouvelle*, pp. 284-285; Lucius, *Révolutions au XX^e siècle*, p. 380; Lucius, *Une Grande industrie dans la tourmente*, p. 79. See the proposals for a vertical corporation of Mathon and Brethe de la Gressaye: Bacconnier, *Salut*, pp. 139-140 discussing the views of Mathon; Brethe de la Gressaye, *op. cit.*, p. 323. See appendix for Valois' scheme in detail.

ration all the trades and industries working toward the same goal. For example, masons, carpenters, plumbers, elevator constructors, etc., would be embraced within the building corporation. By the third method of combination, all those industries which extracted, transported, or utilized the same raw material would be assembled together. There would thus be a gasoline corporation, a rubber corporation, etc. Lastly, classifying " by cycle of production " would centre the corporation around the product. The flour corporation would include producers of wheat, grain-brokers, millers, bakers, pastry-cooks, etc. The Comte de Paris seemed to prefer this last method, although he realized that the most feasible combination would be prescribed by circumstances.[92]

By horizontal type of structure, theorists referred to a corporation of industries which confined their operations to the same stage of production or to similar economic activity. Bacconnier's proposed agricultural corporation exemplified this type. Wheat-growers, stock-raisers, and farmers would comprise the agricultural corporation. Grain brokers and other agricultural brokers would join in a separate horizontal corporation, while millers and other processors would form still another. Bacconnier and Lenormand opposed a vertical scheme in which the wheat corporation would admit all those dealing with wheat at any stage from land to consumer, claiming that farmers would be at the mercy of grain brokers.[93] Some theorists who endorsed the horizontal plan, restricted the scope of each corporation to one craft, much in the manner of the medieval craft guild.[94] The various kinds of horizontal corporation were criti-

92 Comte de Paris, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-92. For a similar analysis, see Bonnard, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71.

93 Bacconnier, *Salut*, pp. 139-140; Lenormand, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

94 Brethe de la Gressaye, while favoring vertical corporations and giving them full legal status, at the same time allowed craft societies freedom to develop. Brethe de la Gressaye, *op. cit.*, p. 323.

cized by proponents of the vertical scheme as artificial in nature and tending to break up the solidarity binding the economic activities relative to a specific product.[95]

Regardless of whether they preferred a vertical or horizontal structure, theorists shared the feelings of Buret, La Tour, and Mazaroz that some sort of pyramidization was imperative. At the apex should be a national or general council of the corporation, in the middle regional units, and at the base local councils. Delegates would be elected from one level of the hierarchy to the next one. Appeals from the decisions of the lowest council would be taken through the hierarchy to the national council, if necessary.[96]

Supplementary to and concomitant with organization by in-industry or trade, an inter-corporative association would exist. Interbellum corporatists were eulogistic of regions and some, like Paul-Boncour, paid allegiance to the concept of economic federalism. "Decentralize French industry" was one of their most reiterated slogans. To this end, a ladder was constructed, with a district council of different corporations at the base, a regional chamber above, and a national chamber of corporations or a national economic council over the entire corporative system. By means of such a structure different industries would be able to communicate their needs to one another. Production and prices could thus be coordinated regionally throughout the nation as a whole.[97] As an alternative scheme, Bacconnier pro-

95 See Bonnard, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71.

96 On the structure of the pyramid see Valois, *L'Economie nouvelle*, pp. 28-283; Comte de Paris, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-187; Brethe de la Gressaye, *op. cit.*, p. 257 on the Social Catholic scheme; Bacconnier, *Salut*, pp. 141-143; Duthoit in *Chronique sociale de France, 1935*, p. 524; Lucius, *Déchéance des bourgeoisies d'argent*, pp. 272-273; Lucius, *Une Grande industrie dans la tourmente*, p. 82.

97 Valois, *L'Economie nouvelle*, pp. 269-270; Comte de Paris, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-187; Lucius, *Déchéance des bourgeoisies d'argent*, pp. 272-273; Brethe de la Gressaye, *op. cit.*, p. 344, Duthoit in *Chronique sociale de France, 1935*, pp. 519-520; Chanson, *op. cit.*, pp. 229-231. For a detailed description of the

posed that intercourse between corporations be maintained by special organs of liaison.[98] The Comte de Paris hoped for the eventual fusion of the two general systems, the professional and the regional.[99]

The government of each corporation would be mainly in the hands of the local corporative council and would perform social and economic functions. However, regulations and decrees of the local council could be altered by a higher council in the corporation, or by one of the intercorporative bodies, and in the final instance, the state could change any measure which it deemed contrary to public welfare.

Further complications were introduced by certain corporatists with a pro-employer bias. Their division of the corporation into sections, in only some of which employers would be given a voice, was a convenient method of insuring the supremacy of employers. They were insistent that prices and production be regulated by the employer section of the corporative council, for the employing class, they argued, took the risks of industry and should be given every opportunity to safeguard their interests. Also, matters of price fixing and production were beyond the competence of workers.[100] They should have no fear that ex-

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national council, especially in its relations to the state, see the following section. The national council, while possessing the power to coordinate and integrate the activities of the various corporations, was awarded by most theorists merely a consultative role in the political government.

98 Bacconnier, *Action française*, February 17, 1934; *Salut*, pp. 141-143.

99 Comte de Paris, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-189, 195.

100 Duthoit suggested that the corporative council contain four distinct sections: 1) economic section (employers only) regulating production and prices; 2) labor section (employers and workers) controlling wages and hours; 3) financial section (employers and accountants) in charge of the corporative patrimony; 4) technical section (engineers and craftsmen) in charge of the technological phases of production. Duthoit in *Chronique sociale de France, 1935*, pp. 522-524. Mathon and Lucius recommended only two sections: 1) economic section (employers only) regulating production and sales; 2) social section (employers and employees) regulating wages and hours and managing the corporative patrimony. Lucius, *Révolutions au XX^e siècle, passim.*

cessive employer authority would lead to monopoly prices, because different professions would exercise mutual restraint upon each other, while the state could intervene as a last resort to protect the common weal. Eugène Mathon suggested consumer organization as a further preventive of possible abuses.[101]

A system so heavily weighted on the side of employers was challenged by the true disciples of Buret, La Tour, Mazaroz, and Durkheim. Paul Chanson expressed the viewpoint of this group:

> Whether corporative or intercorporative councils, whether local, regional, or national councils—all the corporative organisms will be *paritaire* and mixed. It is in this sense that corporatism is revolutionary and that one may speak of its "constructive revolution." This revolution brings to the fore a great problem, the realization of the participation of workers, not only in the social government of the corporation, but also in its economic government.[102]

He also cited passages from Pope Pius XI's encyclical, *Quadragesimo Anno,* to show that full participation of workers in the corporation was in the best Catholic tradition.[103]

Where labor was given a vote, it was hedged in by elaborate requirements of age and experience, while restrictions were seldom placed on the employer's franchise. Eugène Mathon listed the following qualifications for electors: minimum age twenty-five years; minimum experience five years (including apprenticeship); and employment in the same establishment for at least two years. He raised the requirements for election to office to thirty, ten, and four years, respectively, with the additional stipulation that every officer be the head of a family of at least three children.[104] Sympathetic to labor though he was, Paul

101 Brethe de la Gressaye, *op. cit.*, p. 263, explaining the theories of Mathon; Puiffe de Magondeaux, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

102 Chanson, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

103 *Ibid.*, pp. 233-235.

104 Lucius, *Révolutions au XX^e siècle*, pp. 337-338, citing Mathon.

Chanson declared that the inexperienced, beardless youth should not be put on the same footing with the seasoned worker and consequently classed workers according to their years in the profession, bestowing plural votes upon those with the longest service.[105]

Most interbellum corporatists rejected the proposal of vote by order in the corporative council, according to which each order —capital, labor, technicians—would have only one vote.[106] They recommended that the number of employer and employee delegates in the council be *paritaire*. This word parity was used in a loose sense. To many corporatists it meant that the employing group—always smaller numerically—would be allotted at least an equal number of delegates (and presumably of votes) as the worker group. Duthoit thought that management should be entitled to as many representatives (and therefore the possibility of as many votes) as all the other groups—engineers, technicians, and workers taken together.[107] There were other theorists who went even further, and hinted that to employers, should fall a greater number of delegates and votes. Brethe de la Gressaye, though in general favorable to labor, provided that the president of the corporation should "weigh" the votes "equitably" to each faction.[108]

In discussing the question of whether or not the corporative regime should be all-inclusive, compelling all industries to join, most corporatists provided for a period of transition before the legalization of corporations. During this period, it would be made increasingly disadvantageous for persons or enterprises to be isolated from the corporative fold. Once the corporations

105 Chanson, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

106 This had been proposed by La Tour du Pin.

107 Duthoit in *Chronique sociale de France, 1935*, p. 163.

108 Brethe de la Gressaye, *op. cit.*, p. 320. The Count of Paris regretfully wrote that "perhaps in the beginning, while workers do not have sufficient education . . . only a consultative voice should be given to the representatives of workers." Comte de Paris, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

became legal, the majority urged compulsory membership.[109] Roger Bonnard formulated the position: "There can never be for the corporation as for the syndicate, voluntary or optional adherence."[110] Bacconnier, on the other hand, in a pamphlet published in 1927, made allowances for the existence of employers and workers outside the corporative system. This, he indicated, could be achieved through the medium of the *corps d'état.*[111] Within the *corps d'état,* the totality of persons exercising the same trade or profession would exist. Each *corps d'état* would possess a professional chamber representing all producers, whether members of the corporation or not.[112] The Comte de Paris provided that private companies, excluding *sociétés anonymes,* whose capital did not surpass a certain figure, would be permitted to continue outside the corporation. However, such companies would be at a decided disadvantage, since the Count suggested that corporations be given special privileges by the government.[113]

Some of the bitterness of La Tour du Pin's attack on *sociétés anonymes* crept into the corporate writings of the nineteen-thirties. In one work after another appeared indictments of these giant combines. They were accused of having brought about the depersonalization of capital and the irresponsibility of directors of enterprise, thus permitting an oligarchy of three hundred financiers to dominate the principle economic forces of France.[114] The corporative regime was advanced as the only

109 See, for example, Chanson, *op. cit.*, p. 228; Puiffe de Magondeaux, *op. cit.*, p. 118; Spinasse, *op. cit.*, p. 1826.

110 Bonnard, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

111 This concept of *corps d'état* had been developed by La Tour du Pin and the Social Catholic school.

112 Bacconnier, *L'A.B.C. du syndicalisme,* p. 7.

113 Comte de Paris, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

114 See, for example, Bacconnier, *Salut,* pp. 163, 165, 167.

effective counter-measure to this dictatorship of capital. Compulsory inscription of *sociétés anonymes* in the corporation would subject them to the healthy restraints of corporative regulation. Reforms in the management of these societies were also suggested. Lucius, for example, specified that there should be a single head over each *société anonyme*. Elected by the stockholders from the corporation of commissioners of superintendence he would be known to the public, financially responsible, irremovable except for malfeasance, and entrusted with real power.[115]

For several theorists, corporative regulation of *sociétés anonymes* was inadequate and needed to be supplemented by special state surveillance. Chanson accepted corporative control of many *sociétés anonymes* but thought that those *sociétés* engaged in banking and credit and in public utilities should come under close state supervision.[116] The socialist, Spinasse, went even further and called for state management of all *sociétés anonymes*.[117] The latter proposition, however, was unpalatable to most corporatists who endeavored to shy clear of *étatisme*.

Try as they would, interbellum corporatists could not avoid mention of the state and its role in the corporative system, and their references to state intervention in the interest of the public were numerous. In fact, many theorists devoted a chapter of their works to the relationship between corporations and the state.

The Role of the State in Corporatist Theory

Though the winds of political doctrines blew over Europe during the armistice between the two World Wars, French corporatists advanced few fresh ideas on the nature of the state

115 Lucius, *Révolutions au XX^e siècle*, pp. 341-342. See also the similar proposals of Chanson in Chanson, *op. cit.*, p. 243 and *passim*.

116 *Ibid.*, pp. 104, 108, 130, 177, and *passim*.

117 Spinasse, *op. cit.*, p. 1826.

and its place in a corporative regime. As in so many other aspects of their doctrine, the same concepts, indeed the same phrases as those of nineteenth century theorists, leap from the pages of their books. A new twist here, a difference in detail there ornamented the central pattern.

These corporatists with few exceptions evinced as much apprehension as had earlier theorists over the prospect of complete creation of a corporative regime by state fiat. Only gradually, they reasoned, should chambers of commerce, agricultural organizations, labor unions, and similar associations be integrated into corporations. " The interior constitution of the corporation should in large measure be left to employers and workers themselves " [118] since " in the organization of work, the best legislators are producers themselves." [119] The Comte de Paris spoke for the opposition on this issue. As defender of the royal prerogative, he contended that the state should organize the corporative system from the beginning.[120]

There was no division of opinion on the point that corporations should be legalized and nurtured by the state. They should be recognized as public rather than private institutions, their regulations should have the authority of public law, and they should be endowed with the legal right to perform many public functions formerly executed by the state.[121]

Within the state, the corporation was to possess a limited autonomy. While certain theorists of a leftist tendency granted extensive control over the corporative system to the state,[122] the

118 Plan du 9 juillet (Paris: Gallimard, 1934), p. 45.

119 Bacconnier, *L'A.B.C. du syndicalisme*, p. 11.

120 Henri, Comte de Paris, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

121 Bacconnier, *L'A.B.C. du syndicalisme*, p. 12; Bacconnier, *Salut*, pp. 11, 149; Brethe de la Gressaye, *op. cit.*, pp. 255 ff., 344-358; Duthoit in *Chronique sociale de France, 1935*, p. 517; Lucius, *Révolutions au XX^e siècle*; pp. 336-338.

122 For example, Charles Spinasse. François Perroux who could hardly be called a leftist, desired the state as a "*tiers départageant*" to have representatives in the corporation. See Perroux, *op. cit., passim.*

majority believed in restricting the state's jurisdiction to coordination and arbitration. "The state coordinates their [i.e., the corporative] activities, arbitrates their respective interests and makes them accord with the general needs of the national economy." [123] As "supreme arbitrator of interests" [124] the state was to settle all disputes between employers and employees or between different corporations which could not be conciliated within the corporative framework. It was to place its veto upon corporative regulations contrary to the national welfare, "but it will not penetrate into the domain of work itself where it is incompetent." [125]

A voice in the national government would assure corporations some measure of protection against harmful and unjust state interference with their activity. Most corporatists believed that corporations should make their economic desires known and should advise the state on legislation, treaties, and budgets which affected corporative interests. However, they rejected any plan similar to that of Mazaroz in which corporations controlled the state, on the grounds that it would lead to internal schism and strife.

Various propositions were advanced for giving corporations a degree of participation in the government. Duguit's idea of a professional senate was revived by certain theorists who sought a corporative counterpoise to the political Chamber of Deputies. Others expressed doubts about such a system, anticipating that it would create a perpetual conflict between the two assemblies "due to their difference in origin." [126] As an alternative, they prescribed a national council of corporations or national eco-

123 Chanson, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

124 Mathon, *Crise économique et crise d'autorité*, p. 11.

125 Valois, *L'Economie nouvelle*, p. 15. See also: Bacconnier, in *Action française*, March 17, 1934; *Salut*, pp. 11-12; Comte de Paris, *op. cit.*, p. 195; *Plan du 9 juillet*, p. 45; De la Rocque, *Service publique*, pp. 141, 142 ff.

126 Bonnard, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

nomic council existing independently of the legislature. Roughly analogous to Buret's supreme council of national production, it would crown the corporative pyramid and consist of the presidents or other delegates from each corporation, with the minister of corporations or of national economy as its presiding officer. Among the manifold functions of the council, the following were highlighted: research and documentation, assistance to the ministry of economy, general control and guidance of corporative activity, and presentation of corporative remonstrances and desires to the state. The state would be required to consult the council on economic matters and the legislature to take action on corporative proposals.[127]

Bacconnier and Spinasse rejected the principle of either a single national council of corporations or national economic council. The former urged instead the organization of several economic chambers—one each for agriculture, industry, and the liberal professions. Their role should be purely consultative, while "their recruitment should be on a corporative basis and their geographic district should be the region in place of the department or province." These regional chambers could, when occasion required, form national congresses by appointment of delegates.[128] For Spinasse, a permanent national economic council spelled incompetence and irresponsibility with regard to the national welfare, and consequently he would have none of it.[129]

127 Brethe de la Gressaye, *op. cit.*, pp. 259, 263, 344; Chanson, *op. cit.*, p. 231; Comte de Paris, *op. cit.*, p. 231; Duthoit in *Chronique sociale de France, 1935*, p. 525; Lucius, *Une Grande industrie dans la tourmente*, p. 89; De la Rocque, *op. cit.*, pp. 145, 211; *Plan du 9 juillet*, pp. 45-46, 26; Bonnard, *op. cit.*, p. 120. See also the proposals of Paul-Boncour re a National Economic Council in Ernest Paul, *op. cit.*

128 Bacconnier, *Salut*, pp. 236-239. See Jacques Valdour, *Organisation corporative de la société et de la profession* (Paris: Librairie Arthur Rousseau, 1935), p. 60.

129 Spinasse, *op. cit.*, p. 1826.

Consideration of both corporations' part in the government and the nature of the state went hand in hand in most corporative literature published in the second and third decades of the twentieth century. This literature was impregnated with pluralist doctrine, particularly that of Duguit. In pluralist phraseology, corporatists declared that the state's sphere of action "would be limited by the statutes of the constituted bodies—families, associations, corporations, communes, provinces." [130] Fascism and *étatisme* ran counter to such a concept and were therefore scorned. Even writers like De la Rocque and Lucius, who were usually grouped among fascist sympathizers, stated that Italian and German fascism were contrary to French tradition.

> The natural order requires that the state serve society. When It absorbs society, when the state, according to the "racists" and fascist expression, is "totalitarian", the social body soon wastes away and the state itself which is the head of it will only be prosperous if the communities which constituted it are prosperous first.[131]

Unlike Duguit, most interbellum theorists believed that the state was endowed with a definite personality. From medieval scholasticism and the political doctrines of Bonald, Maistre, and Comte they derived the notion of the state as the head of a hierarchy of lesser communities organically united.[132] At the base of

130 Lucius, *Rénovation du capitalisme*, p. 300.

131 Lucius, *Révolutions au XX^e siècle*, pp. 328-349. Even Valois who maintained in 1924-25 that fascism was necessary to combat Marxism, desired semi-autonomous corporations, regions, etc. He thought that corporations should set up and execute their own program, while the state should merely fix the limits which they were not to exceed. Valois, *La Révolution nationale*, pp. 167-168, 176. See also: Lucius, *Une Grande industrie la tourmente*, p. 83; *Faillite du capitalisme*, p. 181; *Rénovation du capitalisme*, p. 286. For the attitude of other corporatists toward *étatisme* in general and its fascist brand in particular see: Bonnard, *op. cit.*, p. 77; Bacconnier, in *Action française*, February 17, 1934, p. 3; Duthoit in *Chronique sociale de France, 1935*, p. 481.

132 See, for example, Lucius, *Rénovation du capitalisme*, p. 304; *Révolutions au XX^e siècle*, p. 232.

this organism, the family was allotted a political role by several corporatists. For instance, De la Rocque provided for a family vote, by which the head of each house would cast as many votes as there were members of his family.[133] Above the family, the corporation would function not as a mere administrative unit of the state as in the Italian fascist regime, but as a genuinely semi-autonomous association. The role of the region in the hierarchy would be to serve as an administrative agency of both state and corporation. This would provide a concrete step toward political decentralization and the restoration of provincial life and culture which had been so dear to the heart of the Comte de Chambord.

At the same time that they called for a revival of secondary or intermediate groupings between the state and the people, corporatists of all political persuasions agitated for a strengthening of the state itself at the pinnacle of the social pyramid. As Alfred Rolland expressed it:

> The hierarchy of the trade, after that of the family demands the restoration of the state; not a state without title, quality, or honor, presented to us as both feeble and tyrannical at the same time, but a guardian state, sure of its destiny, just in its advice, strong in its decisions, worthy finally to constitute in the exercise of the great art of governing men a model for the profession of others.[134]

Existing political institutions were to be recast to fortify the state. Most of the rightists wished to abolish, or at least to diminish, democratic and parliamentary government which they regarded as both a prey to the political and economic interests of pressure groups and an obstacle to the development of corporations.[135] The more fascist-minded like Valois (after 1925)

133 De la Rocque, *Service publique*, p. 97; Jacques Doriot, *Refaire la France* (Paris: Grasset, 1938), p. 97.

134 Alfred Rolland in Boivin and Bouvier-Ajam, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

135 In 1929 agricultural unions in France were thwarted by the creation of departmental offices which attempted to diminish the influence of professional organizations. *Cf.* Bacconnier, *Le Salut par la corporation*, pp.

and Pierre Lucius were willing to countenance violence if necessary as a last resort to accomplish a political reformation.[136] Lucius condoned the riot of February 6, 1934 and cast the blame for the shedding of blood upon Daladier.

> The National Revolution of 1934 began. It was directed by the third party hostile to the great anonymous and irresponsible capitalism which governs France, and to the materialistic and internationalistic Marxism issuing from the frays of the liberal era. The National Revolution will restore the state, with professional and regional foundations which will permit the nation to govern itself in true freedom and to accomplish the decentralization and the regeneration of the public finances. The sacrifice of those who fell on the sixth of February has not been in vain. The memory of them will be piously conserved by generations to come.[137]

To most of the rightists, the intrigues of the multiple political parties in France were anathema.[138] Nevertheless, they did not definitely suggest a one-party system, because they hoped the state would remain outside factional interests.

In the opinion of members of the right, the state should have a strong leader who would be its very incarnation. Authority was to be vested in him in proportion to his responsibilities, which would indeed be heavy. As protector of internal peace, arbitrator of conflicting interests, and coordinator of national activity, he would be entitled to the loyalty and respect of all citizens. Rightists differed as to the manner of choosing the leader according to their political outlook. Royalists naturally

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149-151. Yet on the other hand, Bacconnier and others stated that the corporations had already progressed far in their evolution. Pierre Lucius felt that the French government was a mere tool in the hands of the C.G.T. and other pressure groups.

136 See Valois, *La Révolution nationale, passim,* and *La Politique de la victoire,* pp. 25, 26, 31.

137 Lucius, *Révolutions au XX^e siècle,* pp. 263-264.

138 See, for example, Bacconnier in *Action française,* February 17, 1934.

favored a chief selected by the whims of heredity, while Fascists demanded one appointed by himself or his followers.

The proposals of De la Rocque and Doriot illustrate the tendency to increase the power of the chief executive at the expense of the legislature. The former specified that the leader should hold mandate for at least two successive legislative sessions and should possess the right of dissolution. He thought that each member of the chief's cabinet should be individually responsible for his acts, except in general political matters where cabinet solidarity would come into play. Doriot, while demanding the strengthening of the executive and the limitation of the rights of parliament, particularly in matters of expenditure, hoped to extend the outward forms of democracy by establishing the right of referendum.[139]

Even the democratic corporatists such as the Group of July Ninth swelled the outcry for a stronger executive, although they clung to the democratic principle of electing him. As for the legislature, they would retain it with curtailed powers.

Nationalism, particularly nationalism of a traditional flavor, was more in evidence in corporative works of the twentieth century than in those of the preceding one. Veneration of French history and the French nation was idealized.

> France is an historic as well as a national formation. She was born of an effort of will and intelligence pursued during eleven centuries. In the measure in which we commune in this effort and continue it, we will receive from the distant past the spiritual aid of those who accomplished it before us. "The true patriotism," wrote Fustel de Coulanges, "is not the love of soil, but love of the past, respect of the generations which preceded us." [140]

> The goal is national existence. A regime is a means. Men who serve regimes serve only instruments. Before crying "*Vive la République*" or "*Vive l'Empereur*" or "*Vive le Roi,*" we should insist that people shout "*Vive la France.*" [141]

139 De la Rocque, *Service publique*, pp. 213-214; Doriot, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

140 Lucius, *Révolutions au XX^e siècle*, p. 354.

141 De la Rocque, *Service publique*, p. 197.

There were occasions when on the surface this nationalism appeared to compromise the corporatism of certain theorists. Doriot declared that: "French nationalism must be affirmed on the face of France and of the world. There must be a sacred national egoism. Our creed is the country and nothing but the country." [142] This was a statement which left little room for loyalty to profession, region, or family, yet Doriot did recognize the importance of these groups. To the family especially he paid homage as one of the bases of national life.

Corporatists of the interbellum period were economic nationalists. They regarded economic nationalism as a world phenomenon resulting from the decline in world markets. This shrinkage was in turn caused by the development of mixed agricultural-industrial economies.[143] France was compelled to follow the protectionist policies of other nations. Bacconnier gave expression to the growing corporative insistence that high customs barriers be erected to safeguard French industry and that foreign workers be excluded from France.[144] The socialist, Spinasse, took the opposite view that international division of labor would be preferable, but possible only in the distant future. In the meantime, he thought France should abandon her policy of economic exclusiveness and encourage exchanges with other countries.[145] Valois, writing in the days before "overproduction" and "limited markets," postulated the theory that a steadily increasing volume of production was the only means of combatting a regenerated Germany and expressing the glory and destiny of France.[146]

Most interbellum theorists did not call upon France to seek glory in an aggressive nationalism but to bestow benefit upon the world at large through nationalism of a humanitarian

142 Doriot, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

143 Lucius, *Faillite du capitalisme*, p. 167. The same reasoning is found in other works.

144 Bacconnier in *Action française*, February 17, 1934, March 3, 1934.

145 Spinasse, *op. cit.*, p. 1820.

146 Valois, *L'Economie nouvelle*, pp. 1-13, 294-301, and *passim*.

brand. " The universal order will be restored by by the restoration of the national order . . . The note given by nature is a tempered nationalism." [147] France had a sacred mission to civilization:

> She ought to give to the world her culture, her soldiers, her scholars, her workers. Her duty is to be one of the great protectors of European peace . . . . She should be among those peoples who will deliver Europe from the burden of compulsory military service, and at the same time from the monstrous wars of people against people.[148]

The general concept of the state and its relation to corporations held by the majority of interbellum theorists was severely criticized by Gaëtan Pirou. He seemed to think these corporatists were living in a dream world spinning impractical schemes. In his opinion, their belief that state unity would not be broken up feudally by corporative pressure groups and that the state would interfere sparingly and spasmodically in corporative affairs was fundamentally unrealistic. Under such a system, declared Pirou, disharmony would inevitably arise between particular corporative interests, and the state would be bound to interfere continually or to remain at the mercy of warring factions. In fact, dictatorship would become requisite to prevent the primacy of producers' interests over those of the consumer and the undermining of workers' rights by employers' interests. A humanitarian, traditional nationalism should be replaced by the mystical halo of integral nationalism which would give a tremendous impetus to the whole national economy.[149]

Pirou's criticisms were shared by Odette de Puiffe de Magondeaux [150] and to a certain extent were justified by later events in France. Certainly the corporative regime which France came to adopt was impregnated with a high degree of *étatisme.*

147 Lucius, *Révolutions au XX^e siècle,* p. 354.

148 Valois, *Révolution nationale,* pp. 186-187.

149 Pirou, *Le Corporatisme,* pp. 40-65.

150 Puiffe de Magondeaux, *op. cit.,* p. 150, and *passim.*

CHAPTER VI

CORPORATISM UNDER THE PETAIN REGIME

French corporative theory of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was translated into fact by the Vichy regime instituted on July 11, 1940 after the capitulation of France to the armies of the Third Reich. Many corporatists of the nineteen-thirties now came into their own and found their writing meeting with official governmental approval. Marcel Déat and Adrien Marquet, the leaders of the Neo-Socialists, who in 1933 had seceded from the Socialist party to adopt a corporatist program, basked in the favor of the Germans and the Vichy government. Déat as editor of *L'Oeuvre* and Marquet as editor of *Le Petit parisien* supported corporatism to the plaudits of an appreciative official audience. Likewise Jacques Doriot, whose corporatist ideas had been plainly expressed in book form in 1938 and in articles even earlier, continued to enunciate them in his papers, *Le Cri du peuple* and *L'Emancipation nationale*. And at Limoges the *Action française* was still published, its leader Maurras at first espousing wholeheartedly the new government but gradually growing cold toward it.[1] Other corporatists found themselves members of the official family. Gaëtan Pirou, for example, the keen analyst of corporative doctrines during the thirties, became a member of the Constitutional Commission of the National Council.[2]

1 Since Maurras advocated decentralization, reestablishment of free and spontaneous communities and concrete liberties instead of abstract liberty, his initial approval of the regime turned to displeasure. He was suspicious of the growing *étatisme* of the Pétain regime and was dissatisfied with the establishment of compulsory syndicates under the labor charter, preferring that the workers be permitted to choose among several syndicates.

2 François Perroux, Professor of Law at the University of Paris, who had written books in 1938 advocating corporatism, was made a member of the Economic Council under Pétain. The socialist Spinasse who had veered toward corporatism as early as 1934 backed the Pétain regime, and the syndicalist Paul-Boncour approved its corporatist features, although he disliked the suppression of liberty and democracy.

The ideas of these corporatists were best synthesized by Marshal Pétain, the symbol of the Vichy regime. He lent the dignity of his name, his age, his title of Chief of State to the erection of a corporative system sought after by French theorists through so many long years.

Life of Pétain

The life of Pétain bears in many respects a curious resemblance to that of the Social Catholic corporatist La Tour du Pin. Both were born in the northeastern section of France; both had sentimental attachments to the soil; both became professional soldiers after training at St. Cyr; both married past middle age; both lived under the rule of the German conqueror and survived beyond their ninetieth birthday; and finally, both were impregnated with traditionalist and Catholic doctrine. On the other side of the picture, La Tour du Pin was of noble birth, Pétain of peasant stock; La Tour left his army career with the rank of colonel to devote the latter portion of his life to the exposition of his corporative ideas, while Pétain remained a professional soldier; and La Tour du Pin never held high political office.

Henri Philippe Pétain was [3] born in 1856 in the Pas de Calais, the fifth child of peasant parents. He was educated at Jesuit and Dominican schools. The Paris Commune, occurring when he was fifteen, made a lasting impression upon him, and according to Janet Flanner,[4] left him with a distaste for the proletariat and chaos.

> It was to prevent anything so *populo* [sic] and chaotic as a second Commune that Pétain, sixty-five years later, advised immediate capitulation to the Germans.[5]

3 He was christened Henri Philippe Benoni Omer Joseph Pétain.

4 Janet Flanner, *Pétain, The Old Man of France* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944). Most of the biographical material is gleaned from this work.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 9.

With his entrance into St. Cyr at the age of twenty Pétain commenced his military career. His advancement in the army was painfully slow. At forty-four he was a major and growing bald. Meanwhile his baggage of traditionalist, anti-parliamentarian notions was fortified by the Dreyfus Affair in which he supported his ardently anti-Dreyfusard superior, General Emile Zurlinden. On the eve of the First World War, Pétain, only a colonel, was in his fifty-ninth year and headed for inconspicuous retirement. The war was his salvation. Whether or not he won the battle of Verdun, the title of "Victor of Verdun" became attached to his name. From a relatively obscure colonel he rose overnight to be Commander-in-Chief of the French armies and a Marshal of France. After the war he held important positions in the defense organization of France, serving in 1934 as Minister of War.

In the meantime Pétain came into contact with the Spanish corporative regime. His introduction to it took place in 1926, when on the invitation of Primo de Rivera, he visited Spain and was very favorably impressed. While in Africa during the Riffian war, he made the acquaintance of Spain's future dictator, Colonel Francisco Franco. His pro-Franco attitude during the Spanish Civil War helped bring about his appointment as ambassador to Spain in 1939. In May of 1940 he was recalled by Premier Reynaud to become special military counsellor and vice premier. With the resignation of Reynaud on June 16, 1940, Pétain assumed the post of premier and with the abrogation of the Republic on July 11, the eighty-four year old Marshal took over supreme power as dictator of France.

Pétain's Pre-Vichy Doctrines

While Pétain did not give expression to any specific corporative ideas before his advent to power, the general tenor of his thought long before 1940 was similar to that of many corporatists. In 1916, for example, he declared to his friend, the novelist, Henri Bordeaux,

> A general should be a statesman. Only a few men are needed to lead France. Too many parliaments, too many ministers, too many committees . . . Three, perhaps: a triumvirate . . . Or one alone, but one who knows how to surround himself.[6]

Most corporatists of the interbellum period desired a strong executive while the rightists favored a monarch or a dictator.

During the thirties, Pétain set forth his ideas in speeches and essays. At a dinner of the *Revue des deux mondes* he attacked the French public schools for teaching individualism. In various essays he decried the " mirage " of materialism, modern science, and the low birthrate of France. At Verdun in 1936 he called the family the essential cell of life and urged its preservation. In still other speeches he asserted his hatred of parliamentary corruption, his desire for the restoration of authority, for the protection of the family and the moral health of France, for effort and work on the part of the French, for the furtherance of the Latin heritage.[7] Corporatists were voicing the same sentiments at the same time, and Pétain's utterances as chief of state were but a repetition of them.

There was thus a continuity in the development of Pétain's ideas. One chain of thought connected the different periods of his life and the links of that chain were forged in French political doctrines. Consciously or unconsciously, directly or indirectly, Pétain and his aides derived from many French political thinkers a variety of concepts: from Saint-Simon, rationalization of production; from Proudhon, regionalism, mutualism; from Sorel and Paul-Boncour, syndicalism (though in a metamorphosed and attenuated form); from medieval theorists and Duguit, pluralism; from Comte, Taine, Barrès, Maurras, antiparliamentarianism; and from La Tour du Pin, Valois, Lucius, and others, corporatism.

6 Flanner, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19.

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36. See also Pétain's collected speeches: Henri Philippe Pétain, *Paroles aux Français* (Vichy: 1942), *passim.*

The National Revolution

Under the impulse of such ideas and assisted by circumstances, Pétain inaugurated the National Revolution. True, this revolution differed from the National Revolution advocated by such rightist corporatists as Georges Valois and Pierre Lucius, who desired that it should occur in a prosperous and powerful France.[8] Contrary to their hopes, the Vichy Revolution had all its reforms, all its accomplishments shaped, colored, and limited by the exigencies of defeat. Nevertheless, the principles of the Pétain Revolution conformed to an unusual degree to the doctrines of numerous corporatists. Pétain's definition of the National Revolution could have been written by La Tour du Pin,

> But to be national our revolution must be social. I do not want my country to have either Marxism or liberal capitalism. The new order which is about to assume its place cannot be founded on anything but a severe internal order, one which demands from all the same discipline, founded on the preeminence of labor, the hierarchy of value, a sense of responsibility, respect for justice, and mutual confidence within the profession.[9]

Thus values admired by corporatists such as discipline, order, hierarchy, solidarity, responsibility, and morality were to be strengthened by the "New Order." According to numerous statements of Pétain, these values were to be reaffirmed within the profession, within the family, and within the state. The profession was to be organized for production, its internal or class conflicts abolished. The family was to be organized for reproduction, its material and moral decadence checked. The state

8 See Georges Valois, *La Révolution nationale* (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1924); also his La *Politique de la victoire* (Paris: 1925); Pierre Lucius, *Révolutions au XX^e siècle, Perspective de restauration d'un ordre social français* (Paris: Payot, 1934).

9 Henri Philippe Pétain, *New Year's Message*, January 1, 1942 (Emission Havas-Télémondial de Vichy, January 1, 1942).

was to be organized for supervision, its lack of authority remedied. To all this good corporatists could cry amen!

The National Revolution replaced the watchwords of 1789—"Liberty, Equality, Fraternity"—with another triad "Work, Family, Nation." The slogan of eighty-nine, according to Marshall Pétain, expressed mere abstract principles which could be of practical value only if limited and supplemented by other concepts. Liberty without authority and security, equality without hierarchy and duty, fraternity without nation and family—these, in his opinion, were vain, meaningless words.[10] Most corporatists of the right and center concurred in this sentiment. The new slogan Pétain considered to be more concrete and salutary. Thus "Work, Family, Nation" were the pillars on which the National Revolution and the Vichy corporative state reposed.

Work

The first of the three foundation stones of the National Revolution, "work,"[11] was to be laid with corporative cement. Pétain's arguments for corporations strongly paralleled those of many corporatists previously discussed. Like them, he denounced the class struggle and maintained that its elimination constituted the chief advantage offered by corporatism. He scored the Marxist doctrine of the inevitability of class conflict as false and pernicious.

> If it is normal that men group themselves according to the affinities of their trade, of their social level, of their type of

10 Henri Philippe Pétain, "La Politique sociale de l'avenir," *Revue des deux mondes*, September 15, 1940.

11 Like La Tour du Pin, Valois and other corporatists, Pétain in speech after speech lauded work for its moral and physical values. See the following speeches of Pétain: *To the Legionnaires*, August 31, 1941 (Emission Havas-Télémondial de Vichy, August 31 and September 1, 1941); at Annecy in Haute Savoie, September 23, 1941 (*Le Jour*, September 24, 1941); May Day, May 1, 1941 (*Informations générales*, No. 36, June 10, 1941); October 10, 1940. See also Pétain's article "La Politique sociale de l'avenir," p. 17.

> life, if it is legitimate that these diverse groupings vindicate their particular interests and rights—the struggle of classes considered as the great motive force of universal progress is an absurd conception, which leads peoples to disintegration and to death itself, either by civil or foreign war . . . . If competition is the law of life, and if the interests of employers and workers can sometimes be in opposition to each other, the general interest of the profession, which is common to them, ought to dominate the opposition of their particular interests, and the still more general interests of production ought to dominate the interest of the profession.[12]

Pétain bitterly excoriated those who perpetuated hostility between classes. Workers should be disillusioned concerning the false promises of politicians of the Third Republic who, for selfish reasons, kept the fires of class hatred burning.

> Workers, my friends, listen no longer to demagogues. They do you too much harm. They have fed you on illusions. They promised you everything. Remember their formula: bread, peace, liberty. You have received instead poverty, war, and defeat. For years they have wounded and weakened our country, sharpened hatred, but done nothing to benefit the conditions of workers, because, living by the rebellion of workers, they are interested in keeping its causes alive.[13]

Other politicians had pandered to the interests of employers who were only too inclined to be narrow and egocentric. Consequently, the managerial element was to be censured for its part in class warfare.

> Employers: Many among you have had a share in responsibility for the class struggle. Your selfishness and refusal to understand the conditions of the proletariat have only too

12 Pétain, "La Politique sociale de l'avenir," pp. 115, 116.

13 Speech to the workers at St. Etienne, March 1, 1941 (*Informations générales*, March 1941), p. 7.

> often been the best fosterers of communism. I do not ask you to renounce the legitimate profits resulting from your business activity, but I do ask you to be the first to understand your duties as men and Frenchmen.[14]

The deterioration of class relations pointed clearly to the "necessity of organizing the profession on a corporative basis, in which all the elements of an enterprise can meet, confront each other or adjust their differences." [15] This meeting together of employers and employees would help to create a real solidarity between them.

> When in each enterprise or group of enterprises, employers, technicians, workers have acquired the habit of meeting to manage in common the interests of their profession, to administer in common their social tasks: apprenticeship, placement, qualification, family allocation, sickness benefits, pensions, lodging, and workers' gardens—a solidarity of interests and an indestructible fraternity of sentiments will quickly result.[16]

Corporatism, in Pétain's view, would eliminate any worker inclination to combat employers by satisfying the legitimate aspirations of employees. According to the Marshal, workers did not want to be treated as merchandise or machines, but they wished to have man-to-man relations with their chiefs. They longed to escape the uncertainties of tomorrow, such as unemployment, and

> to find in their trade a security, or to use a better term, a property, and to be able to advance in their trade as far as their aptitudes permit. They want moreover to participate in a reasonable measure in the progress of the enterprise with

14 *Loc. cit.*

15 Pétain, "La Politique sociale de l'avenir," pp. 115-116.

16 Speech of May 1, 1941 (*Information générales*, No. 36, May, 1941).

> which they are associated; to have an efficacious safeguard against poverty which haunts them when malady or old age comes; to be able to raise their children to a state where they can honorably earn their livelihood according to their abilities.[17]

Corporatism would satisfy all these demands of labor. In the first place, workers under a corporative system would come into personal contact with their employers since both would meet together to discuss and manage the interests of the profession. Secondly, corporatism would establish the principle of ownership of one's trade through guaranteeing to the worker employment and opportunity for advancement.[18] This was a concept elaborated by La Tour du Pin, and numerous other corporatist precursors of Pétain. Thirdly, corporatism would give the worker social security through the institution of a corporative patrimony.[19] Since a levy on profits would be the principle means of maintaining the patrimony, workers would participate to some degree in the profits of industry. Here again Pétain borrowed a well-known corporative concept, discussed by La Tour and others.[20]

Other arguments for a corporative regime marshalled by Pétain likewise revealed striking similarity to those of previous corporatists. In them, he indicated corporatism as a solution to the problem of social-economic organization which would avoid the evils of liberalism, capitalism, and collectivism.

17 *Loc. cit.*

18 The Pétain regime established licenses and *cartes de profession* for most trades and professions. They proved a convenient method of preventing undesirables and opponents of the regime from earning a livelihood, and at the same time provided a means of giving preference to the supporters of the "New Order." But Pétain as well as the theorists who preceded him realized that workers would sometimes have to be transferred from one industry to another.

19 *Cf.* the provisions of the Labor Charter concerning the patrimony. *Le Moniteur*, October 29, 1941.

20 Such as La Farelle, Emile Keller, De Mun, Brethe de la Gressaye, etc.

> Liberalism, capitalism, collectivism are foreign products imported into France, which France, restored to her true self, quite naturally rejects.[21]

Instead the nation should adopt corporatism because "this conception of social life is purely and profoundly French." [22] Moreover, that "French quality which has long been the honor of our country" [23] would be restored to production through the elimination of shoddy and inferior goods. Corporatism would also give a spur to French production.

Since the details of the structure and functions of a corporative system were barely discussed in Pétain's speeches, they must be sought in his various acts and decrees. His early laws were negative in character, abolishing those organizations of a class or political nature which might be considered inimical to the creation of a corporative system. The law of August 16, 1940 specified that "all general organizations which unite on a national scale the professional organizations of employers or of workers shall be dissolved." [24] However, it was not until November, 1940 that such organizations were actually dissolved and their property sequestered. Among those employer groups thus affected were: the *Confédération Générale du Patronat Français,* the *Comité des Houillères de France,* and the *Comité*

21 Pétain, "La Politique sociale de l'avenir", p. 116.

22 *Loc. cit.*

23 Preamble to the Law of August, 1940. Also in the preamble to the resolution to abolish the constitutional act of 1875, Pétain wrote, "and its [France's] industry will be obliged to resume quality production." Cited in Shotwell, *Governments of Continental Europe,* Appendix by R. K. Gooch (New York: Macmillan, 1940), p. 5.

24 Law of August 16, 1940, *Journal officiel,* August 18, 1940, p. 4732. See also *New York Times,* August 18, 1940. A complete analysis of all Pétain legislation does not fall within the scope of this study. Emphasis is placed upon the corporative aspects of Vichy measures, but a detailed examination of the functioning of these laws is not included.

des Forges de France. Among the worker federations concerned were: the *Confédération Générale du Travail,* the *Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens,* and the *Confédération des Syndicats Professionels Français.*[25]

These negative measures were considered but a prelude to the real work of constructing a corporative system. Theoretically, Pétain tried to minimize the state's role in the creation of the new corporative organs. At St. Etienne, he declared:

> As concerns professional organization, a legal text, however perfect, is powerless to create social order; it can only sanction it in institutional form after men have established it.[26]

This statement accorded with the beliefs of other French corporatists who opposed the creation by state fiat of a complete corporative structure. However, as in other cases, Pétain was forced to permit reality to modify his theory. Obviously, since a corporative structure had not spontaneously evolved, government measures were necessary to create it. Therefore in the very same speech in which he said that the state should only sanction an already established social order, Pétain announced that it was the state's task " to stimulate social action, to indicate the principles and the direction of this action, and to orient the initiatives." [27] Such a role would be considered too *étatiste* by many of the French corporatists.[28]

25 *Journal officiel,* November 12, 1940, pp. 5653, 5654.

26 Speech to the workers at St. Etienne, March 1, 1941 (*Informations générales,* March, 1941), p. 7.

27 *Loc. cit.*

28 Early in its career the Pétain government became enmeshed in measures of an *étatiste* character. Most of these were necessitated by the crisis situation in France brought on by the defeat and the severe shortages of food, materials and manpower. A complete state system of provisioning and rationing was set up under the Secretary of State for *Ravitaillement* while by the Law of September 10, 1940 a central office for the distribution of industrial products was established under the Ministry of Production and Labor. The Secretary of State for Industrial Production and the Minister of Agriculture were empowered to fix prices in their respective spheres with the aid of regional price committees. Also a central price fixing committee composed

The first important constructive move in the direction of a corporative system was the creation by law of the system of committees of industrial organization.[29] At first these commit-

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of all the Ministers and Secretaries of State attempted to coordinate prices within the national economy. (See *Journal officiel*, November 10, 1940, p. 5626; June, 1941, p. 2228.) Wages, hours and the employment of labor were likewise government regulated in this case by the Secretary of State for Labor, although the Labor Charter gave the social committees some power in this field. Such *étatiste* legislation ran counter to the main current of French corporatist thought. (See decree of May 23, 1941 and laws of March 25, 1941 and October 11, 1940.)

29 Law of August 16, 1940 (*Journal officiel*, August 18, 1940, pp. 4731-4733). This was the basic law establishing the general framework of the system. Special decrees were issued by the Ministry of Industrial Production. Following is a list of most of the industries for which such decrees were issued:

MONTH	INDUSTRY IN WHICH COMMITTEE WAS CREATED	PAGE (*in Journal officiel*)
1940		
Oct.	Industry & commerce of automobiles and cycles	5201
"	Textile industry	5474
"	Rolling stock	5497
"	Wool industry	5498
Nov.	Leather industry	5547
"	Clothing industry	5559
"	Commerce of iron products	5644
"	Commerce of solid mineral combustibles	5644
"	Electric energy	5652
"	Lime and cement	5653
"	Smelting industries	5666
"	Chemical industries	5666
"	Hydraulic machines, etc	5666
"	Paints and varnishes	5668
"	Advertising	5734
Dec.	Cinematograph industry	5986
"	Glass industry	6083
"	Rubber industries	6300
"	Aluminum and magnesium	6337
"	Iron ore	6337–8
"	Ceramic industry	6338
1941		
Jan.	Coal tar and benzol	106
"	Large forge and foundry	107
"	Industries & commerce of pharmaceutical products	201
"	Metal working	464
"	Machine tools; watches, clocks	465
Feb.	Salt	573
"	Industries and trades of arts	574
"	Sports articles, games, toys	673
Mar.	Industries and commerce of music	1188
Apr.	Gas industry	1746
May	General committee of organization for commerce	1944

tees represented employers alone and were in that respect similar to the economic corporations regulating production and sales which were proposed by such corporatists as Mathon, Duthoit, and Lucius. In the sense that the Pétain industrial committees were an attempt to give the professions themselves a voice in the management of industrial production they were a step in the corporatist direction. Nevertheless, in the last analysis, the Vichy government retained supreme control over all phases of production although the committees were often able to influence government decisions.

These industrial committees were established for almost every branch of industrial and commercial activity. One such committee, for example, was that for automobiles and cycles. It was composed of a director and an advisory body of twenty members made up of representatives of automobile manufacturers, accessory makers, automobile sales agents, and bicycle and motorcycle producers. A number of other committees such as those for the textile, wool, leather, and clothing industries, had a similar organization.[30] A government commissioner was appointed without exception for every committee in each industry. Decisions of any committee were not definitive until approved by the Secretary of State for Industrial Production, who could delegate this right of approval in certain cases, to the government commissioner. Moreover, the members of the committees were appointed by the government on the proposal of organizations of the industry. Thus the state retained the final authority.

The list of powers granted to these committees as set forth by the law of August 16, 1940 seemed imposing. Among them were the following: (1) inventorying businesses; (2) deciding programs of production and manufacture; (3) organizing the

30 See: *Journal officiel*, October 30, 1940, p. 5474, *ibid.*, August 18, 1940, pp. 5666-5667. On the whole, these committees were organized vertically rather than horizontally, although there were horizontal types such as the Committee of Commerce.

acquisition and distribution of raw materials and products necessary for the industry; (4) formulating rules to apply to businesses in matters of general conditions of production, maintenance of quality, employment of labor, rates of exchange for products and services; (5) laying before competent public authorities suggested prices of goods and services; (6) forming or encouraging the formation of the machinery likely to assure better functioning of the particular branch of activity in the common interest of both employers and wage earners.[31]

These powers appeared on the surface very extensive, but in reality most of them were performed by various government agencies. The control of raw materials, for example, rested partly in the hands of the department of agriculture and partly in those of industrial production. The office for the distribution of industrial products under the authority of the Secretary of State for Industrial Production had jurisdiction over the distribution and use of both raw and finished industrial products. Prices for these products were fixed by the government price commission. Wages were ultimately determined by the Secretary of State for Labor, while under the Labor Charter, mixed social committees were given some authority in this respect. However, the industrial committees worked in close liaison with various other agencies, especially with the office for the distribution of industrial products. As a result, they influenced many government decisions on matters of production.[32]

The lack of labor representation on the industrial committees was partially remedied by the Order of September 1, 1941 which attached advisory councils to the committees. These advisory councils were composed of the heads of enterprises, collab-

31 *Journal officiel*, August 18, 1940, pp. 4732-4733: Law of August 1940.

32 The industrial committees were criticized because the big trusts secured too great a control over them and attempted to use them for their own gains. Pétain himself admitted this and tried to revamp the committees, giving larger representation to small industry and artisans. See Pétain, *Broadcast to the French Nation*, August 12, 1941 (*Journal officiel*, August 14, 1941, pp. 3394 ff.).

orators (engineers, technicians, foremen, salaried employees), and manual workers. These councils were to be consulted chiefly on any temporary measure for the reorganization of property, necessitated by the shortage of raw materials and entailing the closing down or suspension of certain plants. They could give advice on the procedure for selecting those enterprises which had to be suspended, and for reabsorbing the workers thus deprived of their normal employment.[33]

It was not until the Labor Charter of October, 1941, that labor was placed on a comparatively equal footing with employers in an organization combining the two. This charter was drawn up by the Committee of Professional Organization of the National Council.[34] In its task of drafting the charter, the committee pursued the goals set forth by Pétain.

> The notion of the mixed social committee will replace that of the partisan syndicate, and step by step we will progress toward the establishment of a corporatism which, taking into account the evolutions in the social and economic domain, will recall in many respects the close solidarity which formerly existed among the remarkably conscientious workers of our old families.[35]

33 *International Labor Review*, XLV, No. 1, January, 1942, 72-73.

34 The Committee of Professional Organization was established by the Decree of March 27, 1941. Presided over by Henri Moysset, a student of Proudhon (he had edited Proudhon's works), it consisted of twenty-one members appointed by the government (seven employers, eight workers and clerks, three technicians, two artisans, one cooperator). It is interesting and curious to note that the first meeting of the Committee did not take place until June 4, 1941 over two months after its creation. (*France Libre*, October 15, 1941, p. 521; *Informations générales*, No. 41, June 10, 1941). Henri Moysset, a stanch conservative, was at one time a collaborator with Henri Tardieu. (French Information Center, File 17 C b.) Lucien Romier, Minister of State, played a large part in directing the work of the Committee.

35 Speech at Chambéry, Savoie, September 22, 1941 (*Le Jour*, September 23, 1941). In several speeches Pétain asserted that termination of the class struggle was the goal *par excellence* to be reached by the Labor Charter. See the following: Speech at St. Etienne, March 1, 1941 (*Informations générales*, March 4, 1941, p. 7.)

The Labor Charter and the various decrees amending it[36] divided French industries and professions into twenty-five "professional families." Each "family" was sub-divided into the following distinct categories: (1) employers; (2) workers; (3) clerks; (4) agents of management; (5) engineers and technicians. Building upon this basic classification of its members each professional family might be organized in one of three ways: by social committees, by mixed groups, or by corporations. While the latter was considered as the most desirable form, it was realized that most "families" would find it easier to begin with the first type.

The structure of the social committees was grafted upon syndical roots. Each of the five categories within the "professional family" was to form a syndical pyramid. At the base, local syndicates included the personnel of several enterprises. On the second level, regional syndicates were composed of representatives from the local organizations, while on the top level, the national syndical federation contained some delegates from the regional associations and some appointed by the Secretary of State for Labor. The chief duties of these syndicates were representation of their members, transmission and execution of social committee decisions, offering of suggestions and solving of problems interesting their adherents.

Broadcast to the French Nation, August 12, 1941. (*Journal officiel*, August 14, 1941, pp. 3394-3396.)

Speech to the first meeting of the Committee on Professional Organization, June 4, 1941 (*Informations générales*, No. 41, June 10, 1941.) The charter should also, according to Pétain, permit workers to have a share in the profits of enterprise, after capital had been fairly remunerated. See Vichy News Release, September 27, 1941.

36 Pétain issued the Labor Charter on October 4, 1941. Among the more important amendments were the decrees of November 13, 1941, and February, 1942. The following discussion of the Charter is based on the text appearing in the *Journal officiel*, October 26, 1941, the supplementary decrees, and:

Le Moniteur, October 29, 1941; *Monthly Labor Review*, February, 1942; S. B. Clough, "The House that Pétain Built," *Political Science Quarterly*, LIX (1944), 30-39; Paul Vaucher, "The National Revolution in France," *Political Science Quarterly*, LVII (1942), 7-27.

The social committees were likewise erected in a pyramidal shape. At the base, all those establishments employing more than one hundred persons were to have a social committee comprising the employers and representatives from the different categories of the personnel. This committee was not to interfere in the conduct and management of the enterprise, but could assist employers in labor questions.

On the second level of the pyramid, there was a local social committee of twelve to twenty-four members selected from the administrative bureaux of the local syndicates and plant social committees. Above the local committees there were regional and national social committees, whose members were to be designated by social committees of the lower level and syndicates of their own level. Provision was also made for mixed interprofessional social committees.

All the social committees above the level of the factory social committee were to have jurisdiction over the following matters: (1) wages and collective contracts; (2) professional education and apprenticeship, examination, recruiting, and promotion of workers; (3) management of the corporative patrimony and the use of its funds for unemployment, sickness, accident benefits, pensions, family aid, etc. In their composition and functions these committees corresponded roughly to the social corporation of Mathon, Duthoit, and Lucius, just as the industrial committees were similar to the economic corporation of their proposals.

The charter contained detailed provisions establishing rules by which wages would be regulated and labor disputes settled. The first process in calculating wages was the determination of the minimum amount necessary for the maintenance of an individual without dependents. To the minimum wage, there was to be added a "professional remuneration" corresponding to the professional qualification of the individual, a supplement based upon aptitude and accomplishment, and allotments according to the size of the worker's family.

DIAGRAM OF THE CORPORATIVE SYSTEM UNDER THE LABOR CHARTER



From Shepard B. Clough, "The House that Pétain Built", *Political Science Quarterly*, LIX, March 1944

Strikes and lockouts were prohibited by the charter, and labor disputes were to be arbitrated. Special regional labor courts, composed of two magistrates and three members of the regional social committee were established. A national labor court, composed of three magistrates and four members of the national social committee, was to have final jurisdiction in the arbitration of labor conflicts.

If a " professional family " preferred, it could choose a more corporative type of organization than the social committee—either the mixed employer-worker group, or the corporation. The mixed group was subject to supervision by the National Social Committee and evolved along geographical lines analogous to those of the social committees. The corporation was also set up in local, regional, and national units. Hence there would be a national corporation for each " professional family " that chose this plan of organization. Over the whole system of syndicates, social committees, mixed worker-employer groups, and corporations was placed the Superior Council of the Labor Charter composed of the Director of the National Social Committee and various Secretaries of State and other government representatives.

The social committees were the most prevalent type of organization actually set up under the Labor Charter, although Pétain hoped that they would prove merely a step toward the formation of true corporations with both economic and social functions. Even before the issuance of the Labor Charter, a few genuine corporations were founded, but their formation still progressed slowly after the Charter's publication. It may be that those established did not function well, or perhaps employers opposed giving labor a voice in matters of production.

Typical of those social-economic corporations created by Pétain was the Corporation of Sea Fishing.[37] It included local

37 Law of March 13, 1941 (*Journal officiel*, March 30, 1941, p. 1370). A complete economic-social corporation was established for the clothing industry. (*New York Times*, April 5, 1942.)

syndicates, regional unions of syndicates, inter-professional committees, and a Central Corporative Committee of Sea Fishing. A local syndicate was established for each of the following branches of the profession: (1) Shipowners; (2) Fishermen who were proprietors or coproprietors of vessels; (3) Fishermen (officers and crews). The regional unions of syndicates were composed of representatives of each category of local syndicates, appointed by the Secretary of State for Naval Affairs on the nomination of the local syndicates. From these regional unions members of the central committee were chosen. A government commissioner sat at the meetings of all the various committees and the decisions of the central committee required final approval of the Naval Secretary. Matters of wages, apprenticeship, mutual aid, etc., lay within the province of the regional unions. Regulations for fishing, marketing, processing, etc., were made by the inter-professional committees set up for different branches of the industry.

The professions in the colonies were also organized into social-economic corporations.[38] They were classified into six groups: agriculture and forests; industry; mines; transports; credit; commerce. At the top of the hierarchy of organisms within each of these six classes was a central committee which was directly responsible to the Secretary of State for Colonies. Below the central committee in descending order were confederations, federations, and associations. Membership in an association was compulsory. All these colonial corporations had jurisdiction over economic and social matters, and included employers and employees.

Agriculture was also given a special corporative organization since for Pétain, scion of peasant folk, agriculture and the peasant were the backbone of France. In an interview with the American press in August 1940, he declared:

38 Laws of December 6, 1940, March 4, 1941, March 29, 1941 (*Bulletin du Service Central d'Information des Antilles Françaises*, October 23, 1941, pp. 1364-1370).

> The France of tomorrow will be at the same time very new and very ancient; she will become again what she should never have ceased to be: an essentially agricultural nation.[39]

Hence Pétain was eager to provide agriculture with corporative institutions.

Provision was made for two types of agricultural organizations—the inter-professional committees and the agricultural corporations. The former corresponded roughly to the committees of industrial organization, and had jurisdiction over the production, sale, and distribution of a particular commodity such as lumber, meat, or dairy products.[40] Each committee was subdivided into several branches. For example, the Dairy Committee included representatives from the syndicates or federations of milk-producers, from dairy cooperatives, and from the commerce of dairy products.[41] The power of these committees was restricted by the necessity of approval of all its regulations by the Secretary of State for *Ravitaillement*.

Agricultural corporations were established by the law of December 3, 1940.[42] In ascending order, the various organisms created were: local agricultural syndicates, regional unions, and a national corporative organization. As in the Fisheries Corporation, special organizations were set up for each branch of production. On all the committees a representative of the government was to sit, and decisions had to be approved by the National Agricultural Corporative Council and eventually by the government.

Between the publication of the Labor Charter and January 31, 1944, only three corporative charters appeared in the *Jour-*

39 *La Petite gironde*, August 25, 1940.

40 Law of July 27, 1940 (*Journal officiel*, July 29, 1940, pp. 4593-4595); Law of September 18, 1940 (*Journal officiel*, September 1, 1940, p. 4870); Law of July 12, 1941 (*Journal officiel*, July 1941, p. 2928).

41 Law of July 27, 1940 (*Journal officiel*, July 29, 1940, pp. 4593-4595).

42 Law of December 3, 1940 (*Journal officiel*, December 7, 1940, pp. 6005-6007).

nal officiel. These were the corporative charter of the Butchers (decree of December 5, 1942, *Journal officiel,* December 6, 1942), Pork Butchers (decree of November 27, 1943, *Journal officiel,* December 18, 1943), Property Administrators (decrees of November 27, and December 19, 1943, *Journal officiel,* December 17, 20 and 21, 1943).[43]

Family

At the same time that Pétain molded the pillar of "work" to support the National Revolution he undertook to shape the other two pillars of "family" and "nation." Like most corporatists, he insisted on the importance of the family. Writing in the *Revue des deux mondes,* he stated:

> The right of families is indeed anterior and superior to that of the state, just as the family is superior to the individual. The family is the essential cell; it is the very base of the social edifice.[44]

To protect the family Pétain proposed to root out individualism, its arch enemy, and stem the declining birth rate.[45]

Among Vichy measures taken to increase the birth rate and improve the family's welfare were an extension of the system of family allowances[46] begun in 1918, the introduction of a family salary among certain classes of workers such as civil servants,[47] and the exemption of large families from inheritance taxes.[48]

43 V. L. Chaigneau, *Histoire de l'organisation professionnelle en France* (Paris: Pichon et Durand-Auzias, 1945).

44 Henri Philippe Pétain, "La Politique sociale de l'avenir," *Revue des deux mondes,* September 15, 1940.

45 Speech given in *Living Age,* June, 1941 (quoted from *La Revue universelle*; Mother's Day Speech, May 25, 1941).

46 *Le code de la famille du 29 juillet, 1939, modifié par les décrets du 6 décembre 1939, 24 avril 1940, et 18 novembre 1940* (Paris: *Comité Central des Allocations Familiales,* 3ème édition, 1940).

47 Law of October 1, 1941 (Vichy News Release, October 31, 1941).

48 *La Petite gironde,* December 12, 1940; see also law of July 20, 1941.

Aid was offered to expectant mothers. Physical education and religion were encouraged.[49] Several of the anti-clerical laws of the Third Republic were abrogated [50] and the Ferry school laws were modified to allow religious instruction as an optional subject in the school curriculum.[51] A special section of the government was established for the family.[52] With family life thus reinforced, the moral reform of France could be effected and the qualities of tenacity, frankness, loyalty, probity, and obedience could be inculcated in all true Frenchmen. To this program corporatists could give wholehearted approval.

Nation

In addition to "work" and "family," "nation" was another great pillar upon which the National Revolution rested. Like most corporatists, Pétain clothed his theories in the garments of nationalism. For him the nation was a spiritual union among the families, professions, communes, and provinces which comprised France. It was a union not only between the living but also between the living and the dead. Following in the footsteps of the *Action Française,* which did so much to make Joan of Arc a national heroine, Pétain called upon his countrymen to turn their eyes toward the patron saint of *la Patrie,* toward "the martyr to national unity . . . the symbol of

49 *Journal officiel,* August 8, 1940, pp. 4556-4557; April 1941, p. 1506. Anticlerical and "irreligious" organizations such as the Masons were dissolved. See decree of February 27, 1941, *Journal officiel,* March 1941, p. 1183.

50 The law of July 7, 1904 for example, which suppressed Congregationalist teaching was abolished. (*Journal officiel,* September 4, 1940, p. 4889. Also a number of religious orders were legally recognized by the Pétain government. See *Journal officiel,* March, 1941, p. 1184.

51 *Journal officiel,* February, 1941, p. 918.

52 A Ministry for Family and Youth was created in July, 1940 (see *Journal officiel,* July 12, 1940, pp. 4521-4522) but was replaced in September, 1940 by the Secretary of State for the Family under the Ministry of the Interior. Regional directors of family and health were appointed to head the medical and social services of each region. (*Journal officiel,* November, 1940, p. 5619.)

France." [53] In speech after speech he proclaimed the cult of *la Patrie.*

But Frenchmen should do more than worship their nation, declared the Marshal. They should actively serve France by following the example of Jeanne d'Arc and by working for national unity. And to Pétain, national unity meant unswerving loyalty to himself as chief of state.[54]

To aid in securing this national unity, Pétain called upon the Legion of War Veterans:

> Legionnaires! You must by the example of your complete loyalty and your absolute discipline, guarantee the unity of the nation and its obedience to the Leader during the years of tribulation which lie ahead.[55]

The legion should help root out dissension and "tumultuous criticism." [56] Other steps taken to achieve national unity included the dissolution of all secret associations,[57] and the cancellation of French citizenship of persons deemed dangerous to *la Patrie.* Such measures were endorsed by corporatists of the right.

The spiritual union which is a nation should be formed, shaped, and made orderly, if it was to be durable, asserted Pétain. This was the object of politics which was the "art of governing men in conformity with their most general and highest interest." [58] For Pétain, the state was the servant of the nation, and his conception of it was far removed from that of the Ital-

53 Message of May 11, 1941 (*Information générales,* No. 38, May 1941).

54 Radio speech, April 15, 1941 (*Information générales,* No. 33, April 1941).

55 Speech to the French Legion, February 9, 1942.

56 Speech to the Legionnaires, August 31, 1941 (Havas, No. 213).

57 Decree of August 13, 1940 (*Journal officiel,* August 14, 1940, p. 4691).

58 Pétain, "La Politique sociale de l'avenir," p. 113.

ian and German totalitarian regimes. In common with most French corporatists, he possessed almost a pluralist idea of the state, certainly an anti-*étatiste* one. The preamble to the Government Resolution to Amend the Constitution of 1875, for example, declared in phraseology reminiscent of corporatists of preceding periods:

> the government, moreover, well knows that social groups, families, professions, communes, and regions exist prior to the state. The state is only the general organ of national consolidation and of unity. It ought not, therefore, to encroach upon the legitimate activities of these groups; but it will subordinate them to the general interest and the common good. It will control them and protect them.[59]

If the state was necessarily the nation's servant, it could in reality make or break the nation. "The parliamentarian, majoritarian, representative regime" of the Third Republic was, in the opinion of Pétain, an example of the destructive effect a government could have on a nation's existence.[60] Only a strong state could save France from eternal perdition.

> A strong state is the indispensable organ of a good government, because to fulfill its mission worthily, a strong state must be free and because free hands alone are strong for the commonweal.[61]

This strong state should be "authoritarian and hierarchical."[62] The counting of voices and the confused party wrangling of parliamentary regimes should be alien to it. At the top

59 Quoted by R. K. Gooch in a supplement to James T. Shotwell, *Governments of Continental Europe* (New York: Macmillan, 1940), p. 5 (of the supplement). The preamble was promulgated on July 10, 1940.

60 Speech to members of the Constitutional Commission of the National Council, July 8, 1941 (*Informations générales*, July, 1941).

61 Pétain, "La Politique sociale de l'avenir."

62 Speech to the Members of the Constitutional Commission.

of the hierarchy there should be a chief in whom is vested supreme but not arbitrary authority.[63]

> The chief, being responsible, ought to be honored and served. He is no longer worthy of being a chief from the moment that he becomes an oppressor.[64]

He should delegate authority to competent ministers responsible to him alone.[65] Moreover, to a limited extent, power should be decentralized. In the economic sphere, professions should have a voice in matters concerning them. In the political sphere, provinces and communes should possess a limited authority in matters affecting local life.

63 The list of actual powers granted to the Chief of State by Constitutional Act No. II follows:

1. He has power to name and recall ministers and secretaries of state, responsible only to him.
2. He exercises legislative power with a council of ministers:
   (a) until the formation of new assemblies;
   (b) after the formation of new assemblies in case of external pressure or grave interior crisis, on his sole decision. In some circumstances he can issue all budgetary and fiscal provisions.
3. He promulgates laws, and assures their execution.
4. He names all civil and military officials whose appointment is not otherwise provided for by law.
5. He disposes of the armed forces.
6. He has the right of pardon and amnesty.
7. Envoys and foreign ambassadors are accredited to him. He negotiates and ratifies treaties.
8. He can declare a state of siege in one or several portions of the territory.
9. He cannot declare war without the previous consent of the legislative assemblies.

(*Journal officiel*, July 12, 1940, p. 4516.)

64 Interview with correspondent of *La Dépêche tunisienne*, November 18, 1941 (Emission Havas).

65 The ministers and secretaries of state of the Pétain government were responsible to the Chief of State. A National Council was created, but it was merely an advisory body meeting in committees. Its members were appointed by Pétain. The Committee on Professional Organization of this council drafted the Labor Charter. Another committee worked on a project for regional organization, another on the draft of a Constitution.

Like La Tour du Pin, Charles Maurras, and other corporatists, Pétain was very emphatic in his desire to recreate provincial life, "to revivify the customs and traditions of the *petites patries* of our incomparable land." [66] A system of regional prefects possessing special police and economic powers was established [67] and plans for a complete provincial organization were studied by a Committee of the National Council. In a letter to this committee,[68] Pétain declared that, while he did not wish to see the *départements* abolished, he looked forward to the creation of provincial governors and councils.

Communes possessing less than two thousand inhabitants were allowed to elect municipal councils which in turn elected the mayor, but for larger towns the council and mayor were appointed by the prefect. Thus only the small villages were allowed local self-government.[69]

Such was the type of state in which Pétain believed. Corporatists of the right, center and even some of those of the left nodded assent.

The Pétain Regime Measured by Corporatist Ideals

To what extent did the Pétain regime satisfy the expectations of French corporatists? In the realm of theory to a considerable degree it did, but in practice it fell far short of their hopes. While it preached anti-*étatisme,* in reality the strong arm of the Vichy government was omnipresent. Charles Maurras, for example, voiced the corporatist objection to its *étatiste* character.[70] Others criticized its incompleteness and failure to fulfill many of

66 Speech to the Savoyards, September 22, 1941 (*Le Jour*, September 23, 1941).

67 Law of April 19, 1941 (*Journal officiel*, April 22, 1941), p. 1722.

68 Letter to the Committee on Administrative Reorganization, August 20, 1941.

69 Decrees of November, 1940 and Law of May 30, 1940. See *La France Libre*, March, 1941, p. 54.

70 *La France Libre*, January 15, 1942.

its promises. Many organizations were established on paper but transformed only partly or not at all into active institutions. Little was done to implement Pétain's promise that the National Revolution would be social,

> that labor and talent will be the sole basis of the new social hierarchy, that money must be no more than the wages of effort.[71]

The workers and peasants of France did not respond with enthusiasm to the Vichy corporative system. By December, 1941, only nine of the eighty departmental labor unions had rallied to the Labor Charter. The Catholic syndicalists and twenty-one federations of the supposedly defunct C. G. T. opposed it.[72] The peasants of France were most uncooperative toward the "new order," and they found myriad of ways to break the Vichy regulations. Hoarding and black market operations came to be regarded as virtues.[73]

Yet the obstacles under which the Pétain regime operated were more than sufficient to place insurmountable barriers in the path of a smoothly working corporative system. Pétain himself constantly complained of the trying situation. In his New Year's Message of 1942, for example, he asked his fellow countrymen and by implication the world at large

> to measure the magnitude and difficulty of our task, the obligation under which we labor of frequently being able to live only from day to day; the difficulties of administering two zones under different statutes, of meeting the exigencies of the occupation, the penury of raw materials.[74]

71 Speeches of October 10, 1940 and July 11, 1940. One of the few steps taken was the law making presidents and directors of *sociétés anonymes* fully liable for the company's debts.

72 *France Speaks*, December 29, 1941.

73 S. B. Clough, "House That Pétain Built."

74 New Year's Message (Emission Havas-Télémondial de Vichy, January 1, 1942).

Shortages of food, of housing, of labor, incessant demands of the Germans, dissatisfaction among the people, disunion within the Vichy [75] government itself—all these constituted a strong alibi for lack of success. And when one realizes the short period during which the new system functioned—from July, 1940 to the end of 1942 [76]—one is inclined to soften harsh judgments of this experiment in corporatism. All in all the Pétain regime was not a fair or just test of the workability of French corporative theories.

The Pétain regime did, however, illustrate the potency of corporative ideas in France. Many persons, particularly in America, have held the mistaken notion that the Vichy corporative system was merely a German importation imposed upon the recalcitrant French. Such was not the case. France possessed a long tradition of corporative doctrine and there were many corporatists in France in 1940 who looked hopefully toward the realization of their ideas. Further, as has been pointed out, the doctrines of the Pétain regime opposed at many points those of the Third Reich.[77]

75 *Cf.* particularly the Pétain-Laval controversy.

76 The Germans retaliated to the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa on November 8, 1942 by moving into unoccupied France. The Vichy regime ceased to have even a semblance of autonomy.

77 The pluralist concepts of the Pétain regime, particularly its desire to give a large degree of autonomy to the family, corporations, and regions as institutions which existed prior to the state, were in opposition to the Nazi policy of centralization under which the citizen's entire loyalty to state, party, and leader was demanded.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION--RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

FRENCH corporatists attempted to solve within the framework of capitalism and without recourse to *étatisme* some of the persistent problems which have plagued the economy of nations and of the world in recent generations. With the advance of time, these problems grew more pressing until by the second half of the twentieth century their solution seems on many sides to have become one of the prerequisites for the survival of private enterprise and democracy.

Foremost among these questions which attracted the attention of French corporative theorists was the existence of strife between employers and employees known as the class struggle. As manifested particularly in the form of strikes, French corporatists viewed this conflict as a mortal threat to French economy, and to the capitalist system in general. They believed that every time a strike or a threat of one occurred the wheels of production received such a tremendous jar that the danger of a breakdown of the machine was made imminent. They were prone to see in strikes and other types of class hostility a source of distrust, hatred, and disunity bordering upon mass psychosis. Certainly the solidarity of profession and nation which they so earnestly desired appeared to be in the process of being shattered. For corporatists the only remedy lay in the setting of wages and the arbitration of labor disputes within the framework of the corporation, an institution designed to foster amicable relations between employers and employees. Whether such a program would succeed under a democratic regime remains to be demonstrated.

The blight of depression also worried corporatists. It became increasingly evident to theorists that controls were necessary, that regulation of production and price could not be left com-

pletely in the hands of the individual *entrepreneur*. However, they rejected state planning and pleaded instead for decentralized control by each industry organized corporatively. The industry itself would be more competent than the state to set production quotas, to regulate quality which needed to be restored to French products, and to determine prices. The state would see that corporative rules did not violate the public welfare. Whether this can be done without constant state intervention in corporative activity has yet to be proved.

Corporatists recognized that social security was a universal desideratum. They regarded state management of the various types of social insurance and technical education as wasteful and inefficient. The profession, through its corporation, should have the authority to look after the well-being of its members.

The weakness of the executive under the Third French Republic and the confusion in French political life led many corporatists to demand a strengthening of executive power. Corporations should have a voice in the government either through a corporative branch of the legislature, or an advisory national corporative council. It was assumed that such a corporative voice would lessen, if not eliminate, political confusion.

The decline in morality so evident to corporatist eyes would be checked by corporatism. Family life, the influence of the Church, and loyalty to the nation would all be strengthened. In short, French corporatists believed in corporatism as a panacea for all the important economic, social, and political woes of France.

Many of these corporative ideas were not products of the twentieth century. To no small extent they were built upon various concepts prevalent before 1870. To the Middle Ages and the *ancien régime* corporatists were indebted for the notion of guilds, the concept of a state limited by groups such as the family, province, and profession, the Thomistic doctrine of just price, and the ideals of good workmanship, paternalism, and Christian fraternity. They adopted certain of the anti-laissez-

faire arguments of Levacher-Duplessis and other early nineteenth century partisans of restoration of the guilds. In the works of the Utopian Socialists and Proudhon, they found schemes for class cooperation and mutualism which helped to mold their corporative doctrine. The writings of such social reformers of the July Monarchy as La Farelle, and of Social Catholics of the Second Empire, though somewhat influenced by economic liberalism, suggested guild ideas more in harmony with an industrial order than those of Levacher-Duplessis. The doctrines of political philosophers like Bonald, Chambord, and Comte contributed organismic theories of the state.

With the advent of the Third Republic, corporatism had evolved into a well-defined body of doctrine. Under the leadership of La Tour du Pin and De Mun, the Social Catholics broke with economic liberalism and sought a corporative regime for France. In parliament, De Mun and his followers fought in vain for corporative legislation, while in the pages of *Association catholique* and in the work of the *Oeuvre des Cercles Catholiques d'Ouvriers,* La Tour du Pin propagated his doctrine. The latter's thought was so fully elaborated and his influence was so great that his admirers have given him the title of "Master Theorist of the Corporative Regime." In the last years of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth, the Social Catholics, while still adhering to corporatism, became more actively interested in social legislation and political agitation through their Popular Liberal party. In the meantime important non-Social Catholic influences came to bear upon corporative doctrine in the period between 1870 and 1918. Sorel, Paul-Boncour, Mazaroz, Durkheim, Duguit, and Maurras either directly or indirectly influenced corporatism, largely through the contribution of syndicalist, solidarist, and pluralist ideas.

In the period between the two World Wars corporatists of all shades of political coloring preached their doctrine. From Fascists like De la Rocque to centrists like the Social Catholic Chanson and the Professor of Law, Bonnard, to leftists like Déat and Marquet, they bathed in sentiment, rebelled vocifer-

ously against both laissez-faire and Marxism, and proposed measures for a corporative organization. With high hopes many of them greeted the Pétain regime, whose theories echoed their own, only to be disillusioned by its trend toward *étatisme.*

In spite of their discoursing upon the crisis of French economy, most French corporatists were not economists. Their approach was rather a socio-political one. With the exception of perhaps Gaëtan Pirou and François Perroux, even those corporatists who had training in economics seemed to take the socio-political approach. Corporatists in general did not face up to the economic problems that would occur following the adoption of their system. The problems of the monopolistic position of corporations and of the necessity of harmonizing their vested interests were only touched upon. The needs of the producer were usually given a more important place than those of the consumer. In fact, although they condemned laissez-faire, corporatists were living in a kind of dream world of automatic, autonomous regulation, and neat checks and balances. No corporation would step on the toes of any other. Different interests would check each other. The state would maintain a fatherly protection over the whole system, intervening only to safeguard the public welfare. Nevertheless, we have seen how easy it is for the state to evolve from a position of ocasional to constant intervention to definite direction and finally to control of the corporative system.

It is questionable whether corporatists could maintain social peace without unduly undermining the position of labor—an intention they denied. Of course they would abolish the right to strike (this was not a true right of labor anyway, they argued). Labor unions on a national scale would be destroyed, and the only labor organizations allowed would be those which would be integrated into the corporation composed of workers and employers. Several theorists (Duthoit, Mathon, etc.) insisted that employers posess the lion's share of power in ruling the corporation. Whether labor could really achieve an equal

voice with capital under a corporative system remains yet to be seen.

French corporative theorists were thus utopians who failed to go beyond their plans to an examination of the conflicts that would arise from their system. The clashes and jockeying for position between producers and consumers, capital and labor, large and small industry, corporation and corporation, state and corporation were not discussed because they were not supposed to occur to any degree; and when they did occur under any existing corporative regime, French corporatists merely answered that this was a perversion of their plan. They insisted that the corporative systems of Mussolini and Pétain, with their great degree of *étatisime* fell wide of the mark of true corporatism.

What is in store for French corporatism in the future? In answer to this question, Professor S. B. Clough writing in 1944 declared that " except in the case that the country becomes a socialist society, France may make use of corporatism . . . ",[1] particularly if it is given a democratic character and directed toward socially desirable ends.

That corporatism has not fully died in France with the Pétain regime may be seen in the reassertion of allegiance of the Social Catholics to corporative doctrine. In fact, Pope Pius XII gave his blessing to their efforts. In a letter to Professor Charles Flory, President of the Catholic *Semaines Sociales,* he called for the institution of corporative associations " in every branch of the national economy " [2] in preference to nationalization. The Pope further asserted that

> A corporative form of social life, and especially of economic life, in practice favors Christian doctrine concerning the individual, community, labor, and private property.[3]

1 S. B. Clough, " The House That Pétain Built ", *Political Science Quarterly,* LIX (1944), p. 89.

2 *New York Times,* July 21, 1946, p. 1.

3 *Loc. cit.*

In an ironic twist of events, General Charles de Gaulle, arch opponent of the Pétain regime, has declared for corporatism. In a speech to the miners and other workers at St. Etienne on January 4, 1948 he proclaimed:

> We have had enough of the opposition between the different groups of producers that is poisoning and paralyzing French industry. The truth is that the economic recovery of France, and at the same time the advancement of the workers, is bound up with the problem of association, which we shall have to follow.[4]

The type of association advocated by De Gaulle seemed to be corporative. In any group of industrial enterprises, all those who have a part, including chiefs, officials, clerks, and workers would, under a system of organized arbitration, decide together their conditions of work and principally their remunerations.

> They will set these in such a way that from the employer down to the hand laborer they will receive under the law, scaled according to hierarchy, a remuneration in proportion to the output of the enterprise.[5]

Likewise De Gaulle advocated political representation of these associations. He stated that "once French activity has been rendered coherent through association, its representatives should be incorporated within the state."[6] A second chamber coequal with the Assembly might be based on a system of corporative legislation. De Gaulle event went on to favor such organization in the other nations of Western Europe.

De Gaulle's appeals to family, religion, army, constituted orders of society, and national unity were not too different from

4 *New York Times*, January 5, 1948, p. 5.

5 *Loc. cit.*

6 *Loc. cit.*

7 H. Stuart Hughes, "Gaullism: Retrospect and Prospect," *Modern France, Problems of the Third and Fourth Republics* (Ed. Meade Earle, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951).

those of Pétain. Some have seen in his combatative and nationalistic *Rassemblement populaire français* a movement analogous to the French Fascist groups of the interbellum period. In his demand for a strong executive who would balance and integrate in a nationalistic sense the great socio-economic groups of the country, De Gaulle has shown himself to be close to the spirit of French corporatism.

Corporatism of a democratic brand has not had an opportunity for a fair trial. Its adoption in a country with free and democratic institutions suggests grave difficulties. Labor unions would oppose the abolition of their right to strike. They would argue that corporations might be controlled by employer interests against which they would have no power. The problem of balancing employer-employee factions and of guaranteeing just and democratic procedures within the corporation is no minor one. Other difficulties would be those of preventing conflicts between different corporations, protecting consumer interests, and organizing social insurance on a corporative basis when a national scheme might be more efficient.

A democratic regime might develop into a form of *étatisme* through the necessity of constant state intervention. The state might be compelled to interpose its authority in the corporative system whenever the public welfare was transgressed. Semi-autonomous corporations might be transformed into mere agencies of an all-powerful state. Gaëtan Pirou realized the problem when he suggested that dictatorship would become necessary to prevent the primacy of producers' interests over those of consumers and the undermining of workers' rights by employers' interests.

Despite its shortcomings, corporatism has made a noteworthy contribution to economic and social theory. To see in it a fantastic idea, or merely an attempt on the part of certain employers to maintain their prerogative and profits is unjustifiable.

On the roster of French corporatists were the names of profound thinkers; and many corporatists, even some employers like Chanson and Lenormand, were sympathetic to labor. The exact significance of their efforts can only be measured by the events and the historians of the future.

APPENDIX

A TYPICAL CORPORATION ACCORDING TO VALOIS: THE CORPORATION OF BOOKS[1]

VALOIS borrowed from the profession that he knew best in order to present a typical corporation. He gave the minutes of a possible semi-annual meeting of the general assembly of councils of the economic groups concerned with book production:

At the summons of the President, the members of the High Council of the Book Industries groups met in the semi-annual general assembly at the *Cercle de la Librairie,* 117 Boulevard Saint-Germain, in Paris.

Present were:

The Council of Letters and Arts: a delegate from the Society of Men of Letters, a delegate from the Syndicate of Writers, a delegate from the Syndicate of Authors and Composers of Music, a delegate from the Syndicate of Poets.

The Council of Publication, of Bookselling and Stationery: two delegates of the Syndicate of Publishers, two delegates of the syndical Chamber of French Bookstores, four delegates from the Syndicate of Workers in Publishing Houses and of Clerks of Bookstores and of Stationers.

The Council of Printers: two delegates of the Employers' Syndicate of Typographical Printers; two delegates from the Book Federation.

The Council of Paper: four delegates of the Central Union of Syndical Chambers of Papermaking, two delegates from the Workers' Syndicate of Papermaking, two delegates from the Syndicate of Clerks of the Paper Industry.

The Council of Bookbinding: two delegates from the Employers' Syndicate, two delegates from the Workers' Syndicate.

The Council of Typefounders (same as above).

1 Georges Valois, *Economie nouvelle* (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1919), pp. 284-285.

The Council of Photogravure, of Stereotypy, and Electroplating: a delegate from each specialized Employers' Syndicate and from each specialized Workers' Syndicate.

The Council of Book Machinery: two delegates from the Syndicate of Printing-press makers, a delegate from the Syndical Chamber of Makers of Machine Tools (with only advisory powers), two delegates from the Workers' Syndicate, two representatives of Technical Engineers.

The Director of the Services of the Group, in an advisory capacity.

The Director of the Bookman's House, in advisory capacity.

All the members of the councils represented have full power to act in the name of their constituents.

DIAGRAM OF THE SYSTEM OF FREE COMPETITION [2]



" The tendency to least effort comes from the consumer as a demand for low prices.

The pressure exercised on Commerce is at once felt by Production. In the rush of commercial life, and in the absence of any institution to give a useful direction to this pressure, there results a pressure of Production on wages and on hours

2 Valois, *ibid.*, p. 185.

of work. The manual laborer, being underpaid, demands lower and lower prices, leading Commerce to sell shoddy, imitation goods and Production to manufacture them. This is a system of bidding down prices, of low wages, and small profits incapable of renewing the necessary machinery fast enough."

DIAGRAM OF THE SYSTEM OF UNILATERAL UNIONISM [3]



"This is the system to which we are now subjected. The economic groups, reacting against the cheapening of prices of the preceding regime, are all organized for sale, but not for buying. The tendency manifested is not any longer that of the least effort, but that of the greatest pleasure or the greatest profit. It comes, not from the consumer but from the manual worker. Production feels the pressure and transmits it to commerce. Agreements to strike multiply and in the absence of any institution to guide it in a proper direction, it comes to light as a raising of prices. The laborer feels the increase of living costs and demands still more increases in wages. These bring about still higher prices. A system for high wages and large profits, both quite unused."

3 *Loc. cit.*

DIAGRAM OF THE SYSTEM OF INTEGRAL SYNDICATES[4]

or The System of Mutual Constraint Under Control of a Strong and Independent State



"The tendency to least effort comes from the consumer. It is transmitted through Commerce as a pressure on Production, which at first transmits it in the direction of lowering wages. Blocked on that side, it tries to exploit the State. Repulsed, it moves toward Commerce in an attempt to extort higher prices through falsification of goods. Once more repulsed, it at last returns to the heart of production and makes for the only free outlet—technical progress. This is the direction of greatest effort. Production carries the laborer along and demands a greater professional skill of him. It also carries Commerce along and demands greater activity of it. It is a system of high wages, large profits, and low prices for goods and services; there is much saving. Capital is focussed and forced into use in constant improvement of means of production."

4 Georges Valois, *Economie nouvelle*, p. 185.

SIMPLIFIED DIAGRAM OF A SILK CORPORATION ACCORDING TO COQUELLE-VIANCE[7]



7 Georges Coquelle-Viance, *Un ordre corporatif français* (Paris: Editions de la Fédération Nationale Catholique, 1938), p. 87.

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