Ideology and Politics in the State that Nobody Wanted: Austro-Marxism, Austrofascism, and the First Austrian Republic

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> By the beginning of the next week it was all over, except for the Government's vengeance on its prisoners. The workers were made to fly the white flag. The Engels Hof was renamed the Dollfuss Hof. Every man over eighteen from the Schlinger Hof was in prison, including the sick and the cripples. Terrorism became economical, since a new law stopped the unemployment pay of those who had been arrested. Meanwhile Frau Dollfuss went among the workers' families, distributing cakes. […]
>
> One evening, while we were having supper in a restaurant a man named Patterson came to our table. He was a journalist, who did a movie gossip-column for one of the daily papers […] a breezy stupid thick-skinned person, whose curiosity knew no inhibitions: in fact he was very well suited to his job.
>
> "Well Mr Bergmann," he began heartily, with the fatal instinct of the very tactless, "what do you think of Austria?"
>
> Christopher Isherwood, *Prater Violet*

Christopher Isherwood's short book about an Austrian film director in England who follows with increasing fury the depressing news from

Vienna during the coup d'état of 1934 is less well known than his books about Berlin—just as the political upheavals in Austria are less well known than those that brought down the Weimar Republic. Although Austria-Hungary was a great European power, whose political affairs and cultural achievements were reported across the world, the defeat and dismemberment of the empire had reduced Austria to a country scarcely larger than Scotland, just one among many successor states in Central Europe demanding the attention of the diplomats, politicians, and the international press. Nevertheless, the world's interest in Austria did not stop abruptly in 1918. The collapse of the monarchy itself was described by a contemporary "without fear of exaggeration as the biggest purely *political* event of its kind in the whole history of modern Europe."[1] The mass strikes and revolutions that accompanied the collapse of the empire were extensively reported, as were the successive economic and political crises that afflicted Austria in the 1920s and 1930s. Despite the loss of its imperial hinterland, Vienna remained one of the largest and most cosmopolitan cities in Europe, and many of the intellectuals and artists of "fin-de-siècle" Vienna who have attracted so much attention from cultural historians continued to live and work there in the 1920s. The city itself, much admired abroad before the war for its achievements in urban planning, continued to attract attention as "red Vienna," a model of municipal socialism that brought social justice to its citizens in the face of formidable opposition—and also balanced the books.[2]

In Austria itself the history of the First Republic has frequently been reduced to the story of a brief and doomed democratic interlude between the moribund authoritarianism of the Habsburg Empire and the destruction of parliamentary democracy at the hands of fascist movements domestic and foreign. In short, it has been a negative yardstick against which to measure the relative economic success and political stability of the more fortunate Second Republic, and in this respect it echoes in many ways the kind of fatalistic historiography associated with the Weimar Germany. Yet despite the undeniable problems it faced, the achievements of the First Republic were considerable, and its creative potential was enormous, as more recent approaches to its history have shown.[3] Outside Austria there have been relatively few serious general studies either of the history of the First Republic itself or of the competing ideologies that shaped its political landscape.[4] This essay is concerned both with the origins and nature of Austro-Marxism and "Austrofascism" and their role in the political development and demise of the republic, and with the place of both as political movements in the broader political history of Europe from the

emergence of popular politics in the late nineteenth century to the Second World War.

The Origins of Austro-Marxism

The roots of Austro-Marxism are both long and broad. It developed as an identifiable school of political thought during the last decades of the empire, and its origins are associated with the intellectual fecundity of late imperial Vienna although it has rarely featured much in the many cultural histories of the Viennese fin de siècle. Its essence was famously summed up by Otto Bauer in an article in the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* in 1927. The essay was written in response to attempts by the right to distinguish Austrian social democracy as a "particularly malign form of socialism," more radical and dangerous than the Social Democratic parties of Western Europe. But it provided the opportunity for a potted history and an explanation. The term was first used, Bauer wrote, by an American socialist (albeit one from a Russian-Jewish background), Louis Boudin, in 1907. It was used in the years before the First World War—its real heyday—to describe "a group of young Austrian comrades active in scholarly research […] the best known among them being Max Adler, Karl Renner, Rudolf Hilferding, Gustav Eckstein, Otto Bauer, and Friedrich Adler."[5] Renner, Hilferding, and Max Adler had been friends at Vienna University, where they had studied under Carl Grünberg, the later founder of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research. They were at once the "chief theoreticians of Austrian social democracy," and its future political leaders; and they were also much like many another such "circles" in Vienna at the turn of the century: a small tightly knit group of like-minded friends with a range of interests in philosophy, political economy, social thought, and the law who met at the *Café Central*. They were particularly associated with the educational association "*Zukunft*" (founded in 1903) and engaged with contemporary issues in the *Marx-Studien* launched in 1904, and in the daily and periodical press of the Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP), notably *Arbeiter-Zeitung* and *Der Kampf*.[6]

Austro-Marxism took shape at a propitious time both in the development of Marxism and in the history of the Habsburg Empire. In a series of interventions during the 1890s Eduard Bernstein's revisionism had challenged many of the basic assumptions of orthodox Marxism, opening up divisions in the international labor movement which have never been fully healed. On the basis of his own observations of contemporary society, Bernstein had concluded that the working class was not becoming

increasingly impoverished as Marx had expected; that the revolution was by no means inevitable; and that the German Social Democratic movement should therefore work as a party of progressive reform within existing political structures in order to ameliorate the working and living conditions of the working class. In many ways this was a welcome development to intellectuals in the party. They wanted to establish within Marxist thought a scholarly framework of ideas capable of engaging systematically with new intellectual developments, and this meant locating Marxism itself in a broader European intellectual tradition, accepting that it was a product of its time, and that its precepts needed to be revisited as circumstances changed. But it was also a problematic development for the Austrian SDAP, as it was for labor parties across Europe. The party, which had only recently emerged from years of political persecution, had achieved a fragile unity between moderates and radicals, which its leader, Victor Adler, was anxious to preserve. The result was a compromise of a kind that was to define the identity of Austrian social democracy: its program retained much that was orthodox, while its political practice presented the party with a number of practical reasons to work for reform within the existing political order.

The first was the opportunity in 1905 to work with the state for the introduction of universal manhood suffrage, and then for Social Democrats to enter parliament when the new legislation was applied in the election of 1907. Another was the problem of nationalism. The relationship between the nation and the state was the most pressing political issue in Europe during the last decades before the First World War, and nowhere more so than in Austria-Hungary, where the pressure from nationalism threatened to blow the state apart. In the age of the nation state the Habsburg Empire looked increasingly like an anachronism, despite the fact that other major powers such as Russia, the U.S., and imperial Britain and France scarcely matched up to the ideal type. Moreover, the increasingly authoritarian racism of many nationalists in Central and Eastern Europe was fueling pressure to think of the nation in terms of ethnic homogeneity, an impossibility within the existing structures of the empire. The problem here was less the need to depart from Marxist orthodoxy, than to address an issue that had been largely neglected by Marx and Engels. Elsewhere in Europe the national question was postponed until the advent of socialism; in Austria the issue was more pressing.

Karl Renner tackled the subject in early pamphlets at the turn of the century, and challenged the assumption that the achievement of national statehood was a necessary stage on the road to socialism.[7] Instead, he had suggested the principle of "non-territorial national autonomy," where

national groups would organize as juridical entities independently of the specific territory they inhabited, like members of different religious confessions. This solution was—and is—a controversial one that challenges received ideas about the indivisible authority of the nation state and the requirement of sovereign territory for the fulfillment of national self-determination.[8] Renner's focus was on a workable constitutional and legal framework which would resolve the conflicts generated by the nationalist movements, and he argued that the empire should be democratically transformed into a "*Nationalitätenstaat*," a concept that was anathema to the nationalist right.[9] For many pragmatic and self-interested reasons social democracy was to become one of the "centripetal" forces working to hold the Habsburg state together during its final years, and was referred to facetiously by its enemies as "*K.K. Sozialdemokratie*."[10]

Otto Bauer's major work, arguably the most sophisticated Marxist treatment of the nationalities problem, was published in 1907, just as universal male suffrage was introduced in Cisleithania and the Social Democrats, the only genuinely supranational party in Austria, entered the Reichsrat as the largest party.[11] Bauer agreed with Renner, at least initially, that the national principle should not be based on territory. He set out to redefine what is meant by a nation debunking several existing theories, including the racist theories of the contemporary radical right. Although he used the term "national character" himself, he rejected ahistorical notions of a mysterious national soul that supposedly embodied the essence of nation and lasted endured forever. For Bauer, national character was a social construct, determined in part by the physical evolution of a population, and in part by the transmission and consolidation of a national culture, but above all changing over time in response to changing circumstances.[12]

Although Bauer's work was a response to the specific conditions of the Habsburg Empire and questions facing the Austrian Social Democratic Party, it also had implications beyond that immediate context. Lenin and Stalin were particularly critical, fearing the possibility of pressure from the nationalities in the Russian Empire for a federalization of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP). Social Democratic support for national self-determination was correct, but they thought that the national-cultural autonomy for which Renner and Bauer argued would promote the fragmentation of the party along national lines (as had undeniably happened in the Austrian party during the early twentieth century). Lenin judged the concept of "cultural-national autonomy" to be akin with "ideals of the nationalist petty bourgeoisie."[13] Stalin visited Lenin in Krakow at the end of December 1912, and then went on to Vienna in January 1913, where he

Otto Bauer, around 1925 ©Austrian National Library

wrote most of his own work on *The National Question and Social Democracy*. He argued that it was no business of socialists to promote nationalism and, taking his (unacknowledged) cue from Kautsky, defined the nation in terms of language, territory, and economy. Although he criticized Bauer's "psychological" definition, he also added "national character" to the list of his own criteria for nationhood. After the Russian revolution the nationalities problem in the USSR was addressed through the creation of national republics and autonomous regions, which suffered from the same problem as the successor states of interwar East Central Europe in that they contained within them further national minorities requiring extra-territorial national-cultural autonomy.[14]

Austro-Marxism and the Austrian Revolution

For Austria, of course, the First World War changed everything. The strength of Slav nationalism prompted Bauer to part company with Renner on the national question and advocate political independence for the nationalities. Renner supported the idea of domestic truce (*Burgfrieden*) throughout the war and published his ideas in *Marxismus, Krieg und*

Internationale in 1917, which was badly received by those who had been seeking to reestablish international links between the labor movements of the belligerents. The party avoided the split experienced by the German SPD, but it was from this point that the left dominated.

Defeat, revolution, and the collapse of the state presented Austrian Social Democrats with new and urgent problems in a context where the only certainty seemed to be continual change. In November 1918, Karl Renner found himself presiding over the provisional government of a German-Austrian rump state, and had to confront a very practical aspect of the nationalities problem: a contested border. As he complained to his colleagues in the council of ministers, it was impossible to govern without even knowing where the frontiers of the state were, and with Czech policemen entering the German-speaking towns and villages of Bohemia and Moravia, ousting the German-speaking authorities and claiming the territory for the newly created *Nationalitätenstaat* of Czechoslovakia.[15] The question was now no longer about the position of minorities in a multinational empire, but about the right of Austria's Germans to national self-determination and union with the Reich.

The SDAP emerged as the dominant political force at the end of the war and continued to avoid the damaging rift of the kind suffered by organized labor in other parts of Europe. The Communist Party (KPÖ), founded in November 1918, attracted little support and the Social Democrats' participation in the grand coalition of 1918-20 ensured the passage of important constitutional and welfare legislation that effectively implemented long-standing party policies. The "incompleteness" of the revolution, however, which ushered in radical political and constitutional changes but left social and economic relations virtually unchanged, posed practical and theoretical problems, not least the question of what actually constituted democracy.[16] Plans to socialize the economy through state control of the means of production were stillborn in the face of Christian Social and German National opposition, and there was a great deal of communist agitation to resolve the issue by moving from parliamentary democracy to a councils system. In the context of widespread shortages of food and heating fuel, it was feared that this was a solution which might attract a following.

The decision of the party leadership to stay with "bourgeois democracy" was emphatic.[17] Russian peasants felt themselves to be proletarian, Bauer maintained in a speech to the party congress in 1918, but Austrian peasants considered themselves bourgeois; a councils system would have no support in the countryside, and attempting to impose it would probably lead to

civil war.[18] So the commitment to working with "bourgeois democracy" was reinforced by an acute awareness of the possibility of a counter-revolution from the provinces. Party leaders were also mindful of the country's dependence on both Western capital and the goodwill of the Entente, and they were right to be concerned. Writing from Berne in April 1919, Lord Acton painted lurid portraits of the leading Social Democrats in Vienna, basing his views on memoranda from "persons who are well acquainted with the situation in Austria and Hungary." Bauer himself was presented as an extremist, whose early release from Russian captivity raised suspicions that he was "deliberately sent back to Austria on a Bolshevistic mission." Similarly, Julius Deutsch was depicted as "a fanatical Social Democrat," and the *Volkswehr* as numerically weak and morally unsound, its power in Vienna a result only of its possession of the arsenal and all the ammunition and "made up of men who wish to live in luxury without having to work, and in consequence possesses no moral courage nor stamina." According to Acton, a thousand picked soldiers, preferably British, "would strike terror into the hearts of the Volkswehr and put an end to the present intolerable situation."[19] So, while affirming its solidarity with the "heroic Russian Proletariat," and condemning the white terror in Hungary (and the Entente machinations behind it), the party congress of 1919 noted that "German Austrian social democracy is not in a position to employ the same methods of struggle as the Russian Soviet Republic."[20] Nevertheless, Bauer complained in a letter to Karl Kautsky in January 1920 that the Christian Social Party was sabotaging all the coalition's work, and that the *Länder* simply refused to obey Vienna.[21] It came as something of a relief when the party was more or less compelled to bring to an end its uneasy collaboration with the bourgeoisie after the election of that year.

If the revolution presented the Social Democrats with unexpected opportunities and challenges, it also presented Austro-Marxism with new theoretical problems. Bauer wrote in 1927 that war and revolution had "dissolved the 'Austro-Marxist' school."[22] The new circumstances, and in particular the messy reality of an unanticipated and unfinished revolution, required an explanation. Bauer sought to explain the effective stalling of the revolution in terms of a political stalemate in which class forces were evenly balanced, and the state effectively a neutral agency.[23] Although the working class had demonstrated its strength and had been able to make political gains, he reasoned, its economic weakness prevented any further progress; and even if workers were to assert themselves against the Austrian bourgeoisie, the country's dependence on international capital was enough to prevent any decisive action. But, as Raimund Loew has argued, the Entente

was not really in a position to act against the threat of Bolshevik revolution in Central Europe, despite the intervention in Hungary: Bauer and his colleagues had independently rejected the Bolshevik model as inappropriate for Austria and made a positive choice in favor of parliamentary democracy, a choice he ultimately ascribes to a "fatalistic" determinism in the Austro-Marxist interpretation of Marxism and history, and one which was to make resistance to fascism impossible.[24]

Counter-Revolution and Fascism

The emergence of fascism as a new and distinctive form of politics prompted a range of explanations and strategies from Marxists across Europe, from the variety of self-contradictory assessments made by Gramsci in 1921 to the rigidities of the official Stalinist line.[25] The prototype Italian movement had emerged from the gangs of thugs hired by local farmers and businessmen to protect their interests, and similar movements had sprung up across Central and Eastern Europe, including Austria, as part of a broader counter-revolutionary reaction to the events of 1918. The legitimacy of the republic and its constitution was by no means universally accepted, and among the dispossessed elites of the collapsing monarchy and right-wing intellectuals there was at least ambivalence and often outright hostility to democracy. Tensions were heightened by the installation of radical "Soviet" regimes in neighboring Hungary and Bavaria, and the expectation of a similar radicalization in Vienna. As the old Austrian army disintegrated in the aftermath of defeat, there was a real need for improvised self-defense against foreign incursions, particularly along the Yugoslav border with Styria and Carinthia, and a perceived need for defense against plunder by the retreating soldiers making their way through Austria to homes in the successor state. A law of 1918 permitted local armed formations to guard against looters, which were then "formed in most places under various names: Bürgerwehr, Stadtwehr, Ortswehr, Bauernwehr, Einwohnerwehr, Heimwehr, Volkswehr &c. These formations comprised citizens of all classes and opinions."[26] But in the conservative provinces there was also considerable hostility to the new republic's socialist-dominated army, the *Volkswehr*, combined with a determination to resist the anticipated depredations of the "socialist" state, which was trying to organize supplies from a reluctant countryside to feed the starving towns and cities.[27]

The memoirs of the future Heimwehr leader, Prince Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg, provide an insight into the way many on the right sized up the postwar situation: Both citizens and property were at risk from marauding

gangs, which the disorganized republican state and its weak security forces were unable or unwilling to control:

> Discipline had broken down. Everyone was hungry, and the rations officially distributed from improvised food kitchens were all too meagre. Hence the frequent plundering of wayside farms. There were […] looting expeditions by townsfolk, whom hunger and privation, the future Heimwehr leader whom hunger and privation made susceptible to the influence of anarchist agitators. The new republic's security police were barely organised, and were, anyhow, too few to protect village property. To that end peasants, farmers' sons and agricultural labourers banded themselves together into a local guard, called "Feld- und Flurwache" (rural defence force).[28]

Similar combat units formed throughout the Austrian provinces, the most radical being the *Frontkämpfervereinigung* (Veterans' Association) in Vienna and eastern Austria. Cross-frontier links were very quickly established to coordinate counter-revolutionary activity in what has been called a "transnational theater of paramilitary ultra-violence" in which, despite recruitment from the peasantry, activists often tended to constitute "a fairly homogenous transnational milieu of predominantly middle- and upper-class political radicals characterized by youth and war-induced militancy" (although not all were old enough to have seen active service).[29] Vienna was the haunt of Hungarian refugees from the "Soviet" regime of Béla Kun, and there were strong links between the *Heimwehren* and the radical right in Germany, especially with the Bavarians. The Escherich organization (*Orgesch*) supplied the Tyrolean and Upper Austrian units with arms, while refugees from the Kapp putsch and the Hitler putsch found shelter in Austria.[30]

The early Heimwehr was a sporadic and fragmented force for counter-revolution, counted by its socialist counterpart, the Republican Defense League, a formation under centralized authority created out of the workers' guards in 1923. The Heimwehr was transformed into a mass movement with its own ambitions for political power by the events of 1927 and the drawn-out political crisis they unleashed: the murder of civilians by *Frontkämpfer* in the village of Schattendorf in the Burgenland in January; the acquittal of the murderers in Vienna in July; and the subsequent riot by socialist workers which culminated in the burning down of the Palace of Justice and the government's security forces opening fire on unarmed civilians. At home the government increasingly came to see the Heimwehr as an ally against the socialists and saw to it that its organizational structure was

tightened up and its links with the army and the police were strengthened. Abroad, it received support both from the Horthy regime in Hungary and, increasingly, from Mussolini's fascist regime in Italy.[31]

The ascendancy of the Heimwehr also needs to be seen in the context of a hardening of anti-democratic attitudes on the Austrian right during the 1920s, and particularly within the broad church of political Catholicism.[32] The Christian Social Party engaged directly in democratic politics while Catholic intellectuals promoted more authoritarian solutions, ranging from Othmar Spann's sustained critique of liberalism, published as *Der wahre Staat* (1921) and inculcated in generations of students at Vienna University, to the concept of "true democracy" espoused by Ignaz Seipel, the most influential and powerful Austrian politician of the period.[33] That such voices ultimately prevailed was, like many other ostensibly Austrian developments, the consequence of a broader European pattern of radicalization and susceptibility to authoritarianism in European Catholic politics.[34]

Pressure mounted for an authoritarian revision of the constitution, which was partly met by the constitutional reforms of 1929, but intensified during the economic crisis of the following years. The political conditions and sequence of events that prepared the way for the Dollfuss dictatorship are both well documented: the emergence of the Heimwehr as an independent electoral force encroaching on Christian Social constituencies in the provinces; the open espousal of fascist ideology by Heimwehr leaders at Korneuburg, followed by the failed "*Pfrimer-Putsch*" in Styria in 1931; the dismissal of parliament on a procedural pretext in 1933; and then, finally, the armed suppression of the labor movement by government security forces and the promulgation of a new, arguably fascist constitution a year later.[35]

It would be invidious to dwell again here on whether the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime per se constituted a fascist dictatorship or not, and it is clear that the controversy around naming it has as much to do with post-1945 political sensibilities as it does with the nature of the regime itself. Suffice it to say that it was at least a coalition of authoritarian conservative and fascist elements, and that it is by no means clear that all of the fascism in the mix was accounted for by the Heimwehr.[36] More importantly, for the purposes of this debate, is what the relationship of Austrofascism was to the wider world, and what impact it had. The term "clerical fascism" is useful in this context. It was used by contemporaries on the left and, although it has been a contentious term, has since been used sporadically by historians.[37] The tone was set for clerical fascisms across Europe by the papal encyclicals *Rerum novarum* (1891) and *Quadragesimo Anno*: the first a belated coming to terms, following years of denial during the pontificate of Pius IX with

the realities of industrial modernity; the second a restatement forty years on of the essential principles from the politically assertive Vatican of the interwar years.[38] *Rerum novarum* and the Catholic social teaching that followed upon it was essentially a critique of capitalism and democracy that suggested corporatist alternatives to the inevitability of class conflict. It reflected an influential body of conservative social thought then current in Catholic Europe, including Austria, and its assumptions would have underpinned the moral and political education of many of the political leaders who established clerical dictatorships in the 1930s.

Corporatism was the political leitmotif of Austrofascism from the slogans at Korneuburg to the pious programmatic statements of the *Ständestaat*. "We reject western democratic parliamentarianism and the party state!" Steidle had proclaimed in 1931. He went on: "We are determined to put into its place the self-government of the Estates and a strong leadership which develops, not from the representatives of the parties, but from leading personalities of the large Estates. […] We are fighting against the subversion of our nation by the Marxist class struggle and the shaping of the economy by liberal capitalism."[39] These points neatly encapsulate the importance of corporatism to radical right-wing regimes across Europe, whether they were expressed in the language of "*Volksgemeinschaft*" or of "corporations." They also explain the apparent contradiction of fascism's antipathy to both "Bolshevism" and "plutocracy": The concern was with the baneful effect of "class struggle" on the life of the national community, whether institutionalized in "bourgeois" parliamentary democracy or enshrined in workers' rights, trades unions, and social welfare. The ostensible "anti-conservatism" of the radical right was largely hostility to "business conservatism" (i.e. economic liberalism), and this was as prominent a part of the outlook of Austrofascism as of comparable regimes.[40]

Corporatism was prominent in the ideology, propaganda, and self-representation of the regime, but did the dictatorship of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg actually function as a "Christian corporate state"? The formal institutions of the state were comprehensively reformed and "estates" replaced parliament and local councils. Opposition parties were suppressed and the Fatherland Front was created as an organization that would transcend sectional interest and class conflict. In reality, however, these institutions were hollow, and it is significant that the majority of legislation passed between 1934 and 1938 was implemented by means of the same War Economy Enabling Act that had been used to circumvent parliamentary authority before the coup.[41] Similarly, the Fatherland Front could never be a convincing mass movement: The regime had swept to power on a surge of

unpopularity; real political vitality was demonstrated only by the illegal Nazi movement; and Austria's political weather was being made increasingly in Berlin rather than Vienna. The regime's attempts to create a new sense of Austrian national identity, distinct from the people's ethnic and cultural German identity, had only very limited success, just as attempts to fashion a convincingly Austrian "style" in art found it difficult to escape from the pervasiveness of modernism.[42]

Austrian Ideologies and the Wider World

Austro-Marxism and Austrofascism, along with their organizations (the SDAP, the Heimwehr movement, and the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime), dominated the history of the First Austrian Republic to the extent that it became a battleground between them for political control, and the events of 1934 fictionalized by Isherwood mark the point at which the latter prevailed. This history and this relationship brings the two political phenomena together, but otherwise it is difficult to compare them.

Austro-Marxism, whether one refers to the body of theoretical work or its manifestation in the Austrian party and its associational life was an integral part of the broader international labor movement and of the intellectual history of Marxism. Much of its impact was felt in Austria itself, but Bauer's work on the nationalities problem, and perhaps even more Hilferding's treatise on imperialism, had far-reaching international significance, and both went on to occupy ministerial positions (Hilferding in Germany). Its attempt after the First World War to evolve an institutional home in an effort at conciliation between the Second and Third Internationals (the proposed *Arbeitsgemeinschaft sozialistischer Parteien*) earned it the sobriquet "two-and-a-half International." Although it was an experiment that soon petered out and the Austrians rejoined the mainstream as Social Democratic Party, it did give Austro-Marxism a distinctive international role and reputation.[43] It was the identity of Austro-Marxism as a third way between Stalinism and reformism that attracted attention after the war at a time of Cold War détente and "Eurocommunism." Collections of documents, monographs, and scholarly articles were published in English, French, German, and Italian, conferences were held and there were special issues of journals.[44] Most of the attention was positive, but not entirely uncritical either in Austria itself or abroad.[45]

Austrofascism, on the other hand, has been the ideology that dare not speak its name, and to that extent it has frequently (but not always) been used as an approximate cover term for a number of disparate phenomena,

and as a result the controversies around its definition show no signs of abating. This is of course part of a more general problem with the definition of fascism, which veers between rigid "objective" typologies and subjective mentalities. However it is applied, whether to "Heimwehr fascism," the "corporate state," or the diffuse ideology uniting the two, it cannot be said to have had the same kind of impact either within or beyond Austria. The dictatorship itself achieved little that was positive or enduring, and has often seemed an interlude characterized by a loss of initiative on the part of Austria's ruling class that culminated in the Nazi takeover. While it was very much part of broader political developments in interwar Europe, it was subordinate to more powerful external influences rather than a generator of influential original thinking or action. Its gestation was assisted by material support and ideological influence from outside, above all Italy and Hungary, but also the Vatican, and in that respect it was not dissimilar to fascist movements and authoritarian regimes in other small European states of the interwar years. There was little specific interest in this particular Austrian experiment from the outside world, except for a flurry of interest from Catholic intellectuals—not least in Ireland, where parliamentary government continued, but the ideology of corporatism was not without resonance.[46] The "martyrdom" of Dollfuss at the hands of Nazi assassins has ensured a certain kind of sympathetic treatment abroad, but there was for a long time very little critical or scholarly literature outside Austria. Similarly, the demise of Austria's independence at the hands of the Nazis has prompted many to see the foregoing dictatorship as the lesser evil.[47] If there has been a revival of interest more recently in Austrofascism it has come only in Austria itself for the most part, and much later than for Austro-Marxism, not least because it was a taboo subject for many years.[48]

It is worth returning in conclusion to an earlier point. Isherwood's novella notwithstanding, attention was deflected away from Austria for much of the First Republic, and on the whole only the crises and conflicts were reported abroad. This has distorted our understanding of interwar Austria, both in the democratic period and under the dictatorship. The First Republic was a positive and progressive stage in Austria's political and cultural development, and although its potential was thwarted, its history deserves fuller attention.

Notes

1. R. W. Seton-Watson, "Austria and Her Neighbours," *Slavonic and East European Review* 13, no. 39 (1935): 549.

2. Helmut Gruber, *Red Vienna: Experiment in Working-Class Culture 1919-1934* (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1991); and Jill Lewis, "Red Vienna: Socialism in One City 1918-1927," *European Studies Review* 13 (1983): 335-55.

3. See, for example, Helmut Konrad and Wolfgang Maderthaner, eds., *Das Werden der Ersten Republik ...der Rest ist Österreich*, 2 vols. (Vienna: Carl Gerold's Sohn, 2008).

4. Charles Gulick, *Austria from Habsburg to Hitler*, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948) remains unmatched in terms of scale and range. F. L Carsten, *The First Austrian Republic 1918-1938: A Study Based on British and Austrian Documents* (Aldershot: Gower, 1986) is a manageable scholarly overview in English (and much of volume two comprises lengthy analyses of first Austro-Marxism and "clerical-fascism"). Tom Bottomore and Patrick Goode, eds., *Austro-Marxism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978) provides an anthology of excerpts from the work of leading Austrian Marxists. Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Alexander Lassner, eds., *The Dollfuss/Schuschnigg Era in Austria: A Reassessment*, Contemporary Austrian Studies 11 (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2003) in this series provides the most recent overview of "Austrofascism" in English. Norbert Leser, *Zwischen Reformismus und Bolschewismus: Der Austromarxismus als Theorie und Praxis* (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1968) provides a wide-ranging account of Austro-Marxism in German; and the revised edition of Emmerich Tálos and Wolfgang Neugebauer, eds., *Austrofaschismus: Politik—Ökonomie—Kultur 1933-1938*, 5th ed. (Vienna: Lit, 2005) provides the most recent and wide-ranging collection of material on Austrofascism in German.

5. Otto Bauer, "What is Austro-Marxism," in Bottomore and Goode, eds., *Austro-Marxism*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 45. The term was rarely used after the war. See also Paul Pasteur, *Pratiques politiques et militants de la social-démocratie autrichienne 1888-1934* (Paris: Belin, 2003), 66.

6. See Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, vol. 2, *The Golden Age* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 240-43; Bottomore and Goode, eds., *Austro-Marxism*, 8-15.

7. Synopticus, *Staat und Nation* (Vienna, 1899) and Rudolf Springer, *Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen um den Staat* (Vienna, 1902), cited in Norbert Leser, "Austro-Marxism: A Reappraisal," *Journal of Contemporary History* 11, nos. 2-3 (1976): 133-48. See also Günther Sandner, "Austromarxismus und Multikulturalismus: Karl Renner und Otto Bauer zur Nationalitätenfrage im Habsburgerstaat," published by Kakanien Revisited, <www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/fallstudie/GSandner1.pdf>.

8. Ephraim Nimni, "Nationalist Multiculturalism in Late Imperial Austria as a Critique of Contemporary Liberalism: The Case of Bauer and Renner," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 4, no. 3 (1999): 297-99.

9. Bottomore and Goode, eds., *Austro-Marxism*, 31. Nationalist ideologues on the right disparaged the "*Nationalitätenstaaten*" that emerged in East Central Europe after 1918. See Herbert Scurla, *Die Dritte Front: Geistige Grundlagen des Propagandakrieges der Westmächte* (Berlin: Herbert Stubenrauch, 1940), cited in Tim Kirk, "Deutsche Kulturpolitik und öffentliche Meinung in Südosteuropa: Die Wiener Presse- und Kulturberichte Südosteuropas," in *"Mitteleuropa" und "Südosteuropa" als Planungsraum: Wirtschafts- und kulturpolitische Expertisen im Zeitalter der Weltkriege*, ed. Carola Sachse (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2010), 202.

10. See Oscar Jaszi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 177-85. Jaszi's famous analysis of the problems of the last years of Austria-Hungary was first published in English in 1929. Gulick, *Austria from Habsburg to Hitler*, 1370.

11. Otto Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (Vienna, 1907); translated as Otto Bauer, *The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy*, edited with an introduction by Ephraim J. Nimmi and translated by Joseph O'Donnell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

12. The discussion of these points is lengthy and in some respects now seems very outdated:

Bauer, *The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy*, 19-36. See also the very different summaries of Bauer's position in Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, vol. 2, 285-90, where it is located in a history of Marxist thought; and Nimmi's introduction to the English translation, *The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy*, xv-xlv, which explicitly avoids discussion of the book's position in Marxist ideology to concentrate on its contemporary applicability.

13. Raimund Loew, "The Politics of Austro-Marxism," *New Left Review* I/118 (1979): 22.

14. See Robert C. Tucker, *Stalin: A Revolutionary 1879-1929: A Study in History and Personality* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1974), 150-57; and Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 32. I am grateful to my colleague David Saunders for drawing these references to my attention.

15. Archiv der Republik, Ministerratsprotokolle, Nov. 1918.

16. See Andrew Arato, "Austromarxism and the Theory of Democracy," in *The Austrian Socialist Experiment: Social Democracy and Austromarxism, 1918-1934*, ed. Anson Rabinbach (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 135-40.

17. Leser, *Zwischen Reformismus und Bolschewismus*, 296-300.

18. *Stenographisches Protokoll des Parteitages der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei,* 31 Oct. to 1 Nov. 1918, 110-12, cited in F. L. Carsten, *Revolution in Central Europe 1918-1919* (Aldershot: Wildwood House, 1988), 31-32

19. Memorandum from Lord Acton to Earl Curzon, 12 Apr. 1919, BDFA II F 1 Doc 8, 8-9.

20. Resolutions passed at the Congress of the Social Democratic Party of German Austria. Inclosure in letter from Mr. Lindley to Lord Curzon, Vienna, 7 Nov. 1919. British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part II, Series F, Vol. 1, Central Europe 1919-1922, Doc 21 [150809], 33-34.

21. Carsten, *Revolution in Central Europe*, 302.

22. Bauer, "What is Austro-Marxism," 46.

23. Otto Bauer, *Die österreichische Revolution* (Vienna: Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1923), translated as *The Austrian Revolution* (London: Leonard Parsons, 1925).

24. Loew, "The Politics of Austro-Marxism."

25. See David Beetham, *Marxists in the Face of Fascism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983).

26. Report by Colonel de Ligny, French officer of the Inter-Allied Control Commission. Inclosure in letter from Mr. Lindsay to Earl Curzon, 11 Jan. 1921. British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part II, Series F, Vol. 1, Central Europe 1919-1922, Doc 146 [C 1168/716/3].

27. Ludwig Jedlicka, "The Austrian Heimwehr," *Journal of Contemporary History* 1, no. 1 (1966): 127-44; Bruce Pauley, *Hahnenschwanz und Hakenkreuz: Steirischer Heimatschutz und österreichischer Nationalsozialismus 1918-1934* (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1972), 33-46.

28. Ernst Rüdiger Starhemberg, *Between Hitler and Mussolini: Memoirs of Ernst Rüdiger Prince Starhemberg: Former Vice Chancellor of Austria* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1942).

29. Robert Gerwarth, "The Central European Counter-Revolution: Paramilitary Violence in Germany, Austria and Hungary after the Great War," *Past & Present* 200, no. 1 (2008): 170-80. On the peasantry and the Heimwehr, see the review article by Franziska Schneeberger, "Heimwehr und Bauern—Ein Mythos," *Zeitgeschichte* 16, no. 4 (1989): 135-45.

30. Gerwarth, "The Central European Counter-Revolution," 183-84; Jedlicka, "The Austrian Heimwehr," 129-30; and Ludger Rape, *Die österreichischen Heimwehren und die bayerische Rechte 1920-1923* (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1977).

31. See Lajos Kerekes, *Abenddämmerung einer Demokratie: Mussolini, Gömbös und die Heimwehr* (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1966) on the role of Hungary and Italy in the destruction of Austrian democracy.

32. See Helmut Wohnout, *Regierungsdiktatur oder Ständeparlament: Gesetzgebung im autoritären Österreich* (Vienna: Böhlau, 1993), 20-23.

33. See John Haag, "Marginal Men and the Dream of the Reich: Eight Austrian National-Catholic Intellectuals," in *Who were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism*, ed. Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), 239-48; Robert Stöger, "Der christliche Führer und die 'wahre Demokratie': Zu den Demokratiekonzeptionen von Ignaz Seipel," *Archiv* 2 (1988): 54-67; and Wohnout, *Regierungsdiktatur oder Ständeparlament*, 24-32.

34. Martin Conway, *Catholic Politics in Europe 1918-1945* (London: Routledge, 1997), 47-77 (esp. 48).

35. Emmerich Tálos and Walter Manoschek, "Zum Konstituierungsprozeß des Austrofaschismus," in *Austrofaschismus*, ed. Tálos and Neugebauer, 7-25; and Carsten, *The First Austrian Republic 1918-1938*, 151-78.

36. See the brief survey of then available assessments in Karl R. Stadler, *Austria* (London: Ernest Benn, 1971), 126. He reminds us that Nolte's *Faschismus in seiner Epoche* distinguished between "Heimwehr fascism" and the "Austrofascism of Dollfuss," and that Carsten, while hesitating to designate the "corporate state" fascist, used the term "clerico-fascist" to describe a number of regimes, from Portugal and Austria to Slovakia.

37. Gulick, *Austria from Habsburg to Hitler*, 1403-570; Klaus-Jörg Siegfried, *Klerikalfaschismus: Zur Entstehung und sozialen Funktion des Dollfußregimes in Österreich: Ein Beitrag zur Faschismusdiskussion* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1979); more recently: Robert Pyrah, "Enacting Encyclicals? Cultural Politics and 'Clerical Fascism' in Austria, 1933-1938," in *Clerical Fascism in Interwar Europe*, ed. Matthew Feldmann and Marius Turda (London: Routledge, 2008), 158-70.

38. Wohnout, *Regierungsdiktatur oder Ständeparlament,* 44-56.

39. Cited in F. L. Carsten, *Fascist Movements in Austria from Schönerer to Hitler* (London: Sage, 1977), 172.

40. Diamant makes a telling point about the tendency of Western observers that expect an identification of conservatives with an anti-state intervention, business-friendly ideology, whereas continental European conservatism was often "étatiste." Alfred Diamant, "Austrian Catholics and the First Republic, 1918-1934: A Study in Anti-Democratic Thought," *Western Political Quarterly* 10, no. 3 (1957): 606.

41. Wohnout, *Regierungsdiktatur oder Ständeparlament,* 305-20.

42. See, for example, Margarethe Lasinger, "Wie modern war doch die Biedermeierzeit: 'die pause' und andere Kulturzeitschriften im Ständestaat," in *Kunst und Diktatur: Architektur, Bildhauerei und Malerei in Österreich, Deutschland, Italien und der Sowjetunion 1922-1956*, vol. 1, ed. Jan Tabor (Baden: Grasl, 1994), 260-74.

43. Adolf Sturmthal, "Austromarxism on the International Scene," in *The Austrian Socialist Experiment*, ed. Rabinbach, 177-85; Leser, "Austro-Marxism," 136-37.

44. For example Bottomore and Goode, eds., *Austro-Marxism*; Yvon Bourdet, *Otto Bauer et la révolution* (Paris, 1968); Hans-Jörg Sandkühler, *Austromarxismus: Texte zu Ideologie und Klassenkampf von Otto Bauer* (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1970).

45. See, for example, Raimund Löw, Siegfried Mattl, and Alfred Pfabigan, *Der Austromarxismus: Eine Autopsie: Drei Studien* (Frankfurt: isp-Verlag, 1986); Loew, "The Politics of Austro-Marxism";

and Pasteur, *Pratiques politiques et militants de la social-démocratie autrichienne*, 66-70.

46. See, for example, the apologia for the dictatorship by Brendan Lawler, "Dollfuss and his work," *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review* 26, no. 101 (1937): 78-88.

47. J. D. Gregory, *Dollfuss and his Times* (London: Hutchinson, 1935); and Gordon Brook Shepherd, *Dollfuss* (London: Macmillan, 1961). The theme of Dollfuss biographies is dealt with by Lucile Dreidemy, "Dollfuß-Biographien: Zwischen Mythos und Geschichte," unpublished paper presented at the German Studies Association, Washington, 2009.

48. Tálos and Neugebauer, eds., *Austrofaschismus* has reset the agenda in this respect. An earlier volume in the *Contemporary Austrian Studies* series has taken the issue outside Austria: Bischof, Pelinka, and Lassner, eds., *The Dollfuss/Schuschnigg Era in Austria* (see especially Tim Kirk, "Fascism and Austrofascism"). See also Florian Weininger, "Fascism or Authoritarian Rule? The Representation of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Regime in U.S. Historiography," unpublished paper presented at the German Studies Association, Washington, 2009. A version of this paper and that of Lucile Dreidemy will be published in Ilse Reiter-Zatloukal, Christiane Rothländer, and Pia Schölnberger, eds., *Österreich 1933-1938: Juristisch-historische Bestandsaufnahmen und Perspektiven* (forthcoming).