

## THE ESTADO NOVO AND PORTUGUESE–GERMAN RELATIONS IN THE AGE OF FASCISM

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### History and Historiographical Debates

On 28 May 1926, a military coup brought the First Portuguese Republic (1910–26) to an end, setting in motion a process that within a short time would lead to the rise of António de Oliveira Salazar and to the institutionalization of a dictatorship that would last until 1974. Salazar became president of the Council of Ministers in July 1932. This was the moment when he began to reinforce his power and build a new regime. It was then institutionalized by the 1933 Constitution, which Salazar himself, with the help of some of his collaborators, had drafted. This document made Portugal a “unitary and corporative republic”<sup>1</sup> whose sovereignty was limited only by “morality and law,”<sup>2</sup> maintained a regime of separation from the Catholic Church, and committed the Estado Novo, the New State, with the creation and development of a corporative economy.

When we analyze Salazar’s political speeches, we can see that his predominant line of argumentation was one that always defended the national paradigm. That is to say, the dictator conceived his Estado Novo to be an original, national phenomenon applied to the Portuguese national context. As such, it could not be included in the group of fascist and totalitarian regimes.<sup>3</sup>

However, we should not undervalue the demagogic nature of Salazar’s statements and the analysis should go beyond the dictator’s discourse. In fact, if we compare the ideological matrix and the political–institutional characteristics of the Estado Novo with those of other regimes, such as National Socialism and Italian Fascism, we can find a plethora of fascist elements. This is the case, for example, of the omnipresent, violent, anticommunist and antiparliamentarian

discourse that was in fact characteristic of the political programs of all fascisms. Like National Socialism in Germany and Fascism in Italy, the Portuguese regime was presented as a “Third Way,” an alternative to the previous ruling order and to communism. The structuring of the Estado Novo in the form of a dictatorship was made through the alliance between different right wings, and this fact has been used as an argument to reject its fascist nature. In opposition to what he considered to be the crumbling republican parliamentary system, and being against Marxist–Leninist solutions, Salazar appeared as the bearer of a New Order, a New State—the Estado Novo.

This New Order consisted of a wide-ranging project that was not only political in nature but also cultural and economic. At the economic level, it meant breaking with the “old” liberal capitalism. It involved the creation of a corporative state that was to take an active, dirigiste role. At the political level, it meant breaking away from the previous “disorder” caused by the parliamentarianism of the First Republic, subordinating the individual to the state, placing the nation above individual interests and regenerating the “homeland” (*patria*) which was considered to be “sick.” There was a unique party, the National Union (União Nacional, UN), although this party had not conquered the power “on the streets.” The political police was restructured, with the State Defence and Surveillance Police (Polícia de Vigilância e de Defesa do Estado, PVDE) appearing in 1933. Special military tribunals were also established, and legislation was passed that moved toward the corporatization of the economy. The dictator used repressive means and propaganda mechanisms, and adopted a charismatic leadership style, in order to ensure his power. Actually, his moral authority was presented as being based on his knowledge, emanating from his status as full professor in Coimbra, which led the Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno to designate the Portuguese regime as “cathedralic *fascism*.” The populist leadership of the dictator was also based on the image of simplicity and austerity, and Salazar was presented as “the savior of the nation.”

The new ruler sought to establish totalitarian control over Portuguese society, creating institutions through which to ideologically shape individuals and to repress all those who might deviate from the imposed order. The regime’s “totalitarian inclination” was reflected in the need to shape and re-educate the Portuguese people, with a view to creating a “New Man.”<sup>4</sup> To this end, institutions such as the National Propaganda Secretariat (Secretariado de Propaganda Nacional, SPN) and the Portuguese Youth Organization (Mocidade Portuguesa, MP) were set up, the latter against the backdrop of the Spanish Civil War. It was because of this same context that Salazar made the army

subordinate to the regime, reforming it and, in 1936, appointing himself as minister of war. Along the way he had to remove his opponents. For example, he exiled Rolão Preto, the leader of the National Syndicalist Movement (Movimento Nacional-Sindicalista, MNS),<sup>5</sup> but accepted any of Rolão Preto's former followers who wished to be integrated into the regime and who agreed to accommodate to the Salazarist solution. The pressure exercised by this faction led to the creation of institutions such as the Portuguese Legion (Legião Portuguesa, LP) and the National Foundation for Joy at Work (Fundação Nacional para a Alegria no Trabalho, FNAT), which were both greatly influenced by similar Italian and German organizations.

Contemporaries were aware of the affinities existing between the German dictatorship and the Portuguese regime, and sought to highlight them publicly. They looked with admiration at Germany and forced themselves to view the "National Revolution"<sup>6</sup> that had occurred in Portugal alongside what had occurred in Germany. Although the attraction for National Socialism was not consensual, one part of the Portuguese elite enthusiastically welcomed Hitler's rise to power, expressing "a political passion favorable to Germany."<sup>7</sup> These individuals therefore made a huge effort to demonstrate the ideas and ideologies shared by the two countries, and some of them immediately established contacts with Nazi Germany. According to Oswald von Hoyningen-Huene, the German minister plenipotentiary in Portugal (1934–44), his country had many friends and admirers at the very heart of the government, and the National Syndicalists were particularly enthusiastic.<sup>8</sup> The Germans, like the Portuguese, also made a great effort to demonstrate the existence of a "kinship of spirit and feelings"<sup>9</sup> or even a *Schicksalsgemeinschaft*, a "community of destiny."<sup>10</sup>

In point of fact, the Estado Novo had more in common with Germany and Italy than with countries with liberal governments such as Great Britain. German diplomacy took advantage of the state's political-ideological bases, and during the war it even used the fact that Salazar's opponents were hoping for an Allied victory to convince government circles that it was Germany that was Portugal's true ally.<sup>11</sup> German victories in the war were always widely publicized and even praised in the Portuguese press. This enthusiasm increased even more with the opening of the Eastern Front and the start of the "crusade" against communism.<sup>12</sup>

There were of course important differences. One of these is the fact that, unlike Italian Fascism and German National Socialism, there was no mass movement, which led Manuel de Lucena to claim that Salazarism was a "fascism without a fascist movement."<sup>13</sup> This very fact

was noted and highlighted at the time by contemporaries. According to Hans Freytag, the German minister plenipotentiary in Lisbon, not even National Syndicalism, which ideologically showed a greater proximity to the Nazi regime, could be considered as a mass movement, since the overwhelming majority of the Portuguese population were illiterate.<sup>14</sup> For Hoyningen-Huene, Freytag's successor in Lisbon, the Portuguese dictatorship did not choose to become a major fascist movement with a revolutionary dynamic, but limited itself to sympathizing with National Socialist and fascist ideology.<sup>15</sup> Although Salazar knew the benefits of introducing fascism under his own leadership, there were three factors that prevented him from taking this course: first, the opposition of the army, which did not want to relinquish its influence to a large popular movement; second, Salazar's personal aversion to a populist leadership that would mean personal contact with the masses; and finally, the fear that the "Portuguese temperament" would not adjust to the internal and perpetual tension that fascism demanded from each individual. Huene had shrewdly identified two key differences between Salazarism and National Socialism: the Portuguese New State was not based on a popular revolutionary movement; and the aversion of Salazar towards the masses.

Another crucial difference was anti-Semitism, which was a central tenet of Nazi ideology. In Portugal, however, it was not part of the regime's ideology and was just a "marginal" phenomenon.<sup>16</sup> In fact, German diplomats themselves said there was a lack of understanding about the racial issue in Germany, which, in their opinion, was due to the large amount of miscegenation that existed in Portugal.<sup>17</sup>

The comparative studies about the political nature of the Portuguese regime, written by historians and political scientists, tend to emphasize the differences and uniqueness, and exclude the *Estado Novo* from the "fascist" category.<sup>18</sup> However, this is not a consensual interpretation, and for other historians Salazarism fits unquestionably into the typology of fascism.<sup>19</sup>

It is not our intention to take this discussion further in this chapter. However, we consider that fascism should not be understood as a monolithic and immutable block but rather as an ideology that spread a little throughout the whole of Europe in the interwar period. In some countries it managed to come to power and put its political-ideological project into practice; in others it did not. Despite sharing a common nature, however, the ideology was adapted to suit national conditions.

This chapter thus seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the transnational communications, exchanges, and transfers between National Socialism and the *Estado Novo*, because, besides those few

comparative studies, the transnational dimension of the Estado Novo and the countless cross-border communications have not received the attention they deserve. Our main aim though is to analyze the relationship between the Portuguese regime and National Socialist Germany, focusing on a single aspect of the many transnational exchanges and transfers during the period.

We assert that Portugal and Germany were very close and that there was intensive cooperation between the two regimes. For example, Portuguese organizations like the MP or FNAT were set up to mirror their German counterparts. Why are these organizations so important? It is because they were created at the time when the greatest fascistization of the Portuguese regime was taking place and at the very moment when neighboring Spain was experimenting with a Manichaeistic struggle between the republicans and the nationalists led by General Francisco Franco. Moreover, it was the regime itself that asked the German Legation for information about the Nazi organizations.<sup>20</sup>

This was naturally well received by the German authorities. Hoyningen-Huene, at the time the German minister plenipotentiary in Portugal, told the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Auswärtiges Amt, AA) that it was of great “interest that Portugal should also proceed with this organization [the LP] according to our model, because it is to be hoped that new advances in promoting understanding for our National Socialist Germany might result from it.”<sup>21</sup> This proves that there was a desire on the part of at least some members of the regime to make National Socialist Germany the model to be followed. It also shows that it was important for the Germans that Portugal use German organizations as their model so that National Socialism might be better understood. The interest was, therefore, reciprocal. Thus it can be seen that Germany, like Italy, became a center that sought to spread its hegemony throughout Europe, influencing other countries both politically and ideologically.

The thesis we will present in the following pages claims that Portuguese young people were one of the main focuses of attention for German diplomacy. We will seek to analyze the relationship between the Third Reich and the Estado Novo, focusing on academic exchanges and especially the interaction between the two regimes’ youth organizations. This choice is not in any way random. After consulting documentation in German archives, we concluded that German diplomacy managed to set up a large network of contacts, whose main actors were young people and academics who connected Germany to Portugal in a strategy that aimed, ultimately, at bringing the two regimes closer together.

## **The Importance of Cultural Exchange in the Normalization of Portuguese–German Relations**

With Portugal's entry into World War I on the side of Britain, relations between Portugal and Germany were broken off for some years. It was only in the 1920s that exchanges between the two countries returned to normal. But even so they continued to be very much affected by postwar problems and by the resolution of such questions as war reparations and the return of goods belonging to Germans that the Portuguese government had seized in 1916, as described in reports sent back by German diplomatic representatives in Lisbon.<sup>22</sup>

In the face of such obstacles, it was cultural and scientific diplomacy that, in our opinion, helped lead to the normalization of diplomatic relations. Indeed, German diplomats realized early on the potential of German culture as an exportable "product" to Portugal. The "Notes for the Reception of the Portuguese Envoy by Hitler," dating from 1933, lamented that the negotiations referred to above had gone on for so long, but stressed that cultural relations between the two countries had intensified in the last few years.<sup>23</sup> A few years before, in March 1929, Albert von Baligand, the German minister plenipotentiary in Lisbon, called the attention of the AA to the fact that four university professors had been part of the last government. "As we know, scientific circles have considerable influence in politics there," wrote Baligand. Most of the better-known university teachers had already occupied ministerial places on one or more occasions. The diplomat therefore considered it very important that the political activity of the legation should continue to foment constant contact with these circles, and also offer them the chance to work alongside Germans.<sup>24</sup>

The Portuguese elite were in effect the main target of German diplomacy in Portugal. This fact seemed to be obvious to their contemporaries. In the final years of the Weimar Republic, the Germans were already maintaining a cultural policy in Portugal in response to the strategy of the other powers, as reports sent back to Berlin by the legation mention. At that time Britain did not overly concern the Germans, who were more interested in expanding their contacts with those Portuguese who had studied in German universities and who wanted to maintain close ties to "German" science. They therefore considered it a good idea to create the means necessary to grant scholarships to Portuguese students and to pay for Portuguese professors to travel to Germany.<sup>25</sup> Such an opportunity arose in 1929 when the National Education Board (Junta de Educação Nacional, JEN) was founded, as this institution was responsible for awarding study scholarships to students in Portugal

and abroad. It is therefore understandable that at the beginning of May 1930, in a report on Portuguese cultural propaganda abroad, Baligand drew the attention of the AA to an interview given by Simões Raposo<sup>26</sup> to a Portuguese newspaper, even saying that JEN was “the central organ for Portuguese cultural propaganda.”<sup>27</sup> Thus the Germans started to direct their attention at this organization, and this was reflected in the number of scholarship holders sent to Germany.

This immediate and close relationship with JEN can be explained by the fact that Germany was traditionally one of the main destinations for Portuguese scholarship holders and interns. What is more, the German pedagogic and university model had been used as a blueprint for Portugal,<sup>28</sup> and German institutions certainly served as a model when JEN was set up. Furthermore, at the head of the board were figures who maintained an umbilical cord relationship with Germany, as was the case of Gustavo Cordeiro Ramos, the minister for education and a university professor. Germany, together with France, then became the main destination for Portuguese scholarship holders and, even after Hitler’s rise to power, the relationship between the board and Germany was strengthened and institutionalized, as an academic exchange service with the German Academic Exchange Service (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, DAAD) was inaugurated in the academic year 1934/35.<sup>29</sup> JEN, and later the Institute for High Culture (Instituto para a Alta Cultura, IAC) which replaced it in 1936, became the partner par excellence of the Nazi cultural and academic institutions in Portugal, with whom they exchanged books, academics, and scholars.<sup>30</sup>

From 1933 on, relations between Portugal and Germany intensified, especially with the arrival in Lisbon of a new diplomat, Baron Oswald von Hoyningen-Huene, who, as mentioned earlier, remained as German minister plenipotentiary until 1944. This aristocrat, who had started working for the AA during the Weimar Republic, was not a radical Nazi and only joined the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP) in 1937, probably under pressure. In Portugal he sought to restrain the local Nazi Party Group (NSDAP-Landesgruppe Portugal), setting himself up as the only official representative of the regime. Huene had the prudence of curbing the impulses and desires of the Nazi organizations in Portugal, restricting their activities to the Germans living in that country. The Nazi indoctrination was mostly made in private “spaces,” such as the German schools, the German Club, and even onboard the ships of the *Kraft durch Freude* (“Strength through Joy,” Nazi leisure organization). Although some Portuguese also participated, the most

visible ideological indoctrination took place behind closed doors and not in public spaces. The limitation of the activities of the party to the German citizens living in Portugal was the main reason of tension with the *Landesgruppenleiter* (National group leader of the Nazi Party in Portugal), who acted under the directives of the AO, often against von Hoyningen-Huene's will. Huene feared that a parallel diplomacy could damage the political strategy of the legation, or even threaten the trust he had with the Portuguese dictator.<sup>31</sup> He was aware that the party's activity should be more reserved, so as not to cause protests from the Portuguese government.<sup>32</sup> His attitude was very important to win the confidence of the Portuguese dictator, and differed from that of the British embassy and the British citizens living in Portugal, which led Salazar to praise the Germans.<sup>33</sup>

Nevertheless, Hoyningen-Huene faithfully served the Nazi regime's interests, which explains why he remained so long at the head of the German Legation in Lisbon. He even became a friend of Salazar, which strengthened his position, thus enabling him to fulfill his political objectives. Huene's strategy involved Germany moving closer to Portugal in the economic and military spheres, taking advantage of the strained relations between Portugal and Britain that had been caused by the outbreak of civil war in neighboring Spain. This had led to major changes being introduced in Salazar's domestic and foreign policy,<sup>34</sup> as he supported the faction led by Franco. The Germans sought to tighten the economic ties between the two countries, even managing during World War II to become one of Portugal's main commercial partners. This came in the wake of relations between the two countries becoming closer on a military level, since Germany had taken a great interest in the Portuguese rearmament program early on. The Nazis also took advantage of the terrain left vacant by Britain, which had been very reticent to supply the Portuguese national army in view of the support given by the regime to General Franco. From then on, Germany began to facilitate financing for the army, and welcomed Portuguese missions that went to the Reich to choose military material and equipment, and which received technical training there.<sup>35</sup> The PVDE had also established an important collaboration with the Gestapo and the Abwehr, especially under the impulse of the Captain Paulo Cumano, a well-known Germanophile who had studied mining engineering in Germany. Erich Emil Schroeder was the Security Service (*Sicherheitsdienst*, SD) agent in charge of police liaison with the PVDE.<sup>36</sup>

Right from the first moment, the strategy conceived by Huene was designed to be carried out over the long term, and he even admitted in confidence that Portuguese–German relations should be constructed



through a “century’s worth of work.” Furthermore, the Germans were committed to the idea of continuity—whereas the British Embassy had had four ambassadors in ten years, only one minister plenipotentiary had passed through the German Legation. Huene’s strategy was based on “long and patient work,” which he carried out for over a decade.<sup>37</sup> Part of this effort involved forging closer links with the younger generation, promoting numerous activities run by the German cultural institutions in the country such as the German–Portuguese Society (Deutsch–Portugiesische Gesellschaft, DPG), and developing contacts with the Ministry for Public Education and the MP. Huene’s strategy, like that of his predecessors, was profoundly elitist. In other words, it was centered on the political, scientific, and cultural elite of the Estado Novo and not on the uneducated masses, who carried no weight in the political decision-making process of a regime where censorship was in force and freedom did not exist.<sup>38</sup>

Huene also continued to instrumentalize German culture and Germany’s supposed “scientific superiority” so as to impose the cultural, scientific, and, consequently, ideological hegemony of the country he represented in Portugal. To this end, he set out early on to win over the Portuguese elite who, by tradition, were culturally “Francophile” and “Francophone.” Culture and science in fact played a central role in his activity, to such an extent that he fought hard for a Cultural Agreement to be signed between the two countries—an accord that Portugal never wanted to sign. In fact, in the terms in which it was drawn up, the agreement transformed the cooperation that took place on various levels—both official and unofficial—and between various organizations into an official state relationship that placed Portugal within the sphere of the ideological and political influence of the Reich. Despite this setback, during the first few years that Huene was in Lisbon the German diplomatic apparatus increased in size, while the academic and scientific exchanges became even more numerous. Visits by ships of the KdF also increased in number, as did the exchange of delegates between the MP, founded in 1936, and the Hitlerjugend (HJ).

### **Exchange between Youth Organizations**

In the summer of 1937, Gertrud Richert, head of the Portugal and Spain Section at the Ibero-American Institute, gave an interview to the newspaper *A Voz* on the subject of German–Portuguese cultural relations. When asked what would be useful to strengthen exchange between the two countries, Richert replied:

It would seem to me very important to bring the youth of our two countries closer together, something many people have already taken an interest in doing. The reciprocal visits between the Portuguese Youth Organization and the Hitler Youth Organization could become a stimulus for the exchange of high school students, which could be arranged at the same time. I also hope that exchanges between the women's movements in Germany and in Portugal might take place, and with good results.<sup>39</sup>

This exchange between the MP and the HJ is in fact one of the clearest examples of "cross-border cooperation" between fascist-type regimes. The Hitler Youth, which inspired and supported youth organizations throughout Europe, was not indifferent to its Portuguese counterpart. It quickly became an inspirational model for the Portuguese Estado Novo, and is an example of what attracted it to Nazism. This influence was also seen in the School Action Vanguard (Acção Escolar Vanguarda, AEV), set up in 1934. There was a constant exchange of delegations, and both the German minister plenipotentiary and the representative of the Nazi party in Lisbon, Wilhelm Berner, were represented at the São Carlos Theater when the movement was officially presented,<sup>40</sup> where they listened to Salazar's speech in which he referred to communism as "the great heresy of our age."<sup>41</sup> Shortly afterwards, the Vanguardists organized a demonstration in support of Salazar, and the "Green Shirts" of the AEV appeared for the first time, differentiating themselves in this way from the "Blue Shirts" of the National Syndicalists. The new organization, born out of the dissolution of the National Syndicalist Movement that Salazar had closed down in July 1934, ended up incorporating symbols (uniforms) and rituals (political meetings, the salute) shared by the different fascisms. This was meant to show that throughout Europe the time had come to fight communism, a fight that was in fact one of the driving forces behind all these fascisms.

From its creation until its extinction in 1936, Wilhelm Berner, at the time secretary of the German-Portuguese Society, was the true doctrinal mentor of the AEV and a propagandist of Nazi Germany who used the newspaper *Avante!* to carry his message.<sup>42</sup> As well as Berner's texts, anonymous articles about German youth appeared in this paper,<sup>43</sup> and every issue included some small piece of information about Germany.

The Nazi indoctrination made through these texts was afterwards reinforced by means of other activities such as the showing of films and documentaries in the legation or in the DPG to which the Vanguardists were also invited. These films helped to consolidate the knowledge about young Germans that had been acquired from newspapers, books, and magazines, thus increasing even more the admiration nurtured for Nazism.<sup>44</sup> In the pages of *Avante!*, German language and culture courses

organized by the German–Portuguese Society were advertised,<sup>45</sup> as were other events organized by German institutions in Portugal, which the Portuguese elite made a point of attending. These institutions sought to influence Portugal’s younger generation, in particular high school students.

Visits by Portuguese leaders to the Reich were also very common. In 1935, for example, António Almodôvar traveled to Germany to study how the German government managed the task of integrating young people, which he considered to be a decisive element of the “work for the political–social renovation of the Third Reich.”<sup>46</sup> The invitation to go to Germany came from the Ministry of Propaganda, who suggested that the German minister plenipotentiary in Lisbon should invite a leader of the AEV to attend the annual rally of the Nazi Party in Nuremberg so that he could “form a true impression of the new Germany.” The suggestion was welcomed by the legation, which considered that Germany should not “leave this terrain solely to Italian propaganda,”<sup>47</sup> and by the AEV itself.

Such important exchanges, however, did not stop strong criticism of National Socialism being voiced within the AEV. While some highlighted the singularity of the Portuguese Estado Novo, allegedly constructed in accordance with the national “character,” others rejected external influences and exogenous models that could lead Portugal into the “Germanic sphere of influence in the world.”<sup>48</sup> Other aspects of Nazism that were strongly criticized were imperialism and the position taken toward the Church and Catholics in Germany. Nazi paganism and the way the German regime antagonized the Church did not please Portuguese Catholic circles. News of priests being imprisoned and Catholic organizations being dissolved reached Portuguese ears despite censorship being in place. One article published in *Avante!* even went so far as to praise the way that the Church in Germany was resisting and opposing the sterilization law.<sup>49</sup> How can such condemnation by a newspaper and an organization that were both clearly pro-Nazi be explained? These criticisms were possible as there was not, in fact, any consensual opinion about Germany and the benefits that importing the Nazi model would bring Portugal. Indeed, certain sectors of the regime’s elite had always harbored strong reservations about Nazism. Many continued to prefer the influence of Italian Fascism because they considered it more suited to the supposedly Latin and Christian Portuguese “character.”<sup>50</sup> Even Salazar himself perceived Mussolini “more cautious, more Latin,”<sup>51</sup> while the Portuguese Catholic Church was vehemently opposed to the youth exchanges with Nazi Germany.

However, even despite these critical voices, the AEV continued to favor the relationship with Germany, as can be seen in *Avante!* In fact, the person responsible for the DPG, Johannes Roth, assured the legation at the end of 1935 that interest in the New Germany had grown of late in Portugal and that, almost daily, there were requests for information from intellectual circles about the HJ, *Winterhilfe* (Winter Relief), the National Socialist People's Welfare Organization (Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt, NSV) and KdF.<sup>52</sup>

## The Decline of the Vanguard Movement and the Creation of the MP

Over time, the Portuguese Vanguard movement, the AEV, began to lose its dynamism. When the Estado Novo no longer had need of it, it ceased to be able to count on the regime's support, and ended up fading away. By appointing António Almodôvar to head this organization, the Ministry for Public Education broadened, as it had wanted, its sphere of action, and brought under its own control an organization that had been born with its umbilical cord tied to the SPN. Its life span proved to be very short and the AEV was, according to Homem Cristo, never anything more than a modest "version" of the "youth organizations that were more or less sportive, more or less political, more or less military" that had been created in Italy and in Germany.<sup>53</sup> A better organizational model would only appear in 1936 within the Ministry of Education, but calls in this direction could already be found in the last few issues of *Avante!*:

It is urgent to work so that the day might shortly come when our youth—within our Latin temperament and given our educational processes—can start being prepared to indisputably ensure the continuation of the magnificent work of salvation that we owe to a few good Portuguese citizens.<sup>54</sup>

This pressure came not only from the Vanguard movement itself but also from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and from some of the National Union's leaders.<sup>55</sup> Curiously enough, it was following António Almodôvar's trip to Germany when it was decided to create a new organization, given the decline of the AEV, but under the aegis of the Ministry for Public Education. Based on what he had seen and heard when in the Reich, Almodôvar highlighted how the Germans operated in terms of physical preparation and "political-social training." The former ensured a type of pre-military technical preparation acquired through practicing sport, marching, gliding, and handling weapons. The latter, on the other hand, ensured a form of "nationalist training" through lectures

and readings that were, obviously, guided. Finally, this was also seen as one of the ways to guarantee the “strengthening of the race” through excursions, camping, and sport; in short, through life in the open air.<sup>56</sup>

In the context of the educational reform headed by the minister, António Carneiro Pacheco, the MP was set up. This covered all young people between the ages of 14 and 17, even if they did not attend school.<sup>57</sup> Both in the decree that instituted the organization and in the regulatory ordinance published some months later, it was made very clear that the new organization was not merely aimed at promoting the physical and pre-military education of young Portuguese people, but at providing both a moral and a civic education. Naturally this was a nationalist education because it proposed to stimulate “devotion to the fatherland in terms of order, a fondness for discipline, and the cult of military duty.”<sup>58</sup> The Regulatory Ordinance of the MP further pledged to foment a Christian education and would therefore not admit, for example, members with no religion.<sup>59</sup>

Its first commissar had a very different project though. In a highly radicalized period, owing to the outbreak of the Civil War in Spain, Francisco Nobre Guedes wanted to make the MP the instrument by which all young people could be shaped in a totalitarian way. He encouraged an intensive exchange program with the HJ, which served as his model. The first public appearance of the MP was in Germany when a group of twenty-nine members (students from the Colégio Militar and sons of leaders of the MP) took part in an international youth camp at the time of the Olympic Games in August 1936. After this, the young Portuguese students traveled around Germany for one week.<sup>60</sup> In Dresden they were received by the *Gauleiter* who “praised” Portugal, claiming it was “walking at Germany’s side in the fight against false ideas,” and in Munich “the Germans exceeded all expectations in terms of kindness.” When he thanked the “friendly” way in which the MP had been received in the Reich, the minister of education, Carneiro Pacheco, assured the German minister plenipotentiary that the boys of the Mocidade would retain “an unforgettable memory of their stay in Germany.”<sup>61</sup> He went on to say:

I hope that this visit will be the beginning of a continuous exchange, and that bringing the youth of our two countries into contact with each other might enable them to have a fuller understanding of each other and might be the guarantee that Portugal and Germany will always know how to show mutual respect and understanding for each other. The similarity of our social objectives and our shared efforts to defend Christian civilization are the guarantee that this work of bringing them closer together is solid and will enjoy a wider projection.

Huene made a point of sending a copy of Carneiro Pacheco's letter to Friedhelm Burbach, *Auslandskommissar* of the NSDAP for Spain and Portugal, saying that it proved the reception of the Portuguese boys in Germany had been appreciated and that, through the visit, "a new stone in the building of German-Portuguese friendship, for which we are all working together, had been laid."<sup>62</sup>

The visit lent added force to exchanges between the two countries because news appeared in the press during the month of September about a possible trip to Lisbon of leaders of the HJ at the invitation of Carneiro Pacheco. This, according to the same newspapers, was proof that the collaboration between the young people of the two countries had been a success.<sup>63</sup> The Germans, ever attentive to developments in Portugal, immediately took an interest in the MP and appointed a delegate to be in charge of relations with the new organization. The Nazis in fact showed an interest in all the youth movements that were appearing in various countries. This led the leader of the HJ to try to set up an office that could impose the German model's leadership on the foreign youth organizations. He thus became responsible for collecting information during his frequent trips abroad. The HJ also asked the AA about youth movements and organizations in other countries and, in due course, about the most important legislation in this domain, as well as quarterly reports about youth work, magazines, and newspapers.<sup>64</sup>

In Portugal, the German authorities made a point of emphasizing the affinities between the youth organizations of the two countries, and the numerous visits arranged were seen as proof of their very close relationship. These contacts became even closer in the following years. They were of as much interest to the Germans as to the Portuguese, with IAC being the intermediary for the exchanges. These were very important occasions, enabling ideas to be exchanged and strengthening the bonds that linked the two organizations.

The Portuguese-German exchanges in this area continued, despite some criticism and reluctance, reaching their highest point in 1937-38. A report from the British Embassy said that "the year 1938 witnessed the continuation of the struggle for Portugal."<sup>65</sup> Throughout this year the British continued to feel threatened by Germany's behavior, believing that the German Legation in Lisbon and various other organizations were working intensively to prepare the way to later dominate the country. For the British, it was obvious that the German policy was to "gain control of the Mocidade Portuguesa."<sup>66</sup> They were aware that the organization was similar to the German one in its methods and practices, despite Nobre Guedes having tried to reassure the British and guaranteeing to Lord Lloyd that there was no cause for alarm in

relation to any possible Germanization of the organization. This also caused deep discontent among Catholics, and in particular amongst those who gravitated around the patriarch cardinal, Manuel Gonçalves Cerejeira, who looked with growing apprehension at how the movement was developing.<sup>67</sup> In the collective pastoral letter of 18 April 1938, God was called upon to prevent the totalitarian state's paganism from seducing the youth of Portugal. The patriarch cardinal expressed his surprise to the minister of Education at the invitation proffered to the *Reichsjugendführer*, Baldur von Schirach, to take part in the MP's camp on 28 May 1938. In his opinion, intensifying relations "would not only be offensive and dangerous for Portuguese Catholic consciences but also not at all worthy of our national pride, as we know the inferior idea the Germans have of us, children (according to them) of an inferior and negroid race."<sup>68</sup>

The mobilization of Portuguese youth, following the German model, continued to be a systematic target for attacks by the Catholics, which the national commissar responded to by guaranteeing that it was a "mistake" to fear "contagion and absorption," considering that "meetings of good camaraderie with foreigners ... do not alter our boys' way of being and way of feeling, but rather give them reasons to always take pride in their nationality, an awareness of their patriotism."<sup>69</sup> The growing reluctance led Hoyningen-Huene himself, ever cautious, to advise that exchanges be increased. The diplomat must have felt that, of late, political Catholicism had exerted a strong influence on the education of young Portuguese people, which had forced the MP to slow down its joint projects with the German youth movement, particularly when this work was highly visible. Given the circumstances, Huene advised that four exchange trips with Portugal should be organized, including during the summer months. He also recommended that a group of HJ should visit Porto. In his opinion, if there were a reduction in the number of visits, German-Portuguese relations in the area of youth education, still in its initial (but auspicious) stages—so wrote Huene—could suffer a setback due to the influence of Catholic political circles.<sup>70</sup>

In May 1938, more members of the HJ arrived in Lisbon.<sup>71</sup> In July of the same year, fourteen Germans, all members of the HJ, came to Portugal in the company of Walter Prinzhorn at the invitation of the director of the Infante de Sagres College. Then in the summer of 1938 the commissar, Nobre Guedes, went to Germany to take part in the International Congress on Technical Education as the representative of Portugal.<sup>72</sup> News of his trip was reported in both the Portuguese<sup>73</sup> and the German<sup>74</sup> press. At the invitation of the MP's commissariat, three leaders of the HJ—Georg Berger, Josef Forster, and Werner Lamann—visited Portugal

in December 1938.<sup>75</sup> For a whole week they visited various centers of the MP as well as the German School.<sup>76</sup> *The Times* newspaper of 6 December 1938 also reported the presence of the three leaders.<sup>77</sup>

Despite the outbreak of war in September 1939, the exchange program continued. Contrary to what Simon Kuin claims,<sup>78</sup> the two organizations remained close, although relations were less intensive and less visible, as Orlando Grossegeesse has already noticed.<sup>79</sup> There were naturally moments when war developments forced initiatives to be cancelled. This happened, for example, following the sinking of the Portuguese ship *Corte Real* by a German submarine in 1941, which led to the cancellation of a visit by members of the HJ. Despite the Portuguese government's desire to receive the young Germans, it was thought that people would not understand such an expression of friendship toward the Germans; and so the visit, considered inopportune, was cancelled.<sup>80</sup>

The exchanges continued despite the war and the replacement of the Germanophile Nobre Guedes<sup>81</sup> by Marcelo Caetano. In 1941 the Portuguese Consulate in Berlin asked the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, MNE)<sup>82</sup> if it could give visas to two older HJ members, Lutz Hassenpflug and Werner Lamann, who were going to Lisbon to visit the MP and to prepare the arrival of a group of gymnasts from the HJ that was planned for October.<sup>83</sup> In the same year, on 3 September, the Portuguese Legation in Berlin mentioned the presence in Germany of an official mission from the MP who were taking part in the Breslau Sports Festival.<sup>84</sup> In July 1942 the legation communicated to the MNE that a visit to Berlin was expected from Captain Quintino da Costa and a group of boys from the MP.<sup>85</sup> In the same year the MP was officially represented at the meeting at which the European Youth Association was created.<sup>86</sup> These exchanges did not pass unnoticed by the British. In 1942 an official memo from the Portuguese ambassador in London, Armindo Monteiro, to Salazar reported a conversation he had had with the head of the British Council, who expressed his displeasure at the position taken by the MP. He did not understand how an official organization of a country that was "an ally of England" could at that moment continue to "accept invitations to visit Berlin." This was not in fact the first complaint made by Britain regarding the behavior of the MP, who refused to accept any British assistance, even technical. Monteiro believed that the organization was about to be "put on the Black List" by the British, and he lamented that "the people who lead the 'Mocidade' are not aware of the external repercussions of their acts."<sup>87</sup>

Collaboration between the youth organizations of the two countries began, as has been seen, very early on. It responded to the interests of



both, although it was not consensual in Portugal where it encountered opposition from Catholic circles who feared the assimilation of the German model, which they characterized as totalitarian, pagan, and militarist. These contacts were maintained, although in a somewhat reduced form, during World War II. As the war spread throughout Europe, it became increasingly difficult to travel. In addition, Oliveira Salazar always remained intransigent in his defense of neutrality, which helps us understand the reason why news about these exchanges ceased to appear on the front pages of the newspapers. It also explains why he did not give in to pressure from the German Legation which, following instructions from the AA, made a great effort to persuade Portugal to send a volunteer force of Legionnaires to fight Bolshevism in the East.<sup>88</sup> It is obvious that for Salazar, who wanted to keep the Iberian Peninsula out of the conflict, sending a sort of Portuguese “Blue Division” would be a clear breach of neutrality and would lead to a strong response from Britain.<sup>89</sup> During the war, his main concern was to keep the country out of the conflict, demonstrating a tremendous ability to adapt to circumstances. Thus, he moved closer to Nazi Germany when victory seemed certain, sending diplomats there—Nobre Guedes and Tovar de Lemos—who would help this rapprochement. But he gave in to pressure from the Allies when their victory became very obvious, ceding the military base of Lages in the Azores and putting an embargo on the sale of wolfram. Salazar, who would have preferred a peace “with neither winners nor losers,” as he put it, had to prepare himself for the new postwar order that was marked by the defeat of Nazi Fascism.

## Final Remarks

António de Oliveira Salazar was not an enthusiastic supporter of the National Socialist regime. The dictator rejected paganism and the imperialist thrust of the German regime. He feared for the survival of small nations like Portugal should the Germanization of Europe come about. In official speeches Salazar systematically sought to differentiate his Estado Novo from totalitarianism and Nazism, arguing that the Portuguese regime was original and that it was a *sui generis* solution applied to the Portuguese case.

However, among the political-cultural elite of the Estado Novo, and even within its institutions, could be found great enthusiasm for the Third Reich. Within the regime’s organizations, such as the MP, the LP, and FNAT, relations with their German counterparts were very close.

This rapprochement was not only encouraged by German functionaries and diplomats but it was also sought by Portuguese leaders who looked at the HJ and the KdF as models to be imitated in order to help create the Portuguese “New Man.” Despite some reservations regarding Nazi racist doctrines and German expansionism, many viewed Hitler’s rise to power with enthusiasm. The Third Reich became a “dominant model,” and both organizations and German diplomacy tried to project the image of an omnipotent and omnipresent Germany.<sup>90</sup>

In the case of Portugal, this rapprochement benefited from the Spanish Civil War when the biggest period of “fascistization” of the regime occurred with the creation of paramilitary and other organizations to shape the population. During these years the exchanges of delegations multiplied. By means of these contacts, as well as through articles they wrote in Portuguese newspapers and magazines and intensive propaganda, the Nazi leaders managed to make their influence permeate the Portuguese regime.

The profile of the individuals involved is very similar. There were men of the regime, leaders of the most fascistized organizations, ministers, journalists, and university professors; but there were also young people, members of the MP and the LP, high school students and even university students. Drawn from the well-educated upper class, they were part of an intellectual tradition that regarded Germany as the cradle of erudite music and literature, philosophy, and the most advanced technical knowledge. They spoke German and in most cases attended German universities, with many of them receiving scholarships under the agreement established between DAAD and IAC. All of them showed their sympathies for Germany through magazines and newspapers, in which they let it be known that they vehemently believed in an authoritarian, antiliberal and anti-Marxist solution.

For peripheral countries like Portugal and Spain, Germany appeared in the eyes of their intellectuals and scientists to be in the vanguard of culture and technology. Through personal contacts, visits to the Reich, and cultural events organized by the Nazi institutions in Portugal, Germany tried to draw Portugal into its sphere of influence. Indeed, the Reich became a veritable “magnetic field” for the Portuguese Estado Novo. It sold armaments, it received military missions; it sent teachers, it received students in its universities where it trained and shaped them. Without a doubt, this was a relationship that was intended to be global and to cover all areas—from the military to the artistic, the scientific to the economic. The strong commitment to a strategy based on cultural relationships did not, however, prevent the traditional strategic paths of politics and economics from being maintained and strengthened.

Nevertheless, culture was the domain in which the Germans could act with greater freedom until the end of the conflict. They did not face any strong competition from the British in the first phase. On the contrary, the latter were forced to follow the German strategy on the cultural level, organizing lectures and, among other initiatives, encouraging the teaching of English. Besides, a propaganda strategy focused on culture could slip past unnoticed, despite its aggressiveness and the fact that it contained a political message that was easily dissimulated. German propaganda acted on those people with influence, on the regime's elite, and on the young, who, in the future, would ensure the continuation of German influence. Moreover, it rapidly shifted from being a strong cultural factor to being a political and ideological influence. Culture served as a political instrument, but it also facilitated economic penetration. It is in this context and within this logic that the Portuguese–German relationship should be understood—and especially the exchanges established with the Mocidade Portuguesa and the JEN/IAC. However, this relationship between the Portuguese Estado Novo and National Socialism was but one of the many faces of the intensive transnational communication and interaction among the fascisms of Europe.

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## Notes

1. Constitution of 11 April 1933, article 5.
2. *Ibid.*, article 4.
3. The National Archives (TNA), GFM 33/4334, L053438-L053452, "Übersicht über die Ereignisse des Jahres 1933."
4. Fernando Rosas, "O salazarismo e o homem novo: ensaio sobre o Estado Novo e a questão do totalitarismo," *Análise social* 35(157) (2001): 1031–54.
5. António Costa Pinto, *Os Camisas Azuis: ideologia, elites e movimentos fascistas em Portugal, 1914–1945* (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1994).

6. Name by which the military coup of 28 May 1926 was known at the time.
7. *Dez Anos de Política Externa (1936–1947). A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. 9 (Lisbon, 1974), 198.
8. The National Archives GFM 33/4334,L053458-L05474, “Jahresbericht,” 15/27/1935.
9. *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, *apud Jornal da MP*, Ano I, n. 24, 15/11/1938, 2.
10. “Empfang des Ibero-Amerikanischen Instituts,” *Abend und Nacht-Ausgabe. Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro* (4 April 1939): 1.
11. TNA, FO 371/26858, C 1094, 25.1.1941.
12. Alfredo Pimenta, “A hora das decisões,” *A Jovem Europa [Junges Europa]. Folhetos da Juventude Académica da Europa*, vol. 1/2 (1942): 6–7.
13. Lucena was one of the first academics to investigate the relationship between the Portuguese regime and fascism. In 1971 he presented a thesis in France on the Portuguese corporative system. It was only published in Portugal in 1976.
14. TNA, GFM 33/4334, L053740–L053746, “Die innerepolitische Lage in Portugal ...,” 23/11/1933.
15. PAAA, R102412, “Jahresbericht,” 20.1.1937.
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17. TNA, GFM 33/4334, L053438–L053452, “Übersicht über die Ereignisse des Jahres 1933.”
18. Stanley G. Payne, *Fascism, Comparison and Definition* (Madison, WI, 1980); Ernst Nolte, *Die faschistischen Bewegungen: Die Krise des liberalen Systems und die Entwicklung der Faschismen* (Munich, 1966); Pierre Milza, *Les Fascismes* (Paris, 1991); Yves Léonard, *Salazarisme et Fascisme* (Paris, 1996). Portuguese authors: António Costa Pinto, *O Salazarismo e o fascismo europeu: problemas de interpretação nas ciências sociais* (Lisbon, 1992); idem, *Os Camisas Azuis*; Manuel Braga da Cruz, *As Origens da democracia cristã e o Salazarismo* (Lisbon, 1980); idem, *O partido e o Estado no salazarismo* (Lisbon, 1988); Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, *Salazar. Uma biografia política*, 4th ed. (Alfragide, 2010), 187.
19. Manuel de Lucena, *A Evolução do Sistema Corporativo Português* (Lisbon, 1976); Fernando Rosas, “Cinco pontos em torno do estudo comparado do fascismo,” *Vértice* 13 (1989): 21–29; idem, “O salazarismo e o homem novo”; Luís Reis Torgal, “Estado Novo e Fascismo,” in *Estados Novos: Estado Novo* (Coimbra, 2009), 289–367; idem, “Estado Novo: um totalitarismo à portuguesa?” in *Estados Novos: Estado Novo* (Coimbra, 2009), 249–88; João Paulo Avelãs Nunes, “Tipologias de regimes políticos: Para uma leitura neo-moderna do Estado Novo e do Nuevo Estado,” *Revista Portuguesa de História* 24 (2000): 305–48; Manuel Loff, *O nosso século é fascista: o mundo visto por Salazar e Franco (1936–1945)* (Porto, 2008).
20. João Pinto da Costa Leite (Lumbrales), who had been appointed by the government to run the Portuguese Legion, asked the German Legation for information about the SA (Sturmabteilung) and the SS (Schutzstaffel) so that the Portuguese Legion might follow the same model. António Louçã, *Portugal visto pelos Nazis: documentos 1933–1945* (Lisbon, 2005), 51.

21. António Louçã, *Conspiradores e traficantes Portugal no tráfico de armas e de divisas nos anos do nazismo (1933–1945)* (Cruz Quebrada–Dafundo, 2005), 51.
22. TNA, GFM 33/4334, L053394–L053432.
23. TNA, GFM 33/3171, E 592399–592400, “Aufzeichnung für den Empfang des Portugiesischen Gesandten durch den Herrn Reichskanzler,” 18.10.1933.
24. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amt (PAAA), R 71629, “Förderung deutscher Geschichtsstudium in Portugal,” 7.3.1929.
25. PAAA, R 71629, “Kulturpolitik fremder Mächte in Portugal,” 1.5.1930.
26. Simões Raposo was, at that time, the first secretary of the National Education Board.
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30. Cláudia Ninhos, “Portugal at the ‘Third Front’,” *Nazi Germany and Southern Europe, 1933–45. Science, Culture and Politics*, ed. Fernando Clara and Cláudia Ninhos (New York, 2016), 120–40.
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35. Telmo Faria, *Debaixo de fogo! Salazar e as Forças Armadas (1935–41)* (Lisbon, 2000).
36. Irene Pimentel and Cláudia Ninhos, *Salazar, Portugal e o Holocausto* (Lisbon, 2013), 129–34.
37. TNA, FO 371/39596, Sir R. Campbell to Mr Eden, 23.11.1944.
38. Cláudia Ninhos, “‘Com luvas de veludo’: A estratégia cultural alemã em Portugal (1933–1945),” *Relações Internacionais (R:I)* 35 (September 2012): 103–18.
39. A news cutting from the newspaper *A Voz* entitled “Intercâmbio Intelectual: As relações culturais germano-portuguesas” [Intellectual Exchange: German–Portuguese Cultural Relations] (AHIC, 1207/18—Instituto Ibero-Americano de Berlim, document 23, 15.08.1937).
40. “Apotheose vanguardista em S.Carlos,” *Avante!* 2 (1934).
41. António de Oliveira Salazar, *Discursos*, 5th ed., vol. I (Coimbra, 1961), 312.
42. Wilhelm Berner, “História e Organização da Juventude Hitleriana,” *Avante!* 6 (2 March 1934); idem, “O antigo quartel-general do Comunismo na Alemanha,” *Avante!* (24 March 1934); idem, “A ditadura alemã,” *Avante!* 16 (27 May 1934); idem, “Educação política da juventude alemã,” *Avante!* 5 (23 February 1934).

43. "Contribuições para organização da juventude portuguesa", *Avante!* 3 (1934).
44. *Avante!* 19 (24 February 1935): 2.
45. *Avante!* 14 (20 January 1935).
46. António Almodôvar, "A Educação da Juventude, Escola Portuguesa," *Boletim do Ensino Primário Oficial* 55 (31 October 1935).
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48. Anon., *Contra todas as Internacionais* (Lisbon, 1934), 38.
49. "Germânia," *Avante!* 8 (1934); António Costa Pinto and Nuno Afonso Ribeiro, *A Acção Escolar Vanguarda (1933–1936): a juventude nacionalista nos primórdios do estado novo* (Lisbon, 1980), 102–3.
50. Anon., *Contra todas as Internacionais*; Costa Pinto and Ribeiro, *A Acção Escolar Vanguarda*, 100–101.
51. António Ferro, *Entrevistas a Salazar* (Lisbon, 2007), 140.
52. PAAA, Lissabon 45, "Roth an die Deutsche Gesandtschaft," 6.11.1935.
53. Fernando Homem Cristo, "Palavras aos Vanguardistas", *Avante!* 24 (1935): 3; Costa Pinto and Ribeiro, *A Acção Escolar Vanguarda*, 109–10.
54. *Avante!* 3 (16 December 1935).
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60. *Diário da Manhã*, 30 August 1936.
61. PAAA, Lissabon 46, letter from Carneiro Pacheco to the German minister, 14.9.1936.
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63. PAAA, Lissabon 46, von Huene an den Gebietsführer Herrn Schulze, 25.9.1936.
64. PAAA, Lissabon 46, Kaufmann an Aschmann, Auswärtiges Amt, 1.10.1937.
65. TNA, FO 371/24071, "Annual Report on Portugal for 1938," 28.2.1939.
66. *Ibid.*
67. *Ibid.*
68. Kuin, "A Mocidade Portuguesa nos anos 30," 585.
69. Direcção-Geral de Arquivos (DGARQ), Arquivo Oliveira Salazar (AOS), CD-2, no. 207-236, letter from Nobre Guedes to Oliveira Salazar, 3.12.1938.
70. PAAA, Lissabon 45, "Portugalfahrten der Hitlerjugend," 4.5.1938.
71. "Estiveram em Lisboa alguns rapazes da 'Hitler Yuguend'", *Jornal da M.P.*, 15 May 1938.
72. "Está na Alemanha o Comissário Nacional da 'M.P.'", *Jornal da M.P.*, 1 August 1938.
73. See, for example: *Diário da Manhã*, 16 July 1938, in PAAA, Lissabon 46.

74. *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, 23 July 1938, in PAAA, Lissabon 46.
75. "A Visita a Portugal de 3 dirigentes da Juventude Hitleriana," *Jornal da M.P.*, 15 December 1938.
76. PAAA, Lissabon 45, "Bericht über den Portugalaufenthalt von Reichskassenverwalter Gebietsfuehrer Georg Berner ...," 14.12.1938.
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78. Kuin, "A Mocidade Portuguesa nos anos 30", 573.
79. Orlando Grossegeese, "A lição alemã na Mocidade Portuguesa," in *Portugal-Alemanha-África: Do colonialismo imperial ao colonialismo político*, ed. A.H. Oliveira Marques, Alfred Oritz, and Fernando Clara (Lisbon, 1996), 185–97.
80. DGARQ, AOS/NE-7, pt 28, Notes on the conversation with the German Minister about the visit to Portugal of a group of HJ members, 15.10.1941.
81. Salazar sent him to Berlin to head the Portuguese legation in Germany, given his sympathy for and ideological proximity to National Socialism.
82. Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (AHDME), Telegrams received 1941, Berlin, From the Portuguese Consulate in Berlin.
83. The visit was cancelled after the sinking of the *Corte Real*.
84. AHDME, Telegrams received 1941, Berlin, 3.9.1941.
85. AHDME, Telegrams received 1941, Berlin, From the Portuguese Legation in Berlin, 17.7.1942.
86. Gründungstagung des Europäischen Jugendverbandes [Founding Meeting of the European Youth League]. (Cf. Kühberger, *Europa*, 2009, p.16 note 27).
87. DGARQ, AOS/CD-8-P.2, n. 384–400, Official memo from Armindo Monteiro, 26.10.1942.
88. TNA, GFM 33/143, 121120, "Telegramm," 27.7.1941.
89. For Berlin, even if only small, it would give "a visible sign of Europe's solidarity in the fight against Bolshevism" (DGARQ, AOS/ND-1, pt.1, 6.7.1941). The question was discussed with Salazar, and the MNE, who retreated behind the excuse that sending a volunteer force of Portuguese nationals to fight Bolshevism in the Soviet Union would serve no useful purpose since it would only be a small force and would have no effect on the final outcome of the struggle. Even so, Salazar agreed to think about a possible public manifestation of how the fight against Bolshevism was positively viewed in Portugal. In July, the Central Board of the LP (Junta Central da Legião Portuguesa) issued a Service Order in which it declared its solidarity with the fight against the Soviet Union: "The great size of the armed forces that today are facing Russian communism have no need of our collaboration on the battle front, but we should consider ourselves mobilized and ready to join the struggle as soon as it might be deemed necessary in this western extremity of Europe." "Ordem de Serviço à Legião Portuguesa," in *Boletim da Legião Portuguesa* 47 (July 1941): 3–4.
90. Arnd Bauerkämper, "Ambiguities of Transnationalism: Fascism in Europe between Pan-Europeanism and Ultra-Nationalism 1919–39," *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute London* 29 (2) (2007): 58–60.

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