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TAHA PARLA

THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT
OF ZIYA GÖKALP
1876-1924



LEIDEN
E. J. BRILL
1985

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BY

TAHA PARLA



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
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FOREWORD

The present study was submitted to Columbia University as a doctoral dissertation in July 1980. In September 1980 Turkey experienced another military intervention. The argument of the study, I think, has explanatory value concerning what has unfolded since then. (Which, in turn, I think, vindicates that argument.) Therefore, I have made no substantive change in the text and even left the time clauses as they are in the final chapter. Here, I would like to stress one point. The ideological "constants" I have indicated in twentieth-century dominant Turkish political thought by using Gökalp, in a sense, as a foil, retain their validity for the 1980's at a certain level of abstraction. The post-1980 concrete political groupings and realignments represent but organizational reshuffling and change of places among familiar actors, on a familiar political space—the ideological parameters of which now officially defined as exclusively corporatist and on which proliferation of corporatist institutions, laws, and practices continues.

I thank: Jacob Hurewitz and Douglas Chalmers of Columbia University; Şerif Mardin of Boğaziçi Üniversitesi; Joseph Rotschild, Edward Allworth, and Richard Bulliet of Columbia University; Marion Leith, Engin Akarlı, and Zafer Toprak of Boğaziçi Üniversitesi; Ayla Ortaç; Jane Warner and Nurten Şenay; Peggy Freund and M. Ann Campbell. I give this book to the person to whom it owes its existence.

PART ONE
THE CONTEXT

CHAPTER ONE

HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL SETTING

Ziya Gökalp is the only systematic thinker of stature that Turkey has produced in the twentieth century. He lived and wrote in a time of profound crisis and change which marked the transition from the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire (1299-1922) to the nation-state of the Turkish Republic (1920/1923). Under conditions of political turmoil, economic bankruptcy, world war, and a desperate search for cultural re-orientation, he tried to create a synthesis of Turkic, Islamic, and Western values and concepts for the national revival of Turkey.

Gökalp witnessed the collapse of an empire whose relative weakness vis à vis the other European powers had grown deeper since about the end of the seventeenth century, and had evolved into a disintegrative process through 1914. Historians generally take the abortive siege of Vienna in 1683 as the beginning of the reversal of Ottoman power when its expansion Westward was decisively halted by Europe.¹

In a series of treaties from that of Karlowitz (1699) to Lausanne (1923), the Ottoman Turks lost their territories in Central and Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Aegean, Crimea and Caucasia, the Persian and Arab Near-East.²

What was won by an Islamic conquest-state over four hundred years was progressively lost in the course of two hundred years. Early in the 19th century, populations governed by policies of tributary imperialism and granting of semi-autonomy to religious communities (*millet*s) began to resort to revolutionary activities which soon took the form of separatist movements organized along ethnic lines and inspired by nationalist ideologies. In the predominantly Christian provinces, independent nationalist states began to form, while the predominantly Muslim provinces fell under European rule one after another. At the close of the First World War Turkey had already become an Anatolian state and an ethnically and religiously homogeneous nation by way of secession and elimination. Turkish nationalism was thus less a chosen policy than an accomplished fact of history. Gökalp, as the major formulator of Turkish nationalism and amidst the persisting lost causes of Ottomanism and Islamic communalism, acquiesced in the dictates of historical reality and advocated a nonexpansionist, nonirredentist Turkism to ease the public conscience in the transition from empire to nation.

Continuous military defeat and territorial retreat before the Europeans in the two centuries of decline forced upon the Ottomans what has been called defensive modernization, and ushered in an era of reforms. Modernization in

some way always meant Westernization, for the Ottomans identified with the strong in order to resist the strong. Earlier attempts at modernization (1718-1839) were confined to adoption of Western military techniques and weaponry, training and organization. A second phase (1839-1876) involved comprehensive reforms in the administrative and educational fields, again based on Western models. After an abortive experimentation in parliamentarism (1876-1878), modernization efforts continued under Abdülhamit II's despotism (1878-1908) and during the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918).

In the eighteenth century, the major Western source of inspiration was France. Starting in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, British influences were added. By the 1890's German influences made their appearance, to last until well after World War I. Western-oriented modernization efforts, throughout, not only elicited opposition and intermittent revolts from the traditional sectors of the Ottoman society, but also posed agonizing intellectual dilemmas for the modernizers themselves. To reconcile Western concepts and practices with traditional Islamic and later Turkish values was not an easy undertaking. The result was, invariably, either shallow eclecticism or internally contradictory combinations. In this respect, too, Ziya Gökalp was to stand out as the originator of the least inconsistent synthesis.

What I have called the second phase of modernizing reforms; the *Tanzimat* period (1839-1876), is a controversial episode in Turkish history, but it had far-reaching and lasting effects on Ottoman-Turkish society. Drawing upon earlier beginnings, especially in the reigns of Selim III (1789-1807) and Mahmut II (1808-1839), *Tanzimat* (meaning reorderings or reorganization) signified modern Turkey's irreversible entry into the Western "circle of civilization," to use one of Gökalp's terms, although he is a strong critic of the *Tanzimat* in many ways as we shall see. As the Shaws correctly observe, the *Tanzimat* changed "the concept of Ottoman reform from the traditional one of attempting to preserve and restore the old institutions to a modern one of replacing them with new ones, some imported from the West." Also, "the successes as well as the failures of the *Tanzimat* movement in many ways directly determined the course reform was to take subsequently in the Turkish Republic to the present day."¹

The *Tanzimat* came in the wake of a number of important developments. The first was the 1808 *Sened-i ittifak* ("Contract of Alliance"), signed between the palace and the *Ayans* (provincial power magnates of semi-feudal nature) in an effort to reach a consensus over reorganizational principles and measures for the consolidation of governmental authority. It essentially stipulated a more broadly based governmental system that incorporated the provincial power bases. The Contract, however, was born dead. Istanbul was unwilling to cooperate with the provincial leaders who were considered rivals

of the Sultan and, therefore, challengers of central authority. As a matter of fact, protracted attempts were made under Mahmud II (1808-1839) to purge the *ayan* and exert Sultan's authority over the provinces through military centralization. Mahmud II's relentless measures towards that end, however, brought him into a head-on collision with Mehmet Ali, the powerful governor of Egypt. In the first round of the struggle (1832-1833) Mehmet Ali registered devastating victories over Mahmud's armies. In the second round (1839-1841), Mehmet Ali was duly cast back into Egypt as a vassal, but only with Great Britain's crucial naval, military, and diplomatic support. To acquire that support, Istanbul liberally offered to the British the Commercial Treaty of 1838 (Trade Convention of Balta Limani) which removed previous Ottoman trade restrictions and tariff walls and opened up Ottoman territories as a vast market for British manufactures.⁴ Istanbul thus emerged triumphant in the struggle for destroying provincial power bases, albeit at a rather high cost.

Mahmud II died in 1839. The initiative of reform and reorganization was taken over not by his 16 year-old successor Abdülmecid (1839-1861) but by Reşid Paşa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had been the Ottoman negotiator with the British. He became the chief architect of the *Tanzimat*.

The official document that augured the *Tanzimat*, the *Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu* ("Imperial Rescript of Gülhane") came in 1839, immediately after the Commercial Treaty of 1838. The Gülhane Rescript declared to reform taxation and conscription, and to guarantee the life, honor, property and inheritance rights of all Ottoman subjects regardless of their creed and religion. In net balance and in application, the Rescript represented less a universalistic confirmation of liberal principles than legal assurances to the non-Muslim and non-Turkish mercantile groups protected by and affiliated with European commercial interests. It was penned by Reşit Paşa, but it was pressed for and approved by the British—foreshadowing the typical local-Western configuration of the *Tanzimat* brand of Westernization.

The Imperial Rescript of Reform (*Islahat Fermani*) which was issued in 1856 to reaffirm the Rescript of Gülhane was outright co-authored by three European ambassadors together with Âli Paşa and Fuad Paşa, both protégés of Reşid and the leaders of the second stage of the *Tanzimat*.⁵

In fact, the *Tanzimat* was characterized by the domination of the government by Western-oriented grand viziers (Reşid, Âli, and Fuad), who came to supplant the power of the Palace with that of the Sublime Porte (*Bâb-ı Âli*) in the now centralized Ottoman state. The *Tanzimat*, in restructuring ministries, government departments, legislative councils, the administration of justice and of municipal government, deepened the process of centralization. It also introduced a new system of schools for the education of Westernized bureaucrats, institutionalizing the long process of secularization in

modern Turkey.⁶ Although no secularization of general public education was undertaken, these developments signified the further eclipse of the traditional religious school system (*medreses*) along with the diminution of the political influence of the learned clergy (*ulema*).

What is, however, inadequately stressed by historians is that the *Tanzimat* reforms carried out by a Westernized upper bureaucracy, often in conjunction with European powers, were taking place in what J. C. Hurewitz has called "modernization in a closed circuit."⁷ They were compartmentalized into the military, administrative, legal, and institutional spheres, without corresponding modernization in the social and economic fields. The results, if not also the cause, was deepening economic dependency on European capital and political power as well as eventual financial bankruptcy.

This aspect of the *Tanzimat* did not go unnoticed by contemporary critics, as it was to be one of the reasons for Ziya Gökalp's condemnation of the *Tanzimat* elite's manner of Westernizing.⁸ A new bureaucratic intelligentsia that came into being as a result of the early *Tanzimat* reforms now started to see the *pasas* as not only too Weststruck at the expense of traditional Islamic values and national (meaning Ottoman) interests, but also autocratic and oligarchic. The movement formed itself into a society of Young Ottomans in 1865, only to be disbanded in 1872. The Young Ottomans, led by Namık Kemal and Ziya Paşa, called for political liberalization, constitutional checks on the monarchy and Porte-bureaucracy, parliamentarism, and a better balance of Westernism and traditionalism.⁹

The Shaws correctly observe that the "Constitution and Parliament introduced in 1876 and again in 1908 were the direct results of the agitation of the Young Ottomans, but one must remember that they could not have been achieved without the preparatory reforms carried out through the years by the dedicated Men of the *Tanzimat* whom the Young Ottomans criticized so vigorously."¹⁰ Moreover, the changes in the basic institutions of Ottoman government were accompanied by significant alterations in the Ottoman social structure. As the Shaws put it, the "Old Ruling Class of Ottomans was replaced by a new class of bureaucrats, the *memurs*, with the insecurity resulting from their position as slaves of the Sultan replaced by a new assurance provided by their development into a secular bureaucratic hierarchy with legal protections that discouraged the rapid shifts of fortune endemic in the Old Order."¹⁰

Penetration of European capital and consequent development of intermediary commercial activity, coupled with the *Tanzimat*'s legal protection of private property, had also given rise to a new mercantile middle class. "Domination of Ottoman government and society by the *memurs* was challenged by the new middle class, which was just becoming a significant political factor in the latter half of the nineteenth century. With the bulk of

wealth in traditional Ottoman society coming from the land and with its revenues considered the property of the sultan and his Ruling Class, capital among the subjects could be amassed only through trade and industry.¹¹ But new political and economic factors in the eighteenth and especially nineteenth centuries led to the rise of private landed as well as commercial wealth in the hands of local notables. The most powerful of these notables (the *ayan*) used their wealth for political purposes, often building their own local armies to perpetuate their power. But when Mahmud II's efforts to crush these and centralize all means of physical coercion in the empire ultimately succeeded, only those provincial notables who were willing to use their wealth as capital to develop economic and commercial enterprises had a chance to survive. The *Tanzimat* incorporated this new class of wealthy notables ("eşraf", in the Turkish sense of the word) into the provincial administrative councils, thus giving them some leverage over local politics.¹²

It was mainly the Christian elements, however, who gained most from intensified commercial relations with Europe under the *Tanzimat*. Almost always the Europeans preferred to work through local Christian merchants in conducting business in Ottoman lands. Often, the economic and legal privileges enjoyed by the Europeans (as a consequence of the 1838 Commercial Treaty and similar conventions successively signed with other European states) were extended to their local agents as well. Muslim merchants, who felt dependent on their Christian colleagues even in the predominantly Muslim areas, desired to have a greater share of the lucrative trade with Europe. In the predominantly Christian Balkan provinces, on the other hand, similar frictions arose between Christian peasants and their Muslim landlords. The government cautiously but firmly tried to appease the pleas of Christian peasants for fairer treatment in compliance with the principles of the *Tanzimat*. It failed to prevent, however, the intensification of nationalistic liberation movements among Christians, led by prosperous middle classes and often supported by one European power or another.

The Young Ottoman movement and the abortive First Constitutional Period (1876-1878)¹³ that it led to must be seen against this background. On the basis of the 1876 Constitution, a bicameral parliament convened in Istanbul. The lower house, which brought together an ethnically and religiously mixed group of provincial representatives, served as a convenient platform for the expression of widespread complaints against the *memurs*. Most of the deputies represented the interests of the new middle classes and were willing to cooperate with the central government, but the centralist, elitist, and authoritarian traditions of Ottoman statecraft precluded toleration of that type of criticism. Besides, ethnic and religious hostilities and frictions between the deputies hardened just about the time when the Ottomans suffered one of the worst defeats of their history (the Russo-Turkish War of 1877). The

government was overwhelmed by humiliating peace negotiations, a bankrupt treasury, an enormous foreign debt, fresh separatist attempts and claims, Muslim refugees flooding into Istanbul from lost territories, and an intensified reaction among the Muslims against Western encroachments. Abdülhamid II, the reigning sultan (1876-1909), prorogued the lower house of the Parliament on the basis of his constitutional rights and with the support of leading statesmen,

He then began to centralize the government around his person. The ensuing period of despotism represented a shift of power from the Porte to the Islamicist sultan, who, in alliance with a "plutocracy of pashas"¹⁴ and keen on acquiring the support of Muslim notables and religious leaders in the provinces, put an end to all political liberalization. Efforts to modernize the governmental machinery and to train qualified bureaucrats to improve and secularize the court and public education systems, and to develop the economic infrastructure continued without interruption, if not with renewed vigor. The Sultan desired that his Muslim "subjects" benefit more from these improvements. He was partially successful in this, but his Islamicist policies provoked great pressure from European powers and contributed to further intensification of the separatist nationalistic movements among Christians. Meanwhile, his oppressive measures drove young intellectuals, bureaucrats, and officers into clandestine opposition movements that considered the Sultan's policies a threat to the integrity of the State,

A secret society founded in 1889 by military cadets, the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*), soon found adherents among junior civilian and military bureaucrats, dissident intellectuals in exile in Europe, and among the Turkish and Muslim sections of the emergent middle class—who saw in the Young Turks' incipient nationalism a better opportunity to expropriate and replace the mercantile minority groups. The Young Turk "Revolution" of 1908 brought about the restoration of the 1876 Constitution and of the parliament by Abdülhamit, who was finally deposed in 1909 having been held responsible for an attempt at counter-revolution by the reactionary elements in the society. Among those elected to the first Central Committee of the Union and Congress Party in 1909 was Ziya Gökalp.

By 1914, however, the Unionist government had been transformed into an authoritarian one-party rule under the triumvirate of Enver, Talat, and Cemal paşas, who entered the First World War as an ally of Germany and promptly fled to Berlin at its conclusion in 1918. The Armistice of Mudros (1918) and the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) formalized the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. British, French, Italian, and Greek forces began to invade parts of Turkey. Remaining Unionist leaders including Ziya Gökalp, were exiled to Malta.

Nationalist resistance formed in Anatolia under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In 1920 a Grand National Assembly convened in Ankara, and

a "Government of the G.N.A." was set up in opposition to the Allied-controlled Ottoman government in Istanbul. A new republican constitution was drawn up in 1921. In 1922 the Sultanate was abolished by the G.N.A., depriving the Istanbul government of its legal foundation. The War of Independence having been brought to successful completion in 1922, the Republic was officially declared in 1923. The years 1923-1945 were to be those of the authoritarian single-party regime of the Kemalist Republican People's Party. Ziya Gökalp, after his return from Malta in 1922, joined the Kemalist nationalists in Ankara, and the RPP when it was founded in 1923.

Gökalp served, in the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1920), as a major ideologue and a member of the Central Committee of the Union and Progress Party. His ideas, however, were more amply implemented under the single-party rule (1920-1945) of the first generation of Kemalists, whom Gökalp joined and fully endorsed. Although his untimely death probably deprived him of recognition as the official ideologue of the First Republic as well, his influence can hardly be exaggerated. As a member of the Republican People's Party, among other public offices, Gökalp wrote and advised on a range of subjects from the constitution to the family and gave initial formulation to the organization and ideology of the single party, however much his teachings were to be distorted subsequently.

Through his works, and indirectly through his many students and disciples who came between the two world wars to fill important posts in the Kemalist party and bureaucracy, in academia and in the press, Gökalp continued to exert immense influence on the political and intellectual life of inter-war and post-war Turkey. In fact, the major thesis of the present study is that Gökalp's corporatist thinking has provided the paradigmatic worldview for the several dominant political ideologies and public philosophies in Turkey; and that, more specifically, Unionism (1908-1918) and Kemalism (1923-1950) as singular official ideologies, as well as contemporary Kemalism (1960-1980), are but programmatic and, in the narrow sense, ideological variations of his inclusive system. Indeed Gökalp's corporatist model was the earliest, most articulate, and most democratic one in the Turkish Republic.

Gökalp's system may be taken as a codification of the dominant ideas of his time, blending European corporatism and elements of the national political mentality. It may also be viewed as a source of influence and point of departure for what followed. In other words, his system fixed the parameters within which mainstream political discourse and action has been conducted in Turkey. To put it differently, the major ideological positions in Turkey have been derived from his pervasive corporatist model, occasionally explicitly acknowledged and often only implied. Thus, I contend that the solidarism of the Republican People's Party of the Second Republic (1960-1980), the Kemalism of the original RPP, the continuing Kemalism of the armed forces.

and the national socialism of the Nationalist Action Party are variants of Gökalp's corporatism. Their corporatism ranges from solidarism, with an element of democracy, to fascism. All are anti-Marxist, anti-socialist, and anti-liberal, but not anti-capitalist. Each selectively emphasizes one aspect or another of Gökalp's corporatism, or rather, corporatist capitalism in its philosophical, political, and economic dimensions. Hence, an assessment of his system should furnish a yardstick for evaluating the several political movements whose ideologies trace back to Gökalp.

Gökalp's corporatism, moreover, has been so formative in Turkish political development that the étatist and authoritarian "liberalisms" of the Democratic (1950-1960) and Justice (1965-1980) Parties have also had to operate within comparable cultural and institutional corporatist structures, not to mention the corporatist ideological residues they themselves have inherited, via Kemalism if not directly from Gökalp. It is important, if for no other reason than this, to form an adequate understanding of Gökalp's system. If there is to come, at all, from liberal or leftist vantage points a serious critique of the dominant, persistent cultural and institutional structures of recent Turkish politics, that enterprise will have to come to terms with Gökalpism-Kemalism first.

English speakers know Gökalp through the translations of Niyazi Berkes (*Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp*, 1959) and Robert Devereux (*Ziya Gökalp: The Principles of Turkism*, 1968), and through the monographic work of Uriel Heyd (*Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp*, 1950). The first two works contain translations mostly of Gökalp's historical, cultural, and nationalistic writings with little representation of his political and social thought. Heyd's work is a valuable, if somewhat dated, attempt at a comprehensive exposure of Gökalp's thought, focusing, however, again on matters of culture, religion, history, and nationalism, with some inadequate and unsystematic coverage of the theoretical substance of Gökalp's nationalism.

Heyd states that his study is "concerned purely with Gökalp as the theorist of modern Turkish nationalism" and that "greater prominence is given to his views on religious problems" than to his "very numerous articles on theoretical sociology."¹¹ The merits of Heyd's study notwithstanding, it is difficult for one who has judiciously examined the substance of Gökalp's nationalistic political-social thought to agree with Heyd's categorical judgments as to the unoriginality, illogicality, and political opportunism of that thought.¹² Gökalp may have done "little original thinking and merely accepted and paraphrased the theories of Western, 'particularly French,' sociologists";¹³ but in that case, Gökalp should be considered at least as logical in his sociological theory as the European sociologists he emulated, in

order for Heyd to be consistent himself. Even if Gökalp were unoriginal as far as his analytical sociological theory is concerned, it would be something else to consider unoriginal as a whole his social and political theory and philosophy, which was a synthesis of several sources—French, or rather European, sociology being merely one constituent part thereof.

What exists in Turkish on Gökalp, although voluminous, is mostly in the form of biographical studies, memoirs, and disjointed exposés of his views on various subjects, not infrequently marred by polemics of varying levels of sophistication. It is the need, then, for a systematic and critical analysis of the meaning and influence of Ziya Gökalp's political theory that this study hopes to fulfill.

CHAPTER TWO

LIFE AND POLITICAL CAREER

Ziya Gökalp was born on 23 March 1876 in Diyarbakır, a provincial center in Southeastern Turkey, to a family of modest civil servants.¹ The year of his birth corresponded to the short-lived first constitution and parliament of the Ottoman Empire. He matured and reached his prime in the long and despotic reign of Abdülhamit II (1876-1909). Gökalp, despite his provincial background, became the theoretician of the Young Turk or Unionist "Revolution" of 1908 and later of the Republican or Kemalist "Revolution" of 1920.

Gökalp's native town of Diyarbakır had been ruled by Arabs and Persians until it came under Ottoman domination in the sixteenth century. Diyarbakır was thus a cultural frontier between the Turkish and other Near Eastern civilizations. At the turn of the century, it also contained non-Turkish ethnic groups. While Armenians sought independence, Kurdish tribes stood in revolt against the central Ottoman government. Uriel Heyd rightly observes that the intellectual leader of Turkish nationalism was born amidst conflicting national traditions, like many other nationalist leaders who came from border populations.²

Gökalp's political opponents have asserted that he was of Kurdish origin. Gökalp himself and his Turkish biographers, on the other hand, have argued that the small town of Çermik, northwest of Diyarbakır, from where his ancestors came, had always been inhabited by Turks, surrounded though it was by Kurdish villages. Heyd notes that Gökalp's claim to be of Turkish parentage refers to his paternal family only and does not exclude the possibility that he had some Kurdish ancestry on his mother's side.³ Whatever the merits of this case of ethnic origin, the more important thing is Gökalp's express argument that, even if his ancestors had come from a non-Turkish district, he still would have considered himself a Turk. For his nationalism, as we shall see, is a matter of subjective identification, language, and acculturation, and has nothing to do with elements of race or ethnicity. In an essay titled "My Nationality" (1923), he stated:

These evidences demonstrated to me that the inhabitants of Diyarbakır are Turks. I have learned also that I am racially a Turk, since the two grandfathers of my father came a few generations ago from Çermik, which is a Turkish area.... However, I would not hesitate to believe that I am a Turk even if I had discovered that my grandfathers came from the Kurdish or Arab areas, because I learned through my sociological studies that nationality is based solely on upbringing.

Also, in a poem addressed to a member of the puppet antinationalist government of İstanbul, who accused him of being a Kurd, he replied:

Even if I were a Turk or not,
I am the friend of the Turk;
Even if you were a Turk or not,
You are an enemy of the Turk.⁷

Gökalp's family had a distinguished record of government service. His grandfather, Mustafa Sıtkı, was the son of a religious leader (*müftü*) and held government posts in the Eastern Anatolian towns of Van and Nusaybın. His son, Tevfik Efendi, Gökalp's father, worked for the Diyarbakır provincial government. He was director of the archives and the printing press. Later he became editor of the official Gazette of the province and published a Government Year-Book (*şalname*) of Diyarbakır.⁸

Gökalp's father blended in his son's education modern Western and traditional Islamic values. Gökalp reports, as often quoted in his biographies, that upon a suggestion that his son should be educated in Europe, the father replied: "If I send him to Europe, he might become a *gâvur* [unbeliever], but if he stays here, he will become an ass." Accordingly, Gökalp neither went to Europe nor stayed in Diyarbakır, going instead to İstanbul, where he learned about Europe and its intellectual currents.

After graduating from the military junior high school (*Askeri Rüştiye*) in Diyarbakır in 1890, the year of his father's death, Gökalp completed four years later the state senior high school (*Mülki İdadîye*), also in his native town. He disliked subjects which required learning by rote, mastered mathematics, and developed into an avid extra-curricular reader, especially of folk stories and poetry. His uncle taught him Arabic and Persian and initiated him into the works of Islamic philosophers such as Gazali, İbnü Sina, Farabi, and the mystics, Muhiddin Arabî and Celaleddin Rumi.

In high school, Gökalp also studied French, and progressive teachers, who opposed Abdulhamit's despotism, led him to the liberal works of European thinkers. Particularly important was his relationship with Abdullah Cevdet, one of the founders of the Committee of Union and Progress, who probably was Gökalp's first link with this secret society, Abdullah Cevdet later represented the radical revolutionary, atheistic, and positivist wing of the Young Turk movement. Abdullah Cevdet introduced Gökalp to a particular brand of European organicist sociology and materialist philosophy (Herbert Spencer, Gustave LeBon, Ernst Haeckel, and Ludwig Buechner). (10)

In his last high school year or just after his graduation (at the age of seventeen or eighteen), Gökalp began writing revolutionary poems. Also at this time Gökalp suffered a deep depression ending in an attempt at suicide. Surgery saved him, but the bullet remained in his skull until his death. Some attribute his later susceptibility to fang ~~and~~ even his early death to the act of

forty-eight to this fact.⁸ Whether this was true or not, he was a compulsive and indefatigable worker. Others found the reason for his attempted suicide in family and financial problems. But psychological disturbances caused by anxieties about his mission in life seem to be the more probable cause. In fact, Gökalp himself later sublimated his attempted self-destruction as a crisis of personal philosophy. He wrote that he was torn between the rationalistic arguments received from his Western-oriented high-school teachers and the mystical ideas derived from the Islam-oriented circle of family elders. ✱

There was however, also a definite social dimension. The mental dilemma took place in the larger context of Gökalp's search for social and political anchorage in a period of despotic rule and many local social problems to which he was sensitized. Gökalp himself identified the event as an anomic suicide after he became acquainted with Durkheim's work on the subject. In "Hocamın Vasiyeti" ("My Teacher's Testament"),⁹ Gökalp lists the contradictory ideas that had seized him: mysticism vs. natural sciences, ideals vs. positive facts and objective conditions, mind vs. matter, emotion vs. reason, necessity of natural laws vs. freedom of will. His resolution of the dilemma

dedi was this: the supreme truth (*hakikatı kübra*) is the "ideal", and the supreme ideal is nation and freedom.¹⁰ *(not liberal, nation is important)*

In 1896, Gökalp arrived in İstanbul to study at the Veterinary College [*Mülkiye Bayıar Mekteb-i Âlisi*], the only institution of higher learning he discovered he could attend without paying board and tuition. Gökalp did not graduate from this school. Nor did he receive an academic degree from any university, for he was imprisoned for ten months in his first or second year for political activities against the monarchy, and then sent back to Diyarbakır. During his stay in İstanbul, political activity claimed a greater portion of his time than his curriculum in the natural sciences. He officially entered the secret Society of Union and Progress and met, through Abdullah Cevdet, with other founders of the Committee such as İbrahim Temo and İshak Sükûti. He also made contact with, and studied, the emerging Turkist movement. He befriended Hüseyinzade Ali, a Pan-Turkist from Russia teaching at the School of Military Medicine [*Askerî Tıbbiye*], the stronghold of the Young Unionists, as was the Military Academy [*Harbiye*]. He read the seminal works of Ahmet Vefik Paşa and Süleyman Paşa on Turkish history and language, as well as the investigations of the French orientalist, Leon Cahun.¹¹ In prison, Gökalp also met a veteran revolutionary, who seems to have influenced him with the advice that the constitution might be restored to limit the sultan's powers, but that real democracy would have to await the introduction of universal education. Gökalp later acknowledged this debt in his "Pirimin Vasiyeti" ("The Testament of My Mentor").¹² ✱

During five years of exile in Diyarbakır Gökalp noted that he read "hundreds of books" on natural sciences, philosophy, sociology, pedagogy,

psychology, books in French on the "new sciences," works on Islamic philosophy, and mysticism, also resuming his study of Sufism (*tasavvuf*).¹³

In 1902, Gökalp became Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce in Diyarbakır; in 1904, Assistant Secretary-General of the Executive Committee of the Provincial Council. This is significant because it provides an instance of the close relationship between the Committee of Union and Progress and the local notables (*teşraf*) in Anatolia, who also controlled local government—a topic not yet adequately researched. In 1908 after the Young Turk Revolution the Central Committee of the Union and Progress Party appointed him inspector of party organizations in the northeastern provinces of Diyarbakır, Van and Bitlis. He lectured at the local branches of the party. In 1909, he attended the Salonika congress of the party as the delegate from Diyarbakır. At that time he turned down an adjunct instructorship in psychology in the Department of Theology and Literature at Istanbul University because of the low salary. He thus remained in Diyarbakır as the Inspector of Elementary Education for the Province.

Between 1904 and 1908, Gökalp published poems on the plight of the peasantry and articles on the economic problems of the province in the local paper *Diyarbakır* (1904-1908). His long poem, "Şaki İbrahim Destanı" ("Epic of İbrahim the Bandit"), protesting the exploitation of peasants by the hired hooligans of an oppressive landlord, also appeared in *Diyarbakır*. Articles on historical and religious subjects appeared under his signature in the local paper *Peyman* in 1909.

Gökalp became a member of the Central Committee of the Union and Progress Party in 1910 and went to Salonika. (Salonika was chosen as the CUP headquarters in the days of secrecy because of its distance from Istanbul as well as for its liberal atmosphere, sustained by the emergent commercial bourgeoisie.) He kept that influential position until 1918, when the Party officially dissolved itself after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I. In Salonika, Gökalp also taught sociology at the party school and directed the party's youth department. He earned the respect of the party leaders and became a popular lecturer. Nevertheless, he did not directly participate in practical politics, nor did he accept or was he offered any cabinet position. Gökalp's poems and philosophical essays in the years 1910-1912 appeared in the Salonika bi-weekly, *Genç Kalemler*, whose editors, Ali Canıp and Ömer Seyfettin, had initiated a policy of "purifying" the Turkish language.

It was during his Salonika years that Gökalp consummated his interest in the works of the French sociologists, Gabriel Tarde and Gustave LeBon, known respectively for their theory of imitation and mass psychology. Gökalp mostly read and lectured on Alfred Fouillée, the idealist and solidarist French philosopher, and for the first time became acquainted with the works of Émile Durkheim, who later became his favorite author.

With the removal of the Central Committee headquarters from Salonika to Istanbul because of the Balkan Wars, Gökalp settled in Istanbul in 1912. Even without an academic degree or a university diploma, he was appointed as the first professor of sociology in Turkey to the first chair of sociology at Istanbul University. In this middle phase of his writing career, his articles appeared in most of the major journals.

A series of articles on Turkism, Islam, and modernism first appeared in the years 1912-1914 in *Türk Yurdu*, published as a book in 1918.¹⁴ In this work Gökalp emphasized Turkism and Westernism against the two other movements of the day, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Ottomanism. In these years Gökalp also contributed to many Istanbul periodicals: the bi-weekly *İslam Mecmuası* (1915-1916),¹⁵ which promoted a nationalist liberal theology in opposition to the organs of orthodox Islamic thought; *Millî Tettebbular Mecmuası* (1915),¹⁶ a journal of nationalist research; *İktisadiyat Mecmuası* (1915),¹⁷ an advocate of protectionist "national economics"; the monthly *Muallim* (1916-1917), the "teachers'" journal, in which his articles on the philosophy and methods of education appeared, to be posthumously assembled and edited in 1972 under the title of *Millî Terbiye ve Maarif Meselesi* ("The Question of National Education and Training"); and *İçtimaiyat Mecmuası* (1917),¹⁸ a journal of sociology. Above all, his contributions to the weekly *Yeni Mecmua*, (1917-1918)¹⁹ shaped the character of this prestigious publication of the day. Gökalp's two volumes of poetry, *Kızıl Elma* (1914) and *Yeni Havat* (1918), became a medium for transforming theories into slogans and myths. These poems later produced confusion over the meaning of some of his ideas.

Without confounding the role of scholar and teacher with that of politician (for Gökalp never became that in the usual sense), he advised the Unionist government on matters of political and cultural importance for the country: the unification of secular and religious education; the reorganization of university and its libraries, and of religious colleges; the abolition of the office of Şevhülislam; the reform of pious foundations (*vakıflar*); and the modification of family law. These policies and reforms, inaugurated by the Unionist government, were pursued more energetically by the Kemalists. Gökalp was also among the founders of the Economic Association (*İktisat Derneği*)²⁰ and a leading member of the Turkish Hearths (*Türk Ocakları*).

After the dissolution of the last Ottoman parliament by the British invasion forces on March 18, 1920, Gökalp was exiled to Malta along with hundreds of politicians and men of letters. In Malta, Gökalp seems to have taken stock of his previous views and used the interval (1919-1921) partly to revise some of his earlier works, while drafting new ones. There he also kept in touch with his widely strewn disciples, and, as the saying goes in biographies and memoirs, conducted a "one-man university." His students consisted of former

ministers and MPs, some of whom returned to join the resistance under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal.

In a sense, the years of exile (1919-1921) for Gökalp were a continuation of the war years (1914-1918), during which he had been preparing himself, as well as others, for the psychological transition from empire to nation, while the leaders of the CUP were still committed to the ideology of Ottomanism. In contrast to the Ottomanist policies of the political leadership of the CUP and the Pan-Islamic loyalties of other groups, both of which were trying to salvage the empire, Gökalp had been single-mindedly formulating the outlines of a realistic, non-expansionist Turkish nationalism. Now that the war was lost, along with the empire, Gökalp had a better chance in Malta to work out the definitive version of that nationalism and to impress upon the public the futility of the other two currents. The transition Gökalp himself made in these years from "Turkism, Islamism, Modernism" (*Türkleşmek İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*, 1912/1918) to "Principles of Turkism" (*Türkçülüğün Esasları*, 1923), most probably drafted in Malta, but on basically unchanged lines of thought, symbolized the close of an era and the beginning of another. In the meantime, the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922) was being fought to its successful end in Anatolia.

The question of the nature of patriotism was not the only point of difference between Gökalp and the Committee of Union and Progress, that is, the second-generation Young Turks who achieved power after the Young Turk "Revolution" of 1908. In some important respects, the substance of Gökalp's teachings and the CUP policies diverged considerably, as was also to be the case with the Kemalists. In one sense, Gökalp was the official ideologue of the Unionists and the unofficial ideologue of the Kemalists; but in another sense, as I shall try to suggest in the pages that follow, he was not.²¹ Although his writings and informal teachings provided the conceptual framework and the political terminology for both, distortions of the substance of his thought, purposive or unwitting, were equal to, if not greater than, his direct influence and accepted proposals.

Although Gökalp was a most respected party ideologue during the period 1908-1918 in cultural and educational matters, he never became one of the policy-makers of the party. Nor was his political theory one likely to be adopted, even if fully understood. In those years of political turmoil, ideological proliferation, party atomization,²² and cultural-psychological bewilderment, the CUP itself was adrift, devoting the first half of its tenure to consolidating power in shifting alliances with the old bureaucratic elite,²³ and the second half to mismanaging the war. The Unionists, as Feroz Ahmad correctly points out, were not a monolithic political organization; there were severe internal divisions, which prevented them from putting up a united front.²⁴

Gökalp, then, was an island among islands. Moreover, he could not have partaken in the authoritarian, bureaucratic, and vanguardist practices of the Unionists, or for that matter of the Kemalists, both of which movements soon turned into autocratic, if not technically dictatorial, regimes. By nature and philosophy he was an unambitious and unassuming man. He never became a polemicist nor did he subordinate his principles to a passion for political office, or material benefit. His passion was for rational discourse and persuasion in the service of social and national progress through humanitarian and peaceful means. A prominent educator, Gökalp's colleague at İstanbul University in the 1910's, quotes Gökalp as saying, "I have entered politics in order to restrain the evil doings of politicians."²⁵

A note of stoical resignation coupled with unyielding mental activism emerges from his correspondence from Malta. In a letter, he writes: "It is impossible for me to give up hope in the world.... I have strong faith in the civilizational progress of mankind and the cultural progress of my nation.... I am optimistic by nature and emotion, as I am optimistic in my philosophy and science. In my view it is such scientific optimism that would save us, the Turks"²⁶ In another letter, he says that humanity has two wings, science and the "ideal", that assure inevitable progress: "Humanity may sometimes fall, but it can rise again with these wings."²⁷

Upon his release from Malta in the spring of 1921, Gökalp returned to Turkey via Italy in the fall of the same year. Not given back his chair at the University or any other position in Ankara, the new capital of the nationalist government, Gökalp settled in his hometown and started to teach sociology and psychology at the secondary school and the teachers' seminary in Diyarbakır. Between June 1922 and March 1923 he published a little weekly, which he accordingly called *Küçük Mecmua*, and in which he wrote on politics, economics, and social and cultural problems. Gökalp had once again become a source of influence on the political and intellectual life in Turkey. Falih Rıfkı Atay was right in saying: "We have to admit that through his *Küçük Mecmua* Gökalp directs from Diyarbakır the trends of thought in İstanbul."²⁸

Gökalp also started to contribute to the major dailies in İstanbul (*Cumhuriyet*²⁹ and the revived *Yeni Mecmua*) and Ankara (*Yeni Türkiye*,³⁰ *Yeni Gün*, and *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*). At the end of 1922 Gökalp was invited to Ankara to direct the department of publication and translation in the Ministry of Education. In 1922 he published *Türk Töresi*, a work on the religion, customs and law of the ancient Turks; in 1923, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, which elaborated the principles of Türkism as applied to all fields of national life. In 1923, he also published *Alın Işık*, a volume of Turkish folk stories, and completed the first volume of *Türk Medeniyet Tarihi*, the history of Turkish civilization, which was published in 1926. His political pamphlet, *Doğru Yol* ("The Right Way"), in which he fully endorsed and theorized on Mustafa

Kemal's newly founded Republican People's Party in 1923, and his political writings in *Küçük Mecmua* were later collected in 1947 under the title *Fırka Nedir?* ("What is a Political Party?");

Gökalp was selected to serve in the second Grand National Assembly (1923-1927) as a deputy from Diyarbakır. (I do not say "elected," for candidates for the National Assembly throughout the period 1923-1945 were handpicked by the Kemalist leadership.) He served on the parliamentary Committee on Education, which prepared the reforms in the school system, curriculum and textbooks, and he participated in the preparation of the Constitution of 1924. When he died on 25 October 1924, he left to his wife and three daughters nothing but his government pension.

CHAPTER THREE

INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT

Gökalp's death was received with an exceptional sense of loss. In *Türk Yurdu*, Hamdullah Suphi, MP and president of *Türk Ocakları*, described him as a "torch in our temple" and as a "plow that sowed deep into the soil of our country." Ahmet Ağaoğlu, MP and professor of political science, called him the "most dedicated Turk who gave us the 'ideal.'" Yahya Kemal, poet, cherished him as a "national treasure" and wrote that "since the day the radium-like intellect of Ziya Gökalp ceased to exist, darkness rules over the sciences in our country," and that "his value was not appreciated even by the elite." Ruşen Eşref, historian, portraying him as a man "who came from Sufism to the positive sciences and who brought us the West from the East," stated that "in science and knowledge there are two Turkeys, before Gökalp and after Gökalp." In 1931, F. R. Atay, publicist and popularizer of Kemalist ideology, regretted that "neither our generation nor the next has been able to produce a man of his calibre"; in 1936, N. Ataç, man of letters, called him a "great systematizer and guide who was unique in 'imposing' his ideas"; I. H. Baltacıoğlu, educator, described Gökalp as "the greatest sociologist after Durkheim," as "our greatest and last stride in consciousness," and regretted that "we do not know him well enough."

In *Türk Yurdu*, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Turkish man of letters and diplomat, gave what was perhaps the most perceptive portrait of Gökalp:

Ziya Gökalp was a man who, for the first time in the East, combined in his person the ancient virtues of the Orient with a scientific mind in the Western sense. There is no trace in him of the profound but resigned and labyrinthine way of thinking peculiar to old Eastern sages, neither does he possess at all their epicurean and easygoing disposition. He was a man of principle who applied all his ideas and his philosophy to his own life, and who lived in their jaded walls. One should not think that the atmosphere that surrounded him within these walls was an atmosphere of pleasure and happiness. His was a bed of thorns, a pillow of stone, and a quilt of renunciation.... The level of his contemporaries was not high enough to appreciate this soldier of ancient virtue. In an age of double standards when all men of ideas thought one way and lived another, individuals who united their principles and living were strangers carrying within themselves the discomfort of their estrangement. I say Ziya Gökalp did not feel even this discomfort.... His calm and clear head, always above human passions, did not for a moment bend over to the feverish vicissitudes that we call daily politics, even during his membership of the Central Committee. He always saw high and thought high.

These statements by some of the most prominent intellectual and political figures of republican Turkey, most of whom belonged to the innermost circle of Kemalists,⁴ raise an interesting question. How was it possible for a man of

Gökalp's provincial background and humble origin to achieve such national recognition and revered influence? And that, without any political success or self-promotion, but solely by the force of his ideas and personal example. Part of the answer is already contained in the last clause of the previous sentence. But, then, how was this man able to start building such an impressive intellectual system and moral philosophy, far out in the geographical and cultural periphery of the empire, distant not only from European events and ideas but even from the developments and intellectual amenities of the metropolitan centers of Turkey?

There is, I think, not more than one answer. And that answer requires the use of a difficult term. Ziya Gökalp indeed was a man of genius, who educated himself by sheer force of intellectual curiosity and determination. He was also a man of vast humanitarian concerns, who channelled his intellect into socially motivated directions. At the age of thirty-four, when he effectively began his career as the political and moral educator of generations, first in Salonika (1910) and then in Istanbul (1912), in the metropolises of the country, he had not been out of the provincial cultural milieu of Diyarbakır (except for several student years in Istanbul, a good part of which was spent in prison); yet he was somehow prepared for that role—in which he continually tried to renew himself for the remaining fourteen years of his already short, forty-eight years of life. What he achieved in those fourteen years only is attested to by the above statements.

If it were not for the factor of genius, the formal education and informal socialization Gökalp could receive, as he did, in his native town, even including the inspirations from Islamic Sufism and the rudiments of Western thought he got from his uncle and his teacher, Abdullah Cevdet, respectively, would not be enough for him to transcend traditional frameworks of thought—let alone achieve the only viable synthesis of his times and become *the* shaper of public philosophy in twentieth-century Turkey. For the lack of usual, metropolitan intellectual facilities and stimulations, this man compensated by greater-than-normal reading and thinking. That he did feel the need for compensation was in itself something.

Even if Gökalp's intellectual development started after he came to the metropolitan centers of Salonika and Istanbul, the mark of genius still has to be admitted. For these were the years when many intellectual patriots were in contact with European currents of thought, either through books and journals circulating in Istanbul, secretly in the years 1878-1908 and publicly after 1908, or as members of a self-styled diaspora of the intelligentsia in European capitals, often financially protected before 1908 by liberal pashas in exile and after 1908 by government grants. All first-generation and second-generation Young Turks had a much greater chance than Gökalp, as far as knowing Europe and living in it were concerned. Yet, with the former, the result was,

Handwritten notes:
 1. 1878-1908
 2. 1908-1910
 3. 1910-1912
 4. 1912-1914
 5. 1914-1918
 6. 1918-1922
 7. 1922-1924
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 58. 2024-2026
 59. 2026-2028
 60. 2028-2030

invariably, eclectic and superficial formulas when sincere, and high-blown rhetoric but political opportunism when insincere. (Most top Young Turk leaders were known for their capitulating to Sultan Abdülhamit II upon being offered position and remuneration.)

Although Gökalp may be considered a second-generation Young Turk, and was certainly a formal member of the Unionists, who were the Young Turks in power, he represents a very different intellectual and political synthesis from the Young Turk thought within the context of which his intellectual career matured. In other words, if we can take Gökalp's social and political thought as a codification or "recodification", as Mardin puts it,⁶ of the dominant ideas of his time, that codification was one which certainly included, among others, aspects of Young Turk thought—transcending the latter, however, by incorporating it in a new synthesis, the totality and the logic of which was entirely different.

The Young Turk thought was not a monolithic or homogeneous intellectual movement; it was highly eclectic and consisted of indiscreet borrowings from European schools of thought, mostly in their popularized versions. Ernest E. Ramsaur, in his study of the Young Turks and the 1908 Revolution, concludes that the political thought of the Young Turks was a sort of undigested and unrefined liberalism.⁷

Nothing can be more misleading than this judgment, for despite certain liberal slogans that went into the Young Turk idiom, their political ideology was by definition anti-liberal (and certainly anti-Marxist). Their acknowledged European sources, if reviewed with the minimum of attention, would reveal this point clearly. And it was no coincidence that not only did the most professedly liberal wing of the Young Turks (Prince Sabahattin) enjoy leadership at no point but also his "liberalism" was not liberalism in the proper sense. It was inspired by European thinkers whom Ernst Nolte calls "critical liberals,"⁸ that is, critics of classical liberalism.

Şerif Mardin, in his detailed and theoretically sound study of the Young Turks,⁹ captures the nature of their thought correctly. In his overall evaluation of Young Turk thought, Mardin concluded that this thought was not libertarian but motivated by the "reason of state"; it was not democratic but ambiguously populistic in its simultaneous distrust of the common people and idealization of manipulated mass action; it was bureaucratically conservative and not at all radical, despite a propensity for forceful changes from above, in itself inconsistent with the Young Turks' general linear evolutionism; it was definitely authoritarian and in most cases proto-fascistic, or as Mardin calls it, "pre-totalitarian"; it was anti-parliamentarian, despite the Young Turks' superficial constitutionalism that has misled many observers (most in fact were simply legitimist monarchists); it was definitely elitist in its emphasis on the authority of specialists, especially political elites. All Young

✓ Turks—civilian or military—were vanguardists in the sense of advocating reforms by mobilizing and manipulating the gullible masses. All were materialistic positivists in their epistemology, some adhering to the economicist and some to the biologicist variants thereof, and all anti-Marxist in their selectivity of European currents of thought. Most were deeply influenced by social Darwinism.

All this is alien to Gökalp's thought, as we shall see in detail in the pages that follow. While the mainstream Young Turks were authoritarian, conservative, and elitist positivists in their political ideology, drawing even their name from August Comte's famous motto, "order and progress,"¹⁰ Gökalp's main source of inspiration was Emile Durkheim, who, although still in the positivist tradition methodologically, had interjected an idealistic epistemology and a much more democratic and pluralistic political ideology into that tradition with his solidaristic corporatism.¹¹

Gökalp became acquainted with Durkheim's work only after 1910, when he arrived in Salonika. Before that, the French sociologists he had read were Gabriel Tarde, known for his "theory of imitation" in explaining social change, and Gustave LeBon, known for his theories on mass psychology. He was also familiar with the organicist social theories of Herbert Spencer and René Worms, along with some materialistic European positivists that were in vogue in Young Turk circles. These thinkers, who appealed immensely to other Young Turks, did not have an impact on Gökalp's thinking. On the contrary, they are harshly criticised, as we shall see, in his writings.

From what we can gather from Gökalp's running commentaries on specific European thinkers—he was rather sloppy in his references—he was familiar with quite a range of European thinkers, but the ones who impressed him positively, before Durkheim, were few. The voluntaristic idealism of Alfred Fouillée appealed to him only until he discovered Durkheim's positivistic idealism. Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, on the other hand, seem to have left a lasting impression on him. This comes out not only through Gökalp's explicit, affirmative references to Kant and Rousseau but also from the substance of his thought, as we shall see.

Gökalp is popularly known as an unoriginal follower of Durkheim. He indeed derived his analytic social-political theory mainly from the French sociologist. But that is only part of the story. Gökalp's normative theory or social-political philosophy contains elements of Rousseau and Kant as much as it does elements of Durkheim.¹² In another respect, too, Gökalp differs from, or is more than, Durkheim. Gökalp's synthesis is a tri-partite one, which consists of cultural Turkism and ethical Islamism, Durkheimian solidarism being only one of three components.¹³

At the turn of the century, no less turbulent for Europe than for Turkey on its fringe, Gökalp, like Durkheim, tried to explain and to affect the course of

events with his own version of solidaristic corporatism. In this effort, he stands out in Turkey as the one person who was able to go beyond narrow ideological blueprints to a systematic theoretical construction. With him, and in contrast to the Young Turks, loose ends come together; eclecticism is replaced with synthesis; the discrepancy between what is prescribed and what is practised becomes smaller; imitative and idiosyncratic Westernisms are supplanted by a critical appreciation of the West; radical chic is superseded by a sense of proportion and totality.

It is no mean achievement to have laid out the only plausible, comprehensive cognitive map for Turkey's passage from a six-hundred-year empire to a new nation-state. In constructing his synthesis of Turkism, Islamism, and Modernism, Gökalp's genius was able to do justice to all these elements. He could handle the dichotomies of tradition-modernity, continuity-change, nationalism-internationalism, and Islamism-secularism much better than his contemporaries. What has not been duly appreciated in Gökalp's thought is the fact that, in his synthesis, the emphasis is always on the second terms of these dichotomies. That fact, I think, will clearly emerge from the present study. In this sense, Gökalp's thought is more modern than traditional, and more universalist than nationalist, however surprising at first sight this may sound to ears accustomed to cliché interpretations of Gökalp.

Gökalp's genius transcended the shortcomings of his contemporaries and the constraints of his social and cultural milieu especially in that he assigned realistic, and therefore lasting, weight to each element of his synthesis. His well-considered Westernism was more forceful than the uncritical Westernism of many Young Turks (and all *Tanzimat* modernizers as well as many Kemalists). Unlike those of many Unionists (and Kemalists), his modernist proposals were not un-rooted in national traditions; nor was he inhibited too much by those traditions, as were the hesitant Young Ottomans.

Only such qualities of genius, then, could have made a provincial intellectual into a nationally acclaimed teacher of public consciousness and morals. As a master of the short essay, Gökalp indeed shaped, in the course of a mere fourteen years, the public philosophy of modern Turkey. His articles, essays, poems, and pedagogic tales in journals and newspapers alone exceed four hundred. He tried to educate the public, at times pedantically so, but never preaching from an assumed position of moral superiority. Furthermore, Gökalp was a man of ideas with a system of his own. In other words, he was not a public-spirited intellectual only; he was a social philosopher and political theorist in his own right—certainly not one of the "greats" in the annals of social and political thought, but very significant in the Turkish context. For it is Gökalp's corporatist system that both best reflects and has greatly shaped the dominant political thinking in modern Turkey. To use one of Gökalp's own terms, he was an exceptional individual who gave "consciousness" to

PART TWO
THE SYSTEM

"CHAPTER FOUR"

GÖKALP'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

The Disparate Sources

Gökalp did not systematically study or write on philosophy as such, except in the form of occasional philosophical meditations, posthumously collected under the title of *Çınaraltı Talks*. His chief preoccupation centered on social, political, economic, and cultural questions. As Heyd indicates, he dealt with philosophy to the extent necessary for the theoretical foundations of his doctrines. According to Heyd, Gökalp explained the lack of interest in philosophy in his "usual way," that is, by state of the society in which he lived.¹ In fact, Gökalp argued that the circumstances in Turkey did not foster specialization in philosophy as a speculative discipline. In a nation faced with political and economic turmoil, he believed that the intelligentsia should concentrate on finding theoretical answers to practical problems. Heyd's interpretation also stresses that, for Gökalp, philosophy as well as political and social theory merely served as agents of practical activity for national revival. Gökalp's social and political doctrines were not simply analytical. They constituted a theory with strong normative elements based on social, political, and moral philosophy. He thus escaped the charge that he was relegating philosophy to secondary consideration. Nor did Gökalp subordinate analysis to practice or constantly modify his theoretical positions to fit the political changes. He explicitly held that theories could be appreciated in rational terms and in the reality of objective conditions. In short, Gökalp did not aim at decoupling a value-free theory from social reality. Instead he tried to blend the two, sometimes doubtfully, though no less so than other European philosophers who also pursued a synthesis of idealism and positivism.

What were the substance and premises of Gökalp's political-social theory? He titled it Turkist-Islamist-Westernist Modernism. Gökalp summed up his "social ideal" in a single sentence: "We are of the Turkish nation (*millet*), of the Islamic religious community (*ümme*), of Western civilization (*medeniyet*)."² He was thus attempting to integrate into a single theory Islamic and Western intellectual traditions, which seemed to some totally irreconcilable and inconsistent and to others combinable only by acknowledging inescapable contradictions. Such judgments, however, are much too facile, as a comprehensive assessment of Gökalp's intellectual effort demonstrates.

In Gökalp's view, Turkish nationalism represented a cultural ideal and a philosophy of life which laid the basis for social solidarity. He believed that this applied to every nationalism. His was a non-racist, non-expansionist,

pluralistic nationalism. Similarly, his unorthodox, Sufi brand of Islam, with its emphasis on ethics rather than politics, reinforced solidarity. Thus, Turkism became the cultural norm and Islam the moral norm in his societal model.

Westernism or modernism, which Gökalp used interchangeably, meant the scientific, technological, industrial achievements of European capitalism, which were to form part of his program of national revival. Western science, as he saw it, included the social sciences, especially sociology, politics, and economics. Moreover, corporatism, as the solidaristic perception of society as an analytic discipline, also served as a philosophical model of society. The system as a whole took the shape of idealistic positivism: the method was scientific in the positivistic sense, and the ideology was solidarism, a variant of corporatist capitalism, as opposed to Marxist socialism or liberal capitalism. Gökalp labeled it social idealism (ictimai mefkûrecilik).

The social scientific theory stemmed from a second meaning that Gökalp attached to the West. Western civilization, including the social sciences, did not consist of the liberal model of society and its economic and political organization. The concern of liberalism for the individual, the market mechanism, and representative parliamentary democracy was anachronistic and therefore undesirable. Nor was this diagnosis unique. Many European corporatist writers, especially at the turn of the century, shared that judgment. This explains Gökalp's close affinity to these writers. Although in Turkey, as in Europe, the attempted implementation of the corporatist ideas had to await the end of the First World War, the underlying theories hark back to the second half of the nineteenth century.

Thus, Gökalp decoupled the scientific and technological from the liberal rationality of Western capitalist civilization as an analytic and philosophical model of society. He admired the one and criticized the other, siding with many Europeans who were separating capitalism and liberalism and forging a new rationale for the capitalist civilization, in solidaristic and fascist or proto-fascistic variants. Unlike Marx, who praised the cultural and technological achievements of Western capitalism—perhaps more accurately, the liberal bourgeois civilization—Gökalp divided the two, believing that the technological rationality of capitalism could exist without its liberal rationale. He joined a good number of Western theorists in adopting corporatism as a different and supposedly higher and more humanitarian rationale for capitalism. The axiomatic elements of capitalism itself, however, never constituted the subject of the critique that Gökalp or others undertook.

The compatibility of the cultural and moral solidarism of the Turkish and Islamic traditions with European solidarism deserves a further word. Had Gökalp tried to synthesize the local traditions with European liberalism, that indeed would have been an amalgam of irreconcilables. Instead he saw the

potential harmony of the moral and social communalism of Turkish culture and Islamic Sufism with comparable elements in European solidaristic corporatism. In all these systems the individual loses his individualism as he assimilates into the community.

Ziya Gökalp's synthesis of Turkish nationalism, Islamic Sufism, and European corporatism—both as a scientific-analytical model of society and as a social-political philosophy—became plausible in his distinction between "culture" (*hars*) and "civilization" (*medeniyet*). In an article called "Three Movements" (1912),⁴ he argued that Turkism, Islam, and Modernism were not contradictory ideals, since each answered a different need. The idea of modernism signified the pursuit of the scientific, technological, and industrial civilization of the West. It did not demand the adoption of the European "way of life" and "moral values." Nor did it suggest the simple transfer of the technology of Europe. Rather it required becoming "independent" of Europe.⁵ In short, he called for a defensive modernization without an accompanying sense of cultural inferiority.

In a series of articles on education (1916),⁶ Gökalp furnished working definitions:

The total of "judgments of value" that exist in the "conscience" of a nation is called culture (*hars*). Education is transmitting this culture into psychological habits in the individuals of a nation.... The total of "judgments of fact" that exist in the "mind" of a nation is called science (*teknik*). Training is transforming this knowledge into psychological habits in the individuals of a nation.

Hence, (culture) is the moral and aesthetic aspect of civilization; science and technology, the cognitive and material aspects. In Gökalp's usage the dichotomy simply assumes, somewhat misleadingly, the names of culture and civilization, or perhaps more accurately, national culture and international civilization.⁷

Values and institutions that conform to the collective conscience and, therefore, to the national culture constitute living traditions. Those that do not are "social fossils." Dualities emerge in the life of nations when culture and civilization are not properly distinguished from living traditions and dead ones. In nineteenth-century Turkey, for example, he discerned two civilizations (Arabic-Persian and European) and one culture (Turkish). At the turn of the century, a third civilization (Old Turkish) was added to this incoherent social-intellectual mixture, since the devotees of Turkism advocated that old Turkish words, long in disuse, replace words of Arabic and Persian origin, even though they had already been assimilated into the collective conscience and thus become firmly rooted in the Turkish language.⁸ Gökalp opposed extremism in the movement for the "purification" of the Turkish language and also the proposed change from the Arabic to the Latin alphabet on the ground that it would sever the continuity of national culture. At the same time, he ad-

vocated basing education on national culture. Gökalp rejected the idea that the principles of modern education were necessarily those of the most civilized and powerful Western nations. Those principles lay in the domain of training (which is civilizational), not education. Therefore, educational reform did not imply the abandonment of culture for civilization but exactly the reverse.¹⁶

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 In another article on "Cultural Groups and Civilizational Groups" (1918),¹⁷ Gökalp further clarifies the subject. There are two kinds of social groups and two sets of corresponding judgments. Value judgments—such as moral obligations, legal rules, aesthetic views and "ideals"—are subjective, relative, and peculiar to cultural groups. However, scientific truths, medical knowledge, economics, engineering, commercial and agricultural techniques, logical and mathematical concepts, and the like are objective, absolute, and belong to civilizational groups. According to Gökalp, in their analyses of society Gabriel Tarde emphasized, as the more important phenomena, civilizational groups and cognitive judgments, while Emile Durkheim emphasized, more accurately, cultural groups and moral judgments.¹² Through "consciousness," the "individual in culture" internalizes and obeys as valuable ideals the norms set by the "social conscience" (collective conscience). The "individual in civilization" thinks within the logical framework of a "social reason."¹³

In other words, judgments of facts and their science fall essentially in the domain of civilization which is international. Ideals and their philosophy fall essentially in the domain of culture which is national. Through such a mechanism, Gökalp arrives at his vision of national-cultural diversity within international-civilizational unity. The creations and virtues of every nation contribute to the richness and versatility of the international community, which also is characterized by equality and peace among nations. He separates the national culture group—which resembles somewhat the "community" of Ferdinand Tönnies (1885-1936), as distinct from "society"—from the international civilization group for fear of the eclipsing of the former. Gökalp completes the circle and gives a communitarian aspect even to the civilization group. This idea, he expressed epigrammatically in a couplet of his poem, "Medeniyet," ("Civilization") (1918);

Civilization is a book to be written internationally,
 Its chapters to consist of the culture of each nation.¹⁴

For Gökalp there was no inherent contradiction between culture and civilization, or between one nation and another, or between nationalism (Turkism), religious community (Islam), and international community (Modernism—Westernism). Although these should not be confused, they were in no way incompatible as ideals worth preserving, provided that their function, place and level in national life were not confused.¹⁶ Comparably, there

were tensions but no incompatibilities within the culture group itself between secondary groups and their norms. These, too, could be harmonized.

The tensions between a national culture and other nations or international civilization were in fact unnecessary, because each answered a different need (at a different level. So, according to Gökalp, it became possible for Turks to aim simultaneously at a Turkish-Islamic culture, while equipping itself with the "reason and science and technology of contemporary civilization." As European nations formed part of a Christian internationalism, the Turkish nation formed part of the Islamic civilization. Nevertheless, Gökalp observed, the contemporary development of science and technology had replaced the religious criterion of internationalism with that of positive science. As the religious community ceased to be the criterion of internationalism, or international civilization, religion became a type of morality and social solidarity. *

He believed that *Tanzimat* modernism had gone astray in rejecting Turkism and aiming at a multi-religious Ottomanism, while disregarding Islam. The *Tanzimat*'s cultural policies, according to Gökalp, might not have been contradictory, had they accepted Turkism as a pillar of Ottomanism and Islam against "cosmopolitanism," that is, an unsound form of internationalism, inspired by an uncritical acceptance of Western culture at the expense of traditional values. The *Tanzimat*'s fatal mistake sprang from its failure to take into consideration the fact that the ideal of nationalism had become the driving force of the age.²⁶

For Gökalp, the importance of national culture, including religious ethics, derived from its function of assuring the individuals of a society based on social solidarity. While national culture (*hars*) strengthened solidarity, international civilization might endanger it, if the affective and cognitive levels were confused.

In another article on "Culture and Civilization" (1918):²⁷ Gökalp defined the culture of national society as the "sum of institutions that create solidarity and interconnect individuals of a society." In contrast to cultural institutions, civilizational institutions linked the "upper strata of one society to the upper strata of other societies."²⁸ While culture was a cohesive element between the people and the elite of a society, civilization, if not shared, became a divisive element between them.

Gökalp claimed that if culture and civilization were clearly distinguished and their levels kept apart, many "social dualities" in a nation would be identified and prevented. These were due either to the conflict of cultural and civilizational institutions and norms, or to the conflict of two or more civilizations in a society. Giving many examples from Ottoman Turkish society, he analyzed the split between the elite and the people as well as intra-elite conflict in language, literature, music, architecture, law, and military and civil administration. For instance, he noted that the early laws and decrees of the Ottoman state were based on Turkish custom, unlike the Selçuk statecraft which

derived from Arab and Persian sources. He attributed the decline of the Ottoman Empire mainly to the neglect of Turkish institutions and values and their subordination to Arab and Persian analogues. Under the *Tanzimat*, he observed, "to the conflict between popular Turkish culture and the courtly Ottoman (Arab-Persian) civilization, were added new tensions: European-French civilization (Westernizing bureaucrats) as opposed to Arabic-Persian (the *ulema*) among the elite, and Turkish culture as opposed to both these civilizations between the people and the elite." Consequently, "our literature, philosophy, politics, and ethics became a mixture of Persian and European civilizations."²⁴

In attempting to emulate the "positive sciences and industrial techniques" of Europe, which were the "real elements of civilization" and were "common institutions among nations," and which had reached the highest level in Europe at the time, the *Tanzimat* made a fatal mistake. That mistake consisted in imitating the (national) cultural values of the individual European nations, which in any case were not integral elements of the European civilization group.²⁵ Gökalp's receptivity to European civilization, critical and selective, was predicated on the condition that civilization should not replace or become culture, but should be integrated into the national culture. The prerequisite was the acceptance by, and conformity with, the collective conscience and traditions of the people.

By definition, "aesthetic, moral, philosophical, and other norms.... emotions, enthusiasms, tastes" are peculiar to national culture. What may be borrowed from abroad (i.e., European civilization) are "concepts, methods, techniques." It therefore followed that the people would determine the elements of European civilization for selection by the "Turkist and Islamic Ottoman nation."²⁶

Only those elements of civilization which are accepted, beyond the elite [preferences], by our people may be included in our culture. Institutions which are not tolerated by the people, are excluded from national culture, even if these are accepted by the elite....

There is in our country a class, the so-called Levantines or Cosmopolitans, who try to adopt the aesthetic, moral, philosophical tastes, and entire customs, ceremonies and behavior of the West rather than its scientific methods and industrial techniques. That is, they try erroneously to imitate the cultures of other nations under the name of civilization.²⁷

Gökalp went on to say that the people did not view this class as one of their own. The latter in turn considered it "a disgrace to be at one with the people's tastes." This division of taste and conscience led to the emergence of two separate nations without solidarity and without the possibility of "a normal development of the division of labor."²⁸ Still it should be understood that Gökalp insisted not on a static cultural tradition, but on one that accepted change and modernization provided that it did not deviate from the essence of

national custom.²⁹ "Custom (örf) can neither remain a slave to old traditions (anane), nor reassume totally Western forms at the pleasure of cosmopolitans. It changes by itself only, and it evolves; it cannot be pushed forward or backward by force."³⁰

In a related article on the "Interrelationship of Culture and Civilization" (1918),³¹ Gökalp elaborated upon the attributes of the two social groups and norms. Culture is non-utilitarian (hasbî), altruistic (bimênfaat), public-spirited (umumcu), and idealistic (meskûrevî). Civilization is utilitarian (inîfaî), egoistic (hodgeâm), individualistic (ferîcî), and self-interested (menfaatperest).³² From these contrasting traits of culture and civilization Gökalp deduced certain generalizations, which he presented as a sociological law. Decline was inevitable in those nations which, in contact with others, failed to preserve their culture and subordinated it to civilization. Conversely, nations inferior in civilization but superior in culture overcame nations which were superior in civilization but inferior in culture. Civilization, owing to its attributes, destroyed culture as well as solidarity and morality in a society, especially if the unbalanced development, as opposed to the balanced development, of culture and civilization were due to external dominance. In other words, for Gökalp, as for Rousseau, civilization destroyed societal solidarity and morality.³³ Writing in the last year of World War I, Gökalp further called attention to the overextension of empires and imperialism as a "pathological, extreme" manifestation of civilization causing degeneration of national cultures and thereby loss of moralities and ideals.³⁴

In the foregoing we have the germs of Gökalp's critique of liberalism as a social philosophy, as distinct from liberalism as an economic system and political organization, which will be examined below. When Gökalp contrasted abstractly the utilitarianism, egoism, individualism, and self-interestedness of civilization with the non-utilitarianism, altruism, public-spiritedness, and idealism of culture, he had in mind as concrete cases a liberal (and Western) versus a solidaristic (Turkish, Islamic and a particular Western) model of society. When Gökalp wrote that the individualism of civilization sapped the power and destroyed the solidarity of a nation,³⁵ or of other nations when it was directed outside, i.e., imperialism, he meant the individualism (fericilik) of liberalism (ferdiyeticilik). He explicitly argued that the decline of cultures and the development of imperialist states were causally linked. Gökalp mistakenly identified imperialism with liberalism or liberal capitalism, obscuring the fact that monopoly and state monopoly capitalism might also be imperialistic. He wrote "liberalism" when he really had in mind "liberal capitalism," and not capitalism as such, but his meaning was clear: he preferred solidarism (of culture) to liberalism (of civilization). His distinction between culture and civilization was thus something much larger than Tönnies' "community and society," as Hevd suggests.³⁶ It was a juxtaposition of

liberalism and solidarism, as two alternative analytical models as well as normative philosophies of society.

What then was the aspect of contemporary Western liberal capitalism Gökalp proposed to synthesize with Turkish nationalism and Islamic ethics, as two traditional normative systems of social solidarity, if he was so critical of liberalism? The problem was only apparent. For Gökalp, modernism or Westernism or European civilization meant the industrial and technological achievements of capitalism and the positive sciences which, he thought, had made that possible. Moreover, when he asserted that contemporary civilization was now developing through the positive sciences (replacing religion as the criterion of internationalism), he was emphasizing in the sociological idiom of the turn-of-the-century European solidarist writers, who, like Durkheim, were trying to synthesize an early positivism as a method and epistemology with an idealistic social philosophy, thereby, it was hoped, bridging the ideal and the real "scientifically," Gökalp shared this optimism. He declared that, with the advance of the positive sciences, particularly the science of sociology, and their application to social problems, nations would democratize as empires disintegrated.³⁶ He assumed that the science of sociology would be a solidaristic one, premised on the normative elements of social harmony and public spirit in social relations. His optimistic and humanitarian corporatist model of society, as one form of reaction to the liberal model at the turn of the century, contrasted sharply with the other reaction, namely, the elitist and pre-totalitarian theories that represented a loss of faith both in the positivist science of society and in the rationality of capitalist social relations in general.

In *Türkçülüğün Esasları* ("Principles of Turkism") (1923), Gökalp reiterated these views on the relationship between culture and civilization, and between nationalism and internationalism. But it should be noted in this last work, which appeared after the realization of the ideal of nationalism and the formation of the republic in 1923, that his emphasis on culture and nationalism as contrasted with internationalism and civilization was not accentuated but toned down. His early efforts distinguished national culture from international civilization. Only after that did he stress the diversity of national cultures within a unity of international civilization. In his latest study he tried to minimize the cultural distance between the several nations of the international community. The communal solidarity he prescribed for national cultural groups was extended to the civilization group.³⁷

In the chapter on "National Culture and Civilization" (1923),³⁸ Gökalp offered a new version of the same definitions of culture and civilization. A nation's "social lives" consisted of religious, moral, linguistic, political-legal, economic, rational, and scientific lives. The last two in his own terminology were, in fact, civilizational, not cultural categories. However, if they con-

formed to the customs of the people, that is, the real store of national culture. they could become elements of national culture. Thus, culture represented a "harmonious whole" of the social lives of a nation; civilization, the "sum total" of the lives of several nations which belong to the same civilization group (*medeniyet dairesi*). Reason and science became the points of convergence. They were created by "individual wills" and "by way of method," while products of culture derived naturally from the inspiration and source of national conscience."

The superimposition of civilizational elements on a culture was not voluntary, however. As he noted in "Toward the West" (1923),³⁹ each culture had a "different logic, a different aesthetics, a different worldview," and not all civilizational elements could be mechanically absorbed into a culture. He illustrated this in his criticism of the Tanzimat, which adopted the "externalities" of Western civilization despite their antithetical nature to the popular national culture.

In the "Two Meanings of Culture" (1923),⁴⁰ Gökalp further lowered the barriers between culture and civilization. He began by breaking down culture into two connotations. Hars corresponded to "popular culture." It was "democratic" and consisted of the traditions, habits, customs, oral and written literature, language, music, religion, morals, and aesthetic and economic creations of the people. Tehzib corresponded to "refined culture." It was aristocratic ("the aristocracy of mind") and was found in intellectuals who had received higher education. It signified appreciation of cognitive and positive sciences, fine arts, literature, philosophy, and religion. Since, however, the source of popular culture and refined culture was national culture, this distinction implied not a qualitative difference but a matter of degree of sophistication. The intellectual elite in question still remained a national, not cosmopolitan, elite.

By this distinction, Gökalp brought together culture and civilization (e.g., sciences and philosophy) and one culture and other cultures (e.g., fine arts and literature). For he insisted that hars was national and tehzip international, an attribute of civilization. Hence, Gökalp disapproved of parochialism in intellectuals, while preparing the theoretical escape from parochialism in the masses through higher education. "People probably value only their own national culture. But persons of refinement appreciate cultures of other nations as well.... Accordingly tehzip makes one more humanitarian, charitable, and eclectic."

According to Gökalp, cultural refinement also helped one to transcend nationalism (*milliyetçilik*) and become internationalist (*milliyetlerarasıcı*) through involving the adoption of the scientific and technological achievements of Western civilization and the appreciation (not superficial imitation) of the cultural values of other nations. "Internationalism" differed totally from

"cosmopolitanism," since nationalism and internationalism were compatible, although nationalism and cosmopolitanism were not.⁴³

Gökalp struck a balance as follows: "One must not confuse the 'national taste', which appreciates the national culture, with the 'external taste', which appreciates foreign cultures." National taste was "constant and primary"; external taste was "admissible" only when it remained "secondary." Otherwise, Gökalp warned, we encountered the "pathology" of the Ottoman elite's Persianism and the Tanzimat elite's Westernism. Cultural refinement was "normal" insofar as it observed the prerogatives (*hukukuna riayet*) of national culture. Otherwise it became "sick and invalid."⁴⁴ Unintentionally reversing the Western Orientalists' ethnocentricism in finding the East "exotic," Gökalp concluded that the Turks' pleasure in, and appreciation of, the cultural creations of the French, British, Germans, Russians, and Italians should not exceed the limits of "exotic tastes." He concluded on the following note:

It is seen that our Turkism, though it loves and admires its own original culture, is not chauvinistic and bigoted. As it is determined to emulate European civilization fully and systematically, it possesses no feeling of estrangement or scorn for the culture of any nation. On the contrary, we value and respect all national cultures. Moreover, we admire and respect the cultural products, thinkers and artists of even those nations who have done evil to us and of all political organizations we do not like."

Cultural Turkism

cultural nationalism benign

The well-being of the Turkish nation was a terminal philosophical value for Gökalp. His brand of nationalism was unequivocally based on a linguistic and cultural nationalism that was to co-exist with other nationalisms in peace and reciprocal respect. Many, however, have taken literally the Turkist and Turanist myths, legends, slogans, and figures of speech he used in a number of poems he published especially between 1910 and 1915 and assembled in a volume in 1914 under the title *Kızıl Elma*. Gökalp expressed here in poetic form a linguistic and cultural nationalism as a unifying factor for all Turkic groups. He idealized the national culture to reinforce the popular morale and solidarity. In a time of war with leading Western countries (Italy, Britain, and France), he defended the national cultural values of the past as in no way inferior to Western culture.

In poems such as "Turan" (1910), "Millet" (1915), "Lisan" (1915), in epic poems such as "Altın Destan" (1912), "Ergenekon" (1912), "Balkanlar" (1912), "Kızıl Destan" (1914), and in tales such as "Ala Gevik" (1912), "Kızıl Elma" (1913), as well as in non-political poetry, Gökalp tried to create, in his own words, "an ideal which existed in the realm of imagination, not in the realm of reality."⁴⁵ When one remembers that Turanism, the racist and ir-

redentist brand of Turkish nationalism, does not figure even as an ideal in any of his theoretical or political articles and essays written in a period when his literary output was prolific, the suggestion that many mistook the cultural myth for theoretical argument or a political program becomes plausible. Moreover, one must remember that such poems cluster around the years of the Balkan and the First World Wars and totally cease after 1915.

What Gökāl̄p wrote in "Turan" about the imaginary notion of Turan embracing Turkey and Turkistan and in "Lisan" ("Language") about the common language of Turan which preserved the Turkishness of Turkic peoples⁴¹ implies no political expansionism and unification beyond spiritual unity, or rather affinity in language, literature, and culture. Another poem, "Türklük," confirms that he was promoting cultural ties without appealing to xenophobia. He wrote that the Turk "listens to the voice of the West, and makes the West hear his voice" and that "his golden age does not fade out from his heart."⁴²

What interests us here is not Gökāl̄p's reflections on the ancient Turkish civilization, cosmology, religion, customs, arts, or social and political organization but his theoretical and philosophical attitude toward nationalism as one of the highest "social ideals" and his sociological conception of the nation in general. To be sure, he cherished the values of Turkish culture and history and often sought to offer them as precedents in the political and cultural revival of Turkey. More important for his political theory is the kind of nationalism he espoused, and how he related it to other nations and national cultures.

Türkçülükün Esasları (1923)⁴³ codifies his views on the subject. It focuses on the method of Turkism and the program of Turkism. It sets forth his theoretical premises of nationalism and their application to different aspects of national life. An introductory chapter on the "History of Turkism" reviews the stages of development in the movement of Turkism. Gökāl̄p, in a following article entitled "What is Turkism?" (1923),⁴⁴ defines Turkism as "elevating the Turkish nation" and passes on to a definition of the "nature of the social group or collectivity called nation." According to Gökāl̄p, the "racist nationalists" in the Turkish movement went astray in equating nation with race. In fact, some anthropologists, borrowing the concept of race from the science of zoology, in which it is used for classifying types of animals according to their external appearances and physical features, have endeavored to extend the concept to the classification of nations, despite the fact that in every nation there are individuals who belong to different races. These anthropologists have also claimed a relationship between racial and social traits. This claim Gökāl̄p refutes thus: "Since there is no relationship between racial and social characteristics, there can be no relationship between race and nationality, which is the source of social characteristics."⁴⁵

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Gökalp goes on to observe that the "ethnic-nationalists" in the Turkist movement, in turn, confuse nation with kinship. The ethnic, that is, the kinship group has to do with parentage and heredity. Traditional societies cherished the kinship ideal because religious atavism, now abnormal, was then the main form of social solidarity. Furthermore, kinship and heredity do not determine social traits, emotions, and thoughts such as language, religion, morality, aesthetics, political, law, and economics. Society through education transmits these from generation to generation. He adds that "today, social solidarity is based on cultural unity."³⁴

Furthermore, he faults the "geographic nationalists" in the Turkist movement. To them, nation meant the "totality of peoples residing in the same country." Since the languages and cultures of various peoples in a single country may differ, this definition, too, is deficient. For the same reason, the Pan-Ottomanist perception of nation as embracing all the citizens of the empire did not hold up. Gökalp also rejects the Pan-Islamists' definition of nation as embracing "all Muslims," for *ümme*t signifies religious community, but not "common language and culture." Finally, he casts aside the "individualistic" definition of nation as "any society to which a man considers himself to belong." Gökalp notes that individuals do not enjoy such a freedom of choice, since membership in a nation is involuntary.³⁵

Gökalp then gives his own sociological definition of the nation based on a superior criterion—"shared" education, culture, and emotion, with language as the primary medium. Thus, the nation is a social group or collectivity consisting of individuals who have received the same education, and who have a common language, emotions, ideals, religion, morality and aesthetic feeling.³⁶ In other words, nation is the most developed social group; society rests on social solidarity; and the highest form of solidarity is that based on common language and culture, and on cognitive and affective norms.

Gökalp further distinguishes between "Turkism and Turanism" (1923).³⁷ In the same vein as in his earlier poems, he states that the cultural unification of the Anatolian Turks ("the realized ideal") may be extended to a cultural unification between them and the other Oguz Turks, or Turkmens, in Azerbaijan, Iran, and Khwarezm ("the proximate ideal"). Finally, the cultural unity between these and the other Turkic nations who are situated in central Asia (Kazan Tatars, Kirgiz, Özbeks, and Yakuts),³⁸ that is, in Greater Turkistan ("the distant ideal") may be strengthened. All these groups together comprise the Turan, which is unambiguously a linguistic and cultural entity.³⁹ Gökalp adds that there is not even linguistic affinity among the Turks, Mongols, Magyars, and Finns.

Gökalp defines a distant ideal, that is, the ideal of cultural unity in a way not too dissimilar to the notion of an Anglo-American cultural unity. It is an "attractive vision, in the quest of which enthusiasm of the soul increases in-

finitely." He adds that "if it were not ^{does this make it more acceptable?} for the ideal of Turan, Turkism could not have spread as rapidly as it did."⁶¹

That Gökalp's Turkism is a cultural, nonpolitical program becomes still clearer in "Political Turkism" (1923):⁶² "Turkism is not a political party; it is a scientific, philosophical, aesthetic movement. In other words, it is a method of cultural travail and rejuvenation."⁶² After pointing out that Turkism is also anti-clerical, anti-theocratic, anti-absolutist, and supportive of the Republican People's Party, Gökalp, in his characteristic paired definitions, states: "Our doctrine in politics is populism; our doctrine in culture is Turkism."⁶³

These views of Gökalp on nationalism in the *Principles of Turkism*, which he published after the birth of the Turkish Republic, hark back to those expressed earlier in *Turkism, Islamism, Modernism*, first as a series of articles (1912), later as a book (1918). Directly related are his essays on "The Fortunes of Turkism," "The Turkish Nation and Turan," and "The Ideal of Nationalism."⁶⁴ These articles also reveal the social function he attached to nationalism or to the ideal of a nation, which is not equally manifest in the *Principles of Turkism*, precisely because the ideal of nationalism had in his view realized its objectives. When Gökalp wrote that the Turks were disparate individuals without a sense of national obligation, national conscience, national ideal, and that their backward state stemmed from "not knowing themselves" and "not recognizing their national responsibilities,"⁶⁵ he was referring to the social function of nationalism as one major normative system providing social solidarity. Similarly, when he spoke of the obligation of a nationalist to "avoid personal ambitions and cherish sacred national duties,"⁶⁶ he had in mind a solidaristic model of the relationship between the individual and society.

In juxtaposing the "socialist ideal" and the nationalist ideal, Gökalp described the former either as a "great enemy" of Turkish nationalism,⁶⁷ or as an ideal, upon its emergence after industrialization, that must remain subordinate to the ideal of nationalism, which is supreme:

...ideals that are based on ethnicity, religious community, state, fatherland, family, corporation, etc., all these are subordinate to the ideal of nationalism.... After large-scale industry is founded in Turkey, the ideal of socialism will be born, too. But like the other lesser ideals, that would be secondary to the ideal of nationalism."⁶⁸

Gökalp, thus, has a hierarchy of norms, or normative systems, through which social solidarity and, therefore, the viability of a society are assured. In that hierarchy, the ideal of nationalism occupies a paramount place. His political-social theory is a normative, not an empirical theory, which, however, is couched in sociological terms.

Finally, that Gökâlp's nationalism as a philosophy of life and cultural norm of social solidarity is not felt to be incompatible with Western civilization, and even Western cultures, may be further seen in his proposals for the cultural advancement of the new Turkish nationstate. After stating that "fatherland means national culture," he advocated the formation of research institutes on the national culture: national and ethnographic museums, national archives, a national history library, and a directorate of statistics. It is noteworthy that Gökâlp simultaneously recommended other institutions such as a theater, a conservatory, a university, and an institute of Turcology with a view to improving the studies on, and performance of, Turkish folklore, music, and history by the application of Western "methods," as well as to introducing Western cultures and sciences as such.⁶⁶

Ethical Islam

As Turkish nationalism was a cultural-normative system for Gökâlp, Islamic religion was an ethical-normative system, the two supplying the bases of solidarity in the society. As Mardin correctly points out, the social function of Islam, not its theology, interested Gökâlp.⁶⁷ It was thus no coincidence that Gökâlp adopted Durkheim's sociology, the "science of morality" above all, as one of the tripods of his synthesis, in which he tried to combine a solidaristic analytical model of society with a non-individualistic moral philosophy. Here, the principle of the communion of the self with a transcendental god in Islamic Sufism (*tasavvuf*) easily fitted into, or reinforced, the primacy of society over the individual in the solidaristic corporatist model. Gökâlp's emphasis, however, was on the latter; Sufism was a prop for solidarism, not the reverse. Also, as Turkism was compatible with international civilization, Islamic Sufism, which Gökâlp defined as an idealistic philosophy, was perfectly compatible with the Western idealist tradition. The result, on balance, was secular.

Gökâlp contended that orthodox Islam, like other religions, helped hold society together. He did not himself subscribe to orthodox Islam and did not defend Islam as the official religion of the state. Gökâlp undertook to study religions scientifically and comparatively and to make Islam a cornerstone of his normative system. Heyd correctly observed that "but for the anti-Islamic attitude of Atatürk, Gökâlp might have become the initiator of a fruitful scientific investigation of Islam in Turkey and perhaps even been the father of an interesting religious reform movement."⁶⁸

Gökâlp regarded Islam as a historical phenomenon subject to change and dependent on the social circumstances in which it developed. Following Durkheim, he considered religion as a symbolic expression of life and sought a rational explanation for the religious ceremonies of Islam. Although Gökâlp's early emotional and intellectual outlook was formed by religion, under the in-

fluence of Sufism and of rationalism, he did not subscribe to the dogma, politics, and ritual of orthodox Islam. What interested him was the meaning and the moral value of Sufism that might bind together the individuals of a society.

That Gökalp's Islam was an ethical system generally free from legal and political rules may be seen from the proposals he advanced to modernize orthodox Islam. He put forth a new theory of the Islamic canon law (*şariat*). He first distinguished two sources of the *şariat*: *nas* ("dogma"), the divine revelation contained in the Koran (the sacred book), and the *sünnet* (deeds and utterances of the prophet Muhammad); and *örf* or customary law, in which the collective conscience of the Muslim community was embodied. Like every custom, Islamic *örf* was modified to accord with changes in the social structure. Therefore *örf*, which includes *icma* ("consensus of the community") and *kıyas* ("analogy"), should be used to explain, and might replace, *nas*. Furthermore, Gökalp stated that almost all obligations of *nas* which referred to matters of this world were in fact derived from *örf* and that even the obligations based only on *nas* had to be harmonized with *örf* in order to be applicable in practice. In this way, Hevd argued, Gökalp reached the conclusion that with the exception of the personal relationship between man and God, all religious obligations depended for their sanction on the social conscience. This is nothing but a further secularization of an already ethical religion, bringing God and religious metaphysics down to earthly society, a position not much different from that of Auguste Comte's making society the God and sociology a secular religion. With Comte's works Gökalp had already become familiar before he discovered Durkheim. Whatever the merits of Gökalp's handling of the theological and social aspects of Islam according to orthodox Muslim jurists and theologians and, for that matter, the value of his revision of Islam, the thrust of his proposal is clear.⁷¹

Gökalp further urged the creation of a new branch of science to study the development of *örf* in different Muslim societies and to complement the traditional jurisprudence (*usul-ü fıkıh*), which centered on the obligations of Islam on *nas*. The new science in which theologians would cooperate with sociologists would be called *ictimai usul-ü fıkıh*, or "sociology of law."⁷²

In "Political Turkism" (1923)⁷³ Gökalp asserted that all remnants of theocracy and clericalism should be eliminated from the political sphere, securing for the state the prerogative of secular legislation. In accordance with the pluralism of his solidaristic corporatism, political and religious authorities, as distinct social units, would be mutually autonomous.⁷⁴ Such a conception led Gökalp to recommend the elimination of the office of the *Şeyhülislam* (the supreme *müftü*) from the structure of the secularized state. As the head of the *ulema*, the Şevhülislam was the highest authority on religious matters. He also sat in the cabinet to monitor the enactment of new laws and the new

decrees of the Sultan so as to assure their conformity (*terva*) with the canon law, Gökâlp also advised restricting the Şeyhülislam's authority to matters of belief and ceremonies (*ifta*) and transferring his legal authority (*kaza*) entirely to the state.⁷⁷ Gökâlp's package of proposed religious reforms included, along with the disestablishment of the office of the Şeyhülislam, the transfer of the administration of the religious courts to the Ministry of Justice and of the supervision of religious schools to the Ministry of Education, as well as the abolition of the Ministry of Pious Foundations (*evkaf*), which Gökâlp described as a state within state. The Unionist government (1908-1918) implemented some of these reforms even before the Kemalists came to power.⁷⁸

Under Unionist rule, Gökâlp expressed his antimonarchical feelings in poems and endorsed the abolition of the Sultanate and its separation from the Caliphate in 1922 in the opening years of Kemalist rule. Nor did he object to the abolition of the Caliphate in March 1924, shortly before his death. Much, however, has been made of Gökâlp's lack of explicit condemnation of the institution of the Caliphate. His critics used this as evidence for his religious communitarianism (*ummetçilik*) and thus for his alleged opposition to the nationalism (*milliyetçilik*) of the Kemalists as the driving principle of social and political organization. What led to such allegations, however incompatible with the universal acceptance of his credentials as the father of modern Turkish nationalism, was the position and reorganization Gökâlp tried to give to religion as a moral and cultural institution. He envisioned a religious organization on the national scale ranging from local mosques (*mesids*) headed by *imams* to large mosques (*cami-i kebirs*) in towns headed by *müftüs*, to a national office of head-*müftü* as the highest religious authority. The head-*müftüs* of all Islamic nations would select a caliph as the head of the entire Islamic community of nations. Such a religious organization, which resembled in structure the Roman Catholic Church, did not, however, in any way intersect with the secular political institutions of the nation. With its conferences and congresses, such an "ethical corporation" represented solely a spiritual authority. At any rate, this idea was not among the central tenets of Gökâlp's system, for his writings on the subject consisted of a few articles only, dating back to his second phase and progressively losing their strength.⁷⁹

One final point might be useful to show Gökâlp's handling of Islamic Sufism as a part of his idealistic philosophy and solidaristic model of society. In an article entitled "Muhiddini Arabî" (1911),⁸⁰ Gökâlp observed that, among Muslim thinkers, the one closest to present-day idealist philosophy was Muhiddini Arabî, who had given "rational expression" to the intuitive states which the Sufis reached through direct experience.

It is erroneous to equate Sufism with that school of thought called mysticism in Western philosophy. Sufism corresponds, in its general meaning, to idealism. Among the Sufis were those who represented different forms of idealism, and

among them there were those who were mystics. The term *tasavvuf* is a general term covering various doctrines which did not ascribe a real existence to the world of sensibles [phenomena?]. Some of the idealists reduced reality to ideas, some to sense experiences, and some to will. In Sufi doctrine these corresponded to what the Sufis themselves called stations (*makam*). When the Sufi denied the real existence of the world of sensibles, he formulated his idea by saying: 'The realm of existence is of the order of idea.' Those who remained at this stage of knowledge and did not go beyond were idealists.... But as the Sufi was a seeker after perfection, he could not remain at a fixed station. He sought continuous progress, continuous elevation... he discovered that the idea is a reproduction reflected from outside on consciousness, and that the objects which we perceive have an external source and become closed by the sensibility of our consciousness.... Those who remained at this station were sensationalists.... Sense experiences are the acts of expression and of contraction, which are the results of satisfaction and thwarting of the will. The will is the most absolute, the most real part of the being which, not content with existing perfections, strives to perceive and construct those perfections which ought to exist. Muhiddin calls these perfections inherent in things which ought to exist, the 'eternal essences.' These real goals of the will, which are real existents [noumena?], are the real motives and factors of universal evolution, of the universal apotheosis of perfection. He formulated this great truth by saying: 'The decree of divine providence on things takes place only according to the nature of those things.'

Gökalp contended that the three stages through which idealism passed in the history of modern Western philosophy "exactly" corresponded to these three "stations" of the Sufis. Berkeley and Kant represented the first and second stages; and recent philosophers such as Fouillé Guveau, Nietzsche and James, the final one.¹² These philosophers, according to Gökalp, declared that ideals are nothing but *idées-forces*, that beliefs and opinions are not mere passive ideas, but effective forces, creative or destructive.¹³ As to the moral content of this idealistic philosophy, it is clear that man, in his actions, should strive for the perfection of the "ought," conceived in a platonic-religious manner. This early formulation of Gökalp was later tempered by a sociological objectivity (see "The Synthesis"), the essential idealistic epistemology remaining intact.¹⁴

This is not the place to dwell on the theological subtleties of the article, for, although Sufism, and through it Islam, formed part of his early thinking and lay behind his social philosophy. Gökalp did not make much of it in his writings. In fact, the article is one of the very few instances where he explicitly elaborated upon this theme. Mainly, he sought to demonstrate the essential affinity of a secular moral philosophy and scientific social theory to Sufi philosophy and ethics. Islam thus constituted only one part of his general ethical system, in support of cultural Turkism. In any case, reacting against the materialistic-positivism of the turn of the century, Gökalp viewed the social function of religion as far more important than its theological aspect.

Modern European Corporatism

Gökalp wished to present his nationalistic and Sufi philosophy in a scientific garb. This opportunity he found in European corporatist social-political thought. When Gökalp introduced Westernism as the third element of his tripartite synthesis of Turkism, Islamism, and Modernism, he meant, beyond the scientific and technological accomplishments of Western capitalism, a particular brand of social-political thought, positivistic in methodology, and thus scientific, and idealistic in epistemology and underlying moral philosophy. The social-political theory and model of society and polity that characterized this school of thought was solidaristic corporatism, which rejected the liberal and the Marxist model.

It was no coincidence that among the European thinkers he had come to be familiar with, Gökalp acknowledged Emile Durkheim as his source of inspiration. Through most of what Gökalp wrote, runs Durkheim either verbatim or with slight changes here and there, except in a few respects. Gökalp was indebted to Durkheim not only for the latter's views but also for an introduction to the views of other European corporatist thinkers, with whose works he became acquainted through Durkheim. Foremost were the solidarist French economist Paul Cauwes, and the German economist Friedrich List, who preached protectionism. Their critiques of the liberal political economy and vision of an organicist "national" economy appealed to Gökalp no less than to Durkheim.

In the famous Preface to the second edition (1902) of his *Division of Labor in Society* (1893), Emile Durkheim prophetically wrote on "the role that occupational groups are destined to play in the contemporary social order."¹ From this document, which I consider to be the major manifesto of modern corporatism, I would like to quote at some length, for it should help place Gökalp's solidaristic corporatism in good perspective.

We repeatedly insist in the course of this book upon the state of juridical and moral anomy in which economic life actually is found. Indeed in the economic order, occupational ethics exist only in the most rudimentary state.... It is this anomic state that is the cause, as we shall show, of the incessantly recurrent conflicts, and the multifarious disorders of which the economic world exhibits so sad a spectacle.... From this, it follows that as the world is only feebly ruled by morality, the greatest part of their existence takes place outside the moral sphere. Now, for the sentiment of duty to be fixed strongly in us, the circumstances in which we live must keep us awake. Naturally, we are not inclined to thwart and restrain ourselves; if, then, we are not invited, at each moment, to exercise this restraint without which there is no ethic, how can we learn the habit? If in the task that occupies almost all our time we follow no other rule than that of our well understood interest, how can we learn to depend upon disinterestedness, on self-forgetfulness, on sacrifice? In this way, the absence of all economic discipline can-

not fail to extend its effects beyond the economic world, and consequently weaken public morality.

But, the evil observed, what is its cause and what can be its remedy?

In the body of this work, we have especially insisted upon showing that the division of labor cannot be held responsible, as is sometimes unjustly charged; that it does not necessarily produce dispersion and incoherence, but that functions, when they are sufficiently in contact with one another, tend to stabilize and regulate themselves. But this explanation is incomplete.... For anomy to end, there must then exist, or be formed, a group which can constitute the system of rules actually needed.... Neither political society, in its entirety, nor the State can take over this function: economic life, because it is specialized and grows more specialized every day, escapes their competence and their action. An occupational activity can be efficaciously regulated only by a group intimate enough with it to know its functioning, feel all its needs, and be able to follow all their variations. The only one that could answer all these conditions is the one formed by all the agents of the same industry, united and organized into a single body. This is what is called corporation or occupational group.

Now, in the economic order, the occupational group does not exist any more than occupational ethics. Since the eighteenth century *rightfully* suppressed the old corporations, only fragmentary and incomplete attempts have been made to bring them back with new foundations.... Since the market, formerly municipal, had become national and international, the corporation must assume the same extension. Instead of being limited only to the workers of a city, it must enlarge in such a way as to include all the members of the occupation scattered over the territory, for in whatever region they are found, whether they live in the city or the country, they are all solidary, and participate in a common life. Since this common life is, in certain respects, independent of all territorial determinations, the appropriate organ must be created that expresses and regularizes its function. Because of these dimensions, such an organ would necessarily be in direct contact with the central organ of the collective life, for the rather important events which interest a whole category of industrial enterprises in a country necessarily have very general repercussions of which the State cannot fail to take cognizance; hence it intervenes. Thus, it is not without reason that royal power tended instinctively not to allow great industry outside its control when it did appear. It was impossible for it not to be interested in a form of activity which, by its very nature, can always affect all society. But this regulatory action, if it is necessary, must not degenerate into narrow subordination, as happened in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The two related organs must remain distinct and autonomous: each of them has its function, which it alone can take care of. If the function of making general principles of industrial legislation belongs to the governmental assemblies, they are incapable of diversifying them according to the different industries.... There is even reason to suppose that the corporation will become the foundation of one of the essential bases of our political organization. We have seen indeed, that if it first begins by being outside the social system, it tends to fix itself in it in proportion to the development of economic life. It is, therefore, just to say that if progress continues to be made in this direction, it will have to take a more prominent and more predominant place in society. It was formerly the elementary division of communal organization. Now that the communal heretofore an autonomous organism, has lost its place in the State, as the

municipal market did in the national market, is it not fair to suppose that the corporation also will have to experience a corresponding transformation, becoming the elementary division of the State, the fundamental political unity? Society, instead of remaining what it is today, an aggregate of juxtaposed territorial districts, would become a vast system of national corporations. From various quarters it is asked that elective assemblies be formed by occupations, and not by territorial divisions; and certainly, in this way, political assemblies would more exactly express the diversity of social interests and their relations. They would be a more faithful picture of social life in its entirety. But to say that the nation, in becoming aware of itself, must be grouped into occupations,—does not this mean that the organized occupation or corporation should be the essential organ of public life?... Thus the great gap in the structure of European societies we elsewhere point to would be filled.... A society composed of an infinite number of unorganized individuals that a hypertrophied State is forced to oppress and contain constitutes a veritable sociological monstrosity. For collective activity is always too complex to be able to be expressed through the single and unique organ of the State. Moreover, the State is too remote from individuals; its relations with them too external and intermittent to penetrate deeply into individual consciences and socialize them within. Where the State is the only environment in which men can live communal lives, they inevitably lose contact, become detached, and thus society disintegrates. A nation can be maintained only if, between the State and the individual, there is intercalated a whole series of secondary groups near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their sphere of action and drag them, in this way, into the general torrent of social life. We have just shown how occupational groups are suited to fill this role, and that is their destiny.¹⁶

The worldview and the theory contained in these lines run through Gökalp's work as the third, scientific component of his tripartite synthesis. Before turning in the next section to that synthesis, however, a brief explanation is in order of how I view corporatism myself.

Corporatism is a system of thought and a set of institutions that presuppose a predominantly capitalist mode of production with its central elements of the primacy of private property and enterprise. Corporatism is, by definition, anti-socialist and anti-Marxist. It is also anti-liberal (in philosophy, politics, and economics), but not anti-capitalist. Therefore, designations such as "left-corporatism" and "liberal-corporatism" are clearly contradictions in terms, although more populist (only in that sense left) and more tolerant and pluralist (only in that sense liberal) forms of corporatism may be spoken of, whereby the terms "left" and "liberal" are used in non-technical senses. As a matter of fact, corporatism, the genus (explicitly baptized as a "tertium genus" first by inter-war European corporatist theoreticians), has two main species: solidaristic corporatism or solidarism and fascistic corporatism or fascism—the former still bearing certain residual tenets of political and cultural liberalism as particular ideals, but rejecting liberalism as a holistic model of economic, social, and political organization. In my usage, neither solidarism nor fascism constitutes a "third way" between, or a synthesis of, capitalism and socialism, as almost all corporatist theoreticians and

ideologues as well as some political scientists have asserted. Corporatism, with its solidaristic and fascistic variants, is but a derivative of the "first way", i.e., capitalism, and it is a category at the same abstraction level as liberalism, or liberal capitalism, and socialism, or Marxist socialism—replacing the former as the supersedent rationale of modern capitalism.

I view the emergence or accentuation of corporatist theories and practices as consequent upon "crises of capitalism" and delineate two such crises: the accumulation crisis and the distribution crisis. The former may be observed in delayed capitalism where the corporatist formula serves economic development of a particular kind by providing a disciplined labor force for accelerated private capital accumulation under the protection of neo-mercantilist policies of a state capitalism. The latter may be observed in advanced industrial capitalism, where the corporatist formula serves containment of class polarization between a numerically and organizationally advanced labor and a monopolistic capital, under perceived or actual threat of the former. In either context, the corporatist variant may take either solidaristic or fascistic dimension depending on the specific nature and intensity of the crisis, and on secondary, intervening variables such as the social organization, class balance, political culture, and institutional traditions of a particular country. Thus, I do not assume a one-to-one correspondence between fascism and monopoly capital, as do some of the Marxist analyses; neither do I imply a linear transition from solidarism to fascism.

Corporatism, as I understand the phenomenon, is a system of thought and action which has three distinct referents or levels, logically interrelated, but not necessarily so in practice. Corporatism is (1) a philosophy-ideology about a model of society and economy, (2) a set of economic and class policies and actual procedures for conducting representation of interests, (3) a particular form of political institutionalization and authoritative decision-making.

Manifestation of corporatism at the second and third levels is a presumption of allegiance to a particular model of society and economy at the first level, whether that is consciously and theoretically articulated or not, for (2) and (3) axiomatically derive from (1). But it is not always the case that corporatism is simultaneously manifest at all three levels, hence fully crystallized and readily recognizable. It may be that we have indications of the second and only partial materialization of the third levels, but no subjective expression and formulation, yet, of the first. Furthermore, both partially and fully unfolded forms of corporatism can have the more pluralistic and libertarian solidaristic and the more totalitarian and autocratic fascistic variants.

Corporatism as a model and philosophy of society, then, may be expressed in the form of a well-formulated, programmatic political ideology, or it may remain as a loose worldview. At another level, or dimension, corporatism is a system of actual practices and policies that are the result of, or in conformity

with, such a worldview or ideology. At a third level or dimension, corporatism, beyond the *de facto* manifestations of the second level, unfolds in *de jure* manner as tangible political institutions and legal structures.

As far as a particular theoretical construction of corporatism is concerned, all these levels may be comprehended and specified, or such a theory may encompass only one or two of these levels. In practice, corporatist elements may be present at all these three levels or, as the case may be, they may be manifest at only one or two levels and latent at the other(s). In particular corporatist theories or systems, thus, a state of closure or full unfolding of all these dimensions may obtain, or there may be only a partial development.

As a model of society and economy, corporatism sees society as an organic and harmonious whole consisting of mutually interdependent and functionally complementary parts. The major units, the molecules of society, are the occupational groups and their organizations, that is, corporations. As opposed to the Individual as the main unit, or primary category—in its analytic and normative aspects—in the liberal model of society, and as opposed to the social Class in the Marxist model of society, the corporatist model views the individualism of the former as unintendedly atomistic and consequently disruptive of the equilibrium and survival of the social organism; it views the struggle and warfare, if not the sheer presence, of classes in the latter as detrimental to the maintenance of a particular kind of social system. Corporatism, thus, borrows the Marxist critique of the liberal model of capitalist society as inherently anarchic but, substituting the corporation for the class, tries to bring a harmonizing rationale to capitalist society, repelling and refuting the Marxist critique in the end.

In the corporatist model, society is not, as in the liberal paradigm, the mere total of individuals, and the public interest does not result—through the invisibly regulatory workings of the market mechanism—from individuals' preferably enlightened pursuit of their egoistic interests. In the corporatist model, the sum is greater than the numerical total of individuals; it has its own reality and prerogatives vis-à-vis individuals. Individuals' pursuit of their interests, as well as their private property and enterprise, are considered legitimate insofar as they serve social solidarity and do not violate the public interest—an entity on its own merits. In other words, corporatism, by defending the long-term survival of general, total capital(ism), furnishes the capitalist society with a higher rationale, definitely superseding the previous liberal rationale, which could only justify the narrow short-term interests of individual, private capital(ism)s. The profit-maximization logic of capitalism, in its competitive phase has been subordinated to, but not displaced by, another higher logic of capitalism, the logic of system-maintenance, in its post-competitive, monopolistic phase—be it in advanced industrial or neo-mercantilist, statist contexts.

Corporatism at the second, *de facto* level, as a series of coherent procedures and policies which are derivatives of the first, involves distinct practices in the process of interest representation—not individual, not class, but corporate interest representation either outright by corporations or by interest groups organized on a corporate basis—and distinct governmental, economic, and class policies, often but not necessarily accompanied by non-governmental decision-making bodies such as economic councils or a miscellany of statist and mixed-economy structures. As distinct from even the highest dosages of state regulation and intervention in the economy by the state in the liberal model, in which the economy and the state remain separate and the former primary, in all forms and dosages of statism, or etatism, in the corporatist model, the distinction between the state and the economy is blurred, or the two are inextricably linked. In some cases (i.e., the fascist variant), state and politics become supreme over the economy, not to mention the society. In corporatist étatism, the state not only encourages and advises the economy; it directs, supervises, and manages the economy and assumes the role of arbitrator between labor and capital, between employer and employee, frequently legislating against both strikes and lock-outs.

Corporatism, in theory and practice, as a model of political and legal organization, too, has distinct traits. In the liberal paradigm, the main unit of political activity is the individual, with his legal prerogatives against the state; the main mechanisms of interest articulation and aggregation are the groups and political parties. The groups may be latent or organized, which by definition actualizes when separate individual interests coincide for a period of time and dissolve when the common goal is achieved or ceases to obtain. The accompanying major structure in the liberal model, through which the articulated and aggregated interests are transformed into authoritative, central political decisions, is the institution of parliament. Supremacy of the parliament, elected according to the territorial principle and functioning according to the majority principle and to the principle of electoral mandate given to the government-party for the duration of its term, is axiomatic in the liberal model. This is the principle of the primacy of the legislature or the principle of "parliamentary legitimacy."

In the corporatist paradigm, by contrast, the major units of political activity and organization are not the atomistic individuals and the changeable groups, but the well-defined, constant occupational groups, whose relation to the state is pre-determined through legal or *de facto* structures. Accordingly, the major mechanism of interest articulation and aggregation is not the group and the political party, but the corporative organization (in a variety of forms), which may totally replace or coexist with the latter. The major mechanism of central political decision-making, the governmental structure within which corporations or corporately organized interest groups and the

stem meet, is either a parliament which is elected, not according to the territorial principle but to the corporative principle of functional representation, or outright corporative councils organized in pyramidal form, which displace the institution of parliament. Subspecies of the corporatist model are possible where there may exist a single corporative chamber (pure constitutional corporatism), or a combination of corporatively and territorially elected chambers (mixed constitutional corporatism), the weights of which may change. Finally, corporatism may co-exist with, without totally replacing, the political party system, which has now become subordinate.

Corporations, with their relative monopoly in the political representation of interests, may or may not be singular at all levels, merging employees and employers in a certain occupational sector (the number of categories differs according to the particular corporative scheme), but they must be so at the national level if a corporative organization has crystallized beyond looser corporatist arrangements and structures.

"Corporatism" is thus a larger category than "corporative state" or, for that matter, "corporation"ism, and certainly not co-terminous with "fascism," with which the last two have often been identified, as "corporatism" has been with "fascism." A corporatist ideology, or *de facto* corporatism, or *de jure* corporatism (full or partial) may exist both in the fascistic and solidaristic variants of corporatism. It is only a historical coincidence that the first implementations of "corporative state" in its near-full crystallization have been observed in the classical fascist countries of interbellum Europe, whereas it is theoretically possible even for a fully corporative state to be solidaristic and not fascist.¹¹ Reduction of corporatism to fascism, until very recently, has obscured appreciation not only for the non-fascistic but certainly corporatist (i.e., solidaristic corporatist) elements in the post-World War II advanced capitalist societies, where liberalism has ceased to be the dominant paradigm, though surviving in the form of certain political institutions which are no longer the real foci of decision-making and as a residual ideology lagging behind the actual state of affairs,¹² but also for the corporatist formations, of both solidaristic and fascistic variety, in the non-industrial world before and after the Second World War.¹³ In short, corporatism and fascism should not be identified. Otherwise, post-war and pre-war, western and third-world, solidaristic corporatism would be lost to sight.¹⁴

Finally, to speak of political corporatism, it is not a necessary, although obviously a sufficient, condition that constitutional corporatism should exist. Even in a system where it has not crystallized at the constitutional level, corporatism may exist at other levels of political institutionalization, which again may or may not find its expression in sub-constitutional laws, statutes. Relatedly, corporatist arrangements may or may not include, *de facto* or *de jure*, all occupational organizations or sectors in the system of interest

representation and central political decision-making. Exclusion or prohibition may be effected informally, or semi-legally by not according "public association" status, or by outright legal elimination. (Of course, the differential weight that specific occupational organizations may carry even in the most inclusive form of corporatism has primarily to do with the existing class structure of a particular country.)

There may also be cases where corporatist political structures are not accorded constitutional or sub-constitutional legal status, but where the main mechanism of political decision-making, despite preservation of parties and parliaments, rests elsewhere and does not function according to the axiom of parliamentary legitimacy or supremacy. The party-government may be taking its decisions not on the strength of its electoral mandate as in the liberal model of representative parliamentary democracy, but by seeking the prior approval of organized interest groups formally represented or informally effective in extra-governmental, deliberative or bargaining councils and structures. This process may manifest itself, especially in times of "crises of democracy" (i.e., liberal parliamentary democracy), in political and juridical theories and practices of the "executive supremacy" or "executive legitimacy." Or it may take place, all the same, without such accompanying political-legal justification, in countries of long-established, but now actually *passé*, liberal parliamentary democracy, where corporatism at the first level is not forthcoming to complement the actual practice. Hence, the creeping corporatism in that country, less readily visible because of such a lack of closure.

What distinguishes the solidaristic and fascistic variants of corporatism is essentially the different ways in which they postulate the interrelationship between the Individual, the Society, and the State. They both reject the primary categories of Individual and Class of liberal and Marxist models, respectively, and take the occupational group (or organized interest groups fundamentally based on the occupational principle) as the main unit of social organization and political activity. But the fascistic variant assimilates the Society and therefore the Individual, at least in theory, within a rather metaphysicalized corporative State ("Everything within the state, nothing outside the state"), and sees the occupational groups and the corporations as the public organs of the State to control and dominate the civil Society, transmitting to the latter orders of the State concerning the duties and obligations of Individuals who have no prior rights vis-a-vis the State, as in the liberal legal and political model.

By contrast, in the solidaristic variant, occupational groups and their corporations serve as a buffer between the Individual and the State. While imbuing with public-spiritedness the otherwise egoistical Individuals, they also check and restrain the State from encroaching upon the autonomous jurisdictional domain of respective corporations that are the molecules of civil Society.

ty, thereby also protecting the rights of Individuals. In solidaristic political theory and jurisprudence, Individuals still have rights, if limited compared to the liberal model, as well as obligations to the Society in the interest of solidarity. In the solidaristic variant, the State is but a regulatory and coordinating institution, with jurisdiction primarily in the intercorporational domain. The reason for this basic difference between the two species of corporatism is that fascism attempts to transcend the liberal model by radical negation, while solidarism tries to transcend it by modification, retaining certain political and cultural "ideals" of liberalism.

It is in these terms that Gökalp's solidaristic corporatism is to be examined in the present study, with reference to other corporatist cultural and institutional structures in the single-party period and in contemporary Turkey, where pressing objective conditions and certain ideological developments may well prove conducive to an unfolding of the fascistic variant—representing a movement further away from political liberalism as an ideal, even if residual, in the Turkish cultural and institutional legacy.

The Synthesis: Social Idealism

In the preceding sections, I have discussed Gökalp's nationalism and Islamism and suggested that the two were not incompatible with a specific brand of Western theoretical thinking, if backed by a suitable social and moral philosophy. I have also suggested that Gökalp does not consider Turkism and Islamism antithetical to Western capitalism, provided that the latter be effectively freed from its atomistic individualism and anarchic economic organization. Precisely such a critique of liberalism is offered by solidaristic corporatist thinking, and Gökalp adopts it as the third component of his system, in fact as the "scientific" basis for the first two. Gökalp thus arrives at a reformed model of capitalist society with appropriate institutions and scientifically advancing under moral guidance. Such a model contains a set of methodological and epistemological attributes which I shall now elaborate so as to present a fuller picture of Gökalp's synthesis of Turkism-Islamism-Modernism (Westernism).

Given Gökalp's penchant for preserving the link between theory and practice, between science and society, it is no coincidence that he expounded his methodological premises in a series of articles entitled "Debates on Education" (1917).⁹¹ Education, in his view, was applied sociology and the most important social institution.

According to Gökalp, social science began with Durkheim because he was the first to study social facts empirically as a distinct category of reality, as in other positive sciences. Before Durkheim, Gökalp claimed, sociology served as a branch of philosophy or biology or psychology.⁹² According to Gökalp (and Durkheim), the basic unit of analysis in studying social phenomena is

collective representations, the major form of which is collective conscience, comprising ideas, culture and value judgments shared by members of a society, and to be studied as the primary social facts. Collective conscience consists, although not solely, of individual consciousnesses but has an actuality independent of them, in accordance with Durkheim's principle that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts and has its own reality.⁶¹

Gökalp critically reviews alternative approaches to the study of social ideas (or of the normative sub-system, if we are to use a Parsonian term). According to "spiritualists," collective conscience is a metaphysical entity unrelated to individual consciousnesses, providentially descended upon them. Equally wrong is the "sensationalist-empiricist" approach that views collective conscience as a total of individual consciousnesses without autonomous existence from them because, for Gökalp, although it consists of, but is not solely constituted by, them, it has a separate reality of its own. He also emphatically rejects the criticism of Durkheim's conception of collective conscience as something metaphysical, mystic, and pantheistic by those whom we may call behavioralists and methodological individualists.⁶²

Gökalp also takes issue with LeBon's concept of "collective emotions" as inherent in the essence of a race's character, and calls this "racial psychology," not sociology. Similarly, he questions Tarde's notion of collective behavior as generated by individuals and diffused through a process of imitation, and calls this "interpsychology," not sociology. For him, collective conscience is a social reality distinct from biological and individual-psychological phenomena. It is a system of directly perceivable and empirically observable representations.⁶³ He goes on to say that the behaviorist approach cannot explain the "quantitative difference" between collective and individual consciousness and collective conscience, let alone their qualitative difference, for there is an entirely new quality in the collective conscience which we can express only by terms such as "value judgments," "ideals," or "the sacred."⁶⁴

According to Gökalp, in studying social customs latent in the collective conscience and social institutions which are manifestations of the collective conscience, Durkheim does not reduce these social facts to any other irreducible reality. While monistic "materialists" reduce everything to physical matter and mechanics, monistic "idealists" reduce everything to morality and religion. Scientific sociology, by contrast, is "pluralist" in that it recognizes the independent reality of all phenomena and does not reduce social reality to theology, as it does not reduce it to biology or individual psychology.⁶⁵

Gökalp also rejects the view that Durkheim's system is organicist. Durkheim does not reduce society to an organism but offers an analogy at best, unlike Spencer and Worms. That an organicist opponent of Durkheim like Worms considers him a metaphysicist is evidence of this, Gökalp adds.⁶⁶

Gökalp's definition of sociology as a scientific discipline involves viewing it not only as a science of society but also as a science for society, whose findings are to be applied so as to ensure a healthy society. As for the social function of education, this is to socialize individuals and make them internalize the moral and cultural norms embedded in the national collective conscience. As a matter of fact, an "individual person" becomes a "social person," thereby attaining a richer "personality" through education.⁹⁹ This insistence of Gökalp on the socializing function of a national education has led to certain imputations of advocacy on the part of Gökalp of a normative system that would be homogenizing, and therefore suppressive of free individual development vis-à-vis socially imposed values. But such imputations are unfounded, given Gökalp's preoccupation with pluralism in the educational and cultural spheres and their absolute autonomy from the state in particular. Furthermore, if a non-social development of human beings is not full development, free individual development does not imply freedom from society with the proviso that the state does not interfere and alternatives are considered in the cultural field.

As a matter of fact, in a later series of articles entitled the "Question of Education" (1918),¹⁰⁰ after defining education as "socialization of individuals by the society", Gökalp states that this is a "prerequisite for the survival of society,"¹⁰¹ much like the functional prerequisites of contemporary structural functionalists. Also, he says that individuals are socialized into society not directly and naturally as Spencer argues, but indirectly through social and educational institutions that are the manifestations of the collective conscience.¹⁰²

All this is based on a certain assumption that Gökalp makes on the perfectibility of human nature through a process of improving society and its institutions. Gökalp is not unsympathetic to Rousseau's notion that men were good in the state of nature only to be corrupted by society and civilization. While Rousseau puts the matter simply as one between nature and society, Gökalp in a sense socializes Rousseau by showing how the tension between nature and society can be removed by setting manifest institutions (of civil society) against latent norms (in the collective conscience).¹⁰³ Thus, Gökalp is more optimistic than Rousseau, and his efforts to ground individual personality and its development in the collective conscience and to socialize education are not to be understood as a propensity to absorb the individual in the society, or to impose a general will on individuals. It is only that Gökalp's politics are not liberal in the strict sense of atomistic individualism, just as his sociology is not one based on methodological individualism (see below). Gökalp does not counterpose the individual against the society; he sees society as the prerequisite for the unfolding of full, that is, social development of personality.

As Gökalp takes ideas as primary social data, be they judgments of value or fact, that is, affective or cognitive ideational norms, his methodology is positivistic, but his epistemology is idealistic. In studying social ideas, Gökalp neither employs a reductionism to individual psychology—he criticized Bergson's intuitionism for that—nor advocates the sort of *Verstehen*, or emphatic understanding, used by methodological individualists. What Gökalp does is to look into the meaning of collective ideas as cardinal social institutions, by further differentiating between underlying (*müntesir*) social customs (*örf*) and organized (*müteazzî*) social institutions (*müessesese*).¹⁰⁴ Several implications follow from this approach. One is that Gökalp employs a sort of sociological *Verstehen* in which the subjective meaning system to be understood from within is not that of an individual actor but that of a historically specific social collectivity. The other is that Gökalp does not take meaning systems and normative systems, whether crystallized into tangible social institutions or not, as immutable and unquestionable facts, as a hard-core Comtean positivist or a legal positivist would do, for example. By differentiating latent custom from manifest institution, Gökalp opens the way for the critique of the status quo in cases where it does not conform to the essence of national culture.¹⁰⁵

A final implication that follows from Gökalp's approach is that he treats ideas not voluntaristically, i.e., in the Fouillérian sense of idea-forces, but recognizes their force of determination to the extent that they are grounded in objective social conditions.

Gökalp first criticizes Bergson for not differentiating between intuition and concept, preempting any probable charge of irrational vitalistic philosophical propensities to which Bergson was to be subjected. He then affirmatively cites Kant's maxim that concept without intuition is empty, and intuition without concept is blind. Similarly, he affirms Boutroux's stipulation that scientific knowledge is possible only when intuition and concept are combined, for intuition without concept is a psychological state which can even be called pure emotion—certainly a form of reality in itself that can be studied, but definitely not a sociological datum, for it has no mental meaning for others unless put in an intersubjectively understandable concept.¹⁰⁶ In short, subjective understanding should be elevated to the status of objective precision.

Thus, Gökalp transforms the materialistic epistemology of the positivist tradition into an idealistic epistemology, and combines it with the positivistic methodology of the positivist tradition which he preserves. And using his positivistic idealism, or social or realistic idealism, Gökalp tries to bridge the distance between theory and practice.

Although Gökalp affirmatively cites Kant's "ought implies can" as one of the bases of his social idealism, Kant's categorical imperative is admittedly subjective and individualistic. Despite what Gökalp reads into Kant's "ought

implies can." the relationship in Kant's system between theory and practice remains a dualism, at least in the realm of politics and collective social behavior. As for Durkheim's idealistic positivism, to which Gökalp always took pains not to underestimate his indebtedness, Durkheim never put forth an explicit philosophical theory of idealistic activism, which, however, was implicit in his studiously empiricist analytic theory. In these terms, Gökalp, with his philosophy and theory of social idealism, overcomes both the dualism in Kant and the arrested unification of theory and practice in Durkheim."

It is thus that Gökalp tries to bridge the subjective and the objective, the ideal and the actual, the "is" and the "ought", both sides being however treated as social phenomena that can be studied sociologically, the former as possibility, the latter as potentiality. Durkheim and Gökalp are in the Comtean positivist tradition, but not in its epistemologically materialistic offspring that was common in Europe around the turn of the century. While Gökalp moved away from positivism to idealism in his epistemology, he moved away from idealism to positivism in his methodology in the sense that, for the realization of ideals, he tried to take account of social conditions. Gökalp represents, like Durkheim, an attempt at a synthesis of positivist and idealist traditions, the starting point being the former, but the resultant system being more idealistic than positivistic. Since epistemology has greater determining force than methodology, the term to characterize Gökalp's system should be "positivistic idealism" and not vice versa, although these may have been used interchangeably in parts of this study. In this formulation, positivism stands in a qualifying, adjectival position with respect to idealism. Thus, in a sense, Gökalp goes further than the Kantian dualism and the Hegelian idealist dialectic in offering, with whatever success, a sort of dialectical "social idealism"—which of course was also distinct from Marx's historical materialism (for Gökalp's starting point is norms, not real relations), not to mention the dialectical materialism of economic variants of Marxism.

Gökalp devoted an article to Marxism and compared it with Durkheim's sociology and his own social idealism. In "Historical Materialism and Social Idealism" (1923),¹¹ Gökalp states that in the explanation of social phenomena there are two systems of sociology, which are "both convergent and divergent"—systems founded by Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim. At the outset, these are similar in that they accept the premise that social phenomena are subject to causal laws like material, biological, and psychological phenomena. Here Gökalp does not make any naturalistic epistemological assumptions but merely means cause and effect and "determinism."¹² But after this point, these two systems diverge according to Gökalp, for Marx brings in a kind of "monopoly" in determinism. The "privilege" of being a cause is reserved exclusively for economic phenomena; other social phenomena such as religion, morality, aesthetics, politics, language, mental

phenomena can only be effects, that is, epiphenomena, and cannot exert any effect on others. After giving a mechanistic and highly economic interpretation of Marxism, Gökalp states that in Durkheim's sociology, there is no such causal monopoly. All kinds of social phenomena are "realities" in their own right and can be causes of other social phenomena, as can economic phenomena.¹¹³ It is not that Durkheim rejects the importance of economic phenomena. On the contrary, it is he, according to Gökalp, who has stressed the increasing importance in modern societies of the economy's becoming the foundation (esas) of social structure.¹¹⁴

Gökalp, not recognizing his own contradiction, proceeds to expound Durkheim on this point. In primitive societies, he says, there is only mechanical solidarity, which derives merely from the collective conscience of segments; while in developed societies, there is in addition organic solidarity which derives from the increased division of labor and occupational interdependence—in the parlance of contemporary structural-functional schools, social differentiation and functional specialization. Gökalp goes on to say that division of labor is the "foundation" of economic life. In modern societies, religious, political, scientific, aesthetic, and economic groups are specialized occupational groups generated by increased division of labor.¹¹⁵

Nevertheless, Gökalp adds, Durkheim "reduces" all social phenomena to a "single origin," to collective representation. (Had Gökalp said nothing about causal monopoly in Marxism on the one hand, and about the significance of economics and division of labor in Durkheim on the other, this would have been entirely consistent with his positivistic idealism.) To continue with Gökalp's subjective meaning, let us see an illustration, rather than an explanation, he offers to substantiate his argument. Before 1908, he says, there were workers in Turkey, but since in the collective conscience of these workers there was no idea of their constituting a working class, there was, therefore, no working class in Turkey.¹¹⁶ In terms very close to Marx's "class in itself" and "class for itself," Gökalp thus furnished a proof of his insufficient knowledge of Marxism.¹¹⁷

Gökalp, in "Towards Economics" (1922)¹¹⁸, repeats the same idea that "the economy is the foundation of other social activities."¹¹⁹ Thus Gökalp, very much like Durkheim, while arguing the case of causal "pluralism" as opposed to "idealistic" and "materialistic" monism,¹²⁰ in fact boxes himself into a dualism, whereby he attributes causal primacy, if not monopoly, to ideas (culture and ideals) in one place, and assigns fundamental determinism to the economy (or division of labor) in another. But then, this is the classical impasse of all positivistic idealists who aim at refuting an economically interpreted historical materialism by trying to keep up with Marx's own positivism through their essentially reluctant emphasis on the economy.

Gökalp is not totally unaware of the problem involved here. After reiterating the importance of the economy with reference to the development of division of labor and, therefore, of social differentiation and functional specialization, concerning not only occupational groups directly involved in production but also fields of specialization such as science, arts, and philosophy which are dependent on social-economic surplus to finance such leisurely activities,¹²¹ Gökalp confronts Marx and Marxists in the following way:

Had the truth (the importance of economy) not been overemphasized, nobody would have declined to accept it. But Karl Marx and his followers formed an extreme school of thought out of historical materialism.... The essence of historical materialism is but a plain and simple truth which shows the importance of economic phenomena.¹²²

Gökalp's aversion to Marxism is related less to its methodology than to its model of society, analytically and philosophically. As we shall see, the Marxist model of an inherently conflictual society and Marx's theory of class conflict and revolution are anathema to Gökalp, who, like all corporatist thinkers, postulates and envisions a harmonious society in which there is no conflict of interest and warfare between classes, but in which social peace obtains between the occupational groups that are the functionally interdependent and mutually complementary organs of the social organism.

Before turning in the next chapter to Gökalp's model of society and to his major categories in the analysis of the sociological bases of politics, there is one last point which reveals his method and philosophy of social idealism: the nature and function of the science of sociology.

As early as 1909, before he became acquainted with Durkheim's works, Gökalp was already considering sociology as both a scientific discipline that tries to understand the major mechanism of the social process and as a scientific (scientistic may be a better word) method that could, and should, be applied to the solution of social problems according to the dictates of ideals. In an article on the "Science of Sociology" (1909),¹²³ Gökalp defined the function of sociology as that of:

criticizing and eliminating [those] unsound opinions and institutions caused by the conflicts among linguistic, ethnic, religious, and occupational groups, and replacing these with correct and healthy opinions, thus ending all contradictions.... [The science of sociology] rightly diagnoses social maladies, providing remedial means and effective measures required for the health of the national body.¹²⁴

Gökalp's political and social theory is thus at once explicitly analytic and reformist; indeed, he thought that the two went together perfectly well. That there may be frictions never occurred to him.¹²⁵

CHAPTER FIVE

SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS

The "Ideal"

Two years after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, Gökalp wrote an article on "New Life and New Values" (1910),¹ in which he first formulated his notion of the "ideal." He said that the "political revolution" of 1908 was brought about as a result of widespread "idea-forces" (*kuvvet fikir*) such as liberty, equality, and brotherhood. But awaiting the nation was the second and the more difficult task of "social revolution," which cannot occur by "mechanical action" but only by "organic evolution," meaning diffusion of idea-forces into, and their acceptance by, the collective conscience and then transformation into "opinion-forces" (*kuvvet his*). Gökalp added, "acceptance and rejection of ideas is within the [capacity of] rational will. Opinions cannot be transformed easily, for they are reflections of centuries-long social habits."²

According to Gökalp, ideals which will help establish new values in all spheres of social life are not static utopias in the minds of theorists but are subject to change conditioned by time and realities.³ The new life does have a "method," but that very method stipulates that ideals should not be predetermined, dogmatic values—hence its appeal and conduciveness to progress.⁴ It is in this socially realistic and, therefore, non-voluntaristic, idealistic vein that Gökalp posits the "ideal."

In the "Ideal" (1912),⁵ Gökalp defines and explains his notion of the ideal further. In times of great catastrophes and dangers in the life of nations, individual aspirations and personalities become subordinated to an all-embracing national ideal. The spirit and heart of all individuals begin to beat in a "national personality" in such periods of social crisis and political turmoil; individual wills become silent; a general will resides in all consciences. Egoists are transformed into altruists, cowards into heroes, and self-interest is sacrificed to national interest. After the crisis has abated, the national ideals do not fade out, but continue to mature in and improve all social institutions. The ideal, the highest form of which is nationalism (national independence, national development, national solidarity, and the like), is a social phenomenon in the sense that its genesis is rooted in social circumstances, i.e., crises, and its development requires rooting in the collective conscience. There is no such thing as "individuals with ideals"; there can only be a collectivity with an ideal.⁶

Gökalp explains that the ideal, initially in the form of opinion (*örf*), subsequently becomes law (*kanun*), that is, both officially codified and institu-

nonalized.³ Ideal (*mefkûre*) is idea (*fikir*) socialized. Furthermore, ideal is not an "unlived dream" or "goal," nor a "to-be-realized" "desire" or "wish." It is a lived reality, a psychological and mental state—a collectively shared one to be sure—giving "enthusiasm" (*vecd*) to all. It is a "reality of the past," an "educator of the present" and "creator of the future"; an ideational thrust coming from the past and pushing toward the future.⁴ All this is obviously idealistic, but not voluntaristic since it requires a foundation in social reality beyond individual volition. For Gökalp follows Durkheim's premise that all collective ideas are a result of structural changes in the society, and are amenable to scientific study by the positivist methodology. The emotive element surrounding the ideal, or ideals, is a manifestation of its being social, and it certainly does not involve any irrationalist element, as is the case with certain anti-rationalist and even belligerent fascist theories of mass psychology.

In a series of articles he wrote in 1924, Gökalp elaborates upon his notion of the ideal further. In "Goals and Ideals," he criticizes Victor Hugo's statement that "ideals crumble down when they touch reality" and Alfred Fouillée's assertion that "all ideals ultimately become reality." In "Ideal," he also writes that the ideal is a moral panacea for individual and social maladies.⁵ In the same vein, he writes in "Hope" that the duty of the philosopher is to give his nation a "philosophy of hope," while that of the scientist is to discover a "law of hope," describing his own principal life-time effort as one of "founding a philosophy of hope based on reality."⁶ Rejecting Nietzsche's argument that real revolution is a revolution of values, Gökalp argues that real revolution is a revolution of ideals, which in turn gives way to a revolution of values and then to a revolution of institutions.⁷ He also says that "irrational hope is better than rational despair" and that "moral forces are stronger than material forces."⁸ These slogan-like simplifications, however, should be read with reservation, keeping in mind the distinction I have been drawing between Gökalp's theory and myth.⁹

In an autobiographic article entitled "An Unknown Philosopher" (1924),¹⁰ Gökalp, in a sense, wrote his own "testament." The "unknown philosopher," with whom Gökalp is supposed to converse, portrays himself as an individual who has (social) ideals but is not necessarily an active participant in a mass gathering. In terms reminiscent of Rousseau, the philosopher says that a man may be distant from human beings, yet he may not be remote from human concerns. Without establishing actual relations with other individuals, he can partake in the affairs of humanity and fulfill his social obligations. "Human beings usually abandon humanity and take up passionate and heated struggles. But passion and excitement agonizes me. I wish to lead a life of constant tranquillity and enthusiasm,"¹¹ says the unknown philosopher to Gökalp. Here we have an intimation of an autobiographic

disposition, but also a statement of the general principle that a man of ideals as well as a man of science should be dispassionate, but not detached, even in his idealistic social activism. For Gökalp, theory and reason, by definition, are at least as important as practice and emotion, the two always being in a dialectical relationship.

The social "ideal," i.e., the supreme ideal of nationalism according to Gökalp is the "self-knowledge of society," that is, the transformation of latent norms embedded in the popular collective conscience into manifest ideals in the collective consciousness. "Essentially an ideal is the actualization of the existence of a social group by its members." The terminology may seem that of Hegelian idealism, but the epistemology is not, for Gökalp adds that "...ideals are the product of historical disturbances and social crises,"¹⁷ that is, we may add, not of the unfolding of spirit or reason independent of social conditions.

As this is true for the national group and the ideal of nationalism, it is also true, by extension, for other social groups and their ideals. The principle of a social collectivity attaining its own consciousness, or in Hegelian terms the object becoming the subject, but socially and collectively, remains unchanged.

The supreme ideal, or "the ideal", for Gökalp is the ideal of nationalism. But there are other social ideals, too. We have already seen the nature and characteristics of the ideal of nationalism. Before turning in the next section to other ideals and their general hierarchy, however, it must be noted that the supreme ideal of nationalism is to be considered as such only in a narrow political sense. Theoretically, the occupational ideal or morality is the backbone of Gökalp's analytic model of society. In other words, for the ideal of nationalism to perform its social function as one major form of social solidarity, a substance for that nationalism is called for. We may also say that if the ideal of nationalism provides the main source of social solidarity in times of crisis, the ideal of occupational morality furnishes the main social cement in times of stability. This may be inferred from Gökalp's notion that it is only when collective representations become the ideal that they create revolutions, or rather "transformations." When they are ideals with a lower case, they are simply forms of morality, the theoretically most significant one of which is occupational morality.



Forms of Morality and Hierarchy of Solidary Groups

We have seen in "Culture and Civilization" that Gökalp saw tensions between cultural and civilizational groups, and also between groups and norms within a culture group: for example, between kinship loyalties, class loyalties, and national loyalties, to name a few.¹⁸ But in the same place he also observed that "...it is the duty of the science of sociology to discover the hierarchy

(*derece sırası*) of social groups and to convert this unnatural warfare into a state of peace."¹⁶

The foregoing is consistent with, or follows from, Gökalp's non-conflictual, consensual model of society, in which various collectivities and their norms can, and should, be in harmony. Gökalp goes on to offer his own hierarchy of solidary groups: family, corporation,²⁰ religious group, state, and the linguistic group, that is, the nation—the "most important" social group.²¹ What is significant in this hierarchization is that the nation, that is, the national society, or simply Society in the age of modern nation-states, is superior to the State. The two are not identified, as in the case of fascistic variants of corporatism.

The other thing to be said about this hierarchization is that the corporation or the occupational group and its norms are in fact, theoretically, the cornerstone of the society, notwithstanding the fact that for Gökalp the national group and its norms are the supreme ideal. The point is that the nation is the most advanced form of social organization; but it is also an axiomatic tenet of Gökalp's and Durkheim's sociology that the evolution of society is proportionate to the advancement of division of labor, that is, functional or occupational specialization.

According to Gökalp, basically there are three kinds of social groups (*zumreler*): family groups, occupational groups, and political groups. Most important are the political groups, for these are independent and self-sufficient collectivities "with a life of their own."

Family groups and occupational groups are in the nature of being parts, divisions of political groups. That is, political groups are (like) social organisms, family groups being the cells and occupational groups being the organs of this organism. Therefore, family and occupation groups are called secondary groups.

In this classification of collectivities, Gökalp terms political groups primary, not of course in the contemporary structural-functionalist sense of being an initial stage of socialization—i.e., the family—but as a higher stage of evolution in social organization. Neither does he mean it in the sense of contemporaneous authoritarian German legal-organicist theories of state ("State is organized nation"), which enjoyed popularity in the constitutional legal thinking of the Turkish Republic. As we shall see below, Gökalp did not have a theory of state, let alone a theory of state's primacy over society, as later characterized the fascistic corporatisms in Europe. Just as society has primacy over state in Durkheim, nation as the primary political group transcends the state in Gökalp.

In ascending order of evolution, Gökalp classifies political groups into tribal systems (*cemia*) where political organization is based on kinship, feudal and imperial systems (*camia*) consisting of diverse ethnic and religious groups.

and national systems, or nation-state societies (*temiyet*), in which unity of language, culture, and ideals ultimately lead to political independence and homogeneous integration. Only the last, the modern nation-state, is "real society," the self-realization of an ethnic group,²³ because, as we have already seen, the ideal of nationalism is the highest form of collective conscience, just as the nation-state is the most advanced stage in the division of labor, that is, in structural differentiation and functional specialization.²⁴ Hence, Gökalp's substitution of "nation" for Durkheim's "society"; hence, his substitution of "progress and independence"²⁵ for the "progress" of Durkheim and other positivists, Gökalp played the role of the leading theoretician also of the transition from a multi-ethnic and semi-colonized empire to an independent nation-state.

According to Gökalp, the cement of a harmonious society and a consensual polity is social solidarity. The basis of solidarity, in turn, is collective conscience, that is, shared moral norms. In "Moral Türkizm" (1923),²⁶ Gökalp delineates several kinds, or levels, of morality: national-patriotic, occupational, family, civil-individual, and international.

Gökalp states that Turks have distinguished themselves throughout history in all of these moral ideals, which are based on Turkish national culture.²⁷ To be noted is the fact that, in this *locus classicus* of his views on morality, Gökalp emphasizes the national-cultural rather than the Islamic-religious sources of social morality, which is the non-secular second basis of his normative system.

National-patriotic morality, the morality of the "whole," means love for one's fatherland, nation, and above all, love for one's national culture.²⁸ It includes such central values as commitment to self-government, equality, and peace;²⁹ to democracy, human rights and feminism, and solidarity.³⁰ It is the highest form of morality because "nation" is the only social group (collectivity) which is an independent and self-sufficient social organism.

Gökalp's national morality is unequivocally based on cultural, not territorial, loyalties: "Ülkeden geçilir, toreden geçilmez" ("Country may be forsaken, but not custom"), which is embedded in national culture).³¹ Gökalp further clarifies his views on the relationship between country and culture in another relevant article:

The basis of national solidarity is high patriotic morality. Fatherland does not mean the land on which we live. Fatherland is what we call national culture, the land being merely its container—and sacred for that reason. Therefore, patriotic morality consists of national ideals and national duties.³²

These seem to me to give strong evidence for the non-irredentist character of Gökalp's nationalism and to be wholly consistent with his linguistic nationalism.

Since I shall discuss professional morality in a separate section, we here proceed with the other two of Gökalp's five basic forms of morality. *Family morality*, the morality of the "cell," again based on old Turkish cultural (not civilizational) values, includes such norms as communal property in land;³² democracy in the "parental family," as opposed to the autocracy of the "patriarchal family";³³ immunity of residence, equality of man and woman, and monogamy.³⁴ The elements of national morality originate in the family, the cell of the social organism. Thus, Gökalp's nuclear family, where the individual is first imbued with the elements of national morality, that is, with popular culture, is not an authoritarian one, as it was to be in the fascistic corporatist theories of Europe, where it served as yet another conveyor belt of the totalitarian state.

The demarcation line I am suggesting here may be a very thin one, for the family is postulated as the foundation of society and state in all corporatism; but it may also help keep fascistic corporatism and solidaristic corporatism distinct in yet another respect, since the nature and function of the family in each is rather different. Gökalp writes that

...the cell of the social organism is the family. In a republican state, the family, too, should be founded on republican principles. The basis of democracy is equality; the basis of a republic is liberty. Therefore, the family, too, should be founded on the principles of equality and liberty.³⁵

Civil-individual morality has two main components for Gökalp: "compassion," requiring one to do good to other individuals, and "justice," defined negatively, requiring that one ought not to harm other individuals.³⁶ The latter includes immunity of life, property, liberty, and honor,³⁷ that is, precepts of classical liberalism.

As interpersonal morality of doing good to others and respecting their individual rights and liberties is called civil morality, the reciprocity of doing good and honoring one's commitments (*ahde vefa*) among nations is called *international morality*, including the concomitant values of peace and respect for other nations' political, religious, and cultural existences.³⁸

Occupational Morality, Groups, and Corporations

Gökalp's occupational morality, the morality of the "organ," attempts to combine Durkheim's occupational ethics with old Turkish cultural norms and institutions. Occupational success and ethics, Gökalp insists, were most important among Turks in earlier times; merit and industry counted more than ascription. Also, "economic occupations" were closely interrelated with the religious sect of the Ahi's, which organized occupations (*tarikat*) into religious associations (*azaveler*) on the basis of the principle of the primacy of public interest (*hukukya or halk nefsi*). Ottoman guilds were established upon this tradition.³⁹

Having thus grounded occupational organizations, or corporations (*locaklar* or *loncalar*), in tradition and national culture, Gökalp proceeds to outline the principle of a modernized corporative organization exactly along the lines of Durkheim's 1902 Preface to the *Division of Labor*.⁴² Previously, he says, corporations were in the form of artisan guilds (*tesnaf loncaları*) located within individual towns and municipalities, and therefore local and scattered. Now that we have entered the age of "national economy,"⁴³ that is, of capitalist markets, it is necessary to discontinue the old artisan guilds and to establish nationwide corporations with centers in the capital city.⁴⁴

According to Gökalp, all occupations in a city should be organized into corporations. The corporations should be headed by secretaries-general rather than by *şeyh's* ("sheikhs") or *kethüda's* ("stewards").⁴⁵ Thus Gökalp substitutes a modern, and presumably an autonomous, corporation administration for the traditional religious type of administration controlled and coopted by the imperial and sultanic state. In every city, there should be a central committee, a "labor exchange" (*iş borsası*), composed of the delegates of all the different corporations in the city to regulate the economic life of that city.⁴⁶

This corporative organization should be extended from the municipal to the national level. Thus, corporations of all cities of the same industry should organize themselves into national federations with headquarters in the capital. Delegates from the central committees of these federations should then form a confederation of corporations and elect members to a confederation general assembly, that is, a grand council of corporations. Members of intellectual professions will also participate in this grand council through their own federations. "Thus," says Gökalp, "all occupational groups will unite like a regular army."⁴⁷

Such a corporative organization, Gökalp argues, provides sanctions for occupational morality and professional ethics, which are lacking in Turkey. Corporations supervise the members of the occupation through internal regulations and disciplinary committees. They establish norms of conduct within their jurisdictional domain. Also among their functions are mutual assistance, occupational training, and advancement of the profession.⁴⁸ To be noted is the additional emphasis Gökalp places on the normative function of occupational organizations. For Durkheim, occupational morality and corporative organization are mainly a measure to check the centrifugal tendencies in societies of advanced division of labor, i.e., the conflict between capital and labor in industrial capitalism. For Gökalp, in addition to this, they also provide the moral and organizational bases for economic development, i.e., the deepening of division of labor in the direction of industrialization through a united national effort, a harmonious "work mobilization," among occupations as well as employees and employers.

In "To Strengthen National Solidarity" (1923),⁴ Gökalp specifies the occupational groups that are to be included in his corporative scheme: engineers, doctors, musicians, painters, teachers, authors, officers, lawyers, merchants, farmers, manufacturers, ironsmiths, carpenters, tailors, bakers, butchers, grocers⁵—seventeen categories altogether. Given the immense variety of classification schemes in corporatist theory and practice, depending upon the level of social differentiation and class articulation, on the political strength of social classes or class fractions, and on the nature of the dominant cultural and ideological paradigm obtaining in a particular country at a particular time, Gökalp's classification above should be considered as realistic or as arbitrary as any other such scheme. What is noteworthy in Gökalp's classification is that it reflects truthfully the low industrial level of Turkey in the 1920's, as evidenced by the abundance of artisan categories. The absence of a single labor category may be attributed to the relatively small industrial working class.

What is still more significant in Gökalp's theory of corporative organization is the functionalist rationale he offers for these structures: "These groups are mutually necessary for, and complementary to, one another."⁶ This very sentence later became the official catechism for the duration of the Kemalist single-party rule in Turkey, 1923-1945, repeated verbatim both in the declarations and speeches of the "leaders" and "subleaders" (*chefs* and *sous-chefs*, in the parlance of those days) and in the staple articles of the party programs. Gökalp's functionalist corporatist theory, however, was sincere in its inclusiveness and pluralism, while in the Kemalist practice, which was exclusive and etatist, this rationale served basically a rhetorical function.

Furthermore, while Gökalp's classification rested on an occupational categorization, in the Republican People's Party programs the same functionalist and organicist rationale was used to justify a classification which was in fact based on what resembled essentially a social class categorization, despite claims to the contrary:

It is one of our fundamental principles to consider the people of the Turkish Republic not as consisting of different classes, but as a society differentiated from the division of labor point of view, into various occupations, for the advancement of individual and social life. Farmers, artisans and shopkeepers, workers, members of liberal professions, industrialists, merchants, bureaucrats are the major work organs of the Turkish national body. The activity of each is necessary for the life and welfare of the others and of the public.... The goal sought by our party with this principle is to attain social order and solidarity rather than class struggle, and to establish harmony of interest rather than conflict of interest.

For Gökalp, this functional interdependence of, and reciprocal service among, occupational groups is nothing but organic solidarity in the age of advanced division of labor in modern societies. But in order for this solidarity to

be strong, the division of labor in a society should be "real"; that is, it should be one which is supported by a collective conscience shared by all occupational groups. Otherwise, their interrelationship would be not solidarity but "mutual parasitism."³³ This brings us to the important question of the relationship between respective occupational groups and corporations as well as their relation to the society in general and to the state, such a web of relations being decisive for the nature of the status of the individual in the varieties of corporatist schemes.

Individual and Society, Corporations and the State

What are the relationships in Gökalp's system between these social groups, between the primary and secondary ones, and also what is the relation of the Individual, as a member of each of the above, to the occupational group, to the Society (which consists of occupational groups in the main) and to the State? The answer may easily be deduced from Gökalp's solidaristic corporatism, as opposed to the fascistic variant of corporatism. But the matter needs elaboration and argument upheld by primary evidence, for there has been and continues to be much controversy, misinformation and lack of analysis regarding the question.

Uriel Heyd, for example, has the following evaluation to offer:

Gökalp does not agree with the liberal concept of Western Europe that religion, morality, and international law, of course, demand that the policy of a nation should keep within certain bounds and that loyalty to the nation should not transcend them. Far from restraining Turkish nationalism, Islam is in Gökalp's opinion a factor which strengthens patriotic sentiment even in its aggressive forms. For this view he finds support in the Islamic conception of *Jihad*, the Holy War against the unbelievers, and the stress laid by Mohammad on the fraternity of the faithful (and not on the brotherhood of all men). Ethics too are, in Gökalp's opinion, not supra-national. Since the nation is the source of and the model for all ethical values, morality (*tahlak*) is for him identical with love of the country and service of the nation.³⁴

Heyd immediately reproduces Gökalp's poem "Vazife" (1915):

What is duty? A voice that comes down from the throne of God.
Reverberating the consciousness of my nation,

I am a soldier; it is my commander.
I obey without question all its orders.
With closed eyes
I carry out my duty."

And Heyd proceeds to conclude that

in the system of Gökalp, who looks upon nationalism as the supreme ideal, there is no room for the absolute value of the individual, which is axiomatic in Western

civilization. The individual who, according to his [Gökalp's] definition is the self-centered ego, can never serve as a moral ideal. Personality also, as we have seen, is worthy of honor and esteem only because it represents and reflects society, i.e. the nation."

The errors of analysis and judgment present in Heyd's evaluation are regrettable. Otherwise, his study is serious and more meticulous than its counterparts in Turkish. Heyd's analysis lacks a theoretical base. He compounds the errors by what appears to me the unsound method of reconstructing Gökalp's system, not essentially from his theoretical essays but also selectively from his poems.

Up to this point I have not yet examined Gökalp's specific views on the equality of nations and the ultimate value of international peace (see Chapter Six for "The Goals of New Turkey"), which Heyd did not use. Heyd's material, however, should have been sufficient in itself not to lead him to the conclusion that Gökalp's nationalism was aggressive and disregarding of international law. Heyd manifestly did not comprehend Gökalp's system in its totality, and seems to have been thrown off by the complexities and nuances of Gökalp's thought, which can seem inconsistent if approached with inadequate theoretical backing.

Heyd equates Western European civilization with liberalism. To put it differently, he reduces the West to the liberal West. We know that the West has had other faces, for example, the solidaristic and the fascist. We also know that the particular Western face that non-Western countries and thinkers emulate has not always been the liberal one. Furthermore, it is quite meaningless to criticize Gökalp for not having conformed to the liberal Western precepts when he explicitly set out to do the reverse, and at a time when liberalism was under severe attack from within the West itself. Moreover, if Gökalp was illiberal, he was not more so than Durkheim was.

What Heyd thinks of as "axiomatic" in Western "civilization" is axiomatic only for classical liberalism. It is not axiomatic for the medieval West, nor for the solidarist or fascist West, which are as Western as the liberal West. Even if one reduces the West to the bipolar simplification of liberalism and fascism, and considers the latter as an aberration from Western civilization on grounds of its assimilating and thereby destroying the individual within the state, one may not discard solidarism as easily as that. In rejecting the axiomatic primacy of the individual and attributing meaning to him only as an integral part of the society, solidarism in effect tries to protect the individual against the atomistic individualism of laissez-faire liberalism.

In short, what Heyd calls axiomatic for the West in general is merely axiomatic for the liberal West. It is a slanted point of view to charge Gökalp with breaching the Western axiom without doing the same to Durkheim, Gökalp's professed master, and further to deduce from poetic slogans (behind

which lay an unequivocal and conspicuous solidaristic theory) that Gökalp had no regard for the individual, for his personality and dignity vis-a-vis the society or, in Heyd's words, "society, i.e., the nation."¹⁷ In fact, Heyd makes much of Gökalp's alleged substitution of "nation" for "society" as a great deviation from Durkheim, with supposedly unmistakable indications of a totalitarian view of polity. As suggested above, nation in Gökalp is no more than national society, let alone any implication of an irrational "volkish" nationalism that engrosses the individual through emotion rather than reason.¹⁸ The latter is indeed a characteristic of fascist corporatist thinking. It is nothing but a vulgarization of liberalism itself to attribute it facilely to solidaristic corporatist thinking, too, in which the individual gains meaning only in society without being negated by the society, let alone by the state. Furthermore, Gökalp, or solidaristic corporatists in general, not only theoretically subordinate the state to the civil society, or nation, but also posit the relationship between the state and other social institutions in such a way that they are autonomous from the state. Finally, the individual is defended against the incursions of the state precisely by occupational groups and their corporations, which serve as a buffer between the state and the individual. What facile liberalist clichés cannot capture is that, in solidaristic corporatism, even the occupational groups (which collectively constitute the civil society) exist for the free development of the individual personality, which, however, has to be "social," but still within a framework of cultural and philosophical liberalism.

This point can scarcely be exaggerated: solidaristic corporatism rejects liberalism only as an analytic and ideological *model* of society, for in the atomistic and egoistic individualism of economic and political liberalism (in general) it sees a threat not only to the equilibrium and harmony of the society, but also to the individual himself. But, in contrast to fascist corporatism, it does not reject the liberal *ideals* (in particular) of cultural and philosophical tolerance and pluralism. In a sense, solidaristic corporatism is closer to liberalism in a way that fascist corporatism is not. (This, of course, is the philosophical *ought* of solidaristic corporatism. Whether its analytical theory *can* produce the desired results or not is another matter.) It is no coincidence that elements of Kant and Rousseau, no less than Durkheim, as we have seen, figure prominently in Gökalp's thinking. There are, of course, the same facile liberal interpretations of Rousseau as the father of modern totalitarianism, with which I do not agree, but Kant's credentials in this respect still remain uncontested.

The social duty to be performed in the service of national interest, in Gökalp's notorious poem "Vazife" ("Duty"), would have been indicative of an uncritical allegiance to a totalitarian ideology and regime if one had known nothing about his theoretical writings on the questions of individual moral

responsibility, social but free education, tolerance for pluralism and rational discourse in cultural as well as political life.

It is true that in the solidaristic model the individual does not have rights only, as in the liberal model; he also has duties. Yet, this fact is not sufficient to infer that "Gökalp was influenced by Prussian ideals."⁵⁵ Gökalp indeed entrusts individual development to social education and goes on to say that one cannot change the society by changing the individual, but one can change the individual by changing the society, and this, of course, through education.⁶⁰ Yet this education is to be conducted autonomously from any extra-educational social or political or administrative institution and is to be subjected to no influence other than those within the domain of that particular department of specialization. In a poem called "The University" (1918), Gökalp has the following to say:

...
 Government knows not all,
 For it is no specialist in all.

 Authority is not like office granted
 But by specialization merited.

 A professor recognition acquires
 By his science, your license never requires.

 Give science to scientists;
 You mind the State's affairs.

 University is not by orders reformed;
 With free science only, can it be formed.

 Professions do not get from without their light;
 Let science by professors be alight.⁶¹

This, then, is the libertarian and democratic pluralism behind Gökalp's solidaristic corporatism, and the moral and social philosophy behind it is as follows:

Do not say 'I have rights';
 There is only duty, no right.

 There is no 'I' and 'You,' but We;
 We are both Ruler and Ruined, to be.
 We means One;
 I and You worship the One.

 Whatever is your service,
 That is your assistance,
 Your merit do not reveal,
 So that it may be real.⁶²

This is pure and simple solidaristic morality, which values the individual, without negating its prerogatives, according to his service to social solidarity and the public interest. Solidarism does not counterpose the individual and the society nor deify the society, or the state, at the expense of the individual, but tries to balance them all. Nor is the moral philosophy behind this poem a utilitarian one, as evidenced by the Sufi imagery it uses. Even the mildly utilitarian aspect of Durkheim's social solidarism is tempered by Sufi humility, to be read in connection with the Kantian categorical imperativism Gökâlp has expressed elsewhere: "For some, morality is a means for order in society. Yet, the highest virtues manifest themselves in acts that are not directed to any [practical] objective."⁶³

Gökâlp's is not an integral and totalitarian corporatism which embraces all spheres of social life. Nor is it even implicitly an elitist one, because it is not a unitary normative model which does not recognize sub-cultural autonomy and diversity in the cultural subsystem, à la Parsons. There is no condition under which the political subsystem may interfere for repression in the cultural sphere when the cultural subsystem itself as the primary subsystem fails in its function of system maintenance. In "Culture and Politics" (1918),⁶⁴ Gökâlp makes emphatically clear that "...theoretical and artistic fields are fields of total freedom."⁶⁵ The artists and philosophers cannot impose their works on the general public, nor can the official authorities impose their policies on the artists and philosophers. Ideas and artistic creations can only be "proposed" (*teklif*); they cannot be "imposed" (*tahmil*),⁶⁶ in contradistinction to the sanction and binding force of legislation in the political sphere. The concept of authority (*velayet*) has entirely different meanings in the cultural and political spheres. In the latter it has legal sanction; in the former it is conferred by free public recognition. In short, Gökâlp keeps culture and politics separate, as he does religion and politics.

The Elite and the People

In the preceding section, I have suggested that Gökâlp's corporatism was not authoritarian, let alone totalitarian. His solidaristic corporatism with its pluralist elements is not even an elitist one in the strict sense of the term, although the question of elites occupied his attention to a considerable extent. The concept of elite in Gökâlp, however, is not central to his social-political theory as in the elite theorists proper; it is rather an intermediary category subordinated to, if not sheerly instrumental for, Gökâlp's analytic and normative theory of nationalist populism.

To start with Gökâlp's definition of the elite, or of eliteness: "The intellectuals, the men of ideas of a nation, are called the 'elites' (*seçkinler* or *güzîdeler*) of that nation. The elites, by virtue of their having received higher education and training..."⁶⁷ It is thus evidently clear that Gökâlp's concep-

tion of the elite is that of an "intellectual elite," the necessary condition of which is education. Gökalp's elite is not a basically political and organizational category as in Mosca and Michels or a basically psychological one as in Pareto, postulated as causal and universal laws. In such classical elite theorists, the concept of elite is not only a major analytic category used to explain political and social phenomena; it is also a positive normative judgement of value. In other words, elitism is both a science and an ideology for these theorists.⁶⁶

In diametrical opposition to classical elite theorists, the elite category is neither a major analytic nor a major ideological one in Gökalp. It is not analytic, because the concept of elite does not occupy a central explanatory position in Gökalp's political-social theory; neither is it ideological, because the concept of elite does not entail or lead into, nor is it derived from, any elitism in Gökalp's political-social philosophy. Instead, it is employed to explain and criticize the historical bifurcation between the people and the government and to provide one of the avenues of national-cultural revival in Turkey, which, among other things, involves the elimination of this bifurcation. This is perfectly consistent with his idealistic activism and his views on the relationship between theory and practice.

As populism in politics means democracy and equality for Gökalp, populism in culture means establishment of social solidarity on the basis of national popular culture, in which effort the intellectual elite is supposed to return to the national "culture" embodied in the collective conscience of the people, rather than carry the burden of imposing values of foreign cultures that belong to Western "civilization" despite their unsuitability to the national popular culture. Gökalp argues as follows:

The intellectuals, the men of ideas of a nation are called elites of that nation. The elites, by virtue of their having received higher education and training, are differentiated from the people. And it is these that should go toward the people. Why will the elites go to the people? Some answer this question as follows: 'The elites should go to the people in order to carry national culture to the people. However, as we have seen, ...what is called national culture is possessed only by the people. The elites have not yet received their share from the national culture. How, therefore, can the elites bring national culture to the people, who are the living museum of national culture itself? ...The elites possess civilization only.... Hence, the elites may go toward the people for two reasons: (1) to receive education in national culture, (2) to take civilization to the people.'⁶⁷

After criticizing the "un-national" education the elites have been receiving in Turkey in "un-national" schools, Gökalp advises nationalization of curricula and cultural activities and participation in the way of living of the people in order to compensate for the past estrangement of the elites from popular culture—in language, literature folklore, music, art, religion, architecture, humor, and so on. Gökalp adds that Pushkin, Dante, Petrarch,

Rousseau, Goethe, Schiller, D'Annunzio have all become art geniuses because of the inspiration they got from their respective national cultures.⁷⁰ The science of sociology, too, says Gökalp, demonstrates that aesthetics can only flourish in cultures which do not negate their own values, as was the case with the Ottoman elites who scorned the Turkish peasants as "the Turk of an ass" (*eşek Türk*) and Anatolian urban residents as "provincials." "The title given to the people as a whole consisted of the word commoner (*avam*)."⁷¹ Precisely because the courtly Ottoman elites (*havas*) scorned the people and neglected the popular national culture, their language, literature, music, philosophy, ethics, politics and economics could not develop and survive.

Gökalp continues to criticize the cosmopolitan Westernism of the Ottoman elites and warns the new Turkist elite not to stop at a rhetorical idealization of Turkish culture but to go to the inner parts of Anatolia, both to teach and to be taught, if they are to become a "national elite."⁷² Thus, the sufficient condition of being an elite, for Gökalp, emerges as that of "nationalness," its prerequisite being education.

If for Gökalp, elite in the pejorative sense is represented by the term *havas*, elite in the affirmative sense thus specified is rendered by the term *güzide*, that is, the national elite at one with the people, distinct from the people only by reason of their training in the positive sciences. It is totally incorrect to interpret Gökalp's distinction between the elite and the people as one between a tutelar elite (not only cosmopolitan but also even self-professedly national in the high-brow sense) and the "common people," as is done in many Turkish or foreign studies.

There are two sides to the problem. On the one hand, and in contrast to the Unionists and the Kemalists, the people and the popular culture for Gökalp are not passive but receptive containers, or at least malleable raw material, which can be filled with or duly molded into "elitist national" or "Western cultural" (in the guise of "civilization"), therefore, "progressive" forms. Such a tutelary attitude leads one to view the people as unfit to participate in politics, let alone govern, unless they are educated by a single party in party schools and party-administered centers, and through a process of indirect elections until they reach political maturity. In the meantime, the people serve an elite, vanguardistic in its nationalist and populist policies, as a mass-base which by reason of its essential irrationality and gullibility, can be mobilized and manipulated by political "formulas" in the Moscan sense and "myths" in the Paretian. In Gökalp, there is no trace of such substitutism or dirigism. The people are the source, and the objective—not a rhetorical one, but a serious one.

On the other hand, the people and the popular culture, in Gökalp, are not romantically idealized out of proportion, to be emulated by the intellectual elite emotionally and without critical reason. Thus, Hevd's likening, for ex-

ample, of Gökalp's populism to Russian Narodnickism or to Fichte's and Treitschke's vociferous romantic nationalism⁷³ is, to my mind, quite facile and misplaced, for in Gökalp the element of individual and social "reason," as we have recurrently seen, is always present. Therefore, although it is quite accurate of Heyd to liken Gökalp's conception of people (not "common" though) to those of Rousseau's and Herder's, it is considerably inaccurate of him to include LeBon in the same breath of comparison.⁷⁴ For, not only does Gökalp insistently criticize LeBon's conception of the people as a volatile mass with irrational psychological drives; but also, in a more general way, Rousseau and Herder on the one hand, and LeBon on the other, are quite different thinkers both in their analysis and philosophy of the people and the nation.

In a sense, what was perceived by the Unionists and the Kemalists as making for difficulty in their "reform from above"—the backward and inert mass, and the resultant bifurcation between the elite and the people—constituted an opportunity for Gökalp: there was still something on which "real revolution" could be based. If the bifurcation posed any problems, which it did, the burden of self-improvement lay with the elite, not the people. In this reversal of emphases on the elite and the people, Gökalp's version of solidaristic corporatism emerges as a non-elitist, non-tutelar, and non-paternalist one, as distinct even from other solidaristic corporatisms, which can be all of these in differing degrees without becoming fascistic. The latter, of course, are definitely so, but they are also much more: the pluralist and mild elitism and paternalisms of solidaristic variants are replaced by rigid and totalitarian hierarchies, both in the theory and practice of fascistic variants. One may also note that Gökalp stands out as one of those few contemporaneous thinkers who gave serious attention to the question of elites (without becoming an elite theorist in the technical sense indicated above), but did not make the not too uncommon transition from elitism to fascism. The reference, of course, is to people like Mosca, Pareto, Michels,⁷⁵ and, if you will, Sorel—making due room for Mosca's later recantation.

Returning to the question of the bifurcation between the elite and the people, in "A Talk on Culture and Civilization" (1923),⁷⁶ Gökalp reexamines the problem of "duality" and the conditions for the "natural entry" of elements of international civilization into the national culture. In a follow-up article on "Turkish Culture and Ottoman Civilization" (1923),⁷⁷ after giving examples of dualism from many fields of social life, Gökalp states that in "normal societies" and in "healthy nations" there is a reciprocal relationship between the elite and the people. By contrast, in Turkey, the elite considered the people as commoners (*avam*) and subhuman (*hevam*), and saw everything that belonged to the people as vulgar, low, and banal.⁷⁸

Gökalp specifically contrasts Turkish popular ethics with Ottoman elite ethics. As opposed to the values of equality, honesty, sacrifice, and modesty in the former, the latter was based on "domination over subordinates" and "hypocrisy toward superordinates."¹⁰ Gökalp continues with the contrast in philosophy: while the Ottoman elite cherished prosperity and hedonism, the Turkish people gave priority to stoical happiness through social ideals.¹¹ Gökalp ends on a harsh note:

...the Ottoman elites were traitors. They were, more or less, the elect intellects of the nation.... Yet [they] avoided national culture and cherished the corrupt oriental civilization. Therefore, the blame for the lack of codification and institutionalization of our national culture rests not with our culture or our people, but entirely with the Ottoman elite.¹²

When Gökalp thus indicts the Persianism of the early Ottoman and the Frenchism of the *Tanzimat* elites,¹³ there is some sort of a class dimension that Gökalp attaches to this cultural bifurcation:

...the Ottoman type entered the field of imperialism, which was harmful to Turkish culture and life; it became cosmopolitan; it gave primacy to class interest over national interest.¹⁴

According to Gökalp, the cosmopolitan "ruling class" of Ottomans came to see itself as the "dominant nation," while the "ruled class" of Turks came to be seen as the "dominated nation."¹⁵ And since the two received separate and different educations, there could be no cohesion between them.¹⁶ Moreover, the courtly intelligentsia in their official capacity robbed the people to support the extravagance and debauchery of the court. The oppressed people could not bring themselves to like these oppressors.

In an article on "Popular Civilization" (1913), Gökalp had already written that every nation has two "civilizations" (note that Gökalp uses the term in an unusual but not inconsistent way): popular civilization and official civilization.¹⁷ When the latter does not conform to the former, a duality results, along with two kinds of elites: popular and national elites versus official and unnational elites. By introducing the critical concept of an "official elite," Gökalp definitely differs from the positivistic determinism of elite theorists. When such an "official elite" does not conform to the popular cultural norms and thereby fails to become a "national elite," not only culturally, but also with derivative political and economic consequences of domination and oppression, it wrongs the collective conscience with respect to its primary norms, i.e., the well-being and the supremacy of the people themselves, and nothing less than the legitimacy of that elite is what is at stake.

Thus, unlike Weber's mechanistic formalism in studying power, be it elite power or otherwise, Gökalp is critically concerned with the sources of power and with legitimate power, that is, with authority. In contrast to Weber's

descriptive study and classification of forms of authority, which are essentially based on a positivistic and deterministic conception of hierarchical and coercive domination, best symbolized in Weber's own term "imperative coordination."⁵⁵ Gökalp is concerned not with power politics but with the sources and criteria of legitimate power.

In one of his later articles on "Authority and Domination" (1924),⁵⁶ Gökalp distinguishes two connotations of the French word *autorité*. One kind of authority is "obeyed with respect and affection." This is called *velayet* ("legitimate power"); moralists and revolutionists consider only this kind of authority as "legitimate" (*meşru*).⁵⁷ Another kind of authority is "obeyed with fear and disgust." This is called *sulta* ("coercive power"); moralists and revolutionists consider this kind of authority as "illegitimate" (*gayrı meşru*) and as one which ought to be destroyed,⁵⁸ regardless of the fact that such "official" authority goes politically unchallenged.

Gökalp makes a further distinction between "public authority" (*velayet-i amme*) and "private domination" (*sulta-i hassa*), the latter meaning conversion of the powers of a public office into "personal power." It is in these terms that Gökalp briefly surveys the usurpation of public powers by individuals in tribal, patriarchal, and sultanic systems—in terminology similar to that of Weber, but in theory and philosophy, entirely different from that of Weber. Gökalp adds that "republic" means the abolition of all private powers and the establishment of public authorities. In these terms, authority is not incompatible with liberty; on the contrary, it advances liberty through order.⁵⁹ Here, we have a notion of popular sovereignty couched in the positivist⁶⁰ principle of "order and progress." This brings us to Gökalp's theory of politics and political organization.

CHAPTER SIX

THEORY OF POLITICS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Definition of Politics

In Gökalp's system, all social phenomena, including, of course, the political, have a distinct reality of their own and therefore may be causes of other social phenomena. Yet, given the relative causal primacy of ideas on the one hand, and of the division of labor on the other, politics and, therefore, political science in their strict, narrow senses are relegated to an implicitly secondary position in Gökalp's system.¹ When we take into account the importance of ideational, moral, and cultural factors in Gökalp's idealistic political philosophy, however, politics and, therefore, political science in this larger sense reassume significance in Gökalp's system.

For Gökalp, politics and political activity are not a mechanical thing, nor can their study stop at formally describing and measuring the location and distribution of power. Given Gökalp's idealistic positivism, politics is willful and subjectively meaningful activity, which is nevertheless amenable to objective scientific investigation. Consequently, political science is capable of theoretically informing practice.

It is then no coincidence that one of the specific definitions of politics by Gökalp is given in an article on "Culture and Politics" (1918).² According to Gökalp, in every society there are two "social wills": culture and politics. Before passing on to his own notion of politics, he examines the views of Friedrich Nietzsche and Alfred Fouillee on the subject. Nietzsche held that the motor force of life is the "will to power": that is, both the individual and the society have a tendency to put all beings under their influence (*nüfuz*) and power (*iktidar*). Fouillee, on the other hand, argued that the motor force of life is "will of conscience"; that is, the individual like society tends to embrace existence within his consciousness. Both thinkers are right, says Gökalp, in that they have intuited an important "social reality." But both are also wrong in that they have reduced general reality to a particular reality.³ Roughly, nevertheless, the "will of conscience" in Fouillee corresponds to "culture" in Gökalp, and the "will to power" in Nietzsche corresponds to "politics."

According to Gökalp's supposedly synthetic definition, culture is the "sum of all theoretical ideas and emotional impressions possessed by a nation" politics, the "sum of all practical struggles of a nation."⁴ To continue, the function of theory (*ic̣tihar*) is "comprehension of truth within consciousness," while the function of practice (*mucahade*) is "winning of power positions to eradicate social evils and replace them by social good."

The paramount importance of the cultural sphere in Gökalp is predicated on an uncompromising pluralism. In contrast to fascist cultural monism or even elitist cultural tutelage, Gökalp's cultural and philosophical liberalism, if you will, recognizes no internal cultural or external political restrictions, since the field of ideas is one of total freedom.⁸ Gökalp argues:

Culture, with its theoretical norms, guides the practice of political groups and the government....; as the function of culture is to establish principles for politics, the function of politics regarding culture consists solely of preparing the grounds for its autonomous development.

Gökalp goes on to lament that "...unfortunately in our country, the difference between cultural schools and political parties has not yet been understood."⁹ He adds that it is ultimately futile to try to obtain parliamentary majorities and governmental sanctions to propagate particular cultural norms, for scientific truth or artistic beauty can be established only on the basis of autonomous professional expertise. Politics and legislation can neither verify nor falsify works of science and art.⁹

Gökalp's cultural liberalism and pluralism, however, do not derive from a pure moral relativism. In an article on "Tolerance and Indulgence" (1922),¹⁰ Gökalp distinguishes between "logical errors" (*mantiki hatalar*) and "moral misdeeds" (*ahlaki kabahatlar*). A person may be criticized for his logical errors but he may not be condemned on these grounds. Yet, some people, being unable to discriminate, condemn others who have simply made logical errors. This is called intolerance (*musaafesizlik*). Consequently, errors are pardonable if the moral intention is good.¹¹

Some writers, however, observed Gökalp, understand "tolerance" not as *musaafe* but as *müşamaha*, although the latter is merely "indulgence," which, in turn, means overlooking one's moral misdeeds. And tolerance does not admit of indulgence, particularly when nations are trying to achieve a moral transformation (*inkılap*). Tolerance is the very basic condition of liberty. Today, however, indulgence is becoming dominant in Europe, replacing tolerance. As a result, European morality is becoming "materialistic"; "moral ideals" are retreating before the advance of "economic passions." This trend will ultimately lead to moral bankruptcy in Europe. In other words, Gökalp distinguishes between the atomistic and egoistic individualism of liberal capitalism and the solidarism and public-spiritedness of corporatist capitalism. Of the two, he manifestly prefers Turkey's adoption of the second.¹²

The foregoing is entirely consistent with Gökalp's views on the relationship between the individual and the society, between right and duty, between liberty and authority. Neither a deification of society nor a moral collectivism is involved, given his philosophical and cultural liberalism, which makes him uphold political liberalism as an "ideal," while rejecting liberalism as a total

analytic and philosophical "model." Consequently, his solidaristic corporatist model of society and polity leaves room for liberal ideals, in contrast to fascistic corporatist models. This brings us to Gökalp's understanding of democracy.

The Origins of the "Six Arrows"

The theoretical foundations of the emblematic Six Arrows of Kemalism, that is, of the Republican People's Party and of the First Turkish Republic are to be found in Gökalp's thought. Of these six principles, three are not, in my view, theoretically problematic and have been established without much political controversy as to their meaning, despite certain modifications of Gökalp's early formulation as well as polemical misrepresentation of his view on the subject. These are Nationalism, Republicanism, and Laicism.

A fourth one, Transformism (*Inkılâpçılık*) has taken definite root in Turkish political culture without any political disputation. It is also a principle that is theoretically significant and interesting. The other two, Statism (*Devletçilik*) and Populism (*Halkçılık*), are both theoretically problematic and have been politically controversial. These are also the two principles with respect to which Gökalp's thought has been most distorted in different ways by different groups.

The Six Arrows of the Kemalist Republican People's Party were incorporated into the Constitution in 1937, legalizing the party-state at the constitutional level. In the 1961 Constitution, as well as in the programs of many political parties and ideological groups, all of these continue to figure in one form or another in different forms and dosages—as Kemalism, if not always as Gökalpism.

Gökalp's nationalism, the nature of which we have seen, has been by and large the official guiding policy of Turkey to date, as symbolized in the motto of "peace in the country, peace in the world" (*Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh*), despite certain misrepresentations of Gökalp's stance by various groups.

Republicanism as well has become a foregone conclusion with the declaration of the Republic in 1923, if not with the popular sovereignty article of the 1921 Constitution. Similarly, the principle of laicism has become an established fact since its constitutional expression in 1928 by an amendment to the 1924 Constitution. That some Kemalists and leftists on the one hand, and the radical right on the other, have tried, and continue to try, to infer otherwise from Gökalp's ephemeral views on the caliphate and the reorganization of the religious institution as some sort of an ethical corporation is totally misplaced. A man who first brought positivism and laicism to Turkey at a theoretical level could not have been anti-laicist. As for Gökalp's republican credentials, these are beyond doubt in his theoretical writings as well as in his very early youthful poems. As early as 1895, Gökalp had written:

When governments are formed to protect rights,
Why should we abandon all rights to a Sultan?¹³

and:

It is we who work in the fields and the mills.
It is we who are the state, the nation, and the country.
Abdicate sultan! It is we who are the sovereign.¹⁴

Gökalp's anti-monarchism, at a time when almost all Young Turks/Unionists in their critique of the monarchy did not go beyond the limits of legitimism, was axiomatic, given his theoretical identification of democracy with republicanism. Yet this emphasis on equality and liberty is not predicated on a "natural law" theory or on the individualistic conceptions of classical liberal law. Rather, Gökalp's equality and freedom lie within the context of a political and juridical solidarism.

According to Gökalp, the natural law theory, advocated by "bourgeois jurists" (Gökalp means "liberal-bourgeois" jurists) prior to and during the Revolution of 1789, has served its historical mission against the privileged classes. Since then, it has served only to "feed a constant microbe of revolution," impeding the development of a "stable form of government."¹⁵ Gökalp shares the post-1789 belief that "if the 1791 (Jacobin) sun should ever rise again, it is upon a non-bourgeois society that it would do so." He shares Durkheim's and Comte's fear and enmity of all violent upheaval involving a sudden breach with the past, that is, radical social revolution.¹⁶ As I have indicated above, equality and liberty, for Gökalp, are not those of classical liberalism but of the anti-liberal, solidaristic egalitarianism and libertarianism inherent in "order" or "union," developing on a linear path of evolution that precludes serious conflict.

Gökalp goes on to say that the liberal bourgeois notion of natural law has been replaced in Europe by the schools of "historicist jurisprudence" and "solidarist jurisprudence." Jhering and especially Hegel in Germany formulated principles that would "strengthen" the state and thereby prevent revolution. and in France Leon Duguit's "realist jurisprudence" superseded liberal legal norms. Gökalp adds that in Turkey, too, natural law with its individualistic principle of "no duty, only right", which was dominant before 1908, is being replaced by a "national" (meaning based on national solidarity) legal thought.¹⁷ Gökalp cites the view of another solidarist philosopher, Lévi-Bruhl, that in matters of practical morality, the precepts of national and social solidarity should be supreme, whatever ethical philosophy may be adopted.¹⁸

In an article entitled "Public Spiritedness" (1923),¹⁹ Gökalp contrasts individualism and solidarism as two opposing ethical philosophies and political moralities. The first has characteristics of self-interestedness, passion for power, and vanity and status, while the second is marked by public-spiritedness, calling for social service, and solidaristic virtue. Gökalp con-

siders the latter to be the prerequisites of real democracy. Gökalp's ideal of democracy is not liberal democracy but solidaristic democracy, in which individual liberty is meaningful to the extent that it does not act against social solidarity and public interest. Gökalp's *umumculuk* is precisely public-spiritedness, as he explicitly makes clear here, and not populism (*halkçılık*) or collectivism (*kollektivizm*) or communitarianism (*cemaatçilik* or *ümmeçilik*), as some interpreters assert with all the attendant implications of totalitarianism.

In the preceding chapter, we discussed the nature of Gökalp's views on the elite and the people, and suggested that Gökalp's populism was not a rhetorical and elitist one. Now we have to examine his definition of the relationship between populism and democracy. Heyd argues that "Gökalp's idea of democracy is rather different from liberal conceptions. It is true that he calls the regime which he advocates *halkçılık*, which he means to be a translation of the term 'democracy.' In fact, however, he desires to place supreme control in the hands not of the masses of the people (*halk*) but of the nation (*millîyet*), and more precisely of the national elite (*güçlüler*) who have to govern in the interests of the people. He states categorically that in his opinion democracy is not the rule of the ignorant masses (*avâm*) but of the elite who are the people because they say 'we are the people.'"²⁰

What Heyd presents here is not Gökalp but the Kemalist transformation, if not distortion, of Gökalp, which Heyd takes to be Gökalpism. In Chapter Four, it was seen that Gökalp's "people" were not "commoners" or *avâm* or *hevâm*, which concepts he explicitly rejected and criticized; nor was any tutelary substitutism involved, as Heyd asserts. Gökalp's "idea of democracy" was indeed obviously and conspicuously different from "liberal conceptions"—it was precisely his stated aim to transcend liberalism with a solidaristic corporatism like Durkheim and Duguit, for example—but that does not automatically mean that Gökalp was an elite theorist.

As for Heyd's statement that the elite are those "who are the people because they say 'we are the people,'" that is, indeed, Gökalp's definition of populism, or rather of being "of the people," but with a difference. This subjective identification Gökalp does not confine to the elite, that is, the intellectual elite, but extends to all social groups (*zumreler*) in the national society. Finally, when Heyd says that for Gökalp "the only way to establish the democratic regime is not by putting an end to the rule of the upper classes, but by applying the principle that 'democracy means turning the whole people into aristocrats'"²¹, he comes closer to what Gökalp in fact meant, however inconsistent for him to quote this from Gökalp in juxtaposition with his preceding argument.

The elite for Gökalp is an "intellectual elite," and education, national and universal, is a prerequisite for both individual and social progress. This is not

elitism, but romantic social idealism. If Gökalp's system cannot avoid being unintentionally elitist—though minimally so, compared to other solidaristic or fascistic corporatisms—this does not derive from his social and moral philosophy. Rather, it stems from the inherent weakness of his chosen political theory, i.e., corporatist theory, and also from the positivist Comtean-Durkheimian ideology of "order and progress" that creates the major tension in his system, given his Rousseauesque egalitarianism. But I do not wish to anticipate here the general evaluation of the concluding chapter.

Gökalp's concept of *halkçılık* has two connotations, if not an ambiguity. On the one hand, it means populism or rather philosophical solidarism with its organicist and egalitarian features, distinct from the rhetorical ideologies and practices of populism as well as from populism as a platform of the middle sectors.²² On the other hand, it is used as a synonym for "democracy" or "people's government", the latter being a definition of the former. In this second sense, it is not sheer republicanism, or anti-monarchism, with the accompanying rhetoric of popular sovereignty, as has been the case with the Kemalists; rather, it is effective popular sovereignty along with legal and political equality—the two major characteristics of populist democracy. It presupposes universal franchise and a direct vote.²³

What is problematic in Gökalp's notion of populism is the manner in which he defines "the people":

In Turkey, no one class can monopolize the title of 'people.' Everybody, be he rich or poor, is of the people.... There are no class privileges among the people.... It may be that some legal rules in our old laws are not in compliance with the principle of equality. [But] are not a few sessions of the Grand National Assembly sufficient to legislate to convert these into forms that would conform to equity and justice?²⁴

It is evident that "people" means, for Gökalp, the body of citizens who have equal political rights and equal status before the law. Therefore, democracy means political-legal equality. What is problematic here is that Gökalp sees the people as one comprehensive harmonious whole provided that they all, subjectively, identify themselves as an integral part of that whole, albeit consisting of social classes differentiated on the basis of economic criteria. In other words, Gökalp's often ambivalent use of the term "class" is not so ambivalent here; it means just one of the many categories, despite the explicit mention of economic criteria. But this is internally consistent with Gökalp's un-Marxist conception that the existence of economic classes does not necessarily lead to political class struggle if they share, in Durkheimian fashion, the same collective norms, and if the necessary corporative organization is established to buttress these norms. In this, Gökalp is completely at one with Durkheim's thesis, advanced as an alternative to Marx's deterministic prediction, that increased division of labor, i.e., advanc-

ed industrial capitalism does not necessarily lead to class polarization and warfare if occupational morality and corporative organization, along with a national solidaristic collective conscience, are established."

In accordance with this consensual model of society, both analytically and normatively, Gökalp sees the state and the government as above classes and non-partisan. Accordingly, he states that the Turkish government and army are "non-partisan" and "of the whole nation" and "not an instrument of oppression of one class by another."²⁶ In this respect, Gökalp continues, there can be no comparison between Turkey's new form of government and Bolshevism, as some "foreign authors" try to claim. Firstly, the economic program of Bolshevism requires large-scale industry, whereas Turkey does not have one. There can be no analogy in the political sphere either, for in Bolshevik theory, all governments are assumed to be instruments of oppression of one class by another, either as a "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie" or as a "dictatorship of the proletariat." Moreover, in Russia, the government is under the control of the armed proletariat. In contrast, Gökalp says, the government and the army in Turkey are under the control of the Grand National Assembly, which is—here Gökalp drifts into Hegelian mystification—the "repository and representative of the collective conscience." It is evident, Gökalp continues, that the "real theory of state is never based on oppression"²⁷ but on objective guardianship of the all-inclusive public interest, which the state regulates and serves in the form of a Hegelian bureaucratic universal class or a Duguit-like public service corporation.

Ideologies, Regimes, and "Transformism"

In the preceding sections, we covered Gökalp's definition of politics, his understanding of democracy, and the central concepts of his political philosophy. In this section, we shall analyze his views on the more concrete questions of political organization and institutional mechanisms for the realization of political ideals. This part of Gökalp's thought is, as it has been, most prone to misinterpretation unless placed within the totality of his system, or when taken superficially without due regard to its nuances.

Gökalp's views on ideologies and regimes are condensed in a series of articles he wrote in 1923 on aspects of political parties. In an opening article entitled "What is a Political Party?" (1923),²⁸ Gökalp considers political parties indispensable elements of political life. In the "public-spiritedness" and the discipline (a "necessary evil") of party organizations, he finds a "protective device" against the dangers resulting from the "liberalism of constitutions" and the "individualism of members of parliament." It is true that parliaments are the seats of national sovereignty (defined as the "sovereignty of the collective conscience of the nation"); but, once elected, deputies are prone to act

"egotistically and self-interestedly" unless checked by their respective parties, the surrogates of collective conscience or, in Gökalp's exact terminology, the "levers of national sovereignty,"

Gökalp maintains that it is not governmental institutions but "political forces," especially political parties, that make political decisions. Here, Gökalp not only overcomes a formal-legalistic approach to the study of politics and is quite modern in his emphasis on informal, unofficial structures of decision-making, but also parts company with the prevalent mood of his contemporaries, both at home and abroad, against party politics as well as parliamentary politics. In a period when theories of no-party states and one-party states were starting to flourish and multi-party parliamentarism was being declared bankrupt and subversive, Gökalp simply requires that only those "evils" of parties such as "sectarianism and internationalism" be avoided and subordinated to the supreme national interest.²⁹ All this is consistent with his solidaristic corporatism, which is theoretically pluralist and admits of diversity of functional interests in the society provided that they be subordinate to the public interest. It is this residual liberal strain that makes Gökalp's solidaristic corporatism different from fascistic corporatism.

In another article on the "Political Classification of Parties" (1923),³⁰ Gökalp offers an interesting, if somewhat simplistic, classification of parties, which we can represent by a two-by-two matrix:

	MODERATE	EXTREMIST
TRADITIONALIST	Conservatives	Reactionaries
TRANSFORMIST	Liberals	Radicals

True to the organismic analogy of his fellow solidarists, Gökalp considers Conservative (*muhafazakar*) and Liberal (*liberal*) parties "normal" and "necessary"; Reactionary (*mürteci*) and Radical (*radikal*) parties "pathological" and "undesirable," as well as dysfunctional for the harmony and survival of the national society.

What is problematic in this classification is the criterion of "transformism" (*inkılapçılık*). Ostensibly, traditionalism and transformism are more a matter of content; moderation and extremism are more a matter of method. And, since he rules out radicalism, Gökalp would emerge from this schema as a progressive liberal. But, in view of his total rejection of economic liberalism and his partial but considerable rejection (though not as great as that of the Kemalists) of political liberalism, that would be a paradox.

The paradox dissolves when we consider that the vexing term transformism (*inkılapçılık*) has a certain meaning in both the Ottoman and Turkish political idiom, with connotations of both content and method, though not always explicitly spelled out. Students of Young Turk, Union and Progress, and

Kemalist ideologies and movements have rendered the term *inkılâpçı* miscellaneously as revolutionary, evolutionary, modernist, progressivist, reformist, and radical reformist. All these terms do contain a bit of truth, but when they are used as *the* synonym, they are very misleading. Hence I propose the term "transformism" as the better term to capture both the subjective intention of *inkılâpçı*s and the objective consequences of their actions.

Before giving Gökalp's definition of *inkılâpçılık* in support of my choice of the term "transformism," I would like to clear some linguistic and hermeneutic ground. Revolution means *ihtilal/devrim* in Ottoman and Republican Turkish, respectively. Similarly, evolution is *tekamül/evrim*; modern is *muasır/çağdaş*; progress is *terakki/ilerleme*; reform is *islahat/düzeltilme*. And strange is the oversight: *inkılâp/dönüşüm* is exactly "transformation."

It is also significant that neither Young Turks/Unionists nor Kemalists called their movements "revolution" or "radical reform," but unequivocally, "1908 *Inkılâbı*" and "Atatürk *Inkılâbı*," precisely for the reason that they intended "transformation" and neither "revolution" (which meant destruction and dissolution in the Ottoman and Turkish language and was a pejorative term, unlike the European counterpart) nor "radical reform" (reform was acceptable, but anything radical was anathema to several generations of political elite imbued with the "order and progress" of Comtean positivism). In content, change could be ameliorative and evolutionary at best; in method, change could be radical only in the cultural, technological and political spheres for fear of radical contamination of content as well.³¹ Given this, what better term could have been found than transformism, which stole the light of revolution while pre-empting it?

Gökalp is very clear on the subject: "Transformists (*inkılâpçılar*) desire to reform their society and accelerate its progress and evolution. Traditionalists, on the other hand, wish to preserve old traditions."³² Evidently, for Gökalp, transformism subsumes progressivism and evolutionism toward modernity. It is neither too incremental nor too radical. It is against conservatism, but includes residual aspects of the still progressivist nineteenth-century liberalism—not as a holistic model, to be sure, only in the form of some of its political ideals. In this respect, Gökalp's solidaristic corporatism, which is normatively progressive, egalitarian, and pluralist (and therefore closer to liberal democracy), is remarkably different from Unionism and Kemalism, which could not surpass the Comtean conservatism, elitism, and authoritarianism. It is meaningful that Gökalp rejects "radicalism" but can still comfortably use "liberalism"—in contrast to the then widespread identification of liberal democracy with "anarchic democracy" as opposed to "authoritarian democracy," the "real" democracy, by contemporaneous con-

poratisms, both the fascistic and the solidaristic species, Kemalism being a case in between.

In other words, transformation is nonrevolutionary but accelerated evolutionary change; it is "nothing but sudden acquisition of consciousness by gradual and unconscious evolution."³³ As an example of a change in the "structure" of society followed by a change in its "consciousness," Gökalp mentions that Turkish nationalism could gain ground only after the homogenization of society with the dissolution of the multi-lingual empire after World War I.

No idealistic voluntarism is involved here: "It is not transformists who create transformation. Probably it is the unconscious evolutions taking place independently in the conscience of society that create transformists."³⁴ It remains for the transformists to penetrate and articulate that social reality, that potential for transformation in the collective conscience, and to clear the way for its realization by destroying "lifeless rules and traditions." It must be noted that this dialectical relationship between the subject and the object is quite different from Hegelian idealism in that it involves a "social idealism" grounded in objective conditions.

In all societies, transformists are confronted by traditionalists. In contrast to "social ideals," the highest form of collective conscience, "traditions" are those collective representations that have become institutions, official organizations and processes, that is, collective representations that have become "objectified" (*eşya haline gelmiş*). Traditions which continue to conform to the collective conscience are "living phenomena," whereas traditions which persist in form but are not any more cherished in the collective conscience are "residues" or "lifeless traditions." Conservatives defend the former; reactionaries, the latter.³⁵

It is "indispensable" that in every society there exist traditionalist and transformist parties, or rather their normal kinds, conservatives and liberals. Liberals are those people "who wish to bring transformation up to the point reached by unconscious evolution." Radicals, on the other hand, are those people "who are not content with putting into practice the unconscious evolutions that have become social realities, but who wish to change all traditions, living and lifeless."³⁶ Because, Gökalp adds, liberals are objective and realistic, their transformations are usually successful. In contrast, since radicals do not realize that both traditions and ideals are the product of "social causes" and not of "individual wills," their transformations are usually limited.

Gökalp concludes by saying that the radicals and reactionaries, pathological and dysfunctional, impede the normal and necessary struggle between the liberals and conservatives. Much like V. O. Key's "moving equilibrium" thesis in a two-party system, Gökalp maintains that, in England,

parties restrain each other from going to extremes: "If transformation is analogized to a thoroughbred Arab horse, liberalism and conservatism perform respective functions of the spur and the halter."³⁷ In Turkey, however, Gökâlp regrets, the incomparably larger number of pathological extremist parties, which are also cosmopolitan, anti-nationalist, unpatriotic, and treacherous, have forced the liberals and conservatives into incessant coalitions—as has been the case with both the Union and Progress and the Republican People's parties.³⁸ What Gökâlp arrives at, then, is not a theory of single-partyism, as did the Kemalists, but a reluctant acceptance of the temporary necessity thereof.

In a follow-up article on the "Social Classification of Parties" (1923),³⁹ Gökâlp goes into party-class relations and class bases of political parties. While political classification of parties is based on differences in "conceptions of liberty," he says, social classification of political parties is based on differences in "conceptions of equality" and is, therefore, "according to their class bases." After defining classes, somewhat idiosyncratically, as "those groups which prevent realization of equality in a society, that is, which divide society into unequal parts,"⁴⁰ Gökâlp contrasts the class structures of Europe and Turkey.

According to Gökâlp, there are only two classes in contemporary Europe: the bourgeoisie and the working class.

The bourgeois party disguises itself under different titles in different places: liberal, nationalist, state-socialist, or solidarist.... The constant title of the working class party is socialist. If socialism consists of nationalization (*millileştirme*) only of the larger means of production, it is called collectivism. If it further aims at the socialization (*içtimaileştirme*) of the smaller means of production as well, it is called communism.⁴¹

It is noteworthy that Gökâlp correctly groups solidarism and state socialism under the bourgeois style of politics along with liberalism, and not as "third-way" alternatives between capitalism and socialism.

As a matter of fact, noting the extent of class polarization in Europe, Gökâlp, writing in 1923, further states that today most bourgeois parties have become fascist, while most socialist parties have been bolshevized. That the "revolutionary communism" of the working class was averted by "the famous Mussolini's creation of an armed Fascist party out of 300,000 bourgeois youth" is not peculiar to Italy; it is being replicated in all of Europe: "Communists consider the bourgeoisie usurpers and thieves.... Fascists see the communists as an unpatriotic group determined to destroy the national ideal and culture."⁴²

Given the date of this writing, Gökâlp's perception is both an overstatement and a foresight when he says that in all countries, cities, and towns of Europe, there are "two fronts," which are archenemies of each other. As for the ques-

tion of the side with which Gökalp's sympathies lay, there is no doubt: on the bourgeois side—yet neither in the liberal nor in the fascist form, but in the solidarist form, which we have been calling in this study solidaristic corporatism as opposed to fascistic corporatism, all of which, however, Gökalp recognizes as the political formations of capitalist societies.

Gökalp also predicts that this "internal chaos" of Europe, progressively spreading, will keep the Europeans from intervening in the colonized Islamic states fighting for their freedom and independence,⁴³ initiating another common theme of the Kemalists.

Classes in Turkey, on the other hand, "cannot be reduced to two," says Gökalp, meaning that no class polarization has yet taken place. There are four classes in Turkey:

1. Feudal lords (*Feodal reisler*)
2. Petty bourgeoisie (*Küçük burjuvalar*)
3. Unorganized workers (*Teşkilatsız ameleler*)
4. Serfs (*Fellahlar-Serfler*)⁴⁴

While in Europe "social and political evolution" has liquidated feudal lords and serfs, "a kind of feudalism still exists in some southern provinces" in Turkey. Distinguishing between "political-legal feudalism" and "economic feudalism," Gökalp notes that "this feudalism is not an official institution possessing legal sanctions.... Our laws recognize neither feudal lords nor serfs. Our constitution [1921] accepts all individuals as partners in national sovereignty"⁴⁵; thus, he supplies another instance of his definition of *halkçılık* as political democracy and legal equality.

What is significant in Gökalp's comparison of class structures in Europe and Turkey is that he is the only, certainly the only important, person of his period who admits the existence of feudal structures (as opposed to the Kemalist position of ignoring them, mainly because of a political alliance therewith). Despite his corporatism, which takes occupational groups rather than classes as primary categories of social and political life, Gökalp has the intellectual integrity not to deny the *existence of classes*, as did the Kemalists who were to formulate a theory of "classless society." This certainly does not mean that Gökalp is favorably disposed toward the *struggle of classes*. His solidaristic corporatism, like Durkheim's, is based on the proposition that class struggle should, and can be, averted by the "intercalation" of occupational groups and corporations between the state and the individual.

Gökalp also specifically mentions "petty" bourgeoisie and "unorganized" workers, implying that the reason for the non-existence of class polarization, not of classes themselves, is the numerical and organizational weakness of the two fundamental classes.

Today, we have neither a *conscious* bourgeois class nor a *conscious* working class. Therefore, the time has not yet come in Turkey for the working class to struggle

against the bourgeois class. The bourgeois class has two historical roles which have not yet been performed in our country. The first of these is to put an end to feudalism; the second is to create a national industry. The bourgeois class, before it becomes a harmful element, emerges as a useful factor. Its first job is to destroy feudalism in the villages. Therefore, it is necessary for us first to put an end to the graver harms caused by feudalism before putting an end to the harms of the bourgeoisie. In all European nations, it is the bourgeoisie that has uprooted feudalism by its struggles against feudal lords. With us, too, it can only be the bourgeoisie who will put an end to feudalism. It is a fact that, in the southern provinces, those who are on the side of the government and the people are only those who practice commerce and crafts in the cities. However, what is regrettable is the fact that, in our country, this class is as yet very weak. For this reason, it has not been able to effect the transformation it is obligated to carry out against feudalism. As to its duty to create a national industry and economic organization, the bourgeoisie has not done that either."

In this passage, Gökalp accepts the historically progressive mission of the bourgeoisie as well as its "harm"s. This is misleading unless we know that (see Chapter Seven) what Gökalp abhors is only certain sections of the bourgeoisie, namely, the commercial and financial bourgeoisie who make abnormal profits in non-productive activities. In contrast, he espouses the development of a national industrial bourgeoisie, which has also been the goal of both Unionists and Kemalists. It may also be misleading to infer from this passage that Gökalp anticipates a socialist revolution eventually as well. From all that we know about Gökalp's solidaristic corporatism, his major effort was to pre-empt that eventuality. Even in his most fatalistic moments, he maintained that, should the "ideal of socialism" emerge ultimately, it may do so only as a "subordinate of nationalism," the supreme ideal."

Gökalp concludes on the problematic relationship between classes and parties in Turkey as follows:

The People's Party is not only bound to include the liberals and the conservatives within its ranks and in coalition *for some time to come* in order to eliminate reactionaries and radicals whose presence is detrimental to the fatherland; it is also obligated to unite the workers and the bourgeoisie within its bosom until it neutralizes the lords and extremists (sic) of economic feudalism by assimilating them in the mass of people, and until a national economy and large-scale industry are created in the country. In such important times, when the fatherland needs absolute unity, formation of an all-inclusive party, which shall embrace the whole nation, will also save the nation from the partisanship which causes nothing but disunity."

Here we have another instance of Gökalp's codifying salient themes of the period, namely, the necessity for and rationalization of a single-party system, which was to last until 1945. But there is a difference: Gökalp proposes a single party only "for some time to come" and does not equate partisanship necessarily with party politics, given his brand of two-partism (alongside functional representation, to be sure). In short, he does not advance a "heavy

of one-partyism," as the Kemalists later did. But before passing to his views on the Republican People's Party, we must first review Gökalp's views on the system of representation of interests.

The Corporative National Assembly

Translation of Gökalp's social corporatism into constitutional corporatism receives explicit formulation in 1922. After the aborting of constitutional corporatism during the constitutional debate of 1920-1921 while he was still in exile in Malta, Gökalp brings the question on to the agenda again in 1922 in anticipation of the 1924 constitution. In an article entitled "Evolution of Turkish Constitutionalism,"⁴⁹ he states with sociologistic conviction that "the most perfect national assembly from the sociological point of view is one which represents all solidarities [or solidary groups] of the nation."⁵⁰

With a view to simulating the "mechanical solidarities" (primary moral ties based on collective emotions) and the "organic solidarities" (secondary moral ties based on division of labor and economic interdependence) of the national society in the representative assembly, Gökalp suggests that three kinds of deputies should be elected:

1. "Local" (i-mechanical) deputies to be elected by respective provinces, who know local issues and are well known in the localities;
2. "National" (i-mechanical) deputies to be elected on a nation-wide basis, who know the national interest and are well known by the nation; and
3. "Occupational" (i-organic) deputies who will represent the respective interests of occupational groups, such as doctors, teachers, engineers, merchants, artisans, and populists (sic).⁵¹

Gökalp states that the present national assembly (1920-1923) is deficient in this respect, and that in the next elections the number of local-provincial deputies should be maintained but fifty more national and fifty more occupational deputies should be elected. Thus, the local and occupational deputies will check the "universalism" of the national deputies, while the latter will check the "particularism" of the former two. Gökalp also adds, in almost the exact words of Durkheim's "Preface," that the fifty occupational seats should be "divided justly among the nation's occupations according to their scientific and practical values."⁵²

In this mixed corporative parliament, members of which will be elected on three bases, all of the "public," "private," and "occupational" "lives and consciences" of the nation will be represented, making the assembly "sociologically most acceptable." Yet, Gökalp supulates another condition: the next elections should be by direct vote, for the present second-degree voting is "inadmissible" in a democratic form of government.⁵³

The kind of corporative assembly Gökalp proposes is what has been called "mixed corporatism" in corporatist constitutional theory, whereby functional representation is coupled with territorial representation. Unlike the usual formula of two houses so elected, Gökalp does not entirely forego the classic liberal principle of territorial representation, as was to be the case with "pure corporatism" of the fascistic corporatist regimes of the Europe soon thereafter.

Gökalp does not go so far as to declare bankrupt parliaments elected on the territorial principle and composed of political parties; he only wishes to complement these with the corporative principle of functional representation. In an article on "Individualistic Government—Social Government" (1922),⁴⁴ he states that most European parliamentary systems are "individualistic governments" because they are elected solely on territorial and sectional bases, and therefore motivated by self-interest and political ambition. In most of Europe, "societies are governed by individuals," which is "sociologically erroneous"; while in Turkey, through the representation of all solidarities, the society should be governed by a group of idealistic, public-spirited, specialized men who would constitute a microcosm of the national society.

It must be emphasized that Gökalp's constitutional corporatism is not an isolated proposal. It is merely the political extension of his general corporatist theory of society. In an article entitled "Social Types" (1914),⁴⁵ which he wrote shortly after his acquaintance with Durkheim's work, Gökalp offers an evolutionary view of future national societies. He classifies nations into five species according to their social structures: (1) feudal nations (village basis), (2) communal societies (urban basis), (3) city-states, (4) compound societies (communal towns and feudal villages), (5) corporative societies.

In the [first four] species of nations mentioned above, the basic units are territorial groups, that is, villages and towns. The basic units in corporative societies, on the other hand, are corporate bodies which have a national character.... Guilds exist in communal societies, but their activities are confined to the communes. In corporative societies, these organizations assume a national character by having federative councils in metropolitan centers composed of their delegates. ...*The most advanced nations of Europe are developing in this direction....* In the light of this classification, it will be seen that the Turkish nation belongs to the communal type, and that in the future it will develop into a corporative nation."

In his estimate and expectation of corporative societies as the highest stage of development, Gökalp, in a sense, adumbrates later European theoreticians of corporatism, most notably among them Mihail Manoilescu, who hailed the era as the "century of corporatism." Also, Gökalp's corporatism is the "modern," that is, national version of corporatism, as opposed to the pre-modern or medieval, that is, the "municipal" version of it. Like Durkheim, among others, Gökalp is well aware of the difference between the traditional

municipal, and decentralized guild system and a modern, centralized corporative organization at the national level. Finally, when Gökâlp says modernization, certainly meaning Westernization, this is not the liberal West, but it is the corporatist West.

In 1915, Gökâlp wrote another article on "The Procedure to be Followed in the Study of an Ethnic Community,"⁵⁷ in which he came close to suggesting an integral corporatism, one that seemed to extend to the fields of culture, morality, religion, fine arts, literature, pure and applied sciences:

Culture may also express itself in a material organization. Various cultural corporative organizations may be connected to a center of specialization in the metropolitan city, where a great cultural league composed of the representatives of these centers may be formed. We may call this type of a nation a nation with a corporative basis.⁵⁸

These "cultural authorities," however, are to be "entirely separate from the executive and legislative powers."⁵⁹ Thus, Gökâlp's integral corporatism is not a monistic one which subordinated cultural and ethical corporations to the control of a totalitarian state; it is pluralist and autonomy-conscious, although comprehensive. On this very decisive issue of the nature of the relationship between the national corporative organization of occupational groups and the state, Gökâlp was misunderstood and misrepresented although he was unequivocally clear.⁶⁰

In his chapter on "Legal Turkism" in the *Principles of Turkism* (1923), Gökâlp explicitly and unambiguously states his view on the delicate relationship between the corporations of civil society and the political state. Legal Turkism has three aims. One is to create a modern state without any vestige of theocracy and clericalism, where legal equality and popular sovereignty are supreme. The second is to create a modern family system. The third is

...to free occupational authorities and jurisdictions from the interference of public authority and jurisdiction by establishing occupational autonomies based on the authority of specialists.⁶¹

Gökâlp adds that the autonomy of occupational organizations, such as the university, the bar, the societies of doctors, teachers, and engineers should be ensured by new legislation. Hence, in Gökâlp's system, occupational groups or their corporations are to be autonomous in their own domain of jurisdiction and not to be legally subordinated to the political state. It is this democratic pluralism and legal-political autonomy that distinguishes Gökâlp's and, of course, Durkheim's solidaristic corporatism from the later Kemalist practice of state control and direction of occupational groups and, of course, from the fascist corporatism of some future European regime where the state was to dominate civil society and corporate groups as well as individuals. In other words: "Everything within the state, nothing outside the state."

Leader, Party, and the State

Gökalp was also highly misunderstood on the interrelated questions of leadership, the single party, and the state. The fact that Gökalp emphasized the importance of leaders, elites, the temporary necessity of an inclusive political party, and of economic étatism was indiscriminately interpreted as the direct source of the "chief-system," tutelary elitism, and the authoritarian single-partyism and quasi-totalitarian statism of the Kemalist period of 1920-1945.

Although Ziya Gökalp, as a thinker who could not totally transcend his times, did not do much to shake the then dominant elements of Turkish political culture, he certainly did not intentionally reinforce these to the extreme degree to which they subsequently came to unfold. The explanation for such inaccurate attributions lies in a failure to appreciate the moral and theoretical reservations Gökalp entered on these issues, and in an irresponsible conversion of some of his slogans into representations of his central ideas.

To begin with, certain poems he wrote on the Unionist and Kemalist leaders, in which he addressed them as "heroes," "geniuses," "saviours and guides" of the nation, have been interpreted not only as extolling strong men, but also as political opportunism on his part. Hilmi Z. Ülken, for instance, is of this opinion in the preface he wrote to a collection of Gökalp's writings.⁶ If, however, one carefully reads the poems Gökalp wrote on Talat Paşa, Enver Paşa, and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,⁷ one can easily see that they contain surprisingly similar words and themes which, placed in the proper context of his theoretical views on society, the intellectual elite, and his philosophy of social idealism, reveal nothing but personal and political integrity and intellectual, if pedantic, consistency. In these poems, Gökalp sees these leaders as the "consciousness-of-society," as its "unifying spirit," and as the personification of the nation's will, "knowing the intention of the people."⁸

What Gökalp wished to see in all these leaders was an instrument of national revival based on popular culture. Given his "social idealism," which accorded the status of an independent variable in history to ideas and human will without being too voluntaristic, any nationalist leader would do for Gökalp if he promised to serve as the bridge of "can" between the "is" and the "ought." In other words, no personality cult or idolatry is involved here, especially given Gökalp's insistence on, and personal example of, critical reason and individual morality. If a period of "Eternal Chief" (Atatürk) and "National Chief" (İnönü) was subsequently ushered in in Turkey, the chief being both head of the state and president of the single party, that had less to do with Gökalp's teachings than the "Fuehrer Prinzip" epidemic of the times.

The fertile ground provided by the patrimonial and sultanic political tradition in Turkey indeed explains a large part of the Kemalist "chief-system."⁹

What Gökalp did in this respect could only be seen as a subjective attempt to de-accentuate this atavistic political culture. But since he could not offer a radical negation of but only pluralist restraints to it, in accordance with his emphasis on individual dignity, his views on the subject were fraught with unintended consequences to the contrary. He wrote, for example, on "Genius" (1916) in the following manner:

Intellectuals! Forsake your vanity.
From the people, learn the national culture.
....
They are the conscience; you are the consciousness.
Consciousness without roots is insanity."

This might well have been taken, which it was, as a call to, and rationalization of, tutelary elitism and, read in conjunction with the sort of poems above, as an idealization of geniuses and heroes.

The nature of Gökalp's views concerning heroes and geniuses is somewhat different, and can be seen better in his theoretical prose writings. In an article on "Sociology and Ideas: The Influence of Great Men on Society" (1917),¹ Gökalp writes that

...exceptional men may be classified into two main groups: the reformer and the inventor. The reformer (messenger of a religion, a conqueror, a great revolutionary leader, a hero) is characterized by a strong faith and intense will, powerful enough to initiate new movements in history. The inventor, on the other hand, is the man who has achieved great strides in the progress of a branch of learning and civilization by an invention or discovery.... The intensification of [mechanical] solidarity gives rise to the reformer, while increasing division of labor leads to the rise of inventor."²

Gökalp continues:

The reformer....is a precursor who in his own soul experiences in a most distinct and intensified manner the trends of unification and rejuvenation already begun among the people.... The reformer plays the role of consciousness in the trends towards nationhood already begun in a people.... This type of great man is the product and the symbol of awakening of the common national *sentiments* already existing in the unconscious [i.e. the collective conscience!]³

Moreover,

...the rise of the inventor is a product of the division of labor. Like the reformer, the inventor too is at first the product of social evolution and then a cause of it. Just as it is the innovation itself which makes the reformer and not the reformer who makes the innovation, so the force which creates the inventor is the need felt by the social conscience and pre-existing conditions.... The *specialist* is not merely a supplement to another specialist, but also a special organ and thus an integral part of a nation."⁴

Thus Gökalp defines "great men," the heroic reformer and the specialist inventor, both of whom he calls "genius"es. Great men constitute the creative

imagination of nations and, as such, they are devoid of a reflective will and analytical method. This inspired from of creative intelligence is called "genius."⁷¹ It is these geniuses who make nations achieve "historic drives".

It should be borne in mind, however, that just as their inspirations come from the collective conscience, so men of genius appear only at the inspired moments of ingenious nations. The man of genius is a person who, beyond his will, makes his own soul a reflecting surface to the ingenious power concealed in the nation. The coming of a genius requires also certain organic preconditions besides social ones. Every person does not have the capacity to become a social medium. Social conditions, thus, are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the rise of great men.⁷²

But there is a third kind of "intellectual elite" for Gökalp—the men of reason in general, the sociologist in particular:

For the advancement of a nation, men of genius are not necessarily required. Because...there is also an analytic and critical mind [of a nation] which is expressed by its men of learning.... Sociology does not deny the influence of the individual over society as some erroneously claim, but as Durkheim said, it explains the nature of this influence. The influence of the individual is exercised through men either of genius or of reason. Genius is the spontaneous realization of the changes taking place in society unconsciously, which can be carried out, however, also through reason and science of society.⁷³

It may have become clearer that Gökalp, whatever the merit of his sociological analysis of great men and leaders, is not making a case for an idealized or mystified role of great men in history.⁷⁴ let alone furnishing irrational justifications for personal political domination. From the tedious quotations I have supplied, it at least becomes clear that Gökalp makes room for scientific rationality and individual reason, if not giving a higher place to the man of learning and to the rational philosopher than to the heroic man of action and the brilliant man of positive science and technology.

The reason that I emphasize the point is twofold. On the one hand, Gökalp has been much misused or abused as the "theoretical father" of strong leadership and authoritarian rule both during the Kemalist period and in our day. Gökalp is certainly the formulator of modern Turkish political idiom, but not of the distortions of his thought. Atatürk may have said, as he is reported to have done,⁷⁵ that "the father of his emotions is Namık Kemal, and the father of his ideas is Ziya Gökalp," without, of course, according Gökalp any official status as the ideologue of new Turkey. But for Gökalp, greatness and genius always presupposed sincere acceptance of the supremacy of the people, its culture and its political sovereignty.

On the other hand, Gökalp stands out as a democratic and rational analysis of leadership in an age when theories of charismatic leaders, plebiscitarian dictators, duces and Fuehrers, "electric currents between the chiefs and the people," and iron laws of oligarchy were in the making in European political

and social thought. At a minimum, faith in the rationality of the citizen and the effectiveness of parliaments was in decline; ascendant was the belief in the irrationality of the masses and the necessity of dirigist elites and leaders. With his sceptical optimism in human reason, Gökalp did not travel that path to such extremes, despite his criticism of liberalism as a viable model *in toto*. In that post-Freudian age when hierarchic models of society and authoritarian leadership could find even an anthropological-psychological justification through the concept of "ego-ideal," Gökalp stuck to a solidaristic yet also egalitarian system, however fraught that synthesis was with tensions. In "Toward Genius" (1922), Gökalp would still write that "...the source of genius is the people. Men of genius are conscious reflections of the people's conscience."⁷⁶

In an article on "Domination and Authority" (1923),⁷⁷ Gökalp contrasts two forms of power. *Sulta*, by which he means personal domination, is arbitrary, antithetical to liberty, equality, and democracy, and characteristic of the patriarchal family and feudal and imperial systems. *Velayet*, by which he means legitimate power, or simply authority, is the foundation of democracy and social order. While "private authority" (*velayeti hassa*) provides "discipline" (*inzibat*) in the family, "public authority" (*velayeti amme*) provides discipline in the society. By discipline Gökalp means obedience to rules and performance of duties, and adds that in a society without discipline, there can be no liberty and equality. With this obvious move away from individualistic liberalism and in view of the familiar configuration of family-discipline-social order, Gökalp once again seems to sail into waters reminiscent of fascistic corporatism; but he, once more, stops short at the edge of solidaristic seas.

Despite his idiom, we know from his previous views on democracy in the family and on pluralism in social and political life that Gökalp's call for discipline has its origin in a concern to keep together a post-war and post-empire society and to achieve national revival and development through unity and solidarity. Atomistic tendencies in the political and economic life and anomie in the cultural and moral life of the nation must have seemed fatal to him. His further definition of authority, however, is more problematic than anything he has said so far: "Authority is the influence over us of a leader (*reis*) whom we love and respect.... those who have to be forced to obey [him] are those who do not carry in their hearts the love and respect [due him] that are the bases of authority."⁷⁸ In this circular definition of authority, Gökalp introduces for the first time, and in contradiction to the opening lines of the article itself, a definition of authority as a personal influence devoid of any objective legal norm or institutionalized rule. Secondly, he fails to indicate normative criteria for love and respect, whereby any critical distinction between a desirable leader and an incumbent leader is blurred. Although Gökalp

later enters the reservation that "if the leader (*veli*) exercises his authority against the good of those who are under his authority, that authority becomes null and void,"⁷⁹ the conditions for it are left unspecified. Nor is "the good defined at all. It remains for us to fill in the blank with "service to social solidarity and the public interest," given Gökalp's solidaristic corporatism. Elsewhere, in fact, Gökalp, using the same terminology, says that in political parties principles are more important than persons and factions, and that the importance of persons and their authority (*velayet*) derives from their representing these principles.⁸⁰

A comparable ambiguity surrounds Gökalp's views on the subject of single-partyism and strong executive. In a brochure entitled *Doğru Yol*,⁸¹ written in 1923 to explicate and endorse the platform of Atatürk's party, Gökalp asserts that separation of powers, even balance of powers, leads to "anarchy" by tempting the executive to attempt "coups d'état" against the legislature, and that the system of unity of powers which is adopted by the 1921 Constitution is the most "natural" one.⁸² Gökalp, however, meant this in the sense of concentration of powers in the national assembly as the microcosm of society, functionally and otherwise. The Kemalists were to invert Gökalp's "natural-ity" theory diametrically to justify their concentration of powers in the executive, which, in turn, came to be centralized in the person of Kemal Atatürk and, later, İsmet İnönü. Despite the *de jure* limiting verbiage of the 1921 and the 1924 Constitutions, Atatürk as the head of state, president of the assembly, *ex-officio* chairman of the council of ministers, and, of course, as the "inalterable general president" of the single-party, became the apex of a "chief-system." A constitutional theory of dictatorship was not explicitly developed in the sense of the "enabling acts" of some European countries; but the conversion of Gökalp's "natural-ity of the unity of powers" into a justification of executive supremacy, as opposed to parliamentary supremacy, was nevertheless completed.⁸³ Before long, full-fledged Kemalist theories of single-partyism and totalitarian statism flourished, accompanied by a host of corporatist institutions and legislation. (I examine these in a separate study.)

Gökalp had no "theory" of leader or single-party or state. Such was precluded by his democratic and egalitarian populism, by his emphasis on the function of political parties alongside occupational representation, by his solidaristic corporatism which postulated subordination of the state to the corporations, and by his insistence on the supremacy of the partly corporative parliament over the executive. At any rate, subsequent Kemalist developments such as the following were contrary to the spirit and letter of everything he said:

Therefore, it is wrong today, particularly for us Turks, to posit the nation as a concept contradictory to the state. Today, a Turkish child who incorporates the Turkish genius in his person is at the head of the nation. We have no parties; party

means part, party means separation. [But] it is out of the question to seize, by this or that means, the unity of powers called the state and to use the state power against other groups. The organization which can perfectly be called today the *Republican People's Organification* instead of the *Republican People's Party* consists of the gathering of those citizens whom the nation has chosen as its guides to govern its destiny. And of course, there exists a guide of the guides, and he is the greatest Turk, Atatürk. This organic hierarchy, which is directed from below to above to the head of the state, is but the materialization of the thesis of state and the antithesis of nation as the synthesis of Turkism. Therefore, it is possible to define the state according to the ideology of the Turkish transformation (*inkılap*) by this short sentence: 'The state is the nation gathered around its Father [Ata].'⁴

In an article entitled "Whom Should I Vote For?" (1923)⁵ Gökâlp optimistically endorsed Atatürk's People's Party, affirming that it met all his requirements: (1) trustworthy leaders, (2) a clear and sound program, and (3) libertarian (*hürriyetperver*), progressivist (*terakkîperver*), modernist (*ümücedid*) and egalitarian (*müsavatçı*) principles. In this piece, Gökâlp repeats his staple specifications for leaders. What is more interesting is his elaboration of the principle of egalitarianism: a party which works for the public interest must needs be egalitarian. Accordingly, it should deliver the people from the "domination of privileged and oppressive classes,"⁶ the sort of prescriptions that would not make their way even into the verbiage of the Republican People's Party's programs.

National Democracy and International Peace

For Gökâlp, very much like Kant, peace is the basic moral norm. Peace, in turn, presupposes equality: equality among citizens and equality among nations. Without taking into account this profoundly egalitarian dimension, the democratic nature of Gökâlp's thought cannot be appreciated.

In a series of articles entitled "Yeni Türkiye'nin Hedefleri" (The Goals of New Turkey),⁷ written shortly before his death, Gökâlp lays down his "principles of democracy" or "principles of the democratic ideal," to each of which he devotes an article:

1. "Equality of Races" (Irkların Müsaviligi)
2. "Equality of Nations" (Milletlerin Müsaviligi)
3. "Equality of Sexes" (Kadınla Erkeğin Müsaviligi)
4. "Equality of Castes and Classes" (Kastların ve Sınıfların Müsaviligi)
5. "Affection Among Nations" (Milletlerin Sevismesi)
6. "Removal of Artificial Inequalities" (Sunî Eşitsizliklerin Kaldırılması) "and Substitution of Natural Inequalities" (ve Tabii Eşitsizliklerin İkamesi)
7. "Men Are Free" (İnsanlar Hürdürler)."

In other words, democracy for Gökâlp is based on equality, liberty, and affection among races, nations, men, sexes, and classes.

In the "Equality of Races," Gökâlp reiterates his previous views that reject basing nationalism on racism. After stating that democracy, the most ad-

vanced form of government, requires equality, he takes issue with authors who reduce social phenomena to biological heredity with a view to arguing for the superiority of some races over others. He irrevocably states that such utilization of biology against equality and, therefore, against democracy is inadmissible.⁸⁶ Citing Durkheim, Gökalp asserts that men are born asocial and receive their social characteristics from the society through education. Since no hereditary, pre-determined handicap is in question, all races can advance in civilization.⁸⁷

In the "Equality of Nations," Gökalp, by a typical pairing of concepts, explicitly states that if the first principle of democracy (*halkçılık*) is the equality of races, its second principle is the equality of nations. Rejecting LeBon's definition of nation as a "historical race" and his idea that all ethnic groups have a "racial character" due to hereditarily transmitted traits, Gökalp maintains that a "national character" can be spoken of only as transmitted through education based on national culture.⁸⁸

Gökalp argues that the peoples of a country can become a nation through common culture even if they originally belonged to different groups.⁸⁹ He once more rejects LeBon's explanation of the degeneration of nations on grounds of mixing with other races, and argues that the cause of national and social disintegration is the loss of national culture and mixing with foreign cultures, not races.⁹⁰ For Gökalp, the real causes of social evolution and decay are demographic, morphological, geographic, and cultural factors, not racial or hereditary ones.⁹¹

In the "Equality of Castes and Classes," Gökalp refers to the research of Célestine Bouglé, another solidarist sociologist, stating that scientific sociology has shown that the caste system does not bring, through heredity, any improvement in the techniques transmitted intergenerationally, and reaching the conclusion that the reason for, and the justification of, inequalities in the caste system should be sought not in racial superiority but elsewhere.⁹² The answer he offers, however, is less in the nature of explaining how this particular social stratification originates than how societies ideologically reproduce their given social structure. Yet, the normative thrust of Gökalp's stance at least is unequivocal. Under the impact of their collective conscience and shared value judgments, he says, societies "produce a hierarchy that puts groups (*zumreler*) and things (*şeyler*) into a mystic classification."⁹³ This ideational production (or ideological reproduction, if you will), Gökalp continues, may be based on religion at certain times or on other normative systems at others. At any rate, it is not heredity but social phenomena that give rise to inequalities; therefore, Gökalp, taking a normative position, suggests that these inequalities should be removed through the collective conscience, that is, by the inculcation (*telkin*) of the norms of "equality" and "freedom" in all groups and individuals — which norms, we

may add, are already implanted in the collective conscience as a philosophical derivative of Ziya Gökalp's solidaristic version of egalitarianism.

In "Affection among Nations," Gökalp condemns the theory that competition, hate, and war among nations is the basic law of evolution, and makes a case for affectionate cooperation and peace. He criticizes those "imperialist" authors, such as Von Bernhardi, who try to adapt Darwin's "assumption" of the survival of the fittest to social life as a prop for their thesis of might is right. Gökalp adds that Darwinism has only partial explanatory value even in zoology and botany, while it has no relevance whatsoever for social phenomena, which are incomparably more complex.⁹

A manipulated Darwinism, says Gökalp, can only be used to justify "slavery, serfdom, feudalism, imperialism, absolutism, chauvinism, and bigotry," which are all against the "ideal of democracy," which in turn requires "abolition of all institutions that violate freedom and equality."¹⁰ Thus, Gökalp rejects any and all social Darwinism and glorification of belligerence, common in his age. He further adds that "it is the bigoted monks and imperialists and capitalists who make nations enemies of each other."¹¹ If it were not for these, brotherhood would prevail among nations who are natural friends. Encompassing the diversity of national cultures, there is the international community of nations held together by civilizational solidarities, such as economic interdependence and scientific exchange.¹²

In "Removal of Artificial Inequalities," Gökalp makes a Rousseauesque critique of civil society and emerges as a radical democrat. He maintains that most of the existing inequalities, such as those between slave and master, sharecropper and landlord, worker and boss, the uneducated and the educated, are all the result of man-made social institutions like slavery, serfdom, property, and inheritance. Gökalp considers these artificial inequalities, as opposed to natural inequalities deriving from constitutional abilities.¹³

After posing the rhetorical question, "Can a society *progress in order* in civilization if its intelligent individuals remain agricultural workers and its stupid individuals preside over the most important institutions?"¹⁴ Gökalp states that every child should be "born into equal rights" as regards nutrition and education, above all.¹⁵ In this Rousseauesque egalitarianism, which is simultaneously Durkheimian, if not Comtean, with its "progress in order" principle, Gökalp not only reaffirms the principle of equality of opportunity but also seems to hesitate at the edge of "equality of conditions," at least in so far as children are concerned. Otherwise, and all-consistent with his solidaristic corporatism, which is directed against a critique of civil society as liberal capitalism without involving a radical critique of capitalism itself, Gökalp concludes: "But to attain this goal, it is not necessary to be Bolshevik or communist, not even collectivist or socialist."¹⁶ *Halkçılık* (here Gökalp uses the term both as democracy and populism) can succeed in this respect

Gökâlp's insistence on equality of opportunity as a basic principle of democracy is meant both for the free development of the individual and for the benefit of the society. "As a matter of fact, the goal of democracy is not a stubborn egalitarianism.... Complete justice means giving everybody his due."¹⁰⁷ Although couched in a manner reminiscent of the Platonic notion of distributive justice, what Gökâlp means here is that, in simple solidaristic fashion, rewards should be proportionate to the service an individual renders to the society. "Social worth is measured by social service."¹⁰⁸ Conversely, it is also the obligation of society to remove those inequalities that are its own creation: "Social justice requires that all individuals are favored (*ımazhar*) by the society with equal care (*ihımmam*) and protection (*hımaye*)."¹⁰⁹ Gökâlp adds that upon removal of artificial inequalities, only natural inequalities will remain, which, however, can be reduced by education and training, if not eliminated completely.¹¹⁰

According to Gökâlp, there are three basic kinds of social goods (*ıctımai nimetler*): political rights, educational and cultural opportunities (*ıfevızler*), and tools and techniques (*ıalet ve teknikler*) of production (ownership of which leads to "wealth").¹¹¹ "So, all human children born into the world would be equally endowed by the society with these three kinds of social forces (*ıctımai kuvvetler*). To give to one class some of these but not to others would be to violate social harmony (*ıahenk*)."¹¹² Thus, continues Gökâlp, in Turkey women are given education, but not the vote; the landless peasants are given the right to elect and be elected, but nothing is done about their condition of oppression by the landlords. Furthermore, they do not have the freedom to travel and move away, for they are tied down by their debts.¹¹³

In "Men are Free," Gökâlp begins by saying, now that he has destroyed the case for inequality based on biology, that he can proceed to destroy cases against freedom based on psychology. He argues that individualistic psychological desires and passions can be overcome by the power of social ideals, that is, both by "emotional will" (*ıvecdı irade*) and by "rational will" (*ıcehdı irade*);¹¹⁴ in other words, by cognitive and affective solidaristic morality. Gökâlp concludes on the note that political freedom presupposes spiritual freedom, which is a social product as well. And this is something diametrically opposed to any notion of political tutelage and guided democracy by a single party.

From these not too profound observations on democracy and international peace, Gökâlp nevertheless emerges as an unequivocal egalitarian and humanist. He may be supplanting the atomistic individualistic conceptions of equality and freedom by a solidaristic version of these, but to go all the way in suggesting, as many have done, Turkish or foreign, that his nationalism is aggressive and expansionist and his populism is totalitarian and anti-democratic has to be considered inaccurate, to say the least.

CHAPTER SEVEN

PROBLEMS OF GÖKALP'S POLITICAL THEORY

Political Philosophy and Political Theory

Gökalp calls his system "social idealism" (*ictimai mefkûrecilik*) and "social solidarism" (*ictimai tesanütçülük*) depending on the context. Writing on politics, he terms his theory "social democracy" when he means a form of government, or "social populism" when he means a system of political beliefs. Both meanings he renders by the phrase *ictimai halkçılık*, *halkçılık* thus meaning either democracy or populism. Still another term he employs in his political writings is "social government" (*ictimai hükümet*).

There is an underlying logic and a conscious plan to such a seeming proliferation of concepts. The distinctive element in all this is Gökalp's systematic usage of "solidarist" as antithetical to "socialist." And when he uses *ictimai halkçılık*, the literal translation of that term as "social democracy" should not mislead, for what he means is essentially populist democracy or solidaristic democracy, with no technical social democratic content; and, of course, it is an antithesis to liberal democracy.

We can schematically, but not incorrectly, state that Gökalp's political-social *philosophy* is social idealism, his general *social theory* is social solidarism, and his *political theory* is populist democracy.

This conceptual hierarchy within Gökalp's system is quite consistent with his idealistic positivism. An attempt is made to synthesize a philosophical theory which in its departure is highly normative with a methodologically positivistic empirical and analytical theory; and which, to complete the full circle, is again infused with normative elements. Thus, Gökalp's political-social theory is at once a philosophical and empirical theory, one that would bridge, hopefully, theory and practice, one that would analyze objective conditions scientifically in order to transform them in the direction desired.

The emphasis is on the normative rather than the analytic, without, however, foregoing scientific objectivity in the service of idealistic activism. Gökalp thought that there was no inherent contradiction between fact and reason, provided that the former was analyzed and then transformed by the latter. This is quite reminiscent of Hegel's "what is real is rational, and what is rational is real," allowing of course for Gökalp's methodological positivization of Hegel's idealism. Epistemologically, Gökalp, too, remains an idealist: he assigns causal primacy to ideas, although he investigates them as social facts and by a positivistic methodology.

As for the philosophical and ideological orientation of the two authors, Gökalp, like Hegel, can be said to have ultimately emphasized the first clause of the latter's aphorism because of his residual "ideological positivism" stemming from "order and progress" in the Durkheimian, if not Comtean, sense (though not in the same degree as Hegel's conservatism)—despite the radical egalitarian elements in his political and moral philosophy à la Rousseau.

This gives us the major tension in Gökalp's system—the tension between a political-social philosophy which on balance is Rousseauesque in its critique of civil society and in its egalitarian normative aspirations, and a political-social theory which he thought would provide perfect normative and analytic congruence, but which, we may observe, fell short of this happy marriage. His chosen analytic theory was not on a par with his philosophy because it was deficient in providing a radical critique of the civil society he wished to reform.

More specifically, Gökalp's solidaristic *theory* could not provide a sound analysis of the criticized society, nor supply the mechanisms for bringing about the desired society (of his egalitarian and "really solidaristic" philosophy); for it stopped only at a critique of liberalism, or liberal capitalism, without attaining a critique of capitalism itself in its fundamentals as the most recent form of society engendering inequalities and injustices. In these terms, Gökalp's theory was a "weak theory," because it could not carry over his more "developed philosophy" to its realization. And the weakest part of that theory pertained to matters of political economy.

Every political theory, if it is to be something more than a personal subjective philosophy, however developed, has to contain two compartments: a philosophical, moral, normative part—explicitly worked out as such or ontologically lurking behind—and an analytical, theoretical (in the stricter sense) part which rigorously and empirically explains, and proposes, if that may be the case, alternatives for the existing political institutions and arrangements that sustain or make possible those normative principles. It is in this respect, then, that Gökalp's advanced political theory (in the broader sense) remains unfulfilled by his weak political theory (in the narrower sense).

Gökalp's philosophy of social idealism derives from two sources. The first is a residual Durkheimian "ideological positivism," which modifies liberalism as a holistic *model* based on the axiom of atomistic individualism, without, however, foregoing political and cultural pluralism as particular liberal *ideals*. In this sense, Durkheim, as opposed to fascistic corporatism, is not totally anti-liberal, but upholds, like Gökalp, a Kantian philosophical liberalism in his critique of liberalism in general as a historically specific phenomenon. The ideologically positivistic element in Gökalp, like Durkheim, stems from the notion of "order and progress," with all the attendant elements of evolutionary reformism through mildly elitist politics; it is, however, still pluralist

compared to the fascistic corporatist unfolding of the original Comtean idea, with its accompanying authoritarianism, hierarchism, much greater conservatism, and above all, its total negation of liberalism, including all liberal ideals. The fact that neither solidaristic nor fascistic corporatism offers any critique of capitalism itself will be discussed below.

The second constituent part of Gökalp's political philosophy, which, in my evaluation, weighs heavier at this normative level, is the more critical, egalitarian, and radical democratic Rousseauian element. But even this dimension cannot take Gökalp further in the direction of the realization of his philosophical political theory, because the specific analytic political theory to which he consigns the Rousseauian ideals, together with the Durkheimian ones, is his Durkheimian solidaristic corporatist theory—that is, “social solidarism” as the general political-social theory and “populist democracy,” or rather “solidarist democracy,” as the strict political theory, the latter logically following from the former. Consequently, Gökalp's highly humanistic and egalitarian theoretical critique of civil society is arrested at a mere critique of “liberal capitalism,” while his philosophy demands and presses for a critique of “capitalism” in its fundamentals.

It is precisely for this reason that the solidaristic corporatism of Gökalp and others, despite its sincere subjective ideals of equality, liberty, and pluralism (in short, certain universal ideals that became historical only with the advent of liberalism), not only remains as an inadequate analytical demonstration of liberalism as a general model that has become detrimental to the realization of such particular ideals; it also opens, ironically, the theoretical door to the categorical denial and total negation of those very ideals by the fascistic corporatisms, which, after all, belong to the same genus as solidaristic corporatisms in their central axioms at higher levels of abstraction. To put it differently, it was from the chronologically prior solidaristic variants that the fascistic variants of corporatism took their theoretical cue for their critique of liberal capitalism, identifying it mistakenly or rhetorically, as the case may be, with capitalism itself. The only difference, and it is a significant one, was that fascism took the solidaristic critique of liberalism to its logical extreme. Solidaristic corporatism wished to preserve some liberal ideals while criticizing the model, and therefore became inconsistent. Fascistic corporatism had no scruples about throwing away all the ideals with the model, hence achieving, paradoxically, greater consistency than its democratic and humanitarian counterpart species. Since there was no tension between its philosophy and theory, its theory was less contradictory internally. Fascism's inconsistencies in other respects were many, however, and again derived from the lack of a radical critique of capitalism, a defining essence of all corporatist theory and practice.

Gökalp's Political Economy

The incongruence between Gökalp's political philosophy and political theory, as I have suggested, originates in his political economy, which is the weakest part of his system. This is at once part of Gökalp's problem and part of our solution. Despite his emphasis, however ambivalent, on economics and the division of labor, Gökalp, consistent with the essentially idealistic character of his system, approaches political economy as an idealist. The result, I think it will be observed, is poor analysis.

Gökalp concentrated on economic matters at two different stages of his career. The first consists of a series of articles he wrote for *Dişarbakır* and *Peyman* newspapers before the revolution of 1908, for some time during which period he was the secretary-general of Dişarbakır Chamber of Commerce. Most of the views he then adopted were to remain an integral part of his mature views formulated in his third phase, during the period 1922-1924. There is the same fundamental continuity here as elsewhere in Gökalp's thinking. What is more significant is the fact that, despite their inferiority in sophistication to his sociological and political writings, Gökalp's concepts and idiom of political economy, too, provided the conceptual framework within which economic thinking and policies were to be conducted in Turkey thereafter (at least until the Economic Congress of Turkey in 1948).

1. *Property and Interest: Private and Public.* The locus classicus of Gökalp's views on political economy is his short chapter on "Economic Turkism" in *The Principles of Turkism* (1923).¹ After describing the economic life of nomadic Turks and the commercial proficiency of settled Turks in international trade, Gökalp, whatever the merit of these historical observations, argues that the Turks have always founded "economic states" in which economic organization and commercial and industrial activity played a central role in social life. This, he says, can be seen in the great number of old Turkic towns named after various occupations and professions.

Gökalp argues that the old Turks used to produce much and consume much, referring also to the institution of public festivities as a major basis of popular support of political leaders. Gökalp sees no reason why the economic prosperity of the old Turks should not be repeated in the future, with the proviso that the "wealth to be acquired should belong to the public."

Turks love freedom and independence: therefore, they cannot be socialists. But since they love equality, they cannot be liberals either. The system best suited to Turkish culture is solidarism. Private property is legitimate in so far as it serves social solidarity. The attempts of socialists and communists to abolish private property altogether is not justified.... The social ideal of Turks, therefore, is to prevent usurpation of social wealth by individuals without abolishing private property, and to preserve and increase social wealth in order to spend it for the benefit of the public.

It is clear that Gökalp is unequivocally against socialism but not against capitalism *per se*; what he rejects in capitalism is the extreme individualism of its liberal variant which, he thinks, is based on the axiom of private property and private interest unbound by any consideration of social utility and solidarity.

Gökalp envisages a coexistence of private and public property, and proposes a sort of mixed economy which involves both public management and ownership of enterprises beyond liberal interventionism in the economy.

Along with private property, there must be public property. Surplus profits that are the result not of the labor of individuals but of the sacrifices and hardships undertaken by the society should belong to society. It is not legitimate for individuals to appropriate such profits for themselves.⁷

As we shall shortly see, what Gökalp means by public property is state property, not social ownership in the Marxist sense or collective ownership (social but partial) in the Bolshevik sense. (The reader is also referred to the distinction Gökalp previously made between socialization and nationalization). Although Gökalp uses, and quite problematically so, terms like labor or surplus profits, and appropriation, he clearly does not subscribe to any labor theory of value in the technical sense, and therefore, can speak of "profits" that result from "sacrifices and hardships" undertaken by the society. In a manner reminiscent of the "socialists of the chair," Gökalp continues:

Large amounts that are to be realized by appropriating surplus profits or surplus values for the society are to be made the capital of factories and large farms to be established on behalf of society. Returns of such public enterprises are to be reinvested in special care-houses and schools for the poor, orphans, widows, the sick and invalids, the blind and the deaf; in public gardens, museums, theaters, libraries; in health centers for workers and peasants; in country-wide electrification networks. In short, all kinds of misery are to be alleviated, and everything shall be done to provide for the well-being of the public. When this social wealth reaches a certain adequate level, it may even become unnecessary to collect taxes from the people any more. At least, the variety and the amount of taxes may be reduced.⁸

Whatever the feasibility of Gökalp's type of utopian welfare state (utopian because of the means he suggests for its attainment), Gökalp emerges from this passage as an advocate of public interest and social justice, which is entirely consistent with his solidaristic corporatism. What is also problematic is that his expectation of the cessation of taxation at some point leaves the earnings of such public enterprises as the only way to replenish the social wealth fund. The next logical step would be that these should operate on the principle of profitability, but then, the question become "to what extent?" (This was to be one of the main controversies, at least up to 1948, around the state economic enterprises founded by the Kemalists, the major criticism coming

from the "national bourgeoisie", whom the former had in fact set out to strengthen.)

Also problematic are the qualifications of social function and legitimacy Gökalp attaches to private property. In this typical solidaristic position, Gökalp fails to indicate any reasonable criteria that would assure conformity to social solidarity or to ask the fundamental question of whether private property, once recognized as primary and sacred, can at all be so controlled, regardless of the normative intent to do so. Such problems are not manifest to Gökalp, for his typical solidaristic idealism is reinforced in this respect by his Islamic ethics. In an early article on economics in 1907,¹ Gökalp examines four different connotations of fastidiousness (*kanaat*). The first two connotations, not working too much and not consuming too much, he eliminates, and passes on to the other two connotations: not aiming at illegitimate acquisitions and not reserving one's wealth exclusively for one's self. He argues that the commendable kind of fastidiousness is a combination of these two dispositions—in a sense, the first being a necessary, the second a sufficient, condition of fastidiousness. And from these paired concepts, Gökalp arrives at the secular notions of legitimate, that is, normal profit and redistribution of wealth by taxation.

There is no oriental resignation and unworldly obscurantism involved in this particular interpretation of *kanaat*; on the contrary, it is much like a work ethic similar to that of ascetic Protestantism, perhaps even approaching Calvinistic undertones: "The intrinsic value and respectability [of an individual] is proportionate to his work and acquisitions."² Here, there is both a religious and a secular, solidaristic element present. Gökalp goes on to say that God loves those who work a lot and who earn a lot, and then he secularizes the argument: "To work hard and to earn a lot is man's duty. The service of each individual to his state and country is equal to the amount of his work."³—provided the work and the returns do not breach social solidarity. For

In fact, acquisitions, that is, legitimate wealth, are not solely the product of a man's own work (*sey*). Wealth is acquired by personal endeavor as well as by providential favor, by the protective encouragement of the state, and by mutual social assistance.⁴

By this religious-turned-secular reasoning, Gökalp lays out nothing less than the foundation of the Kemalist as well as Unionist ideology and policy of "creating a national bourgeoisie" through neo-mercantilist policies of state protection and franchises; these evidently go quite well with his solidaristic corporatism, which does not deny, normatively or analytically, the *existence* of socio-economic classes, but argues that *struggle* between classes may well be averted if the emphasis is shifted from classes to occupational groups and if

economic inequalities are sweetened by solidaristic and Islamic charity. In fact, Gökâlp proceeds to prescribe that "those distinguished by useful and religiously commendable deeds" should assist the needy classes of the society by giving alms and donating to hospitals and orphanages.¹¹ Such behavior would not only be socially utilitarian but also be commendable in the providential eye. In a poem called "Zekât" ("Alms-giving") (1908), Gökâlp wrote:

An industrious, intelligent man earns a lot of money;
One thinks all this is the remuneration of his labors.
But no, these monies are the property of all the people,
For in it included is the work of all men.

....

What is a nation? Think of a mutual assistance company.
In this company, there is the labor and the vote of each individual;
In the wealth of the rich, there is the share of the poor.

Oh, the fortunate one! I am not telling you to distribute all your wealth.
That is your right; but every year give one fortieth of it as *zekât*.
Give to the poor from your earnings the share that belongs to them.¹²

Gökâlp's views may be naive in conception and expression, but certainly not peculiar to him, and they are common in essentials to a variety of solidaristic corporatisms, secular or otherwise, for example, to social Catholicism and others. It may be that Gökâlp's naiveté conspicuously reveals the weaknesses of more sophisticated versions of the species. On the other hand, Gökâlp displays a certain logical and conceptual clarity, or perhaps moral integrity, in trying to synthesize Islam with solidaristic corporatist capitalism and in not presenting a lost or rhetorical case for an Islamic socialism, varieties of which have since emerged in the Middle Eastern countries. For only solidarism but not socialism can go hand in hand with Islamic charity within the vision of an organicist and consensual society, without any critique of private property and inheritance. In a sense, then, Ziya Gökâlp, with the aid of Islam, converts the "capitalist spirit" from a liberal to a solidaristic one.

2. *National Economy and the "Economic State."* In the second part of "Economic Turkism", Gökâlp says that the "economic ideal" of Turks is to establish large-scale industry in the country. Emphatically rejecting the view that Turkey should stay as an agricultural nation of farmers, Gökâlp requires that Turkey should make an industrial revolution, the most important of European revolutions, and defines industrial revolution as "substitution of a national economy for municipal economies and large-scale industry for small crafts."¹³ Here Gökâlp uses "national" economy with several implications. Firstly, it is a modern, developed market economy with advanced division of labor and organic/occupational solidarity and functional interdependence in

Durkheim's sense, as opposed to the local and self-sufficient multiple economies of segmented societies. Secondly, he means a nationalistic economy with no class tensions or economic egoisms which are detrimental to the public interest. Thirdly, he means the neo-mercantilist policies of a nationalistic state capitalism.

The economic ideal can be achieved, Gökalp continues, by the system of protectionism and by adopting the theories of national economy. According to Gökalp, Friedrich List in Germany and John Rae in America have demonstrated that the liberal economics of the British "Manchesterians" is not a "general and international" science of economics but simply a national system of economic thought peculiar to England and suited to its industrialized economy and imperialistic policies.¹⁴ England, Gökalp argues, is a country of large-scale industry, so that it is "bound to" export its manufactures and to import raw materials. Therefore, the most beneficial policy for England would be "open-door" policies, free trade, and absence of tariffs.¹⁵

Adoption of these policies by countries that have not yet been able to found large-scale industries would inevitably result in their "eternally remaining in economic slavery to industrialized countries like England."¹⁶ According to Gökalp, the two economists mentioned above have founded a system of "national economics" suitable to the circumstances of their respective countries. Now that, he adds, America and Germany have established large-scale industry, they, too, are following open-door policies.¹⁷ Gökalp concludes by advising preparation of a scientific program for national economic development, which would be implemented under the supervision of a ministry of economics. This agency would act as a "general regulator of individual economic activities."¹⁸

The question of laissez-faire versus protection, however, is one of the rare issues on which Gökalp somewhat changed his views. In an article on "Commerce" (1907),¹⁹ Gökalp addressed himself to the virtues of free trade (*serbestî*) over trade restrictions (*himaye*). What he means here by *himaye* is not the direct sense of protection of infant industries, but the policy of tariff walls to that effect. He advocated laissez-faire on the grounds of differences in natural resources, of the theory of comparative advantage, and of the mobility of factors of production, though not in exact technical terms. What is noteworthy in the article is the strong statement to the effect that implementation of tariffs would mean having the people pay higher prices to protect the national manufactures. This contradiction Gökalp was eventually to solve in favor of the emergent manufacturers and at the expense of the people, as he anticipates here. In fact, the contradiction was only superficial; the exigencies of capital accumulation in the hands of a national bourgeoisie could easily be justified by his formula which harmonized entrepreneurship-state encouragement-providential favor.

In an article entitled "The Economic Miracle" (1922),²⁰ Gökalp outlines his project for economic development that would harmonize individual enterprise with national enterprise, market economy with regulated economy. He argues that the primacy of individual enterprise over municipal and state enterprises in the British political economy is not suitable to an agricultural country like Turkey, where industrial development requires government encouragement and protection in the absence of autonomous vigorous private entrepreneurship, of joint stock companies and of high technology. He criticizes, on these grounds, the economic policies of the Turkish state since the *Tanzimat*, which, under the spell of Manchester economics, erroneously kept state passive even in the face of the progressive decline of existing industry, commerce, crafts and artisan organizations under the impact of foreign manufactures and capital.

At the present stage of private capital accumulation in Turkey, Gökalp continues, large-scale industry can only be founded by the initiative and investment of the national government, provincial councils, and local municipalities. Public enterprises to be so founded would then be sold to individuals and joint-stock companies. (These are to be exactly the blueprints, as well as controversies, of the next decades.)

In a following article, "How Should We Work for the Economic Transformation?" (1923),²¹ Gökalp details his state capitalism. He starts by saying that "the state and the provincial and municipal councils which are part of it" have four options in launching an economic enterprise:²² (1) direct public ownership and management of an economic enterprise, that is, a state monopoly or "regie"; (2) granting of a monopoly by the state to a private enterprise, that is, a franchise. Between these two "pure" forms, there are two others: (3) joint ventures between the state and private enterprise, whereby profits are distributed among the state, private enterprise, private entrepreneurs, and employees and workers, management resting with the private entrepreneurs (Gökalp singles out this as the best option); (4) farming out of tax collection to private persons, which is in Gökalp's view undesirable for Turkey.

Gökalp argues that, by these forms of economic organization or their combinations, especially in public utilities, Turkey could create an economic miracle, and poses a rhetorical question: "For these enterprises, are we to wait for the arrival of greedy European capitalists?"²³ This brings us to Gökalp's views on economic systems and ideologies.

The Turkish "Third Way"

In his article on the "economic transformation," Gökalp says that the state's assumption of an active role in the economy is also a "moral service" to the country. As he puts it,

....this would prevent the formation in our fatherland of a new class of profiteers composed of speculators. This class, called "capitalist" in Europe, a mere criminal group, was entirely exposed when their ambitions were unveiled during the Peace Conference.... Today, European imperialism is based on liberal capitalism. If we adopted the system of state capitalism, we would prevent the emergence in our country of an avaricious and rapacious gang, the so-called capitalists.²²

Thus, Gökalp hastily identifies imperialism, liberalism, and capitalism with one another, but what he really means is capitalism in its liberal form and liberalism in its extreme individualistic version. On the other hand, he correctly calls his alternative "state capitalism" and not "state socialism", as was the rhetorical vogue in his day.

What is more significant is Gökalp's equating "capitalism" with profiteers and profiteering. From all that we know about Gökalp's thinking, he is only anti-liberal capitalist, but not at all anti-capitalist. In upholding private property and private enterprise as primary and sacred in the last instance, however constrained by the imperatives of social solidarity and public interest, he is clearly for a corporatist capitalism. All he does is to blame the subjective motivations of egoistic individuals and groups and liberalism as a model, never carrying his critique to its logical extension, to the inner logic and the systemic workings of capitalism itself. Like many others before and after him, Gökalp deems possible and desirable the development of a national bourgeoisie—commercial and industrial—that would *not* seek profit-maximization because of its solidaristic conscience. In other words, he thinks that, the "capitalist spirit" can be transformed from a liberal one to a solidaristic one. That this is an exemplary petty bourgeois illusion can be seen in the following enthusiasm and disillusionment, respectively, of two prominent Unionist contemporaries of Gökalp, who shared the same faith:

The Union and Progress Society was initially based on military officers and civilian bureaucrats.... Upon realizing the shortcomings of relying on [these], however, it then formed artisan associations as a power base. Although it thus became possible, through responsible secretaries appointed by the Society, to manage artisans in the directions desired, the latter proved useful only as a mob in street demonstrations.... Therefore, as in all other civilized countries, it is necessary for the Union and progress Society to form a bourgeois class and secure its survival by [allving itself with] that class. For this purpose, the Society endeavors to found national joint-stock companies, a national bank, and associations of artisans and merchants.²³

And, after a decade of "national economy," during which the main policy was to "create a national bourgeoisie," here is the inventory:

National economy in its present form is not in any way beneficial to the fatherland, but perhaps harmful in many respects.... The elements that constitute our national economy, instead of operating for the happiness of all individuals of

the nation by increasing the public well-being, have enriched certain individuals at the expense of public wealth. The modest capitals accumulated through years of agonizing saving by moderately well-to-do men have flowed into the pockets of certain men produced by chance and corrupt dealings. Thus have emerged an indecent class called the war-rich."²

The myth of "a bourgeoisie *created* by the state" was an express ideology of the Unionists and the Kemalists alike. Creation of a "national merchant class" (*milli tüccar*) or a "national bourgeois class" (*milli burjuva*), used interchangeably at first, ultimately came to mean creation of a national industrial bourgeoisie. Objectively, this meant the collaboration of the nationalistic bureaucracy with a national commercial bourgeoisie to expropriate and replace Levantine and minority mercantile groups, and then to help a very subordinate industrial bourgeoisie into dominance through state protection, franchises, and credits. Yet, the expectation that such a bourgeoisie would defer to social solidarity and public interest as well as state control was to prove illusory and to be a cause of chronic frustration for the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie in Turkey to date.

What is, in the wording of the 1935 program of the Republican People's Party, to be "protected" as "valuable organs of the social whole"³ are the "normal" and "productive" capitalists, precisely what Gökalp called capitalists who are not criminal (*canî*) and greedy (*haris*). For what Gökalp opposes is not capitalism or capitalists in general but certain hypothetical kinds of them. In his perception, liberal capitalism gives way to an undesirable variety of capitalists who procure speculative, i.e., unproductive profits and illegitimate, i.e., abnormal profits in industry and commerce; to his mind, these are aberrations of capitalism due to liberalism and would not exist in solidaristic corporatist capitalism.

That Gökalp's ostensibly anti-capitalist vocabulary is not directed at capitalism *per se* is evident from a careful reading of his very first writings on economic matters. In an article entitled "A Talk on Economics" (1906),²⁴ Gökalp dwells on the necessity of concentration of capital, i.e., the formation of joint-stock companies to channel savings into increased productive investments, and on the importance of mechanization in agriculture for increased productivity and exportation of commercial crops.

Neither is he opposed to the commercial bourgeoisie *per se*. On the contrary, in an article on "Commerce and the New Chamber of Commerce" (1907),²⁵ he states that the merchant class "serves the national interest by connecting other classes and strata (*sunufu tabaka*) with one another." Gökalp also calls for closer cooperation between the government and chambers of commerce. Thus, it is totally incorrect to interpret Gökalp, as some do, as wishing to eliminate the middlemen or the intermediaries. For Gökalp, they, too, have a function in the division of labor, provided that they do not seek

speculative and illegitimate profits. The same goes for the industrialist class, provided that it works rationally and productively. The idea was to find its echo in the programs of the RPP in the following words: "In the advancement of the country, all commercial activities are important. All normal and productive capital shall be protected and given priority."³⁰

Nor is it to be thought that Gökalp is for autarchy and against all economic cooperation among nations. His premise of functional interdependence, raised to the international level, and his objective of attaining the accomplishments of Western industry and technology would preclude that. He explicitly states in "Foreign Capital" (1924),³¹ that for the time being, both foreign capital and specialists are necessary for the economic development of Turkey, but that precaution should be taken against the entry of foreign capital with "political conditions" attached. "Reciprocal service" is only too "normal" in the international division of labor; what makes such a relation "pathological" and "mutually parasitic" is political strings.³²

Gökalp expresses similar views in "The Weakest and Strongest Points of Turks" (1924).³³ For economic development, he says, a strong national determination is not sufficient; advanced functional specialization can rapidly be brought in from Europe: "I do not have qualms about European capital entering our country, as I entirely trust the genuine specialists of Europe who are not politically motivated."³⁴

Gökalp attached the same significance to specialists and technocrats in the foundation of an "economic state." For the realization of the economic ideal and transformation, not only are "organizers" and "entrepreneurs" in the field of private enterprise necessary, but also called for in the public sector are a class of technocrats.³⁵ In order that the state accomplish its economic functions, he says, the state must become an "economic state," which he defines as one in which all statesmen and public officials are also thorough-going economists, administering the state as a large, efficient firm—keeping, of course, one eye on the much too individualistic capitalists.³⁶

Gökalp tries to base the notion of the "economic state," which had wide circulation in the European corporatist literature of the era, on national character: "Turks are *étatist* (*devletçi*) by nature. They expect all innovation and progress from the state. Even revolutions in Turkey are initiated by the state."³⁷ Such emphasis on the role of the state does not, however, mean an authoritarian state corporatism whereby the "economic state" becomes also an "administrative state," not only protecting, regulating, and co-managing the economy but also, at least in theory, totally controlling it. That is by definition precluded by Gökalp's solidaristic corporatism, which extends its pluralism and principle of autonomy to the economic sphere as well.

In an article on "Economic Decentralization" (1924),³⁸ Gökalp argues that the economic sphere, like the social and cultural spheres, should be

autonomous from central political authority and intervention. Functional specializations and occupational domains should not be subordinated to the state, he says, extending the argument to cover the bar association, medical association, and teachers' association as well. He also enters the qualification that this does not mean total government abstention from economic life; it is only that the government should not exceed the limits of a "national economy policy" (the elements of which we have reviewed above). For in the economic sphere, it is the "occupational authorities" that are competent, not the "public authority."³ Here, of course, by "public" authority Gökalp means "central political" authority; otherwise, occupational jurisdictional units in his system are by definition "public," as opposed to "private."

Since, Gökalp argues, it is the deepening of division of labor, i.e., functional and occupational specialization, that would induce economic development, "economic organizations" (*iktisadi teşkilatlar*) should be left on their own; corporative organization should not be "created" and "interfered with" by the state.⁴ He adds, somewhat hyperbolically, that Durkheim too, although a centralist in many respects, favored complete decentralization in the economic sphere.⁴

This overstatement, however, reveals an important problem inherent in the solidaristic corporatism not only of Gökalp but also of Durkheim and others. On the one hand, there is the explicit pluralistic intention to guard the autonomy of corporations, and of the civil society against state control and superordination, theoretically restricting the state's jurisdiction to intercorporational matters and postulating the state, if you will, as an arbitrator of interoccupational disputes. On the other hand, the state, although rejected as an "administrative" or "totalitarian" state as it is in fascistic corporatisms, is nevertheless invested not only with certain regulatory functions as an "economic state," but also with the function of being the guardian of the over-all, integrative, "collective conscience" beyond and above several "occupational consciences." The result, not only manifest in practice, but also already inevitably implicit at the very theoretical inception, is an aggrandizement of the state anyway, compared to the liberal model. Therefore, it seems to me, it is quite misleading to postulate the two major species of corporatism as "societal" and "state." The state looms large in both cases. Solidaristic and fascistic corporatism, to my mind, are better designations in that they do not take "state" out of "corporatism" in one of its species, but posit as the major criterion of distinction not presence vs. absence of state but the different *nature* of state-society relations.

Although Gökalp, like Durkheim, does not have a "theory of state" both because of the "secondariness of politics" in his system and because of his anti-totalitarian political philosophy, it may be said that his analytical theory, despite his normative theory to the contrary, fails to preclude, logically, a

totalitarian theory of state to be superimposed on or incorporated into his system. In other words, the *political philosophy* and the subjective intention of solidaristic corporatism, closer to liberal ideals in this respect, is certainly different from fascistic corporatism; but it may well be that its analytical *political theory* is weak in the sense that it cannot bring its guiding philosophy to realization. It may well be also that fascistic corporatist theories and practices with their explicit "theory of state" have filled this very vacuum in the analytic theory of solidaristic corporatism, utilizing it in the service of a philosophy and practice wholly unacceptable, subjectively, to solidaristic corporatism.

That there is no serious logical barrier to such an eventuality lies, in my view, in the fact that both solidaristic corporatism and fascistic corporatism in their critique of liberalism—the former by modification, the latter by total negation—not only do not aim at a critique of capitalism itself, but try to supply it with a higher—corporatist—rationale. And it is in this sense that both solidarism and fascism as avowed "third way"s between capitalism and socialism are not actually so, but they are derivatives of the "first way"—capitalism—and express antitheses to the "second way"—socialism.⁴⁷ This is evident in their preservation of the central premise of capitalism, i.e., the axiomatic primacy of private property and private enterprise for profit, and in their categorical rejection of the basic Marxist critique of capitalist society itself, i.e., its class character—which they in fact attempt to obfuscate analytically or normatively or both by substituting the occupational group and the corporative unit as the basic category, as opposed to the "individual" and the "class" of the liberal and Marxist models, respectively.

To repeat something I have already suggested, fascism rejects liberalism both as a model and as a set of ideals; solidarism rejects it as a model, but not all of its ideals. And this is precisely what makes the solidaristic "third way" of Gökalp and others more democratic and humanitarian than the fascistic "third way." However fragile solidaristic corporatism may be theoretically and analytically, it does make a difference, philosophically and normatively. Practically, it again makes a difference—to the extent, of course, that the solidaristic version can be afforded by capitalism depending on objective conditions and the seriousness of the crisis. In any case, the fact should not be obscured that both solidarism and fascism are "third way"s, i.e., corporatist capitalisms with a definite, and at least objective, class character. This brings us to the final aspect of Gökalp's theory—his views on social classes.

Durkheim wrote his "Preface" at a time of high class articulation and in the wake of fierce class struggles. His main thesis was that the advance of industrial capitalism should not necessarily lead, as Marx argued, to class polarization and warfare, but that this could be averted by a corporatist *ratio* and corporative organization. In a sense, Durkheim's corporatism was con-

ceived as a solution to what we may term a "distribution crisis" of capitalism. Gökalp's context was somewhat different. In the Turkey of his time, class articulation had not gone very far, and he did not witness any serious class struggles, let alone class warfare. His corporatism was conceived both in anticipation of, and to pre-empt, that prospect, and as a project for unified, harmonious societal effort to achieve national revival and economic development. In other words, Gökalp's corporatism was an answer to what we may term an "accumulation crisis" of capitalism. What, then, was developed by European thought, and subsequently practice, as a defense against class struggles and as a measure to restore social equilibrium was now being introduced in Turkey as a blueprint for social and economic "progress in order," without any political, let alone revolutionary, disturbance.

If Durkheim's theory aimed at rationalizing a class structure that had already formed but needed to be "re-cast,"⁴³ Gökalp's theory, at first glance, aimed at justifying a class structure that was yet in the making. But the principal objective was the same: attainment of a bourgeois society without bourgeois politics and bourgeois economics, that is, a bourgeois society without liberalism—which failed to produce or reproduce the very society of which it claimed to be the best *ratio*.

Yet, given the very strong Rousseauian element in Gökalp's *philosophy* that stood in tense juxtaposition to the Durkheimian element at this philosophical level, the question, although a speculative one, suggests itself, whether Gökalp would have insisted on a Durkheimian, i.e., corporatist *theory*, had he witnessed the subsequent class domination and class policies in Turkey after his death. That he would certainly have not approved of the particular kind of corporatist tendencies toward the fascistic variant, during the single-party period and in contemporary Turkey, is amply clear from the explicit pluralistic and libertarian restraints in his solidaristic corporatist work on the record.

Concerning the ambiguities inherent in Gökalp's views on social classes, a few examples are in order. Gökalp is strongly against inequality among men and against domination of men by men. In an early article on "Toward the Sources of Liberty" (1909),⁴⁴ he says that men's subjection to other men is but slavery; but, failing to make any social class analysis, he merely offers the moral normative injunction that the faithful man is free, and that, in Islam, freedom is second only to worship in the normative hierarchy.

Gökalp's writings are full of diatribes against "oppressive landlords" and "profiteering merchants";⁴⁵ against "corrupt government officials and intellectuals";⁴⁶ against local notables and "village-owners" (*köy sahipleri*) and "village-lords" (*köy ağaları*), who pose as the protectors of peasants only to exploit them;⁴⁷ against large land-owners who, instead of increasing the pro-

ductivity of their own land, enclose the lots of small peasants:" but no systematic analysis of the causes of these is forthcoming.

That Gökalp attributes class inequalities and oppression not to any systemic relations of production, but to the subjective motivations of some members or sections of certain classes—a term he often uses, and most pejoratively, but merely as a statistical category—is clearly seen in his poem "Ağa Kimdir?" ("Who is a Lord?") (1915)⁴⁶ Here, he uses *aga* both as "landlord" and as "master," and *ısqı* both as "tiller" and "worker," and says not only that the age of oppression, misery, and exploitation of men is over, but that all those workers who travail for the good of humanity, society, and nation can become masters, in the sense of acquiring property and status. The message is that with industry and solidaristic morality, property becomes a "deserved" reward, notwithstanding its being in itself a cause of social inequality. This is also ironic in view of Gökalp's essentially unmaterialistic ethics and personal example, but it reveals the extent to which Gökalp is a man of his times and current value judgments.

Gökalp's views on the relationship between social class and political power are equally naive. Many have interpreted his attitude on the subject, and not wholly without reason, as a typical petit bourgeois mentality. His étatism has been interpreted as a bureaucratic authoritarian ideology, just as his much mentioned poem "Esnaf Destanı" ("Epic of Artisans") (1914)⁴⁷ was interpreted as a case for the political supremacy of the middle classes against big capital. The problem, however, is somewhat different.

Gökalp not only rejects an "administrative state", as we have suggested above, but also gives his reasons for it: "If in any country the government rests on the class of bureaucrats, that government is always a weak government"; for strong governments are those that rest on "economic classes," and the bureaucrats have "no relation to production."⁴⁸

Neither can his praise of artisans as the "core of the nation" be a presumption of any anti-big business sentiment, as was the case, for example, with the "artisan socialism" of the early Nazi party. Gökalp's was more a nationalistic defense of small-scale industry against foreign manufactures than any theoretical critique of monopoly capital. In a country and at a time when the dominant ideology was the "creation" of a "national bourgeoisie," the "size" of capital could not, anyway, have been a matter of contention, but only a desideratum, familiar qualifications on its "nature" notwithstanding. Moreover, Gökalp had not yet seen the allegedly socially disequilibrating effects of the phenomenon of concentration and centralization of capital, as many European corporatist authors thought they had.

Gökalp's psychology, then, was not exactly that of a petit bourgeois thinker who felt sandwiched between big business and big unions, but simply that of a naive solidaristic corporatist thinker, for whom all "class"es could and

should coexist in harmony as equally valuable organs of the social organism. This was both a wish and a possibility for Gökalp. Had he actually observed the analytic impossibility of this, he may not have insisted, as Durkheim did, on the normative dimension of it. That remains, to my mind, a plausible speculation in view of his Rousseauesque tendencies—his all too hasty elimination of alternatives notwithstanding.

PART THREE
THE SIGNIFICANCE

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF GÖKALP

It is much easier to point out the faults and errors in the work of a great mind than to give a distinct and full exposition of its value.

(Schopenhauer on Kant)

The critique of Gökalp's solidaristic corporatism is an important element in the present study, which evaluates his total system. Any judicious and effective critique, however, has to be based on a prior task such as the one described above. That is what I have tried to do. Also, as Findlay in his noted work on Hegel has well put it, my aim has been "to give as clear an exposition, as I could of certain ideas which seemed to me central in [Gökalp], in terms of which all his doctrines become connected, and to follow these ideas throughout the system, so as to show that they really are borne out by [Gökalp's] statements.... To treat [Gökalp] in this manner seemed to me a more worthwhile contribution to [Gökalp] studies than to argue with other interpreters."¹ Finally, I have not created a system for Gökalp; I have only tried to reconstruct the system that is already there in Gökalp's writings.

In the preceding chapters I have presented Gökalp's social-political philosophy (Chapter 4), his general social theory (Chapter 5), and his political theory proper (Chapter 6). In Chapter 7, I have tried to examine Gökalp's political economy, which, as I have been suggesting throughout, is the problematic connection between his corporatist political-social *theory* and his part-corporatist and part-radical democratic political-social *philosophy*.

The tension in Gökalp's system, at this philosophical level, between elements of Durkheim and Rousseau must be seen, I have suggested, as the principal problem, if not inconsistency, in Gökalp's thought. Otherwise, I have tried to argue that his thought retained a basic internal consistency and intellectual integrity over the years. In other words, Gökalp's thought is not as controversial as the controversy about it, which still continues, unfortunately and unnecessarily, at that, at levels much below where the problem actually lies, and which is conducted with arguments that reflect anything but Gökalp's ideas, unwittingly or polemically.

I have adopted throughout the study the procedural rule of not reliving or taking issue with, any specific interpretation or distortion of Gökalp's views. Rather, I have tried to present in a critical manner only what Gökalp himself said. In this concluding chapter, however, I have to lift this methodological restraint somewhat in order to show the relation of Gökalp to later ideological positions in Turkey, especially to those that explicitly claim

descendance from, or adherence to, Gökalp's thought. That some of these positions, as I shall suggest, are excessive distortions of Gökalp is yet further evidence of the influence or relevance of his thought, even if in directions unintended by Gökalp. A thinker may be influential in ways which are true to the spirit and the letter of his ideas; he may also be significant in that his ideas may serve as a vehicle for quite different purposes. But even then, the question still stands, why that thinker and not another.

Despite the tension within Gökalp's philosophy, his theory logically follows from one part of that philosophy, and this theory is basically rigorous within itself. For Gökalp is a methodologically conscientious and theoretically conscious writer, who has given, as Şerif Mardin suggests, a systematic and theoretical status to the dominant ideas of his time.² Whatever the comparative worth of Gökalp's thought among great political theories, his significance for Turkey in this respect cannot be exaggerated. In fact, the respect for theoretical reason over pragmatic action starts and ends with Gökalp in Turkey in the twentieth century. His effort to build a systematic political theory based on a social-moral philosophy, even if as a guide for idealistic social praxis, has not since been duplicated. The Kemalist maxim of "doctrine follows action" has pervaded political life and academia alike. Gökalp's positivistic idealism has been transformed into a mechanistic positivism of the most pragmatic kind. Consequently, neither broad philosophical concerns nor the theoretical concerns as to consistency and learning figure much after Gökalp. What actually remain are his conceptual vocabulary and idiom, and parts of his corporatist theory which, in distorted form, have found their way into fascist doctrines.

Gökalp's influence throughout the period 1908-1980 has not been uniform and uncontroversial. His ideas have received varied interpretation. Often the same person or group has rejected one part of his system, while upholding another. Some have hailed Gökalp as a sociologist as great as Durkheim, or perhaps even greater. Others have described him as no more than an imitator. The truth lies somewhere in between. The left have accused him of racism and totalitarianism, while the right have praised him for the same, wrong reason. The fact remains that his nationalism rests unequivocally on language and culture. His solidaristic corporatism is a pluralistic form of corporatism, as compared with the authoritarian etatist and the outright fascistic corporatism of the early Kemalists and the later Nationalist Action Party, respectively.

We have seen in Chapters 2 and 3 how Gökalp stood with the Unionists as their chief ideologue in cultural and educational matters, with not much influence on their politics. We have also seen how his death was received by the Kemalists, who, however, did not accord him the same status as did the Unionists, although they made much greater use of his teachings than did the Unionists. The attitude of the official Kemalist leadership toward Gökalp, on

the whole, was rather ambivalent, as is best exemplified by the fate that befell his works after his death. Official and semi-official committees were formed in 1924, 1931, 1941, and 1949 to prepare his collective works. All, however, proved abortive, with the insignificant exception of the 1941 undertaking, which resulted in the collection of some of his letters, poems, and tales. So his voluminous writings remained scattered in unsystematic publications of individual publishing houses—an additional cause of the inadequate appreciation of his thought. It was only in 1973 that the Ministry of Education undertook to begin this task. Moreover, between 1924, Gökalp's death, and 1938, Atatürk's death, no work of Gökalp was transcribed into the Latin alphabet, which became the standard script in 1928. The very first enterprise in that direction came, ironically, from a fascist nationalist group, who published his *Türkçülüğün Esasları* in 1939. (See below.)

Such neglect of Gökalp's work cannot be explained in terms of indifference. We know that many Kemalists cherished him as the mentor of the nation, including Atatürk himself, however perfunctorily in one of his modest moments. The explanation lies elsewhere. Beyond the restrictions that must have been imposed by the personality cult of the period, which could not admit more than one "guide" for the nation, the more important cause was that misplaced controversies over Gökalp's thought were then already under way. Some Kemalists mistook Gökalp for an exponent of religious conservatism in contrast to the radicals on the right, who held him to be an uncritical advocate of Westernism, insensitive to the prerogatives of Turkism and Islam in his, to them, all too concessionary eclecticism. The truth is that the Kemalists could not tolerate the realistic weight he tried to assign to tradition in his tripartite synthesis of Turkism-Islamism-Modernism and therefore eliminated the second term, while the latter categorically refused to allow the third term. Consequently, the Kemalists denied the debt they owed to Gökalp for their own laicism, albeit learned from him, although he had tried hard to couple it with the modernization of religion in a secular direction as an ethical system. Actually, a man who brought nineteenth and early twentieth-century secular and positivist thought to Turkey could not have been anti-laicist; conversely, a man who tried to synthesize occidental reason with oriental mysticism could not have been anti-traditionalist.

The main reason for such early disagreement over the "real" content and meaning of Gökalp's ideas is that, apart from partisan distortions, his system as a relatively sophisticated and nuanced synthesis of elements that are difficult, but not impossible, to reconcile has not been appreciated. Moreover, people have advocated or criticized Gökalp's slogans and myths, which generally constituted the subject of his nationalistic poems and propagandistic political writings, without always placing these in the proper context of his more theoretical works.

Thus, many have facetiously attributed the "Six Arrows" of Kemalism (Nationalism, Republicanism, Laicism, Populism, Etatism, Transformism) to Gökbalp, or have paid lip service to Gökbalp's being the founding father of academic sociology in Turkey, among many other seminal ideas and fields of influence, but not much care has been taken to distinguish the inner content, for example, of Gökbalp's egalitarian populism from that of the Kemalists' elitist populism, or Gökbalp's "economic statism," subordinate to civil society, from the Kemalists' "administrative statism," superordinate over society.

Again, many have facetiously and wrongly reiterated, with approval or disapproval, that Gökbalp assimilates the individual within the society, thereby paving the way for the authoritarian Kemalist single-party regime, if not for an outright totalitarian state. But the fact has been obscured by many, including naturally the "Kemalist-socialists" of the Second Republic (in our terminology "solidaristic corporatists" of a Kemalist sub-species), that the interrelationship of the Individual, the Society and the State in Gökbalp's system is far more democratic in its social, political, and cultural pluralism, and that all the subsequent modifications or derivatives of Gökbalp's corporatism have proved to be definitely less democratic and libertarian. Similarly, it is remembered by almost none that Gökbalp was also the originator of projects such as the autonomy of universities and the whole educational and cultural sphere from the state, the necessity of radical land reform, the indispensability of the liquidation of semi-feudal reform, the indispensability of the liquidation of semi-feudal structures in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey—policies which have not yet been adopted by even the most "left-democratic-populistic" of political parties in the Turkey of the 1970's, that is the "new" RPP, let alone by the first-generation Kemalists.

If the main reason for such unsound interpretations of Gökbalp's ideas, as I have indicated above, was a misemphasis on his partial myths and slogans rather than his theory in its fullness, the main reason for that in turn, to my mind, was the fact that all interpretations have had the limitation of attempting to comprehend Gökbalp's corporatist thought from vantage points that remained within that very same corporatist paradigm, and have thus rendered themselves, from the outset, incapable of understanding, as distinct from catechicizing, the major statement of that paradigm, owing to the lack of alternative critical paradigms from without. For, I submit, all recent Turkish political thought falls within a pervasive corporatist paradigm, with species and variants, to be sure. What distinguishes Gökbalp's initial and more articulate formulation from what came afterwards is its philosophical tolerance and political pluralism—within, of course, the objective limits of a corporatist framework. Ironically, these are precisely the aspects of Gökbalp's system not adopted by his acknowledged adherents, not to mention the fact that they have been totally overlooked by his critics.

As we have seen, Gökalp's corporatism is one which is quite developed at a philosophical-ideological level, that is, at the "first level" according to the differentiation I have made in Chapter 4. It is not, however, worked out in detail at the "third level," that is, concerning the institutional aspects, although the basic outline and the normative principles are there, as I have indicated in Chapters 5 and 6. To be more specific, for example, the relationship between the corporative assembly and the grand council of corporations is not specified, nor is the numerical distribution of occupational deputies among various occupational categories, beyond the Durkheimian evasion of "according to the current value-judgments." But one thing is amply clear: this corporative political organization is one in which the state-society and the state-corporations relationships are based on the principles of pluralism and autonomy.

The subsequent development of corporatist tendencies in Turkey, both in the First Republic (1920/23-1960) and the Second Republic (1960 to date), especially during the Kemalist single-party period (1923-1945), merits a separate study. Here we can only point out that the unfolding of corporatist elements at all three levels has been essentially within the confines of Gökalp's solidaristic corporatism, and only in some respects outside it, in a fascistic direction.

At the first, i.e., philosophical-ideological level, anyone can tell that the Turkish political mentality is unmistakably a solidaristic corporatist one, from the program of the old Kemalist Republican People's Party to the Program of the new RPP, the latter avowedly at once Kemalist and "democratic left," if not occasionally, and of course rhetorically, "social democratic"; from the official declarations of party and state ideology and policies to the supposedly objective and social scientific studies and expositions of that ideology, be they in the fields of constitutional and political theory, economics, or sociology (for all derive explicitly from Kemalism and explicitly or implicitly from Gökalp); from the theoretical underpinnings and the institutional structures of the 1961 Constitution to the frequent "memoranda" of the military, the latest being delivered in January 1980.

At this level, solidaristic corporatism has been either latent in the form of a loose political mentality, or manifest in express ideological formulations—at any rate, a persistent structural feature of Turkish political culture in general. The only case, so far, of an explicitly fascistic variant of this corporatism was offered by the Nationalist Action Party shortly after the establishment of the Second Republic in 1960/1961. And it is precisely for this reason that a correct evaluation of Gökalp's thought, and for that matter, of Kemalism, assumes vital importance; for it is the Nationalist Action Party that poses as the most vocal and aggressive descendant of Gökalpism and Kemalism—Kemalism, of course, still being the inalterable, ritualistic loyalty of each and all of the other

parties and groups in contemporary Turkey. Before turning to the phenomenon of NAP, however, it is necessary to note the nature of corporatist tendencies in the First Republic.

It would not be correct to say that, during the Kemalist single-party period, there were no fascistic corporatist developments at the ideological level. An ideological movement and group that was later to constitute the embryo of the Nationalist Action Party not only could, and did, exist under the umbrella of mainstream Kemalism until its liquidation in 1944, but certain aspects of mainstream Kemalist ideology itself also exceeded the limits of a solidaristic corporatist worldview. Only a separate study can deal with such delicate matters; at this juncture, suffice it to note emphatically that, on balance, Kemalist ideology nevertheless remained more a solidaristic corporatist than a fascistic corporatist one—despite, to repeat, important but partial, fascistic buddings here and there. Ali Fuat Başgil, for example, as one of the leading party-professors of the day and holder of the chairs of Public Law at Istanbul University and at the prestigious Faculty of Political Science before it moved to Ankara in 1935, was advocating the classical definition of the fascist state:

Étatism (*devletçilik*) is the system that regulates from above the economic, social, and even moral life and activity and directs these toward a national ideal; that organizes [the nation] with a view to establishing social justice in economic life; that aims to embrace within the comprehensive vision and orderly activity of the state all national forces, activities, and capabilities, especially the economic ones. *Everything within the state, nothing against the state, nothing outside the state.* Here is today's formula of étatism.⁴

In fact, the étatism of the Kemalist RPP had not reached anything like what Başgil was describing. Still, coming from him on the occasion of the 1935 Grand Congress of the party, or the "state-party" as Başgil called it, this kind of evidence can hardly be overlooked as far as the ideological propensities of the single-party period are concerned. Similar Kemalist excesses over Gökalp can also be observed in such matters as the question of leadership, elites, single-partyism, authoritarian statism, as I have indicated in previous chapters, but the Kemalists never fully developed at this philosophical-ideological level a totalitarian model of society and polity and remained, on balance, solidaristic corporatists.

Neither at the second nor the third levels I have delineated above did Kemalism reach fascistic corporatist proportions. Certain developments in legislation and political institutionalization, such as the 1935 Labor Code, the much amended Penal Code, the 1937 Physical Education Act, the 1938 Associations Law, the 1938 Press Union Law, the 1938 Lawyers' Act, the 1943 Act concerning the reorganization of Chambers of Industry, Commerce, and Artisanry went considerably beyond the limits of a solidaristic corporatism; but the fascistic corporatist unfolding at this level, as at others, re-

mained partial and non-dominant, without reaching anything like full closure or crystallization.

The abortive constitutional corporatism of 1920-1921, the Economic Congress of 1923, the 1927 High Economic Council, and many other corporatist arrangements and policies at the second level are the subject of a separate study, but all represent predominantly a solidaristic corporatism. It must also be noted that corporatist foundations laid out, at all three levels, in the single-party phase (1923-1945) of the First Republic (1920-1960) have continued into the Second Republic (1960/1961) basically unaltered. Kemalism is still the semi-official ideology; a plurality of groups profess it now, instead of a single party. (After September 1980, and formally after the 1982 constitution, "semi" has to be dropped.) The basic legal-institutional structures have not changed, although they did undergo token liberalizations during the Democratic Party period (1950-1960), only to be restored in other ways by the 1960 coup that toppled that party and to be written into the Constitution of 1961. For corporatism is a particular system of thought and action that justifies and reproduces a particular class structure and a system of interest representation in Turkey, which have not changed, but only been fortified, since Gökalp.

The reason that there was no further crystallization of fascistic corporatism beyond embryonic spurts seems to me to be twofold. Firstly, the objective conditions did not necessitate it, in the sense that there was as yet no distribution crisis in Turkey and no serious political struggle between a threatened industrial-financial bourgeoisie and a threatening working class, roughly speaking. The period was one of accumulation crisis where a national bourgeoisie was being provided with a disciplined and low-cost labor force through the state-capitalist policies of an authoritarian single-party.⁴

Secondly, and this may be controversial, there were the restraints, however marginal, imposed by the theoretical and moral teachings of Ziya Gökalp. For, whatever the later distortions of them, Ziya Gökalp's ideas were like Gogol's "Overcoat," from which all the rest issued and within which all the rest sought intellectual moulding. Who donned the coat with whatever plausibility and justification with regard to the original meaning and intention of Gökalp, is, of course, extraneous to his thought, but the ways in which Gökalp's ideas influenced, and were utilized by, others remain important from the viewpoint of the sociology of ideas and the study of subsequent ideological positions in Turkey.

To take the question of influence first, it is my estimation that if it were not for the influence and moral authority of Gökalp's ideas over the Kemalist generations, the ideology of the single-party period might have registered a greater deviation from solidaristic corporatism. When one looks at the sources and the resultant nature of Young Turk thought, as Şerif Mardin has

done in *Jön Türklerin Siyasî Fikirleri*, one can see how Kemalist thought would have progressed, had it not been for the intervening input of, and the sifting and sorting by, Gökâlp.

As for restraining influence of Gökâlp's ideas in the Second Republic, however, especially in the 1980's, which have been ushered in by the 1 January 1980 memorandum of the military, one is hard put to speak even of a debatable marginal effect of his solidaristic ideas. Under the increasing pressure of objective conditions, now characterized more by a distribution crisis, further corporatist developments of a fascistic nature have to be expected. And this brings us to the question of the more recent distortion of Gökâlp's ideas, much greater than that obtaining in the single-party period. It is a distortion in the sense that, although his corporatism still supplies the guiding worldview and the conceptual framework (the real revival of interest in Gökâlp's works took place in the 1960's and the 1970's, initiated by the "left" Kemalists and the fascist NAP movement, respectively),⁸ his solidaristic version of it is being thwarted in the direction of a fascistic variant.

We now turn briefly to the pages of the journal *Ziya Gökâlp*, published bi-annually by the Ziya Gökâlp Society, founded in 1974 on the fiftieth anniversary of the thinker's death during the term of a coalition government headed by the new Republican People's Party.⁹ This journal features excerpts from Gökâlp's writings along with articles from an entire range of writers from almost all ideological positions except the left, with the exception of a few detached and objective commentaries. Here, I shall give no more than a minimal sample of the abuses to which Gökâlp's thought is still being subjected.

A professor who declares himself a rightist writes that "the rightist front, the nationalist circles" have not been up to their natural task of propagating Gökâlp's ideas which "have dominated Turkish thought for sixty years, and which will definitely continue to dominate it in the future."¹⁰ The writer accuses the "leftist front" (as if the center had then gone out of existence in Turkey)¹¹ of adapting Gökâlp to its own purposes (as if that were possible; yet the observation of the fact contains truth as far as the "leftist-Kemalists" go), and he pays homage to the studies of the idealist (*ülküçü*)¹² front. The writer concludes his article on the note of an irredentist pan-Turanism, to which cause he enlists Gökâlp and Mustafa Kemal alike.

The same theme is expounded by one of the assistant secretaries-general of the NAP in another article. After presenting Gökâlp as the "man of ideas" and Atatürk as the "man of action" of a Turkism that is alien to both men in its histrionic Turanism, the writer concludes: "The action of Turkism began with the Unionists and continued with Atatürk. Now it is conducting its fight in the trust of a Nationalist, Turkist generation. We may call this the third phase. In the first and second phases, a very high cost was paid to arrive at the

target—in lives, in blood. But the whole Turkish world was enflamed. Turkism, which has now completed its cadres and spread over all lands of the Turk like a wave of faith, has again set out to become a *state policy*.”¹¹

The general president of *Ülkü Ocakları* (“Hearths of the Ideal”) presents Atatürk as the person who has best understood and benefited from Gökalp’s ideal of Turkish nationalism and predicts that “so long as the Turkish nation understands Gökalp’s ideal of Turkism, it will *rise above the level of civilized nations* and demonstrate to the world that the Turk is capable of *forming the world state*.”¹² The first underlined phrase indeed belongs to Mustafa Kemal, but not the second.

The general president of the NAP, Alpaslan Türkeş, veteran of the 1944 events (see below) and initially a member of the National Unity Committee that staged the coup d’état of 1961, who made a permanent comeback onto the Turkish political scene after a brief exile following the 1961 coup on charges of a new coup attempt, addresses the youth in the audience as “our Beloved Grey Wolves” and reiterates the same distortions of both Gökalpism and Kemalism.¹³

Another professor, in a speech given at *Ülkü Ocakları* on the same occasion, claims that Gökalp and, therefore, Atatürk have laid very strong foundations for Turkish nationalism and a Turkish form of democracy.” To go into the works of the “rightist front,” in which they elaborate their model of society and polity, exceeds the limits of this study. But the flavor of their racist and expansionist nationalism supplies a clue to the fascistic corporatist nature thereof. And none of this is Kemalism, let alone Gökalpism, in view of the pages that precede.

In the text of this study we have seen Gökalp’s Turkism to be an explicitly anti-racist and anti-expansionist nationalism which smoothly derives from his philosophical egalitarianism and cultural pluralism, coupled with a peaceful internationalism as a logical extension of his solidaristic corporatist theory, taking the notion of international functional interdependence perhaps even further than Durkheim. We have also seen that the above kind of fascistic corporatism cannot claim pedigree from Kemalist nationalism, which, in its well-known maxim and policy of “peace in the country, peace in the world,” is still preeminently Gökalpian and solidaristic. At any rate, Kemalism was still a distinctly positivist ideology, however much cruder than Gökalp’s positivistic idealism, and not given to the irrationalist, anti-intellectualist, and totalitarian extremities of a fascistic corporatism. Even allowing occasional oscillations in the fascistic direction, such as the “history theses” and the “sun-language theory,” mainstream Kemalist nationalism remained, on balance, within the confines of Gökalp’s formulation in this respect.

All said, one must not fail to note that the matter is not so simple. Nor are these distinctions water-tight. In and about some contexts, clear-cut categorical

analysis is possible, but in some others only the nuances can be discerned. So I submit that although Gökalp's solidaristic corporatism is paradigmatic Turkish political thought at its possible best, it is still corporatism, and solidarism and fascism are but species of the same genus, at the next higher level of abstraction. As the Turkish saying goes, "there is no smoke unless there is some fire."

One kind of evidence for this argument is supplied by the fact that a group of intellectuals and officers were arrested and imprisoned in 1944 by the RPP Government for "Racist-Turanist" activities conducted in collusion with the German authorities. Among the measures taken by the government was, paradoxically, the banning of the works of Ziya Gökalp—paradoxically because, if the racist Turkish nationalists had (unjustifiably we may add) exalted Gökalp as their intellectual mentor, a whole generation of Kemalists, too (and much more plausibly), had done as much. In fact, when one looks at the composition of the members, the executive committee, and the affiliated authors of the quasi-official "Book Lovers' Society" (*Kitap Sevenler Kurumu*) that published the 1939 edition of Gökalp's *Principles of Turkishism*, the first Gökalp book in the new Latin alphabet, also banned in 1944, one encounters, beside the gallery of prominent racist nationalists, many well-known mainstream Kemalists from the parliament, cabinet, party, university, and the press.¹⁷

Collaboration of some prominent Kemalists with the racist nationalists in this and similar instances certainly does not mean their subscription to the latter's fascistic nationalism, yet it does show how thin the demarcation line between the two has been in some respects, especially if one considers the central position of some of these Kemalists. After all, solidarism and fascism, to repeat, are but varieties of corporatism.¹⁸

I would like to conclude, however, on the note of the "diversity and species" of corporatism rather than on that of the "unity and genus" of corporatism: neither Gökalp's solidaristic corporatism nor the more-solidarist-than-fascist Kemalist corporatism is the same thing as the fascistic corporatism of a NAP. Gökalp's solidarism is a "weak system," as I have argued in Chapter 7, both theoretically and practically, but it is no more so than the other corporatist formulas of the inter-war and post-war years; yet it may serve to expose fascism, morally and conceptually, even "from within" the corporatist world-view. Time, however, will tell when in Turkey solidarism is to be replaced by obvious fascism, and when corporatism in general is to be displaced altogether.

NOTES

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

- 1 Two recent comprehensive studies of Turkish history are Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1977) and Stelanos Yerasimos, *Azgelismislik Surecinde Türkiye*, 3 vols. (Istanbul, 1974). Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1961), Geoffrey Lewis, *Turkey* (New York, 1960), and Roderic Davison, *Turkey* (Englewood Cliffs, 1968) are among the better concise works.
- 2 For the political and diplomatic history of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, see J. C. Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record*, Vol. 1, 1535-1914 and Vol. 2, 1914-1945 (New Haven, 1975 and 1979); Vol. 3 forthcoming.
- 3 Shaw and Shaw, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 55.
- 4 See Hurewitz, *op. cit.*, for the text of the agreement.
- 5 Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton, 1963).
- 6 See Nivazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (Montreal, 1964).
- 7 J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (New York, 1970).
- 8 For their ideas, see Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton, 1962).
- 9 Shaw and Shaw, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
- 10 *Ibid*, p. 105.
- 11 *Ibid*, p. 113-114.
- 12 *Ibid*, p. 114.
- 13 See Robert Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period: A Study of the Meşihat Constitution and Parliament* (Baltimore, 1963).
- 14 I borrow the term from Vedat Eldem, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun İktisadi Şartları Hakkında Bir Teşkilat* (Ankara, 1970).
- 15 Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp* (London, 1950), p. x.
- 16 *Ibid*, p. x, xi.
- 17 *Ibid*, p. x.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

- 1 This biographic section is based on Şevket Bevsanoğlu, *Ziya Gökalp'in İlk Yazı Hayatı* (Istanbul, 1956), Preface, pp. 1-16; Ali Nüzhet Göksel, *Ziya Gökalp'in Nesredilmemiş Yedi Eseri ve Aile Mektupları* (Istanbul, 1956); and Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism, The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp* (London, 1950), Part One, pp. 17-40, which is mainly based on Ali Nüzhet Göksel, *Ziya Gökalp'in Hayatı ve Mektupları* (Istanbul, 1931) and Enver Behnan Şapolyo, *Ziya Gökalp, İttihat Terakki ve Mesrutiyet Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1943). Göksel, *Yedi Eser*, pp. 73-76 contains a c.v. Gökalp gave in 1910 to the local Department of Sociology at the party school of the Committee of Union and Progress. For other biographic studies on Gökalp, see the Bibliography.
- 2 Heyd, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
- 3 *Ibid*.
- 4 "Millet Nedir?" *Küçük Mecmua*, 1923 (18); reprinted in *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*, ed. and trans. N. Berkes (New York, 1959), pp. 43-45; p. 44 (Emphasis mine.)
- 5 *Ibid*, p. 314. (Berkes' translation.)
- 6 Heyd, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
- 7 "Babamın Vasıfeti" ("My Father's Testament"), *Küçük Mecmua* (17), pp. 1-3; cited in Bevsanoğlu, *İlk Yazı Hayatı*, pp. 7-8.

- 8 During his years of imprisonment in Malta, he used to "work while everybody slept and talk while everybody was awake." Göksel, *Yedi Eser*, p. 30.
- 9 *Küçük Mecmua* (18), pp. 1-2; cited in Beysanoğlu, *İlk Yazı Hayatı*, p. 9.
- 10 For the "ideal," see Chapter 4; see also Heyd, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
- 11 See "Türkçülüğün Tarihi" ("The History of Turkism"), *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (Istanbul, 1976), pp. 7-16.
- 12 *Küçük Mecmua* (19), pp. 1-2; cited in Beysanoğlu, *İlk Yazı Hayatı*, p. 11.
- 13 Beysanoğlu, *İlk Yazı Hayatı*, p. 12.
- 14 The title *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak* literally means "to become Turkish, Muslim, contemporary" and may be rendered also as Turkification, Islamicization, Modernization.
- 15 Editor Halim Sabit, historian and Gökalp's disciple.
- 16 Editor Fuat Köprülü, Turcologist, Gökalp's assistant; later founder of the Democratic Party and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- 17 Editor Tekin Alp (Moiz Kohen), economist and Gökalp's assistant; later author of *Kemalizm*, a work on the ideology of Kemalism.
- 18 Editor Necmettin Sadık (Sadak), sociologist and assistant of Gökalp; later writer of the official sociology textbook in the Republican era and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- 19 To be revived in 1923 under the editorship of Falih Rıfkı Atay, journalist and man of letters and Gökalp's junior colleague; later confidant of Mustafa Kemal, popularizer of Kemalist ideology, lifetime member of the parliament; author of works such as *Çankaya* (n.d.), *Moskova-Roma* (1932), *Faşist Roma, Kemalist Tiran, Kaybolan Makedonya* (1933).
- 20 With Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk, member of parliament, holder of several ministries in Kemalist governments, professor of economics at the Faculty of Political Science, author of *Ökonomi Dersleri* (1934).
- 21 See especially Chapters 3 and 8.
- 22 See Tarık Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler, 1859-1952* (Istanbul, 1952).
- 23 For a political history of the period, see Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914* (Oxford, 1969).
- 24 *Ibid.*, p. vii.
- 25 İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, on the 50th anniversary of Gökalp's death, *Zıva Gökalp*, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 253.
- 26 Göksel, *Yedi Eser*, p. 26.
- 27 *Ibid.*, p. 31.
- 28 Heyd, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
- 29 A series of philosophical meditations he published in *Cumhuriyet* in dialogue form were posthumously collected under the title *Çınaraltı Konuşmaları* (1939).
- 30 A series of articles which appeared in this paper on the "goals of new Turkey" were posthumously collected under the same title: *Yeni Türkiye'nin Hedefleri* (1956).

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

- 1 Cited in Ali Nüzhet Göksel, *Zıva Gökalp: Hayatı, Sanatı, Eseri* (Istanbul, 1959), pp. 15-16.
- 2 *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.
- 3 Cited in Göksel, *Zıva Gökalp*, pp. 16-17. Yakup Kadri was also editor-in-chief of the controversial political journal *Kadro* (1931-1933) and author of numerous political and social novels, including a work on Atatürk.
- 4 For ambivalences in the later Kemalist attitude toward Gökalp, see Chapter 8.
- 5 See Chapter 2. In fact, the kind of rudimentary and undigested Westernism of the Young Turks often produced half-informed, and even unhealthy, intellectual

- solutions. Abdullah Cevdet himself is notorious for his proposal that, in order to get Westernized, the Turkish nation should be infused with German blood through systematic, increased intermarriage.
- 6 Ziya Gökalp (November 1974), Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 156.
 - 7 Ernest E. Ramsaur, *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908* (Princeton, 1957).
 - 8 Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism* (New York, 1969).
 - 9 Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Sivast Fikirleri* (Ankara, 1964).
 - 10 With the Union and Progress people, who were out to salvage a multi-ethnic empire rather than establish order in a national society, Comte's "order" had become "union"—the latter, of course, subsuming the former.
 - 11 For the two offsprings of Comtean positivist tradition in France, those of Durkheimian solidarism and Action Française fascism, see Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism* (New York, 1969).
 - 12 For the tensions in Gökalp's system, see esp. Chapter 7.
 - 13 See Chapter 4.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

- 1 Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism* (London, 1950), p. 43. See "Felsefi Türkçülük," *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (Istanbul, 1976), pp. 172-173.
- 2 Heyd, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
- 3 "Garba Doğru" ("Toward the West"), *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, pp. 51-65; p. 65.
- 4 "Üç Cereyan," *Türklesmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak* (Istanbul, 1976), pp. 9-17.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 16.
- 6 Reprinted in *Milli Terbiye ve Maarif Meselesi* ("The Question of National Education and Training") (Istanbul, 1972):
 - a "Milli Terbiye, I" ("National Education"), *Muallim*, 15 July 1916, no. 1. *Milli Terbiye*, pp. 1-9.
 - b "Milli Terbiye, II" ("National Education"), *Muallim*, 15 August 1916, no. 2. *Milli Terbiye*, pp. 9-17.
 - c "Terbivenin Ganesi, I" ("The Goal of Education"), *Muallim*, 15 September 1916, no. 3; *Milli Terbiye*, pp. 17-24.
 - d "Terbivenin Ganesi, II" ("The Goal of Education"), *Muallim*, 15 October 1916, no. 4; *Milli Terbiye*, pp. 24-31.
- 7 *Milli Terbiye*, p. 1.
- 8 Misleading because, as we shall see, Gökalp has a tendency to use "civilization" in a larger sense (positive sciences, technology, and industry) and in a narrower sense (technology and industry only, positive sciences occupying an intermediate position between the poles of national culture and international civilization).
- 9 *Ibid.*, pp. 3-5. Note also: "A person who worships the Arabic-Persian civilization cannot appreciate national culture, just as a person who worships the old Turkish civilization cannot understand contemporary Turkish culture."
- 10 *Ibid.*, p. 15. Note also (pp. 21-22) Gökalp's idea that the more an individual becomes national, that is, internalizes national culture, the greater is his individuation and personality development. Gökalp anticipates the possible charges that his notion of national education obscures the individuality of persons and says that, on the contrary, the goal of all education is the free development of individuality but that, for this, national culture is a prerequisite. (Such charges did materialize. Gökalp was to be accused of absorbing the individual not only in his political theory, but also in his educational method—both of which were ungrounded, as I shall try to show.)
- 11 "Hars Zümresi, Medeniyet Zümresi," *Türklesmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*, pp. 29-36.

- 12 *Ibid*, pp. 29-30.
- 13 *Ibid*, p. 31.
- 14 Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Society* (London, 1955). Durkheim, too, was influenced by Tönnies' distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* in constructing his "mechanical" and "organic" solidarities. But there is a difference: for Tönnies, who came from the organicist German tradition, the older form of social organization, *Gemeinschaft*, is the more "organic," the more "natural." In contrast, Durkheim, the heir of the French Enlightenment, finds the modern form of solidarity the more "organic," the more "progressive." (See Lewis Coser, *Masters of Sociological Thought* (New York, 1971), p. 155). Gökalp resembles Tönnies with respect to "culture" and Durkheim as regards "civilisation."
- 15 *Yeni Havad* (Istanbul, 1941), p. 20.
- 16 *Millî Terbive*, p. 33.
- 17 *Ibid*, p. 34.
- 18 *Ibid*, p. 36.
- 19 "Üç Cerevan," *loc. cit.*, pp. 14-15, 17.
- 20 *Ibid*, p. 15.
- 21 "Hars ve Medeniyet," *Yeni Mecmua* 1918 (60); reprinted in *Hars ve Medeniyet* (Ankara, 1972), pp. 1-9.
- 22 *Ibid*, p. 1.
- 23 *Ibid*, pp. 1-4. Similarly, Yunus Emre's poems in Turkish were "cultural" and reinforced solidarity among Anatolian Turks; Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi's, in Persian, were "civilizational", interconnecting the Anatolian upper strata to the upper strata of Persian and other Islamic lands.
- 24 *Ibid*, p. 5.
- 25 *Ibid*, p. 6.
- 26 *Ibid*. Note that the date of this writing is prior to the formation of the Turkish nation-state. Also note that a theoretical door is opened to the adoption of even cultural values of the West if accepted by the people.
- 27 *Ibid*.
- 28 *Ibid*, p. 7. This is somewhat reminiscent of Disraeli's "two nations," except that culture, not economics, is the dividing line for Gökalp.
- 29 The term *örf*, literally custom, corresponds in Gökalp's scheme to Durkheim's "opinion."
- 30 *Ibid*.
- 31 "Hars ve Medeniyetin Münasebetleri," *Yeni Mecmua*, 1918 (61); reprinted in *Hars ve Medeniyet* (Ankara, 1972), pp. 25-34.
- 32 *Ibid*, pp. 25-26, 29-30. Gökalp, with an anthropological approach, and with his usual symmetry, traces back the origins of culture and civilization to religion and magic, respectively.
- 33 *Ibid*, pp. 27-30.
- 34 *Ibid*, p. 28.
- 35 Hevd, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-68.
- 36 *Ibid*, pp. 32-35.
- 37 "Millî Kültür ve Medeniyet," *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, pp. 31-45.
- 38 *Ibid*, pp. 31-32 and 44-45. As Gökalp does not eliminate the former and exclusively idealize the latter, his emphasis on popular culture is quite different from the notion of *Folkgeist*, with its irrational and emotional aspects, untempered by science and reason.
- 39 "Garba Doğru," *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, pp. 51-65.
- 40 "Hars ve Tehzib," *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, pp. 97-98.
- 41 *Ibid*, p. 97. Religion as duplicated in this catalogue should be read as philosophy of religion.
- 42 *Ibid*, p. 98.
- 43 *Ibid*.
- 44 *Ibid*, pp. 100-101.

- 45 *Ibid*, p. 102. "Evil" should be read as imperialism, and "political organization" (*sıvası teşkilatı*) as liberalism and Bolshevism. (See Chapters Six and Seven.)
- 46 For a collection of Gökâlp's poems and tales, see Fevziye A. Tansel, ed., *Şiirler ve Halk Masalları* (Ankara, 1952).
- 47 *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, p. 11.
- 48 Tansel, *op. cit.*, pp. 5 and 15-16.
- 49 See Tansel, *op. cit.*, p. 276. Not even his very anti-British poems are xenophobic; he is infuriated at British policies and diplomacy. See pp. 285-286, 310-311, 313-314, and 318.
- 50 *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (İstanbul, 1976).
- 51 "Türkçülüğün Tarihi," *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, pp. 7-16. Gökâlp delineates 3 stages: "Turquerie," "Turcology," and real, authentic "Turkism."
- 52 "Türkçülük Nedir?" *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, pp. 17-24.
- 53 *Ibid*, pp. 17-18. See also p. 24: "Pedigree should be sought in horses because race is very important in animals since their capabilities derive from instincts, and the latter are hereditary. It is not correct to seek pedigrees in human beings, for race has no effect on social characteristics."
- 54 *Ibid*, pp. 18-20.
- 55 *Ibid*, pp. 20-21.
- 56 *Ibid*, p. 22. Gökâlp had already expressed these views in the same form in an article on "National Culture and Race" (*Hars ve Irk*) in *Yeni Mecmua*, 1918 (62); reprinted in *Hars ve Medeniyet* (Ankara, 1972).
- 57 "Türkçülük ve Turancılık," *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, pp. 25-30.
- 58 The Yakuts are situated in the forest-tundra region of Siberia.
- 59 *Ibid*, p. 26. See, however, also the ambiguity in Gökâlp's immediately following rhetorical question: "What is the object of this union? A political unification? For the moment, no." This is the single instance I have encountered in his Turkish poems and articles which seems to imply something more than cultural unification, owing to the clause "for the moment."
- 60 *Ibid*, p. 28.
- 61 "Sıvası Türkçülük," *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, pp. 170-172.
- 62 *Ibid*, p. 170.
- 63 *Ibid*, p. 172.
- 64 "Türklüğün Basına Gelenler," "Türk Milleti ve Turan," "Milliyet Mefkûresi," *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak* (İstanbul, 1976), pp. 37-46, 58-64, 70-76, respectively.
- 65 *Ibid*, p. 40.
- 66 *Ibid*, p. 45.
- 67 *Ibid*, p. 61.
- 68 *Ibid*, pp. 75-76. It is ambiguous here whether Gökâlp makes a reluctant deterministic prediction or merely speaks in hypothetical terms.
- 69 "Millî Davasını kuvvetlendirmek" ("Strengthening National Solidarity"), *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, pp. 85, 90, 96.
- 70 Şerif Mardin, contribution to "Forum," *Ziya Gökalp* (November, 1974), Vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 148-149.
- 71 Heyd, *op. cit.*, p. 82. My account of Gökâlp's attitude toward orthodox Islam is based on Heyd (pp. 82-103), who is an authority on Islamic jurisprudence and theology.
- 72 Heyd, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-87.
- 73 In fact, Heyd expressed reservations about this: "In general, Gökâlp's references to Islamic traditions in support of his theories have to be accepted with much caution" (p. 87). Heyd also quotes another oriental authority, H. A. R. Gibb, regarding Gökâlp's theory of *nas* and *örf* as "purely subjective" and "irreconcilable with the bases of Islamic thought" (p. 88). Gökâlp's efforts may well be irreconcilable with the canons of Islamic theology and jurisprudence, as Heyd and Gibb suggest, but the point is that Gökâlp does not depart from orthodox Islamic

- dogma for his theories; on the contrary, he departs from his own original theory, which he also applies to Islamic thought. If he has not succeeded in fitting Islam into his theory, the effort still stands as a normative proposal.
- 74 Heyd, *op. cit.*, p. 88. Heyd renders it as "science of the social roots of the law."
- 75 "Siyasi Türkçülük," *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, pp. 170-171.
- 76 This may be against the essence of Orthodox Islam, as Heyd suggests (p. 89), but then that is not Gökalp's overriding concern.
- 77 Heyd, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
- 78 See Heyd, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-92.
- 79 See Heyd, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
- 80 *Genç Kalemler*, 1911 (8); in Niyazi Berkes, trans., *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization* (New York, 1959), pp. 50-55.
- 81 *Ibid*, pp. 50-51. (Berkes' translation.)
- 82 *Ibid*, p. 51. How a pragmatist like William James can be grouped with the others is unclear.
- 83 *Ibid*, p. 52.
- 84 See, *Ibid*, p. 53: "As matter is the manifestation of spirit, everything consists of spirit more or less consciously. Spirit is the real being and matter is its manifestation.
- 85 Emile Durkheim, *The Division of labor in Society*, trans. George Simpson (Glencoe, Ill., 1960).
- 86 *Ibid*, pp. 1-2, 4, 5, 24, 27, and 28.
- 87 It is interesting to note that Ernst Nolte, in perhaps one of the best works on the intellectual sources and theories of fascism, *Three Faces of Fascism* (New York, 1969), summarily calls corporatism "the most reactionary demand of fascists," totally overlooking the solidaristic variety.
- 88 For "quasi-corporatism" in England, see Samuel Beer, *British Politics in the Collectivist Age* (New York, 1969); for "numerical corporatism" in Scandinavia, see Robert Dahl, ed., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven, 1966); for "neo-corporatism" in general, see Robert Presthus, ed., *Interest Groups in International Perspective* (Philadelphia, 1974); for "liberal corporatism" (a contradiction in terms in my terms), see Philippe Schmitter, ed., *Liberal Corporatism in Western Europe* (special issue of *CPS*, April 1977).
- 89 For post-war corporatist developments in Latin America, see, for example, F. Pike and T. Stritch, eds., *The New Corporatism* (Notre Dame, 1974). For an example of corporatist "novo estado" between the two wars, see Philippe Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil* (Stanford, 1971).
- 90 This is a very large topic in itself, into which we cannot enter here.
- 91 "Terbive Münakasaları," *Muallim*, 1917 (7, 8, 9); reprinted in *Milli Terbive ve Maarif Meselesi* (Ankara, 1972), pp. 31-42, 43-51, 51-62. (Page numbers refer to *Milli Terbiye*.)
- 92 *Ibid*, p. 57. Under social sciences, Gökalp lists history, political science, law, economics, ethics, linguistics, aesthetics, theology, ethnography, demography, human geography and education.
- 93 *Ibid*, pp. 60-61 and 54.
- 94 *Ibid*, pp. 43, 51, 60-61.
- 95 *Ibid*, pp. 36-37, 59, 43.
- 96 *Ibid*, p. 40.
- 97 *Ibid*, pp. 47-48.
- 98 *Ibid*, pp. 40, 49, 60-61.
- 99 *Ibid*, p. 55.
- 100 "Terbive Meselesi," *Yeni Mecma*, 1918 (32, 34, 36, 38); reprinted in *Milli Terbive*, pp. 62-68, 68-73, 73-83, 83-97.
- 101 *Ibid*, p. 62.

- 102 *Ibid*, pp. 69-70, 76. Here Gökalp criticizes Spencer's organicist and naturalistic reductionism in explaining morality and social life, implicitly disapproving of his social Darwinism.
- 103 *Ibid*, p. 71.
- 104 *Ibid*, p. 83.
- 105 This is somewhat different from a more or less automatic replacement of old institutions by new ones, corresponding to changes in collective conscience, in Durkheim. Gökalp can conceive of instances when a given balance between customs and institutions will be pressured by custom, and thus harmony attained at another level of development.
- 106 *Ibid*, p. 84.
- 107 Arrested because, despite his normative idealism, Durkheim remains more of an ideological positivist than Gökalp. Social idealism is an original term employed by Gökalp.
- 108 "Hars Zümresi, Medeniyet Zümresi," *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*, pp. 29-36; Cf. esp. pp. 29-30.
- 109 *Loc. cit.*, p. 31.
- 110 *Loc. cit.*, p. 33. This formulation is reminiscent of Kant's "critique of pure reason," "critique of practical reason," and "critique of judgment", which is the bridge between the "ought" and the "is"
- 111 "Tarihi Maddecilik ve İçtimai Mefkûrecilik," *Yeni Gün* (8 March 1923); reprinted in *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, pp. 66-76 and in *Fırka Nedir* ed. E. B. Şapolyo (Zonguldak, 1947), pp. 40-44.
- 112 *Fırka Nedir?* p. 40.
- 113 *Ibid*, p. 41.
- 114 *Ibid*.
- 115 *Ibid*.
- 116 *Ibid*, p. 41ff.
- 117 For a very harsh and otherwise unsatisfactory critique of Gökalp's anti-Marxism. see Kerim Sadi, *Ziya Gökalp: Tarihi Materyalizmin Muarızı* (İstanbul, 1940).
- 118 İktisada Doğru," *Küçük Mecmua*, 1922 (7); reprinted in *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*, pp. 83-90.
- 119 *Ibid*, p. 83.
- 120 *Ibid*, p. 89. Gökalp's exact term is "monistic reduction" (*valide irca*), that is, into ideas, especially religion, and into economics.
- 121 *Ibid*, pp. 84-85 and 88.
- 122 *Ibid*, pp. 86-87.
- 123 "İlmi İçtima," *Peyman* (28 June 1909), Şevket Bevsanoğlu, ed., *Ziya Gökalp'ın İlk Yazı Havanı* (İstanbul, 1956), pp. 94-95. In his sociologistic scientism Gökalp always preferred "science of sociology" (*ilmi içtima*) to sociology (*içtimaiyat*).
- 124 *Ibid*.
- 125 See Chapter 7.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

- 1 "Yeni Hava ve Yeni Kıymetler," *Genç Kalemler*, 1910 (8); reprinted in *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak* (İstanbul, 1976), pp. 120-127.
- 2 *Ibid*, p. 120.
- 3 *Ibid*, p. 125.
- 4 *Ibid*, p. 124.
- 5 "Mefkûre," *Türk Yurdu*, 1912 (56); reprinted in *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*, pp. 51-57.
- 6 *Ibid*, pp. 54-55.
- 7 Gökalp's *ör* corresponds to Durkheim's moral judgment or opinion, but Gökalp sometimes uses it in the sense of custom as well (*cf.* p. 76), and always with the

- connotation of *müntezir*, that is, most closely, "latent." Gökalp's *müessese* corresponds to Durkheim's institution and has the connotation of *müteazzı*, literally "organized" but effectively "manifest."
- 8 *Ibid*, pp. 56-57.
 - 9 "Hedefler ve Mefkûreler," *Cumhuriyet* (13 September 1924); reprinted in *Çınaraltı Konuşmaları* (Ankara, 1966), pp. 90-96; p. 94.
 - 10 "Mefkûre," *Cumhuriyet* 11 May 1924); in *Çınaraltı Konuşmaları*, pp. 30-32.
 - 11 "Ümit," *Cumhuriyet* (23 August 1924); in *Çınaraltı Konuşmaları*, pp. 81-85; p. 83.
 - 12 *Ibid*, p. 84.
 - 13 *Ibid*, pp. 81-82.
 - 14 The same goes for morale-building hyperboles like "the supermen envisioned by the German philosopher Nietzsche are the Turks" (*Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*, p. 126). Notwithstanding Gökalp's remarkable sense of proportion that knows where to stop, one cannot avoid observing the delicate margin within which the pendulum has swung between idealistic collective activism and fascistic idealization of self-professed superlative national virtues, martial or otherwise, as an important trait of political culture during the formative years of the Republic and afterwards.
 - 15 "Meçhul Bir Filozof," *Cumhuriyet* (8 May 1924); in *Çınaraltı Konuşmaları*, pp. 21-23.
 - 16 *Ibid*, p. 22.
 - 17 "Millîyet Mefkûresi" ("The Ideal of Nationalism"). *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak* (1918); reprinted in Niyazi Berkes, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization* (New York, 1959), pp. 79-82; p. 79.
 - 18 *Millî Terbiye ve Muârif Meselesi* (Ankara, 1972), p. 34.
 - 19 *Ibid*.
 - 20 The words Gökalp uses for the occupational group and its organization, that is, the corporation, are *ocak*, as here; or *lonca*, literally guild (but since Gökalp, following Durkheim, sharply differentiates between medieval guilds and modern corporations, that should not mislead); or *hey'i*, literally corporate; or in the case of *hey'i devlet*, corporative state.
 - 21 *Millî Terbiye*, loc. cit.
 - 22 "Millî Vîcdanı Kuvvetlendirmek" ("To Strengthen National Conscience"), *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (Ankara, 1976), pp. 77-83; p. 77. I have inserted the bracket mindful of Gökalp's own qualification (see Chapter Four) that his, and Durkheim's, organismic analogies do not involve any reduction of society to a physiological organism.
 - 23 *Ibid*, p. 78.
 - 24 *Ibid*, pp. 80 and 83.
 - 25 *Ibid*, p. 83.
 - 26 "Ahlaki Türkçülük." *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (İstanbul, 1976), pp. 141-162:
 - a. Türklerde Ahlak ("Turkish Morality"), pp. 141-142.
 - b. Vatani Ahlak ("National-Patriotic Morality"), pp. 142-146.
 - c. Meslekî Ahlak ("Professional Morality"), pp. 146-149.
 - d. Aile Ahlakı ("Family Morality"), pp. 149-156.
 - e. Cinsî Ahlak ("Sexual Morality"), pp. 156-158.
 - f. Gelecekte Aile Ahlakı ("Family Morality in the Future"), pp. 158-159.
 - g. Medenî ve Şahsî Ahlak ("Civil and Individual Morality"), pp. 159-161.
 - h. Milletlerarası Ahlak ("International Morality"), pp. 161-162.
 - 27 *Ibid*, pp. 141-142.
 - 28 *Ibid*, p. 143.
 - 29 *Ibid*, p. 144.
 - 30 *Ibid*, p. 145.
 - 31 *Ibid*.
 - 32 *Ibid*, p. 143.

- 33 "Millî Dayanışmayı Kuvvetlendirmek" ("To Strengthen National Solidarity). *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, pp. 84-96; p. 84.
- 34 "Ahlaki Türkçülük," *loc. cit.*, p. 150. (Cf. also Chapter Five for Gökalp's Turkish "étatisme" and "social solidarism.")
- 35 *Ibid.*, p. 152.
- 36 *Ibid.*, pp. 154-155.
- 37 *Çınaraltı Konuşmaları* (Ankara, 1966), p. 101. See also pp. 43-45 and 46-50, where Gökalp anticipates the subsequent reforms in family law concerning marriage (1926) and family names (1934).
- 38 "Ahlaki Türkçülük," *loc. cit.*, p. 160.
- 39 *Ibid.*, p. 87.
- 40 *Ibid.*, pp. 161-162. Thus there is no ethno- or religio-centrism in Gökalp. (For his views on the "equality of nations," see Chapter Six.) For Gökalp, national/cultural and Islamic/religious values pertain to solidarity *within* nation-states; they are not bases for politics among nations. Solidarity *among* nations is based on international morality, and science to be sure.
- 41 *Ibid.*, pp. 146-147. Gökalp gives here a philological argument that *tarikati*—sects—actually means *vollar*—ways, that is, division of labor into occupations.
- 42 Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York, 1964).
- 43 Cf. Chapter Seven on Gökalp's Political Economy.
- 44 *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, p. 146.
- 45 *Ibid.*
- 46 *Ibid.*, p. 147. What Gökalp actually means by "labor exchange" (*iş borsası*) is a union of corporations or, in today's parlance, *esnaf dernekleri birliği*.
- 47 *Ibid.*, pp. 147-148.
- 48 *Ibid.*, p. 148.
- 49 "Millî Dayanışmayı Kuvvetlendirmek," *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, pp. 84-96.
- 50 *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.
- 51 *Ibid.*
- 52 Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *1935 Programı* (Ankara, 1935), p. 6.
- 53 *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, *loc. cit.*
- 54 Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism* (London, 1950), p. 125.
- 55 *Ibid.*, p. 124. (Heyd's translation); reprinted in *Yeni Havad* (Istanbul, 1941), p. 12. *Yazıfe* means duty.
- 56 *Idem.*
- 57 *Idem.*
- 58 In Gökalp, enthusiasm is always controlled by reason, as practice is by theory. To emphasize only the poetic figure of speech of "performing social obligations with closed eyes" is a lop-sided view to take. Gökalp even sweetens the concept of "community," which is otherwise important for him because of its national-cultural connotations, by the following: "Our social life will not be based on the principle of 'community,' but of solidarity produced by free wills." ("Yeni Havad, Yeni Kıymetler." *Türklesmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*, p. 127.)
- 59 See Heyd, *op. cit.*, p. 124. esp. fn. 1.
- 60 Cf. above, "Terbiye Münazaraları," *Millî Terbiye ve Maarif Meselsi* (Ankara, 1972).
- 61 "Darülfünun"; reprinted in *Yeni Havad* (Istanbul, 1941), p. 31. It should be noted that such liberal ideals have not taken root even in the Turkey of the 1980's.
- 62 "Ahlak" ("Morality"); reprinted in *Yeni Havad*, p. 11. (First published in 1915.)
- 63 "İktisada Doğru" ("Toward Economics"), *Küçük Mecmua*, 1922 (7); reprinted in *Türklesmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak* (Ankara, 1976), pp. 83-90; p. 88.
- 64 "Hars ve Sivasat." *Yeni Mecmua*, 1918 (57); reprinted in *Hars ve Medeniyet* (Ankara, 1972), pp. 66-74.
- 65 *Ibid.*, p. 66.
- 66 *Ibid.*, p. 67.
- 67 "Halka Doğru" ("Toward the People"), *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, pp. 46-50; p. 46.

- 68 For these distinctions, see Geraint Parry, *Political Elites* (New York, 1970).
- 69 "Halka Doğru," pp. 46-47.
- 70 *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.
- 71 *Ibid.*, p. 48.
- 72 *Ibid.*, p. 50.
- 73 Heyd, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
- 74 *Ibid.*
- 75 For an instance of facile, and therefore, misplaced and misleading comparison of complex concepts, see Heyd, *op. cit.*, p. 114, where the author suggests resemblances between Gökalp's and Michels' conceptions of nationalism. Heyd argues for the similar usage, in both thinkers, of a certain "type of myth common to many nationalist ideologies" and continues as follows: "Just as Turkish history proves to him [Gökalp] the *moral superiority of his race*, he believes that the historical mission of the Turkish nation is 'to realize the highest *moral virtues* and to prove that the sacrifices and heroic deeds which are generally regarded as impossible are not beyond human strength'" (my emphases). We have seen that the concept of "race" figures in Gökalp's nationalism only as a criterion to be rejected. We have also seen and will further see that "moral superiority" of a nation (even if linguistically defined) never figures in Gökalp: equality of nations, their cultural diversity being an asset for the community of nations, is an explicit tenet for him—"moral equality" in the Tocquevillean sense would have been an appropriate association if some such had been required. (See "Turkism" and "The Sources" in Chapter Four and "The Goals of New Turkey" in Chapter Six for the nature of Gökalp's nationalism and internationalism.) Furthermore, what Heyd quotes from Gökalp himself—even allowing for the merits of translation—contains nothing that supports Heyd's immediately preceding judgement: deeds "regarded as impossible are not beyond *human strength*" (my emphasis), as distinct from "Turkish" strength. That the Turkish nation, as any other, may "realize the highest moral virtues" is obviously somewhat hyperbolic as anyone can tell; but then, it is only too consistent with Gökalp's general idealistic activism, and since that is a general possibility, other nations, too, can do it. (Cf. the "Ideal" above.)
- 76 "Hars ve Medeniyet Üzerinde bir Musahabe," *Hakimiyeti Milliye* (1 May 1923); reprinted in *Hars ve Medeniyet* (Ankara, 1972), pp. 103-107.
- 77 "Türk Harsı ve Osmanlı Medeniyeti," *Hakimiyeti Milliye* (16 May 1923); in *Hars ve Medeniyet*, pp. 118-124.
- 78 *Ibid.*, pp. 118-119.
- 79 *Ibid.*, p. 121.
- 80 *Ibid.*, p. 122.
- 81 *Ibid.*, p. 123.
- 82 *Ibid.*, p. 124.
- 83 "Millî Kültür ve Medeniyet" ("National Culture and Civilization"), *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, pp. 31-45; p. 38. Although the concept of social class is replaced in Gökalp's theory by the concept of social group, especially the occupational group, Gökalp, as we shall see, makes a sort of class analysis not too infrequently.
- 84 *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.
- 85 "Millî Davanışmayı Kuvvetlendirmek," *loc. cit.*, p. 85.
- 86 "Halk Medeniyeti, I," *Halka Doğru*, 1913 (XIV); reprinted in *Hars ve Medeniyet*, pp. 108-110. This pair of concepts, one may note, is reminiscent of another adjectival pair, latent and manifest.
- 87 See Max Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, ed. Talcott Parsons (New York, 1957). For an analysis of Weber's "Machtpolitik" and his neglect of the question of legitimacy, see Otto Stammer, ed., *Max Weber and Sociology Today* (Oxford, 1971), especially the articles by Raymond Aron and Wolfgang Mommsen.

- 88 "Velayet ve Sulta," *Cumhuriyet* (10 May 1924); reprinted in *Çınaraltı Konuşmaları* (Ankara, 1966), pp. 27-29. For another version of this article ("Sulta ve Velayet"), see Chapter Six.
- 89 *Ibid.*, p. 27.
- 90 *Ibid.*
- 91 *Ibid.*, p. 28.
- 92 Positivist in the sense of the "ideological positivism" of A. Comte and E. Durkheim.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

- 1 For the methodological and epistemological ambiguities inherent in Gökalp's idealistic positivism, see Chapter Four.
- 2 "Hars ve Siyaset," *Yeni Mecma*, 1918 (57); reprinted in *Hars ve Medeniyet* (Ankara, 1972), pp. 66-74.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 66. The French terms Gökalp uses in the text are *volunte de conscience* and *volunte de puissance*.
- 4 *Ibid.* Gökalp's theoretical ideas "inazarı içihattarlar" may also be rendered as "cognitive norms"; his "emotional impressions" (*hissi intibalar*) as "affective norms" (note the similarity with Durkheim's "judgments of fact" and "judgments of value"). As for the "practical struggles," I have used it for *amelî mücahade*.
- 5 *Ibid.* In this insistence on practice guided by theory, Gökalp differs radically from the later official Kemalist ideology to the effect that action is everything, doctrine is nought.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 67. Cf. also Chapter Five.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 73. (Note that what guides political activity is culture's theoretical norms, that is, reason, not its emotional norms.)
- 8 *Ibid.*
- 9 *Ibid.*
- 10 "Musaafe ve Müsamaha," *Küçük Mecma*, 1922 (32); reprinted in *Türkleşmek, İslanlaşmak, Müasırlaşmak* (İstanbul, 1976), pp. 95-98.
- 11 *Ibid.*, p. 95.
- 12 *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.
- 13 From "Gazel," in Şevket Bevsanoğlu, *Ziya Gökalp'in İlk Yazı Havası* (İstanbul, 1956), p. 22.
- 14 From "Hürriyet Marsı," *loc. cit.*, p. 25. (Heyd, *op. cit.*, p. 137, offers rather weak translations of both poems.)
- 15 "Maarif Meselesi," ("The Question of Education"), *Muallim*, 1916 (11 and 12); reprinted in *Millî Terbiye ve Maarif Meselesi* (Ankara, 1972), pp. 105-122; pp. 109-110.
- 16 See also Heyd, *op. cit.*, p. 136.
- 17 *Millî Terbiye ve Maarif Meselesi*, pp. 109-110.
- 18 *Ibid.*, p. 112. Gökalp also contrasts the legal morality of the Turks and the Arabs (i.e. orthodox Islam). The former emphasizes public authority in jurisprudence and social justice in ethics; the latter emphasizes private power and personal charity. This comparison is rather superficial.
- 19 "Umumculuk," *Küçük Mecma* (5 March 1923); reprinted in *Fırka Nedir?* ed. E. B. Şapolyo (Zonguldak, 1947), pp. 30-31.
- 20 Heyd, *op. cit.*, p. 137.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 133.
- 22 For varieties of populism, see Ernest Gellner and Ghita Ionescu, eds., *Populism* (New York, 1969).
- 23 In contradistinction to the Kemalist definition of "authoritarian democracy," which is based on the two major principles of "second-degree voting" (until 1946)

- and the "petition system" (*dilek sistemi*). For an official expression of this definition by Recep Peker, the long-reigning secretary-general of the Republican People's party, see Tarık Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler* (Istanbul, 1952), p. 438.
- 24 "Hükümet ve Tahakküm" ("Government and Domination"), *Küçük Mecmua* (4 December 1922); reprinted in *Fırka Nedir?* pp. 33-35; p. 33.
- 25 Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York, 1964), esp. the Preface.
- 26 "Hükümet ve Tahakküm, *loc. cit.*, p. 34 and 33.
- 27 *Ibid.*
- 28 "Fırka Nedir?" *Hakimiyeti Milliye* (19 April 1923); reprinted in *Fırka Nedir?* pp. 11-13.
- 29 *Ibid.* The Sivas Congress of the Kemalists had already declared "party-politics" as "divisive politicking" (*tefrikacılık*).
- 30 "Fırkaların Siyasî Tasnifi," *Hakimiyeti Milliye* (23 April 1923); in *Fırka Nedir?* pp. 13-15.
- 31 For the differences in this respect between Gökaltıp and the Unionists and Kemalists, see the concluding chapter.
- 32 *Fırkaların Siyasî Tasnifi*, p. 13.
- 33 *Ibid.*, p. 14.
- 34 *Ibid.*
- 35 *Ibid.*, p. 14.
- 36 *Ibid.*, p. 15.
- 37 *Ibid.*
- 38 *Ibid.*
- 39 "Fırkaların İçtimai Tasnifi," *Hakimiyeti Milliye* (29 April 1923); in *Fırka Nedir?* pp. 15-17.
- 40 *Ibid.*, p. 15.
- 41 *Ibid.*
- 42 *Ibid.*, p. 16.
- 43 *Ibid.*
- 44 *Ibid.*
- 45 *Ibid.*
- 46 *Ibid.*, p. 17 (my emphases).
- 47 This invites the association of "national socialism," but Gökaltıp's corporatism is too solidaristic for that.
- 48 *Ibid.* (my emphases).
- 49 "Türk Meşrutiyetinin Tekâmülü," *Küçük Mecmua* (11 December 1922); *Fırka Nedir?* pp. 31-32.
- 50 *Ibid.*, p. 31.
- 51 *Ibid.*
- 52 *Ibid.*, p. 32.
- 53 *Ibid.* (This, however, was not forthcoming till 1946. The Kemalists, as in other various respects, did not share Gökaltıp's trust in the "people's maturity.")
- 54 "Ferdî Hükümet"-İçtimai Hükümet," *Küçük Mecmua* (27 November 1922); *Fırka Nedir?* pp. 28-29.
- 55 "İçtimai Nevîler," *İslam Mecmuası*, 1914 (20); reprinted in *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*, trans. Nivazi Berkes (New York, 1959), pp. 123-124.
- 56 *Ibid.*, p. 125 (emphasis mine).
- 57 "Bir Kavmin Tetkikinde Takiholunacak Usul," *Millî Tettebbular Mecmuası*, 1915 (2); reprinted in Berkes, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-123.
- 58 *Ibid.*, p. 121.
- 59 *Ibid.*, p. 122.
- 60 The prevalent criticism against Gökaltıp especially from the left has been that he not only produced a convenient ideology for the authoritarian etatism of the Kemalists but also, to double the injustice, that his own system was even more

- authoritarian, or rather, outright totalitarian. The truth of the matter is that the Kemalists did not heed Gökâlp's anti-statist, pluralist, and democratic restraints but distorted his views into slogans justifying their actions in the direction of fascist shades of corporatism.
- 61 "Hukukî Türkçülük," *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (İstanbul, 1976), pp. 162-164; p. 163.
- 62 Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Ziya Gökalp* (İstanbul, 1939).
- 63 Reprinted in *Yeni Hayat* (İstanbul, 1941); "Talat Paşa" (1915), p. 39; "Enver Paşa" (1915), p. 40; "Petitions to Atatürk" (1923), pp. 45-48.
- 64 Cf. Atatürk's famous claim that he "hid as a national secret in his conscience" all the reform projects until the time was opportune for their execution—a statement to be mythified in Turkey. See M. Kemal Atatürk, *Söylev* (İstanbul, 1971).
- 65 See Vasfi Rasit Sevig, *Teşkilatı Esasiye Hukuku* (Ankara, 1938) for a semi-official exposition of the political and constitutional theory of the Kemalist single-party. A major thesis of the author is the self-congratulatory assertion that the Italian and Germans achieved their own "miracles" by borrowing the miraculous "chief-system" developed by the Kemalists. The former, however, the author adds, took this system to extremes.
- 66 "Deha" (1916); reprinted in *Yeni Hayat*, p. 21.
- 67 İçtimaiyat ve Fikrîyat: Cemiyette Büyük Adamların Tesiri," *İçtimaiyat Mecmuası*, 1917 (1); reprinted in Berkes, *op. cit.*, pp. 156-170.
- 68 *Ibid.*, p. 157. (Berkes' translation).
- 69 *Ibid.*, pp. 158-159 (emphasis mine).
- 70 *Ibid.*, p. 163 (emphasis mine).
- 71 *Ibid.*, p. 164.
- 72 *Ibid.* (Cf. "Ideal" in Chapter Four). Note also the resemblances to Weber's "charismatic leader" and "calling."
- 73 *Ibid.* Cf. also "Transformism" above.
- 74 For an example of the widespread and persistent view that the Turkish revolution is the work of a single leader, specifically expressed in this instance as "Turkish revolution is but a photograph of Atatürk's mind," see Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, *Atatürk İhtilali* (İstanbul, 1940), one of the "subleaders" and the architect of the modernization of the Turkish legal system in the 1920's. Gökâlp reverses the arrow of causality.
- 75 See Enver B. Şapolyo, *Mustafa Kemal Paşa ve Milli Mücadelenin İç Alemi* (İstanbul, 1967), p. 153.
- 76 'Deha' ve Doğru." *Küçük Mecmua*, 1922 (1); reprinted in Berkes, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-265; p. 264. (Berkes translates conscience as consciousness.)
- 77 "Sulta ve Velâyet." *Küçük Mecmua* (19 February 1923); reprinted in *Fırka Nedir?* p. 37. Cf. above for the reversely titled version of this article ("Velâyet ve Sulta").
- 78 *Ibid.*
- 79 *Ibid.* Note that *veli* literally means custodian and guardian. Gökâlp seems to feel comfortable with these connotations.
- 80 "Fıkraların Sivasî Tasnifi," *loc. cit.*, p. 13.
- 81 *Doğru Yol*; reprinted in *Fırka Nedir?* pp. 45-50.
- 82 *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.
- 83 See M. Kemal Atatürk, *Söylev*, p. 124 for the "naturalness" of the unity of power in exact Gökâlpian terms.
- 84 Orhan Arsal, *Devletin Tarifi* (Ankara, 1938), p. 32. This is an official party publication of a lecture delivered in Ankara Halkevi by a professor of law. It was one of the policies of the Republican People's Party to organize "conference series" at the "People's Lodges" to propagate the official Kemalist ideology. In its drive for "ideological mobilization," as opposed to active mobilization, the RPP had secured the complete coordination of the university, giving birth to the quite numerous social type of professor-MP. This is among the reasons that social sciences in Turkey have been arrested at the level of catechistic ideology (Kemalist)

for a long time. This kind of "university-trained jurist" turned professional politician in Weber's terminology was of course not an entirely desirable thing for Gökalp. (Cf. Chapter Five for his views on the autonomy of the university from the state.) That he himself accepted a deputyship from the Kemalists remains a fact, but then there is the difference of critical attitude and intellectual integrity. In Turkish, *Ata*, from which Atatürk is derived, means father, but with connotations of the greatest ancestral father. Hence, my ongoing references to an atavistic political culture. See also the records of the 1939 Extraordinary Congress of the Republican People's Party, convened upon Atatürk's death, the Eternal Chief, to confer the title of the National Chief on İnönü, for extreme instances of the internalization of the Fuehrer-guide (*rehber*) principle by a "political class," often couched in very interesting Freudian imagery.

- 85 "Revimi Kimlere Vermeliyim?" *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (17 April 1923); *Fırka Nedir?* pp. 20-21.
- 86 *Ibid.*, p. 21.
- 87 Posthumously collected as *Yeni Türkiye'nin Hedefleri*, ed. Hikmet Tanyu (İstanbul, 1974).
- 88 1. *Yeni Türkiye* (1 July 1923); pp. 33-37.
 2. *Yeni Türkiye* (2 July 1923); pp. 37-41.
 3. *Yeni Türkiye* (3 July 1923); pp. 41-45.
 4. *Yeni Türkiye* (4 July 1923); pp. 45-49.
 5. *Yeni Türkiye* (5 July 1923); pp. 49-53.
 6. *Yeni Türkiye* (6 July 1923); pp. 53-58.
 7. *Yeni Türkiye* (9 July 1923); pp. 58-61.
 (Page references are to *Yeni Türkiye'nin Hedefleri*.)
- 89 *Ibid.*, pp. 33-35.
- 90 *Ibid.*, p. 36.
- 91 *Ibid.*, p. 37.
- 92 *Ibid.*, p. 38.
- 93 *Ibid.*, p. 37.
- 94 *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41. How remote this is from the "radical purity and hygiene" of the Kemalist theories of history that gained circulation, especially during the 1930's, and certainly from those of the "Racist-Turanist" movement of 1943-1944, which constitutes the intellectual origin and veteran cadres of the present National Action Party.
- 95 *Ibid.*, p. 46.
- 96 *Ibid.*
- 97 *Ibid.*, p. 48.
- 98 *Ibid.*, p. 50.
- 99 *Ibid.*, p. 51.
- 100 *Ibid.*, p. 53. For the ambiguities involved in Gökalp's usage of "capitalism," as well as "class," see Chapter Seven.
- 101 *Ibid.* Cf. also Chapter Two on "Culture and Civilization."
- 102 *Ibid.*
- 103 *Ibid.*, p. 54. (Emphasis mine.)
- 104 *Ibid.*
- 105 *Ibid.*
- 106 *Ibid.*
- 107 *Ibid.*, p. 55.
- 108 *Ibid.*
- 109 *Ibid.*, p. 56.
- 110 *Ibid.*
- 111 *Ibid.*, p. 56.
- 112 *Ibid.* For Gökalp's use of "class," see Chapter Seven. To be noted is Gökalp's shift from "justice" to "harmony" in this excerpt.

- 113 *Ibid.*, p. 57. Women were enfranchised in 1934; the second-degree voting that lasted till 1946 effectively barred the peasant from being elected; the question of oppression of peasants by feudal landlords and bondages was never taken up by the Kemalists.
- 114 *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

- 1 "İktisadî Türkçülük," *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (İstanbul, 1976), pp. 165-170.
- 2 *Ibid.*, pp. 165-166.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 167.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 168. "Solidarism" is in its French original in Gökalp's text. Also note that *ferdiyetçi* is liberal and *fertçi* is individualist in Gökalp.
- 5 *Ibid.*
- 6 *Ibid.* "Surplus value" is used in its French form and also as a synonym for "surplus profits." The conceptual confusion present in this whole first sentence is obvious but Gökalp's intention is quite clear.
- 7 "Makale-ı İktisadiye," *Diyanbakır* (28 March 1907); reprinted in Şevket Bevsanoğlu, *Ziya Gökalp'in İlk Yazı Havanı* (İstanbul, 1956), pp. 64-66.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 65.
- 9 *Ibid.*
- 10 *Ibid.*, p. 66.
- 11 *Ibid.*
- 12 This poem is the fourth in a five-piece "Peasant Poems" (*Köylü Şiirleri*), others being "Oruç," "Ezan," "Namaz," and "Bayram," *Diyanbakır*, (22 and 29 October 1908); reprinted in Bevsanoğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-38.
- 13 "İktisadî Türkçülük," *loc. cit.*, p. 169.
- 14 *Ibid.*
- 15 *Ibid.*
- 16 *Ibid.* Cf. also Chapter Four for Gökalp's anti-British poems.
- 17 *Ibid.*, p. 170.
- 18 *Ibid.*
- 19 "Ticaret," *Diyanbakır* (28 February 1907); reprinted in Bevsanoğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-63.
- 20 "İktisadî Mucize," *Küçük Mecmua*, 1922 (23); reprinted in *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak* (İstanbul, 1976), pp. 91-94.
- 21 "İktisadî İnkılap için Nasıl Çalışmalıyız?" *Küçük Mecmua* (5 March 1923); reprinted in *Fırka Nedir?* ed. E. B. Şapolyo (Zonguldak, 1947), pp. 37-38.
- 22 *Ibid.*, p. 38.
- 23 *Ibid.*
- 24 *Ibid.* I have taken care to render Gökalp's words most literally, and I consider any explication redundant.
- 25 See footnote 26.
- 26 The first passage belongs to Kara Kemal at the outset of the Unionist rule in 1908; the second to Tekin Alp, at the close (1918) of a decade of "national economy" and "national bourgeoisie" policies. I am thankful to Zafer Toprak for referring me to these particularly revealing passages. (The former is from Osman Nuri: *Mecelle-i Umur-u Belediye*, p. 869, the latter from *Yeni Mecmua*, 1918 (59) pp. 133-134.)
- 27 See CHP (RPP) *Program* (Ankara, 1935).
- 28 "Musahabe-i İktisadiye," *Diyanbakır* (8 November 1906); Bevsanoğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55.
- 29 "Ticaret ve Yeni Ticaret Odası," *Diyanbakır* (11 February 1907); Bevsanoğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-59.

- 30 CHP (RPP) *Program* (Ankara, 1935), p. 11. The literal translation of the second sentence is "All owners of capital who work normally and with (advanced) techniques...."
- 31 "Ecnebi Sermayesi," *Cumhuriyet* (29 August 1924); reprinted in *Çınaraltı Konuşmaları* (Ankara, 1966), pp. 86-89.
- 32 For an echo of this attitude toward foreign capital by the Kemalists, see the speeches of statesmen at the "First Economic Congress of Turkey" in 1923. The records have been edited by Gündüz Ökçün, *Türkiye İktisat Kongresi* (Ankara, 1968).
- 33 "Türklerin En Zayıf ve En Kuvvetli Noktaları," *Cumhuriyet* (12 May 1924); *Çınaraltı Konuşmaları*, pp. 33-37.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 35.
- 35 See "Teşkilatçılar," *Cumhuriyet* (15 May 1924); *loc. cit.*, pp. 39-42.
- 36 *Ibid.*
- 37 "İktisadi İnkılap için Nasıl Çalışmalıyız? Fırka Nedir? p. 37.
- 38 "İktisadi Ademi Merkezizet," *Cumhuriyet* (31 July 1924); *loc. cit.*, pp. 67-70.
- 39 *Ibid.*, pp. 68 and 69.
- 40 *Ibid.* Cf. the significant distinction between "state corporatism" and "societal corporatism" made by Philippe Schmitter in "Still the Century of Corporatism," in F. B. Pike and T. Stritch, eds., *The New Corporatism* (Notre Dame, 1974), pp. 85-131.
- 41 *Ibid.*
- 42 Thus, the designation of "third way" is not conceptually tenable at a "real" system level, be it Benito Mussolini's third way—fascism as "constructive socialism"—or the Kemalist RPP's third way—étatisme as an "intermediate system" between capitalism and socialism—or Baathism or Peronism or "novo estado"'s or "sinamos," and so forth. The designation is tenable only at a *system rationale* level, i.e., Marxism vs. liberalism vs. corporatism (fascistic or solidaristic), and then only without overlooking the fact that liberalism and corporatism are not different ways at the former level. The untenability I suggest is restricted to a *conceptual-theoretical* level. Otherwise, this very conceptual inconsistency may be and has been quite functional at the *political-ideological* level, providing widespread external legitimacy, especially in times of crises of capitalism. In fact, it is a distinguishing mark, perhaps a defining essence, of all "third way"'s, i.e., corporatist capitalisms that they claim to be a synthesis and transcendence of capitalism and socialism, the common notion that "each resembles only itself" notwithstanding. It is a "co-existence or juxtaposition of logically and conceptually irreconcilable parts within the same cognitive whole," leading to a peculiar synthesis, or rather a dissonant conceptual bag, which I have termed elsewhere the "summation of incompatibles." (Paper given to the S.S.R.C. Conference on Hierarchy and Stratification in the Contemporary Near and Middle East, New York, May 1979.)
- 43 I take the term from Charles Maier's *Recasting Bourgeois Europe* (Princeton, 1975).
- 44 "Hürriyetin Menbalarına Doğru," *Peyman* (5 July 1909); reprinted in Beysanoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 102.
- 45 "Divarbakır Nasıl Bir Vali İster?" *Peyman* (28 June 1909); *loc. cit.*, pp. 92-93.
- 46 "Asar İhalesi," *Peyman* (12 July 1909); *loc. cit.*, pp. 102-103.
- 47 "Ziraat ve Zecamet," *Peyman* (19 July 1909); *loc. cit.*, pp. 107-108.
- 48 "Arazı Münazaaları," *Peyman* (23 August 1909); *loc. cit.*, pp. 125-126.
- 49 *Peyman* (12 July 1909); *loc. cit.*, p. 90. For similar sentiments, see also the poem "Köy" ("Village") in *Yeni Havaat* (İstanbul, 1941), p. 14; first published in 1915.
- 50 See *Kızıl Elma* (İstanbul, 1941), pp. 120-124.
- 51 "Üç Cerevan," *Türklesmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak* (İstanbul, 1976), pp. 12-13.

NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT

- 1 John N. Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-Examination* (New York, 1964), p. 1.
- 2 Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Sivas Fikirleri* (Ankara, 1964).
- 3 See especially the 1935 Program of the old RPP and the 1976 Program of the new RPP for striking continuities of Gökalpian-Kemalist elements.
- 4 Ali Fuat Başgil, "Dördüncü Kurultay Münasebetile," *Sivasal Bilgiler*, 50 (May 1935), p. 3. (My emphasis.) It may be interesting to note that after the coup of 1960, Başgil was among the presidential candidates of "liberal" circles.
- 5 Establishment of a constitutional corporatism had to wait for the 1961 Constitution, when a highly corporatist draft was eventually trimmed down to milder proportions.
- 6 In fact, these were the years when Başgil, in advocacy of the new Labor Code, much inspired by German and Italian models, was stating that the workers, like cows, become more productive if a little "cared for" by the employers and the state. See his *Türk İş Hukuku* (Ankara, 1935), pp. 18-19.
- 7 Cf. Chapter 3.
- 8 Cf. the Bibliography.
- 9 See the first issue of *Zıya Gökalp* (November 1974), vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 240-241 for salutatory cables from the general presidents of the Republican People's Party (Prime Minister of the day), of the Justice Party, and the Nationalist Action Party, all confirming the significance and greatness of Gökalp. The opening issue, as all others, contains contributions from "liberals" who criticize Gökalp's extreme "collectivism," which supposedly diminished the value of the individual; from "left" Kemalists who try to read into Gökalp a sort of "solidaristic socialism"; and all sorts of commentaries on this or that part of his system. The most notable distortions, however, come from the extreme right in these pages:
 It is no coincidence that the National Salvation Party, one of the four major parties, was absent from this commemoration. This fundamentalist, Islamicist party, which polled 9% of the vote in the 1977 general elections, consistently disassociates itself from Gökalp, whose laicism can be camouflaged for politically opportunistic reasons, i.e., in appeals also to the Islamicist radical right, only by a dubious party like the Nationalist Action Party, whose present leadership in the 1940's had similarly distorted Gökalp's nationalism as racism. What is more interesting is the fact that the inconsequential fascistic corporatist cadres and movement of 1944, banned by the solidaristic corporatist old RPP, have, following the 1961 coup d'état, not only acquired increasing legitimacy in Turkish political life, but also become by the 1980's a mass party with partnership in two coalition governments. The explanation of variance, in this case, lies in the objective conditions. The NAP polled 7% of the vote in the 1977 general elections, increasing its seats in the parliament from 3 to 17. I predict that it will increase its vote considerably in the next general elections—whether normally held in 1981 or at a different date upon a not improbable episode of a higher dosage and more conspicuous form of military intervention. Even as of today, the NAP is one of the largest of its kind in the world in terms of its electoral strength and parliamentary representation—not to mention its informal power over the minority government of the Justice Party and elsewhere.
- 10 Mehmet Eröz, "Büyük Sosyoloğumuz Zıya Gökalp," *Zıya Gökalp*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 164-170; p. 164.
- 11 In the 1977 elections, the RPP and the JP polled 80% of the votes and 90% of the seats between themselves. The JP, however, won a landslide in the 1979 interim elections and is progressively shifting to the right even in its rhetoric: this is very significant for a previously staunch "liberal" party, the successor of the Democratic Party, whose opposition to the etatism of RPP it had inherited.
- 12 The term is a legacy from the 1944 movement, today pre-fixed to NAP's affiliated associations and para-military youth organizations. It is the new Turkish word for

- Gökalp's *mefkûre* (cf. above), having, of course, not much to do with it content-wise.
- 13 Sadi Somuncuoğlu, "Gökalp ve Atatürk," *Ziya Gökalp*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 176-177; p. 177. (My emphasis.)
 - 14 *Ziya Gökalp*, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 266. (My emphasis.)
 - 15 *Ziya Gökalp*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 269-272.
 - 16 Emin Bilgiç, *loc. cit.*, p. 268.
 - 17 *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (İstanbul ve Ankara: Arkadaş Matbaası, 1939). See especially the Preface by R. Oğuz Türkkkan, now affiliated with the Nationalist Action Party, along with a large contingent from the 1944 generation.
 - 18 In an appendix to this edition of Gökalp's *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, the Book Lovers' Society outlined its projected publication program. It proposed to study, and instruct the public in, the "Basic Principles of the Idea and Action of Turkism" (*Türk Fikrîyatı ve Fîliyatının Esas Hatları*), which are listed as follows: Racism (*Irkcılık*), "Socialism" (*Cemiyetçilik*), Martialism (*Savaşçılık*), Disciplinarian Democracy (*Disiplinli Demokrasi*), and Action and Work (*Çalışma ve İş*). To leave no doubt about the nature of their nationalism, the Book Lovers' Society defined "our nationalism in its full and comprehensive meaning" as "our racism and the protection of the purity of our race." Thus, in its explicit racism, bellicose and militarist expansionism, and disciplinarian democracy, the society declared in the technical jargon of the era its national-socialist brand of fascistic corporatism. The Appendix cites as developmental models the examples of Japan, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, and Finland, and categorically states that "the force that creates history" is "neither the struggle for subsistence, nor the environment, nor the culture," but it is "the race." Some of these terms have been prudently dropped from the jargon of the NAP, the present embodiment of the 1944 movement, for example. Racism and Warriorism, but National-Socialism (*Milliyetçi-Tophumculuk*) and the rest remain.

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List of Abbreviations¹

A. Books: (in order of publication in Latin alphabet):

1939 [1923]	Türkçülüğün Esasları	TE
1941 [1914]	Kızıl Elma ²	KE
1941 [1918]	Yeni Hava ³	YH
1942 [1923]	Altın Isık ⁴	AI
1947 [1922-1923]	Fırka Nedir	FN
1947 [1922-1923]	Doğru Yol	DY
1952 [misc.]	Şiirler ve Halk Masalları*	ŞHM
1953 [1908]	Şaki İbrahim Destanı*	ŞİB
1956 [1923]	Yeni Türkiye'nin Hedefleri	YTH
1956 [1894-1908]	Ziya Gökalp'in İlk Yazı Hayatı (ed. Bevsanoğlu)	İYZ
1956 [misc.]	Ziya Gökalp'in Nesredilmemiş Yedi Eseri (ed. Gökse)l	NYE
1959 [misc.]	Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization (trans. Berkes)	TNWC
1960 [1912-1918]	Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak	TİM
1964 [misc.]	Hars ve Medeniyet	HM
1964 [misc.]	Millî Terbiye ve Maarif Meselesi	MTMM
1965 [1919-1921]	Lımnı ve Malta Mektupları	LMM
1966 [1924]	Çınaralı Konuşmaları	ÇK
1968 [1923]	The Principles of Turkism (trans. Devereux)	PT
1975 [1923]	Türk Töresi	Tİ

B. Journals and Newspapers: (chronological)

Divarbakır	Divarbakır, 1904-1908	D
Peyman	Divarbakır, 1909	P
Genç Kalemler	Salonika, 1910-1912	GK
Türk Yurdu	İstanbul, 1912-1914	TY
Halka Doğru	İstanbul, 1912-1914	HD
İslam Mecmuası	İstanbul, 1914-1915	ISM
Millî Tettebular Mecmuası	İstanbul, 1915	MTM
Muallim	İstanbul, 1916-1917	M
İctimaiyat Mecmuası	İstanbul, 1917	İÇM
Yeni Mecmua	İstanbul, 1917-1918	YM
Küçük Mecmua	Divarbakır, 1922-1923	KM
Yeni Gün	Ankara, 1923	YG
Hakimiyet-i Millîye	Ankara, 1923	HM
Yeni Türkiye	Ankara, 1923	YT
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NOTES TO BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1 Full titles have been used in the text. This list is only to facilitate cross-reference in the bibliography.
- 2 Dates in brackets indicate original publication in Ottoman script. Between 1924, Gökalp's death, and 1938, Atatürk's death, no work of Gökalp was published except for *Türk Medeniyet Tarihi* (vol. 1) in 1926. The Latin alphabet was adopted in 1928.
- 3 Asterisk indicates that the work is a collection of poems.
- 4 This list shows the first date of publication in Latin script. In cases where I have used another edition, I have indicated it in parentheses. Brackets show the original publication.
- 5 This list is not exhaustive. It includes only those articles that are specifically examined in the text. An asterisk is used for poems. Otherwise, the piece is an article or short essay.
- 6 Only independent books, monographs, and collections of articles have been included.