

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI

A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

What Once Was Desert Shall Be a World:
Getúlio Vargas and Westward Expansion in Brazil,
1930-1945

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in History

by

William Raymond Steiger

1995

UMI Number: 9544182

**Copyright 1995 by
Steiger, William Raymond
All rights reserved.**

**UMI Microform 9544182
Copyright 1995, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.**


**This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.**

UMI

**300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103**

© Copyright by
William Raymond Steiger
1995


The dissertation of William Raymond Steiger is approved.




Eduardo Dias



James Lockhart



Theodore Young



E. Bradford Burns, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

1995

This dissertation is dedicated to my mother and her sister, for their support and inspiration.

I would also like to thank the following people:

In Los Angeles, the members of my doctoral committee, Dr. Eduardo Dias, Dr. Donald Kalish, Dr. James Lockhart, Dr. Geoffrey Symcox, Dr. Ted Young, and, especially, Dr. E. Bradford Burns, for their wisdom and guidance; Barbara Bernstein; Shela Patel; Garrett Donovan; Andrew Chesnut; Robinson Herrera-Gaitán; and the Anderson Rugby Club.

In Rio de Janeiro, the staffs of the Arquivo Nacional, Arquivo do Itamarati, Biblioteca Nacional, Biblioteca da PUC, Biblioteca do Departamento de Antropologia do Museu Nacional da UFRJ, Fundação Getúlio Vargas/CPDOC, Museu da República; Mac Margolis; Andrew Posner; Dr. Luiz Henrique Vieira; and *a galera do Parque de Flamengo*.

In Brasília, the staffs of the Arquivo Público do Distrito Federal, Biblioteca da Câmara dos Deputados, Biblioteca do Memorial Juscelino Kubitschek, and Biblioteca do Senado; and dona Rosinethe, Pedro, and Ana Rosa Monteiro Soares.

In Goiânia, the staffs of the Arquivo Histórico do Estado de Goiás and the Arquivo Pedro Ludovico; Dr. David McCreery; and Leandro Penna and family.

In São Paulo, dona Zuleide Medeiros of the Cinemateca Brasileira.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter One:	Promise and Communion	1-41
Chapter Two:	Paradise Misplaced	42-70
Chapter Three:	Indecision, 1930-1935	71-104
Chapter Four:	The Miracle on the Planalto	105-135
Chapter Five:	Canaan Awaits Its People	136-172
Chapter Six	Go West, 1940-1941	173-207
Chapter Seven	"The Formidable Duel with the Desert," 1942-1945	208-263
Chapter Eight	Productions of the Spirit	264-283
Chapter Nine	The Cult of History	284-317
Chapter Ten	Engineering Consent	318-370
Chapter Eleven	"After Amazonia, I Don't Know. . ."	371-390
Bibliography		391-422

VITA

October 17, 1969	Born, Arlington, Virginia
1991	B.A., <i>summa cum laude</i> , History Yale University New Haven, Connecticut
1991	Elected to Phi Beta Kappa
1993	M.A., History University of California, Los Angeles Los Angeles, California
1992-1993	Teaching Assistant University of California, Los Angeles
1993-1994	Field Work, Brazil
1995	Named Luce Scholar for 1995-1996

PUBLICATIONS

Translated "Mercosul, Democracy, and Labor," by Hector Alimonda,
Latin American Perspectives, 21 (4):21-33.

Translated "The State and Trade Unionism," by Armando
Boito, Jr., Latin American Perspectives, 21 (1):7-23.

Translated "The Disruptions of the Adjustment: Women in
Nicaragua," by Anna M. Fernandez Poncela, Latin
American Perspectives, 22 (2).

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

What Once Was Desert Shall Be a World:
Getúlio Vargas and Westward Expansion in Brazil,
1930-1945

by

William Raymond Steiger

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California, Los Angeles, 1995

Professor E. Bradford Burns, Chair

Throughout the twentieth century both civilian and military regimes in Brazil have proclaimed the nation's West a promised land to be carefully guarded and developed. For much of the first three hundred years of Brazilian history, the state did not control the pace or direction of westward expansion, but after 1930 the administration of Getúlio Vargas took a more central role in the development of the region. Vargas, guided by an ideology of state-sponsored Manifest Destiny, envisioned the Brazilian West as the key to the future prosperity of the nation. With the "March to the West"

campaign of the mid-1930s, Vargas made integration of the frontier a centerpiece of his corporatist restructuring of Brazilian politics and society. The president waged a vast campaign to proclaim the taming of the interior as a panacea for Brazil's economic and social ills and created the first agencies to oversee a comprehensive development plan for the western territories. Through archival sources the dissertation examines the political and economic motivations for the launching of the March to the West, and also discusses the propaganda in various media that the Vargas regime used to promote its agenda of western expansion from 1930-1945. The dissertation concludes that the March to the West was designed to tie the interior of the country into the capitalist market economy of the urbanized Southeast and represented a conservative attempt to forestall an exodus from the countryside and avoid agrarian reform in Brazil. Where once the federal government had allowed the private sector to dominate westward expansion, Vargas' New State and its apologists encouraged peasants and city-dwellers to move West to boost the region's economic productivity, a scheme Vargas called Brazil's internal "imperialism." The March to the West, while largely a failure under Vargas, influenced the policies of succeeding regimes. By the early 1960s, the ideology of Manifest Destiny created by Vargas had become official government policy in Brazil, and the *plano piloto* of Brasília points toward the salvation that many still fervently believe lies obscured in the Amazonian wilderness.

Every now and then someone says that the
"Last Frontier" is now to be found in Canada
or Africa, and that it has almost vanished. On
a far larger scale this frontier is to be found in
Brazil. . . and decades will pass before it
vanishes.

-- Theodore Roosevelt

By one man's firm obedience fully tri'd . . .
Eden raised in the wast Wilderness.

-- John Milton, *Paradise Regained*, I:1-7

Chapter One: Promise and Communion

i: Myth and Politics

We live no longer in a rational world; we live in a mythical world.¹

--Ernst Cassirer

Myth is an anticipated participation that combines at once the desire of good will and the instinct of power; myth is indissolubly promise and communion.²

-- Jean-Marie Domenach

After the Republican Revolt of 1889, Brazil slipped into a form of moral vacuum as the elites of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do Sul directed the country for their own benefit. A group of disgruntled young army officers, referred to regardless of rank as lieutenants (*tenentes*), and their civilian sympathizers recognized the hollow core of the Old Republic and sought to fill it with a new sense of purpose. Having seized power with the *tenentes'* aid in 1930, Getúlio Vargas, following on the vision of Euclides da Cunha and others, created in the years after 1938 a defining national ideal: the March to the West (*A Marcha para o Oeste*).³

Under Vargas, ideology assumed a paramount role in Brazilian life as it never had before, as the State attempted to widen its base of legitimacy among diverse sectors of society and set the parameters for the nation's vision of itself. Alôr Caffé Alves has defined ideology as "alternative cosmovisions through which the

world becomes intelligible."⁴ Both Vargas and his successor, Juscelino Kubitschek, created, through the March to the West, precisely such a powerful, universal revelation of Brazil's interior, one that would have policy repercussions to this day. This dissertation, to borrow from Max Lerner, concerns "the force of the irrational in the history of ideas, the role of propaganda as well as of individual creativeness, the role of insecurity and fear as well as of class and national interest, [and] the role of instinctual drives as well as of logical formulations."⁵

This dissertation also deals with historical and political perceptions. As Henri Lefebvre has written, "Ideologies may contain class illusions, have recourse to outright lying in political struggles and yet be related to myths and utopias."⁶ Ideology and myth are not incompatible, and in the case of the March to the West, actually meld together.

What, then, is myth? Myth does not always involve supernatural beings in the distant or unrecorded past, but can be defined as dealing with current situations and recent history and politics.⁷ Myths also are not limited to primitive, tribal cultures lost in remote backwaters; one can use the conceptual analytical category of myth when discussing contemporary societies and politics. According to Ernst Cassirer, modern politicians have learned that "great masses can be moved much easier by the force of imagination than by sheer physical forces."⁸ The March to the West in Brazil belongs to a rubric Cassirer entitles modern political myths, "the

complete fusion [of] magical and technical thought."⁹ In this blending of the ancient and the current, "the modern politician becomes the *vates publicus*," an updated version of the Roman reading of entrails before anxious crowds or the pronouncements of the Renaissance court astrologers.¹⁰ Cassirer explains the process of conjuring up this twentieth century ideological sorcery as an intellectual assembly line:

The new political myths were by no means wild fruits of an exuberant imagination. They were artificial things made by very skillful and cunning artisans The twentieth century developed a technique of mythical thought which had no equal in previous history. Henceforth myths were invented and manufactured in the same sense and according to the same methods as machine guns or airplanes.¹¹

The March to the West under Getúlio Vargas stands out in Brazilian history as the first government-sponsored exercise in modern mass mythmaking as defined by Cassirer, a symbolic representation of deep-seated national aspirations and fears cobbled together for parochial and personal political advantage that lodged in the nation's consciousness and has yet to disappear.

Cassirer's concept requires some refinement, however, to encapsulate the specific criteria which categorize the March to the West as political mythology. Vargas' campaign qualifies as what sociologist Read Bain terms "secular myths," identified as "stereotype[s] of a cherished value, usually based on hope or fear."¹² Bain lists several characteristics of this category of idea:

A concept is a myth when it is held to describe necessary, 'natural,' and immutable behavior; when it is regarded as

sacred and requires unquestioning allegiance; when it is treated as self-evident and engenders intense and passionate certitude; when those who criticize its validity or implications are branded as dangerous, traitorous, wicked, and stupid; and especially when it is held to be the revealed or 'intuited' purpose of 'higher powers.'¹³

The Brazilian March to the West shares all of these traits. Proclaimed as inevitable, mystical, patriotic, opposed by sinister foreign forces, and driven by the nation's cosmic destiny, westward expansion from 1938 to 1945 formed one of the central tenets of the country's political creed.

Seen from another angle, the ideals of *A Marcha para o Oeste* function as what anthropologist Mircea Eliade has called "origin myths."¹⁴ Explaining Brazilian society and politics through the iconography and symbolism of their public espousals of western development, Vargas and his propagandists wove a narrative of their nation's history that turned their version of the past into a model for contemporary relations and future plans. Born of this "liquidation of time," fabricated from already extant notions, the March to the West assembled a new ideology from the recombination of a limited repertoire of associations, rhetorical flourishes, and representations.¹⁵ While retooling the past, the president also employed the future in the form of prophecy, pointed to by Cassirer as an important element in modern politics.¹⁶ Both Vargas and later governments used this method, either making their own predictions or recycling others from various sources, to imbue their efforts with cabalistic certitude.

Such modern, secular myths, with their powerful and persuasive manipulations of time and history, serve as political tools of justification. E.R. Leach describes a process in which "a mythological fiction [is] used as a cover story to justify a change [of regime]."¹⁷ The March to the West, by reaching back to the past to legitimize the Vargas regime, meshes with that pattern. Yet this explanation of a change of ruler or political order does not imply an embrace of social reform or transformation; quite to the contrary, "the function of myth . . . is to strengthen tradition and endow it with a greater value and prestige by tracing it back to a higher, better, more supernatural reality of initial events."¹⁸ Put in practical terms, ideological movements such as the March to the West often achieve successful results through the "dissimulation of social reality." They do not aim to rebuild society along new lines but stress "the conservation of the *status quo*."¹⁹ Vargas and his successors used the March to the West as political cover to serve influential special interests and to avoid undertaking popular reforms, particularly in the area of land tenure.

How did Vargas communicate this new mythology to the Brazilian people? In theoretical terms, he employed a technique called "transference" or "propagandistic vicariousness," in which an idea is universalized to appeal to all, cast as a common goal that no one could oppose.²⁰ Those notions that might naturally appeal to a particular class or group are cloaked as ideals that seem to benefit all, or at least benefit the particular audience to which the authors

direct the pitch. The March to the West was a campaign that presented Brazilians with ideas about the nature of the State and its power in the form of platitudes and shibboleths (such as "development") that beckoned to the pride and self-interest of a large percentage of the population, all the while "hiding the real interests in play."²¹ In keeping with the outline of theorist João Camillo de Oliveira Torres, Vargas pursued this strategy by "justify[ing] events through doctrine . . . demonstrat[ing] that the doctrine is the realization of the secret and intimate aspirations of the people. . . [and] present[ing] it as inevitable."²² The outlets for this methodology of transference were two types of propaganda.

First, Brazilian politicians advanced the cause of the March to the West through an unprecedented outpouring of mass propaganda. Following Torres, the first step in consolidating the victory of an idea among the general public is "intensive penetration in all media, so that everyone, everywhere, receives the impact of the propaganda, principally in indirect forms."²³ With the creation of the Department of Press and Propaganda (*Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda* - DIP), Getúlio Vargas by the early 1940s was using radio, magazines, newspapers, speeches, and films to promote his vision of westward expansion. This dissertation will examine each of these avenues of influence to track the strategy and rhetoric of the various campaigns.

Apologists also pushed the March to the West through what David Altheide has categorized as "bureaucratic propaganda," or "any report produced by an organization for evaluation and other practical

purposes that is targeted for individuals, committees, or publics who are unaware of its promotive character and the editing processes that shaped the report."²⁴ Altheide points out that bureaucracies by definition attempt to justify and preserve their own existences, and their output more often than not is "self-serving": "People as workers in organizations can promote myths . . . just by doing their jobs."²⁵ The importance of this nuanced form of propaganda is that it employs "a new form of discourse that is infused with rationality and scientific appearances" to disguise its essentially contrived and biased nature.²⁶ Aimed at what Altheide calls "impression-management," such myth-making acquires the status of objective evaluations of reality through constant repetition, and can enjoy more legitimacy than traditional mass propaganda because of its "factual" cache.²⁷

Beginning in the early 1940s, bureaucratic propaganda became especially important in the March to the West as planning and technocracy dominated policy. The production of the public information arms of the Central Brazil Foundation (*Fundação Brasil Central*-- FBC) and the Special Service for the Mobilization of Workers to Amazonia (*Serviço Especial da Mobilização de Trabalhadores para a Amazônia*-- SEMTA) will form a key part of this dissertation's analysis of that period. The planners themselves under the March to the West began to take on a second role as the campaign's chief propagandists, even starring in heroic news reels: "What was once only part of culture [was] now shaping culture."²⁸

Both of these types of propaganda rely heavily on the use of slogans, or "virtue words and symbols" that serve as "labels for deep-seated ideals."²⁹ This short-hand vocabulary, termed "inner speech" by the Russian semiotician Lev Vygotsky,³⁰ allows an audience to recognize instantly an entire range of values, ideas, and intentions that might not be overtly articulated in a discourse. Simplification combined with repetition ensures that slogans never die, "and continue being repeated for years and centuries,"³¹ ready for the use of future generations of propagandists. The name "March to the West" itself is the ultimate slogan in modern Brazilian politics, a catch-phrase for a whole gamut of attitudes, emotions, and projects that by the early 1960s virtually every citizen understood without amplification.

The cumulative effect of these campaigns created a "climate of opinion"³² in Brazil on the eve of the military takeover that considered the state-directed development and settlement of the West as overwhelmingly positive and crucial to the growth and stability of the nation. Ultimately, the March to the West fits into Umberto Eco's analysis of popular music, for it depends on "plagiarism," formulas recycled, the past repeated, ideas stolen to respond to the demands of its audience.³³ The push for westward development both molded and responded to the Brazilian body politic, which by the early 1960s found the familiarity of the campaign and its ideas pleasing and comforting. Reanimating nineteenth century nationalism and even older archetypal fears and

desires, the March to the West from 1938 to 1945 operated in a political sense as the "homogenization of the collective taste,"³⁴ and produced a consensus challenged only in the 1980s.

ii: Deciphering the Sphinx

The miracle and uproar of the East would be repeated in the bosom of Brazil.³⁵

-- Alberto Rangel

The West attracts with the force of a primitive passion.³⁶

-- Roy Nash

In 1656, León Pinelo, a Peruvian-born cartographer, drew a map of South America that now resides in the library of the Palacio Real in Madrid. At the center of the chart, around the Planalto of Brazil, the mapmaker sketched a circle in which he wrote the words "*Eden. Arbor Vitae. Locus Voluptatis. Boni et Mali*," and he traced the four rivers of Genesis flowing from them.³⁷ The idea of Brazil as more than just the terrestrial paradise, as the locus of both Good and Evil on earth, remains as powerful today as it was almost four centuries ago, and has had a defining influence on Brazilian public policy in the last sixty years. Armando Dias Mendes identifies a dialectic of three overarching myths about the Oeste, an alternation between the West as Paradise, as Hell, and as El Dorado.³⁸ These paradoxical visions of the interior as the combination of Gehenna and the Promised Land, of promise and danger, lurk behind the two guiding principles of twentieth century frontier expansion in Brazil, national security and Manifest Destiny.

From 1938 to 1945, for partisan and ideological motivations Getúlio Vargas appropriated the symbolism of Paradise and El Dorado

to weave together a modern political propaganda campaign to create support for a government-sponsored push into the interior. Over the same period, the Brazilian military expanded upon the traditional fears of the hinterland as an Inferno to manufacture an ideology that painted the area as a possible threat to the nation's security. This work challenges Alistair Hennessy's assertion that "[i]n Latin America . . . there is no West; there is no frontier; there are only frontiers."³⁹ Brazil has a West with an accompanying mythology as powerful in its own way as the westward movement during the nineteenth century in the United States and a political impact in this century perhaps even greater than that of its predecessor.

Brazil has always been linked with stories of the earthly Eden, cloaked in "the most subtle mist of legend."⁴⁰ Long-standing Biblical legend maintains that King Solomon and Hiram of Tyre sent ships to the Amazon, supposedly the location of Ophir and Tarshish, to look for gold and wood for the Temple of Jerusalem.⁴¹ The name Brazil itself comes from the "Fantastic Island of Brasil" reportedly found by the Irish seafaring monk St. Brandon, and has roots in ancient Celtic legends of the paradise in the foggy West.⁴² The search for the earthly Eden, the "seduction of the idea of paradise," formed an important part of the Portuguese drive for exploration, and later became an ingrained force in Brazilian culture.⁴³ Sérgio Buarque de Holanda suggests that the country gained a reputation as a place of miracles and wonder in part because of the curative effects of its

native oranges and limes: amazed sailors who took on fruit from Brazil witnessed their symptoms of scurvy vanish.⁴⁴

Foreign travellers during the nineteenth century reinforced the perception of Brazil's interior as the New Canaan. Henry Walter Bates, the English naturalist who spent eleven years in the 1840s and 50s floating along the tributaries of the Amazon, marvelled at the region and reverently referred to it as "the garden of Eden" in his memoirs.⁴⁵ Other Europeans and Americans made fantastic predictions of future glory for the West, and envisioned it as the epicenter of a joyous new civilization. Louis Agassiz, for example, the Swiss scientist who led a Harvard-sponsored expedition to Amazonia in 1865-66, wrote from aboard the war steamer *Ibicuihy* on the Rio Negro, "Here is room for a hundred million happy human beings."⁴⁶

Yet not all such fervent proclamations issued from what Agassiz dubbed "the prejudiced reports of a floating foreign population."⁴⁷ Several Brazilians over the same period outdid the travelogues and embedded "The Vision of Paradise" in the collective memory of their compatriots.⁴⁸ Aureliano Cândido Tavares Bastos, a legislator from Alagoas and the most enthusiastic advocate for lifting the Empire's prohibition of non-Brazilian-flag vessels on major waterways, set the tone for the visionaries by declaring in 1866, "Amazonas is hope."⁴⁹ A faithful proponent of the nineteenth century ideal of progress, he predicted that the Brazilian West would seize center stage in world history: "Located between two oceans and between Asia and Europe, the [interior] will be the center of

world commerce, just as in the visions of Columbus America appeared to him balancing the world."⁵⁰ Tavares Bastos explicitly recalls the rapturous ravings of Columbus, but maintains that traders instead of angels will inhabit heaven on earth.

Others, especially "romantics [and] nationalists," according to Dias Mendes,⁵¹ followed in this paradisiacal vein throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century. One such writer was the aristocratic amateur chorographer the Baron of Marajó (*Barão de Marajó*), who journeyed extensively in the interior to collect data for his monographs. The Baron synthesized the viewpoints of both Agassiz and Tavares Bastos in making his own grandiose predictions: "[E]verything indicates that [Amazônia] will be one of the great centers of human civilization, the emporium . . . of many races, whose populations will number in the hundreds of millions. . . ." ⁵² Presaging the Mexican intellectual José Vasconcelos by some thirty years, Marajó advanced the concept of the Brazilian hinterland as an Eden one final step by seeing it as the crucible for the eventual melding of humanity.

Despite the fervor of the adherents of "the Vision of Paradise," no tale exercised as much power as that of El Dorado, the second of Brazil's great myths about itself. In 1531, Juan Martínez, a sailor on Diego de Ordaz' voyage along the northern coast of South America, quarreled with his captain, who put the meddlesome crewman ashore as punishment. Martínez claimed to have met a group of natives who led him, blindfolded, to a fabulous city on an island in a

lake far into the jungle, a city ruled by a king bathed in gold dust.⁵³ The stories soon spread throughout Europe, and by the end of the sixteenth century figures as notable as Sir Walter Raleigh and Gonzalo Pizarro had risked their lives and fortunes in a mad scramble to capture the auriferous chieftain and his incalculable caches, and the psychopathic Lope de Aguirre had scattered a trail of corpses in his wake searching for the golden city. Armando Dias Mendes has termed the El Dorado frenzy an "extroverted alchemy" and compares the hold of the legends to that of the archetype of the Philosopher's Stone discussed by Jung.⁵⁴ As lasting and spellbinding as the quest to turn lead into gold, "Of all the myths of Amazônia, it was that of El Dorado that recruited the most men and sacrificed the most lives."⁵⁵ The legend has driven otherwise sane men into the impenetrable forests even into the present century.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, rough-hewn, half-Indian, half-Portuguese adventurers called *bandeirantes* set out from São Paulo to scour the entire South American continent on heroic odysseys to locate gold (as well as slaves). The bandeirantes, quixotic New World seekers of the Old World's most seductive chimera, shaped Brazil's vision of itself as edenic: "[The] Bandeirante, in his own land, pursues a myth-- the geographic utopia of El Dorado."⁵⁶ Participating in a universal search, they themselves turned into global symbols, Brazil's first homegrown archetypes.⁵⁷ The myriad journeys of prospectors, cowboys, and adventurers along the riverways and paths of the backlands unified the Brazilian nation

and later served as icons for nationalists and politicians who would hold up their achievements for emulation.

Tavares Bastos, fulfilling his Delphic mission, helped keep the El Dorado vision alive during the nineteenth century. The member of Parliament sent missives to provincial assemblies to urge them to facilitate the arrival of a new generation of bandeirantes, this time intrepid traders mining markets instead of ore:

Gentlemen. . . very soon you will see transformed into palpitating reality the dreams of those who have enchanted themselves with the possibility of throwing the doors of your *El Dorado* wide open to the true conqueror of this century, the fecund genie of universal commerce."⁵⁸

The shimmering mirage of the aureate chieftain by the 1860s had transmogrified into the fertile genie of global trade. The phrase "El Dorado" could now signify virtually anything, and would serve as what Ataíde de Miranda has termed a "thematic word," a code manipulable to represent a whole host of ideas and points of view.⁵⁹ Later statesmen, particularly Getúlio Vargas, would appropriate the metaphor and wield it for their own purposes.

Such "delirious optimism"⁶⁰ conveyed about the interior by the first two traditional interpretations of the Brazilian interior inevitably encountered a counterweight in the myth of the Green Hell. Terrifying stories of horrific creatures and death traps in the jungle had circulated since the earliest European voyages of discovery: "The antithesis of the edenic hopes emerged from panic in the face of the mysteries of the tropical beyond."⁶¹ The dimness and

eerie stillness of the dense forests often left explorers prey to superstition, and their experiences mushroomed into fanciful accounts upon their return home: "Wandering in the penumbra of the virgin forests, the itinerant hears babbled, fantastic stories that frighten him. And later this outsider himself will. . . propagate the abuses of superstition. . . ."62

The West's near-total isolation, however, meant that a generalized fear of the inhabitants of the interior only really began to taint Brazilians' impressions of the region by the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The true-life tragedies of thousands of the Northeasterners who flocked to Amazônia and Mato Grosso in search of sustenance during the 1870s and 1880s only to find disease, famine, and oppression filtered back to urban areas and confirmed many positivist intellectuals' worst suspicions about the blank spaces on their national maps. Such pessimists echo Cotton Mather and others in New England, in whose demonic visions the wilderness loomed as the den of Satan.⁶³ Dias Mendes, again turning to Jung's categories, posits the "Green Hell" myth as an archetypal vision of Hades; the Brazilian psyche, stunned by the climate and the exuberance of the Oeste, reacted by reliving the Descent into Hell, as ancient a story as exists in human history.⁶⁴

A broadside launched in 1908 against the idealization of the interior, Alberto Rangel's *Inferno Verde* stands as the masterwork of the pessimistic school. Rangel called the West "a country of ruins and silence,"⁶⁵ and the book enumerates a detailed litany of sickness,

desperation, and madness in the jungle. The short stories chronicle the "unfathomable miseries"⁶⁶ of Rubber Boom Amazonia. Oppression, abuse, squalor, violence, and poverty were the vicious and tragic lot of most of those who migrated in search of easy wealth. Rangel seeks to debunk the rosy assessments of the interior as the New Canaan by emphasizing that the cruel wilderness, dominated by "Nature indifferent to Ignominy and Disgust," offered formidable resistance to civilization.⁶⁷ With graphic portraits of diseased and decrepit refugees driven to inhumanity by the harsh conditions on the frontier, *Inferno Verde* paints Amazonia in a much different light than writers who toasted the luxury of Manaus and her Opera. Most in the West regretted their illusions, the author warns, and daily life was an Olympian struggle: "[the] effort of man is that of Atlas supporting the world, and his fight that of an inverted Sisiphus."⁶⁸ Rangel, while he does recognize the future potential of the region, means to dispel the naïveté of many urban Brazilians, and in an admonition directed at his idealistic compatriots, tags the West with a label it still has not entirely shaken: "Amazonas is Hell. . . the green hell of the modern explorer, an anxious vandal who carries with him the beloved image of the lands from whence he came."⁶⁹ The Green Hell in the end manifests nothing but fatal hostility to those who foolishly defy its mastery.

Following Rangel, the common view, virtually unshakable in the population of the Southeast until at least the late 1930s, became that the West was anything but a Paradise. After the turn of the

century, most writers pilloried the climate, habitat, and inhabitants of the Oeste as savage and inhospitable. Arthur Neiva, intellectual and scientist, also attacked the romantic stories of the West, and blamed the exaltation of the interior on "dithyrambic literature."⁷⁰ He wanted to save the youth of the nation from the "sad disillusionment" that would spring from believing in such fantasies. In his diary of a 1912 journey through Goiás, Neiva assumes the role of Dante's guide, warning his countrymen away from venturing into the wasteland: "The sertões that we know are pieces of purgatory . . . where the sins of life are purged with no more consolation than the unconsciousness into which fall the disgraced who founder there."⁷¹ Like the benighted shades of the *Inferno*, according to the pessimists, all who dared to chase the phantoms of the Oeste would flail in a hell in which death comes as a merciful relief.

Only one Brazilian writer manages to combine all three of these strains of thought into a melange that could function as the ideological underpinning for later western expansion led by the state. In his chronicle of the 1896-97 federal campaign at Canudos against the forces of millenarian mystic Antônio Conselheiro, *Rebellion in the Backlands* (*Os Sertões*), Euclides da Cunha conceives of the extreme differences between the Europeanized littoral and the Luso-Indo-Afro mixed-race (*caboclo*) frontier in mythical and metaphysical terms, and presents a contradictory vision of the backlands as not a temporal but a mental space, an idea that would have a strong influence on Brazilian thought throughout the twentieth century.

Like Domingo Sarmiento, the famous inventor of the myths of the Pampas and the Argentine *caudillos*, da Cunha reveals a profound ambivalence about the interior of his country-- the frontier simultaneously represents both the past and the future of Brazil. Since the turn of the century the ideas of da Cunha have influenced four generations of Brazilian politicians and thinkers, and his twin concepts of the frontier have appeared in the rhetoric and policy of various federal administrations.

In the first part of da Cunha's concept, the frontier seems a forgotten and changeless zone, an ephemeral time warp between the past and the present. Euclides sees the gap between the interior and the coast not only in the physical context of distance and climate, but also in chronological, almost metaphysical, terms. He measures the separation between Rio and Canudos in years, not kilometers:

Caught up in the sweep of modern ideas, we abruptly mounted the ladder, leaving behind us in their centuries-old semidarkness a third of our people in the heart of our country. . . . [W]e merely succeeded in deepening the contrast between our mode of life and that of our rude native sons, who were more alien to us in this land of ours than were the immigrants who came from Europe. For it was not an ocean which separated us from them but three whole centuries.⁷²

In *Os Sertões* the distance between the littoral and the backlands of Brazil appears farther than that from the Old World to the New, three hundred years instead of three thousand miles. The caboclos and bandits (*cangaceiros*) of the hills and deserts seem frozen in a land that the modern world forgot.

Canudos for da Cunha represents a resurrection of the old order supposedly defeated by the establishment of the Republic in 1889. To travel into the backlands in *Os Sertões* becomes a journey through a suture in time directly to the Middle Ages:

In the rustic society of the backlands time has stood still; this society has not been affected by the general evolutionary movement of the human race; it still breathes the moral atmosphere of those mad visionaries who pursued a Miguelinho or a Bandarra. Nor is there lacking. . . the political mysticism of *Sebastianism*. Extinct in Portugal, it persists unimpaired today, under a singularly impressive form, in our northern backcountry.⁷³

The ghosts of the Portuguese past survive in the interior of Brazil, according to da Cunha, and they frighten the infant Republic with their messianic lamentations. In the eyes of coastal society, the poor, illiterate, barefoot, malnourished inhabitants of the sertões relived "the pathological passion for self-sacrifice displayed by the mystical warriors of the Middle Ages,"⁷⁴ and deliberately ignored scientific and technological advancements to hide in a shadowy world of feudal superstition. By personifying the past, the people of the backlands provoked a bloody conflict with Europeanized urban society.

In this first vision the positivist author calls the interior a lawless place literally beyond the pale of civilization, a space seized "by crime and madness."⁷⁵ Following in the tradition of Sarmiento and other Liberal Latin American authors who called the hinterland a "lawless, kingless, and faithless" zone, da Cunha describes the frontier as a pocket of barbarism, sterile and unpromising, that

contributes nothing to civilized national life. In the determinist ideology of the age, the discordant and cruel environment of the sertões had distorted human nature there:

A perfect reflection of the physical forces at work about him, the man of the northern backlands has served an arduous apprenticeship in the school of adversity. . . . He is as inconstant as nature. . . . She has fashioned him in her own likeness: barbarous, impetuous, abrupt. ⁷⁶

According to da Cunha, the denizens of the interior, infected with the "germs of disorder and crime"⁷⁷ threaten the cities with the spread of antisocial pathogens. While the French philosophe Rousseau classified primitive peoples as noble savages, the Brazilian positivist denigrates backlander (*sertanejo*) culture, calling it inundated with "frank parasitism"⁷⁸ and a refuge for criminals. Wracked by insurrections and social upheavals, the recalcitrant frontier must learn to live within the rules of order and progress, the mottoes of the new Republic. "[A] whole society of backward individuals"⁷⁹, a folk society that stands in the way of progress and modernization, cannot co-exist with the telegraph, the telephone, and the streetcar. Da Cunha argues that racially, economically, and culturally the interior represents the very past the Republic meant to eliminate, and he calls for the subjugation of the frontier through education and intimidation.

At the same time, however, having painted a decidedly hellish picture of the interior, Da Cunha paradoxically lauds the sertões as a "paradise,"⁸⁰ the shining future of the nation. Although in the

beginning of *Os Sertões* he attacks the extreme faith and millenarian beliefs of the *sertanejos*, by the end of the narrative he reverses himself to share in the myth of the interior as "the promised land-- a sacred Canaan, which the Good Jesus had seen fit to isolate from the rest of the world by a girdle of mountains"⁸¹ that contains the secrets of Brazil's national destiny. In this second vision the Brazilian West appears as a land of untapped human and physical potential, possessed of untold riches. Euclides da Cunha, one of the most rationalist writers of his time, comes to accept an almost biblical position that the salvation of Brazil lies in the interior, now a fantastic mirage of the land of milk and honey. His ambivalent reporting from Canudos shows a mental change from a position of scorn towards the backlands to a glorifying vision of the frontier and its possibilities.

Such grand dreams of Brazil's glory bathe the final section of *Os Sertões* in a luminous optimism, and in his fascination with the interior and its people da Cunha raises the status of the frontier from marginal to central to the nation. Where before he had condemned the *sertanejos* as brutal sociopaths, da Cunha contradicts himself to praise their courage; despite his immersion in the European Positivist ideas of the urban academies, he cannot hide his admiration for the frontier. In one of the most influential passages of the book, he prophetically argues for the integration of the West into the Brazilian mainstream:

It was plain that the Canudos Campaign must have a higher objective than the stupid and inglorious one of merely wiping out a backlands settlement. There was a more serious enemy to be combatted, in a warfare of a slower and more worthy kind. This entire campaign would be a crime, a futile and barbarous one, if we were not to take advantage of the paths opened up by the artillery, by following up our cannon with a constant, stubborn, and persistent campaign of education, with the object of drawing these rude and backward fellow-countrymen of ours into the current of our times and our own national life.⁸²

The residents of the backlands might still be backward, but now da Cunha asks that teachers follow the guns. This notion of extending federal control and civilization to the interior has exercised an enormous influence on twentieth century Brazilian governments. Getúlio Vargas would launch exactly such a campaign after 1938.

Several years after the publication of *Os Sertões*, da Cunha expanded upon this second vision in his writings on Amazônia. In 1904, after the intervention of several literary heavyweights, Foreign Minister Rio Branco named the newly famous author to head the Mixed Commission for the Reconnaissance of the Upper Purus (*Comissão Mista de Reconhecimento do Alto Purus*), the group charged with fixing the Bolivian-Brazilian border along the lines specified by the Treaty of Petrópolis. Da Cunha himself described his trip to Acre as a grim journey, full of privations and dangers, but he found himself enthralled with the "ravishing sight of our nation," as he told a Manaus newspaper in 1905.⁸³ Upon his return to Rio, the youngest "immortal," recently elected to the Brazilian Academy of Letters (*Academia Brasileira de Letras*), proclaimed the vast interior

of Brazil "the last page, still to be written, of Genesis,"⁸⁴ and began a new book based on his experiences. While a fatal duel in 1909 prevented da Cunha from completing his second masterpiece, to be entitled *A Paradise Lost* (*Um Paraíso Perdido*), the sections published posthumously cap his transformation into an apologist for the West. In an essay called *On History* (*À margem da história*), he protests the abusive debt peonage of the rubber tappers (without condemning them as doomed to inferiority by their racial makeup or rural lives), and advocates "some form of homestead [policy] to definitively unite the land."⁸⁵ This clarion call for state action in the West, although ignored in the short term, would resonate in policy-making circles to influence the programs of Vargas and his successors beginning thirty years later.

The propaganda of Vargas about the Oeste shares many characteristics with what Buarque de Holanda calls "the inflamed idealizations and canonizations of the discovered reaches"⁸⁶ recorded by early voyagers to the New World which left a residue in Brazilian culture and thought. The March to the West harks back to the ancient Grecian myths of the Garden of the Hesperides, of Atlas and Herakles, of Atlantis, as well as to the New World legend of El Dorado. Vargas tapped into this rich vein of archetypal legends, using the West as "a type of ideal stage setting, made of [his] experiences, mythologies, and ancestral nostalgias,"⁸⁷ much as the sixteenth century European explorers did. Apologists and policy-makers concocted an artificial magnetism several hundred years late,

mutating gold fever into an advertising slogan. The March to the West was a modern version of medieval alchemy, this time trying to turn the wastelands of the interior into Brazil's golden harvest.

Rather than look at the West as a "land without history," as da Cunha had,⁸⁸ the March to the West explicitly rekindled a sense of Portuguese expansionism and held up the bandeirantes as icons. As anthropologist Otávio Guilherme Velho has pointed out, one of the most striking aspects of the March to the West was this conscious historical reference through "the cultivation of a 'bandeirante spirit.'" With Vargas' efforts, West became a specific place, not just a cardinal direction: "Now the territory had to be definitively occupied. No longer was it just a question of *marching West*, but also of marching to *the West*."⁸⁹

Vargas in his rhetoric about the interior attempted to cure the deep-seated Brazilian attachment to the idea of the Inferno Verde by resurrecting the Romantic ode to Paradise in the forests. Yet while reacting against the negative vision of the West offered by the "scientific positivism"⁹⁰ of the late nineteenth century, the president remarkably preserved a classic positivist outlook of the process through which Brazil should come to terms with the new Eden. Their campaigns presented nature not as an end in itself, as the Romantics had, but as a means to development and prosperity, a force to be harnessed for the good of all Brazilians.

Connecting with the universal will to find the new world and conquer the last frontier, the March to the West celebrated the

possibility of Man's triumph over nature with the aid of the State, "the absolute victory of man in the forest with the help of the Estado Novo."⁹¹ Vargas reached back to a mythic age, contrasting it with the recent past, to proclaim a new present of cooperation between the government and private citizens to expand the nation and fight for occupation of the land. In contrast with the "myth of the garden" so prominent in North American westward expansion, in the March to the West nature must be harnessed for the benefit of progress and civilization; industrialization and modernization takes precedence over the creation of an agricultural utopia.⁹²

Over the same period, extreme nationalists and the intellectual wing of the Brazilian military built upon the Green Hell mythology to construct an ideology in which the West posed a serious national security risk. Influenced by the new European pseudoscience of Geopolitics, beginning in the 1930s army strategists began to identify a host of dangers that lurked in the unexplored backlands, from alien conspirators to homegrown agitators. The military tapped into a hundred-year-old current of Brazilian xenophobia sustained by nationalist suspicions of foreign intentions in the region and took the lead in bringing to life the rhetorical grandeur of the March to the West. Most of Vargas' initiatives in the interior involved the direct participation of the armed forces. Their experience from 1938 to 1945 formed the foundation for the plans and projects that the military would implement in the interior after it seized power in 1964.

Beyond just analyzing the rhetoric of this mythology, however, this dissertation will also follow Henri Lefebvre's dictum that "to understand a given ideology, we have to take into account everything that is going on in. . . the society in question-- classes, fractions of classes, institutions, power struggles, diverging and converging interests."⁹³ The March to the West, while tied to ancient national ideals, also has roots in the social and economic changes that Brazil experienced in the first decades of the twentieth century.

To begin with, Vargas' schemes for Amazonia, the Pantanal, and the Planalto Central fit into a more general pattern of Brazilian nationalism, particularly economic, that dates from the early 1920s. As a broader slice of society began to debate national issues, the productive, urban classes reached a consensus regarding the economy. The new industrializing sectors perceived that Brazilian development had occurred as a reflection of fluctuations in the world capitalist system (especially crises such as the First World War), and they concluded that only nationalization could allow the country to weather the vicissitudes of the global marketplace and push steadily forward.⁹⁴ This reaction against "the Market" ensured the hegemony during the early decades of the twentieth century of what Bolivar Lamounier identifies as the "ideology of the state," a belief system that sought to legitimize the authority of the central government as the guiding principle of society.⁹⁵ Of all the institutions in Brazilian society, only the federal government could knit what theorists of the time denounced as the nation's "economic archipelago" into an

interdependent, organic "intense communion of reciprocal interests"⁹⁶ based on a diversified, balanced national market. We can look at the March to the West, then, as an attempt to "nationalize" Brazil's interior, a movement by the "benevolent Leviathan"⁹⁷ to take advantage of the country's unharvested natural resources for the benefit of a growing industrial economy.

The March to the West is one of the consequences of the ascendancy of the ideology of the state, a gigantic expansion of the scope and reach of the central government apparatus in Brazil from 1930 to 1960, described by Thomas Skidmore as the achievement of "federal administrative predominance."⁹⁸ During the decentralization of the Old Republic, local power groups stepped into the vacuum left by the fall of the Empire. Through financial mechanisms, independent militias and police forces, and the corrupt dominance of elections, local oligarchies-- particularly in the West-- asserted their control over large parts of the country from 1900 to 1930, gaining an autonomy born of federal neglect and indifference (a system called *coronelismo*).⁹⁹ Getúlio Vargas eliminated this problem by creating new organisms, commissions, institutes, councils, departments, ministries, to plan policy and run the nation from Rio. This centralization and inflation of the State followed the construction of what Fernando Uricoechea terms the "patrimonial bureaucracy" under the Empire in the nineteenth century, but with a key distinction: Vargas' regimes, especially the Estado Novo, expanded government not just toward the metaphorical "periphery of the

political community,"¹⁰⁰ as Uricoechea suggests happened in the 1800s, but to the physical periphery of the frontier as well. The "bureaucratic web" became an all-encompassing authoritarian network that touched all aspects of Brazilians' lives, and the March to the West brought the State to the interior as never before. With the cooperation of powerful interventors appointed to suppress the influence of local fiefdoms, Vargas used the March to tie the Oeste for the first time into national politics and personal control. Juscelino Kubitschek would reap the benefits of this inclusion almost two decades later.

In essence, the March to the West can serve as a microcosm of Brazilian politics in the twentieth century, with its constant interplay of interest groups demanding something from the federal government. Social scientists such as Francisco Weffort have postulated that the Revolt of 1930 and the subsequent Vargas regimes represent an alliance, "a tacit compromise between the middle classes who lacked political autonomy and traditional sectors less linked to the export sector" that used the State for the "liquidation of oligarchic interests."¹⁰¹ To refine upon this point of view, while monocultural exporters did lose some of their influence, *A Marcha para o Oeste* shows that the Revolt of 1930-- or at least the Estado Novo-- brought about not the destruction of oligarchic interests but the creation of a new oligarchy, one with roots farther to the West and linked to industrialization, resource extraction, and production for the domestic market.

"Just as the cuttlefish squirts its ink in order to protect itself," in Roland Barthes' marvellous simile,¹⁰² Vargas in part used the March to the West to obscure and justify many of the political pay-offs necessary to keep his disparate coalition of supporters together. Using tactics that some (Marxist) historians have termed "bonapartism,"¹⁰³ the president offered something to all of the partners in his uneasy pact by pushing westward expansion, yet he ensured that none of his plans or propaganda campaigns threatened the *status quo*. The March to the West, instead of revolutionary, was profoundly conservative, an effort to forestall effective change in Brazil's socio-economic order.

Despite its focus on the wilderness, the March to the West was fundamentally an urban movement in conception and execution (Goiânia and Brasília appear as its most prominent achievements), the reflection of the new hegemony of the city in Brazil, a victory still not complete. Weffort postulates that under Vargas the urban proletariat, "the urban popular masses," appear as the only source of legitimacy for the new, massive Brazilian State. The strongman, or *caudilho*, skillfully managed to create the impression that he was empowering the urban working classes while actually muzzling them: the March to the West in part aimed to rein in urban growth and popular power by shifting people to areas where they could more easily be controlled.

Vargas added the myth of the new El Dorado, the new Paradise, to what Max Lerner has called "the Cult of the Nation-State,"¹⁰⁴

known in the specifically Brazilian context as "the cult of the Fatherland."¹⁰⁵ The president made the drive to develop the interior a part of the cult-like, mystical religious fervor of his national vision. By the late 1950s, just as Vargas had once served as "the very personification of Brazilian nationalism,"¹⁰⁶ the West became the incarnation of Brazil's collective aspirations. During the Estado Novo, modern Brazilian nationalism emerged victorious among its competitors. By extension, from 1937 to 1945 an ideology of Western development also triumphed, gaining a central place in the country's political and bureaucratic discourse that it has yet to relinquish. It is ironic that in a country and a regime so influenced by Comtian positivism-- which sought to bring science to statecraft-- Vargas would resort to the antithesis of such reasoning, myth, to bolster his program of modernization.

By his second term in the early 1950s, Vargas had subsumed much of his *Marcha para o Oeste* rhetoric into his broader nationalization campaigns, especially in the petroleum sector. Despite his new priorities, however, he never dropped the idea of penetrating and conquering the West, and he bequeathed to his elected successor, Juscelino Kubitschek, much of the structural apparatus to launch the New March to the West. The wartime economy of the 1940s, full of disruptions and uncertainties, had made central planning a key element of governing in Brazil,¹⁰⁷ and after the Second World War western development acquired a more planned character. French philosopher Jean-Marie Domenach could

have been describing the transition when he wrote, "propaganda is less and less poetic and more and more statistical."¹⁰⁸ The first March to the West (1938-1945) consciously played upon images of U.S. westward expansion-- the "Far Oeste" of Kit Carson and wagon trains-- and merged them with Brazil's own rich pioneer iconography of the interior, the bandeirante legends. Less lyrical and more business-like, the second March to the West (1951-1960) projected itself as the work of technicians and engineers: its model was the Tennessee Valley Authority under Franklin Roosevelt, the harnessing of a region's energy through state-funded mega-projects and the latest technological know-how. During the 1950s, the new developmental nationalism reproduced a positivist view of science, an "instrumentalist view (mixed with Brazil's traditional relegation of scientists themselves to a lesser status)" that ensured that "planning and economic development organs [would] become the most important sponsors of research."¹⁰⁹ This victory of technocracy would ultimately lead to the realization of the positivist model of the "scientific dictatorship"¹¹⁰ with the military's myriad technical plans and projects for the West from 1964 to 1985.

Having inherited the Superintendency for the Planning and Economic Valorization of Amazonia (*Superintendência de Planejamento e Valorização Econômica da Amazônia*-- SPVEA) and other agencies, Kubitschek would only accelerate this acronymic trend. Albert Hirschman has discussed a policy-making "amnesia" in Brazil, an "apparent lack of memory [of administrators] [and an]

insistence on proclaiming the futility and almost the inexistence of previous efforts."¹¹¹ In this example, however, the theory does not apply, for Kubitschek did consciously recall Vargas' programs, continued them, and held them up as models. Bolstered politically by "the promotion of progress,"¹¹² the energetic president recycled Vargas' rhetoric and images to advocate western expansion as crucial for a more prosperous, more powerful future. Jetting constantly over the endless emerald canopy of the forests, Juscelino Kubitschek cast himself as the new bandeirante chieftain leading Brazil gloriously into the space age. Brasília, the otherworldly capital hewn out of the sertão in forty months, concretely symbolized the nation's aspirations. In the words of Osvaldo Orico, Kubitschek "makes history larger than legend"¹¹³: he took Vargas' myths and turned many of them into reality, institutionalizing myth and the pursuit of History as part of the role of the Brazilian state.

During the same time that Vargas and Kubitschek concocted the March to the West, the Brazilian military, in cooperation with nationalist forces, refined an ideology of national security that made the interior a major focus of attention. Marked by "resentment of foreign capital and foreign personnel,"¹¹⁴ this stream of thought tapped into a strong current of xenophobia among Brazilian intellectuals and won many converts among the young officer corps by the 1930s. This concept of an external enemy threatening the nation in the West soon encompassed the idea of an amorphous internal enemy and served as a "an explanation and a

justification."¹¹⁵ The military actively supported both Marches to the West and supplied them with much of their top-down, authoritarian tinge. In one of the great ironies of Brazilian history, a large number of the so-called *tenentes*, who began to agitate for social and political change in the 1920s and joined with Vargas in 1930, turned into the generals and colonels who overthrew him in 1945 and again in 1954. The same group served in high posts in the Kubitschek administration and continued, even accelerated, Vargas' policies after attaining power themselves through the armed forces' coup in 1964.

By the time of the military takeover, the ideology and mythology of the March to the West had become objects of mass consumption and part of the national political memory. As important components of "political imagination" of Brazil¹¹⁶-- representing not just the possible but also the achievable-- the ideas of penetrating into and developing the interior have exercised enormous influence on succeeding policy programs. Like popular sambas or *futebol* fight songs, the icons and slogans of westward expansion melded into Brazilian popular culture, matching Umberto Eco's comment that "one of the characteristics of consumer production is that it does not entertain by revealing anything new, but confirms what we already know, what we have anxiously awaited to hear repeated."¹¹⁷ After twenty-five years of propaganda campaigns, the military's plans for the West would likewise reveal nothing fresh, but would reassure Brazilians by reaffirming something they already knew and eagerly had awaited to hear repeated.

-
- ¹ Ernst Cassirer, "The Technique of Our Modern Political Myths," In Cassirer, *Symbol, Myth, and Culture*, Ed. by Donald P. Verene (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 252.
- ² Jean-Marie Domenach, *La propagande politique*, Septième Édition (Paris: Pressés Universitaires de France, 1973), 86.
- ³ I will employ the term "Oeste" and its English equivalent "West" in the global sense that Nelson Werneck Sodré does in *Oeste: ensaio sobre a grande propriedade pastoril* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1941). The Brazilian West is less a specific zone than an idea, a "gigantic promise" that includes most of the interior of Brazil. To be geographically precise, however, for my purposes the West covers Amazônia Legal, the Planalto Central, and the Pantanal, or the current states of Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, the Distrito Federal, Goiás, half of Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima, and Tocantins. I will use the term "sertão" in a similar, broad sense. While often associated with the desert of the Brazilian Northeast, the word more generally means "backlands," and I, following many of my sources, will employ it to refer to the interior of Brazil.
- ⁴ Alaôr Caffé Alves, *Estado e ideologia: aparência e realidade* (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense S/A, 1987), 37.
- ⁵ Max Lerner, *Ideas Are Weapons: The History and Uses of Ideas* (New York: Viking Press, 1939), 6.
- ⁶ Henri Lefebvre, *The Sociology of Marx* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 71.
- ⁷ See E.R. Leach's groundbreaking analysis in *Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure*, 3rd Edition (London: The Athlone Press, 1970).
- ⁸ Cassirer, "Technique," 259.
- ⁹ Ibid., 253.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., 259.
- ¹¹ Ibid., 253.
- ¹² As quoted in Alfred McClung Lee, *How to Understand Propaganda* (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc, 1952), 62.
- ¹³ Ibid.
- ¹⁴ Mircea Eliade, *Myth and Reality*, Trans. by Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), 21.
- ¹⁵ Neide Esterici, "O mito da democracia no País das bandeiras: análise simbólica dos discursos sobre imigração e colonização do Estado Novo," Dissertação de Mestrado, Departamento de Antropologia do Museu Nacional, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 1972, 16.
- ¹⁶ Cassirer, 259.
- ¹⁷ Leach, 209.
- ¹⁸ Bronislaw Malinowski, *Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1948), 122.
- ¹⁹ Clodovis Boff, "Sobre ideologia," In Clarêncio Neotti, Ed., *Comunicação e ideologia* (São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 1980), 29, 31.

-
- 20 Roberto Fabregat Cúneo, *Propaganda y sociedad* (Mexico City: Biblioteca de Ensayos Sociológicos, Universidad Nacional, 1961), 146.
- 21 Nelson Jahr Garcia, *Sadismo, sedução e silêncio: propaganda e controle ideológico no Brasil, 1964-1980* (São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 1990), 17.
- 22 João Camillo de Oliveira Torres, *A propaganda política* (Belo Horizonte: Imprensa da Universidade de Minas Gerais, 1959), 37.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 David L. Altheide, *Bureaucratic Propaganda* (Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 1980), 5.
- 25 Ibid., 19.
- 26 Ibid., 231.
- 27 Ibid., 229-230.
- 28 Ibid., 18.
- 29 Lee, 65.
- 30 Lev Vygotsky, *Thought and Language* (Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press, 1986), 20.
- 31 Fabregat Cúneo, 174. E.R. Leach prefers the term "redundancy," saying that a myth can have the same, even a more powerful, impact if the details of the various versions do not exactly agree: "[A]s a result of redundancy, the believer can feel that, even when the details vary, each alternative version of a myth confirms his understanding and reinforces the essential meaning of all the others. See Leach, *Genesis as Myth and Other Essays* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969), 8-9.
- 32 William C. Hummel and Keith Huntress, *The Analysis of Propaganda* (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., n.d.), 20.
- 33 Umberto Eco, *Apocalittici e integrati: Comunicazioni di massa e teorie della cultura di massa*, II Edizione (Milan: Bompiani, 1965), 280.
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 Alberto Rangel, *Rumos e perspectivas*, 2ª Edição (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1934), 13.
- 36 Roy Nash, "Será conquistável a Amazônia?" *Boletim da União Panamericana*, October 1925, 712. For citations from Portuguese-language documents and works published before the orthographic reforms of 1941 and 1974, I have left the archaic, even inconsistent, spelling intact.
- 37 "O Brasil, paraíso terrerel," *Jornal do Brasil*, 2 December 1949, 6.
- 38 Armando Dias Mendes, *A invenção da Amazônia* (Belém, PA: Universidade Federal do Pará, 1974), 126-127.
- 39 Alistair Hennessy, *The Frontier in Latin American History*, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978), 6. While oriented towards the East and not the West, Peru also has looked to a frontier for its salvation, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s. See Juan McBride Espejo, *Belaunde y la Amazonia Peruana* (Lima: n.p., 1966) for more on president Fernando Belaunde Terry's campaign to develop and settle the *región oriental*. McBride Espejo coined the slogan "To know the forest is to know the future of Peru" (*Conocer la Selva es conocer el futuro del Perú*).
- 40 Alfredo Ladislau, *Terra Imatura*, 3ª Edição (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira S/A, 1933), 31.

-
- ⁴¹ William L. Schurz, *Brazil: The Infinite Country* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1961), 47.
- ⁴² Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, *Visão do Paraíso: os motivos edênicos no descobrimento e colonização de Brasil*, 4ª Edição (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1985), 167.
- ⁴³ See *Ibid.*, 144.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 259.
- ⁴⁵ Henry Walter Bates, *The Naturalist on the River Amazons* (London: J. Murray, 1863; reprint ed., New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1989), 377. Bates eventually returned to England and, in the grand tradition of haggard expatriates, expressed relief at reacquainting himself with the comforts of home, "I find how incomparably superior is civilized life . . . to the spiritual sterility of half-savage existence."
- ⁴⁶ Louis Agassiz to Charles Sumner, 26 December 1865, In Elizabeth Cary Agassiz, Ed., *Louis Agassiz: His Life and Correspondence*, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Company, 1885), II:638.
- ⁴⁷ Agassiz, *A Journey in Brazil* (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1868; reprint ed., New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969), 515.
- ⁴⁸ José Osvaldo de Meira Penna, *Utopia brasileira* (Belo Horizonte: Editora Itatiaia Ltda, 1988), 100.
- ⁴⁹ Aureliano Cândido Tavares Bastos, *O Valle do Amazonas*, 2ª Edição (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1937), 214.
- ⁵⁰ Quoted in Carlos Pontes, *Tavares Bastos* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1939), 240.
- ⁵¹ Dias Mendes, 126-27.
- ⁵² José Coelho da Gama e Abreu, Barão de Marajó, *As regiões Amazônicas: estudos chorographicos dos Estados do Gram Pará e Amazonas* (Lisbon: Imprensa de Libanio da Silva, 1895), 48.
- ⁵³ This dating of the legend comes from Clovis de Gusmão, "O Amazonas: a vida de um rio-- 1) O Eldorado e a geografia fantástica do século XVI." *Cultura Política*, March 1942, 13-14.
- ⁵⁴ Dias Mendes, 129.
- ⁵⁵ Raymundo Moraes, *Amphiteatro Amazonico* (São Paulo: Companhia Melhoramentos de São Paulo, 1936), 76.
- ⁵⁶ Meira Penna, 50.
- ⁵⁷ Meira Penna classifies the bandeirante as Brazil's version of Jung's myth of Don Juan, just as other others have identified the *malandro* as Brazil's Jungian trickster figure.
- ⁵⁸ Tavares Bastos to the Provincial Assembly of Alto-Amazonas, 20 November 1863, In Tavares Bastos, 403.
- ⁵⁹ Ataíde de Miranda, "Euclides-- o estizador da nossa historia (II)," *Cultura Política*, October 1944, 94.
- ⁶⁰ João Peregrino Júnior, *Panorama cultural da Amazônia* (Salvador: Publicações da Universidade da Bahia, 1960), 52.
- ⁶¹ Dias Mendes, 109.
- ⁶² Ladislau, 31.

-
- 63 For more on this strain of thought in colonial North America, see George Hunston Williams, *Wilderness and Paradise in Christian Thought* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1962).
- 64 Dias Mendes, 111.
- 65 Alberto Rangel, *Inferno Verde: cenas e escenarios do Amazonas*, 2ª Edição (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Minerva, 1914), 109.
- 66 Ibid., 164.
- 67 Ibid., 289.
- 68 Ibid., 80.
- 69 Ibid., 287.
- 70 Arthur Neiva and Belisario Penna, *Viagem científica pelo Norte da Bahia, sudoeste de Pernambuco, sul do Piauí e do norte a sul de Goiás* (Rio de Janeiro: Mangueiras, 1918), 179.
- 71 Ibid., 222.
- 72 Euclides da Cunha, *Rebellion in the Backlands*, Trans. by Samuel Putnam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1944), 161.
- 73 Ibid., 112.
- 74 Ibid., 365.
- 75 Ibid., 476.
- 76 Ibid., 94-95.
- 77 Ibid., 143.
- 78 Ibid., 60.
- 79 Ibid., 197.
- 80 Ibid., 38.
- 81 Ibid., 146.
- 82 Ibid., 408.
- 83 da Cunha, interview with *Jornal do Comércio* (Manaus), 29 October 1905, In Francisco Venancio Filho, *Euclides da Cunha e a Amazônia* (Rio de Janeiro: Serviço Gráfico do IGBE, 1949), 11.
- 84 da Cunha, *Um Paraíso Perdido: ensaios, estudos e pronunciamentos sobre a Amazônia*, Ed. by Leandro Tocantins (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio; Rio Branco: Fundação de Recursos Humanos da Cultura e do Desporto do Governo do Estado do Acre, 1986), 203.
- 85 da Cunha, *À margem da história* (Rio de Janeiro, n.p., 1909; reprint ed., São Paulo: Editora Cultrix; Brasília: Instituto Nacional do Livro, 1975), 38.
- 86 Buarque de Holanda, 276.
- 87 Ibid., 304.
- 88 As quoted in Pontes, 221.
- 89 Otávio Guilherme Velho, *Capitalismo autoritário e campesinato* (São Paulo: DIFEL, 1976), 146.
- 90 Meira Penna, 114.
- 91 Francisco Galvão, "O homem e o deserto amazônicos," *Cultura Política*, June 1941, 50.

-
- 92 For more on the "myth of the garden" in the U.S., see Henry Nash Smith, *Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), 123-ff.
- 93 Lefebvre, 68-69. Or, as Neide Esterci puts it, "[W]e must always try to combine semantic analysis of texts with analysis of social praxis." Esterci, "O mito," 116.
- 94 Octávio Ianni, *Estado e planejamento econômico no Brasil*, 4ª Edição (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira S/A, 1986), 76.
- 95 Bolivar Lamounier, "Formação de um pensamento político autoritário na primeira república, uma interpretação," In Buarque de Holanda, Gen. Ed., *Historia da Civilização Brasileira*, 3 Partes, 2ª Edição (São Paulo: DIFEL, 1990), Parte II: *O Brasil Republicano*, Ed. by Boris Fausto, 3 vols., vol. 2: *Sociedade e instituições*, 356-57.
- 96 Werneck Sodr , "Fronteira movel," *Cultura Pol tica*, August 1942, 102.
- 97 Lamounier, 359.
- 98 Thomas E. Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 34.
- 99 See Francisco Itami Campos, *Coronelismo em Goi s* (Goi nia, GO: Editora da Universidade Federal de Goi s, 1983) for a case study of how local bosses operated beyond the grasp of Rio's authority.
- 100 Fernando Uricoechea, *The Patrimonial Foundations of the Brazilian Bureaucratic State* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), 180.
- 101 Francisco C. Weffort, "Estados e massas no Brasil," *Revista Civiliza  o Brasileira*, Ano I, N  7, (May 1966), 142.
- 102 Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*, Ed. and Trans. by Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), 155.
- 103 See Ruy Mauro Marini, *Subdesarrollo y revoluci n* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI Editores, S.A., 1969), 93; and Esterci, 87-88. Mauro Marini discusses the Estado Novo in general as bonapartist, while Esterci examines Vargas' colonization policy specifically.
- 104 Max Lerner, *Ideas Are Weapons: The History and Use of Ideas* (New York: Viking Press, 1939), 503.
- 105 Ludwig Lauerhass, Jr., *Get lio Vargas e o triunfo do nacionalismo brasileiro* (S o Paulo: Editora da Universidade de S o Paulo, 1986), 149.
- 106 Ibid., 149.
- 107 See Ianni, 54.
- 108 Domenach, 99.
- 109 Ronald A. Foresta, *Amazon Conservation in the Age of Development* (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1991), 160.
- 110 Anselmo F. Amaral, *Get lio Vargas: continuador de uma id ia* (Porto Alegre: Martins Livreiro, 1984), 12.
- 111 Albert O. Hirschman, *Journeys Toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 243. We could apply Hirschman's concept to Vargas' public posture regarding his predecessors' Western policies, however.
- 112 Foresta, 139.

113 Osvaldo Orico, *Brasil, capital Brasília*, 2ª Edição (Lucas, D.F.: Serviço Gráfico do IBGE, 1960), 100.

114 E. Bradford Burns, *Nationalism in Brazil: A Historical Survey* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968), 79.

115 Alcir Lenharo, *Sacralização da Política* (Campinas, SP: Papirus, 1986), 69.

116 Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, "Raízes da imaginação política brasileira," *Dados*, Nº 7 (1970), 138.

117 Eco, 280.

Chapter Two: Paradise Misplaced

Well, gentlemen, El Dorado does exist, and its inhabitants are not happy.¹

-- Paulino de Brito

The earthly paradise rests in the hands of barbarians. . .²

-- Aureliano Cândido Tavares Bastos

A brief overview of the history of central governmental intervention in the Brazilian West is crucial to understanding the significance of Getúlio Vargas' March. National authorities only rarely disturbed, or indeed bothered to think about, the virtual cocoon in which the Oeste slumbered for the better part of four centuries.

Unlikely as it might appear, perhaps at no time in Brazil prior to the 1930s did the state play a stronger role in the interior, especially in Amazonia, than during the colonial period. Difficult coastal currents that defeated even the revolutionary Portuguese navigational skills made communication between the northern coast and the capital in Salvador impractical. To better exercise royal authority before 1763, Brazil above Fortaleza stood alone as a separate colony, Maranhão and Greater Pará (*Maranhão e Grão-Pará*), directly answerable to Lisbon. Conducting a campaign that historian Leandro Tocantins calls a mix of "pioneer impulsiveness [and] a state policy of expansionism,"³ Portugal embarked upon a deliberate exploration and annexation of Amazonia during the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries. While the slave-raiding and gold-seeking *bandeirantes* gleaned greater profits and captured the fancy of generations of Brazilian schoolchildren with their hyperbolic exploits,⁴ a virtually unsung group of traders, soldiers, monks, bureaucrats, and colonists fanned out from Belém do Pará on a state-sponsored mission of Westward expansion past the imaginary line drawn at Tordesillas. Portugal after 1616, the date of Belém's founding, pursued a coherent, well-defined economic and social agenda in Amazonia that involved the conscientious exploitation of the so-called *drogas do sertão* through colonization, evangelization, protectionism, the regulation of prices, and a "policy of intensive miscegenation," all overseen by the Crown and its agents.⁵ Discovery of gemstone and precious metal deposits on the Planalto Central also lured prospectors and their slaves to the West, followed by the tax collectors. Isolated settlements such as Goiás Velho and Vila Bela sprang up thousands of miles from the centers of Brazilian colonial civilization. The Portuguese paid so much attention to the interior that one historian has called the area the "solar center of the colonial world."⁶

Setting a precedent followed throughout subsequent Brazilian history, the military played the primary role in this early attempt to conquer and settle the West. In the eighteenth century, the creation of garrisons at Coimbra on the lower Paraguay in 1775 and at Beira on the Guaporé River in 1776 secured Brazil's southwestern reaches and firmly established Mato Grosso as Portuguese soil. The Treaty of

Madrid in 1750, a renegotiation of the Tordesillas boundaries to reflect Lisbon's successful push into the heart of South America, did not prevent the Portuguese from stationing troops on undefended Spanish land, as they did in 1778 by founding Albuquerque (now Corumbá). Portuguese ministers, especially the wily Pombal, sought to create what one historian has called a "genuine strategic encirclement" to protect their investments and claim as much territory as possible in the nebulous and unmapped wilderness of the interior. The bandeirante incursions from São Paulo received no backing from the central government overseas. Lisbon adopted a hostile attitude towards the expeditions and actively discouraged trade and river traffic between Maranhão and Brazil by closing the Tocantins and Madeira rivers, two of the most important north-south waterways, in 1730 and 1733, respectively.⁷

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Western Brazil had begun to enter an obscurity from which it would only emerge eighty years later. As the gold and diamond deposits of Goiás and Mato Grosso shrunk and Portugal became reluctantly embroiled in European conflicts, the rain forest reabsorbed most of the efforts of the Crown to manage rationally and systematically the vast reaches of the Oeste. Even after Brazilian independence in 1822, the region remained cut off from the rest of the nation.

Only a popular uprising launched in 1835, the *Cabanagem*, would lead to the permanent political integration of the West into modern Brazil.⁸ Because of the legal division between Grão-Pará and

Brazil during the colonial period, Belém contained a large number of Portuguese, particularly merchants, and loyalist sympathizers uneager to recognize the sovereignty of the newly proclaimed imperial government in Rio de Janeiro. The abdication and return to Portugal of Emperor Pedro I in 1831 had left the levers of statecraft in the hands of a committee of regents who ruled in the name of the infant heir, and the ensuing power vacuum unleashed centrifugal forces all across the country. The local American-born elite in Belém called upon the miscegenated population of the interior, the *cabanos*, to help defeat the Portuguese resisters, termed *caramurus*. This mobilization of Indians, blacks, and those of mixed-blood metastasized into a full-scale rebellion of the lower classes as the irregulars from upriver turned upon their urban sponsors. Violence flared for five years, and the central government dispatched troops to crush the insurrection, the first direct intervention intervening in the independent history of Brazil.

Fear and contempt, the primary residue left by the *Cabanagem*, made the Empire content to let Amazonia and the West languish for much of the rest of the nineteenth century.⁹ Possessed by what one later observer described as "the vague, imprecise fear. . . of abandoning the coast, the city, for the sertão,"¹⁰ littoral Brazil turned its back on the interior. The federal government proved more often an impediment to development in the West than a catalyst for it. Rio constructed various obstacles to the pursuit of commerce in the region, and did not approve steamship navigation on the Amazon

until 1850, eleven years after regular service had begun between coastal ports.¹¹

Shipping on the Amazon, in fact, became one of the most hotly contested national questions during the middle of the nineteenth century. The debate set the parameters for how Brazil would respond to and view its West during the next century-- as an object of foreign greed. In the early 1850s, the United States repeatedly exerted high-level diplomatic pressure on Brazil to open the river to American vessels. The Brazilian Minister in Washington, Sergio Teixeira de Macedo, came away from these meetings convinced that the U.S. was planning to invade and occupy Amazonia.¹² Brazil, distracted by the internecine wars of the River Plate, feared that American gunboats could steam in unopposed and stage a sequel to the recent episodes in Texas and California. A secret Itamaraty report on the issue of freeing traffic on the Amazon warned, "The United States has an irresistible way of life of occupation and annexation."¹³ (Brazilian policy-makers conveniently ignored that at the same time they were engaging in occasionally bitter discussions with the United States over the opening of the Amazon, they had gone to war with Argentina and toppled the Rosas regime in part to guarantee Brazilian access to the Rio de la Plata.)

U.S. Navy Lieutenant Matthew Fontaine Maury became the lightning rod for Brazilian concern about American designs on the Amazon Basin. Maury, Director of the Naval Observatory in Washington and an oceanographer whose charts and texts are still in

use, was a tireless proponent of free navigation on the Amazon who used his political connections to advance his agenda. The spiritual godfather of a new generation of corporate imperialists, Lt. Maury convinced the U.S. government to sponsor an official scientific expedition, led by his cousin William Lewis Herndon, to cover the entire river from source to mouth. Enthusiastically approved by the Peruvians, and begrudgingly sanctioned by the Brazilians, over the strenuous objections of Minister in Washington Ignacio de Carvalho Moreira (who believed that the venture served as reconnaissance for an American conspiracy),¹⁴ Herndon departed from Lima in 1851. The voyage lasted the better part of two years before it reached Belém in 1853. The expedition's final report to Congress, an extraordinary document of American hubris, blamed Brazilian opposition to free trade on "a causeless jealousy, and a puerile fear of our people," and virtually demanded U.S. predominance in the area: "the trade of this region *must* pass by *our* doors, and mingle with the products of *our* Mississippi valley."¹⁵

Evidence suggests that Brazilian suspicions about the motives of Maury and Herndon were well-founded. Avowed commercial boosterism seems to have fronted for a covert operation much more pernicious. In correspondence Maury proposed Brazil as a "safety valve" to preserve the Union, and he conceived of a grand scheme to ship southern whites and the surplus black slave population to colonize Amazônia and obviate the free-state versus slave-state question then raging at home.¹⁶ Ironically, Getúlio Vargas would

latch onto the very same notion of the Oeste as a safety valve during his March to the West some eighty years later.

American attention very soon turned to domestic tensions, and the U.S. government did not press its demands any further. Emperor Pedro II finally liberalized navigation on the Amazon on 7 December 1866,¹⁷ but nervousness about external designs on the region limited the new openness. The Amazon's major tributaries remained closed to foreign ships, and European scientists had difficulty convincing government officials and local residents that they were just ethnologists or botanists and not "engineers looking for El Dorado."¹⁸

The perception of galling and craven foreign challenges to Brazil's possessions in the West has lingered to this day. "The dread of usurpation," according to one historian, "has been. . .the sword of Damocles for Brazil,"¹⁹ and the nation's leaders and thinkers have remained firm in their conviction that they sit beneath an imperialist blade suspended by a single hair. Rhetoric about international greed in the interior has cropped up repeatedly among Brazilian leaders since the 1860s, and after 1936 this defensive nationalism would have an impact on the course of the March to the West.

Although the Paraguayan invasion of Mato Grosso during the War of the Triple Alliance in 1865, news of which took several weeks to reach the capital, pointed out the vulnerability of the West, the central government in the middle of the nineteenth century made no substantial efforts to integrate the area into the rest of Brazil.

Many in the centralized Imperial government had never been beyond Minas Gerais, and knew nothing and cared less about the obscure territories farther out. Complaints of the "unpardonable ignorance"²⁰ that had caused so many problems in the war when the army struggled to maneuver and communicate with troops in an uncharted wilderness received little consideration outside of military circles. Louis Agassiz, the Swiss-born Harvard scientist who made a celebrated voyage down the Amazon in 1865-6, blamed the state's indifference towards the interior on the system of patronage that dominated imperial politics:

The Amazonian provinces are made stepping-stones to higher employments. The young candidates who accept these posts claim a reward for the disinterestedness they have shown in exposing themselves to disease, and make the reputed fatality of the climate an excuse for leaving these remote stations after a few months' sojourn.²¹

Not only did bureaucrats never intend to stay long enough in the Oeste to actually accomplish anything, they had a natural incentive to pillory the conditions and prospects of the places in which they served. The celebrated "Green Hell" reputation that the farthest reaches of the Empire acquired in the nineteenth century owes much to the ambition of civil servants eager for plum postings closer to the Court.

A few dissenting voices during this period did challenge the *carioca* prejudices about the interior by decrying the state's inaction and lobbying for less centralization and more resources for the forgotten provinces. General José Vieira Couto de Magalhães, one of

the heroes of the Paraguayan War, became the most vocal advocate of a concerted campaign of Westward expansion and development, a drive to "conquer two-thirds of our territory."²² President of the Provinces of Mato Grosso, Pará, and Goiás, Couto de Magalhães was one of the few appointed executives²³ during the Imperial period who actively worked for the material benefit of his nominal constituents. He lobbied the Court and Parliament for years to look over the coastal mountains and glimpse the rich possibilities of the hinterland. Going further than any other public figure in the nineteenth century, the General proposed the state-directed, martial occupation of the West through the construction of "military colonies" composed of troops and corps of interpreters.²⁴ Couto de Magalhães saw the failure to settle the interior and pacify the indigenous tribes as a danger for the nation:

The existence of a million tribesmen, occupying and dominating the majority of the territory of Brazil, able to rise up on all sides against the Christian population, is a danger and an impediment to the progress and peopling of the interior²⁵

Far from pushing for the extermination of the Indians, however, Couto de Magalhães urged his colleagues in government to view them as an untapped resource, the key to unlocking the secret wealth of the West.

While President of Goiás in the early 1860s, Couto de Magalhães came to believe that federally sponsored navigation of the rivers of the interior would direct Brazil along the path to "the

Promised Land."²⁶ In 1869, he convinced the Emperor to grant him a concession to operate a subsidized steamship line on the Rio Tocantins in Goiás, and he even brought a disassembled vessel overland from the Paraguay River in ox-carts. The venture failed with its mastermind's death and the cancellation of federal support in 1896, but the forlorn hulks of Couto de Magalhães' three steamers, ghostly reminders of quixotic dreams, lay decomposing on the beach at Leopoldina until 1942.²⁷

The fall of Emperor Pedro II in 1889 provided an opportunity to reexamine the nation's priorities, and the idea of pushing West gained new currency. Article III of the new Constitution, written in 1891, enshrined an old Brazilian dream: the shifting of the capital to a site in the interior. Exiled separatist Hipólito José da Costa, founder of the London-based *Correio Brasiliense*, in an 1813 editorial had proposed moving the center of government from Rio,²⁸ and the patriarch of Brazilian independence, Imperial Minister José Bonifácio embraced the idea eight years later. Brazil's foremost historian of the first half of the nineteenth century, Adolfo Varnhagen, the Visconde de Porto Seguro, kept the notion alive during the following decades, but the Imperial entourage had no intention of decamping from the breezy splendors of the Quinta da Boa Vista for newer, more rustic quarters. Only the advent of the Republic resuscitated the concept, as abandoning Rio appealed to those who identified the Marvellous City (*Cidade Maravilhosa*) with the Monarchy. Anew

capital would represent a sharp break with the past and offer a tangible symbol of Brazil's new political order.²⁹

President Floriano Peixoto, following the proclamation of the Constitution, created a commission led by Belgian émigré scientist Luis Cruls to survey the Planalto Central for a suitable location for the new capital. The team diligently selected a site in eastern Goiás, but questions almost immediately arose about the propriety of the proposed move. Accusations of financial misfeasance and technical irregularities in the official report damaged the Cruls Commission's credibility.³⁰ Subsequent unrest (particularly the incident at Canudos in 1896-7) suggested that the "uncivilized" interior was not yet safe for the transfer. The administration of Rodrigues Alves effectively tabled the plans by carrying out a sanitation and modernization campaign in Rio instead in the first decade of the twentieth century.

While the federal government was shying away from schemes to develop the interior, thousands of desperate Brazilians had launched a westward migration that eventually focused the attention of the nation on its farthest corner. Private initiative took over where public efforts had failed, as thousands of poverty-stricken Northeasterners fleeing the century's worst drought poured into Amazônia, 54,000 of them in 1878 alone.³¹ "[M]ore ghosts than men, uncultured, skeletal, spectral," the penniless refugees formed a "most sad avalanche of desperate folk" over which authorities had no control.³² In the vacuum of state indifference, many of the refugees

(*retirantes*) ended up as tappers in the *seringais*, or rubber groves, of the disputed and newly valuable zone of Acre, west of Mato Grosso in Bolivian territory.

The rubber boom, touched off by Charles Goodyear's invention of vulcanization, which suddenly made latex (*borracha*) applicable for a myriad of industrial uses, attracted so many Brazilians that they soon outnumbered the Bolivians. Brazil, through a protocol of 23 September 1898, had effectively ceded most of Acre to its neighbor by allowing La Paz to establish customs posts in the region. Yet a rebellion broke out the following year when tax collectors arrived, and Brazilian rubber tappers, or *seringueiros*, refused to recognize Bolivian sovereignty.

Amid the chaos, the Bolivians found a solution that alarmed Brazilian statesmen and revived the fear of foreign intervention brought on by the Herndon Expedition. In 1901, La Paz signed a deal with the Anglo-American Bolivian Syndicate (headed by the Vanderbilts and President Theodore Roosevelt's son) for the exploitation of rubber in the coveted territory. The possibility of a covert "state-within-the-state"³³ that might eventually lead to direct foreign control, as similar Trojan Horse chartered companies had opened the door for German and Belgian annexation in Africa and Asia during the two previous decades, revived Brazilian fears of an international takeover of Amazonia. Rebels led by Plácido de Castro, an adventurer and former soldier from Rio Grande do Sul, ejected the Bolivians, however. The Brazilian government, with the help of the

Rothschilds in London, bought off the Syndicate, to the tune of 110,000 pounds sterling.³⁴ The example of the Bolivian Syndicate would lodge itself in the collective memory of Brazilian policy-makers, helping to create a paranoia about foreign concessions in the West. The incident has colored policy towards the interior up to the present day.

Brazilian Foreign Minister José Maria da Silva Paranhos Filho, the Baron of Rio Branco (*Barão do Rio Branco*), settled the Acre Question in negotiations with Bolivia in 1903. Brazil absorbed Acre and its limitless repositories of "white gold." The Treaty of Petrópolis, only one in a stunning string of diplomatic victories for Rio Branco from 1895 to 1909, gave Brazil the territory in exchange for cash, a small sliver of land fronting the Madeira River, navigational rights, and the promise of a railroad to link Bolivia to Atlantic ports. Rio Branco suggested the following year that Brazil would pay any price to secure the prosperity of its new Western reaches. He declared, "All the sacrifices that we will make are justifiable" for the thousands of citizens restored to the nation.³⁵

In this heady climate of rubber prosperity and territorial gain, the West for the first time in Brazilian history captured the imagination of the coastal population and piqued the curiosity of the entire world. The state of Amazonas, site of the fabulous and extravagantly expensive Manaus Opera House, responded to the organizers' demands and commissioned Augusto César Lopes Gonçalves to write a book as its official contribution to the Brazilian

pavilion at the 1904 St. Louis World's Fair. *O Amazonas*, published simultaneously in English as *The Amazon*, played up the popular legends about the region, calling it "[the] real El Dorado," while mixing them with rigorous (for the time) scientific and statistical data.³⁶ Gonçalves also urged a vigorous propaganda campaign and a federally backed "American homestead" to attract foreign labor to the interior.³⁷

For a time the government in Rio seemed responsive to the idea of developing the West with taxpayer funds. In June 1906, before taking office, president-elect Afonso Pena became the first Brazilian leader to visit the Oeste, traveling by steamer from Belém to Manaus.³⁸ The scenery enraptured the new president as he floated upriver, and he wrote to his wife of visions of coming grandeur: "the Amazon guarantees Brazil a future without equal in the community of nations."³⁹ Pena, the former Governor of Minas Gerais who had constructed Belo Horizonte in the previous decade, knew the potential and the importance of the interior, and he sought to dispel his countrymen's negative perceptions. Manaus was enjoying the apex of its *belle époque* opulence, and the infectious confidence of the rubber boom swept up the President-elect in a whirlwind of elaborate, eight-course banquets capped by optimistic speeches. On docking in Manaus, Pena declared, "Happily I have arrived in Amazonas, and I can now rebut the dreadful accusations leveled at this land and its good name."⁴⁰

When he returned to Rio, the new President launched a bold program of action in the West. Pena's administration proved the only national government before Vargas to take any interest in the interior and its development. With partial federal subsidies, rails extended west from São Paulo into Mato Grosso. At the same time, a mad American visionary named Percival Fahrquar hewed the Madeira-Mamoré Railroad out of the virgin forests, greatly expanding access to Acre. Yet before Pena could complete his plans, he died suddenly in June of 1909, and the reins of power passed to an interim regime that lacked political capital.

In the succeeding administration of Hermes da Fonseca, civil unrest in Rio, particularly the naval revolts of 1910, focused attention on urban problems, and the state in the following few years continued a hands-off policy towards the Oeste.⁴¹ The only federal intervention in the West was the shelling of Manaus by Navy gunboats in a spate of political infighting to unseat a Governor who resisted the manipulation of the state's ruling oligarchs.⁴² This inaction even extended to financial and physical mismanagement of the few projects in which Rio had invested in the region, such as the three state *fazendas* in Rio Branco (now Roraima). Journalist Aníbal Porto denounced the properties as unkempt, poorly run, and a drain on the Treasury: "These national properties, neglected and invaded by trespassers, have contributed nothing of value"⁴³

Only the collapse of the price of rubber jolted the federal government back into action. By the beginning of the second decade of

the twentieth century, competition from plantations in the British and Dutch East Asian colonies (originally stocked with seeds exported from Brazil by English traveller Henry Wickham in 1876) threatened to burst the Amazonian bubble. The lavish life of the Rubber Boom turned out to have been a mirage, and the crisis transformed Amazonia into "the empire of fraud-- the land defrauded by man and man swindled by society."⁴⁴

The rubber barons of Manaus and Belém clamored for a government bailout. President Fonseca's Minister of Agriculture, Pedro de Toledo, unveiled the "Rubber Defense Plan" (*Plano de Defesa da Borracha*) in January 1912, a tardy valorization proposal based on the 1906 coffee price-support (the Convention of Taubaté). The Rubber Defense Law envisioned a grand plan to stimulate and improve latex production through tax breaks, incentives, the introduction of laborers, and communication and transportation infrastructure improvements. A second law passed in March ordered the Bank of Brazil to buy up huge quantities of latex to bolster the market price. In announcing the program, Toledo appeared to commit the federal government for the first time to a long-term direct investment in the economic and social well-being of the West. He asserted that conditions demanded "a swift and energetic solution from the public sector, combined with a tenacious and well-directed effort on the part of the private interests involved. . . .

"⁴⁵ Partisan political wrangling and bureaucratic infighting sunk the plan, however. Within a year, Congress had suspended the funding for the project. Commentator Arthur Neiva summed up the inadequate and

fruitless legislation with exquisite irony: "Finally the federal government resolved to act. . . . As usual, various regulations were written at the beginning of the response. Unfortunately, however, the rubber crisis did not know how to read."⁴⁶

Rubber prices never rebounded, and by the eve of the First World War, only one institution in Brazil remained interested in the West: the military. The experience of the Paraguayan War had impressed upon the Army the importance of improving communication links with the frontier, but even into the twentieth century the lines of defense in the West remained precarious. In 1888, Deodora da Fonseca, then serving in virtual internal exile as the commander of forces in Mato Grosso, conceived of stretching telegraph lines across the Pantanal from Cuiabá to Corumbá.

Although work was suspended upon Deodoro's return to Rio the following year (shortly before his overthrow of the Emperor), the idea of expanding the military's presence in the region had caught on with the high command. General Antônio Ernesto Gomes Carneiro declared that "the soldier [is] the civilizer of Mato Grosso."⁴⁷ Certain that the Army should take the lead in conquering and settling the West, in the early 1890s he deputized a young engineer fresh from the Military Academy, Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon, to realize Deodoro's plans.

Mimoso, Rondon's hometown, a speck on the map of southwestern Mato Grosso (now Mato Grosso do Sul), had experienced the terror of the unannounced Paraguayan invasion in

1865, and the young officer strongly believed in the need to secure the frontier.⁴⁸ Yet Rondon also had a vision of the interior similar to that of da Cunha at the end of *Os Sertões*: in the West and in its people lay the center of Brazilian nationhood. In the middle of his career he wrote to his superiors that the "wild sertões [are] the national banner, symbol of the integrity of our great Fatherland."⁴⁹ Rondon further imagined the potential of the region to sustain the nation, cabling to Rio to marvel at the "mysterious riches locked for centuries in these unknown precincts, now revealed. . . in that granary and reservoir for the future."⁵⁰

Over twenty-five years Rondon and his steely subordinates mapped more than twenty-four thousand square miles of land, laid almost four thousand miles of wire,⁵¹ founded twenty-five transmission stations, discovered and named fifteen rivers, and found or contacted dozens of indigenous tribes,⁵² one of the most extraordinary feats of exploration of the twentieth century. Yet the stated ends of Rondon's missions, first for the Army and after 1907 for the Mato Grosso-Amazonas Strategic Telegraph Line (*Comissão de Linhas Telegráficas Estratégicas de Mato Grosso ao Amazonas*) and the Indian Protection Service (*Serviço de Proteção dos Índios*), extended far beyond merely jamming telegraph posts into the rain forest soil. Rondon's instructions to "tame [the] still savage regions of the territory of our Fatherland and deliver them to civilized life,"⁵³ sound remarkably like the goals of later efforts. Before Rondon's forays to contact and pacify indigenous tribes, chart the unknown,

and string lines, the Brazilian state had taken no concrete steps to integrate in a planned manner the western two-thirds of the nation. The paths that he cut across the forests and the relaying stations that he established would in later decades literally become the highways upon which a massive immigration from the coast would flood the Oeste. Rondon showed Brazil that the obstacles of nature were not insurmountable, and he sketched out the blueprints for the schemes of the March to the West.

Moreover, as the word "strategic" in its name indicates, Rondon's Commission was first a military operation, a harbinger of the military emphasis that has marked Brazilian western development throughout the century. The expeditions emphasized the preservation of national security and were a model for later proposals for the armed forces to occupy and colonize the West. More important, dozens of officers trained with and served under Rondon, and his vision of the frontier influenced many of them who later rose in the ranks.⁵⁴ In his attitude towards the interior, Rondon stood as the link between military and civilian ideas about the West: the general effectively "militarized civilians, forcing them to act like soldiers."⁵⁵

Despite the Herculean achievements of Rondon, however, none of the expeditions between 1895 and 1920 represent a large-scale, state-directed campaign for development and colonization. The Strategic Telegraph Line might have received the assignment of directing the "definitive occupation" of the territories through which

it past, including "the establishment of population nuclei and the installation of permanent lines of communication,"⁵⁶ but appropriated funds never came close to matching such ambitions. The budget for Rondon's operation in 1917 totaled such a paltry sum that he proposed undertaking a foreign lecture tour, complete with films of his work, to earn extra money.⁵⁷

After the First World War, during which Brazil's economy prospered from the disruptions in normal global trade patterns, expectations about the potential of the Oeste ran high. Rondon's 1913-1914 journey on the Rio das Mortes with former U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt had turned the world's attention to the region, and many dreamed of tapping Brazil's infinite resources to speed postwar reconstruction. T.R.'s memoir of the expedition, translated around the globe, enthusiastically praised his companion and proclaimed Brazil's interior as ripe for modernization: "[T]he teeming lowlands of the Amazon and the Paraguay could readily . . . be made tributary to an industrial civilization seated on [the] highlands [of the Planalto]."⁵⁸

Rondon, his nearly thirty years of wandering in the wilderness over, returned like a Biblical prophet to use his newfound fame to preach a gospel of westward expansion. In a 1920 lecture at Piracicaba, São Paulo, entitled "Into the Sertão" (*Rumo ao Sertão*), the trailblazer called for a concerted, state-led effort to integrate and subdue the West:

The new generations of Brazilians should extend themselves in search of the West, forming the modern counterparts of the conquerors of raw materials for heavy industry. . . .The delicate mission of government officials will be to guide private activities and initiatives, steering these forces efficiently to meet such goals.⁵⁹

Rondon, the fervent positivist, urged his countrymen to emulate the pioneering bandeirantes of old, but this time within the framework of central government support and planning. Instead of gold or slaves, the new expeditions would seek the raw materials to fuel the growing industrial machine of Brazil's Southeast.

In a landmark interview with the leading Rio daily *Jornal do Comércio* two years later, he amplified his vision by comparing Brazil to the United States and pushing for the railroads to serve as the vanguard for conquering the interior. Like a Southern Hemisphere Asa Whitney, Rondon believed that the train tracks would spur continental (even trans-Pacific) trade and induce a migration of settlers:

The problem of the West today depends on one factor, population. Yet the question of settlement cannot be resolved without the co-operation of the railroads; we ought to do in those areas what the North-Americans did: rend our interior with railways and go sowing population clusters along the tracks.⁶⁰

Brazil never raked her interior with rails, but forty years later Kubitschek's highways would fulfill Rondon's prophecies. The seer of the sertão predicted that hordes of migrants would flow into the West behind the steam engine, but instead they followed the diesel engine. Rondon had planted seeds that would begin to sprout in the

late 1930's and early 1940s-- the March to the West owes much to his ideas and his courage.

Only a few years before the Revolt of 1930, however, few Brazilian policymakers proved willing to listen to Rondon, the "Buddha of patriotism."⁶¹ Yet one group of intellectuals, extreme nationalists dubbed the green-yellows (*verde-amarelos*, from the colors of the Brazilian flag), responded by proclaiming the interior of the country a saving antidote to the infectious "cosmopolitanism" of the coast. They wanted to forge a new Brazilian mentality, one that looked inwards (in both the geographic and spiritual sense) to bring about the "greatest conquest of civilization in the tropics."⁶² Plínio Salgado and Cassiano Ricardo, rising young intellectuals and poets from São Paulo, decried Brazil's cities as violent, discordant, individualistic, dangerous, unstable, and awash with foreign influence. Urban chaos, ripe for communism and banditry, was sapping the nation's natural energies, according to Salgado, and he echoed da Cunha in affirming that only by turning to the sertão could Brazil "coordinate. . . [its] consciousness as a people."⁶³

In 1927, Salgado professed that the interior needed to rescue Brazil from "the urban malady": "[T]he soul of our vast hinterland, that spiritual force of thirty million compatriots must rise up in a single expression of will."⁶⁴ He advocated making a national priority of bridging the gap between the cities and rural areas through road-building, agricultural development, and education in the countryside : "Our principal preoccupation should be the most intimate

partnership between the City and the Sertão."⁶⁵ Preceding Vargas by more than ten years, Salgado foreshadowed the March to the West, and synthesized his arguments in a memorable phrase: "In a word: to the land!"⁶⁶ By the end of the next decade, Getúlio Vargas would absorb Salgado's ideas and change the rhetoric of his prescription by only one word: the generalized path back to the land would become the specific March to the West.

On the eve of the demise of the Old Republic, then, sentiment was growing in Brazil to support a turn away from the modern, Europeanized, cosmopolitan coast and towards the recently charted, unassimilated interior. Intellectuals and public figures such as Salgado and Rondon made public manifestos urging their compatriots to abandon the coddled littoral strip and strike out in a new direction-- West. Getúlio Vargas, an ambitious former deputy and Finance Minister reared in the cutthroat political wars of Rio Grande do Sul, was listening, and in 1930 would get a chance to bring the concept of the March to the West to life.

-
- ¹ Paulino de Brito, "O japiim: conto amazônico," In Brazil, Estado do Pará, Conselho Estadual de Cultura, *Paulino de Brito: obra comemorativa*, 2 vols. (Belém, PA: Conselho Estadual de Cultura, 1970), I:166.
- ² Tavares Bastos, *Cartas do solitário*, 3ª Edição (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938), 507.
- ³ Leandro Tocantins, *Acre, Rio Branco e espírito luso* (Rio de Janeiro: Serviço de Documentação, Agência da SPVEA, 1962), 22.
- ⁴ One of Brazil's first social historians, José de Alcântara Machado de Oliveira, pointed out that the words *bandeira* and *bandeirante* in the sense that we use them today do not even appear in documents until 1726, indicating that the recognition of a self-conscious westward effort from São Paulo dates from much later than the Crown's Amazonian policies. See *Vida e morte do bandeirante*, 5ª Edição (São Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora S/A, 1972), 233.
- ⁵ Artur César Ferreira Reis, *Aspectos econômicos da dominação lusitana na Amazônia* (Rio de Janeiro: Serviço de Documentação, Agência da SPVEA, 1961), 15.
- ⁶ Alcântara Machado, 223.
- ⁷ Reis, *Panorama econômico-financeiro do Segundo Reinado: navegação fluvial, especialmente a do Amazonas* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1942), 6.
- ⁸ Raymundo Heraldo Maués, "Amazônias: identidade e integração," paper presented at the 17ª Reunião Brasileira de Antropologia, Florianópolis, SC, 8-11 April 1990, 6.
- ⁹ Even more than a century later, the Amazonense Senator and historian Anísio Jobim would describe the rebels in terms of outrage and terror: "The Cabano turned into the scarecrow, the hangman, the assassin, the brigand, who, although he lurked in every corner of the flatlands, launched himself upon his victims like a jaguar." Anísio Jobim, *O Amazonas: sua história* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1957) 154.
- ¹⁰ Brazil, Comissão de Linhas Telegraphicas Estrategicas de Matto Grosso ao Amazonas, Serviço Sanitario, *Relatório*, by João Florentino Meira de Faria (Rio de Janeiro: Comissão de Linhas Telegraphicas Estrategicas de Matto Grosso ao Amazonas, 1916), 5.
- ¹¹ For a description of the bureaucratic hassles imposed by the federal government in the West, see William Lewis Herndon, *Exploration of the Valley of the Amazon*, Ed. by Hamilton Basso (reprint ed., New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952), 148-ff.
- ¹² See Fernando Saboia Medeiros, *A liberdade de navegação do Amazonas* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938), 50.
- ¹³ Brazil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Seção dos Negócios Estrangeiros, "Parecer sobre navegação do Amazonas," by Paulino José Soares de Souza, Visconde d'Abrantes, and Caetano Maria Lopes Gama, 17 January 1854, 113, AI, Documentos Históricos, 2ª Série, Lata 256, Maço 2.
- ¹⁴ See F.S. Medeiros, 61; and also Reis, *A Amazônia e a cobiça internacional* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1960), 94.
- ¹⁵ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Exploration of the Valley of the Amazon, Made Under Direction of the Navy Department*, 2 Parts, By William Lewis Herndon and Lardner Gibbon, S. Report 36, *Executive Documents*, 32nd Congress, 2nd

Session, 1853 (Washington: Robert Armstrong, Public Printer, 1853), I: 341, 190.

16 Matthew Fontaine Maury to Mrs. Blackford, 24 December 1851. LC, Manuscript Division, Matthew Fontaine Maury Collection, Container IV, 521-523. For more detail on Maury and the Herndon Expedition, see John P. Harrison, "Science and Politics: Origins and Objectives of Mid-Nineteenth Century Government Expeditions to Latin America," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. XXXV, No. 2 (May 1955), 175-202. Harrison calls Maury's plan "probably the most extreme version of Manifest Destiny ever suggested by a public official." Whitfield J. Bell, Jr.'s "The Relation of Herndon and Gibbon's Exploration of the Amazon to North American Slavery, 1850-1855," *HAHR*, Vol. XIX, No. 4 (November 1939), 494-503, covers much of the same ground.

17 The timing of the Imperial decree coincides with the War of the Triple Alliance, which Paraguayan strongman Francisco Solano López helped to spark by closing the Rio Paraguay. Argentine man-of-letters Juan Bautista Alberdi interpreted the opening of the Amazon to foreign-flag carriers as an elaborate ruse to distract the hemisphere's attention from Brazil's real goal of aggressively expanding southward into the Plata Basin. See Alberdi's *El Brasil ante la democracia de América* (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1866; reprint ed., Ediciones ELE, 1946).

18 Karl von den Steinen, *Entre os aborígenes do Brasil Central*, Trans. by Egon Schaden (Berlin: n.p., 1894; reprint ed., São Paulo: Departamento de Cultura, 1940), 26. Brazilian xenophobia about the interior even predates independence: Alexander von Humboldt, who travelled through Amazonia in the first three years of the nineteenth century, reported that local authorities, when they learned that his plans included a sojourn in Brazil, wanted to arrest and deport him when he crossed over from Spanish-held territory. He wrote in his travelogue, "Orders had been issued to seize my person, my instruments, and, above all, those registers of astronomical observations, so dangerous to the safety of state." Lisbon contravened the warrants in time, however, and issued instructions that Humboldt should pass unhindered and with every assistance. Humboldt, *Personal Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctial Regions of America, During the Years 1799-1804*, 3 vols., Trans. and Ed. by Thomasina Ross (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1852), II:392.

19 F.S. Medeiros, 98. More than any other work, Eduardo Prado's *The American Illusion* (*A ilusão americana*) perpetuated these notions in Brazil. Prado denounced the U.S. expeditions in Amazonia as "piracy" comparable to William Walker's adventures in Central America. The book even claims that Maury had raised and launched a private invasion force that the U.S. government detained in Sandy Hook, New Jersey. Ironically, Brazilian authorities originally banned *A ilusão americana* upon its publication in 1893. The book has gone through five subsequent editions, the latest in 1980. Eduardo Prado, *A ilusão americana*, 4ª Edição (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira S/A, 1933), 144-145.

20 Abreu, *A Amazônia: as províncias do Pará e Amazonas e o governo central do Brasil* (Lisbon: Typographia Minerva, 1883), 15.

21 Agassiz, *A Journey*, 515.

-
- 22 José Vieira Couto de Magalhães, *O selvagem* (Rio: n.p., 1876; edição comemorativa do centenário da 1ª edição, São Paulo: Editora da USP, 1975), 16.
- 23 Before 1889, Brazil's states were called provinces, and their governors presidents.
- 24 Ibid., 17.
- 25 Ibid., 25.
- 26 Couto de Magalhães, *Viagem ao Araguaia*, 5ª Edição (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1946), 35. In his capacity as president of Pará, Couto de Magalhães provided critical assistance to Agassiz's expedition. Couto de Magalhães arranged for provisions, boats, lodging, and guides for the professor, and he even travelled with the expedition for a spell. See Agassiz, *A Journey*, 142.
- 27 For more on Couto de Magalhães' steamship line, see Reis, *Panorama*, 28. According to one source, the venture required heavy subsidies for an extremely limited operation: the government chipped in first forty and later eighty *contos* to support only three voyages a year between Goiás and Pará. See "Comunicações para o Interior," *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã*, 31 August 1940, 3. Orlando Valverde witnessed the "rotten carcasses" on a visit to the Araguaia that he described in "Tocantins-Araguaia, eixo do Brasil," *Cultura Política*, March 1942, 73.
- 28 Several authors have erroneously dated the editorial as 1808. Ismael Pordeus settled the issue by reprinting the article in question in his *Raízes históricas de Brasília: datas e documentos* (Fortaleza: Imprensa Oficial, 1960).
- 29 Some opponents of the Emperor were more extreme in their plans than others on this issue. In 1873, a prescient Republican from Piauí, David Moreira Caldas, so clairvoyantly sure of the date of the fall of the Monarchy that he changed the name of his newspaper to *The Eighty-Nine* (*O Oitenta e Nove*), published an article that advocated moving the capital to the Ilha do Bananal! Documented in Joaquim Nogueira Paranaguá, *Carta aberta ao Excelentíssimo Sr. Presidente da República e membros do Congresso Nacional* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1911), 5.
- 30 Typical is Domingos Jaguaribe, *Mudança da Capital Federal do Brasil* (São Paulo: Typographia de O Município, 1896).
- 31 João Craveiro Costa, *A conquista do deserto occidental*, 2ª Edição (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional; Brasília: Instituto Nacional do Livro, 1973), 25.
- 32 Francisco Galvão, "O homem e o deserto amazônicos," *Cultura Política*, June 1941, 48.
- 33 J.C. Costa, 19.
- 34 Tocantins, *Rio Branco*, 41. See also João Ribeiro, *As nossas fronteiras* (Rio de Janeiro: Officina Industrial Graphica, 1930). Ribeiro's account points to the Bolivian Syndicate as the catalyst for Brazilian action on the Acre Question.
- 35 José Maria de Silva Paranhos Filho, Barão do Rio Branco, "Questão do Acre," address, 20 February 1904, AI, Arquivo Particular do Barão do Rio Branco, Lata 876, Maço 3, 4.
- 36 Augusto César Lopes Gonçalves, *O Amazonas: esboço historico, chorographico e estatistico até o anno de 1903* (New York: Hugo J. Hanf, 1904), 16.

37 Gonçalves, 46.

38 Although Pena was the first head of state to visit the West, the Conde d'Eu, husband of Princess and sometime Regent Isabel, arrived in Manaus on 3 July 1879, and stayed in the region for several weeks, visiting Tabatinga and Belém on river steamers. In Manaus, an unruly group of Republican demonstrators tried to break down the door of the Government Palace (*Palácio do Governo*), where the Count was staying, but police intervened. See Reis, *História do Amazonas* (Manaus: Augusto Reis, 1931), 246.

39 Afonso Pena to Maria Pena, 26 June 1906, AN, Arquivo Particular Afonso Pena, Caixa 6.

40 Raúl de Azevedo, *No Amazonas: a viagem do Presidente Dr. Affonso Penna* (Manaus: M. Silva & C., 1906), 5.

41 Rio Branco, who might have continued a vigorous policy of Western development, refused to run for the Presidency in 1910, despite a movement to draft him as a candidate. The draft campaign's posters featured a map of Brazil that showed Amazonia threatened by the talons of an eagle labelled "U.S." Rio Branco, standing off to the side of the graphic, pointed ominously to the danger. Osni Duarte Pereira, *Desnacionalização da Amazônia: um chamamento à consciência dos brasileiros*. 2ª Edição (São Paulo: Editora Fulgor Ltda, 1958), 34.

42 As it was, the incident had more to do with intrigue in Rio between Rio Grande do Sul boss Pinheiro Machado, who ordered the bombardment on behalf of the Amazonas oligarchs, the Néri family, and his political rival, President Fonseca. Fonseca eventually reinstalled the deposed Governor Bittencourt to power.

43 Aníbal Porto, *Em defesa da Amazônia (1906-1915)* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia do *Jornal do Comércio*, 1915), 116. Porto also called for federal action to bail out rubber producers, some six years before the crisis became acute.

44 José Francisco Araújo de Lima, *Amazônia: a terra e o homem*, 2ª Edição (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1937), 197.

45 J.C. Costa, 178.

46 Arthur Neiva, *Daqui e de longe . . . : crônicas nacionais e de viagem* (São Paulo: Companhia Melhoramentos de São Paulo, 1927), 122.

47 Brazil, Departamento da Guerra, *Relatório dos trabalhos realizados de 1900-1906*, by Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1949), 9.

48 While that area of Mato Grosso did (and does) encompass a substantial indigenous population, Rondon himself did not claim any Indian heritage, admitting that "a few drops of Guaná Indian blood" inherited from his great-great-grandmother constituted his only indigenous bloodlines. Propagandists and publicists later invented the famous myth of Rondon's "full-blooded" Indian ancestry as a political tool. See Esther de Viveiros, *Rondon conta sua vida* (Rio de Janeiro: Cooperativa Cultural dos Esperantistas, 1969), 13.

49 Brazil, Ministério da Viação, Directoria Geral dos Telegraphos; Departamento da Guerra, Divisão Geral da Engenharia, *Relatório*, by Rondon, 5 vols. (Rio de Janeiro: Papelaria Luiz Macedo, 1912), I:253.

50 Ibid., 341-42.

51 Mac Margolis, *The Last New World: The Conquest of the Amazon Frontier* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), 74.

52 Amílcar Armando Botelho de Magalhães, *Rondon: uma relíquia da Pátria* (Curitiba, PA: Editora Guairá Ltda, 1942), 26.

53 Brazil, Comissão de Linhas Telegráficas Estratégicas de Mato Grosso ao Amazonas, *Missão Rondon* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia do *Jornal do Commercio*, 1916), 23.

54 One such soldier was Gen. João Bernardo Lobato Filho, Chief of Staff in the Ministry of War (*Chefe do Gabinete do Ministro da Guerra*), who spent time laying telegraph line between Pôrto Velho and Rio Jamarí in 1910. In a memoir, Lobato Filho called the Commission "the classroom. . . of [a] rustic school of labor and character formation." Lobato Filho, *Avança para o Jamarí!: uma tragédia na Comissão Rondon* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Henrique Velho, 1944), 76.

55 Botelho de Magalhães, *Impressões da Comissão Rondon*, 5ª Edição (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1942), 112.

56 Ibid., 154.

57 Rondon's Commission did contract with Vario Films, Inc., of New York to screen films shot of the missions, including one entitled *Sertões de Mato Grosso* (English title *In the Brazilian Wilderness*). Botelho de Magalhães to Nilo Peçanha, 7 January 1918, AI, Arquivo Histórico, Parte I: Correspondência, Maço 305 3 9. The agreement was rescinded in 1920 when Rondon wanted to tour in Europe.

58 Theodore Roosevelt, *Through the Brazilian Wilderness* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914), 189.

59 Botelho de Magalhães, *relíquia*, 22.

60 "Entrevista do General Rondon," *Jornal do Commercio*, 7 April 1922, 2.

61 Glycon de Paiva, as quoted in Joaquim Vicente Rondon, *O Índio como sentinela das nossas fronteiras* (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1949), 34.

62 Cassiano Ricardo, "O segredo dos viaras," *Correio Paulistano*, 14 September 1927, 3. Two other groups in the 1920s at least partially shared this ideology. Nationalist Social Action (*Ação Social Nacionalista*-- ASN), an urban-based party of extreme nationalists, made the movement of the federal capital to the interior part of its platform. ASN also saw the bandeirante as a strong national symbol, "audacious pioneers [who] brought to the heart of the forest the rudiments of the Gospel and the first benefits of civilization!" Álvaro Bomilcar, *A política no Brasil ou o Nacionalismo Radical* (Rio de Janeiro: Editores Leite Ribeiro & Maurillo, 1921), 147. Furthermore, a clique of young republican militants from Rio Grande do Sul known as the "Generation of 1907" touched on the importance of the West. One of the group's members, Lindolfo Collor, later a principal spokesman for the Liberal Alliance and Minister of Industry and Commerce under Vargas from 1930 to 1932, wrote about the interior, "The great reserve of our energies continued given over to a perfect state of barbarism. And this fault is. . . the primordial cause of our

administrative syncopes." Vera Lúcia da Ascensão, *et. al.*, Ed. *A Revolução de 30: textos e documentos* (Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1982), 19.

⁶³ Plínio Salgado, *Literatura e Política*, In *Obras Completas*, 20 vols. (São Paulo: Editôra das Américas, 1956), XIX:96.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, XIX:97.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, XIX:79.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

Chapter Three: Indecision, 1930-1935

While colonial life was the period of the mobility of political frontiers, modern life has been and is the period of the mobility of economic frontiers.¹

--Fernando Saboia de Medeiros

Only fascination drives men to Amazonia!²

--Lt. Col. J. de Lima Figueiredo

In February of 1903, the Twenty-Fifth Battalion, based in Rio Grande do Sul, shipped out to Mato Grosso as part of the Brazilian troop mobilization towards the Bolivian border during the Acre Question. Among the soldiers bivouacked on the edge of the Pantanal was a twenty-year-old resident of Rio Grande do Sul, or *gaúcho*, named Getúlio Vargas, whose brief contact with the West would leave a profound impression on his political sensibility. Rio Branco's diplomatic wizardry ensured that Vargas and his unit never saw combat, and the experience proved disillusioning for the future president. In a letter home dated 27 April 1903, he wrote, "I was very disappointed to see upon arriving here that this was nothing more than a lark, and that we, as mere tools, had been brought here just to serve as scarecrows. . ." ³ Although frustrated with his role as a "scarecrow," Vargas came away from his tour of duty impressed with the wilderness and convinced that Brazil should defend it. Journalist Tad Szulc suggests that the seeds for the March to the West might have first germinated in a tent pitched on swampy ground: "[A]ll Getúlio extracted from [his] army service was an

opportunity to become acquainted with the remote hinterland of Brazil in the jungle-bound vastness of the state of Mato Grosso. His subsequent interest in developing the Brazilian interior . . . may have been in part the fruit of this Bolivian expedition."⁴ Vargas had no immediate chance to act on his newfound convictions, if he indeed had acquired any, for once returned to civilian life he would have no further contact with the West for thirty years.

Having steadily moved through the ranks with the help of the gaúcho political machine of Borges de Medeiros, Getúlio Vargas by the late 1920s enjoyed the status of a successful career politician. Vargas, a former state deputy, federal representative, and Finance Minister, seemed the consummate insider, highly connected and well-versed in the carefully calibrated political calculus of the First Republic. Too old to qualify as a member of the tenente generation, the crafty politico nevertheless understood the significance of the rising frustration of the growing, ambitious middle sectors that had come to resent the restricted and seemingly immutable "Politics of the Governors." In 1930, outgoing president Washington Luís committed the unpardonable error of breaking this decades-old power-sharing agreement between the large, coffee-producing states by choosing another Paulista, Júlio Prestes, as his successor. Vargas sensed an opportunity and joined the opposition. The bosses of Rio Grande do Sul, annoyed at having been excluded from the triumvirate of Rio, São Paulo, and Minas Gerais, cut a deal with the elite of the neglected and overpopulated Northeastern state of

Paraíba to challenge Prestes. In the back-room negotiations Vargas emerged as the perfect compromise candidate.

Vargas' new banner, the Liberal Alliance (*Alliança Liberal*), brought a contentious and unlikely coalition of forces together to oppose the dominance of the coffee oligarchy. The disgruntled included younger military officers, intellectuals, nationalists, and middle class professionals from cities across Brazil. The platform that Getúlio and his running mate, João Pessoa, adopted reflected this disparity, adding up to little more than a "pastiche of liberal doctrine [that] constantly adapt[ed] itself to the political demands of the day."⁵ In essence, to troll for the maximum number of votes the Liberal Alliance tried to please everyone with a grudge against the *status quo*, and cloaked its promises in the "habitual formulas of civics and patriotism."⁶

Yet amid the special interest pandering such as promises of drought relief for the Northeast (an eternal staple of all parties) and planks about modernizing the military and creating better benefits for government workers, Vargas' coalition took the rare step of addressing the question of the interior. Assuming a stance no presidential candidate had taken since Afonso Pena in 1906, the nominee of the Liberal Alliance proclaimed that the time had arrived for the state to intervene and address the desperation of rural citizens:

[I]t is necessary to attend to the fortunes of hundreds of thousands of Brazilians who live in the backlands, without education, without hygiene, poorly fed and

poorly clothed, [and] come into contact with the government only through the extortive taxes that they pay ."7

Relieving poverty in the countryside did not stand alone as a key element in the program, however, but fit into the broader context of the goals of planning, nationalization, and centralization that the tenentes supported.⁸

Amid this general program Vargas did the unorthodox by including the idea of westward expansion. Reading his manifesto at a rally at the Esplanada do Castelo in Rio on 2 January 1930, the Aliança Liberal nominee announced, "Another logical consequence of the systematization and development of national services of instruction, education and sanitation will be the methodical study of the possibilities of colonizing Amazonia."⁹ Perhaps Vargas had seized the chance to include his youthful interest in the West in his political program, but the rhetoric does not herald the advent of a state-sponsored March. Far from launching a national crusade, the candidate presented colonization of the interior as a matter for scientific study and called to mind the establishment of yet another feckless blue-ribbon panel churning out an unread (and unreadable) report.

Vargas did not offer a grand vision for the Oeste, but focused on practical and immediate goals to appeal to the region's elites, such as the "reconquest of our position in the world rubber market."¹⁰ At the heart of the plank lies the alleviation of the labor shortage in the interior: "One of the many difficulties over which we stumble in

Amazonia is the scarcity of labor. We urge that waves of immigrants be directed there."¹¹ As capitalism and an export economy took hold in the interior, landlords needed workers to create a peasant class. Written in hackneyed language, the platform did not specify who would transfer new "arms" to the West, and the whole concept of colonization seemed little more than a sop to the nearly ruined rubber moguls, merchants, and professionals who made up the area's few eligible voters.¹² (Despite such specifically targeted innovations, the Liberal Alliance platform apparently did not strike a responsive chord with much of the public, for the party lost by a large margin in the March 1930 balloting.) Later, propagandists would at times use these few words in the platform about Amazonia to prove that Vargas had always felt a deep concern for the problems of the region, although he would not pay major attention to the West for several years.

One measure of the initial softness of Vargas' support for bold initiatives in the West was the behavior of the new president and his cohorts following their triumph in the Revolt launched in October 1930. Swept into office by the military (particularly the tenentes) following growing unrest and the assassination of Pessoa, Getúlio found himself hailed as the embodiment of hope and change by a wide swath of Brazil's citizens. A high priority of the provisional government became the elimination of vestiges of the old regime, even if they might mesh with the new program. In a sad irony, one of the first casualties of the new orthodoxy was the greatest

champion of Vargas' proposed western expansion, Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon. The revolutionary chiefs doubted Rondon's loyalties, both because of his longtime and open support for the republican system and because he had earned his stars in the mid-1920s by hunting down the Prestes Column, in which many of the tenentes now in charge had participated.¹³ Rather than embrace a strategy to colonize Amazonia, many of Vargas' co-conspirators appeared indifferent and even hostile to developing the West.

A campaign of public attacks began on 7 October, when Lieutenant Juarez do Nascimento Fernandes Távora, leader of the Revolt in the Northeast and a former aide to Rondon, in an interview with the *Jornal do Comércio* in Rio excoriated his onetime commanding officer as a "dilapidator of the public coffers, distributing telegraph lines to the Indians as toys in the rough sertão." Távora added ominously, "In any civilized and policed nation this general would be in jail."¹⁴ Soon after, opposition forces placed the General under house arrest in the Hotel Grande in Pôrto Alegre and sent him to Rio on a guarded railway car.

His reputation questioned and honor besmirched, Rondon wired Vargas to ask for his military retirement, granted on 6 November. Minister of War Leite de Castro exonerated the General from all charges of malfeasance several weeks later, and the president asked him to finish his work along the Argentine border as Frontier Inspector (*Inspetor das Fronteiras*), but the damage appeared irreparable. Rondon retreated from his previous, highly visible

celebrity, and by the next year South America's greatest modern explorer was virtually unemployed. Only a short time later Vargas shut down the Telegraph Commission, ending the federal government's only coordinated program to penetrate the still-isolated interior.

Vargas during the next year even appeared to back away from his public support for Amazonian development that he had embraced as a candidate. In his lengthy speech "Brazil's Fundamental Problems" (*Problemas fundamentais do Brasil*), given 3 October 1931 at the Municipal Theater (*Theatro Municipal*) in downtown Rio, not once did the chief of the provisional government mention the West directly. Meant to commemorate the first anniversary of the Revolt, the more than eighty pages of text analyze and dissect every aspect of policy and governance in summarizing the Vargas regime's accomplishments and future goals, and yet after the brief mention in the Aliança Liberal platform, colonization and westward expansion have dropped from sight. The exposition touches on rubber only very briefly, and ends with an optimistic, vague aside that Brazil's riches depended on its size: "Because of the vastness of its territory and the immense riches to exploit, Brazil will always be a sheltering and abundant land."¹⁵ This pabulum would prove as close to the proposal on the West of the Liberal Alliance campaign as Vargas would approach until 1933.

Since even this limited rhetoric did not match reality, the stall in any plans for a development program for the interior meant that

states and territories in the first years of the provisional government often complained about a lack of funds. The federal interventor in Acre, Francisco de Paula de Assis Vasconcellos, for instance, sent a plaintive telegram to Vargas on 30 December 1931 begging for the federal authorities to release more funds to the territory during the coming year. Like all good bureaucrats, Vasconcellos knew how to cry "fire," claiming that he needed increased government aid because he could not adequately guard the frontier: "[The] public force [is] completely unprovided with armaments [or] munitions, [and] must have its complement increased to 426 men, since it performs a genuine miracle in protecting the border. . . ." ¹⁶ According to the documentation, Vargas did not respond with the requested 1700 *contos*.

Three months later Acre's interventor tried another angle to petition for federal resources. Playing on Vargas' stated concern to improve sanitation in the interior, Vasconcellos cabled Juarez Távara, newly promoted to major and now Minister of Industry and Commerce, to ask for quinine to staunch an outbreak of malaria. The telegram appealed directly to the notion of the richness of the territory and pleaded with Távara to "save this abnegated population [who] extended [the] national frontier and has contributed so much wealth [to the] country." ¹⁷ The Ministry's Director General of Accounting (*Director General de Expediente e Contabilidade*) indicated that he would release no funds to Acre other than a small amount for the purchase of medicine. A federal auditor travelled to

the territory to make sure that all previously distributed monies had been properly spent.¹⁸ Vargas' government, still without a definite hold on power, had clearly not yet resolved to spread federal largesse thousands of miles away from its coastal power bases. It watched every penny of the western states' meager allotments.

In July, chafing at such a tight fiscal leash, Vasconcellos again complained that the federal government was not disbursing Territorial funds, and this time cast the matter as an imperative of national security. The interventor warned in a wire that without adequate money he faced a threat from communist agitators in Bolivia, "defeatist elements who perhaps await occasion to continue [their] insidious, hidden campaign against [our] current institutions."¹⁹ Vasconcellos intimated dark conspiracies on the other side of the border:

I will only be able to guarantee [the] integral tranquility [of the] Territory if I have [the funds]. . . , particularly in this moment in which Communism is actively proselytizing [in the] Bolivian city [of] Cobija, across from the frontier village of Brazilia where our authorities are taking preventative police action against the dangerous invasion of these elements. . . "²⁰

Even the dire threat of a Marxist-inspired, subversive incursion did not seem to set off alarms in Rio, however, for Vasconcellos did not see his budget increased during 1932. Vargas as a candidate may have paid lip service to colonizing the interior, but nearly two years into his rule he had yet to invest significant resources in the West.

The only major investment made in the Oeste during the early 1930s came out of the pockets of Henry Ford. A Brazilian diplomat, José Custodio Alves de Lima, acting with the authorization of Agriculture Minister Miguel Calmon, had written to Ford in the early 1920s to suggest that the tycoon enter into negotiations to start a rubber plantation in Amazonia. Alves de Lima, Inspector of Brazilian Consulates in North and Central America, met with Ford in Dearborn and convinced him that vertical integration in rubber would both benefit the carmaker and revitalize a region severely depressed since the collapse of world prices for latex before the First World War.²¹ In 1927 the state of Pará granted the Ford Motor Company five thousand square miles on the Tapajós River to harvest commercially grown rubber; the government in Belém eventually modified the concession to encompass two areas, Belterra, thirty miles from Santerém, and Fordlândia, eighty miles downriver.²²

Instead of raising nationalist hackles, the project harked back to nineteenth century Brazilian dreams for the region. The governor of Pará at the time, Dionysio Bentes, admitted that a reading of Tavares Bastos' *O Valle do Amazonas*, which calls for the creation of planned plantations to produce rain forest agricultural products, had inspired his decision to approve the deal.²³

Alves de Lima could barely contain his excitement over the project, having written to Ford, "It is not a dream for the people of this country to realize that within ten years, with the provisions enacted by the Government of Brazil, a great transformation is bound

to take place in the Valley of the Amazon."²⁴ Some local officials in the early 1930s seemed to share this enthusiasm. Captain Joaquim Magalhães Barata, Vargas' appointed interventor in Pará, showed an early interest in Fordlândia, and he toured the concession by seaplane with company officials and the U.S. Consul in 1931.²⁵ In a letter to Getúlio written just after the visit to the plantation, Magalhães Barata, impressed by what he had seen, praises Henry Ford as the "carrier of new plans that bring a great advantage to Pará, an industrial future that will turn us into a prosperous and commercial region."²⁶ The chief of the provisional government responded to Magalhães Barata's report by sending Juarez Távora on an inspection tour in 1932, and the minister and the interventor visited the auto manufacturer's properties together. Seized with the vision of his state as an industrial and commercial powerhouse, Magalhães Barata radiographed Vargas from the Panair flight back to Belém to register his support for more foreign capital in the region.²⁷

Despite the minister's journey, however, the Vargas Administration's attitude towards Fordlândia in the early 1930s tended towards indifference and skepticism, and at times skated into outright hostility. Even when positive signals did emanate from Rio, contradictory ones often quickly followed: according to historians of the Ford Motor Company, "The Brazilian government officials seemed to wax hot and cold on the plantation, giving and denying help to the point of frustration."²⁸ Some of the ambivalence seems to have

stemmed from the traditional Brazilian politics, the reluctance of administrations to continue any project begun by their predecessors. Vargas' regime in this case delayed validating several tax abatement decrees that the government of Washington Luís had promised Ford when granting the concession. Seeking relief, the automaker's manager in Rio, Harry Braunstein, went to see Finance Minister Oswaldo Aranha in 1932 to complain that the Brazilians were denying Ford exemptions from duties and import taxes that it needed. Braunstein reported that Aranha greeted him with a "tirade against foreign capital," but changed his tune after the executive shot back that the car manufacturer "was pouring gold into this country and . . . without the investment of foreign capital in projects such as ours the tremendous untapped resources of this country would remain dormant."²⁹ The attitude of the Finance Minister proved typical of Vargas' handling of westward development throughout his first eight years as president: optimistic, nationalist rhetoric about development in public often accompanied constant behind-the-scenes stalling or overt roadblocks. Getúlio, as with other issues, took little real action on the West until politically necessary. As for Fordlândia, Vargas would ignore the plantation until he launched the March to the West in 1938, when he would rehabilitate the almost moribund project as a model for colonizing the interior.

Domestic unrest soon forced Vargas and his allies to focus attention on the West. Angered by interventor João Alberto's heavy-handed governance, opposition forces in São Paulo launched an open

insurrection in June of 1932. Disaffected elements of the armed forces throughout the country joined the rebellion, and the uprising threatened to engulf Brazil in a full-scale civil war. While fighting concentrated in São Paulo and Minas Gerais, incidents in western states highlighted the region's isolation from effective federal control and presented Vargas and his aides with the real threat that the rebels could seize large swaths of under-defended territory. In Amazonas, the Fort of Obidos rose up in support of the Paulista Rebellion. A civilian agent of insurrectionist chief General Bernardo Klinger, Alderico Pompo de Oliveira, commanded the mutiny. Interventor Magalhães Barata backed Vargas, however, and took immediate steps to restore order in his state: he displayed so much enthusiasm for the loyalist cause that he even telegraphed the president to request permission to march into battle at the head of government troops.³⁰ Naval forces sent from Belém and Manaus suppressed the putsch in August, but not before the renegades had taken to steamships and threatened the town of Itacoatiara, east of the confluence of the Amazon and Madeira Rivers.³¹

In contrast to the Amazonian *opéra bouffe*, the situation in vast Mato Grosso appeared much more serious. During early 1932, troops of the Eighteenth Gunnery Battalion (*18º Batalhão de Caçadores*), under the command of Gen. Klinger, in a harbinger of the greater unrest to follow, had mutinied at an army installation in Campo Grande. When Klinger joined the Paulista Revolt, Mato Grosso experienced several rebel operations: As the Prestes Column had

made obvious during the previous decade, the size of the state made patrolling very difficult for the government, and the insurrectionists enjoyed a free hand in a large area. In July, opposition troops occupied Campo Grande and also held Pôrto Murtinho, on the Paraguayan border, for some time.³² Federal authorities in Rio, reliving the experience of the War of the Triple Alliance almost seventy years before, could not respond rapidly to the threat. Despite Rondon's superhuman efforts on the Telegraph Commission, government communications with loyalist forces in Mato Grosso proved so difficult that Vargas received some news from the front via the Brazilian Embassy in Montevideo!³³ The situation sufficiently concerned Vargas, then in Rio Grande do Sul, that he cabled his aide Flores da Cunha to request an increase in troop strength in the West. The president worried that the wide-open border allowed for easy arms shipments to the opposition: "Everything indicates [that the] rebels intend to fight [and] maintain communications [with] Mato Grosso to . . . receive military supplies. . . ." ³⁴ Administrative authorities throughout the state, and indeed throughout the Oeste, remained with Vargas, however, and the insurrection did not generate much popular support outside of São Paulo.

The fall of Pôrto Murtinho doomed the rebellion in Mato Grosso, and the Paulista Revolt as a whole collapsed by October of 1932. The insecurity of the porous western border regions still remained a disturbing problem, as foreign incursions replaced internecine violence as the primary threat. The Paraguayan frontier appeared

particularly vulnerable. In October, Mato Grosso interventor Leonidas de Matos telegraphed the Catete Palace to report that Paraguayan police had attacked a border post at Ponta Porã in the far south of the state.³⁵ His successor, César Mesquita, later cabled Vargas to ask for a deployment of federal troops, claiming that the Mate Laranjeira Company (*Companhia Mate Laranjeira*), which owned huge plantations across the border, was flying its planes in restricted airspace and shanghaiing Brazilians into the Paraguayan army. Mesquita, playing on the same fears of a state-within-a-state that had driven Brazil to intervene in the Acre crisis at the beginning of the century, admitted that the situation was out of control, since he found himself "not disposing of sufficient force to garrison ports that serve [the] Company." He petitioned for military aid to an area "where neither federal nor state authorities exist."³⁶ The Peruvian occupation in the following year of the Colombian town of Leticia, located in the triangle where the two nations meet Brazil, also disturbed Brazilian policy-makers.³⁷

The administration of Getúlio Vargas did not take concrete actions to counter these threats. Since the Liberal Alliance plans for even the study of westward expansion and colonization remained on the shelf, criticism of the government's inaction began to flow from the pens of nationalist authors. Influenced by Central European writers, a school of geopolitical thinkers composed of military officers and academics appeared in Brazil in the early 1930s.³⁸ These writers, led by professor Everardo Backheuser, who introduced two

generations of army cadets to the new theories of geopolitics, emphasized the inherent instability of frontiers and urged the federalization of the West to secure the border regions. Under the principle of "equipoise," or the spreading out of power and resources, Backheuser recommended that the state and the military carry out a planned program of settlement and development in the interior.³⁹ The lectures and books of these geopoliticians, which identified the West as the "centripetal force,"⁴⁰ kept the frontier on the agenda of the tenentes and Vargas administration policy-makers. Backheuser and others would later shape the doctrine of national security that dominated military thinking in Brazil after the 1940s.

Echoing the geopolitical theorists, Martins de Almeida, in his landmark 1932 polemic *Mistaken Brazil* (*Brasil errado*), emphasized the importance of national integration. To create a strong nation, he maintains, Brazilians must overcome, both physically and psychologically, the enormous space of their territory: "So that our people might have a political consciousness, so much spoken about, it is first necessary that we conquer the distance that separates us one from the other."⁴¹ Part of this process of approximation, according to the author, is for those on the coast to recognize the centrality of the interior in the nation's history.

Picking up on Vargas' appeal to aid the Brazilians of the countryside, Almeida emphatically declares that the nation's lifeblood springs from the *campo*, proclaiming that "The history of Brazil is the history of our rural life."⁴² In light of the recent internal

turmoil and external menaces in border reaches, he issues a sharp challenge to his countrymen, and implicitly to Vargas, to deal with the West:

Great desertic spaces, without even an illusory attraction to awaken the indefatigable human ambition, interspersed with scarce clusters of population, play an important role in social and political disintegration. The empty immensity of the land is an invincible challenge to our administrative activity, limited by our material resources and by the vision of our governors."⁴³

One of the few public voices to address the issue of the interior, Almeida criticized the narrow vision of the president and his advisors, who had failed thus far to carry out their electoral promises.

Telésforo de Souza Lobo, a political geographer, expanded upon Almeida's critique in a tract published the following year. An advocate of radical territorial redivision, Lobo stresses that the federal government had to regain control of the West and tap its potential through rational colonization: "The economic grandeur of [the Oeste], her general prosperity and financial wealth, is a question that depends simply on the regular peopling [of the region] with individuals of a strong race gifted with a spirit of organization and a technical education."⁴⁴ Unlike many who had embraced the idea of a state-organized migration to the interior in the past, Lobo understood the difficulty of taming the forest and insists that those settled be highly skilled and well-trained, not just European or coastal Brazilian laborers and farmers. While he fits into a long line of nationalist

thinkers who have posited the existence of two Brazils, North and South, Lobo advances that line of reasoning a stage further by blaming the people of the North for their own misery. Government might have failed to act with dispatch, but the denizens of the West are their own worst enemy, according to *Confederated Brazil* (*O Brasil confederado*):

In Amazonia there has been an amoeboid movement and exploitation of riches, without method, without goals. . . and without respect for an ideal of the community. . . . [I]n the North, men, in contact with nature, are passive. . . while in the South, men produce by struggling against nature. . ."45

Relying on stereotypes that date back even before *Os Sertões* and Rangel's *Inferno Verde*, this analysis condemns the mixed-race caboclos dependent on the vagaries of forest gathering as lazy and shiftless, selfish mongrels inferior to (white) Southerners steeped in the capitalist work ethic. Lobo's dismissal of his countrymen in the interior complements Almeida's complaints: the state must not only manage a movement of migrants to the West to exploit untouched wealth but also to replace the Westerners themselves who have proved incompetent at husbanding known resources in the region. Vargas would adopt this attack on nomadism and the lack of initiative in the hinterland by the end of 1933, and it would eventually form one of the keystones of the March to the West.

Having successfully quelled the rebellion in São Paulo and reestablished his authority, Vargas in 1933 embarked upon the first extended tour of his term, visiting state capitals in the Northeast and

North over two months. Speaking in Salvador, Bahia, on 18 August, the chief of the provisional government returned to a topic he had last publicly elucidated in the Liberal Alliance platform, reaching out to the inhabitants of the interior. Vargas, again echoing the rhetoric of da Cunha, presented education, culture, and hard work as the tools that would reverse the course of Brazil's hinterland:

When the people are educated, the rough sertanejo made a conscientious citizen, man valorized by culture and intelligently productive labor, Brazil, a marvellous land of natural beauty, will transform itself into the great Fatherland that our betters idealized and future generations will bless."⁴⁶

Lobo's uncouth rustic could rise from his lowly station and become a productive citizen, even the crucial contributor to his nation, according to the president. Such a vision of the possibility, indeed the necessity, of the *redemption* of the West and its inhabitants would color Vargas' discussions of development on the frontier and appear as a principal theme of the March by the end of the decade.

In late September, after stops in the major cities of the Northeast, Vargas traveled to Belém aboard the steamer *Almirante Jaceguai*, becoming the first Brazilian president since Afonso Pena to visit Amazonia. There on the 27th he delivered his most important pronouncement on the West of his first eight years as Brazil's leader, a speech that marked a turning point in his public posture on the interior and a text that would become fodder for later propaganda publications. Repeating the predictions of Agassiz and Tavares Bastos, Vargas opened his presentation by foreseeing a magnificent

future for the region: "[The] Septentrion of Brazil [is] destined to become sooner or later-- it will depend on us-- the most opulent and peopled region of the Globe."⁴⁷

The president agreed with the critiques of Almeida, Lobo, and others by decrying the gilded myopia and inefficiency of the residents of the interior, but he placed the responsibility for the state's inertia in the West on the shoulders of his predecessors:

[The] trait of thrill-seeking nomadism has characterized man's efforts in Amazonia, [and is] similarly reflected in the activity of the public sector itself. If the individual, dazzled by the ambition of quick and easy enrichment, threw himself, voracious and improvident, into a world the boons and dangers of which he did not know, the state, for its part, imitated him, involving itself in the same foolhardy and imprudent boom.⁴⁸

According to Vargas, the rootless, greedy chaos of the Oeste sprang both from the flawed and short-sighted ambitions of the caboclos and from a government that had caught the fever of rootless speculation from its constituents. The president turned his critics' analyses to his advantage to issue an accusation that the state under the Republic shamelessly imitated the risky behavior of Westerners, absorbed their traits, and failed to implement any measures to promote development and integration.

Furthermore, charged Vargas, when the federal authorities did intervene, they aggravated crises such as the collapse of the rubber industry. Sounding oddly like a libertarian, the president denounced taxes and bureaucracy for compounding an already critical situation:

Aggravating the lamentable improvidence, the public sector did nothing more than officiate. Associating itself with uneconomical exploitation, through exaggerated taxation it took from the rubber industry the majority of its income, burdening it with levies.⁴⁹

By dismissing the few strategies that republican governments had undertaken to aid Amazonia in the first years of the century, Vargas distanced himself from his predecessors. This strategy of making earlier statesmen culpable for the devastating economic decline of the interior would allow Vargas to set himself up as a savior, a leader who would avoid all of the mistakes of the past-- a frequent theme of the March to the West.

Having disparaged past administrations, the president outlined, for the first time, a comprehensive vision of a state-directed drive to settle and master the interior of Brazil. Vargas identified the principal problem of the West as the transformation of ill-organized husbandry into sedentary exploitation, and he prescribed a solution:

[I]t is necessary to people [Amazonia], colonizing it, that is, fixing man to the soil. . . . As well as facilitating the delivery of economically outfitted and productive streams of immigrants, we should begin to concentrate the disperse domestic populations there, through efficient support and sanitary aid, in conditions to take advantage of their energy and spirit of sacrifice. . ."⁵⁰

Leaving the Liberal Alliance campaign plank far behind, Vargas with this speech in Belém advanced westward colonization and development from an idea for scientific study to a national imperative. The president introduced into his rhetoric two key concepts that would reverberate in the March to the West. First,

Vargas urged that Westerners be "fixed to the soil": this phrase would assume great weight during the early 1940s as a code for various colonization schemes designed to siphon off excess urban population toward the rural interior. Getúlio also appropriated Lobo's idea about the skill level of migrants to the West to indicate that they be adequately "equipped and productive."

No Brazilian president had ever spoken with such clarity and forcefulness on the need to integrate the interior with the rest of the nation, and Vargas left no doubt as to whom the task fell. In a sentence never before uttered by a public official, Getúlio in his discourse echoed da Cunha and Rondon and committed the state to lead the drive for western development: "Governmental authorities have the duty not just to stimulate initiatives of this type, but also, inspired by them, to develop similar efforts to take advantage of [our] national [resources]. . ." ⁵¹ Those who had called for the government to blaze new trails into the West had finally found their champion.

To conclude his seminal oration, Vargas engaged in his first session of myth-making. The president presented an epiphanic vision of the West to his audience, suffused with faith and legend:

Amazonia shall rise again!

In the remote past of conquest and discovery, when the first explorer descended, terrified, the torrential river, he created the marvellous legend that gave it its name. On her banks were located El Dorado and the fantastic Kingdom of the Amazons. In those times of heroic adventure, El Dorado was never found, and the

Amazons disappeared. The prestige of the legend remains, however, as an anticipation of reality.

I sense, perhaps a legacy of the fecund spirit of fiction, that El Dorado is still hidden in this prodigious region of the globe. Brazilians, with continual effort and disciplined work, are to discover it. The promised golden age shall arise-- fruit of wealth, ripened by labor. And down the impetuous current, where Orellana fought the Amazons, will float the treasures of agriculture and industry to supply the markets of the world.⁵²

In perhaps the most lyrical speech of a long career, Vargas recalled Tavares Bastos to resurrect the metaphor of the sparkling, golden-clad king. The president revived the fantastic legends of the past and pronounced them not fantasy but future, the "anticipation of reality": El Dorado exists, Vargas proclaimed with an almost religious fervor. Speaking the language of Manifest Destiny, Getúlio introduced his countrymen to a seductive dream of untold riches that he would employ to great political effect over the next twelve years. Not wild Amazons and Olympian heroes but Tavares Bastos' "fecund genie of universal commerce" will rule the modern El Dorado, the president assures his audience. Instead of gold and diamonds, the Oeste will supply the markets of the world with a bounty of agricultural and industrial products as capitalism reigns triumphant. While he would not officially announce the March to the West until the end of 1938, Getúlio Vargas created the rhetorical framework for his subsequent propaganda campaign in Belém. The discourse of 27 September represented the first merger of the ideology of the state and the Myth of El Dorado.

Despite the messianic speech in Belém, however, the Vargas administration unveiled no projects to match the grand scope of its rhetoric. One could make the case that Getúlio simply used his exposition in Pará to shore up support for his cause in the upcoming constituent assembly. Support for this interpretation comes from the president's opening message to the Assembly on 15 November: in more than one hundred pages of text Vargas mentioned neither Amazonian development nor the West in general except to repeat, almost verbatim, an assertion of the need to demarcate Brazil's frontiers that he had made in his address at the start of the Congressional session earlier in the year.⁵³ For audiences in Rio, the West remained more a question of legality and limits than of occupation and transformation.

If a preoccupation with partisan politics had distracted the president and prevented him from realizing the plans he had laid out in Pará, an international crisis soon returned his attention to the uncertain West. In the final months of 1933, relations between Paraguay and Bolivia worsened in a dispute over the Chaco, rumored to possess large petroleum reserves. Concerned with the possibility of war along Brazil's undefended western borders, Vargas telegraphed his diplomatic representative in Buenos Aires with instructions to communicate to the Argentines a willingness to help arbitrate the Chaco question.⁵⁴ The Brazilian Attaché in Argentine wrote back about the serious danger that a conflict between Bolivia

and Paraguay would present, "The interminable prolongation of this annihilating fight will have very grave social consequences. . ."55

The eventual hostilities in the Chaco, which broke out in 1934, caused great alarm among high officials in the Vargas Administration. Some worried that Paraguay, clearly the stronger combatant, might attempt to drag other nations into the conflict and threaten Brazil's western reaches. An unsigned, confidential letter sent to Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha in December, possibly written by Vargas himself, demonstrates the level of concern about the West that the Chaco War produced in Rio:

The Chaco question is taking an ominous path and getting more complicated. I found our Joint Chiefs of Staff (*Estado-Maior*) somewhat alarmed and their point of view coincides with the information that I bring from the South. Paraguay, militarily strong, with a victorious army of seventy thousand men, does not know what to do with these people after the end of the war. Suspicion exists that Paraguay seeks to create complications on our border in Mato Grosso to provoke an incident to drag Argentina into the conflict."56

War in the Chaco cast the old specter of foreign designs on Brazilian territory, for if the rumors proved true that the disputed region between Paraguay and Bolivia boasted large oil reserves, then geologically similar Mato Grosso might appear as an inviting target for an invasion. Whether Vargas himself wrote the above letter or not, the president and his foreign minister certainly read it and grasped its implications. Conscious of the historical lesson that a well-armed Paraguay posed a threat to the West, both men by the

end of 1934 realized that long-term neglect of the interior endangered all of Brazil.

That the anonymous writer would point to possible complications in Mato Grosso also underscores the chronic instability that the state endured throughout the middle 1930s, a situation that again brought the frontier to Rio's attention. The state had suffered through a particularly chaotic political history during the Old Republic, including one federal intervention and four "revolutions" involving several parties battling for power,⁵⁷ and this turmoil persisted during the Vargas regime. The state's size and poverty made for empty coffers in Cuiabá, and the president had responded to the state's dire financial situation by directing the Ministry of Transport to open a line of credit for roadwork and the construction of the Port of Corumbá on the Paraguay River.⁵⁸ Bureaucracy and other priorities in Rio had delayed the financing, however.⁵⁹ Political wrangling scuttled the project entirely in 1934: Rio Police Chief Filinto Müller, a Vargas confidant and native of Mato Grosso, wrote a four-page, single-spaced letter to Getúlio to refute Matos' justification for the government loan. A potential candidate in the upcoming gubernatorial elections in his home state, Müller discredited his rival's plans as pharaonic: "[N]o one will want to live in the middle of the insalubrious pantanal, without resources of any type, and without any hope, however remote, of progress that will never come. Any project in such a place would represent a useless waste of money, in my view."⁶⁰

Without central government largesse, the financial crisis worsened in Mato Grosso. The interventor had to wire Vargas to ask for funds to pay state workers, whose salaries stood six months in arrears.⁶¹ Amid much unrest, which included an anti-Vargas demonstration in Cuiabá in August,⁶² the dispute between Müller and Matos finally played out in bizarre and convoluted political intrigue during the elections of 1935, events that did not ease the president's worries about the West.⁶³

If the prospect of anarchy in one state in the Oeste was not enough to set off alarms in Rio, similar chaos gripped Pará at the same time. Tension reigned during 1934-- the political unrest featured union strikes and the suppression of Belém's daily *Folha do Norte*. When the state constitutional assembly met in April 1935 to elect the governor and senators, a shootout among the delegates wounded several candidates, including the mayor of Belém. Opposition figures took refuge in the General Barracks (*Quartel General*) and blamed interventor Magalhães Barata for the violence.⁶⁴ (According to one secret source, the trouble had started in Pará when the interventor backed out of the planning of a revolutionary conspiracy headed by Juarez Távora in São Paulo and supported by opposition leader Abel Chermont in Belém.)⁶⁵ Vargas stepped in to resolve the crisis by naming an interim interventor to replace Magalhães Barata and oversee the voting.⁶⁶

The possibility of disloyalty and conspiracy gravely disturbed the president, and the eruptions in Pará and Mato Grosso

demonstrated that the Brazilian state did not control the more remote corners of the nation. Vargas, following the events of mid-1935, faced the question of how to deal with the entrenched oligarchies in the interior, petty politicians and bureaucrats whom Alberto Rangel had called "constitutional agents of nihilism" and "rain-makers sending hail to the budding cornfields."⁶⁷ The local bosses of the Oeste stubbornly refused to cede their authority, and they continued to challenge federal authority at every turn. In both Pará and Mato Grosso, appointed interventors, direct representatives of the Getulista effort to centralize power, had proven unable to stifle local partisan rivalries, and in one case had even joined the fray. The extent to which Vargas' hold on power remained tenuous would become clear only a few months later, during the sanguinary Communist uprising that would explode in November.

With the disturbances in the frontier states as a backdrop, Vargas brought the theme of western expansion back to the national stage. During his Independence Day (*Dia da Pátria*) address on 7 September 1935, the president for the first time to a nation-wide audience alluded to the need for Brazil to develop its West and conquer the forest: "The cycle of our growth has barely begun. . . . When we manage to dominate our exuberance, surveying the expanses of the young and disordered forest, our destiny will certainly acquire a definitive direction."⁶⁸ Vargas linked his nation's growth and prosperity to a effort to dominate the hinterland. He extended the rhetoric of his presentation in Belém to the whole

country-- not just Amazonia but all of Brazil will rise again once the nation peoples and develops its West. However vague, this speech represented the beginning of Vargas' efforts to promote the idea of westward expansion to all of his countrymen.

The Independence Day exposition also introduced another important symbol into Vargas' discourse, the *bandeirante*. Addressing a national radio audience and the crowds gathered at the Castelo Esplanade (*Esplanada do Castelo*), Vargas made detailed reference to Brazil's pioneers as models for the first time in such a message: "[T]he epopee of the *bandeiras*, the epic struggles for territorial integrity. . . make our history a lesson of virility and an example of constructive action."⁶⁹ The *bandeirante*, the impetus behind Brazil's legal occupation of two-thirds of South America during the colonial period, now stood in the 1930s as the standard-bearer of Brazil's physical occupation of the same territory. Since so much of the interior remained a complete cartographical void, the president had ample ground for myth-making, and the myth of the *bandeirante* as a paragon for the March to the West would exert a powerful influence on the Brazilian psyche.

By the end of 1935, Getúlio Vargas had outlined most of the main themes that would undergird the March to the West. The president had not launched a crusade for western expansion, however, and the ideas remained formless and largely unconnected. Communist-inspired violence in several major cities in November, as other insurrections had done before, again diverted Vargas' attention

from the interior. Yet events in the Center-West state of Goiás were proving the viability of Vargas' vision and would provide the political and rhetorical momentum to allow the president to commit himself and Brazil to a course West.

-
- ¹ Fernando Saboia de Medeiros, "A navegação do Amazonas," *Jornal do Comércio*, 20 October 1935, 11.
- ² J. de Lima Figueiredo, "Fronteiras Amazônicas," *Revista Brasileira de Geografia*, Ano IV, Nº 3 (July-September 1942), 506.
- ³ As quoted in Maria Lúcia Teixeira Werneck, *Getúlio Vargas* (São Paulo: Editora Três, 1974), 28.
- ⁴ Tad Szulc, *Twilight of the Tyrants* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1959), 54. Although the book is dated and at times inaccurate, Szulc is the only author to connect explicitly the March to the West with Vargas' army posting in Mato Grosso.
- ⁵ Lauerhass, 102.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁷ Getúlio Vargas, "Plataforma," In *Alliança Liberal, Documentos da campanha presidencial* (Rio de Janeiro: Oficinas Graphics Alba, 1930), 111.
- ⁸ Boris Fausto has termed the tenente ideology an "elitism" that sought top-down change without consensus or, at times, even discussion with the lower orders of society. Boris Fausto, *A Revolução de 1930: historiografia e história*, 13ª Edição (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1991), 67.
- ⁹ Vargas, "Plataforma," 119.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, 120.
- ¹² Prior to the Constitution of 1988 only the literate could vote in Brazil.
- ¹³ See Botelho de Magalhães, *Impressões*, 170.
- ¹⁴ As quoted in Viveiros, 556.
- ¹⁵ Vargas, *De 1929 a 1934* (Rio de Janeiro: Calvino Filho, 1934), 166.
- ¹⁶ Francisco de Paula de Assis Vasconcellos, Telegram to Vargas, 30 December 1931, 3, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 14.
- ¹⁷ Vasconcellos, Telegram to Juarez Távora, 5 March 1932, 3, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 14.
- ¹⁸ Affonso Costa, Memorandum to the Minister of Industry and Commerce, 8 March 1932, 4, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 14.
- ¹⁹ Vasconcellos, Telegram to Vargas, 28 July 1932, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 14.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²¹ José Custodio Alves de Lima, *Recordações de homens e cousas do meu tempo* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Leite Ribeiro, 1926), 373.
- ²² Benjamin H. Hunnicutt, *Brazil Looks Forward* (Rio de Janeiro: Serviço Gráfico do IBGE, 1945), 119.
- ²³ Pontes, 235.
- ²⁴ Alves de Lima, 221.
- ²⁵ "A viagem do capitão Magalhães Barata a Fordlândia," *O Estado do Pará*, 24 March 1931, 1.
- ²⁶ Joaquim Magalhães Barata, Telegram to Vargas, 28 March 1931, 2, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 22. Despite the endorsement, Fordlândia was not always as well-run or as peaceful as either the Brazilian government or Ford would have liked. Early troubles included a riot that broke out in December 1930 when the food

-
- service for workers switched from family-style with waiters to cafeteria-style. See Carlos de Proença Gomes Sobrinho, "Relatório dos acontecimentos em dezembro ultimo na concessão Ford," 18 January 1931, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 22.
- 27 Magalhães Barata, Telegram to Vargas, 21 June 1932, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 22.
- 28 Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill, *American Business Abroad: Ford on Six Continents* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964), 179. Wilkins and Hill wrote with the Ford blessing, and perhaps at some points traded objectivity for access to privileged company documents; nevertheless, their section on Fordlândia is the most complete, from the plantation's perspective, of course.
- 29 Wilkins and Hill, 175. Ford got its exemptions later in the year.
- 30 Magalhães Barata, Telegram to Vargas, 22 July 1932, 2, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 22. Magalhães Barata's devotion to order is especially ironic: he and another future interventor (Aluísio Ferreira of Acre) as tenentes led the Revolutionary Movement (*Movimento Revolucionário*) of 23 July 1924 in Amazonas, in which a group of young army officers seized control of Manaus for several days. The revolutionary junta named Magalhães Barata head of the Military Police. A naval squadron bloodlessly extinguished the revolt, and President Arthur Bernardes decreed a federal intervention in the state that placed it under direct rule from Rio. See Anísio Jobim, *O Amazonas: sua história* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1957), 209-212.
- 31 Jobim, 218.
- 32 Leonidas de Matos, Telegram to Vargas, 8 August 1932, 4, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 21.
- 33 José Bernardino da Câmara to Vargas, 6 September 1932, and 24 September 1932, FGV, CPDOC, Acervo Getúlio Vargas, Rolo 2. Vargas learned of the victory over the insurgents in Porto Murtinho from the Brazilian Legate in Montevideo, for example.
- 34 Vargas, Telegram to Flores da Cunha, 16 September 1932, FGV, CPDOC, Acervo Getúlio Vargas, Rolo 2.
- 35 Matos, Telegram to Vargas, 24 October 1932, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 21.
- 36 César Mesquita, Telegram to Vargas, n.d., AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 21.
- 37 The conflict over Leticia also provided a convenient opportunity for Vargas to remove Rondon from the national scene. A posting as chairman of the international commission established to mediate the dispute would keep the general out of Brazil for four years. See Chapter Nine.
- 38 The influences on the Brazilian geopoliticians included Nazi ideologues like Otto Maull.
- 39 Everardo Backheuser, *Problemas do Brasil: estrutura geopolítica* (Rio de Janeiro: Grupo Editor Omnia, 1933), 69. Backheuser and his allies also strongly supported the movement of the national capital from Rio to the interior. For more on the Brazilian geopolitical school, see Backheuser, *A geopolítica geral e do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1948).
- 40 Mário Travassos, *Projeção continental do Brasil*, 2ª Edição (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938), 130. Travassos was a captain in the army.
- 41 Martins de Almeida, *Brasil errado*, 2ª Edição (Rio de Janeiro: Organização Simões, 1953), 31.
- 42 *Ibid.*, 131

⁴³ Ibid., 31.

⁴⁴ Telésforo de Souza Lobo, *O Brasil confederado* (São Paulo: Escolas Profissionais do Lyceu Coração de Jesus, 1933), 262. Lobo's plan would have reduced the West to just two gigantic states, Amazonas (composed of present-day Amazonas, Roraima, and Acre) and Pará (Pará, Tocantins, and part of Mato Grosso), and a zone of two Federal Territories encompassing Rondônia, the rest of Mato Grosso, and Goiás. He would have given what is now Mato Grosso do Sul to São Paulo.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 237-38.

⁴⁶ Vargas, *A Nova Política do Brasil*, 10 vols. (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1938-1944), II:124. Although the president received much assistance with his speeches, according to Lourival Fontes Vargas intensely involved himself in the editing of his discourses and always had the last word on the final product: "He sketched out or made an outline for his talks. The copies were polished, fixed, corrected, and perfected [by] assistants, collaborators, [and] ghost writers. . . ." Lourival Fontes and Glauco Carneiro, *A face final de Vargas: os bilhetes de Getúlio* (Rio de Janeiro: Edições O Cruzeiro, 1966), 110.

⁴⁷ Vargas, *Documentos históricos* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, Serviço de Publicidade, 1934), 77.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 78.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 80.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 84-85.

⁵¹ Ibid., 86.

⁵² Ibid., 87.

⁵³ Vargas told the constituent assembly, "The action of the provisional government would remain incomplete if it did not also encompass the demarcation of our extensive borders with neighboring countries." Vargas, *De 1929 a 1934*, 296.

⁵⁴ Vargas, Telegram to Orlando Leite Ribeiro, 7 November 1933, FGV, CPDOC, Acervo Getúlio Vargas, Rolo 3.

⁵⁵ Leite Ribeiro to Vargas, 29 November 1933, FGV, CPDOC, Acervo Getúlio Vargas, Rolo 3. Vargas' personal secretary Ronald de Carvalho offered a clue as to what "grave social consequences" meant. In a 1934 letter to Vargas, Carvalho reported of the danger that a "serious movement of a communist character might break out among the Aymara and Guaraní Indians [of Bolivia and Paraguay, respectively]." Ronald de Carvalho to Vargas, 29 November 1934, FGV, CPDOC, Rolo 4.

⁵⁶ Anonymous to Aranha, 24 December 1934, FGV, CPDOC, Acervo Getúlio Vargas, Rolo 4. Although unsigned, the letter offers several clues pointing to Vargas as its author: the writer uses the familiar tuteo form of address, speaks of meeting with the Estado-Maior, and talks of a trip to Rio Grande do Sul in December 1934. On the other hand, marks from a red pencil, resembling those that Vargas habitually made on incoming correspondence, appear on the document, an indication that perhaps Aranha passed the letter on to the President. In any case, the author had to be an well-placed intimate of the Foreign Minister who desired secrecy: the letter closes, "I do not have to

impress upon you the importance and the secrecy of my letter, written at my own initiative, without anyone's previous consultation or knowledge."

57 Things got so bad in Mato Grosso that in 1918, at the end of the two-year intervention, the Conservative and Republican (PRMG) Parties agreed to the installation of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cuiabá, Dom Aquino Corrêia, as a compromise governor. The prelate ruled until 1922. For more on Mato Grosso under the Old Republic, see José de Mesquita, "Espírito matogrossense," *Cultura Política*, June 1943, 89-93. In 1930, a dispute between two political factions in Vila Bela erupted into the Julião Revolt (*Revolta do Julião*). Federal troops marched six hundred kilometers from Cuiabá to quell the unrest, which Frederico Rondon called "a bloodless Canudos." Frederico Rondon, *Na Rondônia Ocidental* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938), 121.

58 Vargas, Telegram to Leonidas de Matos, 10 August 1933, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 98.

59 After the constituent assembly in 1933, Interventor Matos had written to Vargas begging for the federal transportation aid. Matos to Vargas, November 1933, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 98.

60 Filinto Müller to Vargas, 4 June 1934, 2, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 98.

61 Mesquita, Telegram to Vargas, n.d., AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 98.

62 Fenelon Müller, Telegram to Vargas, 22 August 1935, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 21.

63 In the elections, a coalition led by the Liberal Party (*Partido Liberal*) defeated the Müller family's Evolutionist Party (*Partido Evolucionista*).

64 Abel Chermont, *et. al.*, Telegram to Vargas, 5 April 1935, FGV, CPDOC, Acervo Getúlio Vargas, Rolo 4. The gunplay broke out despite the presence of federal troops, who had accompanied the opposition delegates to the chamber to guarantee *habeas corpus*.

65 Aguinaldo, Telegram to Vargas, 11 April 1935, FGV, CPDOC, Acervo Getúlio Vargas, Rolo 4, 2. Chermont had supported Magalhães Barata for Governor, but betrayed him at the last minute.

66 After his removal, Magalhães Barata conducted a campaign to discredit his successor, elected Governor José Malcher by wiring Vargas to allege a "political and military conspiracy" in the state. Magalhães Barata, Telegram to Vargas, 23 August 1935, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 22.

67 Rangel, *A bacia do mar doce* (Rio de Janeiro: n.p., 1934; reprint ed., Rio de Janeiro: Serviço de Documentação, Agência da SPVEA, 1960), 16-17. The original reads, in pleasingly colorful Portuguese, "manda-chuvas de granizo nas searas que vão nascendo."

68 Vargas, *Nova Política*, IV:124-25.

69 *Ibid.*, IV:123.

Chapter Four: The Miracle on the Planalto¹

Goiânia is kilometer zero for the March to the West.²
-- Matma Nago, 1943.

I would have liked. . . the first message sent from Goiânia to the federal government to have read: "The bandeirantes live on."³
-- Pierre Monbeig, *O Estado de São Paulo*, 1938

While Getúlio Vargas stalled on western expansion during the early 1930s, a city was rising from the red soil of the Center-West. Through the exhaustive exertions of the young interventor of Goiás, Pedro Ludovico Teixeira, the March to the West gained its most enduring symbol. The successful, if painful, infancy of the city of Goiânia, born out of a seismic shift in local politics and economics, would enable Vargas to launch his national crusade by the end of the decade.

The state of Goiás, some six hundred miles inland from Rio de Janeiro, lies at the geographical heart of Brazil. Prospectors struck rich veins of gold and precious stones in the state during the colonial period. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries bandeirante expeditions led by the legendary Anhanguera⁴ and others slashed their way through the low scrub forests called the *cerrado*, hunting for slaves and riches. Yet for almost two hundred years afterwards Goiás was a sleepy backwater of ranches and abandoned mines, unknown and ignored.

Contemptuous urban Brazilians traditionally viewed the state as hot, inhospitable, and worthless. Generations of leaders saw no reason to include it in their plans. In the popular imagination, "that vast, almost inhabited zone in the center of the country"⁵ belonged to the past of Anhanguera, not the future, and served only as grist for the mills of eccentric visionaries like Couto de Magalhães and a test of endurance for ambitious young bureaucrats. The isolation continued into the twentieth century: Goiás lay so far out of the federal realm that it was the only state to raise its own force, the "Caiado Column," to expel the Prestes Column in the 1920s.⁶

Historian Francisco I. Campos has posited that such isolation resulted from a deliberate policy of the state's elite, for whom "backwardness was a form of socio-political control."⁷

Underdevelopment suited the ruling *coroneis* (colonels), wealthy *fazendeiros* (ranchers) led by the Caiado family.⁸ Both physical and psychological removal from Rio ensured that federal authorities would not interfere in their affairs, particularly the import and export taxes that the state levied at its border crossings. The coastal image of Goiás as irrelevant afforded the dominant classes an extraordinary degree of autonomy and assured "the maintenance of [their] authority and dominion imposed upon the state [that was] sustained thanks to control of all of the gears of politics."⁹

In an environment of such rigid political and social control, the Revolt of 1930 in Goiás did not feature the component of a disaffected middle class as the rebellion did in, for example, São

Paulo. Goiás was an overwhelmingly rural state in which the professional classes had always aligned themselves with the land-owning oligarchy: "[L]acking a national or regional political organization of their own, the middle sectors insinuated themselves with the oligarches and backed them."¹⁰ In the case of the uprising that swept Vargas into power, the middle sectors of Goiás did not seek to overthrow the power structure built by the colonels, but merely backed the cause of dissident members of the traditional elite.

One of the professionals who joined the conspirators was a civilian physician from southwestern Goiás named Pedro Ludovico Teixeira.¹¹ In action near the Minas border, Republican forces captured, imprisoned, and almost executed the doctor. With the victory of the revolt came freedom, and "Pedro Ludovico hopped on the streetcar of history."¹² For reasons still unclear, soon after his triumph Vargas named Ludovico as his federal interventor in Goiás. Ludovico's installation seems to have involved more chance and luck than anything else: according to historian Nasir Chaul, the high command of the Provisional Government vetoed the other candidate, Mário A. Caiado, because of his last name. (Despite his support of the Revolt, another Caiado in power would not have represented a break with the old oligarchy.)¹³

Almost as soon as he took office in 1930, Ludovico departed sharply from the established governing routine by beginning the process of selecting the site for a new state capital. Moving the

administration from swampy, fetid Goiás Velho had been a dream among the state's futurists for a century: Miguel Lino de Moraes, Goiás' second president under the Empire, had first suggested the idea, proposing Agua Quente as the ideal location.¹⁴ In the 1860s, Couto de Magalhães had supported shifting the government to the banks of the Araguaia River, but the idea did not generate much enthusiasm.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the desire to flee the colonial capital, for both symbolic and epidemiological reasons, remained alive under the Republic, and the state Constitutions of 1891, 1898, and 1918, following the federal model, had also provided for a new center of power. The Caiado oligarchy, whose power base not coincidentally was Goiás Velho, never carried out those constitutional clauses.

Ludovico, however, acted swiftly to fulfill the state's charter, and named a technical commission headed by the Archbishop of Goiás, Dom Emanuel Gomes de Oliveira, to oversee the matter. The commission chose a site in the south-central part of the state, near the hamlet of Campinas. In 1933, architect Armando Augusto de Godói presented the governor with his initial studies for the new capital. On 24 October, in the middle of the wind-whipped cerrado, more than one hundred miles from Goiás Velho, on land donated by local fazendeiros,¹⁶ Ludovico triumphantly presided over the laying of the city's cornerstone and braced to wage the political battle that would consume his life.

The proposed new capital as yet had no name, however, and between 5 October and 7 December the weekly *O Social* sponsored a

contest to christen the city. Entries flooded in from all over the state, and the suggestions included the pseudo-Greek "Goianópolis," the *faux*-indigenous "Tupirama," Couto de Magalhães' beloved "Araguaiana," the historical "Anhanguera" and "Aurilândia," the futuristic "New Fatherland," and, most tellingly, "Eldorado."¹⁷ In a display of Pedro Ludovico's personal magnetism, "Petronia," from the Latin for "Peter," received the most votes.¹⁸ Despite the popular mandate, however, the governor selected a name suggested on 10 October by an unidentified man using the patriotic pseudonym Caramurú Silva do Brasil: "Goiânia." The reader's nomination emphasized a connection with the state's golden colonial past, and read, in part: "Goiânia-- New Goiás, prolongation of the historic Vila Boa, grandiose monument that will symbolize the glory of the origin of all Goianians."¹⁹

Yet Ludovico and his crew of planners looked more to the future than to the past in imagining their new capital. Godói proclaimed in his preliminary report that Goiânia was meant specifically as a model for other Brazilian cities: "The state of Goiás will give a beautiful example to the others of our federation, constituting an advertisement of the first order and a means to attract capital . . ."²⁰ The project soon attracted a number of the nation's most talented young architects, who set to work under the supervision of Godói and Atílio Corrêa Lima, later responsible for the planning of the urban center of Volta Redonda.²¹

Ludovico's motivations for making the transfer of the capital the centerpiece of his governing agenda remain subject to speculation and interpretation. At the time, the interventor claimed that the vision of a new city came to him as a boy, when he studied Brazilian geography and found out that Goiás Velho had a population three times smaller than that of Cuiabá, the capital of Mato Grosso.²² Youthful chauvinistic indignation may have played a small role in Pedro Ludovico's decision to abandon the traditional seat of government, but other factors lie at the root of the change.

In the first place, Ludovico, along with Rondon and Kubitschek, ranks as one of the few visionaries of twentieth century Brazilian politics. The project of Goiânia represented much more than simple construction and logistics; like her offspring Brasília, Goiânia was an ideological enterprise. Ludovico belonged to the long line of thinkers who believed, as did Tavares Bastos and Euclides da Cunha, that the interior of Brazil might contain the salvation of the country. The interventor speculated that moving the capital of the most geographically central state would begin the search for that deliverance: "I came to the conclusion that the transfer of the capital was not just a question in the life of Goiás, but was also the key to solving all the other problems [of Brazil]."²³ The planners also maintained that Goiás needed to break its pattern of backwardness and prepare itself for a new future. Armando Godói stated the rationale for the project, the "principal objective," in forward-looking

terms: the state had to "take advantage of its riches and enlarge its population rapidly."²⁴

At its most intellectual level, the creation of Goiânia aimed to transform attitudes and perceptions, and therefore appears as the first example of governmental myth-making about the West in Brazil. In an oral history interview recorded in 1976, Ludovico recalled that the new capital sprang from a need to transform the outlook of the state: "For Goiás to progress, it had to change the mentality of that little clique that ran the politics of the state ."²⁵

Nevertheless, whatever lofty ideals Ludovico might have ascribed to Goiânia, the city sprang out of prosaic, partisan politics. The movement of the capital took place in the context of the interventor's challenge to the long-standing Caiado family patriarchy, based in their "old political redoubt"²⁶ of Goiás Velho. Ludovico, in a speech following his acclamation as governor by the state constituent assembly in 1934, cast this challenge in stark terms, blaming the problems of Goiás on the despotism of its former governing elite:

Goiás, like no other unit of the federation, has felt the weight of a despotic oligarchy, which has compounded the insecurity in which the Nation has seen itself involved. A plethora of abuses of power, a sadistic pleasure in violence, a feeling of irresponsibility have predominated so much among the *situacionistas* that instability has affected everyone in every way .²⁷

In this manifesto, the new governor attacks one group with particular fervor, the so-called *situacionistas*, those who wanted to keep the capital in Goiás Velho. By constructing his own city,

creating his own stronghold of patronage and loyalty, Ludovico took the most concrete step possible to break the power of the traditional oligarchy.

The location of Goiânia also offers a clue to the motivations of the transfer. In contrast to the plans of Couto de Magalhães, who wanted Goiás to expand northward and connect with Pará via the Araguaia and Tocantins Rivers, Ludovico chose to move the capital south. Ludovico, born and reared near the town of Rio Verde in the southwestern part of the state, very much represented the interests and outlook of his native corner of Goiás. Historian Maria Cristina Machado has identified a "progressive/modernizing mind-set" among the elite of the south and, especially, the southwest of the state that arose during the 1920s and early 1930s.²⁸ Culturally and economically drawn into the orbit of Western Minas Gerais (the *Triângulo Mineiro*), the south became the first region in Goiás to receive road and rail connections to the outside world, and its ranchers and traders saw their possibilities restricted by the isolationism and taxes enforced from Goiás Velho. Perhaps also influenced by the passage of the Prestes Column, the south reacted against the perception of "backwardness" compared with the rest of Brazil and began to demand the "defeat of the retrograde mentality"²⁹ of the Caiado oligarchy. This area, later the focal point of FBC operations under the March to the West and the center of strongest backing for Brasília,³⁰ broke with the traditional elite in the Revolt of 1930 to "demand political power commensurate with its economic position in the life of the state."³¹ The south of Goiás seized upon the shifting of

the capital as the means to guarantee this new hegemony. Goiânia, presenting the possibilities of linking the state to the national economy centered to the south and east, became the "political goal of the oligarchies of the south,"³² who found their champion in Pedro Ludovico. While it later served as the touchstone of the March to the West, the new capital at first grew out of a desire to march to the East.

The Caiados and their allies did not go gently along with the governor's plans. Ludovico had to fight a protracted and bitter political battle to consummate his dream. Inter-elite schisms that had erupted during the late 1920s gave Ludovico some ready allies, but the governor still faced a formidable coalition of normally disparate interest groups.³³ The fierce opposition to Goiânia included workers, businessmen, shop-keepers, industrialists, government employees, many north-central landowners, and others with vested interests in Goiás Velho, still the largest urban center in the state.³⁴ Ludovico recognized that while rural agricultural laborers, perhaps eager to leave the land for jobs in the new city, supported him, only the elite of his native south could act as a counterweight to the state's establishment arrayed against him. The governor spoke of the enormity of the task in his remarks at the laying of the cornerstone of the first building in Goiânia in 1933:

I have gambled my political prestige, contravening the desire of the majority of the intelligentsia of the state. . . . The truth is that ninety percent of the Goianians who inhabit the "hinterland" desire to see this desideratum realized. But the adversaries of the movement of the capital, not the [rural] people, are the ones most involved in politics. . . .³⁵

The political infighting would intensify during the mid-1930s, threatening the stability of the state (and of Ludovico's psyche), creating a tense atmosphere in which "rivalries were transformed into a true war, creating a situation of intolerance."³⁶

During this "[public] washing of dirty laundry"³⁷ among the politicians of Goiás, Ludovico had to endure a number of vituperative personal attacks. Critics telegraphed Vargas to complain that a power-mad governor was bankrupting the state because of "a preoccupation. . . that has already taken on the proportions of an obsession."³⁸ Opponents even called into question Ludovico's sanity; the interventor recalled in 1976 that "I was considered crazy."³⁹ Commenting on both the location and the tenor of the upheaval in Goiás, the most influential newspaper in the region, the newspaper *Lavoura e Comercio* of Uberaba (MG) later would call the debate over the capital a "grave intestinal commotion in the Nation."⁴⁰ Only the cementing of a strong personal and political relationship with Getúlio Vargas would save Ludovico and his vision of a shining city in the cerrado.

The Paulista Rebellion of 1932 provided just the opportunity to strengthen the ties between the governor of Goiás and the president. Ludovico and his government remained loyal to the Vargas regime, and signalled their support early in the insurrection. On 14 July, state Treasurer (*Diretor Geral da Fazenda do Estado*) Nero Macedo wired the Catete Palace to pledge all possible aid,⁴¹ and the interventor raised a cadre of troops to fight the rebels in Mato

Grosso. In an enthusiastic telegram later that month, Ludovico reported to his commander-in-chief, "There are a thousand Goianian men defending the frontier [with] Mato Grosso, ready to battle the mutineers."⁴² Troops from Goiás acquitted themselves with distinction in the fighting, "imped[ing] the invasion of [northern] Mato Grosso and the Triângulo Mineiro by the Paulista rebels."⁴³ According to aide Jaime Câmara, the interventor's steadfast and rapid defense of order during the revolt increased his stock with the president: "The contribution of the state of Goiás, raised immediately in support of Getúlio Vargas in the Armed Movement of São Paulo . . . appreciably increased Pedro Ludovico's prestige with the dictator."⁴⁴ After 1932 Ludovico, and by extension his state, became very important politically to Vargas. That Ludovico survived as one of only two state executives to remain in office from the triumph of the Revolt in 1930 to the fall of the Estado Novo in 1945 demonstrates his power and agility.⁴⁵ The March to the West, in part, represented an effort by Getúlio, never a man to forget those who had helped him, to repay his debts to Pedro Ludovico.

In 1933 Ludovico took advantage of his newfound cachet with the president to include in the report (*Relatório*) of his three years in office a section justifying the movement of the state capital. In this attempt to drum up federal backing for the effort, the interventor preempted his critics, who had sent agents to Rio to lobby Vargas against the change and spread counter-propaganda in the national press. Knowing the importance that Getúlio's sympathy would have

for the Goiânia project, Ludovico decried the "routinized spirit " and "moral hebetude" of his opponents and characterized them as nothing more than the selfish landlords of Goiás Velho:

The natural but egoistic opposition that the property owners in the old capital have mounted has compelled the majority of them to conspire to send an emissary to the Capital of the Republic to plead their case in the press and before the Most Excellent Chief of the Provisional Government. . . ⁴⁶

To bolster Ludovico's position, the twenty-three-page chapter entitled "Moving the Capital" meticulously reprised the arguments, both historical and contemporary, for the transfer. Quoting at length from Couto de Magalhães, reprinting another nineteenth century governor's memorandum, and reproducing passages from Armando de Godói's report, the *Relatório* assembled a distinguished group of defenders of the idea of Goiânia.⁴⁷ Of the twenty such documents that crossed Vargas' desk that year, few could have caught the president's attention as the one from Goiás that presented a radical, urban vision of the interior of Brazil.

The report seems to have impressed the authorities in Rio. By 1934 Ludovico's status had increased sufficiently for Getúlio to make the rare gesture of sending a congratulatory telegram on the governor's birthday.⁴⁸ In more practical terms, in a period during which the Vargas administration stalled on providing funds for other Western states (see Chapter Three), money appeared available for Goiás. Ludovico's influence ensured that when he telegraphed Vargas for aid, Getúlio's Chief of Staff (*Secretário do Estado-Maior da*

Presidência), Gregório Fonseca, responded positively. The government found the resources to extend the Goiás Railway (*Estrada de Ferro Goiaz*) from Leopoldo Bulhões in the southeast of the state to Anápolis, close to the site of Goiânia.⁴⁹

Such a bureaucratic victory emboldened Ludovico and his planners, who hoped to expand the federal largesse to include the construction of Goiânia. Armando Godói, in an interview with the Rio daily *Correio da Manhã* in May, made it known publicly that he believed the project deserved full state support: "I am of the opinion that the federal government ought to aid an undertaking that will exercise a civilizing influence on the central and northern reaches of Brazil, where the results of social evolution have not yet reached."⁵⁰ Both Ludovico and his architect knew that if they could convince the federal government to commit to move its bureaucratic apparatus, the courts and ministry branches, from Goiás Velho, opponents could hardly halt the project.

To that end, the backers of Goiânia conceived of a plan to influence the state in Rio: a 1935 memorandum of the General Superintendency of Construction of the New Capital (*Superintendência Geral das Obras da Nova Capital*) spelled out a strategy of high-profile pressure. The document recommended the formation of a committee of Deputies, Senators, and other public figures to conduct "permanent visits to Ministries with the goals of [obtaining commitments for] the construction of Federal Buildings

[and generating] maximum publicity about these visits."⁵¹ A concerted lobbying effort in Rio on behalf of Goiânia had just begun.

As the construction of the state capital began to run into difficulties both political and financial later that year, Ludovico decided to ask Getúlio for assistance. Wiring Vargas, the governor appeared to remind the president of his debts: "I take [the] liberty [of] reminding [the] eminent Chief [of the] Nation [of the] promises [that] he made [of] help to this state. . ."⁵² A more direct and personal appeal soon followed-- Jeronymo Coimbra Bueno, one of the partners in the firm contracted to build the new capital, journeyed with an arm-load of maps and charts to see Vargas twice in July of 1935.⁵³

The lobbyists from Goiás followed their plan to convince the president of the importance of the undertaking, enlisting the state's congressional delegation to press Getúlio as well. Former revolutionary Mário Caiado, now a Senator, wrote to Ludovico that as soon as he saw Vargas, "I will remind him of the conversation and of the map and data that Jeronymo left [with] him. . . "⁵⁴

The response of the Vargas administration contrasted sharply with its previous position on the matter. In late 1932 Ludovico had repeatedly telegraphed to ask for a federal loan to defray the costs of moving the capital, but Getúlio had passed on the requests to the Finance Ministry.⁵⁵ The Ministry had then rejected the idea of state financing of the project, suggesting an internal bank loan because,

"The current state of our finances make any credit operations inadvisable."⁵⁶

In 1935 the answer was different. Through the good graces of Minister Oswaldo Aranha, the Bank of Brazil (*Banco do Brasil*) conceded a three thousand conto loan to the state of Goiás for construction of the new capital.⁵⁷ In addition, Senator Nero Macedo sponsored a law to issue 5,663 government bonds to underwrite the raising of five federal buildings in Goiânia: the Federal Prosecutor's Office (*Delegacia Fiscal*), the Postal and Telegraph Office, the Federal and Electoral Courts (*Justiça Federal e Justiça Eleitoral*), and the Ministry of Agriculture regional headquarters.⁵⁸

Ludovico appeared to have harnessed the virtually unstoppable momentum of bureaucracy. The federal construction that began by the end of the year turned the city from a fantasy into a mortar-bound reality. Flush with confidence and sure of victory, the governor acted quickly to give his vision legal life: on 2 August 1935 he created the municipality and county of Goiânia, and on 10 December Ludovico moved his family and his official residence to the middle of the cerrado.⁵⁹

Having sold the concept of Goiânia to Vargas and the federal government, Ludovico set out to sell the city, literally and figuratively, to the public. Godói in his 1933 preliminary report had recognized the importance of propaganda to the success of the new capital; reviewing the birth of other planned cities, the architect found that "Another resource that has been employed in the

formation of new urban centers is well-directed propaganda to attract capital and inhabitants."⁶⁰

As opposition mounted to the project, Ludovico concluded that only by firing the public's imagination about Goiânia could he overcome the entrenched forces that sought to kill the new city. The governor for the first time discussed his strategy of opinion-making in the *Relatório* he sent to Vargas: "Combatting, day-by-day, the inertial routine, we are infiltrating ideas of progress into the hearts of the people and the administrators, consubstantiating them with concrete examples. . ." ⁶¹ Much as Getúlio himself would do by the end of the decade, Ludovico set out to win the loyalty of the middle and working classes through a coordinated and concerted campaign of attitude adjustment.

Even before federal authorities had agreed to the project, the governor of Goiás launched his public relations effort. On 1 September 1934, he created the Department of Propaganda and Land Sales (*Departamento de Propaganda e Venda de Terras*), charged with both selling lots in Goiânia and "produc[ing] propaganda for the New Capital."⁶² In the early stages, when the city existed mostly on paper, the emphasis fell on real estate: Ludovico intended to fund much of the transfer through land sales, and construction would halt if the government could not convince private and corporate investors to buy stretches of the deserted Planalto.

Less than a year later, on 6 July 1935, as backing from Rio materialized, the governor merged the Department of Propaganda

and Land Sales into a new agency, the Department of Propaganda and Economic Expansion (*Departamento de Propaganda e Expansão Econômica*-- DPEE). Subordinated to the state Treasury (*Directoria Geral da Fazenda*), the division had a wide-ranging duty to "promote the riches and economic possibilities of the state, through the print media, radio, etc. . . ." ⁶³ Through its subsection called the Superintendency of Real Estate Registry (*Superintendencia Cadestral do Estado*) the entity also continued to control the sale of lots in Goiânia. ⁶⁴ The governor, casting around for a propaganda czar, named a former revolutionary and small-town mayor from Minas Gerais, Joaquim Câmara Filho, to run the new organization. ⁶⁵

Not content with just in-state promotion, Abelardo Coimbra Bueno, Jeronymo's brother and partner, contacted Ludovico in July 1935 to suggest that the publicity effort be extended to the national capital and beyond. The engineer, writing from his office in Rio, complained of the ignorance of Goiás in the press and among the population:

I am tired of hearing, "Goiás does not exist," "Goiás is a geographical hypothesis," etc., etc. It seems to me that publicity about the state would be extremely useful. There is a lot of capital around here to be loaned, but no one wants to invest it a place no one has ever heard of." ⁶⁶

Ludovico apparently agreed, for later in the month he asked Abelardo to establish the Goiás Information Board (*Comissão de Divulgação de Goiaz*) as a lobbying office in Rio, "a department that will make the dissemination of informative data on our riches easier

and more efficient."⁶⁷ From both Goiás and Rio de Janeiro the planners of Goiânia would influence the press and general opinion in their favor.⁶⁸ Four years before Getúlio Vargas took the same step, Ludovico had constructed a nationwide, all-media propaganda machine without precedent in Brazilian history.

This machine ran according to a detailed blueprint. The "systematic propaganda plan," years ahead of its time, emphasized promoting Goiânia in local and national radio and print outlets. A Ludovico administration memorandum that outlined the multi-pronged strategy listed the first priorities as on-air announcements, including a "weekly discussion on the radio . . . on economic matters and on the New Capital of the state" and "quick advertisements interspersed on the broadcasts. . . repeated many times daily."⁶⁹ In addition to regular radio discussions and a constant barrage of advertisements, the master plan advocated exposure in print through posters, magazine articles, and "interviews by all the members of the Board in various newspapers about the possibilities of the state."⁷⁰

The secret centerpiece of the Goiás propaganda strategy, however, was the planting of paid stories in national magazines and newspapers around the country. Readers had no way of knowing that the text was an advertisement, since the articles ran under the by-line, "from our correspondent in Goiânia," or without any by-line at all. The coverage bought by the DPEE encompassed both the capitals and secondary cities in all the states of Brazil and the Federal District. Frequently the agency aimed for saturation of a media

market, and paid to run the same story in morning and afternoon newspapers, dailies, and weeklies.⁷¹ Correspondence hints that the press in smaller cities and the DPEE developed a symbiotic relationship: the agency depended on the papers for distribution of its propaganda, and the papers depended on the funds distributed by the agency.⁷²

In 1936, Ludovico consolidated all of these operations in an autonomous State Propaganda Department (*Departamento de Propaganda do Estado*-- DPE) that reported directly to the governor's office. Câmara Filho gained greater authority to "call the attention of the nation"⁷³ towards Goiânia. Even after the establishment of the Estado Novo, Ludovico resisted subordinating the DPE to the federal DIP, and he and Câmara Filho continued to conduct their own, independent national propaganda campaign on behalf of the state.⁷⁴

Despite the construction of an opinion-influencing apparatus, Goiânia still faced formidable opposition in the Goiás legislative assembly. The situacionistas alternately attempted to bully and bribe Ludovico: on the one hand, they threatened to impeach him, and on the other they offered approval of the transfer of the capital in exchange for his resignation from the governorship.

Behind the opposition's resolve lurked the menace of a military *coup d'etat*. Lt. Col. Joaquim Magalhães Barata, recently removed as governor of Pará (see Chapter Three), had arrived in Goiás in 1936 to command the Sixth Gunnery Battalion (*6º Batalhão de Caçadores*) in

Ipameri. Finding meddling in local politics irresistible, he had signalled his support for the anti-Goiânia forces.⁷⁵

As the vote on the transfer loomed in the state legislature, Ludovico appealed to Vargas for political and public support to stave off the *situacionistas*. In an anxious telegram, the governor looked to his patron in Rio for another favor, the firing of Magalhães Barata: "In these conditions I am obliged to solicit Your Excellency [that] his recall be effected as a measure of prudence in this delicate question. . ." ⁷⁶ Ludovico, no doubt aware of the rumors of disloyalty that had swirled around Magalhães Barata in Belém, warned of a conspiracy to destabilize the state and, by extension, challenge Getúlio's rule.

The president did not remove the commander, and the only destabilization in Goiás occurred within Ludovico's head. "Exhausted" from the stress of the battle over Goiânia, the governor suffered an apparent nervous breakdown in March 1936.⁷⁷ In a hand-written letter to Vargas, Ludovico admitted, "Lately. . . I have felt a certain shock to my nervous system," and asked permission to take a leave of absence from office for several months.⁷⁸

When Ludovico returned from his "rest," he resolved to confront his opponents with renewed vigor. His heavy-handed maneuvering in a dispute over the transfer of the state judiciary to Goiânia, however, nearly backfired by provoking a general rebellion in the legislature. Patience and stamina depleted, the governor finally resorted to force and called troops into the streets of Goiás Velho in August 1936: "A hundred soldiers were dispatched

throughout the city of Goiás, with the calculated objective of establishing panic among the population."⁷⁹ Supporters of Goiânia, in a bizarre cult of personality tactic, hung portraits of Ludovico all over the city, especially on the façades of the houses of opponents of the new capital.

Intimidation might have worked better than persuasion, for the law that sanctioned the removal of the seat of government from Goiás Velho passed in the Legislature not long afterwards. On 23 March 1937, Pedro Ludovico achieved his greatest triumph as he declared the legal transfer of the capital of the state of Goiás to the newborn city of Goiânia.

Despite this victory, only Vargas' declaration of the Estado Novo on 10 November 1937 dictatorship made Goiânia irreversible. The city remained sparsely populated, little more than the several government buildings arranged along dusty, unpaved boulevards. One historian suggests that Ludovico's obstinacy during the final battle for legislative approval of the new capital indicates that he had reason to be supremely confident: "The security and the optimism with which Pedro Ludovico repelled the proposals [of the opposition]. . . lead me to believe that the governor was counting upon an allied force capable of assuring the definitive movement of the Capital." Chaul maintains that that ally was Vargas and claims that the governor, during his "rest" of 1936, met secretly with the president at the Catete Palace in Rio and learned of the plans for the forthcoming November 1937 takeover.⁸⁰ Whether Ludovico had

inside information about the *coup d'etat* or not (an unlikely prospect at best), the Estado Novo certainly guaranteed the ultimate success of Goiânia, and served as the "final catalyst for the transfer of the Capital."⁸¹

If Vargas' Estado Novo finally made the creation of Goiânia possible, then Goiânia made the March to the West possible . Through his quixotic drive to carve a new city out of the virtually uninhabited Planalto, Pedro Ludovico foreshadowed much of Vargas' agenda after 1937. Increased centralization of power in the hands of government, an ideology of progress, utopian visions, and a concerted propaganda campaign all converged in the building of Goiás' capital and made Goiânia "a representative mirror of the policies of Vargas and his successors."⁸² Vasco dos Reis has called Ludovico the "precursor of the '*Marcha para o Oeste*,'"⁸³ and the governor did provide concrete evidence of the viability of settlement and economic development in the West. He also employed a sophisticated strategy of how to promote those concepts to the Brazilian public.

In political terms, over time Goiânia made Ludovico indispensable to the dictator, for the city served as a laboratory for the ideas of westward expansion that Vargas trumpeted. The March to the West placed Goiás on a direct axis with Rio, and Vargas in part used the campaign to reward Ludovico's political loyalty by concentrating many of its investments and practical patronage benefits, such as the work of the FBC in the state.

In socio-economic terms, Goiânia proved fundamental to the March because, by allowing for the solidification of the agricultural frontier in the heart of the country, it pointed the way for further expansion North and West.⁸⁴ The new city cemented the hegemony and prosperity of the farming and ranching oligarchy of southwestern Goiás, the men who would plow the cerrado into some of the richest pasture and cropland on the planet.⁸⁵ Their success would encourage planners to believe that the miracle of Goiás could be replicated throughout the interior of Brazil, even in the humid forests of Amazonia.

Furthermore, Goiânia, by creating an urban pole in the hinterland, avoided any move towards land reform, and Vargas and his successors would use the model of population concentration (although on a smaller scale) to avoid redistributing property in the interior. Perhaps most important, however, the new capital of Goiás turned the Brazilian West, irrevocably, into a human frontier by paving the way for bolder assaults on nature.

Ludovico's influence would extend into the 1950s, for without Goiânia, there would have been no Brasília. The state capital would stand as a model for urbanization in the cerrado, and literally put the Planalto on the map of Brazil: "It was Goiânia that proved [to the country] that Goiás was more than just the setting for fables about jaguars (*onças*)."⁸⁶ Goiânia showed that, by exciting the public imagination, a leader could overcome staunch opposition to change

and move a bureaucracy through space and time. By 1960, diesel lullabies of the jet age would replace the old caboclo jaguar stories.

Paulo A. Figueiredo, chief of the Goiás Office of Personnel Management (*Departamento Estadual do Serviço Público de Goiás*) and one of the prime backers of the transfer of the capital, framed the struggle over Goiânia in exceptionally perceptive terms that encompass Brazil's attitude towards its West: "Goiânia must be comprehended and not seen."⁸⁷ Just as in 1937 the new capital of Goiás existed more in Pedro Ludovico's mind's eye than in its few skeletal buildings, for more than fifty years Brazilian governments treated the March to the West as something to be understood or felt, an idea that was more crucial than any actual event. Concept has always proved more important than reality in Brazil's twentieth century westward expansion, and with the declaration of the Estado Novo, Getúlio Vargas prepared to evoke the enduring myths of the March to the West.

-
- 1 The title comes from José Peixoto da Silveira, *Belo Horizonte e Goiânia* (n.p.: n.p., 1956), 33.
- 2 Matma Nago, "Goiânia e seu Fundador," *Oeste*, July 1943, 14.
- 3 Pierre Monbeig, "Goiânia," In Brazil, IBGE, Conselho Nacional de Geografia, *Goiânia*, (Rio de Janeiro: Serviço Gráfico do IBGE, 1942), 76.
- 4 Bartolomeu Bueno da Silva, called "Anhanguera"-- "old devil" in Tupi-Guaraní-- according to legend subdued an indigenous tribe in Goiás by lighting a basin of (clear) sugar cane rum on fire and intimating that he would spread the flames to the waterways of the region if the Indians did not their give their youth over as slaves. John Hemming, *Red Gold: The Conquest of the Brazilian Indians, 1500-1760* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 378.
- 5 Brito Broca, "Visão de Goiânia," *Cultura Política*, October 1942, 168."
- 6 See Campos, 81.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 65.
- 8 The honorific title "colonel" derived from the rank carried by many large landowners in the old colonial militias. Long after independence, Brazilian still referred to the powerbrokers and political bosses in the interior, ranchers and landlords, as *coroneis*.
- 9 Campos, 64.
- 10 Nasr N. Fayad Chaul, *A construção de Goiânia e a transferência da capital* (Goiânia: Centro Editorial e Gráfico da Universidade Federal de Goiás, 1988), 47.
- 11 In a strange wrinkle of history, Juscelino Kubitschek, the founder of Brasília, was also a physician.
- 12 Chaul, 59.
- 13 *Ibid.*
- 14 "A Inauguração oficial de Goiânia e os grandes acontecimentos que marcaram o momento culminante de historia de Goiaz," *A Manhã*, 12 July 1942, 12.
- 15 Couto de Magalhães encountered much the same resistance that Ludovico would. The exasperated governor declared in 1863, "the prosperity of Goiás depends on the movement of the capital to the margins of the Araguaia, [and] it would be an inexcusable and despicable weakness to sacrifice the general interest of an entire province for the profit of three or four individuals who will lose out." Couto de Magalhães, *Viagem ao Araguaia*, 5ª Edição (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1946), 193.
- 16 Zoroastro Artiaga, *Monografia corográfica e histórica da nova Capital de Goiaz* (Goiânia: Typografia e Encadernação Escola Técnica de Goiânia, 1946), 31-32.
- 17 "Goianópolis," incorporating the Greek combinative form for city, *polis*, reflects a Brazilian fashion for Hellenizing names of cities in the early twentieth century. The most prominent example is Florianópolis, the capital of Santa Catarina, named for president Floriano Peixoto. "Tupirama" stems from the name for the largest family of indigenous tribes in Brazil, the Tupi-Guaraní. Couto de Magalhães had urged the movement of the state capital to the banks of the Araguaia River, hence "Araguaiana." "Aurilandia," refers to the gold strikes in Goiás during the colonial period.

¹⁸ Carlos Pedrosa, "O nome 'Goiânia': como surgiu o topônimo da nova capital do Estado de Goiás?" *Cultura Política*, July 1942, 355.

¹⁹ Ibid. Silva do Brasil, whoever he was, could not claim originality: Manuel Lopes de Carvalho Ramos had first used "Goiânia" in an epic poem of the same name published in 1896. The word had actually appeared in public documents twice before that, on 9 October 1890, when Ramos donated his then-completed poem to the state of Goiás, and on 1 July 1895, when the state government issued a law authorizing the printing and subsequent distribution of the poem. Ibid., 353.

²⁰ Armando Augusto de Godói, "Relatório apresentado ao Dr. Pedro Ludovico, Interventor no Estado de Goiás, sobre a mudança da atual capital para Campinas," In Godói, *A urbs e os seus problemas* (Rio de Janeiro: *Jornal do Comércio*, 1943), 222.

²¹ Corrêa Lima did not live to see the final fruition of his plans: he died in an ironic tragedy in August of 1943, when his VASP plane plunged into Guanabara Bay after takeoff from Santos Dumont Airport in Rio, right off the Seaplane Terminal that he had designed. José Octavio Corrêa Lima, *Em memória de Atílio Corrêa Lima* (Rio de Janeiro: Estúdio de Artes Gráficas C. Mendes Júnior, 1948), 10.

²² Ofelia Socrates do Nascimento Monteiro, *Como nasceu Goiânia* (São Paulo: Empresa Gráfica da Revista dos Tribunais, 1938), 19.

²³ Pedro Ludovico Teixeira, "Como e porque construí Goiânia," In Peixoto da Silveira, 50.

²⁴ Ludovico, "'Porque mudei a capital do Estado para a cidade Goiânia,'" *A Manhã*, 5 July 1942, 7.

²⁵ Ludovico, *Pedro Ludovico (depoimento, 1976)* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas/CPDOC-- História Oral, 1979), 91. Ludovico used the word *povinho*, which literally translates as "little people," and means "rabble," or "riff-raff."

²⁶ Esterici, "O mito," 2.

²⁷ Ludovico, *Memórias*, 2ª Edição (Goiânia: Editora Cultura Goiana, 1973), 51

²⁸ Maria Cristina Teixeira Machado, *Pedro Ludovico: um tempo, um carisma, uma história* (Goiânia: Centro Editorial e Gráfico da Universidade Federal de Goiás, 1990), 79.

²⁹ Ibid., 123.

³⁰ Jataí, the town where Kubitschek, prodded by a question from the crowd at a campaign rally, in 1955 committed himself to constructing the new federal capital, is one of the centers of the region.

³¹ Teixeira Machado, 84.

³² Chaul, 76.

³³ Deep wounds had not healed from a dispute between the state executive and judiciary: the executive, ruled by the Caiados, had altered the composition of the State Supreme Court (*Supremo Tribunal de Justiça*) to ram through a law allowing patriarch Totó Caiado to enlarge his latifúndia at the expense of state lands. Mário Caiado, one of the fired judges, later joined the Revolt of 1930 and became an ally of Ludovico. See Machado, 50.

³⁴ Jamie Câmara, *Os tempos da mudança* (Goiânia: n.p., 1967), 164. No sources make mention of the viewpoint on this matter of the population of the extreme north of the state, what is now Tocantins. The North, traditionally ignored and neglected by Goiás Velho, seems to have been much more absorbed with politics in Maranhão and Pará and local banditry. Soon after the foundation of Goiânia, however, a separatist movement did emerge in the region.

³⁵ "Goiânia," Oeste, October 1944, 5.

³⁶ Câmara, 164. Câmara provides an excellent insider's account of the struggle to build Goiânia. Monteiro's *Como Nasceu Goiânia* also gives a blow-by-blow narrative of the political battles, 586-605. Even though Goiânia provoked much outrage, the opposition was nowhere close to the open revolt occasioned by the transfer of the capital of Mato Grosso from Vila Bela to Cuiabá in 1825. See Brazil, Presidência da República, Gabinete do Presidente, "Informações sobre Mato Grosso," Briefing books prepared for Getúlio Vargas' Presidential Visit to Mato Grosso, 1940, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 182.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Evaristo Machado, Telegram to Vargas, 4 November 1932, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 19, 3.

³⁹ Ludovico, *depoimento*, 96. Belo Horizonte, the planned capital of Minas Gerais, suffered a similar campaign of attacks in the late 1890s. The Anti-Belo Horizonte forces seem to have been a little more clever than the situacionistas in Goiás, as they composed satirical songs and invented a fantastic nickname for the new city: "Papudópolis," City of the Goiters. Opponents also denounced the capital's supposedly high incidence of "cretinism," painting the location as the El Dorado of thyroid problems. See Peixoto da Silveira, 22.

⁴⁰ Monteiro, 589.

⁴¹ Nero Macedo, Telegram to Vargas, 14 July 1932, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 19.

⁴² Ludovico, Telegram to Vargas, 16 July 1932, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 19.

⁴³ Brazil, Presidência da República, Gabinete do Presidente, "Dados relativos ao Estado de Goiás," Briefing book prepared for Getúlio Vargas' Presidential Visit to Goiás, 1940, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 325, 4. Rebel troops did invade southern Mato Grosso (see Chapter Three).

⁴⁴ Câmara, 59.

⁴⁵ The Governor of Espírito Santo is the other. A Vargas propagandist wrote of Ludovico's absolute loyalty, "[Ludovico] knew how to understand and identify himself with the regime from the first hours of the October rising. Such glory only befalls Espírito Santo and the State of Goiás, whose governors are the only that witnessed the October dawn and have kept their posts." J. Trindade, "Goiás sob o olhar do Mestre," *Revista dos Estados*, 31 August 1940, 3. Ludovico also knew the value of flattery; even by the standards of Vargas' Interventors, he proved unusually slavish and effusive in his congratulatory telegrams to Getúlio. At the end of the Paulista Rebellion, Ludovico wrote, "With sincere enthusiasm I have received from Your Excellency the communication relating the end [of the] inglorious struggle [through which] the professional politicians dragged our startled nation. Goiás is delirious with the knowledge [of the] victory [of] our cause. I congratulate the eminent Chief for such auspicious news that manifests that [the] dictatorship sanctifies the national will." Ludovico, Telegram to Vargas, 5 October 1932, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 19.

-
- 46 Brazil, Estado de Goiás, Interventoria Federal, 1930-1933: *Relatório apresentado ao Ex.^{mo} S.^{nr} D.^r Getúlio Vargas, D.D. Chefe do Governo Provisório, e ao povo Goiano, pelo D.^r Pedro Ludovico Teixeira, Interventor Federal no Estado de Goiás* (Goiás: Imprensa Oficial, 1933), 123.
- 47 The nineteenth century document was from then-state president Rodolfo Gustavo de Paixão.
- 48 Vargas, Telegram to Pedro Ludovico, 23 October 1934, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 97.
- 49 Ludovico, Telegram to Vargas, 24 March 1934, and Gregório Fonseca, Telegram to Ludovico, 3 April 1934, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 97. The railroad would reach Goiânia itself by the early 1940s.
- 50 Godói, "A futura Capital de Goiás," In *Goiânia*, 38.
- 51 Brazil, Estado de Goiás, Superintendência Geral das Obras da Nova Capital, Memorandum, 13 July 1935, APL, Pasta 1935, 2.
- 52 Ludovico, Telegram to Vargas, 31 December 1935, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 19.
- 53 Jeronymo Coimbra Bueno, Depoimento, 6 June 1990, APDF, Projeto "Memória da Construção de Brasília," 36.
- 54 Mário Caiado to Ludovico, 27 July 1935, APL.
- 55 Ludovico, Telegram to Vargas, 22 November 1932, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 19.
- 56 Brazil, Ministério da Fazenda, Gabinete do Ministro da Fazenda, Memorandum to Vargas, 6 December 1932, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 19.
- 57 Brazil, Presidência da República, "Dados relativos," 3. Ludovico cited the same amount in his 1976 oral history interview. Ludovico, *depoimento*, 92.
- 58 Ibid.
- 59 "A Inauguração oficial," 12.
- 60 Godói, "Relatório," 22.
- 61 Brazil, Estado de Goiás, 1930-1933, 5.
- 62 Brazil, Estado de Goiás, Arquivo Histórico Estadual, *Decretos: Governo Pedro Ludovico Teixeira (Mudança da Capital), 1932-1933-1934-1935* (Goiânia: [Arquivo Histórico Estadual], n.d.), 10.
- 63 Ibid., 21.
- 64 This comingling of publicity and profit lent itself to abuse. In 1939, an employee of the São Paulo office of Coimbra Bueno's land sale operation (*Procuradoria Especial de Venda de Terrenos de Goiânia*) reported that "a person of the highest circles of government suggested that this office grant lots in Goiânia to the small children of [São Paulo] interventor Adhemar de Barros," a proposal that constituted "an offer we could not refuse." In this shakedown, Coimbra Bueno deeded lots free of charge to Barros' children and then reaped favorable press coverage by making it appear that Barros had bought the land. Coimbra Bueno's assistant wrote to Ludovico, "The offering, made in name of [the state of Goiás], was conditioned on the understanding that publicity be given to this act as if Interventor Dr. Adhemar de Barros had really purchased the lots. This detail is of critical importance, given the repercussion of such a 'sale' . . ." Paulo Paulista to Ludovico, 30 October 1939, APL.
- 65 Joaquim Câmara Filho to Frei Vicente, 29 August 1935, AHEGO. Câmara Filho had served in the high command of the Minas Column (*Coluna Mineira*)

during the Revolution of 1930, and had also been named mayor of towns in Goiás and Minas Gerais before Ludovico tapped him as his propaganda chief. In 1938, Câmara Filho, along with his brother Jaime, founded *O Popular*, now the paper of record in Goiânia and the only daily in the state of Goiás. One of Câmara Filho's successors as propaganda czar, Gerson de Castro Costa, in 1939 founded *Folha de Goiás*, Goiânia's other major newspaper, which closed in 1984. The DPEE therefore had intimate ties with the major outlets in the local press. The Câmara family maintains its grip on the media in Goiás: over forty years the brothers acquired an empire of newspapers and radio and television stations (including TV Anhanguera, the local Globo network affiliate) that dominates opinion in the state. See José Mendonça Teles, *A imprensa matutina* (Goiânia: CERNE, 1989), 50.

⁶⁶ Abelardo Coimbra Bueno to Ludovico, 21 July 1935, 5, APL.

⁶⁷ Brazil, Estado de Goiás, *Decretos*, 30.

⁶⁸ Since the state's budget was extremely limited, the Goianos often looked for opportunities for free propaganda. Abelardo Coimbra Bueno claimed in a letter to Ludovico that he had engaged Herbert Moses, president of the Brazilian Press Association (*Associação Brasileira de Imprensa*) and perhaps Brazil's most prominent journalist, in the drive to promote Goiás and Goiânia. Moses, according to Coimbra Bueno, agreed to drum up support and place articles in the Rio press. Exclaimed Coimbra Bueno, "If Dr. Moses fulfills his promise, it will be splendid for the state, since along with a friendly campaign, we will get free propaganda." A. Coimbra Bueno to Ludovico, 18 May 1935, 4, APL.

⁶⁹ Brazil, Estado de Goiás, Memorandum, 1. Among the radio stations from which the agency bought airtime were *Rádio Mayrink Veiga*, *Sociedade Rádio Nacional*, and *Rádio Cruzeiro do Sul*, all of Rio. Brazil, Estado de Goiás, DPEE, Serviço de Divulgação, *Registro*, 1941-1942, 17. AHEGO.

⁷⁰ Ibid. That several Goianos, Rubenstein Rolando Duarte of the *Gazeta de Notícias* in Rio most prominent among them, were on staff at major papers helped the state's propaganda drive. These journalists worked behind the scenes to generate favorable coverage for Ludovico at their own and other papers. Rubenstein Rolando Duarte to Ludovico, 30 March 1942, APL.

⁷¹ Brazil, Estado de Goiás, DPEE, *Registro*, AHEGO. The payment register for the DPEE shows that the agency contracted to place pre-written articles in dozens of newspapers around Brazil on an almost daily basis. Notable clients included major urban dailies like *A Manhã*, *A Noite*, *Diário Carioca*, *O Globo*, *Jornal do Brasil*, all of Rio de Janeiro; *Folha da Manhã* and *Folha da Noite* of São Paulo; *O Diário* of Belo Horizonte; and regional papers such as *Folha do Norte* (Belém), *Correio do Paraná*, *Correio de Uberlândia*, *Gazeta de Alagoas*, and *Diário da Tarde* (Florianópolis, SC). This propaganda blitz extended to publications geared towards immigrant communities, such as the *Diário Alemão* of São Paulo and the *Correio Português* of Rio, and children, like *Vamos Ler* magazine. The DPEE would even pay the federal *Agência Nacional* to distribute its articles on occasion. For an important article, usually one signed by Câmara Filho himself, the DPEE covered every outlet in a state. For example, in São Paulo, the agency would buy space in the *Folhas* and *O Estado de São Paulo* in the capital, *Diário do Povo* in Campinas, *Diário da Manhã* in Riberão Preto, and *O*

Diário in Santos. Ibid. The subject matter of these pieces ranged from economic boosterism to folklore, sports, and tourism. Câmara Filho at times shamelessly stooped to tabloid tactics to plug Goiás, however. He spread tales of a mummy-woman in Goiânia and rumors of a "King Kong" loose on the banks of the Araguaia that fed on cows' tongues. José Asmar, *Câmara Filho: o revoltoso que promoveu Goiás* (Goiânia: *O Popular*, 1989), 85.

⁷² One editor even wrote to Ludovico to complain when the state propaganda bureau had cut back its usual buy. Alves de Oliveira to Ludovico, 4 August 1942, APL. Other letters in the APL indicate that the DPEE and its successor, the DEIP, were often months late in paying their bills. To be fair to Ludovico and Câmara Filho, newspapers and magazines would occasionally solicit paid articles for special sections or editions. In 1938, for example, the editor of *Revista da Semana* petitioned Ludovico for a Goianian contribution for an edition commemorating the Interventors' Convention (*Congresso dos Interventores*) in January of 1939. J. M. Costa Júnior to Ludovico, 16 November 1938, APL.

⁷³ "Novos rumos à economia do hinterland do Brasil," Interview with Joaquim Câmara Filho, *A Manhã*, 7 January 1944, 3. Payment records for the late 1930s indicate that the agency was a skeleton crew. In addition to director Câmara Filho and his aide José Balduino de Sousa, the DPEE employed three typists, a mimeographer, a doorman, and a photographer. Brazil, Estado de Goiás, DPEE, *Folha de pagamento relativo ao mês de Abril de 1938*, AHEGO, 1. Câmara Filho wanted to call the attention of more than just Brazilians to Goiânia: In August 1935, he wrote to a Brazilian Dominican priest residing in France, an old acquaintance, to see if the Frei could arrange a deal to publish items regularly to the French press about Goiás and Goiânia: "I ask, Frei Vicente, for your suggestions on how to approach the 'Parisian Dailies'. . . . I would frequently send communiqués, whenever possible accompanied by photographs or demonstrative graphics. . . . I am certain that stories of this nature would be well received by the French press." Câmara Filho to Frei Vicente, 29 August 1935, AHEGO.

⁷⁴ A federal decree finally created a Goiás branch of the DIP (DEIP) in July of 1942, three years after a national statute mandated that states fold their publicity agencies into the centralized hierarchy. Vargas confirmed Câmara Filho as head of the new organization. Câmara Filho to Luiz Pereira de Melo, 15 January 1943, AHEGO. The old practice of planting paid stories in newspapers around Brazil continued under the DEIP, but on a smaller scale. While more concentrated on regional papers than under the DPEE, the media buys in 1942 and 1943 did still include the newspapers of record in major cities and one international wire service, *Agência Noticiosa Sul Americana S/A* (ASAPRESS). Câmara Filho to Diretor Geral da Fazenda, 15 April 1942, AHEGO.

⁷⁵ Ludovico, "Como e porque," 65.

⁷⁶ Ludovico, Telegram to Vargas, 20 August 1936, AN, Fundo SPR, 97, 2.

⁷⁷ Câmara, 199.

⁷⁸ Ludovico to Vargas, 22 March 1936, 2, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 19. Vargas showed unusual confidence in Ludovico by accepting his petition for leave without question and not replacing him with another governor.

⁷⁹ Câmara, 217.

80 Chaul, 156. This author has found no evidence to corroborate Chaul's account, neither to confirm that Ludovico knew beforehand about the Estado Novo declaration nor to establish that he travelled to Rio de Janeiro during his leave of absence.

81 Ibid., 158.

82 Ibid., 81.

83 Vasco dos Reis, "A 'Marcha para Oeste' e seu precursor," *Oeste*, 21 October 1944, 9.

84 Chaul says that Goiás "já apresentava condições para atender à política-econômica do Estado Novo." Chaul, 144. In other words, the state had already begun a colonization and land distribution policy. *Decreto-lei* 3.034 of 6 March 1933 gave special concessions to groups that brought in migrants to work in agriculture. Teixeira Machado, 147.

85 For more on this process, see Margolis, 230-241.

86 "Goiânia e o desenvolvimento econômico de Goiaz," *Oeste*, Ano III, Nº 23, 8. The article uses the disparaging Brazilian phrase "*histórias de onças*," referring to the stories that the sertanejos told to frighten their children, and more broadly meaning "backwoods nonsense." The phrase has resonated in the country's politics: despite the article's confidence, presidential candidate Jânio Quadros in 1960 would term the Belém-Brasília Highway the *Caminho das Onças*.

87 Ludovico, "'Porque mudei,'" 3.

Chapter Five: Canaan Awaits Its People¹

The Amazon . . . is the last argument of a desperate people. . . .²
--Onofre de Andrade, 1937

How can we awaken in the present generations a truly passionate attraction for the mysteries [of our] territorial desert, where our inertia has left us unknowingly prodigal?³
--Hermano Ribeiro da Silva, 1936

Even as Pedro Ludovico realized his dream in Goiás, the administration of Getúlio Vargas was still struggling to define a coherent policy towards the West. The president might have visited Pará in 1933, but his government had paid sufficiently little attention to the region in the following few years that Senator Leopoldo Tavares da Cunha Mello from Amazonas could complain on the floor of the upper chamber on 13 June 1936, "The problems of Amazonia do not yet constitute national problems; they have not attracted the attention of our statesmen."⁴

The senator spoke too soon, however, for the West would finally capture the attention of the president and his advisors in 1936. During an Independence Day address entitled "An Appeal to Brazilian Patriotism," Vargas elegized "the rugged and anonymous struggles to occupy the exuberant forest"⁵ as representative of the country's national spirit. Over the next nine years, inspired by the achievements of Ludovico and pushed by domestic political considerations, Getúlio would direct the individual efforts that he praised into a state-led crusade of westward expansion, one of the centerpieces of his Estado Novo.

Vargas' turn toward the West, and toward Amazonia in particular, responded to growing nationalism about the region. In 1936, events overtook the president, for the mood of the Brazilian political class shifted from one of indifference to the interior to one of outraged jingoism when the Senate considered a proposed land concession in Amazonas.

In 1927, two entrepreneurs, Gensaburo Yamanishi of Tokyo and Kinroku Awazu of Rio de Janeiro, had petitioned the government of the state of Amazonas for title over one million hectares of land to "establish colonies of Japanese farmers."⁶ Japanese immigration to Brazil was at its peak, and the concession generated no opposition on the state or national level. After the Revolt of 1930, the Vargas administration did not block the contract, but the deal still languished for several years without being finalized.

The constitution of 1934 mandated that the Senate vet all land concessions larger than ten thousand hectares, however, and governor of Amazonas Álvaro Maia submitted the contract for ratification in 1936.⁷ By that time, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the Italian annexation of Ethiopia had raised the threat that strong nations could snatch territory from weak and undefended ones. Brazilian nationalists became highly suspicious of Japanese intentions in Latin America, and the vote on the concession aroused an unprecedented, xenophobic ire.⁸

While the internal Senate reports that examined the land contract recommended its rejection on the basis of several legal

irregularities, senators, especially from the interior, seized the opportunity to demagogue about the "yellow peril." Not even the report of the National Security Committee (*Comissão de Segurança Nacional*) went as far as legislators did in their speeches on the floor. Senators, led by Senator da Cunha Mello,⁹ the representative of Amazonian landed interests, employed crass stereotypes and thundered, "We cannot consent that this yellow drug be injected in our veins."¹⁰ Ninety-nine federal deputies, headed by former president Arthur Bernardes, sent a telegram to urge the refutation of the contract, and nationalists from all over Brazil wrote in as well.¹¹ Under the intense pressure, on 24 August 1936 the Senate unanimously rejected the proposed Japanese concession by a vote of thirty-one to zero.¹² The unexpected outbreak of nationalist fervor now made the subjugation and settlement of the interior a political issue, and forced Vargas to add the West to his governing agenda. Such virulent, bigoted paranoia about the interior would resurface in Brazil with renewed vigor during the Second World War, and would then cause Getúlio to revamp his campaign for western development.

Following the uproar over the Japanese in Amazonia, a group of Brazilian social critics made the interior a national issue during 1936 and 1937, and the president acquired many of the central ideas behind the March to the West from these writers. Books by economists such as José Francisco Araújo de Lima attacked the previous and current management of the West, lamenting that "the economy [of the region] has always been gravely parasitized."¹³

Araújo de Lima in the 1920s had blamed the central government's "Mussulman indifference" for the rubber crisis and urged increased foreign investment in Amazonia.¹⁴ In the 1930s, he built on those positions by calling for a new push to integrate the western expanses into the national mainstream.

Influenced by the environmental determinism of Euclides da Cunha, the tract entitled *Amazônia: a terra e o homem* analyzes Brazil's problems from the perspective that the forces of nature and climate shape man's characteristics. In this worldview, one that still resonates in Brazilian culture, the very ecology of the interior stands as an barrier to progress: "The forest is the greatest obstacle to the expansion of Man in the Amazonian desert. To chop down but a small section is to open a clearing for constructive and productive labor."¹⁵ Araújo de Lima explicitly links this project with the achievements of the United States— he refers to the interior as "the 'America' of those who ambitiously pursued a golden future" and the "Amazonian Far-West."¹⁶ Vargas would take to heart the author's admonitions to fight the "suggestive Babylonianism,"¹⁷ the disorder and sensuality, of the jungle. Much of the March to the West aimed to subdue a threatening and enigmatic nature and replace it with a safer, man-made landscape, a human frontier.

Another writer, Huascar de Figueiredo, published a pamphlet in 1937 that discussed the interior in even more strident terms. Even as Vargas prepared a coup d'etat with the help of the military, Figueiredo warned of the consequences of another type of

authoritarianism: "The Dictatorship of the Desert." The author depicts a Brazil gripped by the tyranny of geography-- the enormous, empty West dominates the nation's fate and threatens to disrupt its stability. Proclaiming that "[t]he combat against the Dictatorship of the Desert, throughout Brazil, should be the most pressing formula of any political program,"¹⁸ Figueiredo urged that the state move swiftly to conquer the enigma of the interior and people the West. Getúlio Vargas would soon launch his effort to do just that.

During early 1937, the West also surfaced as a topic of discussion in the campaign leading up to the presidential elections scheduled for the following year. As the several declared candidates travelled the country giving their stump speeches, one, José Américo de Almeida, tackled the issue of developing the hinterland. Addressing a crowd in Belo Horizonte, the Minister of Transport and Public Works under the Provisional Government presented a vision of colonizing the West:

Men of the interior. . . I know the needs of that usurious land that is so rich and yet so poor.
Imagine a vertiginous vision of the peopling of that emptiness: busy passes over the mountains, dangerous curves of intense traffic; plains covered by teeming ranks of men; a new life amid the red dust.¹⁹

José Américo's new Brazil that found room for all of its citizens in the fertile and prosperous West resurrected the old Vision of Paradise, and no doubt proved very attractive to his audience in Minas Gerais, where the land had long ago been parceled out. Like Rondon and

Euclides, the Minister saw the railroads as the catalysts for this settlement, and he urged his countrymen "to carry civilization forward on cattleguards, as Euclides da Cunha used to say."²⁰

Vargas knew the power of the old myths and realized that both the campaign and the nationalist tirades of the previous year had raised popular expectations. After Getúlio had obviated the voting (and bitterly disappointed José Américo, who believed himself the president's anointed successor) by proclaiming a dictatorship, he would offer his countrymen a remarkably similar picture of a glorious interior of possibility, although one that fit his scheme of corporatist authoritarianism.

As the president worked to consolidate his power, private initiative to promote westward expansion began to test the regime's commitment to the idea. In 1937, guide and adventurer Willy Aureli organized an expedition called the *Bandeira Piratininga*. Intended to locate the mysterious Roncador Mountains (*Serra do Roncador*) and contact the truculent Xavante tribe in central Mato Grosso, the trek belied Vargas' rhetoric about pushing into the interior. Just as in the early 1930s the Vargas administration had looked to Fordlândia as a convenient means to spur investment in the interior without actually spending federal funds (see Chapter Three), the government saw a low-cost public relations opportunity in the Aureli expedition.

A complete blank on even the most accurate charts of the day, the interior of Mato Grosso presented a formidable challenge. In 1925, British explorer Col. Percy Harrison Fawcett had disappeared in

the region while searching for a legendary civilization of enormous wealth. More recent ventures had vanished in 1932 and 1934, both while looking for Fawcett.²¹

That the West was still such a *tabula rasa* for most Brazilians made it fertile ground for myth-making. Aureli had organized the most audacious attempt to chart the Brazilian wilderness since Rondon's Commission, and Vargas quickly moved to back the scheme publicly. While private funding underwrote the bandeira, Minister of Transport Gen. Mendonça Lima pressured the railroads in July 1937 to arrange free train tickets for the expedition to the end of the line, in western Goiás.²² Getúlio himself sent a national flag to be raised on the Serra do Roncador.

Aureli could not fulfill his ambitious plans, however: short on food and supplies and harassed by the still-unpacified Xavantes, the bandeira turned back in December before reaching its goal.²³ The expedition did traverse the lower part of the Rio das Mortes (last visited by Rondon and Roosevelt), cross the Araguaia, and explore Bananal Island.²⁴

Despite this failure, Vargas knew that the true significance of the bandeira "lay on the level of imagination: it was drama, it was the enactment of a myth that embodied the future."²⁵ The first of several expeditions to reenact with modern equipment the Herculean travels of the colonial bandeirantes, the Piratininga expedition marked the beginning of the resurrection of old heroes that would characterize the March to the West. Like a South American Jefferson,

Getúlio Vargas would find local versions of Lewis and Clark to advance his political and ideological agenda during the late 1930s and 1940s.

Aureli's bandeira was not the only event to focus Vargas' attention on Mato Grosso during 1936 and 1937. The political situation in the state, always tenuous at best, had degenerated into outright internecine violence. The governor, Mário Corrêia da Costa, had defeated Filinto Müller (Vargas' Federal Police Chief; see Chapter Three) in the elections of 1935, but had lost his majority in the Assembly in an intraparty dispute. The president, caught between his loyalty to Müller and a desire for order, became personally involved in the wrangling. He appealed to Corrêia to form a conciliatory coalition to pacify the political climate.²⁶

Gunplay broke out among several state senators, and Müller used the shooting as a pretext to force the legislature to ask for a federal intervention in the state.²⁷ In a blow to the governor's prestige and power, a high-ranking military official, Gen. José Pompeu Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, assumed command of a state of siege in Cuiabá in December 1936. The factional infighting nevertheless worsened, and the president deposed Corrêia on 8 March. Federal authorities would rule Mato Grosso until 1945.

Several new developments made this latest outbreak of anarchy in the interior, not markedly different from the troubles of 1933-1934, a critical issue in Rio. Petroleum had made the reconsolidation of political control in the West bubble to the top of

Vargas' agenda. The Chaco War had raised expectations that the Pantanal and the Bolivian Oriente might contain valuable reserves of oil, and the Brazilian government was in the process of negotiating a treaty with La Paz to build a railroad from Corumbá to Santa Cruz de la Sierra to facilitate access to those (as yet unproven) reserves.²⁸ The Mato Grosso Oil Company (*Companhia Matogrossense de Petróleo*) and other entities, inspired by the prophecies of St. John Bosco, were eager to drill in the border region,²⁹ but political instability threatened the project. Brazilian officials were also concerned that multinational oil conglomerates would covertly help Argentina to seize these presumed deposits.³⁰ Only direct federal control of Mato Grosso, and by extension of the rest of the West, could guarantee that Brazil could guard its resources and exploit them efficiently. Vargas would exert such authority over the nation's riches with the March to the West.

The declaration of the New State (*Estado Novo*) on 10 November 1937 ushered in a new era of centralization and consolidation of power in Brazil. Vargas, having disposed of or neutralized his opponents, sought to unify the nation to pursue his political and economic agenda. To accomplish this goal, "it was necessary that the state assume the responsibility for the creation of a consensus as much among the fractious ruling class as among the subordinate classes, in order to defend the interests of the industrial sector."³¹ The period between 1937 and 1945 therefore experienced an unprecedented expansion of the federal government apparatus in

Brazil. Implemented amid the crises of worldwide economic depression and global conflagration, the Estado Novo was a "therapeutic plan of action" with which Vargas attempted to heal the ills of the nation and build upon hopes and dreams of the Brazilian people.³² The March to the West constituted a centerpiece of this strategy, a grandiose exercise in myth-making to appeal to all Brazilians.

Influenced by fashionable currents in European political thought, the Estado Novo adopted a corporatist approach to society and governance. The Rumanian guru of corporatism, Mihaïl Manoïlesco, a professor of political economy at the Polytechnic School of Bucharest whose works were translated into Portuguese by Vargas ideologue Azevedo Amaral, pointed to organization as the most important factor in national stability and economic success: "The formula for our age is to accomplish in a restricted space and with restricted means the maximum economic results. That formula is no longer liberty but organization."³³ Vargas, modeling his regime after Mussolini's Italy (and to a lesser extent after Salazar's Portugal), would attempt to restrict political participation in a system that he controlled by dividing Brazil into defined class, industrial, and professional groups which owed their allegiance to him and his state. The "new Brazil" would no longer accept the natural, traditional chaos of the West.³⁴

Vargas and his henchmen called his version of European state corporatism "the National Ideal."³⁵ This vision, in Amaral's words,

"could be considered nationalism transformed into a spiritual force. . . [and] a programmatic sense of state action."³⁶ According to the New State ideologues, nineteenth century nationalism had proved weak and sentimental, incapable of permitting Brazil to realize its goals and aspirations. The new nationalism of Getúlio Vargas, which drew heavily on the long-dormant prescriptions of Alberto Tôrres, would allow the state and its directors to metamorphose the unformed feelings of the populous into action during the present time of crisis.³⁷ In one of the great syllogisms of the age, Amaral declared that "[t]he Estado Novo is democratic because it is nationalist."³⁸ Vargas' new, all-encompassing ideology replaced elections by reading minds instead of counting votes.

To that end, the Estado Novo presented itself as "the organ that expressed the national conscience and will."³⁹ According to this ideology, such a process of collective telepathy could occur because the state represented (and invented) the hopes of "a homogenized, mass society in which the divergent interests of classes became diluted in the 'interest of the people' or the 'nation.'"⁴⁰ Vargas saw himself as much more than just the president or head of state-- he proclaimed himself the father of the Nation who embodied Brazil's shared wishes.⁴¹ The Estado Novo under the omniscient Vargas operated according to an essential "elitism,"⁴² an unshakable quasi-Calvinist belief in authoritarian solutions implemented by a concentrated, prepared cadre of intellectuals. (George Steiner's description of Franco's regime in Spain captures the attitude of the

New State in Brazil as well: the system "rejoic[ed] darkly. . . in the conviction that a very few (the leaders) are chosen over the wretched herd of their fellow men.")⁴³ This group of thinkers and policy makers, known as Vargas' "Black Cabinet,"⁴⁴ refashioned Brazil, and "establish[ed] new patterns and values"⁴⁵ within a capitalist framework while forging a new dynamic of power that broke with traditional relations.

This new nationalist project, for the first time in Brazilian history, depended explicitly on a program of state action and intervention. Where before Brazilians had looked to the heroes of Independence or to the Imperial family, in the late 1930s, "[n]ationalism rested principally in the domain of government planning and with the political elite."⁴⁶ Vargas presented a clear blueprint for the growth of federal power. The dictator and his apologists presented a tripartite series of goals, each to be achieved in drives directed by the state: economic development, the affirmation and consolidation of national unity, and vigilance over national sovereignty.⁴⁷ Nelson Jahr Garcia, who critiques the Estado Novo from a Marxist perspective, adds another, unstated, basic tenet for the Vargas regime, "systematic political demobilization,"⁴⁸ that complemented (he would argue made possible) the three avowed goals. The March to the West-- in conception and execution-- formed a crucial part of each of these areas from 1937 to 1945. Westward expansion meshed with the overall Vargas ideological and political

project of national integration and the construction of a paternalistic, corporatist state.

Vargas based his definition of economic transformation on the concept of "modernization."⁴⁹ In essence, the Estado Novo leadership sought to harness and accelerate the "transition from a rural-oligarchic society to an urban-industrial one" that had begun in Brazil during the 1890s and intensified during the 1920s.⁵⁰ Rather than allow market forces to shape this change, Vargas wanted, as Justice Minister and framer of the 1937 Constitution Francisco Campos stated, "to organize the national economy along corporatist lines"⁵¹ beneath the aegis of the state.

A unified plan of government capital investment, import-substitution industrialization, and strategic nationalization not only revitalized and diversified the Brazilian economy, but also permitted the "inculcation of the ideology of development" among the population.⁵² Motivated by "the need to attend to the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie, the agrarian bourgeoisie, the middle class, and the proletariat, all shaken by the international crisis,"⁵³ this new consensus, later termed developmental nationalism in the 1950s, enabled Vargas to realize many of the Liberal Alliance proposals sidetracked by civil disturbance. Along with the giant, state-owned steel mills at Volta Redonda, the March to the West stood as one of the most visible symbols of a "philosophy [that promised that] the country might become a material paradise."⁵⁴ This paradigm still exerts a powerful hold on the Brazilian imagination.

The president predicated such far-reaching economic change was on the forging of a new sense of unity in the continental-size country. Manoïlesco had emphasized the importance of national cohesion as "[t]he beginning and the end of unity and solidarity," the touchstone of any corporatist program.⁵⁵ Vargas called this quality "Brazilianness" (*Brasilidade*), and launched "a deliberate attempt to make people think and act as Brazilians."⁵⁶ The project envisioned knitting the nation together physically as well as psychologically.

To accomplish this feat, the Estado Novo constitution of 1937 stressed the centralization of power to eliminate rivalries among the states and create national, instead of regional, identification. Having survived two challenges at least partially motivated by regionalism, the Paulista Rebellion of 1932 and the Communist uprising of 1935, Vargas recognized the inherent dangers in failing to replace local loyalties with national ones. As Alcir Lenharo has pointed out, the ideal of territorial unity, of a unified physical space, buttressed the ideology of linguistic, cultural, economic, and political oneness that Vargas proclaimed.⁵⁷ Campos succinctly diagrammed this interconnection in a speech on the second anniversary of the 10 November coup when he placed territory before all else in anthropomorphizing his country: "Brazil is Brazil the territory, Brazil the Nation, Brazil the man, Brazil is blood, muscles, sensibility, life--Brazil is alive!"⁵⁸ Getúlio Vargas initiated the March to the West in large part because he recognized that without command over and

knowledge of its own territorial expanses, forging a Nation would prove impossible.

National unity also had two important economic components that underscored the thematic importance of drawing Brazil closer together. Territorial cohesion would allow the regime to more efficiently "husband the natural resources"⁵⁹ of the country for the booming industrial plant of the Southeast. The March to the West, like the nationalization of steel, electrical energy, and, later, petroleum, secured Brazil's raw materials.

Furthermore, national cohesiveness meant "economic solidarity,"⁶⁰ a grand plan to form a single marketplace in Brazil. This idea operated on two planes: on a practical level, radical transformation could not occur without economies of scale. On an ideological level, "[t]he unification of the national market represented. . . the integration of the people, conquering geographical barriers."⁶¹ The March to the West, with its emphasis on transportation and colonization both to improve the flow of products and to establish new populations of buyers, lay at the heart of Vargas' push to mold a national market for consumer goods and light durables in Brazil.

Above these conceptions of economic development and national unity floated an amorphous vision of Brazil's sovereignty and place in history. Vargas saw himself as fulfilling the "predestined glory" of the nation.⁶² His agenda unabashedly looked to hasten the advent of a new era. The Estado Novo, according to the president, functioned

as "an anticipation of the future order" by taking the necessary steps to ensure the coming greatness of Brazil as a world power.⁶³ Much of this futurism comes from the economist and sociologist Aquiles Loria, whose utopianism influenced Vargas and his advisors, especially Oswaldo Aranha. Loria believed that "America has in its hands the key to the historical enigma that Europe has sought in vain for centuries, because this land without history will reveal the Course of Universal History." Aranha affirmed that Brazil would contribute the most to this revelation through its "magnanimity in victory and solidarity in peace."⁶⁴

Out of this determinism came the defining metaphor of the Estado Novo: the March. Propagandist Alvimar Silva summed up the Vargas agenda with a phrase brilliant in its simplicity: "Now is the hour of the march of Brazil."⁶⁵ The March to the West, the metaphor given life, encapsulated perfectly this sense of destiny and inevitable progress that suffused the New State. Pressed to convince the general population, the Estado Novo relied on emotion to connect with ordinary Brazilians. The concoction of a unifying mythology of national integration through westward expansion played on the nation's self-image and dreams. Vargas' program rested on hope, "an incalculable reserve of hope-- the hope of millions of Brazilians faced with the probable surprises of a world without order and the intangible enigma of tomorrow."⁶⁶ Along with the overtures to urban workers, the March to the West instilled the light of a glorious

new day among poor people trapped in the darkness of depression and insecurity.

Getúlio Vargas might have provided solace to Brazilians, but he also manipulated them out of any meaningful input into the political system, the final component of the Estado Novo scheme. Critics have suggested that the dictator followed "no 'ism' other than a vulgar, banal one that demands no fancier label than opportunism,"⁶⁷ and Vargas did exploit circumstances and events for his own benefit. The Estado Novo politically demobilized the Brazilian population, and the March to the West played a role in this emasculation. As with economic development, with the March Vargas and his Cabinet attempted to channel and control an ongoing trend, rural-to-urban migration, for the benefit of the regime and its supporters. The free movement of labor and the question of land tenure presented an uncertainty for the regime, and the March aimed at depoliticizing the issues to avoid conflict and boost profits.

Only weeks after his takeover in November 1937, the president, now dictator, combined all of these themes in his public elevation of the West to the status of a definitive national issue. By the end of 1937, commercial concerns combined with the worsening reports of violence, police abuse, and social upheaval in the West led Vargas to launch a major policy initiative to deal with the region. The atmosphere of tension and instability in Belém, Cuiabá, and Goiás Velho was hampering trade and undermining the grip of the regime in Rio. In his address to the nation from the Guanabara Palace in Rio

at midnight on 31 December, Vargas formally launched the March to the West:

More than a simple image, it is an urgent reality and necessity to scale the mountains, cross the plateaus, and expand along the latitudes. Retaking the trail of the pioneers who planted in the heart of the Continent, in a vigorous and epic feat, the stakes of our territorial boundaries, we must again overcome obstacles, shorten distances, clear paths, and extend economic frontiers to consolidate, definitively, the foundations of the Nation. The true sense of Brasilidade is the March to the West.⁶⁸

In a striking escalation of his rhetoric, Getúlio equated western development with the crux of his regime's ideology. The movement to tame the Oeste now defined Brazil's character and identity as a nation. One sentence had irrevocably transformed the issue of the interior from the province of foreign voyagers and Brazilian futurists to a consuming national campaign that would outlive both Vargas and his Estado Novo. Yet the speech did not specifically link the March to the state. Only as he erected a new machinery of central government would Vargas federalize the West. Nevertheless, as the bells rang in the new year 1938, the dictator had laid the groundwork for the creation of a unifying mythology that still sustains Brazil.

Over the next several months, as he tightened his grip on power and began to assemble the administrative apparatus of the Estado Novo, the dictator continued to present the West as a keystone of his program. During a collective press interview on 19 February 1938, Vargas, having vanquished all of his political foes,

from the Paulistas to the Communists to the Integralists, stated that the only opponent left for the new Brazil was the sertão:

Brazilian imperialism consists in expanding our economic frontiers and integrating them into a coherent system in which resources and goods circulate freely and rapidly. . . . The sertão and its isolation, are the only terrible enemies of the nation's integration.⁶⁹

Harking back to Euclides da Cunha's first vision of the interior as a barrier to progress and echoing Araújo de Lima's rhetoric, Vargas identifies the West as an obstacle to his program of national unity.

In this interview the president prescribed a new solution for this question of the interior: "Brazilian imperialism." Vargas defined this concept as "internal demographic and economic expansion, Brazil conquering herself and achieving the integration of the state."⁷⁰

These comments stand as milestones in the history of Brazilian policy towards the interior-- for the first time a president had spoken of a crusade that linked westward expansion with the solidification of the state. The term "imperialism" consciously recalled the Portuguese colonial project in the West during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. Once again the central government could now develop a comprehensive campaign of colonization and exploration.

In the interview the president introduced another important concept of his later policy, "the mobile frontier." Vargas identified Brazil as a new nation, born of colonizing expansion, in which "the lines of political demarcation and the limits of economic appropriation do not coincide."⁷¹ The March to the West, the new

Brazilian internal imperial drive, heeding the admonitions of nationalists dating back into the nineteenth century, would converge these separate economic and political frontiers into an integrated nation.

The president expanded upon these statements in another interview on 22 April. For the first time, Vargas defined the merging of the mobile frontiers in terms of his three-part Estado Novo outline:

With the immense territorial reserves at our disposal, it will be possible to form a unified market capable of absorbing the production of our already industrialized regions and developing industrialization in recently occupied areas.⁷²

The creation of an internal market for the import-substitution industrialization products manufactured by state-subsidized sectors based along the coast, one of the components of the drive for national unity, was a consummate goal of the Vargas regime. The March to the West hoped to create such a national market by forging economic and transportation links between the urbanized littoral and the rural interior: Brazil would not be able to sell its new light consumer goods to all of its population if it could not ship them to every part of the country. Furthermore, the stores of raw materials hidden in the Oeste would fuel an explosion of industrialization all across the nation.

The leaders of the frontier states fully supported Vargas' decision to commence a national program to incorporate the West. Magalhães Barata, returned to his post as interventor in Pará by the Estado Novo, in a report to the president spoke for his colleagues in

the interior by affirming that the federal government had to take the lead in dealing with the region:

[The] state should be in our country the primary sponsor of economic development. . . . PRINCIPALLY in Amazonia, where the extraordinary exuberance of nature suffocates individual initiative, and man is conditioned more by the environment that surrounds him than in any other place.⁷³

The interventors of the Western states would enthusiastically embrace the cause of the March over the next several years, and they would provide Vargas with some of his most reliable political backing into the 1950s.

For state officials westward expansion signaled the distribution of old-fashioned pork-barrel patronage. As Alcir Lenharo has underlined, during Vargas' crusade the New State appropriated substantial funds for the states of the interior: "[T]he March meant that the central government would grapple with the costs of equipping and maintaining telegraph and telephone networks, as well as creating air transport services and improving terrestrial and fluvial infrastructure."⁷⁴ That the president would bestow the material benefits of westward expansion on states whose leaders had remained staunchly loyal was no accident.

Having introduced the Brazilian people to his new crusade, in 1938 Getúlio Vargas set out to sell the project of westward expansion to one of the most important constituencies of his regime: big business. On 23 July the president visited the heart of industrial Brazil, São Paulo, and spoke before the nation's commercial elite at

the Stock Exchange (*Bolsa de Mercadorias*). Vargas played to Paulista chauvinism to promote his vision:

[T]he Government [is] precisely preaching a new crusade, what I have called 'March to the West,' the valorization of the Brazilian sertão, of those vast zones conquered for this nation by your forefathers four centuries ago. They now [need] to be used for modern processes in the interest of Brazil itself.⁷⁵

The interests of industrial production and commercial expansion would provide much of the impetus for the March to the West. Vargas' push for national integration would knit together a disparate coalition of newly emerging urban and rural elites, considerably different from those that had run Brazil in the past, in the quest to mine resources and profits from the untapped West.

On 10 November, the first anniversary of the coup, Vargas gave a press conference in which he sketched out the future course of his regime. The president declared that he would take swift action on his promises to develop the interior:

The Government will, without delay, . . . address the matter of [colonization], creating, if necessary, a special service to promote the peopling and rational exploitation of the fertile stretches of the . . . Oeste, to establish new nuclei for the expansion of productive energy.⁷⁶

For the first time a Brazilian president had publicly committed himself to expanding the federal bureaucracy to develop the interior and transplant people there.

With the announcement and definition of the March to the West, Vargas co-opted the ideas of his opponents on the right, the Integralists. Riding the nationalist backlash against immigrants and

foreign land concessions, the president in his rhetoric appropriated Plínio Salgado's vision of a duality of "two Brazils," a coast poisoned by foreign influences and an authentic interior that contained the "concrete or essential core of the nation."⁷⁷

The Estado Novo colonization policy also reflected pressure on Vargas from the right wing against the break-up of the latifundia. Gustavo Barroso, one of the Green Shirts' ideologues, insisted, "In a territorial monster like our Fatherland, it is not necessary to take land from anyone, but to give land to the greatest number."⁷⁸ Adopting this point of view, the Estado Novo designed March to the West initiatives to open up marginal areas for settlement rather than to redistribute any of the rich, arable parts of Brazil concentrated in the hands of a relative few. Yet while Vargas took advantage of the Integralists' concept of the other interior Brazil, he also constructed the March to the West specifically to prevent the Green Shirts' solution to the gulf between the coast and the West, a revolution emerging from the sertão. Westward expansion under the New State would be a counter-revolutionary partnership to preserve the *status quo*, not a social transformation.

One arm of the apparatus of the state had already prepared itself to help Vargas in this campaign. With the advent of the Estado Novo, the Brazilian military regained a level of prominence in affairs of state that it had not exercised since 1894. Vargas promoted active-duty officers to many federal and state-level posts, and "[these] technocrats penetrated strategic areas of economic policy

linked to state initiative" for the first time.⁷⁹ From 1937 until 1945, military personnel served as interventors, cabinet ministers, and planners in numbers never before seen in Brazil.

As part of this wide-ranging involvement in policy, the hierarchy of the armed forces became particularly interested in the idea of westward expansion. In the late 1930s, an important current of thought emerged within the Brazilian military. Termed "military pioneerism" (*sertanismo militar*) by one of its most important proponents, Major Frederico Rondon, nephew of the great explorer,⁸⁰ the ideology was the forerunner of the doctrine of national security applied to the West. Military strategists became convinced that civilian efforts had failed to develop the interior of Brazil, and they concluded that only the army possessed the "bandeirante spirit" to correct the errors of the past and bring the West into the twentieth century.⁸¹ Furthermore, elements within the officer corps envisioned the undefended Oeste as "a defenseless bait for universal greed," open for usurpation by an audacious and stronger nation, especially Argentina.⁸² For the first time in Brazilian military thought, a concept of national defense included internal development. Frederico Rondon and others laid the foundations of an ideology for the military's participation in westward expansion that still holds today.

These ideologues saw "a great colonizing mission" for the armed forces, "a national project to integrate the Sertões, man and earth, into the Brazilian Fatherland."⁸³ The essence of this doctrine was the

"militarization" of the frontier.⁸⁴ Military pioneerism encompassed a specific list of duties that soldiers had never before been asked to perform, including "implanting order and encouraging progress through the guarantee of private property, sanitary assistance, [and] the regularizing of indigenous tribes."⁸⁵ As the centerpiece of this strategy, Frederico Rondon revived an old idea, the "paramilitary colonization" of the West, or the planned cultivation of civilian enclaves guarded (and watched over) by detachments of troops.⁸⁶ Composed of Brazilian nationals only, the colonies would both congregate the dispersed populations of the West and provide a "policed and orderly" environment for resettling city dwellers.⁸⁷

Among the strongest proponents of the idea of colonization under the auspices of the armed forces was General José Pessoa, commander of the Ninth Military Region (*9ª Região Militar*) in Mato Grosso. In 1938, the general wrote to Vargas to support, on both economic and national security grounds, the immediate implementation of such a policy. "We are all in agreement on initiating the March [to the West]," Pessoa affirmed, and he asked the president to begin the construction of roads in the interior, along which "should be created nuclei of colonization."⁸⁸ Not long after, the Vargas administration would create an agency to carry out exactly such a plan.

The National Colonization Institute (*Instituto de Colonização Nacional*-- ICN) clarified the calculus of the Estado Novo arrangement on westward expansion by introducing the military as

the third element into the equation. Set up under the auspices of the Army as "a colonizing cooperative society," the Institute, according to its by-laws, promoted "the integration of the frontier and interior sertões into the Brazilian Fatherland."⁸⁹ The goals of the organization, echoed the president's rhetoric in April by emphasizing "the methodical exploitation of natural resources and the development of related industries." Plans also called for the formation of colonies, termed "syndical-cooperative nuclei" of Brazilians and foreigners in the Oeste.⁹⁰ While government-backed agricultural settlements in the West were not a new concept (Euclides da Cunha had proposed exactly such a step as part of his "Transaccreana" Railroad idea in 1909),⁹¹ no administration had actually embraced any such scheme before. The ICN proclaimed that it would literally follow in the path of General Rondon by sowing the seeds of population along the telegraph rights-of-way.

One of the goals of the ICN was explicitly geared towards the preservation of national security. The organization, influenced by the ideology of military pioneerism, intended to form mixed border militias composed of "backlander and indigenous contingents. . . to defend the Sertões."⁹² Reflecting the rise of nativism about the frontier, these companies of Indians and other Brazilians were designed "to correct, in the interests of the Nation, the effects of intensive foreign colonization."⁹³ According to the ICN, Rondon's pacification missions in the West now enabled tribespeople and

colonists to guard the Fatherland in solidarity against the covetousness of outsiders.

While the ICN announced itself as the spiritual heir of the Rondon Commission, in reality the entity was designed as a for-profit joint-stock company supported by federal, state, and local funds and individual donations. Private citizens could join as "cooperators," for a price, by buying shares. Despite lofty principles, the organization had the real motive of generating revenue for its investors and officials. According to the Institute's by-laws, ten percent of the liquid profits were to be disbursed to such share-holders, with only forty percent earmarked for the colonies; administrative costs would absorb the remaining half.⁹⁴ With these parameters, the ICN epitomized the entire March to the West: a profit-driven enterprise underwritten by the state, championed by the military, masquerading as a philanthropic foundation. Vargas early on identified the preservation of the *status quo* and the enrichment of his supporters as his top priority. The ICN set the tone for the development of the Brazilian West right up to the present day.

During 1939, Vargas appeared to revert to his old pattern of dealing with the interior by following a period of activity and public rhetoric with renewed dormancy, as he had after his landmark 1933 trip to Amazonia. Perhaps the organization of the Department of Press and Propaganda (*Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda* -- DIP), the factory that would produce the ideological arms of the March to the West, absorbed most of the president's attention. In

1939, the state quietly raised the structural undergirders for the forthcoming campaign. Only sporadically during the year would Vargas himself appear in the public eye to address the issue of western expansion.

The first such speech took place on 11 April at Areias, Minas Gerais, during inauguration ceremonies for the highway to Caxambú. To his *Mineiro*⁹⁵ audience Vargas for the first time linked the drive to move West with the Estado Novo goal of transforming Brazil into a world power:

We are the lords of these rich expanses that our elders bequeathed to us. What we want is to occupy the place that befits us among the great nations of the World, esteemed and admired for our will to strive, with our labor and our natural resources, for the good of humanity.⁹⁶

Vargas elevated the stakes of developing the Oeste: now the drive would have an impact not just on Brazil's economic and social health, but also on the nation's international standing. Praising the "fecund interior" as "an example of healthy patriotism,"⁹⁷ a line that he would utter on several other occasions, the dictator sought to rally the population of Minas, a buffer between coast and interior, to turn their attention West. No state was better positioned to profit from the March to the West, and some argue that none did.

While Vargas worked at selling the idea of a movement towards the interior to the people of the Southeast, elements of the administration began to fashion a self-protective, revisionist history of federal Western policy. Jorge Andrade, Technical Advisor for the

state Treasury of Amazonas (*Diretoria Geral da Fazenda Pública*), issued a report that blamed the "evidently criminal negligence" of republican governments for the collapse of the Rubber Boom after the turn of the century.⁹⁸ In a classic tactic of bureaucratic propaganda that the Vargas regime would employ repeatedly during the next few years, the document attacked previous administrations for failing to either oversee and regulate the economy or invest in improvements in infrastructure and cultivation. Andrade was also the first Estado Novo official to propagate the "Black Legend" of Henry Wickham-- the report scathingly admonishes the Empire for allowing the Englishman to export *hevea* seeds and thereby ruin the Brazilian rubber industry.⁹⁹ A significant portion of March to the West propaganda, both bureaucratic and mass, would excoriate Vargas' predecessors for their inattention to the interior and present the New State's very modest achievements as major advances in comparison. Pointing to at least a hundred years of government ignorance about the Oeste made Getúlio's eight years of stalling look like a period of careful planning.

Another Vargas advisor, Marques dos Reis, the president of the Bank of Brazil (*Banco do Brasil*),¹⁰⁰ followed Andrade's line in a speech at the DIP on 3 November. On the ninth anniversary of the Revolution of 1930, dos Reis, head of the agency that had provided and would continue to proffer most of the financing for the March to the West (see Chapter Four), underlined the innovation of the president's interior policy: "His work of national unity is grandiose,

[and] what stands out is the dissipation of the prejudice, exploited by evil politicians, in which the [West] almost did not have the right to live.:¹⁰¹ The abolition of parties and "special interests" in favor of a government of national unity served as one of the major justifications of the 1937 coup. The Estado Novo made the republican system culpable for virtually all of society's ills. The March to the West would blame the underdevelopment of Amazonia and the Planalto on partisan politics as well.

Vargas broke his months-long silence on the West a week later, on the second anniversary of the Estado Novo. The president fleshed out his idea of colonizing the interior, and, for the first time, the president talked of actually moving Brazilians out of certain regions: "It is. . . in the sense of promoting the colonization of the interior that the Government is currently setting its sights on fixing the excess population of certain regions of the nation in more productive areas less subject to drought."¹⁰² The head of the Estado Novo had now committed his administration to the movement of thousands of Brazilians into the Oeste, a radical advancement in policy and one that would remain a tenet of governments into the late 1970s. In this context Vargas clearly identified the candidates for removal to the West as the inhabitants of the dry Northeast, the poverty-stricken, overpopulated zone that had sent thousands fleeing to Amazonia in the 1870s and 1880s. Within a few months events would cause the regime to accelerate its planning and add residents the urban slums to its list of ideal colonists.

Vargas' commitment to Western expansion also meant full backing for his allies in the interior, the interventors. When a representative of Northern Goiás (now the separate state of Tocantins) came to Rio to present the president with a report on the dire situation of his region, for two months Getúlio ignored the man's pleas for an audience. No doubt armed with a sheaf of complaints against Pedro Ludovico, the envoy never set foot in Catete Palace.¹⁰³

By the end of 1939, Getúlio Vargas had laid out the direction that his March to the West would take: Internal imperialism, not territorial aggrandizement, became his leitmotif, an effort to merge Brazil's political and economic frontiers to form a unified national market for industrial production and to improve access to natural resources. To accomplish this goal, the state would promote the movement of large numbers of Brazilians to the interior in for-profit schemes backed by the military.

¹ The title comes from a comment by Ladislau, who called the interior of Brazil "[a] Canaan that awaits its people." As quoted by Leopoldo Péres, *Política e Espírito do Regime* (Rio de Janeiro: Empresa A Noite, 1941), 165.

² Onofre de Andrade, *Amazonia: esboço historico, geographia physica, geographia humana e ethnographia dp Rio Jurua* (Maceió: Casa Ramalho, 1937), 29.

³ Hermano Ribeiro da Silva, *Garimpos de Mato Grosso* (São Paulo: n.p., 1936; reprint ed., São Paulo: Saraiva, 1954), 10. Indigenous tribesmen would kill Ribeiro da Silva in Mato Grosso in 1937.

⁴ Brazil, Congresso, Senado, *A concessão de Terras Amazonenses a japoneses* (Rio de Janeiro: A. Coelho Branco Filho Editor, 1937), 13.

⁵ Vargas, *Ordem e democracia* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1936), 5.

⁶ Brazil, Congresso, Senado, Comissão de Constituição, Justiça, Educação, Cultura e Saude Pública, *Parecer Nº 64 de 1936*, In Brazil, Congresso, Senado, *A concessão de Terras Amazonenses a japoneses* (Rio de Janeiro: A. Coelho Branco Filho Editor, 1937), 149.

⁷ Maia had declared in the 1934 constituent assembly that his state was the focus of a propaganda campaign in Asia to turn it into a "yellow paradise." Brazil, *A concessão*, 12.

⁸ Neither a million-hectare concession on the Solimões and Madeira Rivers granted to a Polish syndicate in 1928 nor a 1930 deal of the same size with other Japanese investors in Amazonas had aroused any anger. Reis, *cobiça*, 183; Schurz, 157. Perhaps the first real instance of public nationalism about Amazonia during the Vargas regime came over the Iglesias Expedition, a scientific mission proposed by Spanish air force captain Francisco Iglesias in 1933. The magazine *Cronica* sparked the outcry by publishing an article that claimed that the expedition's equipment included large shipments of military munitions. Fear that Iglesias was fronting for a secret move by Spain to re-colonize Amazonia caused the Brazilian government to kill the mission. Reis, *cobiça*, 190.

⁹ Senator Tavares da Cunha Mello's motives for opposing the Japanese concession may not have been entirely pure. Deputy Luiz Tirelli accused him of having served as the frontman and lawyer for a foreigner's sweetheart acquisition of a large tract of land between Manaus and Boa Vista in 1923. The allegation was not proven, but the senator had represented in court a Brazilian who had won a road-building concession in the Rio Branco region annulled by inventor Maia-- a possible conflict of interest. Brazil, *A concessão*, 205-246.

¹⁰ Ito Plácido Brandão, "A infiltração japonesa no Brasil," *Jornal do Comércio*, 21 October 1935, 5.

¹¹ One of the loudest voices against the Japanese Amazonian deal was the rabidly racist deputy Xavier de Oliveira, from Ceará. As a member of the constituent assembly, Oliveira offered a constitutional amendment to ban all persons "of the black and yellow races" from emigrating to Brazil. de Oliveira, *O problema imigratório na América Latina: o sentido político-militar da colonização japonesa nos países do Novo Mundo*, 2ª Edição (Rio de Janeiro: A. Coelho Branco Filho Editor, 1942), 19. While that proposal failed, another to establish restrictive quotas on Japanese immigration did pass. An equal-opportunity racist, Xavier de Oliveira also ranted that "international Judaism"

had designs on Brazilian Amazonia. de Oliveira, *Redivisão política e territorial do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1946), 66.

12 Ibid., 251. Anti-semitism may have also influenced Brazilian Amazonian colonization policy. In 1938, a French financier wrote to José Malcher, interventor of Pará, to propose the settlement of fifty to sixty thousand European immigrants, including a fair percentage of Jews, in that state. The Vargas administration rejected the idea on the grounds that it wanted to give preference in the peopling of the interior to Brazilians. S. Marcovici-Cleja to José Malcher, 22 August 1938, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 183.

13 Araújo de Lima, *Amazônia*, 205.

14 Araújo de Lima, *A situação econômica do Amazonas, especialmente em face das pretensões americanas* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia do *Jornal do Comércio*, 1923), 22, 38.

15 Araújo de Lima, *Amazônia*, 167.

16 Ibid., 189-190.

17 Ibid., 91. Vargas conspicuously ignored one key portion of Araújo de Lima's agenda, however: land reform. Presaging today's debates about land tenure in the West, the economist criticized Amazonia as the "land of latifúndia" and supported the breaking up of the large estates: "The solution for Amazonia, frustrated in its initial boom of greatness, certainly lies in redistribution, that is, the intensive dissemination of small properties." Ibid., 176-177.

18 Huascar de Figueiredo, "A ditadura do deserto," In Aderson Magalhães, et. al., *Artigos de jornal* (Rio de Janeiro: SPVEA, 1959), 18.

19 José Américo de Almeida, *A palavra e o tempo* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1965), 45.

20 Ibid., 46.

21 The joint Brazilian-Swiss Fusoni/Rattin expedition vanished with 14 men in 1932, and Englishman Albert de Winton was last heard from in 1934, probably killed by the Suías Indians. Willy Aureli, *Roncador: expedição da "Bandeira Piratininga"* (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Cultura Brasileira S/A, 1939), 10-11.

22 Aureli, 47.

23 Arnaldo Otávio Nêbias, "Bandeira Anhangüera-- 1937," *Revista Brasileira de Geografia*, Ano II, Nº 2 (April 1940), 161.

24 Aureli subsequently took a lot of credit for the March to the West. He wrote in his book, "After. . . I launched the idea of a repeat of the 'Bandeiras,' a movement began in that direction. Groups of enthusiastic and patriotic young men bestirred themselves towards the famous West, so rich and so unknown." Aureli, 14.

25 Smith, 17.

26 Mário Corrêia da Costa to Vargas, 28 January 1936, FGV, CPDOC, Rolo 4.

27 For more details on the turmoil in Cuiabá, see Edgard Carone, *A República Nova (1930-1937)* (São Paulo: DIFEL, 1974), 360.

28 Brazil, Presidência da República, "Informações sobre Mato Grosso," Part III, 16. The Tratado de Ligação Ferroviária would be signed on 25 February 1938. Not a new proposal, a railroad constituted one of Brazil's longstanding unfulfilled obligations from the 1903 Treaty of Petrópolis, which settled the Acre Question. As early as 1931, a secret memo to Vargas had urged the

construction of this railway to forestall Bolivian recidivism and preserve Brazilian national security in the region. Lauro Fragin, "Ligações ferroviárias com a Bolívia," Memorandum, 22 July 1931, FGV, CPDOC, Rolo 2, 15.

²⁹ An Italian priest, St. John Bosco, or Dom Bosco, as the Brazilians call him, founded the Salesian Order; in 1883 he dreamt of the existence of oil deposits in the Pantanal, between 15° and 20° latitude. Dom Bosco's prophecies would play an important propaganda role in the founding of Brasília in the 1950s.

³⁰ M.A. Teixeira de Freitas wrote a secret letter to the National Security Council (*Conselho Superior de Segurança Nacional*—CSSN) in which he affirmed, "Very probably, one of the great world forces that control petroleum policy [would give] subterranean support in exchange for the privilege to exploit the formidable oil riches of Mato Grosso." Teixeira de Freitas to Francisco José Pinto, 10 August 1938, AN, Arquivo Particular M.A. Teixeira de Freitas, Caixa 49, Pasta 103, 14. In part because of these concerns, in 1938 Vargas created the National Petroleum Council (*Conselho Nacional do Petróleo*) to co-ordinate Brazilian drilling efforts. The first oil strike in Brazil occurred the following year near Salvador da Bahia.

³¹ Teresa Maria Malatian, *O Estado Novo (1930-1945)* (Franca, SP: Faculdade de História, Direito e Serviço Social, 1986), 23.

³² Gastão Pereira da Silva, *Getúlio Vargas e a psicanálise das multidões* (Rio de Janeiro: Zélio Valverde, 1940), 25.

³³ Mihaïl Manoïlesco, *O Século do Corporativismo*, Trans. by Azevedo Amaral (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1938), 22. Manoïlesco's theories had strongly influenced Mussolini in the 1920s and 1930s.

³⁴ Francisco Campos, *O Estado Nacional e suas diretrizes* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1937), 4.

³⁵ Azevedo Amaral, *Getúlio Vargas: estadista* (Rio de Janeiro: Irmãos Pongetti, 1941), 156.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 153.

³⁷ See Lúcia Lippi Oliveira, "O pensamento de Azevedo Amaral," In Lippi Oliveira, *et. al.*, *Estado Novo: ideologia e poder* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1982), 61.

³⁸ Amaral, *O estado autoritário e a realidade nacional* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1938), 197.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 212.

⁴⁰ Jahr Garcia, 79.

⁴¹ Amaral wrote that "[the] President is not simply the Chief of State, but also the Chief of the Nation." Amaral, *GV: estadista*, 92.

⁴² Malatian, 42. Justice Minister Campos, in assessing the Republican system, complained that "[t]he vice of the liberal regime consisted exactly in giving power to those who did not have responsibility." F. Campos, *Os problemas do Brasil e as grandes soluções do novo regime* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1938), 33. Campos would cap his long career as a jurist by writing the Constitution and Institutional Acts of the military dictatorship in 1964.

⁴³ George Steiner, "Franco's Games," *The New Yorker*, 17 October 1994, 116.

⁴⁴ Affonso Henriques, *Vargas, o maquiavélico* (São Paulo: Palácio do Livro, 1961), 428. The *gabinete negro* consisted of many former 1930 rebels who had

-
- become Getúlio's confidants and insiders, including Oswaldo Aranha, João Alberto, José Américo, and Leite de Castro.
- 45 Ianni, 34.
- 46 Lauerhass, 132.
- 47 Amaral, GV: *estadista*, 159.
- 48 Jahr Garcia, 60.
- 49 Lippi Oliveira, "O pensamento," 69.
- 50 Lippi Oliveira, *et. al.*, *Estado Novo*, 28.
- 51 F. Campos, *Os problemas*, 23.
- 52 Richard Bourne, *Getulio Vargas of Brazil, 1883-1954: Sphinx of the Pampas* (London: Charles Knight & Co., Ltd., 1974), 210.
- 53 Machado, 147.
- 54 Ibid., 211.
- 55 Manoilescu, 16.
- 56 Bourne, 209.
- 57 Lenharo, *Sacralização*, 57.
- 58 F. Campos. "O Sentido Renovador da Revolução," In Brazil, Presidência da República, DIP, *Os Grandes Dias do Brasil Novo*, (Rio de Janeiro: DIP, 1939) , 53.
- 59 Jahr Garcia, 62.
- 60 Sílvio Peixoto, *Aspectos históricos do Estado Novo* (Rio de Janeiro: DIP, 1940), 45.
- 61 Pedro Cezar Dutra Fonseca, *Vargas: o capitalismo em construção, 1906-1954* (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1989), 208.
- 62 Luiz Vieira, *Getúlio Vargas: estadista e sociólogo* (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1951), 116.
- 63 Mônica Pimenta Velloso, "O mito da originalidade brasileira; a trajetória intelectual de Cassiano Ricardo (dos anos 20 ao Estado Novo)," Dissertação de Mestrado, Departamento de Filosofia, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, 1983, 167. Dreams of global power status for Brazil were not so far-fetched: in 1944 and 1945 the United States "vigorously" backed Brazil for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, a proposal vetoed by the Soviets. John W.F. Dulles, *Vargas of Brazil: A Political Biography* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1967), 345. The idea has recently resurfaced in discussions of expanding the Security Council permanent membership to reflect changing global realities. See James Brooke, "Brazil's Chief Due in U.S. Riding Boom," *New York Times*, 15 April 1995, 4. See also Jordan M. Young, *Brazil: Emerging World Power*, 2nd Edition (Melbourne, FL: Krieger Publishing Co., 1991).
- 64 Aranha, *Fronteiras e limites (a política do Brasil)* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1940), 21.
- 65 Alvimar Silva, *O Novo Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1939), 98.
- 66 André Carrazzoni, *Getúlio Vargas*, 2ª Edição (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1939), 210.
- 67 Cláudio de Araújo Lima, *Mito e realidade de Vargas*, 2ª Edição (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira S/A, 1955), 64.

-
- 68 Vargas, *Nova Política*, V:124.
- 69 Vargas, *As diretrizes da Nova Política do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1942), 126.
- 70 Ibid., 124-125. Vargas took pains to specify, in a comment intended to reassure Brazil's nervous neighbors, that "Brazilian expansionism has a purely internal character." The president's reassurances echo the words of Conselheiro F. Octaviano in April 1865: "Brazil does not cast covetous eyes towards the territory of neighboring republics. . . ." Tavares Bastos, *O Valle*, 27.
- 71 Ibid., 124.
- 72 Ibid., 125.
- 73 Brazil, Estado do Pará, Interventoria Federal, "O Pará e o Estado Novo," by Joaquim Magalhães Barata, Report sent to Getúlio Vargas, 9 February 1939, 2, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 183.
- 74 Lenharo, "A Marcha para o Azul," *Anais do Museu Paulista*, Tomo XXXIII (1984), 10.
- 75 Vargas, *Nova Política*, V:305.
- 76 Vargas, *O Estado Novo e o Momento Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: I. Amorim & Cia., Ltda, 1939), 44-45.
- 77 Marilena Chauí, "Apontamentos para uma crítica da Ação Integralista Brasileira," In Chauí and Maria Sylvia Carvalho Franco, *Ideologia e mobilização popular* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra/CEDEC, 1978), 132.
- 78 Gustavo Barroso, *Espírito do século XX*, 2ª Edição (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira S/A, 1937), 252. Barroso continued, "Taking the latifúndia. . . giving them away to the landless would not resolve the agricultural and stock-raising problems of the country. It would only make things worse."
- 79 Aspásia A. de Camargo, et. al., *O golpe silencioso: as origens da república corporativa* (Rio de Janeiro: Rio Fundo Editora, 1989), 258.
- 80 F. Rondon, *Pelo Brasil Central*, 2ª Edição (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938), 293.
- 81 Ibid., 155.
- 82 Teixeira de Freitas, "Indicação apresentada à Comissão de Estudos do Conselho de Segurança Nacional," 1 December 1937, AN, Arquivo Particular M.A. Teixeira de Freitas, Caixa 49, Pasta 103, 2.
- 83 F. Rondon, *Pelo Brasil Central*, 294.
- 84 de Oliveira, *A Redivisão*, 49.
- 85 F. Rondon, *Na Rondônia*, 279.
- 86 Ibid., 159-160; the idea comes from de Oliveira, *A redivisão*, 49.
- 87 Ibid., 49.
- 88 José Pessoa to Vargas, 29 August 1938, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 182, 2-3. Historian Boris Fausto has suggested that "the consolidation of the [Vargas regime] depended on the homogenization of the military apparatus," and that Vargas and Góes Monteiro had to eliminate radical organizations, and "liquidate" the tenente movement by co-opting individual officers. See Fausto, 107. Given the history of tenente uprisings in the interior, the militarism of the March to the West perhaps also represented an attempt to exert better control over armed forces detachments in far-flung areas of the country.

-
- 89 Brazil, ICN, *Estatutos do Instituto de Colonização Nacional* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Militar, 1938), 3, LC, Microform Collection, Latin American and Iberian Pamphlets I: 1802-1950, Group III, Brazil, Reel 44, Pamphlet 384.
- 90 Ibid., 4-5.
- 91 da Cunha, *À margem da história*, 101.
- 92 Brazil, ICN, 3.
- 93 Ibid., 6.
- 94 Ibid., 13.
- 95 Brazilians refer to inhabitants of the state of Minas Gerais as *Mineiros*. Stereotype holds that the *Mineiros* are the craftiest, astutest, and most conspiratorial Brazilians, and supposedly make the best politicians.
- 96 Vargas, *Nova Política*, VI:200.
- 97 Ibid.
- 98 Jorge Andrade, *Panorama economico-financeiro do Amazonas* (Manaus: Imprensa Publica, 1939), 4.
- 99 Wickham, by all unbiased accounts, transported his seeds legally; in any case, Brazilian hubris in failing to develop new, disease-resistant strains of rubber trees and in refusing to limit production had as much to do with the catastrophe as Wickham's "theft" did.
- 100 Not, as might be inferred, the Brazilian Central Bank, but the largest bank in the country, owned by the state.
- 101 Marques dos Reis, "Sob a inspiração do dever," In *Os Grandes Dias*, 26.
- 102 Vargas, *Diretrizes*, 299.
- 103 Anonymous to Vargas, 1939, APL. The man sent a letter to the dictator that read, in part: "Even though I arrived [in Rio] sufficiently credentialed, I have been here for forty-two days, and I still have not been conceded the honor of being brought into the presence of Your Excellency. . . . The People of the orphaned North of Goiás desire to bring to the attention of Your Excellency the capital necessity on the satisfaction of which depends the progress of that vast and forward-looking region." The residents of northern Goiás had reason to complain. Bandits operated with impunity in the region. In one spectacular incident, on 27 January 1938 three hundred heavily armed brigands sacked the town of Pôrto Nacional. The Director-General of Public Safety of Goiás vainly assured Vargas in a telegram that "The Government of the state feels happy that it can guarantee Your Excellency that it has aided and rescued the population of its most vast territory." Manoel Gomes Pereira, Telegram to Vargas, 27 January 1938, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 181. Pereira's reassurance was hollow, however, for federal troops had to lay siege to Pôrto Nacional for four days before retaking the town. According to a report on 1 February in the *Diário de São Paulo*, the violence resulted from a feud between two local factions. Historian Edgar Carone blames the banditry on the rural political system of control known as *coronelismo*. Carone, 138.

Chapter Six: Go West, 1940-1941

Nations shall behold your vindication,
And all kings your glory;
.....
No more shall men call you "Forsaken,"
Or your land "Desolate"¹
-- Isaiah 62:1-5

The modern Brazilian is eager for adventure, and he goes to
conquer the jungle, a movement worthy of encouragement.²
-- J.R. de Sá Carvalho.

The Estado Novo hit full stride during 1940. New State
propaganda, with the establishment of the DIP, intensified: for the
first time Brazilians publicly fêted Getúlio Vargas' birthday, for
example. 1940 also marked the turning point for the March to the
West, as the president journeyed throughout the interior to preach
his crusade.

Why, two years after its proclamation, did the March to the
West take off in 1940? One document changed the plans of the
Vargas regime and brought new urgency to the issue of the interior.
At the beginning of the fourth decade of the twentieth century,
Getúlio Vargas, in a step not taken since 1920, ordered that all
Brazilians should be counted. The census of 1940 demonstrated with
startling clarity what city-dwellers in Brazil had known for some
time: a booming rural-to-urban migration was swelling the
populations of the nation's coastal capitals. From Natal, Recife, and
Bahia in the North to Rio, São Paulo, and Pôrto Alegre in the South,
according to the reckoning, millions had left the countryside

permanently for a new life in the cities. The city of Rio de Janeiro had grown by more than 288,000 people since the last census, and the state of São Paulo by an amazing 2,588,000.³ Most of the new arrivals, or *retirantes*, ended up living in acute squalor in one of the burgeoning shantytowns called *favelas* in the Southeast and *mocambos* in the Northeast. A nation of thirty million, thirteen percent of whom lived in municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants, had become a nation of forty-one million, sixteen percent of whom lived in cities.⁴ By the Brazilian government's definition of urban population, those who lived in an administrative center, the change appeared even more dramatic: Brazil was thirty-one percent urban in 1920 and thirty-six percent urban in 1940.⁵ The drainage of five percent of the population from the countryside alarmed policy-makers in Rio as a possible source of social unrest.

That the most severe population hemorrhage had occurred in the very areas that the government had declared in need of colonization particularly disturbed Vargas and his advisors. The state of Pará and the territory of Acre had less people in 1940 than in 1920. Pará, home to 983,507 people in 1920, counted only 944,644 residents twenty years later.⁶ Acre suffered the most extreme loss: census data originally projected a total of 122,099, which would have comprised a substantial increase from the 1920 population of 92,379. Yet a final analysis readjusted the figures to a paltry 79,768.⁷

Beginning in 1940, Vargas would design the March to the West to help narrow the widening gap between life in the countryside and life in the cities. Diverting rural-to-urban migration, particularly from the Northeast, turned into a high priority of the Estado Novo. In part, the March to the West represented a recognition on the part of policy-makers that only alleviating rural destitution could solve the problems of urban Brazil. Westward expansion would serve as a safety valve to siphon off the landless and prevent their arrival in Rio or São Paulo.

At the same time, the March to the West also represented an attempt to extend social control to rural areas. Hand-in-hand with the Labor Code and the moralization campaigns in popular music, both directed at urban factory workers, western colonization had as one intention "the forging of a depoliticized, disciplined, and productive laborer."⁸ In March, as part of this strategy Vargas issued a directive to "nationalize the frontier" in the West.⁹ The president decreed that a thirty-kilometer-wide strip adjacent to the nation's borders was to be "dominated by Brazilian interests" and populated only by citizens.¹⁰ The Estado Novo allowed only reservists, retired military personnel and public servants, and internal migrants to occupy lands in these areas. Vargas' government also strictly regulated transportation and commerce within the zone.¹¹ To watch over the new colonies, the president turned to the army. Two "frontier platoons" soon took up residence on Brazil's western borders, at Clevelândia (now in Amapá) in the

north and Tabatinga (Amazonas) in the northwest.¹² Minister of War Dutra also moved companies of troops into northern Mato Grosso and Goiás as part of this militarization of the West.¹³

To promote the "new crusade,"¹⁴ during 1940 Getúlio Vargas embarked upon the most ambitious itinerary of domestic travel that any Brazilian statesman had ever undertaken. Casting himself as the "New Moses [who] has placed himself at the front of the new Semites who shall open up" the West,¹⁵ the president resolved to lead his people into the Promised Land of the interior on board his Lockheed 04. Vargas, raised among horses in rural Rio Grande do Sul, became the first Brazilian head of state to travel by air, and he would touch down in five Western capitals during the year. Each of the presidential trips would generate enormous publicity, introducing ordinary citizens to parts of their own country that most had never seen (or perhaps heard of), and would allow the dictator to deliver his message of westward expansion to a mass audience. As the DIP itself admitted, however, "the example of his voyage. . . [was] worth more than the propaganda of his words."¹⁶ The images of Vargas abroad in the interior would become the most powerful advertisements for the March to the West.

Along the way Vargas would reward his supporters and repay political debts to his partisans far from Rio. The journeys would become a standard tool not only of the March but also of every other aspect of his regime-- Getúlio, who had abolished partisan politics, ironically came to govern as if he were eternally campaigning for re-

election. Of later presidents, perhaps only the jet-fueled Juscelino Kubitschek could claim to have logged more miles touring Brazil than Vargas.

That the president's western first trip of 1940 took him to Goiás should come as no surprise: Vargas owed no politician of the interior more than Pedro Ludovico. According to the interventor, Vargas' aide-de-camp (*ajudante de ordem*), Capt. Vanique, convinced the dictator to visit the landlocked state: "Vanique was a sertanejo. . . . He put it into Getúlio's head to come to Goiás, and I seconded the idea."¹⁷ Other than giving the president a good excuse to flee the damp of August in Rio for the dry Planalto, the journey allowed him to bestow "the blessing of the Master," on his protégé's greatest achievement, "the runt capital of the Federation"—Goiânia.¹⁸ Vargas' trip to Goiás marks the true start of the March to the West.

Upon landing at the airstrip in Goiânia on 5 August, Getúlio Vargas strode down the stairway from his military aircraft, shook the hand of Pedro Ludovico, and said, "I am here in your land, Mr. Interventor, to begin the March to the West."¹⁹ Over the next two days, the president toured the city's public buildings (the construction of which he had subsidized in 1935), posed for photographs, and was treated to a huge *churrasco*, or barbecue, hosted by the fifty-three mayors of Goiás.²⁰

Having seen for the first time the concrete results of his monetary and political support for Ludovico, Vargas on the evening of 7 August played up his own role in the development of the West.

At a banquet given by the interventor in the new Government Palace, the dictator delivered a speech entitled "The Present and Future of Goiás" (*O presente e o futuro de Goiás*). He maintained that his administration had returned Brazil to its natural westward path, from which the corrupting cosmopolitanism of the Republic had caused the country to deviate: "With the Revolution of 1930, a movement of nationalist reinvigoration, and the advent of the Estado Novo, which came to give form to the deep yearnings of the nation. . . Brazilian civilization has resumed its path along the parallels, restored to its historic roots."²¹

Vargas also took a large measure of credit for the construction of the state capital itself. The president boldly stated that the plan would have failed without his approval and seemed to skate over the long struggle that had preceded the concession of federal loans: "What you lacked was the support of the central government, and, as soon as it arrived, you showed your organizing skills and your progressive spirit. . . "²² The self-congratulatory remarks, perhaps jarring to those who had fought for ten years against the partisans of Goiás Velho, contained the unarguable message that the dictator's backing made the project irrevocable.

The dictator also had a larger agenda in his address-- to portray the new city as the first victory in the assault on the interior. Praising the people of Goiânia for their industriousness and scientific planning, Vargas declared the new city a paradigm, a beacon for advancements elsewhere in Brazil: "From the heights of your endless

tablelands, where tomorrow the great granaries of the nation shall be, a wave of civilization shall descend to the plains of the West and the Northeast."²³ Goiânia, the president indicated, now served as the departure point for these paths West.

The following day, Vargas spoke at the inauguration of a local civic association named the Direction West Crusade (*Cruzada Rumo ao Oeste*— CRO). There he announced the demographic imperatives of westward expansion. Returning to his concept of Brazilian imperialism, the dictator indicated that the redistribution of population had top priority in the March: "We must promote this uprooting in every way in order to fill the demographic vacuum of our territory. . . . That is our imperialism."²⁴ Vargas called Brazil "an archipelago," and pledged that his regime would unite its various "islands" by conquering the "vast, unpopulated spaces" of the West.²⁵

Aside from the importance of Vargas' remarks, the ceremony of 8 August also stands out because of the organization that it introduced, the CRO. A private entity, the CRO shared the profiteering character of its closest relative, the National Institute of Colonization (ICN-- see Chapter Five), but appeared at first glance more like an independent fraternal group or benevolent association. By the time Vargas stepped onto the tarmac in Goiânia, however, the Estado Novo propaganda machine had swallowed the group whole. As Abelardo Coimbra Bueno, one of the founders of the CRO, later (perhaps disingenuously) lamented, " The idea [was] purely idealistic;

we wanted no position, no advantage. But Lourival Fontes took the idea from me, and transformed it. . . into a demagogic promotion."²⁶

The Direction West Crusade figures as one of the most comprehensive schemes that Fontes created, as sweeping in its claims as it was ineffectual in its results. Article Two of the CRO's by-laws identified the group as an adjunct to the Estado Novo: "[The] CRO will always coordinate with the Public Sector, the press of the Nation, and other entities to promote the campaign of the 'March to the West. . . .'"²⁷ Propaganda clearly took precedence over all else. As its highest goal the group pledged itself to "create and fix in the public conscience the conception of the West as the foundation of the Nation."²⁸ Cloaked in an altruistic mantle but in reality a puppet of the Vargas propaganda bureaucracy, the organization would generate press clippings but little progress in the struggle against nature in the interior.

In this effort the CRO followed the prescriptions of General Góes Monteiro (See Chapter Eight) very closely. One of its major aims was to indoctrinate Brazilian children with an ideology of horizontal expansion. The organization's by-laws spelled out this goal as "Propagating as much as possible in schools, universities, and youth groups the study of the West. . . ."²⁹ In addition to such classroom instruction, the CRO borrowed an idea from the Boy Scouts and put together field trips named "Youth Bandeiras" (*Bandeiras Juvenis*) to expose urban youth to the wonders of the Brazilian interior.

The CRO directed its advertising at adults as well, particularly the intelligentsia. In a program that would not bring results until 1943 and 1944, the group invited the intellectual vanguard of Brazil "to make lectures and write studies about the problems of the Oeste."³⁰ Crusade-backed cultural excursions called "Cultural Bandieras" (*Bandeiras Culturais*), presumably more high-brow than the youth brigade trips, brought opinion-makers and artists to the interior in the hopes that they would incorporate Western themes into their writings and artwork.

Perhaps more important than such didactic proposals, however, business interests would dominate the CRO agenda,. Sharing the capitalist philosophy of the ICN (see Chapter Five), the group boosted economic growth in the West by sponsoring corporate junkets called "Bandeiras Comerciais." Composed of "the preeminent elements of trade, industry, and finance, as well as state representatives and missions," the tours included visits to public works projects and factories.³¹ Furthermore, the organization encouraged foreign involvement and investment in the interior (in contrast to the more xenophobic, protectionist stance that Brazilians would adopt later on). The CRO manifesto announced an intention "to attract the attention of foreign elements [to] channel capital and people to the West to take advantage of its riches."³² Echoing Magalhães Barata's support for the Ford plantations in Pará (see Chapter Three), those behind the Direction West Crusade welcomed foreign help to bring about the triumph of capitalism in the interior.

At the heart of the Direction West Crusade, founded as it was in 1940, lurked the Vargas administration's dread of the rural-to-urban migration. The CRO pledged

"to help drain to the West the excess population of the large cities, [by] organizing centers to provide information about travel, economic conditions, work conditions, statistical data, reports, monographs, and other studies, to those who might wish to emigrate or direct their activities to the interior."³³

The Direction West Crusade embodied the most important, and ultimately the most futile, purpose of the March to the West: the retardation and reversal of the exodus from rural areas. Voluntary cultural and youth "Bandeiras," however, did not prevent thousands more destitute folk from fleeing to Recife, Rio, and São Paulo in search of work. As Brazil's cities filled even more with migrants during the 1940s, Vargas would have to turn to a more direct state-run approach to the population problem.

After his address at the founding of the CRO, the president continued his unprecedented journey through the Center-West. From Goiânia, Vargas flew northwest, traversing hundreds of kilometers of virtually unbroken grassland and forest, to land at the village of Santa Isabel on Bananal Island in the Araguaia River.³⁴ The president, accompanied by his advisor João Alberto and the omnipresent Pedro Ludovico, emerged from his aircraft to the cheers of assembled Carajá and Javaé tribespeople. Until this century sworn enemies of the Brazilians, the Indians, arrayed in traditional dress, lined the earthen runway to greet the leader of a nation to which

they felt no allegiance. In an incredible spectacle, Vargas shook hands with Carajá chieftain Atauí and presented him with a Havana cigar. Atauí immediately asked, in Portuguese, "Got a light?" The president laughed, fished a box of matches out of his coat pocket, and lit the chief's stogie.³⁵

Over the next several days, Vargas and his entourage toured the local villages and attended traditional dances and ceremonies. A photograph of the trip shows Ludovico and a safari-suited, pith-helmeted Vargas admiring a four-foot *jacaré*, or caiman, from a safe distance.³⁶ Another enduring image of the visit captures the fifty-seven-year-old Getúlio cradling a naked, painted indigenous baby in one hand while lighting up a cigar in his mouth with the other.

Then, like the Great White Father, the dictator distributed agricultural implements, machetes, knives, and other tools to the natives. Vargas, cigar clenched in his teeth, handed out trinkets from under a thatched roof; a Carajá who sucked on a Havana himself sat next to the generous president during the potlatch.³⁷ Later, during a ceremonial banquet, photographers found Getúlio, seated at a long table, looking eye-to-eye with an indigenous boy who was downing a swift shot of sugar cane rum (*pinga*) as warriors danced behind them.³⁸

Vargas, the first Brazilian president to visit the Araguaia region,³⁹ undertook his trip using conscious symbolism and historical reference. Other than for an arresting photo opportunity, the dictator stopped at Bananal to inaugurate a series of Agricultural

Colonies (*Núcleos Agrícolas*) for Amerindians and sertanejos in the West. He knew that the island was "exactly the place where, in 1868, Couto de Magalhães founded the Princess Isabel School (*Colégio Isabel*)⁴⁰ for the education of indigenous children, a parallel that DIP propagandists would trumpet. The Great White Father had flown on wings of steel to the redoubt of the pacified Carajá and Javaé to redeem them through technology and education. Aligning himself with Couto de Magalhães (and by implication with the beloved Princess Isabel), Vargas announced by travelling to Bananal that his March to the West was making the interior safe for Brazilians and emancipating the country from its geographical tyranny.

The president's journey into the wilderness (and the images published in urban newspapers), excited Brazilians. One author exclaimed, "They had never seen a head of state like that. . . .To leave the stunning bustle of the boulevards and delve into the silent vastness of the almost impenetrable forest! To leave refined civilization behind to speak with the tribes!"⁴¹ Despite the positive publicity, Vargas himself displayed somewhat conflicting ideas of what actually to do with the West. He returned from Bananal on the one hand musing over (or claiming to reconsider) the so-called "André Rebouças Plan" to turn the island into a national park and forest reserve. On the other hand, the imperatives of business and politics weighed on his mind: to reward his backers by encouraging livestock raising in the area, the president promised state aid to ranchers.⁴²

The long trip West clearly made an impact on Vargas, for he distilled his impressions into one of his most important addresses of the year, given on Independence Day, 7 September, and broadcast to a nationwide audience from Vasco da Gama Stadium in Rio. In marked contrast to previous such patriotic speeches, the president made the March to the West a major theme of his remarks, entitled "The Cult of the Fatherland and the Duty of Every Brazilian." Getúlio identified horizontal expansion as the cardinal virtue of a youthful and growing nation:

Once confined to the seacoast of a vast territory, we have now seen opened to systematic exploitation a fertile, promising, and barely explored hinterland, where the energy, perseverance, and labor of many generations will bloom. Such a broadening of our activities represents an appointment with destiny and imposes a dynamic direction on the march of a young and brave people. . . ."43

By 1940 the March to the West had come to define patriotism under the Estado Novo-- every Brazilian's duty was to unsheathe his machete and help subdue the interior. Like an authoritarian Horace Greeley resolved to "bring the benefits of civilization to the farthest corners"⁴⁴ of Brazil, Vargas stood poised to lead his nation at last into the oft-predicted future of occidental glory.

The president did not tarry before putting his words into action. On 5 October Vargas launched a demanding, three-week 10,000-mile trip by plane through Pará, Amazonas, and what is now Rondônia.⁴⁵ The timing of this epic journey was not random: almost ten years to the day after the Revolt of 1930, the president brought

his new crusade to the most isolated area of the nation. Seven years since his first visit to the region, the dictator returned to fulfill the "promise of transforming Amazonia"⁴⁶ and integrating the immensity of the forest into the economy and society of Brazil. Having fully consolidated power, Vargas, like a Cæsar, journeyed to the farthest corners of his empire to greet his subjects and show the flag. Afonso Pena might have been the first Brazilian president to travel in Amazonia, but Getúlio went there twice.

Fifteen thousand schoolchildren mobbed Vargas upon his arrival in Belém, the first stop on the itinerary, on 5 October.⁴⁷ Mayor Abelardo Condurú presented the president with a gold medallion forged of metal spirited out of French Guiana after the *Paraenses* (natives of the state of Pará) had occupied the colony in retaliation for Napoleon's invasion of Portugal in 1810. While the historical allusion might have disturbed Brazil's neighbors, the symbolism fit: once again the residents of Belém had mobilized for a conquest, this time of their own canopied backlands.

During his three days in the mildewing colonial city, Vargas visited schools, hospitals, police stations, and port facilities. He reviewed parades of flag-waving students and laughed at the monkeys at the Emilio Goeldi Museum of Natural History. Along Getúlio Vargas Avenue still stands the bust of the president city fathers erected to celebrate the visit; the pedestal reads, "From a grateful Amazonia." Photos of the sightseeing show a beaming Getúlio strolling about Belém in a crisp, white double-breasted linen

suit, spats, and a boater. The president never seems to sweat, while interventor José Malcher trails behind, wiping his brow.⁴⁸

Vargas' energy did not flag in dealing with the state's elite. At a banquet hosted on 6 October at the Commercial Palace (*Palácio do Comércio*) by the "conservative and producing classes" of Pará, the president defined the role of the state in Amazonia: "The national government has permanently turned its attention to this extremity of the Fatherland, and its prudent and secure action will. . . endow hard-working Brazilians with the indispensable means for productive labor."⁴⁹ The federal government would never again avert its eyes from Amazonia. State plans for the region would only increase in size and reach over the next forty years.

Returning to the city of Tavares Bastos, the president preached the nineteenth century adventurer's gospel of industrialization in the rain forest. Vargas vowed to use the powers of the state to "prepare [Amazonia] to regain its primacy in the production of vegetative raw materials and even industrialize, to compete on the world market."⁵⁰ The Estado Novo claimed that it would not repeat the mistakes and excesses of the Rubber Boom: the March to the West would bring manufacturing to balance the vicissitudes of forest commodities. According to the president, smokestacks might soon replace the ornate See-The-Weight (*Ver-O-Peso*) Market as the picture postcard attraction of the mouth of the Amazon.

The message of the chief of the New State changed depending upon the audience. Two days after addressing the elite of Pará, Vargas

spoke at a rally of workers in downtown Belém, and he cynically made declarations that he had no intention of fulfilling. To sell the idea of the March to the West to the masses, the president paid lip service to land reform:

As for he who works the land in the interior, sweating blood every day, scattered without comfort in an immense region, he should have that land divided into plots. Thus, the caboclo of the sertão will become the owner of the soil on which he labors and shelters his family.⁵¹

With remarks like these, Vargas engendered the false hope of Amazonia as the promised land of small cultivator. Even if the nutrient-poor rain forest soil had allowed for the realization of Jeffersonian agriculture in Brazil, the March to the West had the control, not liberation, of rural populations as its fundamental aim. Given the political alliances that he had formed in the interior, the dictator had no intention of carrying out real land reform. The March would not redistribute the rich lands of the Center-West, but ship the poor to marginal areas under the supervision of the military and federal agencies. Vargas succeeded, however, in selling the mirage of the interior as an open frontier of free land to the Brazilian public. Such disingenuous promises became the mantra of westward expansion, and the military would take advantage of their appeal to send hundreds of thousands of ill-prepared city-dwellers to the West in colonization schemes, most of which eventually failed.

On his way to Manaus on 9 October, Vargas stopped off at the Ford concession headquarters at Belterra. The president, whose

administration had acted coolly towards the Fordlândia concept in the early 1930s (see Chapter Three), now praised the rubber plantation as an example of the "planned, rational, and systemic" development of the interior that the Estado Novo sought to pursue.⁵² Vargas lauded the Ford project as one of the models for the March to the West, "the resurrection of a lost splendor" through technology and scientific management.⁵³ The Tapajós River, known in the eighteenth century as the "river of the Fathers" because of its six Jesuit missions, was now celebrated by the believers of a new religion for the altar of capitalism that Fordlândia represented. Henry Ford, building on the management processes of Taylor, would lift Amazonia out of its severe economic depression, and Getúlio Vargas meant to spread the gospel of industrialization throughout the West.

When the president landed in steamy Manaus later that evening, military bands and an estimated 10,000 schoolchildren massed on the macadam.⁵⁴ In a replay of the stops in Goiânia and Belém before, Vargas toured the sights of the city, met with civic leaders, and reviewed a parade of workers in front of the Governor's Palace.

The dictator had a far more weighty item on his agenda in Manaus than parades: he had come to deliver the most important address on Amazonia of his fifteen years in power. Before a friendly audience of members of the "conservative classes" at a banquet hosted by interventor Alvaro Maia at the Ideal Club, Vargas on 9 October 1940 offered a comprehensive vision of the role of the immense Northwest in Brazilian life. Borrowing almost verbatim from the remarks of Antônio

Constantino Nery, Governor of Amazonas, delivered upon the arrival in 1906 of president-elect Afonso Pena in Manaus, Getúlio declared, "Seeing Amazonia is the youthful heart's desire of all Brazilians."⁵⁵ The so-called Amazon River Speech (*Discurso do Rio Amazonas*) would resurrect the old rhetoric and myths in the service of the March to the West.

Vargas consciously reached back to the nineteenth century "Vision of Paradise" to push his program of westward expansion. Recalling Euclides da Cunha and Graça Aranha, the president greeted his audience as the denizens of a new Canaan:

[The New State] could not forget you, because you are the land of the future, the promised valley in the life of tomorrow. Your definitive entrance into the economic body of the nation as a factor of prosperity and creative energy will be accomplished without delay.⁵⁶

Despite the biblical rhetoric, this conception of the West has little in common with the Romantic version, for Vargas assures his listeners that the state-- his state-- in positivist fashion will draw out the latent potential of Amazonia by incorporating it into the civilization of coastal Brazil.

This twentieth century Eden will not be a wilderness of innocence. Nature in the *Discurso*, unlike in the North American "myth of the garden," does not appear as something to be preserved, but something to be razed: "Conquering the land, dominating the water, [and] overcoming the forest have been our tasks."⁵⁷ This succinct sentence expresses an ideology that would become conventional wisdom for

several generations of Brazilians. The president intended to pave paradise, linking it to the commercial centers of Rio and São Paulo. "In this centuries-old struggle, we have been winning victory after victory," exclaimed Vargas. The war would turn into a rout over the next four decades.⁵⁸

The dictator also emphasized the grandeur, the destiny, of the undertaking to develop the interior of Brazil. Echoing the Baron of Marajó and Euclides da Cunha (see Chapter One), Vargas prophesied that Amazonia would give rise to a new age of mankind: "Amazonia, under the fecund impulse of our will and labor, will be not just a mere chapter in the history of the Earth. . . but will turn into a chapter in the history of civilization."⁵⁹ With the leadership of the vanguard of the Estado Novo, according to the dictator, Brazilians will write da Cunha's "last page of Genesis."

Finally, Vargas the evangelist indicated how he would bring about the new golden age in the West: by populating the wilderness. Speaking in biblical tones, the president instructed his audience that "It is time that we permanently look after the peopling of Amazonia."⁶⁰ The Amazon River Speech fit into the overall didactic character of the March to the West in urging the new generations to seize the unprecedented opportunities of horizontal expansion. Vargas declared with missionary zeal, "[To] us, a young people, befalls the enormous responsibility of civilizing and peopling millions of square kilometers. . . . a responsibility impossible to flee or deceive ourselves about."⁶¹ The president, clearly influenced by the dictum of Juan Batista Alberdi of

Argentina that "to govern is to populate," presents the answer to the crisis of the interior, and by extension to the crisis of Brazil, as a demographic one.⁶² In contrast with the frenzied rhetoric of Juscelino Kubitschek, Vargas proclaimed that Brazil, a young nation both chronologically and demographically, had embarked upon a task that would require decades to complete. Over fifty years later, Brazil's westward push has still not ended.

Banner headlines, crowded only by bulletins of the German occupation of Bulgaria, trumpeted the news of the *Discurso do Rio Amazonas* in the major newspapers of the country. The daily *O Radical* in Rio de Janeiro reprinted highlights of the speech verbatim, and many other periodicals carried excerpts of the historic address.⁶³

Amid the wave of publicity, Vargas met with interventor Maia and his staff to discuss the March to the West. To an audience that included medical professionals, politicians, and the state directors of health and education, the president enthusiastically offered to help Amazonas clear its debts, calculated at more than 100,000 contos. The dictator, speaking on a familiar March theme, also complained about the sloth of rubber tappers and stated that he intended to ask the state to cede a large area, "a vast zone in which to effect sanitation, construct railroads or highways, divide the land, supply agronomists and seeds, [and] thus organize a great colony."⁶⁴ Despite the announcement of the ICN two years before, the Estado Novo colonization strategy had not yet taken off, and the federal government would wait until 1943 to take action on the matter. Nevertheless, Vargas' comments raised chimeric

expectations that perhaps no leader could ever fulfill, expectations that persisted among poor Brazilians for decades.

The dictator landed several days later in Pôrto Velho, along the banks of the Madeira River several hundred kilometers southwest of Manaus. Now the capital of the state of Rondônia, Pôrto Velho then registered in the minds of Brazilians only as the railhead for the infamous Madeira-Mamoré line. The railroad, nationalized in 1931, had long since passed into decrepitude, and the lethargic city symbolized the nation's neglect of the West.

In such a backwater, Vargas' arrival on 14 October passed through Pôrto Velho like a jolt of electricity. One resident of the city, overwhelmed by the experience of shaking the great man's hand, exclaimed to a correspondent, "Pôrto Velho is the daughter of President Getúlio Vargas!"⁶⁵

The dictator in Pôrto Velho played the role of the benevolent father figure saving his children from squalor. In an interview with the Associated Press, Vargas asserted that his trip was a fact-finding mission: "I have not come to Amazonia like a tourist to be enchanted and impressed. I have come with the objective of verifying the practical possibilities of executing a plan to systematically exploit the riches [of Amazonia] and economically develop the grand valley."⁶⁶ The president, repeating positivist and corporatist orthodoxies, underlined that rational government planning and analysis would gird the March to the West.

The president in his conversation with the AP for the first time offered specifics about what the March to the West actually meant. Demographic and political imperatives had apparently moved the dictator and his "Black Cabinet" to concentrate on two areas, sanitation and colonization. Sounding almost like an agronomist, Vargas described this strategy as a form of husbandry:

The demographic growth [of the country] is evident. And it will suffice to care for these generations, defending them against disease, preparing them physically and culturally, giving them moral and civic education, to transform them into valuable assets for the peopling of th[is] region. . . . The settlement policy will be initiated with groups of Brazilian nationals who will be fixed here to prosper.⁶⁷

Vargas refers here to settlers in a strangely vegetative way: the future colonists, planted in the hinterland like crops, simply need the proper nutrients and care to grow and provide sustenance to the nation. The dictator, obviously aware of the alarming data uncovered by the recent census, offers the large-scale sowing of people as the solution for the economic woes of the far West.

The comments of Vargas also echo the attacks of Telésforo de Souza Lobo against the caboclos: new populations, morally and culturally trained by the New State, would replace the current residents of the Oeste, by implication inferior. Those already living in the West--those who had not already fled East or died off-- clearly did not qualify in the president's mind as "valuable assets," and westward expansion would supersede them with new generations of indoctrinated Brazilian seedlings.

Fleshing out his master plan for the West, Vargas repeated the empty assertions that he had made at the workers rally in Belém about land tenure. Getúlio assured the AP that "We will take advantage of. . . remised land and distribute it, free of charge, among colonists, furnishing them with agricultural implements and seeds." While seemingly a magnanimous endorsement of broad agrarian reform, the president's utterance contains a crafty caveat-- the key word is "remised," from the Latin *remittere*, "to send back," and meaning "to give, grant, or release a claim to."⁶⁸ Even in the wilderness, at mid-century very little arable land lacked some form of deed, and even less had reverted to the public domain. Vargas and his successors would not disturb the large landowners who had supported them, so real reform remained a dream. The migrants of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s would tragically discover this harsh reality many years later.

As he had in Belém, Vargas brought the good news of industrialization to Pôrto Velho. With the establishment of the Estado Novo the president had reversed his earlier suspicion of foreign investment. He informed the AP that the American manufacturing cavalry was on its way to save Amazonia: "to complete [my] plan, we will intensify industrialization. To this end, North American industrialists are coming soon, at the invitation of the government, to collaborate with us in the development of Amazonia, where their capital and resources will find secure and profitable application."⁶⁹ This time Vargas delivered on his promises: by mid-1943, with the announcement of the Rubber Battle, United States interests would pour

into Amazonia to channel latex towards the Allied war effort. Yet the Americans would find neither security nor remuneration-- by 1946 the U.S. had left the region-- and the impact of the entire campaign would prove marginal. Nevertheless, both Kubitschek and the military regime would maintain the dictator's friendly attitude to foreign partnerships in the interior. Starting in the 1950s, the March to the West would acquire a multinational character.

During the next year, events demonstrated with acuity the gap between reality in the West and the pronouncements of the Estado Novo. Civil unrest broke out in the Territory of Acre during early 1941, factional disturbances that mimicked those in Mato Grosso and Pará in the 1930s (see Chapters Three and Five). The violence worsened to such a point that Justice Minister Campos dispatched an aide to investigate the situation in person. Acrean governor Epaminondas Martins sent Campos a forty-seven-page letter to defend himself in response to the investigation.⁷⁰ Another Vargas administration official, M.A. Teixeira de Freitas of the Superior Council of National Security, urged the state to take an active role in the region to avoid further disturbances: "The government. . . cannot assume a passive attitude in the Territory. It is necessary that it interfere in the solution of all problems [there]. . . ." ⁷¹ The president had skipped Acre, Brazil's westernmost expanse, on his 1940 barnstorming tour, and two years into its existence the March to the West had not reached there, either. Only the imperatives of the Second World War would finally bring Acre into the central government's orbit.

Since few Brazilians knew of the disconnection between the claims of the Estado Novo and actual conditions in the interior, Vargas in 1941 made a conscious attempt to link the March to the West with his agenda for the urban working class. At a rally on May Day in the Vasco da Gama soccer stadium in Rio, the president explained his new crusade to the swelling city:

To the Estado Novo falls, without a doubt, the mission of retiring the four-hundred-year-old debt, to which the interpreter of the soul of the sertões alluded, contracted by the men of the littoral with the inhabitants of the highlands, forgotten descendants of the explorers and pioneers who stretched the meridians to extend the horizons of the nation. . . . The redemption of the sertão and the revalorization of Amazonia are essential chapters of the progress planned by the government to give Brazil the prosperity and culture that it deserves.⁷²

Invoking Euclides da Cunha directly, Vargas laid out his patriotic case for the March to the West. Those benefitting from the improved material life of Brazil's cities owed their position to the sacrifices of their brethren in the backlands, according to the president. The forgiveness of that debt might require joining the crusade to the Oeste; every person who left Rio or São Paulo for the wilderness would help to put right the nation's accounts by portaging civilization and industry into the interior. The sertanejo needed redemption, and only the Estado Novo could bring the state of grace.

Having extended an invitation to urban workers to join its cause of westward expansion, a month later the New State got a chance to show Brazilians the industrial wonders that it claimed to be producing in Amazonia. Among the results of Vargas' visit to Belém had been the

creation of a state Port Authority (*Superintendência da Navegação Amazônica e do Porto do Pará*-- SNAPP) to maintain the merchant shipping fleet on the Amazon and its tributaries. In June, Minister of Transportation Mendonça Lima flew to Pará to attend the launching of the first vessel constructed at the government-owned shipyards in Belém. River traffic remained the primary mode of transportation in the West in 1941 (it still is), and the rehabilitation of the fleet promised to pay great dividends. The minister told the press after the christening, employing the dictator's language, "The misery and lethargy of Amazonia have ended. She will rise again, magnificent."⁷³

Despite his official and public posture of enthusiasm, however, Mendonça Lima returned from Belém with a first-hand impression of the dilapidation of Amazonian shipping. In foreign hands before the nationalization, the stock and docks were rotten and dangerous. Those steamers not abandoned were almost thirty years old, and a lack of maintenance had allowed quays to disintegrate and canals to silt up.⁷⁴ As with the Madeira-Mamoré railroad, the state had inherited a wounded white elephant.

As such inconvenient reports filtered in, Vargas resumed his relentless campaigning, and added infrastructure to his plan for the interior. In July 1941 the president flew to the Pantanal in far western Mato Grosso (now Mato Grosso do Sul), a state with which he had an old relationship. There he revisited Corumbá, his post as a young soldier in 1903, and announced a major campaign to integrate the area with the seacoast. Maintaining that "the misfortune of Mato Grosso has been its

great empty spaces," Getúlio pledged that the federal government would dedicate resources to "the means of communication" in the West.⁷⁵ Demonstrating his sincerity, the dictator on 29 July attended the inauguration of a railroad bridge across the Paraguay River at the border station of Palmito.⁷⁶

Transportation, along with colonization and industrialization, completed the triumvirate of the March to the West. With the first, the Estado Novo could guarantee its allies in the Oeste a low-cost labor force for their latifundia. The second would broaden the economic base of the region and encourage the profitable exploitation of natural resources. The third would bring workers to the interior and ship products from the region to the distant cities on the littoral. All added up to enormous profits for the "conservative classes" in the hinterland.

In the most significant stop on the itinerary, on 5 August Vargas rubbed elbows with ranchers at the headquarters of the Union of Stockmen of Southern Mato Grosso (*Sindicato dos Criadores do Sul de Mato Grosso*) in Campo Grande. The president, revelling among the most enthusiastic supporters of the March to the West, pronounced the booming city "the victory of the confidence of Brazilians in the future of the Fatherland." Along with Goiânia, Campo Grande was the second symbolic city of the March to the West. Livestock barons in Mato Grosso and Goiás, eager for cheap labor and protective of their lands, were the true constituency of westward expansion. In exchange for political support the Estado Novo promised to subsidize better transportation and communication links with the markets of the

Southeast, especially the emerging megalopolis of São Paulo. The banquet cemented the special relationship-- By 1943 the federal government would create a new Territory of Ponta Porã, encompassing most of southern Mato Grosso, that gave new autonomy to the landowners.

Two days later Vargas made his way to the state capital of Cuiabá, the site of several protests and intrigues against him in the past (see Chapter Three). He attended the grand opening of the local chapter of the Direction West Crusade and participated in the dedication of the Palace of Justice. The president also toured the city with the sycophantic interventor Júlio Müller and Archbishop Dom Aquino Corrêia.

Also in Cuiabá, Vargas delivered the last major western addresses of his presidency. On 6 August 1941, at a lunch following the inauguration of the new barracks for the Sixteenth Gunnery Battalion (*16º Batalhão de Caçadores*), the president embraced the ideology of military pioneerism. Vargas, following upon the ideas of Frederico Rondon (See Chapter Five), outlined a permanent role for the armed forces in westward expansion as "pioneers in the clearing and occupation of the land."⁷⁷ The dictator also adopted as his own the concept of military colonies in the West: "[A] barracks here is not just lodging for a force of soldiers. It is a center for the radiation of civilization, a school of activity, a nucleus of security. . . ."⁷⁸ With such support from the commander-in-chief, the army after 1941 would take charge of the March to the West.

On 7 August, at a reception at the Governor's Palace, Vargas returned to myth-making. In Belém the dictator had revived the "Vision of Paradise," in Mato Grosso, center of a colonial gold rush, he celebrated the myth of El Dorado:

One cannot look at a map of Brazil without feeling a profound attraction for this region that was the El Dorado of the trailblazers and backlanders. . . . The dense forests that give you your name, the pastures where herds of millions of cattle forage, the subsoil that guards inexhaustible mineral reserves, the climate appropriate for the most varied crops-- all this represents a vast patrimony that we must [put to use].⁷⁹

As he had in 1933, the dictator presented a solidly modern vision of El Dorado, no longer an aureate kingdom but an enormous storage silo for the industrial complex of the new Brazil. Timber, ore, meat will replace gold flecks as the currency of this new prosperity. The March to the West touched off another stampede to Mato Grosso, this time of prospectors lured by Tavares Bastos' muse of capitalism instead of the fantastic stories of the bandeirantes. Getúlio Vargas began the process by which Brazil has appropriated its inheritance in Mato Grosso, and the pace with which the nation has availed itself of the West has only accelerated since.

When the peripatetic Vargas in his long-suffering Lockheed finally landed at Santos Dumont in Rio on 9 August 1941, he had finished the most extensive period of travel ever taken by a Brazilian head of state up to that point. Propagandists compared the trip to Mato Grosso with Cæsar's invasion of Gaul: "President Getúlio Vargas came

and saw."⁸⁰ By the end of 1941, Vargas' conquest of the West was complete. Brazil's had just begun.

-
- ¹ *New American Bible* (New York: P.J. Kennedy, 1970).
- ² J.R. de Sá Carvalho, *Brazilian El Dorado*, Ed. by C.R. Enock, (London: Blackie & Son Limited, 1938), 76. The March to the West attracted many devotees of the fantastic: de Sá Carvalho, a journalist from São Paulo, made repeated assertions that Mato Grosso could have been the site of the lost civilization of Atlantis.
- ³ Armin K. Ludwig, *Brazil: A Handbook of Historical Statistics* (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1985), 47.
- ⁴ James W. Wilkie, Ed., *Statistical Abstract of Latin America*, Vol. 21 (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center, 1981), 64,89.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, 86.
- ⁶ Ludwig, 47.
- ⁷ "Despopulação no Acre!" *O Radical* (Rio de Janeiro), 27 December 1940, 2; Ludwig, 47. Note that in 1940 Pará included the current state of Amapá.
- ⁸ Lenharo, *Sacralização*, 15. Jarbas Medeiros suggests that rural policy influenced urban policy and not the other way around. Vargas' urban populism therefore might have been what we could call urban paternalism, "little more than an extension of rural *coronelismo* from the sertão to urban centers." Jarbas Medeiros, *Ideologia autoritária no Brasil, 1930-1945* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora da FGV, 1978), 530.
- ⁹ Leão Padilha, *O Brasil na posse de si mesmo* (Rio de Janeiro: DIP, 1941), 78.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 79. The population of a second strip, within 150 kilometers of the border, had to be at least half Brazilian, and no one foreign nationality could comprise more than twenty-five percent.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, 81. No individual foreigners could start businesses within the thirty-kilometer strip, and Brazilians had to manage all companies there. Both restrictions were reactions to the behavior of the Mate Laranjeira Company in the 1930s (see Chapter Three). At least two-thirds of the workforce of a firm in the area had to be Brazilian as well.
- ¹² "Pelotões de fronteira," *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã*, 31 July 1940, 13.
- ¹³ "A conquista hodierna dos Sertões," *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã*, 31 December 1940, 17.
- ¹⁴ Vargas, *Ponte das Bandeiras* (São Paulo: Imprensa Comercial, 1940), 18.
- ¹⁵ Ladislau, 20.
- ¹⁶ "A viagem do Presidente ao Oeste," *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã*, 31 July 1940, 30.
- ¹⁷ Ludovico, *depoimento*, 101.
- ¹⁸ Trindade, 3.
- ¹⁹ "Iniciando a 'Marcha para o Oeste,'" *O Radical*, 6 August 1940, 1.
- ²⁰ "Em pleno coração do Oeste brasileiro!" *O Radical*, 7 August 1940, 2. A Brazilian *churrasco*, as in Argentina and Uruguay, is a barbecue featuring every manner of grilled meat in copious quantities. Brazilians in the Center-West often hold family *churrascos* on Sunday afternoons and for special occasions such as holidays or birthdays.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*
- ²² Vargas, *Nova Política*, VIII:23.

23 Ibid., VIII:24.

24 Ibid., VIII:32. With this revision of his definition of imperialism, Vargas again had to offer a public assurance that Brazil did not cast a covetous eye on its western neighbors: "We do not desire one palm's breadth of land that is not ours, but we do have an expansionism, which is to grow inside our own borders."

25 Ibid.

26 Abelardo Coimbra Bueno, Depoimento, 8 June 1990, APDF, Projeto "Memória da construção de Brasília," 7.

27 "*Cruzada Rumo ao Oeste*": *Manifesto, suas finalidades* (Rio de Janeiro: Cruzada Rumo ao Oeste, 1941), 4, AN, Arquivo Particular M.A. Teixeira de Freitas, Caixa 19, Pasta 41.

28 Ibid., 5.

29 Ibid., 6.

30 Ibid. Orator and author Ramayana de Chevalier and painter Olympio de Menezes, both from Amazonas, undertook such a tour in 1941. To awaken public interest in the West, the two artists gave a series of speeches, lectures, and exhibitions throughout southern Brazil. Lourival Fontes did not fund the pair, but he sent them with a letter of official backing that called the journey "a work of pure nationalism." Fontes to Fernando Costa, 12 November 1941, AN, Arquivo da Agência Nacional, Lata 186.

31 Ibid., 4.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid., 5.

34 Not far from the geographical center of the South American continent, the Ilha do Bananal qualifies as the world's largest fluvial island, and splits the northern-flowing Araguaia in two for hundreds of kilometers. The Brazilian government has established the Araguaia National Park on the northern half of the island; the southern half is home to several indigenous reserves.

35 "Em plena selva brasileira!" *O Radical*, 10 August 1940, 2.

36 APL, Acervo Fotográfico.

37 Ludovico, *Memórias*, 125.

38 APL, Acervo Fotográfico. *Pinga*, also known as *cachaça*, is a vicious sugar-cane rum similar to the *aguardiente* of Spanish America.

39 While Vargas qualifies as the first head of state to tour the area, Prince Dom Pedro de Orleães e Bragança, Prince of Grão-Pará and Pretender to the Brazilian Throne, visited Leopoldina on the Araguaia River in 1934. There in northern Goiás (now Tocantins) the Prince witnessed the remnants of Couto de Magalhães' steamships rotting on the beach. Boaventura Ribeiro da Cunha, "O Araguaia, estuário econômico do Oeste," *Estudos e Conferências*, Nº 20, (February 1944), 88. The article is a transcript of a speech delivered 21 December 1943 at the Palácio Tiradentes (headquarters of the DIP) in Rio.

40 Escobar, 113-14. Couto de Magalhães named his Colégio Isabel after Dom Pedro II's daughter Isabel, the Princess-Regent and heir to the imperial throne. Acting as Regent in her father's absence in 1888, Isabel signed the so-called Golden Law, or *Lei Dorada*, that abolished slavery in Brazil.

-
- ⁴¹ Francisco de Paula Achilles, *O Brasil em Marcha*, 2ª Edição (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1943), 65.
- ⁴² "Brasil Central e Brasil Oeste," *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem, e de amanhã*, 31 August 1940, 2. André Rebouças was a prominent nineteenth century Brazilian abolitionist.
- ⁴³ Vargas, *Nova Política*, VIII:45.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., VIII:46.
- ⁴⁵ Dulles, 208. Dulles, forgetting about Afonso Pena, called Vargas "the first Brazilian president to visit the jungle."
- ⁴⁶ Leopoldo Pêres, *Política e Espirito do Regime* (Rio de Janeiro: Empresa A Noite, 1941), 102. Pêres claimed that "The coincidence of that historic first post-revolutionary decade with the visit of the founder of the National State to Amazonia. . . deserves to be interpreted as meaning that the new regime. . . has reached the most advanced point in its stupendous constructive itinerary." Pêres, *Política*, 89-90
- ⁴⁷ "O presidente recebido por 15.000 crianças ao pisar no solo de Belém," *O Radical*, 6 October 1940, 1.
- ⁴⁸ Brazil, Municipalidade de Belém do Pará, Prefeitura Municipal, *A Amazônia agradecida: lembrança da visita do Presidente Getúlio Vargas a Belém do Pará em outubro do 1940*, Photo Album presented to Getúlio Vargas in March 1941 (Belém, PA: Prefeitura Municipal de Belém do Pará, 1941), MdaR. The album is bound in caiman skin, and a small caiman (*jacarezinho*) head—with functioning jaws— attached to the front cover.
- ⁴⁹ Vargas, *Nova Política*, VIII:57.
- ⁵⁰ Vargas, *diretrizes*, 137.
- ⁵¹ Vargas, *Nova Política*, VIII:64.
- ⁵² As quoted by Dulles, 208. Despite the enthusiastic rhetoric about Fordlândia, members of Vargas' cabinet seem to have taken a dimmer view of the experiment. Col. Mendonça Lima, Minister of Transportation, when asked about the plantation in 1938 replied, "I appreciated it well enough, but I think that a great deal of money has been wasted without any practical results up to now." "A entrevista colectiva que o coronel Mendonça Lima, titular da Viação, concedeu à imprensa," *O Estado do Pará*, 30 January 1938, 3.
- ⁵³ Leon Josefsohn, *Getúlio, este desconhecido: o aspecto humano da grande obra de Getúlio Vargas* (Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica Tupy Ltda., 1957), 78.
- ⁵⁴ "Manáos recebeu com entusiasmo, a visita do presidente Getúlio Vargas," *O Radical*, 10 October 1940, 1.
- ⁵⁵ Vargas, *Nova Política*, VIII:77. Nery, referring to Pena, had proclaimed, "The voyage that he has undertaken is the realization of a desire that he has nurtured since his childhood, since he learned his first geography lessons in school. . . ." Raúl de Azevedo, 42.
- ⁵⁶ Vargas, *Nova Política*, VIII:79.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid., VIII:77.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid.
- ⁵⁹ Vargas, *diretrizes*, 137.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid., 300.

-
- 61 Vargas, *Nova Política*, VIII:81.
- 62 Vargas propagandists often cited Alberdi's maxim to justify the March to the West. For example, see José de Mesquita, "A política nacional do Rumo ao Oeste," *Estudos e Conferências*, Nº 15 (December 1941), 56. The article reprints a speech given 29 July 1941 at the Tiradentes Palace (*Palácio Tiradentes*) in Rio.
- 63 See "'Sois a terra do futuro, o valle da Promissão, na vida do Brasil de amanhã," *O Radical*, 12 October 1940, 1,4.
- 64 "O Presidente Vargas passa, em revista, as necessidades da região amazonica," *O Radical*, 11 October 1940, 4.
- 65 "Sanitation, colonization, and industrialization of the immense region of Amazônia," *O Radical*, 15 October 1940, 3.
- 66 As quoted in Licurgo Ramos Costa, *Cidadão do Mundo* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora José Olympio, 1943), 296.
- 67 *Ibid.*, 297.
- 68 *Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary* (Springfield, MA: Mirriam-Webster, Inc., 1986), 996.
- 69 *Ibid.*
- 70 Epaminondas Martins to Francisco Campos, 29 April 1941, AN, Arquivo Particular M.A. Teixeira de Freitas, Caixa 58, Pasta 122.
- 71 Teixeira de Freitas, "Algumas observações sôbre o Acre," Notes enclosed in a letter to Oscar Passos, 6 August 1941, AN, Arquivo Particular M.A. Teixeira de Freitas, Caixa 58, Pasta 122.
- 72 Vargas, *diretrizes*, 138. Vargas' allusions to Euclides were very calculated. Like all educated Brazilians of his generation, the dictator was familiar with the writer's works, but evidence exists that he paid particular attention to Euclides. A Vargas intimate, journalist Leon Josefsohn, remembered, "One of Getúlio Vargas' favorite books was. . . *Os Sertões*, by Euclides da Cunha." Josefsohn, 73. Furthermore, in an interview published 11 June 1939 in the newspaper *El Mercurio* in Santiago, Chile, Vargas claimed da Cunha as one of his two choices for most representative Brazilian author: "If the expression means a writer in whose works [readers] glean testimony of the inquietude, hopes, and desires of the Nation, . . . I should . . . mention the names of Gonçalves Dias and Euclides da Cunha, the former poet of the race and the latter writer of the land." As quoted in Ramos Costa, 291-92.
- 73 Ricardo Pinto, "A hora da Amazônia," *Jornal do Brasil*, 1 July 1941, 5.
- 74 *Ibid.*
- 75 Vargas, *Nova Política*, IX:36.
- 76 The bridge, product of the 1938 Rail Linkage Treaty (*Tratado de Ligação Ferroviária*) fulfilled one of Brazil's obligations from the 1903 Treaty of Petrópolis. The Brazil-Bolivia Railroad that directly connected the transportation systems of the two nations for the first time was not completed until 1955. For more on Brazilian-Bolivian border relations, see Peter Seaborn Smith, "Bolivian Oil and Brazilian Economic Nationalism," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April 1971), 166-181.
- 77 Vargas, *Nova Política*, IX:87.
- 78 *Ibid.*, IX:88.

⁷⁹ Ibid., IX:102.

⁸⁰ Achilles, 55.

Chapter Seven: "The Formidable Duel with the Desert,"¹ 1942-1945

Unknown and complex, whether in its geography, history, or social organization, the Brazilian West remains incognito.²

--Nelson Werneck Sodré, 1941

Modern Brazil is the Brazil of the interior. This Brazil of the littoral is the old Brazil, the civilized and decadent Brazil that has declined prematurely. . . . What we are going to build in the interior is the Brazil of faith.³

-- João Alberto Lins de Barros, 1943

The entrance of Brazil into the Second World War in August 1942 accelerated the planning of the March to the West and prompted the establishment of new structures to carry out its agenda on a stepped-up schedule. Getúlio Vargas' airborne blitz through the Brazilian interior during 1940 and 1941 was the vehicle for the verbalization of the March to the West. After articulating the themes of westward expansion to key interest groups of supporters and to the general public, the president, pressed by the imperatives of the War, presided over the bureaucratization of his new crusade during the next three years.

In 1942 the March bifurcated, and the drives in the Center-West and Amazonia would run, guided by new governmental agencies, on separate, largely autonomous tracks. Despite differences in execution (and even institutional rivalry), the Central Brazil Foundation (*Fundação Brasil Central*-- FBC) and the various bureaux

charged with development in Amazonia shared the same goals, philosophy, and political motivations.

Nelson Werneck Sodré has claimed that the Rubber Boom of the last century cleaved the Brazilian frontier into two zones, "one inclined towards the Platine Basin and one dependent on the Amazon Basin."⁴ The Estado Novo in the mid-1940s repeated that separation administratively to join both parts of the Western periphery to the economic and political center of the nation. While Vargas might have divided the labor and delegated the details of the March after 1942, the dictator ensured in both Amazonia and the Center-West that his bureaucratic bandeirantes carried out his vision of corporatist capitalism in the Oeste, with mixed results.

i: The Rubber Battle

[The] mystique of the National State. . . has reached Amazonia.⁵
-- Lt. Mário Martins de Freitas, 1942

What we are doing, under the superior inspiration of the president, is constructing the Amazonia of the future.⁶
-- Valentim F. Bouças, 1943.

Aside from his triumphal tour of Manaus and Belém, Vargas had done very little for Amazonia since officially launching the March to the West. The Estado Novo policy towards the region appeared the same as the neglectful attitude of the preceding Republican administrations, with the possible exception of the nationalization of river transport under SNAPP. Rubber, Amazonia's principal cash crop, remained a moribund commodity. Brazilian exports of latex had fallen steeply: in the 1930s the nation sold only 115,560 tons, forty-three percent less than in the preceding decade, and barely a third of the country's output during the Boom.⁷

The first confirmation that the president's grand tour of Amazonia had not lifted the region out of its misery came in early 1942. A civic association called the Getulian Crusade (*Cruzada Getuliana*) in Brazil's westernmost town, Cruzeiro do Sul, Acre, wrote a report that criticized the infrastructure of the area as inadequate. Backers of the president and his March, the authors still complained bitterly about dismal public health and communication facilities, prostrate industry, paltry education, and the poor service and

exorbitant rates of SNAPP. The report concluded, "Only the federal government can resolve" the chaos.⁸ Ignored even by the March to the West, Acre belied Vargas and his advisors' confident predictions of the imminent rehabilitation of the interior.

When the President of the National Petroleum Council (*Conselho Nacional do Petróleo*), Julio C. Horta Barbosa, toured Acre, the Crusade made sure that he carried a copy of its stinging critique back to Rio. A number of federal agencies then received the report and wrote evaluations of its complaints and recommendations. At the Ministry of Agriculture, for example, a functionary crafted a memorandum that supported the Crusade and urged a more inclusive state effort in the West: "The agricultural and stock-raising problems of Acre must be resolved with the help of the federal government."⁹ Vargas himself read a copy of the report, marking and underlining sections in his trademark red pencil.

As early as 1939, voices within the Vargas' circle had urged the president to attack the problem by creating a new federal agency to oversee Amazonia. The interventor of Pará, José Malcher, wrote Vargas to suggest a "Federal Inspectorate of Assistance to Amazonia" (*Inspetoria Federal de Assistencia à Amazônia*) that "could study, plan, and execute projects and [provide] services that would take a decisive step towards. . . the progress of the Amazon region."¹⁰ The Second World War would finally push Vargas to develop just such an agency.

In the early months of 1942, when Japanese forces overran British garrisons in Malaya and seized the Dutch East Indies, the Allied powers lost contact with their primary sources of natural latex. The armed forces of the United States, gearing up for an unprecedented mobilization, believed themselves especially hampered by the cut-off of rubber shipments from the plantations of Southeast Asia. Policy-makers and military strategists in Washington searched for a way to ensure a supply of latex from friendly nations. These efforts almost immediately focused on Brazil.

Two years earlier Brazil would have appeared an unlikely collaborator. Germany, which over the course of the twentieth century had come to rival the United States as Brazil's principal trading partner, and Italy exercised a strong influence on the nation's economy and politics. During much of the 1930s, the green-shirted Integralists had distributed Italian and German propaganda and agitated for a right-wing putsch. Vargas had explicitly imitated European corporatism in constructing his quasi-fascist Estado Novo. When war had broken out, moreover, high-level government officials, including propaganda chief Lourival Fontes, National Security Advisor Gen. Góes Monteiro, and Justice Minister Francisco Campos openly sympathized with the Axis cause. As long as the United States remained neutral, Vargas, like Franco, won advantages by pitting the antagonists against each other.

By 1942, however, Vargas' relationship with the Axis powers had soured. Fascist conspiracies had made him wary of the Axis, for

one. Following the Integralists' attack on the Guanabara Palace in May 1938, the dictator had banned the organization and also suppressed agitation among the large German and Italian communities in southern Brazil, even forbidding the teaching of those languages in the schools. Oswaldo Aranha, formerly Ambassador in Washington and now Foreign Minister, also persuaded Getúlio that he had far more to gain from cooperating with the United States than from casting his lot in with Hitler and Mussolini. On 28 January 1942, Brazil severed all diplomatic and economic ties with Germany, Italy, and Japan.

Domestic political considerations also changed the Brazilian attitude towards the Allies. A severe drought in the Northeast that had begun in 1941 brought new urgency to the old Amazonian question. The prospect of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of migrants pouring out of the parched Nordeste to swell the shantytowns that clung to the hillsides of Rio and splayed around the factories of São Paulo frightened federal policy-makers. The drought confirmed the inclusion of rural refugees along with urban slum dwellers in the pool targeted for removal to the interior.

The president knew that the demand for Brazilian rubber would rise as a consequence of the Japanese victories, but his subordinates were telling him that "the groves lack manpower."¹¹ In 1942 Vargas and his advisors looked for a way to channel large numbers of the *retirantes* into the West to tap rubber without repeating the disastrous stampede of the 1870s and 1880s (see

Chapter Two). The dictator hoped that the Americans, eager for latex, might help pay for such an endeavor.

Ever the pragmatist, Vargas entered into negotiations with the United States in 1942. As part of a comprehensive series of agreements that enabled the Americans to establish air bases in the Northeast, essential to ferry troops and supplies for the coming invasion of North Africa, Brazil extracted a pact on rubber. On 3 March 1942, an entity of the United States government called the Rubber Reserve Company agreed to buy up for five years all the Brazilian latex not consumed by the nation's internal market.¹² In addition, the U.S. Rubber Development Corporation established a five million dollar fund to increase production from Brazilian trees by underwriting infrastructure and sanitization projects.¹³

Brazilian officials praised the so-called Washington Accords as the first step towards developing Amazonia and achieving economic independence. Valentim F. Bouças, Executive Director of the binational Washington Accords Control Commission that would oversee the implementation of the treaties, welcomed foreign help in the March to the West: "With this wise 'good neighbor' policy of mutual assistance, we gained access to the financial resources of the United States for the exploitation of the immense riches of Amazonia that would otherwise have gone untapped."¹⁴ Such frank pragmatism characterized the Vargas administration's relationship with foreign capital. When money was at stake, the Estado Novo would often shelve its nationalist rhetoric and cooperate with

international investors. The Washington Accords served as a harbinger of the Amazonian policy of the later Brazilian military regimes, a for-profit collaboration of the armed forces and multinational corporations.

In May, Vargas dispatched interim Labor Minister Dulfe Pinheiro Machado to the Northeast to oversee a drive to recruit labor for the Rubber Battle. Despite the drought, free passage for those "disposed to follow destiny" into the rain forest did not convince many to exchange their homes for lives as rubber tappers, or *seringueiros*.¹⁵ The Minister returned to Rio a failure.

In the wake of the Washington Accords, meanwhile, Germany had begun to treat Brazil as a belligerent power. U-boats prowled the coastal waters and exacted an increasingly heavy toll on Brazilian shipping through the middle of 1942. After a grisly period in which the Germans torpedoed five ships in three days, Brazil declared war on Germany and Italy on 22 August 1942.

Now officially at war, the Vargas administration had to redesign all of its economic planning. The Estado Novo lacked the administrative structure to deal with either the expanding Allied demand for rubber or the industrial retooling of militarization. In late August the president created the Economic Mobilization Agency (*Coordenação da Mobilização Econômica*-- CME) to handle both tasks. Together with the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (*Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística*), the agency would produce an "ambitious but technically unsound blueprint"¹⁶ to move

thousands of Northeasterners to Amazonia that would fail spectacularly.

To head this powerful new bureaucracy, Getúlio settled on former São Paulo interventor and Rio police chief João Alberto Lins de Barros. A gaúcho like his boss, João Alberto had marched with the Prestes Column in the 1920s, and he considered himself an expert on the interior.

Trained in the army as a young tenente and chief of the nation's mobilization efforts for the Second World War, João Alberto brought a decidedly military outlook to westward expansion. During a press conference during early 1943, he called the March to the West "truly a program of war."¹⁷ Since he saw himself as a general commanding troops on a front as important for Brazil as the lines in Europe, he gave an intensity and an urgency to the March that it had lacked before. The Coordinator's emphatic comments indicated with clarity that the period of federal lethargy had ended: "Brazil must move into the interior of the country. It is necessary that we take off for new discoveries. Brazilians must exploit the riches of the interior of Brazil."¹⁸ The federal cynosure in the West, casting himself as the new Rondon, heralded a second age of exploration.

Steeped in the ethos of the tenente movement of the 1920s, João Alberto also displayed an ardent nationalism. That the March to the West rejected the idea of foreign settlement owes much to his thinking. João Alberto left no doubt that on his watch Brazilians would people the West: "It is absolutely unjust that we are always awaiting streams of

immigrants to populate our territory when we ourselves could do it. To remain in the large cities of the coastline expecting others to come to settle the interior of Brazil is. . . absurd."¹⁹ With the foundation of the CME, the Estado Novo rescinded the long-standing invitation that Brazil had extended to the outside world to colonize her fertile soils.

In keeping with the scientific ideology of positivism, João Alberto saw his role as that of a surgeon curing the country of its congenital ailments. He criticized Brazil's growth pattern in medical terms: "Brazil suffers from a type of macrocephalia."²⁰ An abnormal enlargement of the head of the nation (the coastal strip) was causing the body of the nation (the interior) to waste away.

João Alberto's diagnosis of gigantism in the littoral epitomized the Estado Novo response to the rapid urbanization of the 1930s and 1940s. According to the self-proclaimed healer, the illness of rural flight had corroded all aspects of Brazilian life: "The mentality of the city, of comfort and ease, that deprecates work in the interior of the nation and fears the strain of work in the fields, constitutes true decadence."²¹ Like the Integralists and other nationalists, João Alberto wanted Brazilians to return to their roots, to the essence of their nationality, in the countryside. In his view, cosmopolitan city life had corrupted the body politic and weakened it. According to João Alberto, the March to the West would restore vigor and health to Brazil by bringing the country into contact again with its hinterland.

João Alberto's intimacy with the ideology of the March served him well in the middle of 1942, for circumstances caused the Vargas administration to accelerate its plans for Amazonian development. The birth of the CME occurred against a backdrop of increasing nationalism, xenophobia, and fear in and about Amazonia. On 1 October, interventor Malcher confirmed in a secret telegram that the Nazis had torpedoed two steamships off the coast of Pará.²² National security concerns heightened further during October when reports surfaced that unidentified ships at sea had turned spotlights on several beaches along the shoreline of Pará.²³

Spooked by the mysterious beams, Brazilian authorities seriously entertained the possibility of an Axis invasion of the region. One member of the Superior Council of National Security (*Conselho Superior da Segurança Nacional*-- CSSN) warned that foreign agents provocateur could infiltrate the sparsely populated West:

We can be sure that a few audacious men could form a well-organized band equipped with modern weaponry, and unexpectedly drop from an airplane into any city or town in the interior of Brazil. They could easily cut communications with the rest of the nation, dominate the local authorities, and intimidate the [rural] population!²⁴

The Second World War resurrected the old Brazilian fears of silent invasion in the Oeste that dated from the Paraguayan war of 1865. Despite the Olympian labors of Rondon, Brazil's dominion over her northern and western expanses in 1942 was barely more secure than it had been in the middle of the previous century.

While some fretted about paratroopers, the government of the state of Pará expressed concern about a German naval landing near the mouth of the Amazon. A secret report prepared for Vargas by the Federal Police of Pará (*Delegacia Especial de Segurança Política e Social*) interpreted the Nazi naval activity in the region as reconnaissance for the establishment of an enemy beachhead on Marajó Island: "[K]eeping in mind the notorious boldness of the Axis, the emergence at any moment of enemy landings is not impossible."²⁵ With only a token military presence in Amazonia, Brazil seemed to have exposed its vulnerable flank to the Axis Atlantic fleets. The Nazi U-boats had brought back another traditional fear: concerns about such a naval incursion echoed the debate over the free navigation of the Amazon in the 1860s.²⁶

The Federal Police also counseled the president about possible "fifth columnism" in Amazonia.²⁷ In the Brazilian West, this term from the Spanish Civil War implied one group: the Japanese. The states of Pará and Amazonas welcomed several colonies of Japanese farmers in the 1920s and 1930s,²⁸ but by the Second World War Brazil viewed its Asian immigrant communities with suspicion and hostility.

After Brazil entered the war, nationalists whipped up a rabid, race-baiting frenzy over the Japanese in the West. A series of xenophobic tracts appeared in 1942 that accused the colonists in Amazonia of preparing the way for a full-scale Axis invasion. Psychiatrist and former federal deputy Xavier de Oliveira, the

loudest rabble-rouser from the 1936 Amazonian concession debate (see Chapter Five) returned to attack the Japanese in a new book. *The Immigrant Problem in Latin America* (*O problema imigratório na América Latina*) decried the creation of a "New Japan" that would turn the state of Amazonas into "a future base of naval operations against the United States."²⁹ de Oliveira urged the immediate occupation of the interior by Brazilians to combat the "fifth columns" of "racial cysts militarily [and] strategically distributed in the West."³⁰

The anti-Japanese campaign also reprinted the viciously racist and inflammatory articles of the deceased Miguel Couto. A respected physician, professor, and bigoted nationalist in the 1920s and 1930s, Couto claimed that a dream in which the Japanese colonized Brazil and took over the country drove him to protest Asian immigration. Railing against "the meticulously preconceived plan. . . to Nipponize vast stretches of Brazilian territory," the author posthumously incited the ugly wave of anti-Japanese sentiment.³¹

Of all of the race-baiting literature of 1942, *The Japanese Offensive in Brazil* (*A ofensiva japonesa no Brasil*), by Carlos de Souza Morais, qualifies as the most sinister and grotesque. The book's cover displays humiliating, bucked-toothed, slant-eyed caricatures of Emperor Hirohito and Tojo surrounded by other crude stereotypes of a Buddhist monk, a Geisha girl, and a martial arts practitioner. Inside, Morais claims that the "masturbation of the

national political class" prevented Brazilians from seeing the imminent dangers of the Asian colonies in the West.³²

Amid this climate charged with hate and fear of the "yellow peril," politicians in the West felt public pressure to join the calumny. In Amazonas, interventor Alvaro Maia broadcast speeches over the radio to excoriate those immigrants "with the vocation of espionage and felony. . . the Cains of the Fatherland, who receive money from Iscariots."³³ The interventor placed Japanese workers on jute plantations in Amazonas under surveillance by the State Police.³⁴

The continued Nazi attacks and skyrocketing demand for rubber among the Allies prompted Vargas to accelerate his plans for Amazonia. As a corporatist and centralized regime, the Estado Novo considered only bureaucratic strategies for the assault on the wilderness. The only debate was over what form the new institutions would take.

An internal CME memorandum advocated the chartering of a gigantic Amazon Foundation (*Fundação Amazônica*).³⁵ Directly responsible to the president of the Republic, the organ would oversee all aspects of colonization, development, and planning for the region. The proposal, in classic Estado Novo fashion, emphasized top-down coordination and left most decision-making power with the head of the organization and Vargas himself. In line with Vargas administration ideology, the memorandum identified "population" as the crux of the difficulties in Amazonia, and suggested the aggregation of colonists in state-supported clusters.³⁶

Tellingly, the document also reflected the Estado Novo's low esteem for the inhabitants of the interior. Even while praising the West as the repository of the wealth and future of Brazil, the author deprecated the caboclos: "Instituting any program in Amazonia based on discipline or future predictions is useless. Amazonian man, through fighting with aggressive nature, turns barbarous. . . ."37 The scheme conceived of replacing the residents of Brazil's largest wilderness with migrants from the rest of the country who might respond to the call of rigorous, patriotic duty. Estado Novo planners believed that the caboclos, hardened by the mortal struggle in the forest, would not be as pliant as those fleeing the arid Northeast.

Vargas implemented no socioeconomic master plan for Amazonia until his elected term in the 1950s, but in late 1942 he did authorize just such a blueprint for moving thousands of people to Pará, Amazonas, and Acre. On 30 November 1942, João Alberto created the Special Service for the Mobilization of Workers to Amazonia (*Serviço Especial da Mobilização de Trabalhadores para a Amazônia*-- SEMTA) to carry out a grandiose plan to ship 50,000 workers from the Northeast to tap rubber in the interior.³⁸

Another bureaucracy, the Superintendency for the Provisioning of the Amazon Valley (*Superintendência de Abastecimento do Vale Amazônico*-- SAVA) federalized virtually all economic activity in the region. SAVA extended the state's reach into daily life by controlling the stocking, pricing, shipping, and supplying of foodstuffs. Undertaking the unprecedented nationalization of commerce in

Amazonia, the agency also had a mandate to promote agriculture, fishing, and food processing industries and to organize standard and refrigerated warehouses.³⁹ The Rubber Development Corporation agreed to subsidize this government-sponsored development scheme by distributing supplies and constructing housing and airstrips in the rain forest.

SEMTA represented the most extensive militarization of the March to the West under Vargas. The agency, headed by Paulo Assis Ribeiro, viewed itself as a paramilitary organization that performed "a service of war" vital to Brazil's national security.⁴⁰ In its internal documents and publicity campaigns, SEMTA adopted military terminology, euphemistically referring to the workers whom it transported as "Amazonian volunteers"⁴¹ and "soldiers of production."⁴² This conflation with the armed forces also included an exemption from military service for those who participated in the rubber campaign. Recruiting posters portrayed Amazonia as a battleground as important as the one in Europe and trumpeted, "Seringueiros and soldiers are equal in the eyes of the Fatherland."⁴³

Despite the dignified, military rhetoric, the Estado Novo labor program appeared similar to the system of peonage set up by the rubber barons, the *seringalistas*, around the turn of the century. According to SEMTA contracts, the service provided free transport, lodging, and medical assistance for recruited workers on their journey to the forest. Those recruited would supposedly receive sixty percent of the value of the latex that they harvested. Once in

the rubber groves, however, tappers found that SEMTA docked their salaries daily to account for equipment and food in the barracks. In the fine print, the contracts specified that the seringueiros received only a uniform (two pairs of pants, one shirt), sandals, a hammock, a backpack, a cup, and a fork.⁴⁴ The only preparation for the wrenching shock of life in the untamed rain forest was a program run by ecclesiastical authorities to maintain morale.⁴⁵ Vargas' rhetoric about workers' rights notwithstanding, the rubber tappers were never unionized and did not enjoy the same guarantees and privileges as urban industrial laborers. Ironically, in 1940 the federal government had agreed on paper to implement regulations governing the relationship between tappers and the owners of the plantations,⁴⁶ but the Rubber Battle obviated that plan.

As well as enjoying the cooperation of the vigorous Estado Novo media machinery, SEMTA counted on an internal publicity arm to "create the atmosphere for new recruitment."⁴⁷ In 1943, the agency's Propaganda Service (*Serviço de Propaganda*) published a pamphlet to attract Nordestinos to the Rubber Battle. *Path to Amazonia, Land of Plenty* (*Rumo à Amazônia, terra da fartura*), given the low literacy rates of the poverty-stricken Northeastern states, featured far more visuals than text. Illustrated by SEMTA propaganda chief Jean Pierre Chaloz, the booklet showed drawings of happy recruits riding in the backs of trucks to the rubber groves and detailed pictures of the equipment given to each worker.⁴⁸

The pamphlet appealed to its intended audience by calculatedly portraying Amazonia as an Eden compared to the drought-ravaged Northeast. Chabloz and his assistants knew that they had to dispel the evil reputation of the West that Nordestinos had inherited from their forbearers. The tragic stories of those who had suffered in the forests in the migration of the last century, recorded by Alberto Rangel and others, had filtered back into the oral history of Ceará, Maranhão, and Piauí. SEMTA's booklet thus turned the traditional symbols of aggressive and deadly nature, the alligator and the jaguar, into symbols of abundance. One section, embellished with sketches of caiman and jaguar skins, proclaimed the wonderful advantages of life in the rain forest as "all the FISHING and all the HUNTING."⁴⁹ The agency echoed Vargas' speeches by promising that the Estado Novo had abolished the *Inferno Verde* chronicled by Rangel: "Amazonia, no longer the 'Green Hell' of yesteryear, is now the 'Promised Land.'"⁵⁰ This campaign, as with the rest of the March to the West propaganda, would seep into public consciousness over time.

In keeping with its military aura, SEMTA also appealed to recruits on patriotic grounds. The brochure assured workers that as "hero[es] of Amazonia," they would be performing a great service for the Fatherland: "To our laborer befalls a task as important as that of manning machine guns on the bloody fields of battle: the duty of fighting peacefully on the homefront. . . ."⁵¹ Once the Estado Novo had declared Amazonia crucial to national security (and to the

victory of the Allies), later Brazilian governments would never alter that designation.

SEMTA's incentives and cajolement attracted far fewer men than anticipated. In April 1943, a confidential report indicated that the agency had mobilized only about twelve thousand workers.⁵² Recruitment drives continued to show anemic results during April and May of 1943. SEMTA officials told their American sponsors at the Rubber Development Corporation that 314 workers had arrived at the staging camps to be shipped to the rubber groves during the third week of May.⁵³ Such small numbers would never add up to the promised 50,000.

Vargas realized that the rubber campaign was floundering. To prevent the Americans from walking away from the Accords, the president leaned on his surrogates to redouble their efforts. The interventor of Ceará, the state that traditionally supplied most migrants to Amazonia, responded by sending a circular to all the mayors in his state. Urging local politicians to pressure their constituents to enlist, F. de Menezes Pimentel appealed for help "to assure the continuity of [Ceará's] historic mission as a pioneer in the conquest of Amazonia. . . ."⁵⁴ State governments also held parades in the capitals of the Northeast to attract laborers to SEMTA.

At the same time, concerned that the Rubber Battle lacked local dynamic leadership, Vargas returned Col. Joaquim Magalhães Barata to his post as interventor in Pará. A complex, flamboyant, but immensely popular figure, Magalhães Barata was the only frontier

official whose charisma rivaled that of the president.⁵⁵ The colonel also enjoyed a good relationship with the military officers from the American airbase in Belém. Getúlio hoped that such a combination of magnetism and political skill could revive the campaign for victory in Amazonia. That Vargas would reinstate an officer who had spent part of the intervening eight years sowing discord in Goiás (see Chapter Four) testifies to the seriousness of the problem.⁵⁶

To heighten public awareness of the Amazonian campaign, Vargas declared June 1943 as National Rubber Month (*Mês Nacional da Borracha*). An explosion of publicity linked the March to the West to the Allied war effort. The president dispatched a letter to mayors nationwide that instructed them to organize civic activities around the theme "Extracting our rubber is now an imperative of the present and a commitment with the future."⁵⁷

Administrators in Amazonia celebrated National Rubber Month with particular zeal. Magalhães Barata and other officials in Pará gave a series of speeches proclaiming that the drive to tap more rubber "will be the instrument of our prosperity. . . [and] the victory of our labor towards the peaceful economic occupation" of the forest.⁵⁸ In Amazonas, interventor Maia was so enthused that he even closed the casinos in Manaus.

Despite the publicity blitz of the Rubber Month, SEMTA met its recruitment goals. The story of SEMTA is one of bureaucratic infighting, the clash of "palatial ambitions [and] ministerial jealousies."⁵⁹ Assis Ribeiro claimed that he could rarely contact João

Alberto to make definite plans or coordinate operations.⁶⁰

Disorganized, hamstrung by turf disputes between other agencies and between the federal and state governments, SEMTA by late 1943 appeared completely impotent.

Ironically, at the same time that the Estado Novo's rubber campaign was dying, the model for Vargas' version of Amazonian capitalism had sunk into decay as well. With Henry Ford's death in 1942, Ford had suspended investment in Fordlândia and Belterra. Magalhães Barata tried to save the plantations by cabling the president to ask for an exemption from military service for Fordlândia workers and called them "a strong element of national defense."⁶¹ New State propagandists had already begun to disparage the Ford operations openly, however: An article in *Cultura Política* magazine dismissed the properties as a "fleeting mirage" and criticized the "fantastic investment of American capital."⁶² Ford offered the plantations to Goodyear, but the tiremaker balked. In 1945, Valentim Bouças would persuade the Brazilian government to purchase Fordlândia and Belterra for only five million *cruzeiros*, a substantial loss for the carmaker.⁶³

Ongoing difficulties in contracting and retaining labor forced João Alberto to concede defeat. Just before Vargas transferred him to head the FBC, the Coordinator abolished SEMTA in November 1943 and replaced it with a new agency, the Administrative Commission to Guide Labor to Amazonia (*Comissão Administrativa do Encaminhamento de Trabalho para a Amazônia*-- CAETA). CAETA

managed to transport an additional 22,092 workers to the rubber groves from October 1943 to January 1945.⁶⁴ (DIP estimates were much higher.)⁶⁵

The Rubber Battle as a whole failed miserably. Mortality rates among the migrants were so high that a critical series of magazine articles in 1947 would label the campaign "The March of Death."⁶⁶ Colonization proved a chimera, for "most returned to their homes, many of them sick."⁶⁷ The patience of American officials ran out in February 1944, and negotiators forced a modification in the Accords that relieved the Rubber Development Corporation of its obligation to supply food and materiel to the Brazilians. The United States had ceased subsidizing Vargas' experiment in Amazonia. In a farewell letter to Assis Ribeiro, João Alberto pointed to "the wartime conditions, the lack of materials and transportation, and. . . the envy and ill will of unpatriotic and unthinking elements"⁶⁸ for the calamity in the rain forest. Having failed in Amazonia, João Alberto less than two years later would blame the Rubber Battle for sidetracking his work with the FBC.

The Rubber Campaign was so badly run that in 1946 the newly elected congress would convene a special committee (CPI) to investigate the matter. While such bodies have a reputation in Brazil as little more than exercises in whitewashing, this CPI unearthed evidence of total chaos within SEMTA and CAEVA. The deputies heard accusations that the agencies had not cared for the families of tappers and that workers had not received the proper compensation.

Of the lack of coordination that had doomed the project, Assis Ribeiro during his testimony could only admit, "In this question of Amazonia there is. . . a lot of fantasy."⁶⁹

In the late 1940s, Amazonia still presented an incredible portrait of despair and poverty. Malnutrition ran rampant, three hundred of every thousand infants died before their first birthday, and over sixty percent of the population could neither read nor write.⁷⁰ Mineral strikes and the publicity of the Rubber Battle induced Brazilians to migrate to Amazonia during the 1940s, but the region was not prepared for their arrival. The influx strained the poor network of public services and transportation, especially in the new territories of Amapá and Guaporé (Rondônia), which experienced population growth rates of seventy-four percent.⁷¹ In a harbinger of future patterns, the population of Pará exceeded a million people for the first time, the majority concentrated in and around the capital of Belém.⁷² By 1950, the rural to urban migration had come to Amazonia.

One historian has called Vargas' March in Amazonia "the hope for a new era of easy money, of new fortunes, of euphoria, a hope which rapidly dissipated."⁷³ The attempt of the Estado Novo to induce the United States to fund the siphoning off of excess population from the overcrowded and destitute Northeast ended in a deadly debacle. Cloaked in rhetoric of patriotism and Pan-Americanism, the Rubber Battle in reality constituted a quick-fix solution to two age-old Brazilian problems, drought in the Northeast

and economic stagnation in Amazonia, that did not involve meaningful social or agrarian reform. João Alberto and Getúlio Vargas envisioned using American money and technology, proffered in exchange for Brazilian rubber, to prop up the elites of Amazonia, Pará, and Acre who had supported the New State faithfully. Perniciously appealing to the patriotism and desperation of poor country folk, the Rubber Battle brought thousands of unprepared workers into the rain forest under false pretenses.

According to political philosopher Alaôr Caffé Alves, at the same time that ideology clouds certain realities and issues, it must have a grounding in reality to avoid exposure as a fraud, a "subjective basis that does not permit, on the level of society as a whole, 'disillusion' following eventual elucidation by critical consciences."⁷⁴ Vargas' ideology and policy in Amazonia from 1942 to 1945 scarcely rested on such a basis, but nevertheless lived on in the popular and political imagination of Brazilians. Amounting to "mere words, hollow and senseless,"⁷⁵ the March to the West in Amazonia from 1942 to 1945 produced virtually no lasting results, but the ideas that it generated would mark all future governmental strategies to develop the region. Vargas' concurrent March in the Center-West enjoyed a far greater success.

ii: The Central Brazil Foundation

The center, the core of Brazil is empty, hollow, bereft of everything except riches. How can we make Brazil progress and stop clinging to the coast like a crab without putting this region under the direct control of the Federal Government?!⁷⁶
-- Lysias A. Rodrigues, 1944

Behind every project there is a Utopia, explicit or implicit.⁷⁷
-- Armando Dias Mendes

While propagandists of the regime claimed that "the word of the Chief of the Nation signals precisely the passage between verbal fantasy and the reality of action,"⁷⁸ Getúlio Vargas did not so much debunk myths about the West as create his own. The agency charged with translating these myths into reality was the FBC, which carried out the southern half of the March to the West in the 1940s. As early as 1942, Goiás interventor Pedro Ludovico could comment, "The assistance and subsidies that the central government concedes are already innumerable."⁷⁹ Continued, federally sponsored westward expansion through the FBC brought a boom in federal patronage and investment to the region that spurred impressive economic and demographic growth.

The man charged with exploring and developing the Center-West after 1943 was João Alberto. In his memoirs, he recalled that his trek with Prestes through Goiás and Mato Grosso to Bolivia first awakened his interest in the Oeste. João Alberto viewed the frontier

as a place to make money, and he contrasted the situation in the region with difficulties and excessive costs in Rio Grande do Sul:

There in Goiás and Mato Grosso the situation was different: Cheap and fertile land that needed no investment of capital. If one associated himself with local fazendeiros and worked firmly with them, one could make a fortune.⁸⁰

This belief in the richness of the interior and in the preservation of and cooperation with the local elites would characterize the March under João Alberto. As Vargas' czar in the Center-West, João Alberto would begin the transformation of the area from "a place of fantastic legends, with a nomadic and reckless population. . . dreaming of El Dorado and living in misery"⁸¹ to one of the world's most lucrative agricultural frontiers.

At its most elemental level, the March to the West in Goiás and Mato Grosso constituted a conscious effort to re-establish central government control over the extraction of Brazil's resources. Along with the Mining Code (*Código de Minas*) of 1934, the Doce River Valley Company (*Companhia Vale do Rio Doce*— CVRD), and, later, Petrobrás, Vargas used state-directed development in the Center-West to return to the subsoil policies interrupted by the Republic after 1891. During the 1940s, the Estado Novo revoked the rights to the subsoil of those who owned the property above it (called *superficiários* in Portuguese): "[Vargas] resurrected the national tradition, product of Iberian law, that distinguished mineral wealth as goods pertaining to the Nation, exploitable under concession from the central government in the public interest."⁸² With the March, the

state arrogated to itself the below-ground resources of Brazil, and could reward its allies and punish its enemies through the distribution of patronage and concessions to mine and drill in the immense Oeste. The military regime of the 1960s would consolidate this policy by turning the CVRD into an immense bureaucratic conglomerate to control the nation's mineral deposits.

In conjunction with its mineral policy, the March to the West aimed to boost agricultural production and the harvesting of surface resources in Goiás and Mato Grosso. The Estado Novo economic strategy of import substitution depended upon a more efficient flow of raw materials from the inexhaustible western stockpiles to the burgeoning manufacturing centers on the coast, particularly São Paulo. An army official explained this program succinctly in 1942: "The real meaning of the March to the West will be [that] the riches of Goiás and Mato Grosso will complement the unfolding of heavy industry."⁸³

To accomplish these goals of better and faster resource extraction, the sparsely populated interior needed manpower. A movement for colonization, euphemistically called the "occupation of empty spaces," formed the third facet of the March in the Center-West.

Unlike the United States, where the state through the 1862 Homestead Act distributed land and then adopted a laissez-faire stance, the corporatist Estado Novo sought to rationalize and organize the populating of the frontier. The March to the West colonization

schemes were the spiritual descendants of the Land Law of 1850, which made access to land by free labor extremely hard. Both measures hoped to forestall squatting, insure a labor supply for large landholders, and tie down ("fix") rural populations. The key difference between the 1850 Land Law and the Estado Novo colonization is that the former attempted to trap immigrants and rural workers on private fazendas, landless and beholden, while the Vargas administration sought to keep them on government-sponsored settlements where, although they might have title, they labored under the watchful eye of the FBC and the military.

What Emilia Viotti da Costa calls "the pressing problem of manpower" in the nineteenth century, a reflection of the inflexibility of the slave system and its failure to provide adequate labor to the dynamic sectors of the economy,⁸⁴ had been turned on its head by 1940: During Vargas' regime, the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the slaves and immigrants brought in to replace them had begun to flee to the coastal cities. In Brazil, the state (and especially the military) would regulate, conglomerate, and watch over settlers so as to assure a labor force for producers and to leave undisturbed the established patterns of land tenure in the Oeste.

Colonization in the March to the West, following the New State ideological goal of creating the New Brazilian, had as a purpose the transformation or replacement of the inhabitants of the interior. Frederico Rondon (see Chapter Five) defined this policy as "[making] our frontier caboclos efficient colonists. . . ."⁸⁵ According to the

rhetoric of government officials, pastoral life in the Center-West would turn urban undesirables into productive and responsible citizens: "In the [agricultural] colonies Brazilians will find a joyous opportunity to refashion themselves into rural small proprietors [by] peopling distant zones of our hinterland and permitting Brazil to take possession of herself."⁸⁶ Rather than mandating "an effective reform of the regime of land use" to create a class of small holders, however, the Estado Novo and its sponsors among the new industrial and agricultural elites pushed "the occupation of new areas" in the interior.⁸⁷

Consciously or unconsciously, the March to the West recalled the "safety valve" rhetoric popularized in the United States by Horace Greeley. Greeley proposed using the frontier to avoid strikes and social disturbances: "The valve affords safety for the property of the rich against the potential violence of the poor, who are withheld from their vandal attack on the possessions of others by being enticed away to the West."⁸⁸ Getúlio Vargas and his advisors hoped that colonizing Brazil's interior would solve urban overcrowding and rural poverty "without drastic means being taken to restructure the property statutes."⁸⁹ Transferring people to the interior appeared as the perfect solution to what government leaders perceived as dangerous and unstable overcrowding in the coastal cities. Henry Nash Smith's comment on the function of the frontier in the United States also applies to Brazil: "The doctrine of the safety valve was an imaginative construction which masked poverty and industrial strife

with the pleasing suggestion that a beneficent nature stronger than any human agency, the ancient resources of Americans [or Brazilians]. . . would solve the new problems of industrialism."⁹⁰

This settlement scheme in the Center-West differed from previous such drives in its overtly nationalistic character. Rather than relying on the enticement of European immigrants to fill the voids of Brazil, as the Empire and Republic had done in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Estado Novo emphatically reserved its colonies for Brazilians. Nationalist resentment over land concessions in Amazonia to Japanese syndicates in the 1920s and 1930s lingered on among policy makers and military officers. One Vargas administration bureaucrat verged on xenophobia in a blunt assessment of the settlement process: "Nothing is more certain than. . . that foreign emigrants should not colonize [the West]. We ourselves-- since Japan did not use its oriental 'plantation' for universal commerce-- should exploit the greatest riches of Brazil."⁹¹ Even while actively lobbying for foreign capital, the New State closed off the West to migrants from overseas.

In the middle of 1942, the Estado Novo held the official commencement of the March in the Center-West, the Cultural Baptism (*Batismo Cultural*) of Goiânia. A celebration of the "Goiânia phenomenon,"⁹² the inauguration encompassed three weeks of ceremonies and conventions in July. Speakers, artists, religious figures and the Eighth Brazilian Conference on Education (8^o Congresso Brasileiro de Educação) descended upon the city to bestow

nationwide publicity on the country's newest state capital. Local cattlemen and growers, the strongest backers of Ludovico's plan, displayed their wares to the nation at a huge agricultural fair, the Rural Week (*Semana Ruralista*). The Archbishop of Cuiabá, Dom Aquino Corrêia, a strong supporter of Vargas, celebrated an open-air Mass at dawn on 5 July to commence the long schedule of events. M.A. Teixeira de Freitas of the Superior Council of National Security flew in from Rio to deliver the keynote address of the inauguration, and many other states sent official representatives and speakers. After years of scorn and controversy, Brazil formally embraced Goiânia, and the inauguration gave the city and its leaders the authority and legitimacy for which they had long yearned.

No one benefitted more from the attention and approval than Pedro Ludovico. On 5 July, in the Goiânia Cinema-Theater (*Cine-Teatro*), the interventor stepped onto a dais, surrounded by fifteen portraits of himself and Vargas, to deliver the crowning speech of his career.⁹³ Ludovico basked in the national adulation: "[To] Brazil I deliver a grand idea that has turned into a grand reality."⁹⁴ In his inaugural address, the interventor took credit for awakening the mammoth of the interior: "Goiânia was the stimulus, the shock, that obliged the corpulent pachyderm to get up."⁹⁵ Like a recalcitrant elephant, according to Ludovico, the West had responded to the voltage of the new city to once again labor in the service of the nation.

Another behemoth, the bureaucracy in Rio, during this time slowly geared up its plan for western expansion. The Secretary General of the IBGE produced a document that advocated a vigorous policy to reverse rural out-migration. Warning of the "congestion in large cities of parasitic populations" as a result of the exodus from the countryside, the official supported a massive program of sanitation, colonization, and improvement in productivity to divert migrants to the West and prevent those in the countryside from moving to the coast.⁹⁶ Such proposals were not new: as early as 1935, Rio Police Chief Filinto Müller, in a secret memorandum to Vargas following the Communist uprising, listed among his recommended actions to prevent further extremist uprisings the "[d]econgestion of the mass of unemployed in urban centers, by sending them to the interior with the assistance and localization of the state."⁹⁷ The FBC would attempt just such an undertaking after 1943.

In the meantime, Vargas continued a pattern of federalizing important functions in the interior that private concerns had formerly operated. Having expropriated and reorganized river traffic in Amazonia with the creation of SNAPP, in the Center-West the president turned his attention to air service. Goiás and Mato Grosso, lacking Amazonia's arterial network of navigable rivers, depended to a great degree on the rudimentary system of airplane transport developed by several firms in the 1920s. When Condor Airlines suspended its service to much of the West in late 1941, a

flood of telegrams poured into the Catete Palace. Protests from small-town politicians that the flights had "awaken[ed] our silent forests"⁹⁸ and promoted everything from industry to health clinics might have convinced the president to intervene.

During 1942 and 1943, the Estado Novo responded by widening the route map of the Military Air Mail (*Correo Militar*) and constructing new landing strips throughout the Center-West. In a paradigm of the entire March under Vargas, where private initiative had failed, the state-- particularly the military-- would step in. Officers and their civilian allies envisioned a "lightning-colonization, a 'flight to the West'. . . capable of making up for lost time"⁹⁹ that would employ military aircraft to conquer the enormous distances in the Oeste. In the tradition of Santos-Dumont, who as every Brazilian schoolchild knows really invented the airplane, the nation would again present the world with a stunning feat of aviation.

The air force, not coincidentally, became one of the leading advocates of military involvement in the March to the West. Air Force General Staff member Col. Lysias A. Rodrigues, a strong supporter of the Military Air Mail project, as a young aviator had undertaken some of the first missions to scout out locations for airfields in Goiás in the 1930s. In 1943 he published a book about his travels, *Itinerary on the Tocantins* (*Roteiro do Tocantins*), that called for an expansion of the role of the armed forces in the interior. Rodrigues declared that "every man in uniform in Brazil has to be a bandeirante of culture and discipline."¹⁰⁰ Despite the increase in

flights, however, the airplane played only a very small role in Vargas' March to the West. Not until the construction of Brasília in the 1950s under Kubitschek, the flying president, would coastal Brazil truly move westward in the cargo bays of aircraft.

Before moving beyond federalization to the details of authorizing any new agencies for horizontal expansion, however, Vargas approved an unprecedented territorial reorganization of the West. In 1943 the president created four new territories in the Oeste: Amapá (now the eponymous state), Guaporé (now Rondônia), Rio Branco (now Roraima), and Ponta Porã (portions of Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, and Paraná along the Bolivian and Paraguayan borders).

Long advocated by Brazilian geopolitical theorists and military officers,¹⁰¹ the changes on one level rationalized an unwieldy division of land. Mato Grosso, for example, before the split in 1942 comprised an area larger than Portugal, Spain, France, and Italy combined. With less than 500,000 people, the state had a population more than 100,000 less than that of Sergipe, Brazil's geographically smallest state.¹⁰²

As always with Getúlio, beneath the administrative rationale lurked a more important political motivation. The dictator himself called the creation of the territories "an elementary means of political and economic consolidation."¹⁰³ Five new units equalled five new interventors and attendant bureaucracies, beholden and loyal to the president who had invented their posts. In a shrewd maneuver,

Vargas had stripped the largest states in the federation of their disgruntled and isolated border regions. The territories federalized problematic areas and placed them under the direct control of the central government. (That he did not divide the irrationally configured Goiás at the same time testifies to his relationship with Pedro Ludovico.) Discontent in these areas at the government's ignorance of their problems shifted to gratitude, since the territories offered more opportunities for patronage.

With one stroke of the pen, Getúlio fortified his political position in the West and checked the power of his increasingly powerful interventors in Mato Grosso, Pará, and Amazonas. The "wizard," who trusted no one and nothing but his own instincts, had hedged his bets. In a measure of how politically important the territories became, after the dictator's deposition the 1946 constituent assembly quickly tried to erase Vargas' new map of the West. The convention could only succeed in abolishing two of the units.¹⁰⁴

Having prepared the way for a bureaucratic assault on the Center-West by carving out the new territories, Vargas cast around in mid-1943 for the right administrator to run the crusade. In the wake of the failure of SEMTA, the president transferred João Alberto from his job as Coordinator for Economic Mobilization.

On 10 December 1943, Vargas officially named João Alberto president of the FBC, a choice rivalled in its brilliance only by that of Lourival Fontes to head the DIP. The appointee accepted his post by

telling the press, "I hope to reawaken the old idealism that was born in the first days that I crossed Brazil in the revolutionary column."¹⁰⁵

The other administrators of the FBC included at least one other tenente. Silo Meireles, head of the Foundation in the Triângulo Mineiro, had participated in the 1922 Copacabana Fort revolt and had marched with Prestes. Exiled and imprisoned with the declaration of the Estado Novo, he managed with João Alberto's influence to return to Brazil to serve the Vargas administration in the West.¹⁰⁶ Another FBC official, agronomist Arquimedes Lima Câmara, had learned the ropes of the March to the West by running the "Rural Week" (*Semana Ruralista*) in Goiânia during the Cultural Baptism of the city in 1942.¹⁰⁷

João Alberto clearly articulated the goals of his organization. The priorities of the Estado Novo in the Center-West numbered "[f]irst, to explore unknown territory and, immediately thereafter, to promote the colonization of the region."¹⁰⁸ Along with opening new areas to settlement and filling Brazil's empty spaces with urban refugees, by bureaucratizing westward expansion, the FBC would also "conquer nomadism [and] impose processes of exploitation"¹⁰⁹ upon the disorganized populations of the interior.

João Alberto acted swiftly on his first priority, exploration. Repeating the experience of the 1937 "Bandeira Piratinanga," in 1943 the March to the West "curiously covered itself in scientific clothing."¹¹⁰ While still Coordinator of Economic Mobilization, João Alberto signed an order that created the "Bandeira Roncador-Xingú," designed to push into the uncharted wilderness of Mato Grosso. At a press conference to

announce the move he proclaimed, "With the War, to Brazil has befallen a great burden in the economic sector, and we thus see ourselves obligated to reenact the feats of the ancient explorers. . . ."111

Launched from Uberlândia, Minas Gerais, the expedition departed on 7 August 1943. A month later Vargas declared the bandeira "of military interest,"112 and it came under the direct control of the FBC in October. The venture proved far more successful than its predecessor of six years earlier: by 1945 the expedition would penetrate more than three thousand kilometers into the forests of Mato Grosso and eventually reach the Rio das Mortes.¹¹³

Since the CME sponsored the expedition, João Alberto personally planned much of the venture. Nevertheless, as with the Bandeira Piratinanga, private monies underwrote the Roncador-Xingú costs, and the effort received no government funds.¹¹⁴

Along with mapping and the collection of scientific data, colonization numbered among the Bandeira's stated purposes. "[C]onquering the soil for man once and for all," the expedition was supposed (at least on paper) to establish "initial nuclei" in its wake.¹¹⁵ According to the plan, these bases for future government-sponsored settlement "as soon as a second echelon is on the march, will be transformed, with the transport of the colonists' families to these areas, into small towns. . . ."116 Under Vargas the second cohort never arrived, but pioneers would begin to file West along the route of the bandeira in the 1950s and 60s.

The expedition also played a prominent propaganda role. As a publicity tool of the March to the West, the bandeira "projecte[d] the moral and historic values" of westward expansion for young people all over Brazil.¹¹⁷ Symbolically the trek tied the Vargas regime to historical glory by "rekindl[ing]. . . the magnificent impulse of the [bandeirantes]"¹¹⁸ and simultaneously legitimized the March to the West with the aura and authority of disinterested research. As multi-layered as anything else in Vargas' drive to subdue the interior, the Bandeira Roncador-Xingú evoked both the past and the future at the same time and cloaked the present expansion of capitalism in the garb of impartial science.

As the expedition pressed into the virgin forest, in the more settled areas of the Center-West road-building constituted another major facet of the FBC operations. Seen as "tightening the ties that bind us to the land and to the people of the sertão"¹¹⁹ by the March bureaucracy, roads logically followed behind the bandeira. João Alberto, even though he styled himself the heir to Rondon, rejected the explorer's solution to the transportation question in the West, railroads, in favor of conventional highways.

Elements within the regime urged that the program of road-building assume a comprehensive scale. The proposal of a "Transbrasiliana" highway to link Belém with Livramento on the Uruguayan border in Rio Grande do Sul to form the "dorsal spine of Brazil"¹²⁰ generated much discussion in 1943. On behalf of the IBGE, M.A. Teixeira de Freitas wrote a secret report that called for the

immediate construction of the Transbrasiliana. Teixeira de Freitas compared the road to Rondon's telegraph lines and described it as "an avenue of penetration of the first order."¹²¹ As the "first step to realizing the true March to the West," the road, according to the author, would "allow pioneers to reach the core of the country and there tap the potential wealth that will give weight and prestige to Brazil's standing in the international community."¹²²

Teixeira de Freitas also appealed for the construction of at least part of the highway on national security grounds. The official petitioned the Superior Council of National Security in 1943 for the completion of a linkage between Ipameri in northern Goiás and Belém. According to Teixeira de Freitas, the so-called "Tocantins Roadway" (*Rodovia de Tocantins*) would "assure safe interior traffic" and avoid the German cordon of submarines off the coast of Pará.¹²³ Interventor Magalhães Barata championed the idea,¹²⁴ as did some military officers, such as Juarez Távora,¹²⁵ but the road would have to wait another seventeen years. Much of the proposed route now forms the Belém-Brasília highway, opened in 1960 by Juscelino Kubitschek.

The FBC only constructed a few hundred kilometers of unpaved pathways under Vargas, including the beginning of a link between São Paulo and Cuiabá. Military forces, brought together as the First Independent Highway Company (*1ª Companhia Rodoviária Independente*), assisted in the effort by building a road from Vila Bela in Mato Grosso to Pôrto Esperidão on the Jaurú River in Guaporé.¹²⁶ More important than the actual mileage, however, was the idea that the truck,

not the locomotive, would carry Brazilians West and products East. This would have a profound impact on policy-makers in the following years. Juscelino Kubitschek would embrace this strategy fervently and resurrect and complete most of the old highway plans. The migrants who flocked to the Center-West in the 1960s and the 1970s travelled at least part of the way on arteries cleared by the FBC.

The FBC also carried out the president's capitalist agenda in the Center-West. In November 1944, the FBC created a wing named the Commercial Entrepôts FBC Limited (*Entrepósitos Comerciais FBC Ltda.*). A quasi-public business along the lines of the ICN or the Crusade Direction West, the enterprise had a monopoly over the distribution of salt in all municipalities in which the FBC operated in Goiás. The Entrepôts also branched out into other activities, including leather tanning, and drafted plans for rice refining and textile plants.¹²⁷ Not satisfied with improving access to raw materials in the West, the Estado Novo also created industries to process them and secured markets in which to sell them.

The FBC also began Brazil's alcohol fuel program, now a major agro-industry, by founding the Central-South Mill (*Usina Central Sul--Goiana S/A*) in 1945. Instructed by João Alberto to promote "the consumption of domestic fuel in the whole region" as part of the Vargas import-substitution strategy, the mill provided the sugar-cane alcohol to run the Roncador-Xingú Expedition and other activities.¹²⁸ Even though the project had a limited initial impact, the Mill left an important legacy. In the 1960s and 1970s, the military rulers of Brazil

would use the cultivation of sugar for alcohol fuel as a way to provide cheap energy and prevent land redistribution in the Northeast.

Perhaps the most successful FBC venture was the establishment of the city of Aragarças at the confluence of the Araguaia and Rio das Garças Rivers on the border between Goiás and Mato Grosso.¹²⁹ A pet project of João Alberto and located close to the geographical center of Brazil, the urban development symbolized the Vargas administration's taming of the Center-West. The cover of the Urbanization Plan (*Plano de Urbanização*) for Aragarças featured a stylized map that showed the red line of progress (roads built by the FBC) extending from Uberlândia in Minas through Jataí in Goiás into the wilds of Mato Grosso, where the solid line became dotted. A vivid portrait of the creep of civilization, the diagram envisioned the March to the West as a parade of symbols--radio transmitters, airfields, agricultural stations, bridges, sawmills, and hospitals-- into the great unknown.¹³⁰

Under the supervision of Arquimedes Pereira Lima, Aragarças would grow into a substantial settlement by the early 1950s. Now the site of the river crossing for the highway from Goiânia to Cuiabá, the city served as one of the main way stations for the migrants who moved into Mato Grosso and beyond into Rondônia during the 1960s and 1970s.

Despite the positive results of urbanization in Aragarças and Goiânia, the Vargas administration made no attempt to move the nation's capital to the Planalto. Abelardo Coimbra Bueno told the story that after the construction of Goiânia he and his brother prepared a proposal to transfer the administrative center of Brazil from Rio. When the

engineers presented the idea to Vargas, "he laughed in my face," according to Coimbra Bueno, and dismissed the movement of the capital as unnecessary for the March to the West. The president, skeptical of the entire concept, maintained that aviation had made irrelevant the traditional strategic concerns about the vulnerability of Rio de Janeiro to attacks from the sea. He remained confident that better communications would conquer the distances in the interior.¹³¹ Only in his later incarnation as an elected leader in the 1950s, pressured by the new Constitution, would Vargas authorize a commission to study the issue of a new capital for Brazil. The proposal languished until candidate Juscelino Kubitschek made it into a campaign promise in 1956.

At the end of 1944, João Alberto himself produced the most complete judgment of the FBC ever written, a status report presented to the organization's Board of Directors (*Conselho Diretor*). The cover of the document displayed a map of Brazil with a grey-shaded area superimposed upon it to represent the scope of the operations of the FBC— a rough triangle bounded by the Amazon River, the Tocantins River, and a line south from Manuas to a vertex at Uberlândia. An explanatory note termed the diagram "more an allegory"¹³² than an accurate representation, a perfect description of the entire March to the West.

Inside the report's optimistic cover, João Alberto admitted that the FBC had not met the high expectations that he and the president had set forth. He blamed the Second World War (and implicitly the Rubber Battle) for sidetracking his March to the West:

[The FBC] opened new perspectives on the solution of the problem [of the West], which certainly would have been attacked energetically and head-on if not for the priority of the war. International events, attracting the attention of the whole nation, appear to have delayed once again the execution of the thrilling program.¹³³

With a mix of self-pity and bureaucratic defensiveness, the head of the FBC made clear that he had battled alone to get the organization started, and claimed that he had soldiered on without the financial or political support that he needed.

Other, perhaps not impartial, observers appraised the FBC in less complimentary terms. Abelardo Coimbra Bueno criticized the agency for keeping most of its personnel in Rio, a few in Uberlândia, and very few in the field, a situation he termed "taking advantage."¹³⁴ He rated only the FBC's efforts, administered by the Indian Protection Service (*Serviço de Proteção aos Índios-- SPI*) to contact and pacify indigenous tribes as legitimate: "In truth and in practice, the March to the West was reduced to the Villas-Boas brothers. The rest were functionaries, sinecures who were here in Rio."¹³⁵ Since the records of the FBC, absorbed in 1967 by the now-abolished Superintendency for the Economic Development of the Center-West (*Superintendência do Desenvolvimento Econômico do Centro-Oeste-- SUDECO*), have disappeared, the distribution of FBC manpower and resources is impossible to check.¹³⁶

Despite this lacuna in the archival record, one can assess the sporadic activity of the FBC in the Center-West from 1942 to 1945 on several levels. The FBC colonization schemes themselves might not have harbored large populations, but the March to the West did attract

thousands of pioneers into Goiás and Mato Grosso. From 1940 to 1950, the population of state of Goiás grew from 826,414 to 1,214,921, a forty-seven percent increase.¹³⁷ Mato Grosso over the same decade (even with the loss of millions of square miles in the territorial redivision of 1943) gained 89,779 people to top the half-million mark for the first time.¹³⁸ The state-sponsored drive to induce migration into the interior produced impressive results in the Center-West. Even if most of the migrants moved on their own initiative and never participated in Estado Novo colonization schemes, the roads, facilities, and towns constructed by the FBC made the journey easier and more attractive.

While one scholar has called the campaign "a steam-roller of progress and civilization,"¹³⁹ the March to the West ran into serious problems in the Center-West during the 1940s. The new pioneers might have been "incomparably better armed than [the bandeirantes of old],"¹⁴⁰ but they prompted the same reaction as their forbearers had from the original inhabitants of the region. The push westward into supposedly "empty spaces" sparked renewed aggression among the indigenous tribes, especially the Xavantes and the Caiapó. In one incident that received worldwide publicity, Xavantes massacred four men from an SPI mission headed by Genesio Pimentel Barbosa in north-central Goiás.¹⁴¹ The violence even made the March counter-productive along the border between Goiás and Pará— the population of Conceição do Araguaia, 21,000 in 1940, dropped to four thousand a decade later after continued Indian raids.¹⁴²

Life in the boomtowns of the Center-West did not live up to the billing of the FBC in other ways as well. While a zealous poet described Goiânia as a place where "Progress unfurls her sheets of asphalt,"¹⁴³ conditions in the city remained very rudimentary. The Bank of Brazil had denied the state of Goiás a loan to complete many of the finishing touches of the construction, such as street paving,¹⁴⁴ and some of these improvements would wait until the 1950s. In 1948 American novelist John dos Passos visited the new capital of Goiás and reported that "pigs still rooted in the muddy streets."¹⁴⁵

Life in other frontier settlements appears not to have changed in fifty years. A description of Pôrto Nacional (now in Tocantins) by Umberto Peregrino for *Cultura Política* magazine could have been written about the mushrooming communities of Rondônia or Acre today:

A singular human torrent continuously pours over Pôrto Nacional: they are fortune-hunters, credulous and honest, who only manage to save up disillusion; adventurers, who install vice and crime in the mines; and men with a nose for business, who come to found concerns to serve the population rapidly coalescing around the mines.¹⁴⁶

As always in a raw material boom, very few of the miners got rich in the Center-West-- the peddlers, money-changers, and middlemen absconded with the profits.

Although the FBC produced few tangible results under the Estado Novo, the agency left an important legacy, for later regimes continued or expanded upon its ideas. Following the military takeover in 1964, SUDECO absorbed the organization's network of subsidies and monopolies, and continued to funnel money to the elite ranchers and

farmers of the Center-West for almost thirty years. Furthermore, the FBC served as a model for the largest-scale western development and colonization project ever mounted in Brazil, the Program of National Integration (*Programa de Integração Nacional*-- PIN). Launched by President Emílio Garrastazu Médici in 1970, the PIN undertook roadbuilding, including the pharaonic Transamazônica highway across Maranhão, Pará, and Amazonas. Following the pattern of the FBC-constructed roads in the 1940s, planned and freelance settlements sprang up along the highway's path as hundreds of thousands of migrants poured into the West in the 1970s and 1980s.

The real March to the West in the 1940s, the real transfer of population and investment to a frontier region, occurred to the south of the Center-West, in Paraná.¹⁴⁷ Without government sponsorship, without massive propaganda, an increasing demand for new land suitable for the cultivation of coffee created in Paraná the very society of rural smallholders that Vargas and João Alberto claimed to want to produce in Goiás and Mato Grosso. Private enterprise actually engendered much of the success of the southern coffee frontier: in northern Paraná the state government sold a large swath of territory to the same British land company that had developed the Gezira cotton enterprise in the Sudan.¹⁴⁸ While the Estado Novo issued nationalistic rhetoric about the interior, in the south an overseas collaboration of capitalists handled colonization and development for the nation's most lucrative cash crop.

Though both the Rubber Battle and the FBC produced little practical results, the March to the West remains crucial to understanding twentieth century Brazilian history. The ideas and myths that Getúlio Vargas created and used to promote his campaign for westward expansion are the true accomplishments of the March. The remainder of this dissertation will examine the propaganda that carried the messages and images of the development of the West in the 1940s.

-
- ¹ The phrase comes from da Cunha's description of the struggle of life in the forests of Brazil during a 1907 speech entitled "Castro Alves e seu tempo" and given at the 11th of August Center (*Centro Onze de Agosto*) in Rio. da Cunha, *Paraíso Perdido*, 212.
- ² Werneck Sodré, *Oeste*, 11.
- ³ "Uma linha de comunicação entre o sul e o norte do Brasil," Interview with João Alberto Lins e Barros, *A Manhã*, 9 October 1943, 3.
- ⁴ Werneck Sodré, 107.
- ⁵ Martins de Freitas, 104.
- ⁶ "A batalha da borracha ajuda o Brasil a fortalecer a sua unidade econômica," Interview with Valentim F. Bouças, *A Manhã*, 23 June 1943, 8.
- ⁷ Cosme Ferreira Filho, *A borracha na economia Amazônica* (Manaus: n.p., 1952), 10-11.
- ⁸ Cruzada Getuliana, Report of the Cruzada Getuliana to Julio C. Horta Barbosa, 11 February 1942, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 460.
- ⁹ Adrião Caminha Filho, "Memorandum ao Diretor da Divisão de Fomento da Produção Vegetal do Ministério da Agricultura," 14 April 1942, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 460.
- ¹⁰ José Carneiro da Gama Malcher to Vargas, 16 May 1939, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 183.
- ¹¹ Oscar Passos, Telegram to Vargas, 15 April 1942, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 321. Passos, Interventor in Acre, complained that he needed federal aid to bring workers to Acre to work as rubber tappers: "[This is a] doubly difficult moment, given the international situation and the drought in the Northeast. Radical and urgent means capable of assuring an efficient increase in latex production are necessary."
- ¹² Dulles, 238.
- ¹³ Hunnicutt, 127. The so-called Rockefeller Mission performed sanitation and epidemiological research in Amazonia in 1943 to fulfill this portion of the treaties.
- ¹⁴ Valentim F. Bouças, "Prefácio," In Ramos Costa, 23. American representatives expressed satisfaction at the *quid pro quo* of rubber for Amazonian investment. The U.S. Consul-General in São Paulo, Cecil M.P. Cross, commented, "The development and economic exploitation of the Amazon Valley and the central regions of this great Brazil will make possible an era of immense prosperity for Brazilians; at the same time, [the Accords] will give a powerful boost to the Allied cause of victory." "Os acordos entre o Brasil e os EE.UU.," *A Manhã*, 7 March 1942, 11.
- ¹⁵ "O Nordeste e a Amazônia," *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã*, 31 May 1942, 6.
- ¹⁶ Robert M. Levine, *The Vargas Regime: The Critical Years, 1934-1938* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 170.
- ¹⁷ Barros, "O combate ao deserto e o trabalho nos seringais da Amazônia," *Cultura Política*, March 1943, 7.
- ¹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁹ Ibid. Despite his nationalism, João Alberto praised the American Rubber Reserve Company: "Of all the foreign organizations that work in Brazil, [the

RRC] is the most efficient. Its action is very convincing and looks at all problems through a truly Brazilian prism. . . . With all my Brazilian intransigence, which I manifest in all matters, I can say that the RRC is performing an admirable service." Ibid., 10.

20 Ibid., 8.

21 Ibid., 7.

22 Malcher, Telegram to Alexandre Marcondes Filho, 1 October 1942, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 390.

23 Malcher, Telegram to Marcondes Filho, 6 October 1942, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 390.

24 Teixeira de Freitas to Góes Monteiro, n.d., AN. Arquivo Particular M.A. Teixeira de Freitas, Caixa 49, Pasta 103.

25 Brazil, Estado do Pará, Delegacia Especial de Segurança Política e Social, "Relatório dos serviços especiais realizados na costa marajoara," by Luiz Ribeiro de Almeida, 12 November 1942, 3, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 390.

26 Tavares Bastos' 1866 description of the rhetoric of his opponents sounds strikingly like the Brazilian national security warnings of 1942: "In the name of the integrity and tranquility of the Empire the closure of the Amazon was advised. . . . [Some] imagined with horror the entrance of strange ships into the valley of the river and fantasized a thousand discords provoked by the foreigners." Tavares Bastos, *O Valle*, 45.

27 Ibid., 8. The term "fifth column" originated during the Spanish Civil War to refer to Francoist sympathizers inside Madrid as four columns of fascist troops marched on the city in 1936. In a more general sense, therefore, the phrase means "a group of secret sympathizers or supporters of an enemy that engage in espionage or sabotage within defense lines or national borders." Webster's *Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary*, 461.

28 For the history of one such settlement, Tomé Açú in Pará, see Margolis, 241-254.

29 de Oliveira, *O problema*, 160-A. de Oliveira represented Ceará in the Constituent Assembly of 1934 and in the Chamber of Deputies. He also taught at the University of Brazil in Rio. In a subsequent book, de Oliveira called the Asian colonies "*sui generis* Japanese Agro-Military Nuclei" that were conducting "manuevers for a plan to conquer. . . Mato Grosso and the Valleys of the Tocantins, Xingú, and Amazon Rivers." de Oliveira, *Redivisão*, 162.

30 Ibid., v.

31 Miguel Couto, *Seleção social: campanha antinipônica* (Rio de Janeiro: n.p., 1930; reprint ed., Irmãos Pongetti Editores, 1942), 8. Couto's most famous work, *Nações que surgem, Nações que immerge*. . . , appeared in 1925. His crusade against the Japanese gained many converts among nationalist intellectuals, including the novelist Monteiro Lobato, who wrote the preface for the 1925 book.

32 Carlos de Souza Morais, *A ofensiva japonesa no Brasil*, 2ª Edição (Porto Alegre: Livraria do Globo, 1942), 12.

33 Maia, *Na vanguarda da retaguarda: campanha da produção da borracha* (Manaus: Divulgação do DEIP, 1943), 272.

34 "O gigantesco Plano da Amazônia," *A Manhã*, 6 April 1943, 7. Anti-Japanese feelings ran so strong in Amazonas that Maia also had to deny publicly rumors

that the government was sending nisei from São Paulo to agricultural colonies in the state. Ibid.

35 Brazil, Presidência da República, Gabinete do Coordenador da Mobilização Econômica, "Bases para a elaboração de um programa Amazônico," Memorandum, [1942], AN, Arquivo Particular Paulo Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 04.

36 Ibid., 8.

37 Ibid., 5. In a bizarre proposal, the Rio newspaper *Diário de Notícias* suggested the creation of a Labor Army (*Exército do Trabalho*) to replace the caboclos with "elements not adapted to normal activities, harmful or useless participants in social life." "A ocupação do Oeste." *Diário de Notícias*, 10 June 1943, 4. Not even Vargas thought to blaze trails through the West with misfits and sociopaths.

38 Carone, 48.

39 "O abastecimento do Vale Amazônico," *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã*, December 1942, 27.

40 Brazil, Presidência da República, CME, SEMTA, Circular to SEMTA workers, by Renato Lyra, 17 February 1943, AN, Arquivo Particular Paulo Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 04.

41 "Braços para a Amazônia," *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã*, 30 November 1942, 13.

42 Brazil, Presidência da República, CME, SEMTA, "Plano de Colaboração Geral," by Carlos José de Assis Ribeiro, 24 April 1943, 2, AN, Arquivo Particular Paulo Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 04.

43 Odálio Amorim, "30.000 Cóvas na Amazônia," *Panflêto*, 21 September 1947, 17, AN, Arquivo Particular Paulo Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 47.

44 Brazil, Presidência da República, Gabinete do Coordenador da Mobilização Econômica, SEMTA, "Contrato de encaminhamento," AN, Arquivo Particular, Paulo Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 04.

45 SEMTA, "Plano de Colaboração," 3. The religious coordinator for SEMTA was Fr. Helder Câmara, who later would become the outspoken Archbishop of Recife and one of the deans of the Catholic Church in Brazil. Brazil, Presidência da República, CME, SEMTA, "Histórico: implantação," unpublished manuscript, 1943, AN, Arquivo Particular Paulo Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 05.

46 "Para o reerguimento econômico da Amazônia," *Boletim do Ministério da Agricultura*, Ano 29, Nº 11 (November 1940), 66.

47 Brazil, Presidência da República, CME, SEMTA, "Esboço da estrutura de serviços no Amazonas para servir de base à informações e publicidade," Memorandum, 1943, 1, AN, Arquivo Particular Paulo Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 05.

48 Brazil, Presidência da República, CME, SEMTA, *Rumo à Amazônia, terra da fartura* (São Luiz, MA: Typografia Minerva, 1943), 1.

49 Ibid., 2.

50 Ibid., 3.

51 Ibid., 1.

52 Brazil, Presidência da República, CME, SEMTA, "Relato confidencial de observações feitas no Norte, junto ao 'SEMTA,'" by C.J. de Assis Ribeiro, 8 April 1943, AN, Arquivo Particular Paulo Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 04. C.J. de Assis Ribeiro,

the brother of the director of SEMTA, sent the report to Artur Hehl Neiva, Director of the Secretariat of CME.

⁵³ José Rodrigues da Silva to Sub-manager of the Rubber Development Corporation, 29 May 1943, AN, Arquivo Particular Paulo Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 04. The letter claimed that 374 more men were on their way to the camps or awaiting transport to them.

⁵⁴ F. de Menezes Pimentel to Mayors of the State of Ceará, 12 May, 1943, AN, Arquivo Particular Paulo Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 05.

⁵⁵ Magalhães Barata adopted the same cult-of-personality tactics on the local level as Vargas employed nationwide. Almost always in uniform, the interventor staged public rallies at which men held up signs that read, "Hail Magalhães Barata!" ("*Salve Magalhães Barata!*"). Brazil, Estado do Pará, Interventoria Federal, *Interventoria Federal do Para*, Photo Album (Belém: n.p., 1943), 37, AN, Seção Iconográfica.

⁵⁶ The career of Magalhães Barata serves as a paradigm of the paths of the young officers who supported Vargas and went on to carry out the March to the West in the 1940s and 1950s. From a prominent and well-connected Pará family (his godfather was legendary governor and political boss Lauro Sodré), Magalhães Barata attended the Military Academy (*Escola Militar*) in Rio Grande do Sul with many other members of the tenente movement. The young officer commanded garrisons on the frontier with the Guianas before joining the Revolt of 1930. He eventually rose to the rank of general in the army. Following his two stints as interventor of Pará under the Estado Novo, Magalhães Barata adopted to democracy by winning election as senator and then governor. Magalhães Barata died in office in 1959. A reported 250,000 people attended his funeral, and huge crowds passed through the Lauro Sodré Palace to view his body lying in state. Océlio de Medeiros, *In Memoriam: Governador Magalhães Barata* (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1959), 8, 14.

⁵⁷ Vargas, *Nova Política*, X:74.

⁵⁸ Álvaro Adolfo da Silveira, "A batalha do Amazonas e sua influência decisiva no curso da guerra," *A Manhã*, 8 July 1943, 3. da Silveira was the Attorney General (*Procurador Geral*) of Pará.

⁵⁹ Amorim, 16. For a full account of the political infighting and logistical problems that crippled the Rubber Battle, see Luiz de Miranda Corrêa, *A borracha da Amazônia e a II Guerra Mundial* (Manaus: Edições Governo do Estado do Amazonas, 1967). Corrêa tends to downplay the number of people who died or were killed or abandoned in the rain forest.

⁶⁰ SEMTA, "Histórico," 16. The document is SEMTA's internal history, no doubt designed by its authors to cast Assis Ribeiro and the rest of the agency staff in the most favorable light.,

⁶¹ Magalhães Barata, Telegram to Vargas, 3 March 1943, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 463.

⁶² Galvão, "Observações sobre a borracha brasileira," *Cultura Política*, September 1942, 63.

-
- 63 "Fordlândia e Belterra na economia brasileira," Interview with Felisberto Camargo, Agência Nacional press release, 29 October 1951, AN, Agência Nacional Noticiário 1951.
- 64 Carone, 49.
- 65 The DIP claimed that the Estado Novo moved a total of 32,413 men to Amazonia to tap rubber between 1942 and January 1945. "Recuperação e ressurgimento da Amazônia," *Cultura Política*, March, April, May, 1945, 138. Almir de Andrade added in dependents to reach a figure of 48,765, close enough to the promised 50,000 to claim victory. Almir de Andrade, *Contribuição à história administrativa do Brasil*, 2 vols. (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1950), II:48.
- 66 Amorim, "30.000," September 14, 1947, 21.
- 67 Dulles, 239.
- 68 João Alberto to Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, 1 December 1943, AN, Arquivo Particular Paulo Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 05. Extreme nationalists in the early 1950s would condemn the Rubber Battle as directed and prompted by foreigners whose greed for rubber led them to foist onto Brazil an inadequately planned program. See J.M. Othon Sidou, *O sentido socio-econômico da Madeira-Mamoré* (Recife: Sociedade Editora Cambio Ltd., 1950).
- 69 Assis Ribeiro, "Testemunho perante a Comissão de Inquérito da Campanha da Borracha," *Diário da Assembléia*, Ano 1, Nº 137 (24 August 1946), 4315.
- 70 Charles Wagley, "The Brazilian Amazon: The Case of an Underdeveloped Area," In Wagley, et. al., *Four Papers Presented in the Institute for Brazilian Studies of Vanderbilt University* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1951), 12.
- 71 Ludwig, 47. The population of Guaporé jumped from 21, 251 in 1940 to 35,935 a decade later, and Amapá went from 21,558 people in 1940 to 37,477 in 1950.
- 72 Ibid. Pará jumped from 944,644 people in 1940 to 1,123,273 in 1950, a nineteen percent increase. The population of Amazonas grew by seventeen percent, climbing from 438,008 in 1940 to 514,099 ten years later.
- 73 Corrêa, 67.
- 74 Alves, 47.
- 75 Amorim, "30.000," 28 September 1947, 29.
- 76 Lysias A. Rodrigues, "Necessidade da criação do Território do Tocantins," *Brasil-Portugal* (RJ), 10 May 1944, 1.
- 77 Dias Mendes, 151.
- 78 Raimundo Pinheiro, "À margem do 'Discurso do Rio Amazonas,'" In *O Pensamento Político do Presidente* (Rio de Janeiro: *Cultura Política*, 1943), 195.
- 79 "'Goiás trabalha com entusiasmo na certeza de que contribue para a vitória do Brasil unido e eterno,'" Interview with Pedro Ludovico, *A Manhã*, 1 October 1942, 3.
- 80 Barros, *Memórias de um revolucionário* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira S/A, 1953), 105-106.
- 81 Ibid., 2ª Edição (Editora Civilização Brasileira S/A, 1954), 165.
- 82 Vargas, *A política nacionalista do petróleo no Brasil*, Ed. by Alfredo Marques Vianna (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Tempo Brasileiro Ltda., 1964), 13.

-
- 83 Mário Martins de Freitas, "A mística e as realizações do Estado Nacional," *Cultura Política*, September 1942, 110. First Lieutenant Martins de Freitas at the time served at the Army Intendancy School (*Escola de Intendencia do Exército*).
- 84 Emilia Viotti da Costa, *The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), 84.
- 85 F. Rondon, *Uaupés: hidrografia, demografia, geopolítica* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Militar, 1945), 259.
- 86 "A colonização agrícola," *Cultura Política*, December 1943, 186.
- 87 Esterici, "O mito," 28.
- 88 As quoted in Smith, 201. Franco's Spain presents another intriguing parallel. At roughly the same time as the March to the West in Brazil, the fascist regime in Spain attempted to stave off a similar exodus of the poor from the countryside, particularly Andalusia, to the northern cities. Franco employed harsher tactics than Vargas, however: "At first the authorities tried putting a stop to the exodus by force. Policemen were sent to the railway stations with orders to collar anyone with a dark complexion and a battered suitcase and put him on the next train out of town." John Hooper, *The Spaniards: A Portrait of the New Spain* (London: Penguin, 1987), 25. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the Brazilian military government imitated Franco by turning back trucks and buses that arrived in Belo Horizonte and São Paulo full of Northeastern migrants.
- 89 Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Geraldo Müller, *Amazônia: expansão do capitalismo* (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1977), 141.
- 90 Smith, 205-206. Economists and economic historians in the 1970s cast doubt on the effectiveness of frontiers as a labor safety valve. Articles demonstrated that frontier migration did not increase, and actually decreased, the chances for domestic labor to get ahead. Foreign immigrants did prosper, however. See Nathaniel Leff, "Economic Development and Regional Inequality: Origins of the Brazilian Case," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 86 (May 1972).
- 91 "No Acre, a melhor borracha do mundo," Interview with Hugo Carneiro, *A Manhã*, 7 March 1942, 3.
- 92 Paulo Augusto de Figueiredo, "Variações em torno de Goiânia," *Oeste*, July 1943, 2.
- 93 Brazil, Estado de Goiás, Interventoria Federal, *Goiânia: idealizada e fundada pelo Interventor Pedro Ludovico Teixeira; fotos dos atos oficiais e comemorativos da inauguração da cidade, 5-7-1942*, Photo Album, (Goiânia: n.p., 1942), MdaR.
- 94 "A Inauguração oficial de Goiânia e os grandes acontecimentos que marcaram o momento culminante da história de Goiaz," *A Manhã*, 12 July 1942, 11.
- 95 "Inauguração oficial de Goiânia," *Revista Brasileira de Geografia*, Ano IV, Nº 3 (July-September 1942), 625.
- 96 Fernando Mibielli de Carvalho, "O êxodo rural," *Revista de Imigração e Colonização*, December 1942, 17.

-
- 97 Felinto Müller, "Relatório ao Presidente da República sobre os acontecimentos de Novembro," Memorandum to Vargas, December 1935, FGV, CPDOC, Acervo Getúlio Vargas, Rolo 4.
- 98 Manoel Rodrigues Parente, Telegram to Vargas, 24 February 1940, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 182.
- 99 "A ocupação do Oeste," *Diário de Notícias*, 10 June 1943, 4.
- 100 Lysias Augusto Rodrigues, *Roteiro do Tocantins* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora José Olympio, 1943), 7. As always with Vargas' March to the West, Rodrigues' travels through the Center-West had commercial as well as military motives: he also researched possible refueling points for Pan American Airways flights between New York and Rio.
- 101 The military had always involved itself in schemes to redivide the political map of Brazil. For example, soon after Vargas' takeover in November 1930, 1st Lt. Segadas Vianna published a proposal in the *Jornal do Comércio*. He wanted to split Amazonas into five parts, Pará into four, and parcel out most of Mato Grosso to other states. Brazil did later adopt some of the ideas, including the establishment of the states of Tocantins and Amapá. Segadas Vianna, "A divisão territorial do Brasil," *Jornal do Comércio*, 30 November 1930, 4-5.
- 102 "A economia dos Estados: VI— Mato Grosso," *Cultura Política*, February 1942, 28.
- 103 Vargas, *Nova Política*, X:270.
- 104 Ponta Porã, the most controversial of all, did not survive, and neither did the only non-western Territory, Iguassú, formed out of the border reaches of Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul.
- 105 "O Ministro João Alberto presidente da Fundação Brasil Central," *A Manhã*, 10 December 1943, 3.
- 106 Ricardo, *Marcha para o Oeste*, 4ª Edição (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora; São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, 1970), 19.
- 107 Francisco Netto Pimenta, *Anais do Batismo Cultural de Goiânia, 1942* (Goiânia: Prefeitura Municipal de Goiânia, Secretaria Municipal de Cultura, Esporte e Turismo, Núcleo de Patrimônio Histórico e Artístico, 1993), 26.
- 108 "Desbravando o Planalto Central," *Jornal do Brasil*, 21 January 1945, 3.
- 109 Sílvio Fonseca, 17.
- 110 Lenharo, "Azul," 10.
- 111 "Marcha para o Oeste," *A Manhã*, 4 June 1943, 3.
- 112 "Considera de interesse militar a Expedição Roncador-Xingú," *Diário Oficial*, 10 September 1943, 13,489.
- 113 An exact calculation is almost impossible. The estimate comes from Durval Rosa Borges, *Rio Araguaia: corpo e alma* (São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, 1987), 255.
- 114 José Vicent Payá, "Os 'anhangueras' do século XX," *Cultura Política*, December 1943, 240.
- 115 "Os objetivos da expedição Roncador-Xingú," *A Manhã*, 12 June 1943, 7.
- 116 Ibid.
- 117 "Hermano Ribeiro da Silva, o último bandeirante que partiu do planalto," *A Manhã*, 5 January 1943, 9.

-
- 118 "Expedição Roncador-Xingú," 10.
- 119 José Barbosa, "A rodovia São Paulo-Cuiabá-- um caminho para a conquista do Oeste," *A Manhã*, 12 June 1943, 8.
- 120 Brazil, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, "Memorial submetido à ilustrada Comissão do Plano Rodoviário Nacional, 22 February 1943," by M.A. Teixeira de Freitas, 5, AN, Arquivo Particular M.A. Teixeira de Freitas, Caixa 4, Pasta 16.
- 121 *Ibid.*, 13.
- 122 *Ibid.*, 5.
- 123 Teixeira de Freitas to Juarez Távora, 23 March 1943, AN, Arquivo Particular M.A. Teixeira de Freitas, Caixa 18, Pasta 40.
- 124 Magalhães Barata, *Discurso proferido por ocasião do banquete que lhe foi oferecido, a 25 de fevereiro de 1944, em homenagem ao transcurso do primeiro aniversário da sua reinvestidura no governo do Estado* (Belém, PA: DEIP, 1944), 8.
- 125 Juarez do Nascimento Fernandes Távora to M.A. Teixeira de Freitas, 16 April 1943, AN, Arquivo Particular M.A. Teixeira de Freitas, Caixa 18, Pasta 40.
- Távora's ability to do anything about the proposal was limited, since at the time he was serving as Military Attaché at the Brazilian Embassy in Santiago, Chile.
- 126 "A próxima ligação entre as bacias do Amazonas e do Prata," *A Manhã*, 20 August 1943, 3. The goal of the roadway was to link Mato Grosso via Guaporé to the Paraguay River and thus to the River Plate.
- 127 Brazil, Presidência da República, FBC, *Fundação Brasil Central*, by Barros (Rio de Janeiro: FBC, 1944), 41.
- 128 Andrade, II:218.
- 129 The city's name is rich in symbolism: "ara" comes from the Araguaia River and also means "altar stone" in Portuguese; "garças" stems from the Rio das Garças, and means "herons."
- 130 Brazil, Presidência da República, FBC, *Aragarças: Plano de Urbanização* ([Rio de Janeiro]: [FBC], n.d.).
- 131 A. Coimbra Bueno, Depoimento, 5.
- 132 *Fundação Brasil Central*, 1.
- 133 *Ibid.*, 3.
- 134 A. Coimbra Bueno, Depoimento, 6.
- 135 *Ibid.*, 7. Coimbra Bueno used the colorful Brazilian colloquialism "*cabide de emprego*," which literally translates as "hat-stand job," and implies a no-show position. The SPI was the predecessor to the current indigenous agency FUNAI.
- 136 The Collor administration abolished SUDECO in the early 1990s. This author attempted to locate the archives of the defunct agency but was unsuccessful.
- 137 Ludwig, 47.
- 138 *Ibid.* The inclusion of Rondônia would add an additional 35,935 to the population of Mato Grosso.
- 139 Lenharo, "Azul," 11.
- 140 "A Expedição Roncador-Xingú," *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã*, June 1943, 10.

-
- 141 "Pacificação dos 'Chavantes' é uma página épica do Serviço de Proteção aos Índios," *A Manhã*, 16 May 1942, 3.
- 142 Aureli, *Terra sem sombra* (São Paulo: Saraiva S/A, 1952), 23. The city, on the Pará side of the Araguaia River, now faces the state of Tocantins.
- 143 Xavier Júnior, "Goiânia," *Oeste*, July 1943, 38.
- 144 Alberto de Andrade Queiroz, Telegram to Ludovico, 30 March 1939, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 181.
- 145 John Dos Passos, *Brazil on the Move* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), 43.
- 146 Peregrino, 245.
- 147 While this dissertation restricts the March to the West to the Center-West and Amazonia, at least one writer at the time did annex the colonization of northern and western Paraná to Vargas' campaign. See Teófilo de Andrade, *O Rio Paraná no roteiro da Marcha para o Oeste* (Rio de Janeiro: Irmãos Pongetti, 1941).
- 148 Martin T. Katzman, "The Brazilian Frontier in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (July 1975), 279.

Chapter Eight: Productions of the Spirit¹

A whole world deprived of joy has been freed for the empire of myth.²

-- Jean-Marie Domenach

Only image. . . convinces the people in our sentimental democracy. An image is worth one hundred times more than an argument.³

-- Cassiano Ricardo

The skillful propagandist is he who models the plastic soul of the collectivity according to the ideas and ideals of the ruling elite.⁴

-- Antonio Veira de Mello.

In 1946, philosopher Ernst Cassirer, reflecting on the ruins of his native Germany from self-imposed exile at Yale University, speculated that, even in modern society, myth becomes necessary under extraordinary circumstances: "In desperate situations man will always have recourse to desperate means-- and our present-day political myths have been such desperate means."⁵ In 1937, Brazil's leader, Getúlio Vargas, found himself in such a crisis. The Estado Novo and its mythology were Vargas' responses to the economic, social, and political forces that threatened to unseat him, and they became his adroit means of holding onto his power for eight more years.

Having staged a self-coup (*auto-golpe*) with the help of the military in November of 1937, the president-turned-dictator then needed themes with which to rally the nation to his side. Vargas,

once beset by political opposition from both left and right, endangered by growing support for democratization, and hampered by a still-sluggish economy, now knew that he had to mold the attitudes and perceptions of his compatriots to survive. Following Cassiano Ricardo's dictum, much of the Estado Novo thus geared itself towards the production of "richly elaborated and thought-out images and symbols."⁶

The March to the West, part of a strategy of "political integration through myth,"⁷ proved one of the constructs that Vargas employed with greatest success. Cassirer contends that myth "appears only if man is confronted with a task that seems to be far beyond his natural powers,"⁸ and no project could have better supported myths than the subjugation of the largest expanse of wilderness in the New World, the Brazilian West. To disperse the ideas of westward expansion among the general public, Vargas and his advisors relied on a wide-ranging information and censorship bureaucracy. This dissertation agrees with what the Rio paper *A Manhã* stated in 1942: "It is undeniable that propaganda will always be the decisive factor for the realization of the March to the West."⁹

Before Getúlio Vargas came to power in 1930, however, the Brazilian government placed little emphasis on propaganda, and what little promotion the state did come under the authority of the National Press (*Agência Nacional*) in Rio, essentially a government printing office. After the turn of the century the forward-looking

administration of Afonso Pena sought to heighten Brazil's profile on other continents. In late 1907 the head of the Agência Nacional wrote to Rio Branco to place the service at the Foreign Minister's disposition:

Its mission is not just to transmit to Europe or America news that could might go unnoticed in the press there. The great importance of its work is exactly in the possibility to provide to the principal organs of publicity items that will easily be insinuated in their respective columns and thus make their way to all the centers of civilization.¹⁰

Even though the Agência Nacional produced relatively little during the early 1900s, its credo would guide the propaganda campaigns of Vargas and his successors. The strategy of secretly planting stories in both domestic and foreign outlets, a classical political ploy, would prove strikingly effective in pushing the March to the West (see Chapter Four).

Most Brazilian publicity between 1900 and 1930 was the output of private commercial interests and associations. These groups published books, almanacs, and annals, such as the *Annuário Americano*, to drum up business among importers abroad and exporters at home. The federal government in Rio apparently did not vigorously cooperate with such efforts, for private publications occasionally had to solicit the Foreign Ministry for basic economic data.¹¹ In 1923, one trade magazine, the *Boletim Comercial do Brasil*, asked Itamarati for backing by claiming that "propaganda about Brazil is one of those services that should merit the greatest care and support from the federal government."¹² The *Boletim* received no

subsidy, and its argument would not find a receptive audience in Rio for more than a decade.

The few successful projects to increase awareness about Brazil during the first few decades of the twentieth century, such as the Amazonian exhibit at the 1904 St. Louis World's Fair (see Chapter Two), often simply reinforced the nation's exotic and uncivilized reputation. Concern about Brazil's image abroad as a wild, savage place surfaced among the coastal elite as the country prospered under the Old Republic. In 1929, frustrated by the stereotypes, the head of the private Brazilian Information Service in New York wrote a letter marked "confidential" to President Washington Luis in Rio to complain about press coverage in the United States: "Here are the stories from today's New York Times. They are all a discredit to Brazil. . . . This is how the American people judge Brazil-- Indians, Yellow Fever, and Revolution. . . . Let us seek to remedy this evil."¹³ The enclosed clippings demonstrated how paltry the Agência National efforts had been: most Americans envisioned Brazil only as the place where Teddy Roosevelt had contracted the debilitating illnesses that had eventually killed him. A majority of Brazilians living on the coast knew just as little about their own country.

The production of propaganda specifically about the Brazilian West rested almost entirely in private hands before the Vargas regime. The rubber crisis had devastated the merchant community of the region, and few companies or associations could boast of the funds to disseminate propaganda. One of the few enterprises to

boost the image of the West started in 1929 when the Amazonian Annual Foundation (*Fundação Anuario da Amazônia*) in Manaus announced plans to publish *Amazônia Brasileira* magazine, "destined to divulge the resources and economic possibilities of the Amazon region, with ample circulation in Brazil and overseas, irradiating *ubi et orbi*."¹⁴ By the end of the 1930s, Getúlio Vargas would lift the Oeste from obscurity and forge a new image for the area among domestic and foreign audiences alike.

Upon taking office, however, Vargas initially took no action on constructing a propaganda apparatus to promote his regime. The president placed a far greater priority on consolidating his power base than on producing material to sway opinion either at home or abroad. As with his Western policy, propaganda would have to wait for full implementation until after the 1937 *coup d'etat*.

In the meantime, in view of the domestic turmoil of the Paulista Rebellion and the chaos rampant in many states, several of Vargas' advisors repeatedly urged the president to begin promotional campaigns to legitimize the regime. Mussolini's propaganda machine so impressed Oswaldo Aranha on a trip to Italy in 1934 that he could not wait to return to Rio to marvel about it to Getúlio. From on board the steamer *Italia* Aranha wrote to his chief, "You need to begin propagandizing about the country and the administration. . . [because] more and more we are losing ground, economically and politically."¹⁵ The diplomat emphasized that Vargas needed to change Brazil's image in order to attract

investment and foster trade. Echoing the head of the Information Service's complaints in 1929, Aranha insisted, "We must initiate a campaign to show that Brazil is not, as is affirmed and believed, a) a nation of blacks; b) a nation of disease; c) a torrid nation, nothing but tropical."¹⁶ Clearly the public health revolution at the turn of the century in urban areas and the Gobineau-influenced rhetoric about racial "whitening" had not succeeded in changing many opinions about Brazil. The March to the West would aim in part at modifying those perceptions at home and abroad.

Also in 1934, another Vargas advisor, Luis Simões Lopes, later the creator of the Brazilian civil service system, made a trip to Germany and reported back on the achievements of the Nazi regime. Lopes wrote to the president in glowing terms about the German information machine: "What has impressed me most in Berlin has been the systematic propaganda. . . . In all of Germany there is not one person who does not daily feel contact with 'Nazism' or with Hitler, whether it be through photographs, through radio, through cinema, through all of the German press. . . ."¹⁷ Extremely enamored with the Teutonic efficiency with which all media "[were] totally controlled by the government," Lopes went on to urge enthusiastically that Vargas copy the Nazi promotional system in Brazil: "The organization of the Ministry of Propaganda is so fascinating that I suggest the creation of a miniature version of it in Brazil."¹⁸

Vargas heeded the counsel of his intimates by establishing the National Department of Propaganda (*Departamento Nacional de Propaganda*-- DNP) in 1934. "Destined to promote the values of nationalism and to popularize *Getulismo*,"¹⁹ the agency published books of stunning self-promotion and self-aggrandizement. Unprecedented in Brazilian history, the DNP also produced material for broadcast through its National Department of Culture and Radio Broadcasting (*Departamento Nacional de Cultura e Radiodifusão*).

Throughout the mid-1930s, however, social upheaval perpetuated Brazil and Vargas' image problems, and the DNP did not measure up in the estimation of the president's confidants. Soon after the Communist putsch in 1935, Federal District Police Chief Felinto Müller submitted a top secret memorandum to the president in which he suggested a reform of the Press Law (*Lei de Imprensa*) to enable the government to purge radicals and extremists from the media and manage the flow of information better to the regime's advantage. While not acted upon immediately, Müller's ideas would resurface in the Estado Novo decrees that regulated the press.²⁰

Also in 1935, Aranha, now Ambassador to the United States, wrote a long letter to Getúlio imploring him to establish a more assertive propaganda apparatus. The Ambassador warned that the machinations of Pará interventor Magalhães Barata were making Brazil a laughingstock in the American press: "It's difficult to believe. Every day the newspapers are full of our Barata, his election, hijinx, and the rest."²¹ In strong language Aranha implored

his friend and superior to adopt a more aggressive posture with the press: "It is necessary to do something to counteract this campaign of demoralization of our institutions, people, and nation. . . . We must take action, under pain of suffering the material consequences of this abandonment."²²

The Ambassador insightfully perceived that continued negative images would begin to erode confidence in the Vargas government and encourage resistance; Brazilian commercial interests would also suffer. Aranha advised the president to cultivate the press more, saying that "[y]ou need to converse with foreign reporters."²³ "Pay, Getúlio, serious and active attention to Brazilian propaganda," admonished the future foreign minister.²⁴ While Vargas began to meet regularly with correspondents from all over the world, Aranha organized an information bureau within the Brazilian Embassy to improve press coverage in the U.S.²⁵

Elements within the administration also pressured Vargas to direct vigorous propaganda at a domestic audience as well. The shorthanded and disorganized DNP might have published fawning biographies of the president, but it had not prevented the Communists or Integralists from gaining converts and causing trouble. In 1937 Gen. Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro spoke about the importance of propaganda at a 1937 meeting of the CSSN. Góes Monteiro had led the rebel contingent from Rio Grande do Sul during the Revolt of 1930, and as the man who had installed Vargas in power, he exerted a powerful influence on the president and the rest

of the administration. The general, vice president of the CSSN, emphasized that Brazil needed an entity to guide the "moral and civic preparation of the Nation. . . not just through rational propaganda in newspapers and magazines and on radio stations, etc., but also in the heart of primary, secondary, professional, and superior schools."²⁶ These prescriptions form part of what political scientist Leonardo Trevisan has termed "The Góes Doctrine," an early prototype of the Brazilian military's ideology of national security. Possessing a broader vision than Frederico Rondon and his "military pioneerism," Góes Monteiro conceived of a "systematic, step-by-step policy to discipline society and thus provoke economic development"²⁷ as a counterweight to the Communist agitation of the mid-1930s in Brazil. Vargas and his advisors would follow this advice closely. The combination of media and scholastic indoctrination would mark the propaganda of the March to the West and ensure its long-term success.

The general also recommended a tripartite syllabus of subjects for the new propaganda to instill "an eminently Brazilian consciousness among all social classes."²⁸ He advocated an approach that rested upon the reinterpretation and glorification of Brazilian history and tradition, including

- the historical factors that have influenced our formation;
- the life and examples of the great figures and heroic soldiers who have enlarged and consolidated our Fatherland;
- [and] the defense of the vast, opulent, and coveted patrimony, bequeathed to us by our glorious forefathers,

against the imperialism that circles vulture-like about our destiny.²⁹

Góes Monteiro's CSSN outline would soon serve as a guide for the New State propaganda initiative. The March to the West propaganda campaigns would adhere to this scheme with remarkable accuracy, and each of the three themes would serve as pillars of government promotion of westward expansion well into the 1970s. That this counsel came from a member of the high military command (and one of the hard-line faction during the Estado Novo) demonstrates the fervor with which the military would embrace the cause of development in the Oeste, both under Vargas and afterwards.

Yet even after attaining undisputed control in 1937, Vargas waited two years before establishing a national agency to control and disseminate information. Created in December of 1939, the DIP would mature into the most efficient and omnipresent arm of the Estado Novo and an organ of breathtaking reach and purview. Charged with what Jean-Marie Domenach has called the "official carapace of information,"³⁰ the DIP included divisions of publication, radio, cinema, theater, tourism, and printing. The agency wielded not only the authority to produce propaganda in every medium on behalf of the administration but also the power to censor all materials printed, broadcast, or shown anywhere in Brazil, whether of domestic or foreign origin. A published manifesto declared that the agency's mission had a frightening breadth:

to strengthen the bonds of unity through daily contact. . .
[using] propaganda, complete propaganda, from the

microphone, on stage, on screen, through the spoken word and the written, to keep the country up-to-date on the course of internal and external events and to convince the masses of the necessity of the reforms implemented.³¹

Unprecedented in Brazilian history, Vargas' DIP "mounted a systematic government propaganda"³² campaign of a greater and more sophisticated nature than the nation had ever seen. An Orwellian scope enabled the DIP to touch the everyday lives of Brazilian citizens as no state entity had before (nor would again until the creation of the DOPS under the military dictatorship in the 1960s).

The crux of the work of the DIP was its regulation and manipulation of the Brazilian media, in the 1940s dominated by print. Vargas' regime made clear what role the press should play in the life of the nation:

The Brazilian press is reserved for the mission of indefatigably watching over the preservation of what we might call our spiritual frontiers, impeding, in an effort of the highest patriotism, that exotic ideologies penetrate here and seeking to guide Brazil on the path of just, balanced, and pure ideas.³³

For five years the DIP would serve as the ultimate arbiter of what constituted safe and chaste notions suitable for consumption by the Brazilian public. The Vargas administration itself would create many of these ideas, such as the March to the West, and market them aggressively. Moreover, through cooperation between the DIP and the Ministry of Education the Estado Novo followed Góes Monteiro's blueprint to set up a "pedagogic state"³⁴ that imbued millions of

Brazilian schoolchildren with its propaganda. Such "moral preparation"³⁵ ensured that the values of the March to the West survive to this day.

To run this new and powerful organization, Vargas hand-picked a right-wing journalist and writer named Lourival Fontes, an appointment that would stand as one of the president's most brilliant. During the 1930s, Fontes had formed part of the Society of Political Studies (*Sociedade de Estudos Políticos*), a group founded and headed by Integralist leader Plínio Salgado that disseminated the works of Alberto Tôrres, Euclides da Cunha, and fascist authors from Germany, Italy, and Portugal in order to "combat liberal democracy."³⁶ While one American observer in 1940 called the DIP chief "a presidential henchman seldom bothered by scruples of political morality,"³⁷ Fontes subscribed to a more complex ideology than simple Machiavellianism. He formed part of the Brazilian intellectual generation of the 1920s and 1930s, a clique "[i]mbued with a messianic vocation, [and] a sense of mission or social obligation [who] subsequently appointed themselves the illuminated conscience of the nation."³⁸

Fontes and others, such as Cassiano Ricardo, supplied much of the confident elitism of the Estado Novo. They "appeared as the spokesmen for popular desires, since they considered themselves capable of tapping into the 'collective subconscious' of the national community."³⁹ Connected to the modernist artists and writers of the Generation of 1922, the Vargas propagandists looked to "destroy the

colonial complex of the nation"⁴⁰ by pushing themes that reflected the "real" Brazil. The majority of Estado Novo propaganda, especially that which drove the March to the West, would bear Fontes' stamp and claim to reflect the imperatives of brasilidade that lay unrecognized within every citizen.

The DIP's job was to draw out such hidden desires within Brazilian hearts and minds, anxieties and dreams that the populous did not even know it harbored, through "a systematic and tenacious orientation."⁴¹ The DIP had a homogenizing agenda that looked, according to its manifesto, "to combat regionalism, extinguish the symbols of disintegration, [and] exterminate the germs of civil conflict that divergent factions and partisan squabbles used to foment. . . ."⁴² Fontes later echoed such clinical rhetoric in practically describing his job as that of a physician guarding his patient against infection: "[propaganda] has been transformed into an indispensable apparatus for the organization and technique of modern states, into . . . an immunizing and prophylactic force, an antidote and preservative against the influences of egoism and anti-national interests."⁴³ The March to the West would form part of this antibacterial cleansing of the Brazilian body politic, prescribed to rid of the pathogens of liberalism and communism.

The construction of a propaganda apparatus also fit into the Estado Novo drive to expand and revitalize the Brazilian state. Along with Luis Simões Lopes' civil service, Fontes' DIP was the cornerstone for the assembly of a professional bureaucracy in Rio and the state

capitals, part of an unparalleled growth in federal power during Vargas' regime. Public administration, as had happened in the United States during the New Deal, became one of the buzzwords of the day: "Departments of propaganda are irreplaceable organisms of modern administration," wrote the daily *A Manhã* in 1941,⁴⁴ and the DIP represented one of the more aggressive attempts by Vargas to rationalize (and control) government.

Soon after the founding of the DIP, Vargas and Fontes realized that "it was necessary. . . to turn the eyes [of the nation] towards Amazonia."⁴⁵ Along with a pitch to the urban working classes, the March to the West became one of the two main foci of the agency's production from 1939 to 1945. Much of the DIP propaganda about the Oeste took the form of what Pedro Maligo has identified in fiction as "ideological projection": "[The West], initially presented as space apart through the use of the mythical text, is then created or conquered linguistically."⁴⁶ The articles, films, books, and radio programs cranked out by Fontes and his staff did far more to open the West in the early 1940s than any bulldozer or road grader. Vargas and Fontes' triumph was to transform the image of Brazil's interior from a Green Hell to a Holy Grail.

The DIP designed the propaganda of the March to ensure that "generalized in Brazilian public opinion [exists] an exact awareness of what the expansion of our progress to the West represents for the nation."⁴⁷ In a deliberate and calculated manner, Vargas and his publicity craftsmen launched a campaign to sell westward expansion

to a national audience. This effort proceeded according to a polished script. *Cultura Política* magazine published an instructional manual for the plan to produce this propaganda:

These are some concepts that civilians and military personnel in Brazil need to understand to be able to participate in the political and economic consolidation of the Fatherland-- What is the March to the West; its history from the time of the bandeirantes and vaqueiros; why it is being revived now under new circumstances; what it means for the future of Brazil; how it is progressing; what are its principal elements and measures taken; what are the results so far obtained; what are the goals that we mean to achieve and in what time frame to guarantee national unity and integrity and enrich the country.⁴⁸

Telling in its specificity, this litany of themes indicates the seriousness and care with which the regime approached the issue of developing the West. The list also points to the magnitude of the task of convincing a nation of uneducated and semiliterate people to respond to the campaign.

Any discussion of propaganda includes the inherent difficulty of measuring the effectiveness of the message-- in other words, did people buy it? Alcir Linharo has identified the genius of fascist-style manipulation as its degree of penetration: "[It] goes from the world of work to the daily core of each individual to intervene in his expectations and dreams, to reorient his life goals, to colonize his heart and mind. . . ."⁴⁹ Estado Novo propaganda without question reached more Brazilians than any government or private sector publicity did before the advent of television, and only the exhortations of the military regimes of the 1960s and 1970s and the

current beer company advertising campaigns would reach greater levels of saturation. Over five years the Vargas administration, through every imaginable medium and through didactic dissemination, would drill its values, particularly those of the March to the West, into the consciousness of the Brazilian people. Echoing Góes Monteiro, Vargas and his associates determined that the crucial ideas of westward expansion "should be divulged in the clearest way possible, even among schoolchildren, in every state of Brazil."⁵⁰

Resistance to the ubiquity of the Vargas message no doubt occurred (see Chapter Ten),⁵¹ as it would on a far larger and more subversive scale under the generals, but parts of the media blitz--especially the March to the West--outlived their creators and established an independent existence. Peerless in Brazil, "where myths are generally constructed post-mortem," Getúlio Vargas created his own and made them common belief among his countrymen. The great innovation of the *bruxo*, or wizard, "[was] the contemporaneity between the actor and his aura."⁵² Perhaps the best measure of the efficaciousness of the March to the West propaganda remains that the myths about westward expansion that Vargas concocted or sustained became part of what DIP official Amílcar Dutra de Menezes called the "ideological patrimony" of Brazil, to be passed on from generation to generation of policy-makers, soldiers, and educators.⁵³

The genius of the March to the West resided in its explicit attempt to endow mass culture with an ideological content. Myths

about Amazonia and the rest of the Oeste began as a portion of Vargas' larger "demagogic campaign for the mystification of the ignorant masses,"⁵⁴ and passed into popular discourse. The propaganda of the Estado Novo, and of the March to the West in particular, validate the relationship that Antonio Gramsci finds between culture and power-- Vargas used culture to reinforce existing sociopolitical norms, and even more radical, to forge his own new ones.⁵⁵

-
- ¹ "Productions of the Spirit" was an Estado Novo euphemism for propaganda. Mello Barreto Filho, *Anchieta e Getúlio Vargas* (Rio de Janeiro: DIP, 1941), 165.
- ² Domenach, 86.
- ³ Ricardo, *Marcha para Oeste: a influência da 'Bandeira' na formação social e política do Brasil*, 2 vols. (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1940), II:500.
- ⁴ Antonio Vieira de Mello, *A mobilização das consciências* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora A Noite, 1942), 40.
- ⁵ Cassirer, *Myth of the State*, 279.
- ⁶ Lenharo, *Sacralização*, 54.
- ⁷ Velloso, *Os intelectuais e a política cultural do Estado Novo* (Rio de Janeiro: FGV/CPDOC, 1987), 27.
- ⁸ Cassirer, *Myth of the State*, 278.
- ⁹ "Racionalizando a administração, construindo Goiânia e incrementando a exploração das riquezas do Goiás, o interventor Pedro Ludovico realiza uma das mais notáveis obras do Estado Novo," *A Manhã*, 13 August 1942, 5.
- ¹⁰ Alfonso de Ambry to Barão do Rio Branco, 5 December 1907, AI, Arquivo Histórico, Parte I-- Correspondência, Diversos no Interior, Agências de Publicidade, Maço 313 1 20.
- ¹¹ For example, in 1920 the *Annuario Americano* appealed to Itamarati to "furnish any information that might interest our propaganda." L.C. Leão to Director do Departamento Commercial do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 22 November 1920, AI, Arquivo Histórico, Parte I-- Correspondência, Diversos no Interior, Agências de Publicidade, Maço 313 1 20.
- ¹² *Boletim Commercial do Brasil* to Felix Pacheco, 11 December 1923, AI, Arquivo Histórico, Parte I-- Correspondência, Diversos no Interior, Agências de Publicidade, Maço 313 1 20. To no avail, the *Boletim* billed itself as carrying out the "patriotic work of Brazilian propaganda."
- ¹³ H. de Almeida Filho to Washington Luis, 15 March 1929, AI, Arquivo Histórico, Parte I-- Correspondência, Diversos no Interior, Agências de Publicidade, Maço 313 1 20. One could argue that American perceptions of Brazil have not advanced much in the intervening years; perhaps Indians, Carnival, and Soccer would about cover it now.
- ¹⁴ Paulo Eleutherio to Director dos Serviços Commerciaes e Economicos do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 28 November 1929, AI, Arquivo Histórico, Parte I-- Correspondência, Diversos no Interior, Agências de Publicidade, Maço 313 1 20. Eleutherio was the editor of the daily *Folha do Norte* in Belém as well.
- ¹⁵ Aranha to Vargas, 1 September 1934, 3, FGV, CPDOC, Acervo Getúlio Vargas, Rolo 4.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.
- ¹⁷ Luis Simões Lopes to Vargas, 22 September 1934, 2, FGV, CPDOC, Acervo Getúlio Vargas, Rolo 4. Lopes actually posted his letter from London.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.
- ¹⁹ Lauerhass, 103. The excessively laudatory *Perfil do Presidente Vargas*, written by Gilberto Amado in 1936, was one of the most egregious examples of the output of the DNP.

20 Felinto Müller, "Relatório ao Presidente da República sobre os acontecimentos de Novembro," Memorandum to Vargas, December 1935, 42, FGV, CPDOC, Acervo Getúlio Vargas, Rolo 4. Some have credited Müller with the idea of the DIP.

21 Aranha to Vargas, 9 April 1935, 4, FGV, CPDOC, Acervo Getúlio Vargas, Rolo 4.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., 3. Aranha wanted Vargas to fund an extensive publicity campaign in the United States to sway opinion in Washington to the president's side: "Here the European nations. . . admittedly spend several million a year on propaganda and news. It is customary for ambassadors to have two or more journalists in the service of their embassies-- 'press agents'-- to put together commentaries about matters of their countries and have them published in American newspapers, without the newspapers themselves knowing the origin of these articles. . . . Only our Brazil is given over to chance. . . ." Ibid., 3.

24 Ibid., 6.

25 Vargas' response to Aranha's letter indicates that in 1935 the president did not have full control over the federal bureaucracy. The president wrote, "I find very opportune and useful the initiative that you have taken to organize, within the Embassy and under your direct control, a type of technical 'bureau' of propaganda and commercial information," and told Aranha to press Itamarati to extend the idea by officially proposing an increase in propaganda efforts. Vargas to Aranha, 3 July 1935, FGV, CPDOC, Acervo Getúlio Vargas, Rolo 4. In 1943, Aranha forwarded to Vargas a proposal submitted to the Brazilian Embassy by a British flak-catcher who offered to handle Brazil's public relations in the United Kingdom; the memorandum suggested a campaign involving "subjective propaganda," including publications, films, lectures, advertising, and exhibitions, and "objective propaganda" ("so far as the public knows, the disinterested statements and views of other people who are free and independent") to highlight Brazil's participation in the Second World War on the Allied side. The proposition was rejected, because by 1943 the Vargas regime was handling its own propaganda quite expertly. Aranha to Vargas, 10 August 1943; Anonymous, "Propaganda for Brazil," Proposal submitted to Brazilian Embassy in London, 1943, FGV, CPDOC, Acervo Getúlio Vargas, Rolo 7.

26 Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro, "Observações Necessárias," Text of remarks made at meeting of Conselho Superior da Segurança Nacional, 13 October 1937, 2, AN, Arquivo Particular M.A. Teixeira de Freitas, Caixa 49, Pasta 103.

27 Leonardo Trevisan, *O que todo cidadão precisa saber sobre o pensamento militar brasileiro* (São Paulo: Global Editora, 1985), 40-41.

28 Góes Monteiro, 2.

29 Ibid., 2-3.

30 Domenach, 92.

31 "Atividades do Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda," *Cultura Política*, December 1944, 151-2.

32 Velloso, "Uma configuração do campo intelectual," In Oliveira, *Estado Novo*, 72.

33 "O Exército e a Imprensa," *A Manhã*, 26 August 1941, 4.

34 Figueiredo, *Aspectos ideológicos*, 187.

-
- 35 Vieira de Mello, 18.
- 36 Hélio Silva, 1935: *A Revolta Vermelha* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira S/A, 1969), 37.
- 37 Walter R. Sharp, "Brazil 1940-- Whither the 'New State'?", *The Inter-American Quarterly*, October 1940, 8.
- 38 Velloso, *Os intelectuais*, 3.
- 39 *Ibid.*, 17.
- 40 Vieira de Mello, 39.
- 41 Fontes, "Prefácio," In Wolfgang Hoffman-Harnisch, *O Brasil que eu vi: retrato de uma potência tropical*, Trans. by Huberto Augusto (São Paulo: Companhia Melhoramentos, 1940), vii.
- 42 "Atividades do DIP," 151.
- 43 Fontes, *Homens e multidões* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1950), 42.
- 44 "O Estado Moderno e a propaganda," *A Manhã*, 19 August 1941, 4.
- 45 Fontes and Glauco Carneiro, *A face final de Vargas*, 101.
- 46 Pedro Maligo, "Political Literature in Amazonia: Márcio Souza and His Predecessors," In Randal Johnson, Ed., *Tropical Paths: Essays on Modern Brazilian Literature* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1993), 55.
- 47 Brazil, Presidência da República, "Informações sobre Mato Grosso," I:6.
- 48 "A economia dos Estados: VI-- Mato Grosso," *Cultura Política*, February 1942, 29.
- 49 Lenharo, *Sacralização*, 43. While Vargas' regime might not fit the exact definition of "fascist," the Estado Novo explicitly looked to fascist regimes as models and closely copied their propaganda techniques. Therefore, the DIP propaganda qualifies as fascist-style, or at least fascist-influenced.
- 50 *Ibid.* Pedro Ludovico had already established his own propaganda agency, the DPEE, well before Vargas created the DIP (see Chapter Four).
- 51 Clearly the Brazilian people were not stupid: the reach of any propaganda is limited, and doubts exist about how seriously the public took much of the Estado Novo output.
- 52 Malatian, 50.
- 53 "O programa do novo diretor do DIP," *A Manhã*, 14 July 1943, 4.
- 54 Henriques, 19.
- 55 Miriam Goldfeder, *Por trás das ondas da Rádio Nacional* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1980), 31.

Chapter Nine: The Cult of History

The reanimation of the myths of the past and the creation of the myths of the future have characterized fascist propaganda.¹

-- Jean-Marie Domenach

What is history? An "image" of the past that lives within us.²

-- Cassiano Ricardo

The most thematically coherent propaganda strategy of the March to the West under Getúlio Vargas was a concerted appropriation of figures from the past. This strategy, called "The Cult of the Past" or "The Cult of History,"³ formed a conscious and very public effort to choose Brazil's national heroes and identify them with the Estado Novo. Every Brazilian government had lashed itself to the great personalities of the nation's past, but the Vargas regime manipulated history for its own ends more successfully.

The attachment of Brazilian prodigies to the March to the West constituted part of the "great opus of the formation of national spirit"⁴ managed by the DIP. Following the prescription of Gen. Góes Monteiro (see Chapter Eight), the Vargas propaganda apparatus sanctified an official pantheon of heroes and used these individuals posthumously to justify and legitimate public policy. Georgete Rodrigues, in discussing the publicity of Juscelino Kubitschek, has described such a process as the drafting of "figures crystalized by the history of the victors."⁵ This dissertation argues that the Estado Novo, while also adhering to Rodrigues' formula, more often during the March to the West dredged up obscure or unappreciated men

and bestowed upon them a new reputation. In order to give weight to the program of westward expansion, "The National State rehabilitated the cult of our great men, almost always forgotten by the skepticism of yesteryear."⁶ Through press articles, a radio program called "Historical Notes" (*Notas Históricas*) and a lecture series, sponsored by the Ministry of Education, entitled "Our Great Deceased" (*Os nossos grandes Mortos*), the Vargas administration employed its vision of history to promote an agenda in the present.

i: The New Bandeirante Spirit

[W]e need to reinitiate the bandeirante movement, but with another tone. An integral bandeirismo. A planned bandeirismo built on a rational basis. A state bandeirismo.⁷

-- Paulo Augusto de Figueiredo

[E]very bandeira was a precursor to the March to the West.⁸

-- Sílvio Peixoto

The most exalted position in the Valhalla of the March to the West belonged to the anonymous *bandeirante*. These rough, mixed-race slavers and prospectors who embarked from São Paulo to explore the interior in the colonial period became Brazil's most archetypal icons. In the drive to glorify the frontier in the 1930s and 1940s, the Estado Novo claimed the original trailblazers of the Oeste as its own. Baptized as "[a]dvance guards of the spiritual patrimony of the nation,"⁹ the bandeirantes would personify Vargas' campaign to harness the material resources of the West.

In August of 1940, Getúlio Vargas explicitly linked his policy of westward expansion to the most emblematic heroes of Brazilian history. Speaking at the inauguration of the Direction West Crusade in Goiânia, the dictator affirmed, "[T]he program of [the March to] the West is the resumption of the campaign of the founders of the nation, the bandeirantes and the pioneers, using modern processes of culture."¹⁰ The identification of the development of the Brazilian interior under the Estado Novo with the pathfinders of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries would thenceforth mark a major theme of the March to the West.

Because of the "great store of legends teeming around bandeirismo [that] obscured the true history with carnivalesque trappings,"¹¹ Vargas and his henchmen, particularly poet and journalist Cassiano Ricardo, could appropriate the bandeirante mantle for their own political ends. To be sure, the bandierantes had earned the status of national symbols well before the New State. Historian João Capistrano de Abreu had first alerted his countrymen to the historical drama of the bandeirantes in an 1889 essay entitled *Old Roads and the Peopling of Brazil* (*Os caminhos antigos e o povoamento do Brasil*).¹² Ricardo himself describes the classroom lessons about the trailblazers from his childhood that intrigued him so much.¹³ Yet the Vargas administration and its literary apologists effected the apotheosis of the bandeirantes. For the first time, during the Estado Novo the *Paulista* heroes were identified directly with a specific regime and a specific head of state.

The planners of the March to the West claimed the legends as their own and suggested that the "grandiose epopee"¹⁴ could happen again. Vargas calculatedly wanted to recall the feats of the bandeirantes and use them as models for a new westward expansion, economic instead of territorial. Because the bandeirantes had created "a collective imperial consciousness"¹⁵ in Brazil, they became the perfect centerpiece of the institutionalization of that national spirit that the March to the West represented.

For the generation of writers and artists that emerged in São Paulo in the 1920s, "the alchemy of the bandeirantes embodied the

spirit of the modern world in gestation."¹⁶ Vargas would commandeer this embryonic modernism to symbolize and legitimize his efforts to develop the Brazilian West in the 1930s and 1940s. The March to the West fit with the general ideological pattern of the *verde-amarelos* (see Chapter Two), which featured "a transposition of the past for the present" and "an attempt to extract the 'essence' of the past and integrate it" with contemporary culture.¹⁷ In the 1930s such nationalist modernists as Alfredo de Taunay, Menotti del Picchia, and Paulo Prado revived the symbols of the colonial period in a political movement called *Bandeirismo* that held itself as "the true guardian of the spiritual frontiers of the Fatherland."¹⁸ Both physically and metaphorically these writers linked nationalism to the idea of the frontier, and several of them would join the cause of the March to the West as propagandists.

The most important promulgator of the new *bandeirismo* was Cassiano Ricardo. Ricardo devoted his entire career to writing about one core theme, "the search for Brazilian originality,"¹⁹ and in some sense the metaphor of the March to the West formed the crux of that process. He advocated a "bandeirante state" that would tap into the historical and psychological roots of Brazilian identity and return the nation to its Golden Age.

Ricardo assumed the role of the greatest "myth-maker"²⁰ of the Estado Novo. Along with Cândido Motta Filho and Menotti del Picchia, he headed the São Paulo state branch of the DIP (*Departamento Estadual de Informação e Propaganda*-- DEIP), and

served as the most prolific apologist for the New State. Ricardo's masterpiece, the two-volume *March West: The Influence of the 'Bandeira' on the Social and Political Formation of Brazil* (*Marcha para Oeste: a influência da 'bandeira' na formação social e política do Brasil*), published in 1940, was a powerful literary endorsement that used and distorted the history of the bandeirantes to portray the Estado Novo as an organic Brazilian institution. His rhetoric of Brazilian originality, which "expresses, enhances, and codifies belief [and] safeguards and enforces morality,"²¹ qualifies as the most ambitious myth-making of the New State.

Some commentators link Ricardo to the pre-Romantics of the *Sturm und Drang* movement of the nineteenth century,²² who buttressed German nationalism with myth, but for the purposes of this dissertation a more exact comparison is with the United States historian Frederick Jackson Turner. Otávio Guilherme Velho has called Ricardo "an authoritarian Turner,"²³ and both Ricardo and Turner explain the socio-political development of his modern nation through a historical frontier experience. The American, writing at the close of the period of Manifest Destiny, finds the source of his country's democratic tradition in the process of westward expansion. The Brazilian, on the other hand, writing at the beginning of a period of national integration, justifies a new phase of authoritarianism in the centuries-old exploits of western pioneers. In a perverse twist on Turner's purpose "to find a basis for democracy in some aspect of [United States] civilization,"²⁴ Ricardo searched for a basis for

dictatorship in some aspect of Brazilian civilization. Yet the two authors share the same basic goal: "In both cases, the frontier is used as the raw material for the creation of origin myths"²⁵ that still exert a strong influence on both nations.

Marcha para Oeste evokes the bandeirantes primarily to reinforce and lend authority to the political order of the Estado Novo. Appealing to the public through a symbolism that "already exist[ed] in the Brazilian subconscious,"²⁶ Ricardo casts the colonial pioneers as the forgers of the soul of the nation. The bandeira appears as an autochthonous form of government and social organization, the precursor to the Estado Novo. According to Ricardo, Vargas reawakened this original corporatist identity, misleadingly labeled "democracy,"²⁷ and restored Brazil to its true path of destiny. The Estado Novo in this analysis is the long-awaited bandeirante State that was "interrupted in the nineteenth century and disfigured by the dialectic of the littoral."²⁸

Ricardo employs creative history to ascribe the characteristics of the bandeiras to Vargas' dictatorship. *Marcha para Oeste* maintains that just as the expeditions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries "arose in opposition to the communism of the tribes and the feudal regime of the cattle ranches and sugar plantations,"²⁹ the New State in the twentieth century arose to battle Soviet-style communism and the feudalism of the rural political bosses. According to Ricardo, the Paulistas invented a modern and progressive institution that fought the old Portuguese and indigenous

order to create a forward-looking Brazil; Vargas only revived that process to bring the nation into a new era of prosperity and security.

The dictator appears in *Marcha para Oeste* as the leader of a new bandeira that will cast off the country's Europeanized, liberal disguise and return Brazil to its authentic identity. Ricardo presents the family, the patriarchal clan, and the bandeira as the "fundamental units of [Brazilian] socio-political organization."³⁰ Vargas tried to place himself at the head of all three in his roles as "Father of the poor," Chief of the Nation, and captain of the new expedition into the interior.

While not the most important purpose of the work, Ricardo's manifesto strongly bolstered the March to the West. Ricardo, in the preface to *Marcha para Oeste*, addresses his relationship with the Estado Novo campaign of westward expansion:

I speak of "March West" instead of "March to the West," and my intention is not as subtle as it might seem. March West just indicates the direction, without determining the region that would be conquered by the bandeiras. March West simply means "on the Path to the West."³¹

Without involving himself in the geographic and political particulars of the Estado Novo campaign of westward expansion, the author nevertheless produces an ode to the opening up of the interior. Ricardo ostensibly traces the history of the colonial bandeirantes, but with his tone and present tense he unavoidably invites comparisons with Vargas' March to the West.

Having presented "the patriarchal clan, the bandeira, and the 'march West'"³² as essentials of Brazilian society and political life, Ricardo could hardly withhold his support from Vargas' attempt to retrace the old expeditions. Because the Estado Novo consciously based itself on the bandeirante myths, it had to update and continue those myths in deed and in word to maintain its credibility.³³ The March to the West symbolized this modernization and fulfillment of the ancient legends.

In *Marcha para Oeste* and in other writings, Cassiano Ricardo backs the movement of the Vargas regime to resurrect the "mystique of the sertão"³⁴ created by the bandeirantes. The apologist emphasizes that the pioneer spirit he celebrates in the past of Brazil has remained alive in the westward expansion of the New State: "Every Brazilian today who opens new paths is a bandeirante."³⁵ He clearly links the Vargas administration's program in the interior to the exploits of the explorers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He urges his countrymen to retake the trails that their forebearers had blazed into "the 'hinterland' that awaits [them], rich and deserted, like a historical imperative."³⁶ Ricardo identifies four principal aspects to the bandeirismo of the twentieth century: "The subjugation of the sertão through the effective possession of areas already conquered by the traditional bandeirantes; 'pioneer zones' where the social type of the explorer survives; internal migrations; and the 'new March to the West.'"³⁷ He underlines that the Paulistas

in history were not Indian hunters, imperialists, or rebels, and the new bandeirantes would be none of those things, either.

To Ricardo, the March to the West under Vargas emulates the spirit of the original bandeirantes in several ways. The author sees a collective spirit, the occupation of space for the national good, and not the acquisition of private property, at the heart of both the colonial-era and the modern drives into the interior. Such "a sense more of the political and the collective than of the personal and the individual,"³⁸ according to Ricardo, was a legacy of the bandeirantes that the March to the West had inherited. The author thus praises the New State colonies designed to restrict the distribution of land and divert pressure for agrarian reform.

Ricardo also applauds the March to the West for its open militarism. He places "the military aspect," the reinforcement of "hierarchy, obedience, the frontier spirit, [and] national solidarity" at the top of his list of praiseworthy characteristics of the new bandeirismo.³⁹ According to *Marcha para Oeste*, the bandeirantes in the past served as the guarantors of order and national security against both foreign and domestic enemies. Just as the Paulista adventurers had been "the protector[s], . . . the guarantee of tranquility in certain regions of turbulence"⁴⁰ in previous centuries, the new bandeirantes of Vargas' corporatist westward expansion would pacify and secure the West.

Ricardo also maintains that Brazil faces the same foes in the twentieth century as the nation did three hundred years before.

Like all Estado Novo propagandists, he rails against the "errors of the city," and supports the March to the West as an antidote. According to Ricardo, the traditional Brazilian pioneers fought strongly against "liberalism, fascism, and communism,"⁴¹ and the new bandeirantes led by Getúlio Vargas would continue that struggle and emerge victorious.

"The modern world will only be able to comprehend the bandeira as a fable,"⁴² Ricardo wrote in 1942, and he and Vargas gave Brazil exactly such tales. *Marcha para Oeste* points out that the same myths that drove the bandeirantes have still inspired Brazilians in the twentieth century.⁴³ The propagandist himself ensured that those myths survived and benefitted the New State.

Ricardo's greatest victory was that his rhetoric became one of the most important slogans of the Estado Novo. As Ricardo himself proclaimed, many others followed the master: "The bandeira phenomenon forms a leitmotiv for admirable demagogic and nationalist orations."⁴⁴ Writers such as Leopoldo Pères routinely referred to Vargas as the "uncontested chief of the new bandeirismo, the supreme captain (*capitão-mor*) of the new expeditions."⁴⁵

The Vargas apologists presented the new pioneers as the modernized descendants of the colonial explorers. Military officials advocated an updating of the "historical solution" for the interior: "Let us sally forth to apply the conquests of science and industry to [bandeirismo] and we shall have the modern answer to the problems of the Sertão."⁴⁶ Scientists and technicians, as embodied by the Ford

team in Amazonia, would trek "on the trail of the new bandeirantes".⁴⁷ The New State declared that instead of hunting indigenous tribesmen and searching for gold and diamonds, the twentieth century expeditions would build roads: "These days the engineer plays the role of the bandeirante of yesteryear. . . ."⁴⁸ Ricardo's myth-making turned the FBC from a funnel of patronage into an organization imbued with the nobility and courage of Brazil's archetypal heroes.

One cannot underestimate the importance, beneath the historical and nationalistic rhetoric, of local chauvinism in the bandeirante promotions. Ricardo, a Paulista, revamped the old legends as much to boost the image of his home state as to bolster the Estado Novo. Vargas, after the outright rebellion in São Paulo that threatened his regime in 1932, often invoked the bandeirantes to appeal to Paulista pride in his visits to the state. For example, in 1940 the president made a conspicuous appearance at the dedication of the Bandeira Bridge (*Ponte das Bandeiras*) and channelization project on the River Tieté in the city of São Paulo. The dictator invited the new generation to follow the paths of their illustrious forebearers: "Paulistas, renew now, outfitted with the many resources of civilization, [your] historical fluvial expeditions (*monções*) in the March to the West."⁴⁹ In consciously casting São Paulo as the launching pad for (and the primary beneficiary of) westward expansion, Vargas sought to defuse the resentment that the state had shown to him during the 1930s.

The most concrete accomplishment of Ricardo's bandeirante ideology, the Bandeira Monument (*Monumento das Bandeiras*), stands in a traffic island near Ibirapuera Park on the south side of the city of São Paulo. Begun by sculptor Vitor Brecheret in 1922, the year of modernism's great flowering in Brazil, construction of the monument limped along for more than a decade until the Vargas regime seized upon the statue as three-dimensional propaganda. Ricardo himself praised the work as "an administrative and political sign" of the spirit of the Estado Novo.⁵⁰ With its multiracial figures, backs to the sea, straining as they portage a canoe towards the horizon, the monument was consecrated a "formidable civic altar"⁵¹ for the cult of western development. Despite receiving a federal subsidy, the Bandeira Monument, the epitome of the entire March to the West, remained unfinished until after Vargas' fall from power, caught in a "tug-of-war" over money between the state and the city.⁵²

ii: The "Apostles"⁵³ of the March to the West

We have deliberately exhibited, in a gallery, giants and pygmies.⁵⁴

-- Péricles Morais

Brazil was born with [a] fistful of heroes who cemented her history with the credentials of indomitable bravery.⁵⁵

-- Francisco de Paula Achilles

Along with the faceless bandeirantes, the Estado Novo celebrated several individuals from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the Cult of History. Each, after the DIP propaganda blitz of the 1940s, would earn the status of national heroes, in some cases despite their former obscurity.

First in the line of countenances lionized by the Estado Novo's "Cult of History" stood José Vieira Couto de Magalhães. Before Vargas came to power, Couto de Magalhães had slid into historical disrepute. Despite heroic leadership as a general in the Paraguayan War of 1865 to 1870, the former president of three states suffered ignominy at the hands of the Republic. Government troops arrested Couto de Magalhães in São Paulo during the naval revolt of 1893 and later held him incommunicado in the House of Corrections (*Casa de Correção*) in Rio. By the end of his life, the old soldier had lost his mind along with his dignity. Twice confined to asylums after an "eclipse of mental faculties," Couto de Magalhães died a broken man in 1898.⁵⁶

Thirty-five years later, however, the Vargas administration's drive for westward expansion would rehabilitate the disgraced

general as "one of those archetypes that the Fatherland only possesses from time to time."⁵⁷ The ideas of Couto de Magalhães on colonization and militarization (see Chapter Two) helped shape many of the policies of the Estado Novo in the interior. Getúlio even borrowed the phrase "March to the West" from *The Savage* (*O selvagem*), published in 1869.⁵⁸

Even though Couto de Magalhães remained well-known among policy-makers and had exerted such a strong influence on the Vargas government, most Brazilians had never heard of him. In order to reap the propaganda benefits of an association with the accomplishments and concepts of the man, the Estado Novo had to restore him to national prominence. By the end of the 1930s, the Ministry of Education would sanctify Couto de Magalhães "in the elementary school primers as a model of a great Brazilian and a complete generalissimo."⁵⁹

This admittance to the pantheon of heroes first occurred in 1936. Scholar Aureliano Leite gave a lecture on the famous visionary at the National Institute of Music (*Instituto Nacional de Música*) in Rio on 30 September. Sponsored by Minister of Education Gustavo Capanema and published as a book, the discussion reintroduced Couto de Magalhães into Brazil's cultural and historical consciousness.⁶⁰

During the following year, the Vargas administration orchestrated a nationwide celebration of the hundredth anniversary of Couto de Magalhães' birth. The president telegraphed his

interventors in the West with instructions to "exalt the personality of the Brigadier in the national civic cult" as the October date approached.⁶¹ In Goiás, Pedro Ludovico named the plaza at the administrative center of Goiânia after Couto de Magalhães. Pará and Acre also held public ceremonies to fête the memory of "the fearless explorer of the sertão."⁶²

The sudden attention paid to Couto de Magalhães bordered on hagiography. In Rio, the Brazilian Institute of History and Geography (*Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro*--IHGB) held a special centennial commemorative session, the transcript of which appeared as a book in 1938. The slim volume represented the Brazilian academic establishment's official restoration of Couto de Magalhães' reputation. Praising the man variously as an "administrator," "traveller," "explorer," "industrialist," "sage," and "soldier," the IHGB consecrated Couto de Magalhães the first secular saint of the Estado Novo.⁶³

Having revived Couto de Magalhães as a national figure, New State apologists portrayed Vargas as his ideological heir. Ildefonso Escobar's *The March to the West: Couto de Magalhães and Getúlio Vargas* (*A Marcha para o Oeste: Couto de Magalhães e Getúlio Vargas*) presents the nineteenth century statesman as a visionary ahead of his time whose prophecies only one man had the courage to bring to life. According to Escobar, "The Brazilian mentality evolved, the material resources of the nation grew, and another great man of moral energy and clairvoyance emerged who made the dream of

Couto de Magalhães his slogan-- Getúlio Vargas."⁶⁴ As the regime planned its program of western development, the ideas of Couto de Magalhães proved useful. The administration, after resuscitating the general's historical standing, then equated its new model pioneer with Vargas.

Another tarnished personality that the Estado Novo returned to the national limelight was Plácido de Castro, the leader of the Brazilian irregulars in the Acre Question (see Chapter Two). Plácido, like Couto de Magalhães, also suffered persecution at the hands of Republican governments at the turn of the century. Following the absorption of Acre in 1903, Brazilian authorities in the area besmirched him as a "conspirator and an insurgent."⁶⁵ In 1908, Plácido was finally gunned down, and his killers eluded justice.

During the early 1940s, however, as part of Vargas' nationalistic glorification of the military's role in the West, Estado Novo propagandists unearthed Plácido from anonymity. Lauded as the spiritual forerunner of the tenentes, the rebel from Acre posthumously emerged as one of the heroes of the Brazilian armed forces. During the Second World War, the air force even held a ceremony, attended by Vargas himself, to baptize a training plane after Plácido.

No author contributed more to this beatification than Luis Felipe de Castilhos Goycochêa. In *The Military Spirit in the Acre Question* (*O espírito militar na Questão Acreana*), Plácido dominates the text. The book numbers one in a series of tracts published in the

1940s by the Library of the Army (*Biblioteca do Exército*) that focus on the participation of the military in the conquest to the West. In Goycochêa's iconography, Plácido figures as one of "the guardians of the civilization of South America,"⁶⁶ and personifies the patriotism and devotion to western development of the Brazilian army. The dispute over Acre, described in epic language as a "Homeric song,"⁶⁷ appears as an Olympian battle that vindicated Brazilian virtue and destiny in the Oeste.

In a subsequent 1943 book, *Frontiers and Frontiersmen*, (*Fronteiras e Fronteiras*), Goycochêa papers over historical fact to canonize the ex-soldier and rubber entrepreneur as "haloed by the admiration of his contemporaries, adored by the masses."⁶⁸ At the peak of the Vargas western campaign, the author extols Plácido as "the paradigm of nationality. . . [who] consubstantiated in himself the irrepressible force of national expansion."⁶⁹ In the same way that Escobar draws comparisons between Vargas and Couto de Magalhães, this work associates the president with another "thrilling" hero of "Brazil's spreading to the West"⁷⁰ in the hopes that some repolished historical luster would rub off.

A third figure pulled from the attic of history by the Estado Novo and hoisted up as a "precursor"⁷¹ to Vargas in the West was Aureliano Cândido Tavares Bastos. While not vilified like Plácido de Castro or Couto de Magalhães, Tavares Bastos had passed from public memory in the twentieth century. New State writers would

resurrect the explorer and legislator, "forgotten for so many years," as a "[m]an of genius, ahead of his time."⁷²

As with Couto de Magalhães, the ideas of Tavares Bastos (see Chapter One) colored the March to the West, and the regime needed to restore the man's reputation in order to profit from associating itself with his proposals. Much of Getúlio's optimism, and perhaps even some of his rhetoric, come from the nineteenth century legislator.⁷³ Once the New State had publically rediscovered Tavares Bastos as the seer who had foreseen the "economic possibilities, the commercial future"⁷⁴ of the West, then propagandists could crow that the president was following the plans of a national hero.

Tavares Bastos emerged as a favorite object of homage in the semi-official state newspaper *A Manhã*. Editorials in the publication deified the man as "the first voice that was heard" on the issue of western development, a voice that Getúlio Vargas had heeded.⁷⁵ The newspaper also assured its readers that Tavares Bastos, were he to return to Amazonia, would find satisfaction in the March to the West, which had relieved the "painful impression of abandonment that [the region] had once given him."⁷⁶

In keeping with the dicta of Gen. Góes Monteiro, the Vargas administration also marketed Tavares Bastos to a young audience. A textbook titled *Figures of the Empire and Republic* (*Figuras do Império e da República*) eulogizes Tavares Bastos as one of the great Brazilians of the nineteenth century. Published in 1944 and directed at middle-and-high school-age students, the work praises the "highly

patriotic campaign" to open up the Amazon that Tavares Bastos had led, linking it to the Rubber Battle in the rainforest.⁷⁷

Along with Tavares Bastos and other less well-known nineteenth centuries personalities, the Estado Novo also turned for backing to a more recent and more famous figure, José Maria da Silva Paranhos Filho, the Barão do Rio Branco. Foreign Minister during the first decade of the twentieth century (see Chapter Two), the Baron acquired large sections of territory in the West through patient diplomacy and personified the spirit of Brazilian nationalism and imperialism. Given Rio Branco's status as the most prominent state official to promote the nation's expansion in the Oeste, the New State stood to gain much from yoking itself to his efforts. While during his lifetime the Baron had enjoyed a national reputation solid enough to spur efforts to draft him as a presidential candidate, the Estado Novo solidified his standing as the first twentieth century member of the national pantheon.

The Vargas Administration included the Baron in "The Cult of the Past" from the very beginning. As part of the "Our Great Deceased" series patronized by the Ministry of Education, Gilberto Amado gave a lecture in October 1937 (later published), that sycophantically connected Getúlio to Rio Branco. Amado lauds the foreign minister for the skillful use of propaganda to advance his agenda, an ability he shared with Vargas: "Rio Branco knew how to manipulate public opinion here and abroad, using it as no one had

before in our country. . ."78 The publicity campaigns of the March to the West would employ the presentations of the Baron as a model.

Amado's praise for Rio Branco culminates in a literal apotheosis. The author effusively exalts the foreign minister as a Brazilian demi-god: "Without Rio Branco, the sun in Brazil would be less beautiful. Without Rio Branco, 'Brazil' would sound less gratifying to our hearts. . . . In the mythology of Brazil, Rio Branco will be our Hercules. . . ."79 The only man who could match the Baron's Herculean labors is Getúlio Vargas, Amado implies.

Another author makes an explicit link between the feats of the bandeirantes and the achievements of Rio Branco. Sílvio Peixoto, whose *Historical Aspects of the New State* (*Aspectos históricos do Estado Novo*) finds precedents for Vargas' policies in Brazil's past, draws a connection between the early explorers, the Baron, and the March to the West. Peixoto maintains that "[the bandeirantes] opened the doors of an extremely rich Brazil. . . for which, centuries afterwards, the diplomatic genius of Rio Branco would trace the political frontiers."80 According to Amado, Vargas, imbued with the patriotic spirit of Rio Branco, then completed the task by setting out to integrate those statutory boundaries with the economic frontiers of Brazil.

As with the bandeirantes, the Vargas administration decided to honor the Baron with a prominent public monument. In the early 1940s, foreign minister Oswaldo Aranha interceded with the bureaucracy to revive an old project to raise such a structure in Rio

de Janeiro.⁸¹ Vargas inaugurated the monument, an obelisk capped by a large bronze statue of Rio Branco, in the new Castelo Esplanade in downtown Rio on Independence Day of 1943. The Estado Novo also paid homage to the Baron in a more typically Brazilian way by decreeing that the great diplomat's grandson, Paulo do Rio Branco Gouveia, could enter the Foreign Ministry without sitting for the highly competitive entrance examination.⁸²

iii: "The Bandeirante of the Century of Electricity"⁸³

Into the sertão, fellow Brazilians, and carry in your hearts the audacity of the Bandeirantes. . . .⁸⁴

-- Rondon

The spirit of the bandeirante cannot be found among the cushions of upholstered offices.⁸⁵

-- Leolídio di Ramos Caiado

Every Brazilian child learned of the exploits of the bandeirantes in primary school, and Rio Branco had worked his diplomatic magic within the memory of many older citizens, but neither possessed the immediacy and dynamism needed to inspire widespread enthusiasm for the March to the West. No modern figure occupied a more prized position in the Cult of History than General Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon, Brazil's only living bandeirante and the embodiment of western expansion.

The "process of canonization"⁸⁶ through which Rondon passed in the 1940s was a process of rehabilitation. After being arrested and retired from the army during the Revolt of 1930 (see Chapter Two), the General remained under suspicion for his supposed loyalties to the Republic. The new administration, especially former tenentes in high positions, viewed the sixty-five-year-old Rondon as a threat, the most popular and prestigious remnant of the old order, even though he no longer served on active duty or held an official post. Vargas did not join in the calumnies bandied about in the press

about the old soldier, but he did abolish Rondon's institutional power bases by eliminating the Telegraph Commission and ending the autonomy of the Indian Protection Service.⁸⁷

When hostilities broke out in 1934 between Colombia and Peru over the demarcation of their common border in Amazonia, Getúlio took the opportunity to send Rondon into *de facto* exile as head of the Mixed International Commission (*Comissão Mixta Internacional Perú-Colômbia*) chosen to mediate the territorial dispute. The general, isolated in the city of Leticia, Colombia, on the Amazon River, later lamented that he was "stripped of any authority over my former services in the Center-West regions of Brazil."⁸⁸ Vargas during this period pretended as if Rondon did not exist: in his messages to Congress the president never mentioned the general's name while discussing in detail the work of the Mixed Commission.⁸⁹

When Vargas announced the March to the West, however, Rondon suddenly became useful to the regime as the living and breathing personification of westward expansion. The attitude of the Estado Novo towards the explorer changed dramatically in 1938. Vargas' propaganda agents turned Rondon, once a pariah, into a holy man: "Now that the 'March to the West' is the word of order of national reconstruction, the figure of the great Brazilian appears as an example and a symbol."⁹⁰

Rondon epitomized the direction that the president and his allies envisioned taking Brazil in the 1940s, and thus they could forgive the general's republican leanings. Technology allowed for the

creation of grand plans for westward expansion, and Rondon, the "bandeirante of the twentieth century" who had criss-crossed the interior with telegraph lines, best represented the "conciliation of technology with culture" that the March encapsulated.⁹¹ Beatified as "The New Apostle of the Forests,"⁹² the elderly general would serve the men who had jailed him as the most notable spokesman for the policies of the Estado Novo in the Oeste.

The rehabilitation of Rondon began when Vargas summoned him back from his service abroad with the Mixed International Commission in mid-1938. On 4 August, Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha hosted an elaborate reception at the Itamarati Palace to welcome the general home that contrasted with the regime's previous indifference to the work of the Commission. Rondon, grateful for reprieve from exile, enthusiastically endorsed the March to the West in his remarks to the assembled reporters and diplomats:

[G]reat was my happiness at learning of the exclamation, "Direction West," launched by the prescient President of the Republic, since the old explorer who speaks to you could aspire to no greater approbation of his past than those [two] words that describe an administrative program for the young people of today and the future.⁹³

Over the next seven years, as the price for Vargas' clemency, Rondon would lend his considerable popularity and international prestige to the cause of the March to the West in various public settings throughout the country.

The official apotheosis of the general took place almost exactly a year later in the same auditorium. In August 1939, with Aranha

reprising his role as amphitryon, the National Council of Geography and Statistics (*Conselho Nacional de Geografia e Estatística*) conferred upon Rondon the title of "Civilizer of the Sertão." During the lavish ceremony, a female chorus under the direction of world-reknowned composer Heitor Villa-Lobos praised the explorer in song while the historian Edgar Roquette Pinto acclaimed him in word.⁹⁴ Vargas capped Rondon's return to grace by restoring the seventy-four-year-old to the presidency of the Indian Protection Service at the end of the year.

No longer *persona non grata*, Rondon shilled for the March to the West with particular gusto during 1940, declaring that the "March to the West is the most brilliant chapter of our history."⁹⁵ He even made an appearance at the first official commemoration of Vargas' birthday on 19 April in Rio. As the last strains of the national anthem faded in the ornate Tiradentes Palace, Rondon rose from the crowd, gripped by a "new and irresistible rush of enthusiasm" in the "electrified and vibrating atmosphere," and started an ovation by shouting, "Long Live President Getúlio Vargas!"⁹⁶ The hero also spoke as the designated representative of Mato Grosso to the celebration of the anniversary of the founding of the New State on 10 November.

The general continued to praise the president's efforts at a series of fora sponsored by the DIP in Rio. While Vargas conducted his tour of the interior, Rondon provided legitimacy for the New State's agenda of western expansion. In a speech delivered on 3

September he commended the March to the West as "the edifying example that the Chief of the Nation [has instituted] to show the way for private initiatives in the occupation of the nation's territorial vacuum. . . ."97 Rondon referred to Vargas' journeys in another appearance, saying that he had come "to publically applaud the exceptional patriotic gesture" of the president in travelling "to the extreme West of the nation, even to the mesopotamia of Mato Grosso."98 All of the explorer's addresses received copious and favorable press coverage across the nation, having their intended outcome of associating Brazil's only living secular saint with the Estado Novo.99

Loyal to his philosophy and political mentors, however, Rondon always managed to credit the former Republic for initiating the exploration of the Oeste through the Telegraph Commission: "That was the March to the West that most advantageously undertook the modern geo-social reconquest [of the interior] as the living successor to the primitive bandeirantes."100 The general did give Vargas kudos for continuing the process with the "second cry"101 of the March. The New State could tolerate his contumacious republicanism as long as he attached his name to its program.

After the rehabilitation, the Estado Novo trotted Rondon out to boost various public works projects. For example, in 1940 the general spoke at the announcement of the extension of the Araraquara railway from São Paulo to the Mato Grosso border. Rondon vouched for the plan, which called for an road link to Cuiabá,

as the end of "the centuries-long separation of the Cuyabanos, who one day will be linked to the Metropolis from which their ancestors came."¹⁰²

The Vargas administration in the early 1940s also used Rondon in a campaign of indoctrination targeted at young children. First serialized in Roberto Marinho's *Globo Juvenil* youth newspaper, an illustrated panegyric entitled *Rondon: Twentieth Century Bandeirante* (*Rondon: O bandeirante do século XX*) appeared in 1941. The cover of this bowdlerized version of the general's life shows a sketch of a haloed, uniformed Rondon guiding by the shoulder a half-naked Indian dressed in a Wild West single-feather headband. Both figures stand in front of several cross-shaped telegraph poles, symbols of the creep of Christian civilization through the forest.¹⁰³

The children's magazine *Let's Read* (*Vamos Ler*) also ran an effusive profile of the general. Calling Rondon "pioneer of the 'March to the West,' pacifier of the savages of those regions," the article held up the elderly explorer as an object of veneration for the new generation of Brazilians.¹⁰⁴

Another reverential hymn to Rondon focuses on the military spirit of the general. Published in 1942, Clovis de Gusmão's *Rondon* sanctifies its subject as an icon of the modern Brazilian army, from whom "came the great examples of abnegation and heroism."¹⁰⁵

A former long-time lieutenant on the Telegraph Commission wrote the complete hagiography of Rondon later the same year.

Amilcar A. Botelho de Magalhães, a nephew of the Positivist ideologue Benjamin Constant, produced a devotional account of his years in Mato Grosso entitled *Rondon: Relic of the Fatherland* (*Rondon: Relíquia da Pátria*). As one scholar has commented, the subtitle of the book demonstrates "the weight that the image of Rondon had for the state at that moment: 'relic,' a rare piece of sacred value that was also proof and an example for [the] government's 'March to the West.'" ¹⁰⁶ More than any other author, Botelho de Magalhães spreads the myth of Rondon's indigenous heritage. The work lauds the general not just for opening up the interior but for being a Westerner and Indian who had triumphed in the service of his country, the prototype of da Cunha's "bedrock of our race." Adoring Rondon as an icon of "Matogrossense heartwood to encase our faith," ¹⁰⁷ Botelho de Magalhães ratifies the explorer's canonization and wreaths the Estado Novo in his aura.

Amid the adulation of the Cult of History, Vargas could position himself as the "faithful interpreter of the aspirations of his people," ¹⁰⁸ the man who would fulfill the visions of Brazil's prophets. Cassiano Ricardo claimed the March to the West "constitute[d] an old dream of statesman and thinkers. . . inspired by the example of the bandeirantes" that "never passed out of the realm of intellectual circles and private initiatives [until] president Getúlio Vargas inscribed it in his plan of government." ¹⁰⁹ The New State therefore justified its policies in the West as the emulation of patriotic precedents by recognizing the nation's heroes, those men who had

preached or participated in the exploration of the frontier in the past. In creating a "Cult of the Past," Vargas set the parameters of Brazilian nationalism and bequeathed his country a communion of secular saints venerated on national holidays and in classroom textbooks.

¹ Domenach, 85.

² Ricardo, *Marcha*, 234.

³ "O Culto do Passado," *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã*, 31 May 1940, 6.

⁴ Barreto Filho, 13.

⁵ Georgete Medleg Rodrigues, "Ideologia, propaganda e imaginário social nas construção de Brasília," Dissertação de Mestrado, Departamento de História, Instituto de Ciências Humanas, Universidade de Brasília, 1990, 58.

⁶ "Um mês de realizações governamentais," *Cultura Política*, May 1943, 207.

⁷ Paulo Augusto de Figueiredo, "O Estado Nacional, Goiânia e a redivisão política do Brasil," *Cultura Política*, February 1944, 147. The article reprinted a speech given at the Institute of Political Science (*Instituto da Ciência Política*), on 13 November 1943.

⁸ Peixoto, 43.

⁹ Luis Felipe de Castilhos Goycochêa, *Fronteiras e Fronteiros* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1943), 8.

¹⁰ Vargas, *Nova Política*, VIII:32.

¹¹ Alfredo Ellis Júnior, *O bandeirismo paulista e o récuo do meridiano*, 3ª Edição (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938), 217.

¹² Capistrano de Abreu's work, first serialized in the Rio newspaper *Jornal do Comércio*, remains, the most important ever published on the bandeirantes, at least for its groundbreaking vision. E. Bradford Burns has written that Capistrano de Abreu "Brazilianized the study of Brazilian history." Burns, *A History of Brazil*, 2nd Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 246.

Many of Capistrano de Abreu's assertions, such as the importance of miscegenation and the cultural and psychological impact of exploration, have become gospel in subsequent Brazilian historiography.

13 Ricardo, *Marcha*, I:43-44.

14 Peixoto, 43.

15 Elviro Monteiro, *Breves considerações sobre a fisionomia política-social do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: DIP, 1941), 25.

16 Meira Penna, 52.

17 Velloso, "O mito," 41.

18 Ibid., 83.

19 Ibid., 21.

20 See Leach; and Esterici, "O mito," 55. Thirty years later, Ricardo would reprise his role as authoritarian ideologue for the military regime.

21 Malinowski, 79.

22 Velloso, "O mito," 14.

23 Velho, *Capitalismo*, 141.

24 Smith, 258.

25 Ibid., 146.

26 F. Rondon, "Pelo Brasil Central," *Revista da Escola Militar*, December 1934, In F. Rondon, *Pelo Brasil Central*, 274.

27 Ricardo, *Marcha*, I:30.

28 Ibid., II:267.

29 Ibid., I:23.

30 Ibid., I:4.

31 Ibid., I:xix.

32 Ibid., II:132.

33 Velloso writes that "Cassiano Ricardo . . . constructs the origin myth of the National State, locating its foundations in an idyllic past, which breaks the temporal scale to eternalize itself." Velloso, "O mito," 102.

34 Ricardo, *Marcha*, I:xiv.

35 Ibid., II:282.

36 Ricardo, "O Estado Novo e seu sentido bandeirante," *Cultura Política*, March 1941, 129.

37 Ricardo, "As bandeiras do século XX," *Cultura Política*, January 1942, 13.

38 Ricardo, "Estado," 113.

39 Ricardo, "bandeiras," 19.

40 Ricardo, *Marcha*, I:xii.

41 Ibid., II:249.

42 Ricardo, "bandeiras," 15.

43 Ricardo mentions Fawcett as an example: "One of the more recent explorations, that of Fawcett, . . . is still linked to the myth created by Anhanguera in the Serra dos Martírios." Ricardo, *Marcha*, II:63.

44 Ricardo, "Estado," 128.

-
- 45 Péres, *Getúlio Vargas: o homem e o chefe* (Rio de Janeiro: Empresa Gráfica O Cruzeiro S/A, 1944), 150.
- 46 F. Rondon, *Pelo Brasil Central*, 271.
- 47 Josefsohn, 78. Some in the regime apparently took this message to heart. Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, head of SEMTA, wrote in a personal letter, "I, too, want to be one of the bandeirantes of the new Bandeirismo." Assis Ribeiro to M.A. Teixeira de Freitas, n.d., AN, Arquivo Particular Paulo Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 04.
- 48 Hoffman-Harnisch, 182.
- 49 Vargas, *Ponte das Bandeiras*, 18. In a great irony, the project would encase the "river that was the first path of our expansion" in concrete and reduce its length within the city from forty-seven to twenty-seven kilometers.
- 50 Ricardo, "O Monumento da Marcha para o Oeste," *A Manhã*, 30 January 1942, 4. For a lyrical description of the monument today, see Margolis, 44-46.
- 51 "O Sr. Fernando Costa e o 'Monumento das Bandeiras,'" *A Manhã*, 17 April 1942, 4.
- 52 *A Manhã* editorialized in 1944, "That the Old Republic did nothing about the monument, a project that dates from 1922, is expected; but that the authorities of the new regime have not finished it after spending a million cruzeiros on its base lacks any plausible explanation." "As obras do Monumento das Bandeiras," *A Manhã*, 23 January 1944, 4.
- 53 Valdemar Lopes, "Varnhagen e a mudança da capital," *Cultura Política*, September 1943, 166.
- 54 Péricles Moraes, *Os intérpretes da Amazônia* (Rio de Janeiro: n.p., 1935; reprint ed., Rio de Janeiro: Serviço de Documentação Agência da SPVEA, 1959), 59.
- 55 Achilles, 305.
- 56 Affonso Celso, "José Vieira Couto de Magalhães: subsidios para uma biografia," In Brazil, IHGB, *General Couto de Magalhães* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1938), 36.
- 57 Odorico Costa, "Factos da história de Goiás," *Cultura Política*, June 1944, 213.
- 58 Couto de Magalhães, *O selvagem*.
- 59 Trindade, 3.
- 60 Leite's lecture was published in 1936 under the title *Brigadier Couto de Magalhães: The Nationalist Sense of His Work*. Aureliano Leite, *O Brigadeiro Couto de Magalhães: sentido nacionalista da sua obra* (Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica Sauer, 1936).
- 61 Ludovico, Telegram to Vargas, 17 October 1937, AN, Fundo SPR, Lata 97. Ludovico was quoting back the president's orders.
- 62 Malcher, Telegram to Vargas, 15 October 1937, AN, Fundo SPR, 99.
- 63 Celso, 16.
- 64 Escobar, 4.
- 65 J.C. Costa, 168.
- 66 Goycochêa, *O espírito militar na Questão Acreana* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1941; reprint ed., Rio de Janeiro: Companhia Brasileira de Artes Gráficas, 1973), 83.
- 67 *Ibid.*, 143.
- 68 Goycochêa, *Fronteiras*, 257.

-
- 69 Ibid.
- 70 Ibid.
- 71 "Marcha para o Oeste," *A Manhã*, 25 October 1941, 8.
- 72 Paulo Bentes, "Tavares Bastos e o Amazonas," *Estudios e Conferências*, Nº 11 (July 1941), 84, 92.
- 73 For example, Tavares Bastos used the metaphor of the march in describing the interior: "[W]here fear once dominated, courage will reign; where the melancholy of disbelief once muted spirits, the bustling life of a society on the march will sparkle." Tavares Bastos, *O Valle*, 211.
- 74 Bentes, 93.
- 75 "A ressurreição da Amazônia," *A Manhã*, 18 October 1942, 4.
- 76 "'Por um mundo sem fim,'" *A Manhã*, 5 November 1944, 4. In an instance of self-plagiarism not uncommon at the paper, this editorial reproduced, verbatim, a paragraph from the 18 October 1942 article.
- 77 Rodrigo Otávio Filho, *Figuras do Império e da República* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Zelio Valverde, 1944), 107. While not directly published by the state press, the book counts as propaganda since the Ministry of Education reviewed and approved all scholastic texts.
- 78 Amado, *Rio-Branco* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1947), 33.
- 79 Ibid., 6-7.
- 80 Peixoto, 44.
- 81 "História do monumento ao Barão do Rio Branco," *A Manhã*, 5 September 1943, 3.
- 82 "Honrando um nome ilustre," *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã*, 30 June 1940, 28. The Vargas regime also extended this "honor" to Ricardo Daiscon de Sousa, grandson of Irineu Evangelista de Sousa, Visconde de Mauá. Civil service administrators permitted the younger de Sousa to assume an "entry-level career post" without taking the competitive examination. "Um mês de realizações governamentais," *Cultura Política*, May 1943, 207.
- 83 Figueiredo, "Fronteiras Amazônicas," *Revista Brasileira de Geografia*, Ano IV, Nº 3 (July-September 1942), 502.
- 84 Botelho de Magalhães, *reliquia*, 22.
- 85 Leoldio di Ramos Caiado, *Expedição sertaneja Araguaia-Xingú* (1945) (Goiânia: Bolsa de Publicações Hugo de Carvalho Ramos, 1952), 146.
- 86 Antonio Carlos de Souza Lima, "O santo soldado," Unpublished paper, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Museu Nacional, Programa de Pós-graduação em Antropologia Social, 1988, courtesy of Mac Margolis.
- 87 Rondon's trouble with Vargas in the early 1930s was not the first time he had run afoul of civilian authorities. Ironically, in 1927 Rondon was accused of conspiring with Rio Grande do Sul political boss Borges de Medeiros to foment a rebellion within the army against the Republic. Rondon also had a prickly relationship with the Catholic Church, particularly in Mato Grosso. He came under strident attack in the press in 1917 and 1918 after outspokenly opposing the compromise choice of Dom Aquino Corrêa, Archbishop of Cuiabá, for governor of Mato Grosso. Rondon, a committed Positivist, justified his opposition by claiming that the clergyman "would govern catholically and

-
- therefore backwardly." Botelho de Magalhães, *reliquia*, 105. For more on Rondon's changing image over time, also see Souza Lima.
- 88 Rondon, *Mensagem à Associação dos Geógrafos Brasileiros* (Cuiabá, MT: Imprensa Oficial do Estado de Mato Grosso, 1953), 11-12.
- 89 Brazil, Presidente, 1930-1945 (Getúlio Vargas), *Mensagens Presidenciais 1933-1937, Getúlio Vargas* (Brasília: Câmara dos Deputados, 1978), 483.
- 90 Oto Carlos Bandeira Duarte Filho, *Rondon: o bandeirante do século XX*, 2ª Edição (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Zelio Valverde, 1945), 5.
- 91 *Ibid.*, 16.
- 92 Botelho Magalhães, *reliquia*, 32.
- 93 Rondon, *Discurso pronunciado. . . na sessão cívica organizada pelo Ministro das Relações Exteriores Dr. Oswaldo Aranha para comemorar o seu regresso da Presidência da Comissão Mixta Internacional Perú-Colômbia* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1938), 2.
- 94 "General Rondon proclamado 'Civilizador do Sertão,'" *Revista Brasileira de Geografia*, Vol. 1, Nº 4 (October 1939), 123.
- 95 Rondon, "Rumo ao Oeste," *Estudos e Conferências*, Nº 6 (October 1940), 30.
- 96 "O 'Viva!' do General Rondon," *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã*, 30 April 1940, 3.
- 97 Rondon, "Rumo," 16.
- 98 Botelho de Magalhães, 76. Rondon delivered this speech on 17 September 1940 in the auditorium of the DIP in Rio.
- 99 For example, the daily *O Radical* in Rio devoted almost two full pages to reprinting the 3 September remarks in their entirety under a banner headline on the following day. "Rondon mostra o sertão do Brasil," *O Radical*, 4 September 1940, 1-2.
- 100 Rondon, "Rumo ao Oeste," 20.
- 101 Ary Andrade, "O General Rondon conta a sua vida," *Vamos Ler*, 23 May 1940, 66.
- 102 Mário G. Braga, "O prolongamento da Estrada de Ferro Araraquara de São Paulo à divisa com Matto Grosso," *Correio da Manhã* (SP), 4 February 1940, 5. On occasion, the regime called upon Rondon to offer some choice words about an event with which he was not familiar. *A Manhã* interviewed the general about the proposed First Economic Congress of the West (*I Congresso Econômico do Oeste*), later cancelled, even though he had no idea what the event was about and admitted as much: "I confess that I still have not had time to study carefully the agenda of the Congress. . . ." "O General Rondon fala sobre Goiás," *A Manhã*, 22 October 1944, 7.
- 103 Duarte Filho, 1. The cross motif is ironic in light of Rondon's fervent positivism.
- 104 Andrade, 18.
- 105 Clovis de Gusmão, *Rondon* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora José Olympio, 1942), 107.
- 106 Souza Lima, 25.
- 107 Botelho de Magalhães, *reliquia*, 14.
- 108 "A ressurreição da Amazônia," *A Manhã*, 18 October 1942, 4.
- 109 "A nova Marcha para o Oeste," *A Manhã*, 4 June 1943, 4.

Chapter Ten: Engineering Consent

True values are not revealed through cheap propaganda nor self-seeking eulogies.¹

-- Venerando de Freitas

'Go West Young Man' has become a slogan, widely distributed in posters and proclaimed over the radio and given much publicity in the newspapers.²

-- Benjamin H. Hunnicutt

No previous regime in Brazilian history had ever tried so hard to establish and maintain its own legitimacy as the Estado Novo. Through a "sophisticated ideological apparatus" managed by the DIP, Vargas mounted a "systematic propaganda of governance" that employed all media and covered the entire nation.³ This chapter will discuss the promotion of the March to the West in official government magazines, books, films, and radio broadcasts.

i: The Newspaper *A Manhã*

It is in the West, that richest part of mediterranean Brazil, where president Getúlio Vargas has been carrying out a grand project. . . . The West is prospering.

-- *A Manhã* ⁴

In 1936, when Hermano Ribeiro da Silva advocated a public initiative to spur the interest of the Brazilian people in the interior of the nation, he underscored that such a task "without a doubt is the work of men of letters, principally journalists and writers."⁵ No one played this role better than Cassiano Ricardo. Following the appearance of *Marcha para Oeste*, Getúlio Vargas invited the author to edit *A Manhã*, the official mouthpiece of the Estado Novo. The daily, published in Rio beginning in October of 1941, printed a greater volume of propaganda on the March to the West than any other source.⁶

Ricardo himself wrote all the editorials (unsigned) for the newspaper,⁷ many of which extolled the cause of westward expansion. Even in slack periods, *A Manhã* usually ran between one and three editorials each week on some aspect of Amazonia or the Centro-Oeste. As part of the campaign to heighten public consciousness about the interior, these articles did not necessarily fit the present-day mold of opinion pieces. The newspaper had an openly pedagogical purpose, and endeavored "to foster in every Brazilian. . . a greater appreciation for and better knowledge of the [West]."⁸ Many editorials thus took the form of basic expositions of

statistics and facts designed to educate the paper's readership and support the Vargas regime's contentions about the West.

During a time when an estimated sixty percent of newspaper articles were uncredited, verbatim DIP propaganda disseminated by the *Agência Nacional*,⁹ *A Manhã* promoted the Estado Novo agenda with more originality. In its inaugural issue, the paper introduced a column called "March to the West," the only one of its kind in Brazil. An unsigned editorial note stated that the feature had the following objective: "We will be here, every day, to demonstrate that our civilization will not turn outwards, as in the age of discovery, but towards the very heart of the land, the reservoir of all the moral and material riches that are to make Brazil truly great."¹⁰ While to fill space the column did at times resort to stories on the Northeast or the Baixada Fluminense region of Rio de Janeiro, in general its writers concentrated on the West. Articles almost always focused on projects planned or underway to subdue the hinterland. Never, as promised, a daily offering, the feature for the first few months enjoyed two or three columns of space, but it soon shrunk to one or less and remained at that size for the rest of its nearly four-year lifespan.¹¹

Above the column each day ran an inspirational graphic. A stylized map of Brazil with the Tordesillas line superimposed upon it, the logo symbolized the March. The drawing showed people leaving the coast and moving into the interior using every mode of transport-- airplanes, trucks, trains, ox-carts from the Northeast, a

ship on the Amazon river. Gaúchos on horseback and bandeirantes trailed by dark-skinned bearers balancing sacks on their heads added a historical flavor to the scene.¹² Even if a given column did not touch directly on the West, the graphic remained at the top as a prominent visual reminder of Vargas' crusade.

The "March to the West" column and other coverage in *A Manhã* of the interior flowed according to six major themes of the Vargas agenda. First, as part of the Estado Novo attempt to reverse the exodus of poor people from rural areas, the newspaper touted the virtues of life on the land in the West. According to Ricardo and his writers, the problems of urban Brazil all had solutions in the backlands:

The sertão invites an existence of greater economic security and enchantment. There Brazilians discover fortune and social equilibrium.

The city is an illusion. In the city all is ephemeral and fictitious. The sertão is reality. In the sertão is solid, permanent, lasting wealth. . . .¹³

A Manhã presented a quasi-Platonic construction of two planes of Brazilian life, one of appearances and one of reality. Ricardo and his writers wanted to replace the "hysterical attraction of urbanism" with a "love for country living."¹⁴ The March column declared unequivocally, "Brazilians should return to the countryside,"¹⁵ and especially urged that the government ship the poor and "the jobless masses"¹⁶ into the interior. Continuing the ideology of the modernists and verde-amarelo nationalists of the 1920s, the

newspaper repeatedly beckoned its readers to abandon the counterfeit coastline for the authentic West.

Along with this cultural valorization of the sertão, *A Manhã* also trumpeted the salvation of the inhabitants of the West. An "altruistic [and] human" aspect of the March ran through the daily's articles that echoed the rhetoric of Telésforo de Souza and Vargas.¹⁷ Saying that the "forgotten populations in the corners of the thick forests [would be integrated] into the national communion,"¹⁸ the paper maintained that the Estado Novo could deliver the backward sertanejos into a new state of grace.

A Manhã publicized the ancient "Vision of Paradise" and assured readers that a concentrated state effort could mold the West into the Promised Land. "All the sertanejo lacks is more direct assistance from the government," claimed the newspaper.¹⁹ Like good corporatists, Ricardo and his staff advocated stricter federal control over the economy and development of the interior.²⁰

Another component of the ideology of *A Manhã* was a deprecation of the First Republic for its neglect of the interior. The newspaper blamed "political liberalism" for "creating [an] anti-geographical bias" among Brazilians that caused them to ignore two-thirds of the nation's territory.²¹ Ricardo editorialized against the excesses of the rubber boom, and dismissed the turn of the century as a time when "girandoles and fireworks were set off in the halls of Parliament, while Amazonia remained a land of adventurers where isolated men struggled yet succumbed and crafty, prepotent

exploiters took advantage of the miserable and the needy."²² Only the wise leadership of Getúlio Vargas had ended this pattern of neglect, according to the "March" column: "The National State broke this tradition and set its sights on the open roads of the first explorers."²³

A *Manhã* also viewed the West as a priority of national security. From early on the "March" column emphasized that "[a]t the same time that it increases the wealth of the nation, civilizing the people [of the backlands] and making their labor easier," westward expansion would "strengthen the national defense."²⁴ After Brazil entered the Second World War, the newspaper hammered home this theme even more forcefully, particularly in the context of the Rubber Battle.

The daily's coverage of the West explicitly offered the "North American example"²⁵ as a model for development in the Brazilian interior. Consciously tying the pioneer tradition and history of the United States with the new frontier mythology of Ricardo and Vargas, the "March" column told its readers, "The North American plains fortified the muscles of men and transmitted to their spirits the conviction that they could conquer. . . . There is an example that gives heart and comfort to those, like us, who also dominate an immense territory."²⁶ The paper translated and re-published articles with North American themes and affirmed that the March to the West was about to propel Brazil to economic greatness just as the Homestead Act had done for the *gringos* in the 1860s.²⁷ Such pro-

Americanism in the pages of *A Manhã* extended to investment as well: Ricardo praised "North American capital" in his editorials as a "basic force" in the development of Amazonia.²⁸

Finally, *A Manhã* served as a forum for the self-promotion of the interventors of the western states and territories. In profiles, interviews, and editorials, the daily heaped praise on the "dynamism" of Pedro Ludovico, Magalhães Barata, and others.²⁹ The paper also willingly printed the output of the states' own propaganda machines and accepted large adulatory advertisements for the regional politicians. In a country run by the object of a cult of personality, the president's provincial subordinates followed the same tactics.

For nearly four years Cassiano Ricardo and his staff kept the themes and accomplishments of Vargas' campaign for western development on the breakfast tables of the Brazilian literate classes on a daily basis. This saturation exposure given to the March to the West gained widespread, unquestioning acceptance for the ideas of Ricardo, Vargas, and João Alberto. Ricardo's real legacy in Brazil's push into the interior is not his books or poems but *A Manhã*, through which he reached a far wider audience. Only the DIP, which complemented this publicity by directing its efforts at the illiterate majority of Brazilians, could influence more minds.

ii: Magazines

[T]hought precedes action and. . . the word gives birth to thought.³⁰

-- Eugen Hadamovsky

Beginning in the early 1940s, the DIP founded several monthly publications to promote the Estado Novo agenda. Most prominent among them was the state magazine *Political Culture* (*Cultura Política*-- *CP*), produced from 1941 to 1945. Cloaked in the garb of a scholarly journal, *CP* printed undisguised propaganda written by many of the leading literati of Brazil, including Cassiano Ricardo, Vinicius de Moraes, and Gilberto Freire. Other contributors included novelists, geographers, military officers, and intellectuals. The magazine, dedicated to the creation of the "new man" in Brazil,³¹ also reprinted verbatim most of Vargas' major speeches and pronouncements from cabinet ministers and apologists of the regime.

CP, to an even greater extent than *A Manhã*, devoted much of its space to the March to the West. In a typical issue, the magazine ran two or three articles covering the economics, social customs and folklore of a state or region in the interior. As well as introducing urban readers to largely unknown sections of the country, *CP* reviewed and explained Vargas' policy of westward expansion in great detail. Imitating *A Manhã*, even in articles that did not directly refer to the West writers often inserted references to the March.

Four other publications rounded out the DIP collection of magazines. *New Guidelines* (*Novas Diretrizes*), edited by longtime

Vargas propagandist Azevedo Amaral, vowed an "unconditional solidarity with the political order" of the Estado Novo³² and proved even more sycophantic than CP. Another monthly, *The Brazil of Today, Yesterday, and Tomorrow* (*O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã*), distilled the accomplishments of the regime each issue into compact bulletins. To raise the public profile of Vargas administration officials and sympathizers, the DIP in 1941 launched *Studies and Lectures* (*Estudos e conferências*), which reprinted pro-government speeches, addresses, and lectures each month. The New State propaganda apparatus even published in English for an international audience. *Brazil Today*, produced by the Brazilian Information Bureau in New York, collected favorable stories by foreign writers, many concerning the March to the West, to win approval for Vargas in the United States.

All of these publications treated westward expansion as the "true historic mission"³³ of Brazil and contributed to the creation of an ethos of Manifest Destiny during the Vargas years. The DIP, consumed with an almost hallucinatory optimism, announced that the nation had embarked upon "the conquest, without combat or plunder, of a marvellous new world"³⁴ that would bring fantastic wealth to all Brazilians.

Vargas' propaganda magazines emphasized, however, that only the central government could lead such a movement West. According to CP, the state and its technocrats would play the role of the colonial bandeirantes, only this time armed with the weapons of

science and corporatist management: "The savannas of the opulent valley[s] are under the permanent care of administrators and technicians who will integrate them into the Brazilian economy,. . . assuring them markets through roads, railways, and airlines. . . ."35 The DIP drew a contrast between twentieth century Brazilian pioneering and the experience of the North Americans: "Amazonian development cannot be accomplished in the same manner as that of the West of the United States. Only to a limited degree can its benefits be seized by individual enterprise and recklessness. . . ."36 Government road graders, not the ruts of private vehicles would carve out the Oregon Trail of Brazil.

The Census of 1940, which confirmed the unequal population distribution in Brazil (see Chapter Six), sparked an immediate reaction in the DIP-published press. Writers announced that a movement West had become "necessary and fatal"37 because of the dangerous overcrowding of the coastal cities registered by the national headcount. *CP* criticized the nation's burgeoning out-migration from the countryside as "rural escapism," and warned that the population shift had brought a wave of "parasitic individuals [to] the cities."38 To fight the rising urban growth rate the DIP magazines advocated "a healthy policy of valorizing our 'hinterland' [to] keep our men fixed to the soil on which they live."39

As a concomitant measure, the DIP embarked upon a "program to shape Brazil's youth" that involved "forging the pioneer mentality, [and] convincing them of the transcendent mission which is

incumbent upon them."⁴⁰ The regime issued many appeals for city dwellers to move West and cast exchanging urban life for the rain forest as a patriotic duty in "the highest interests of the nation."⁴¹ Writers like Orlando Valverde urged their countrymen in long articles to take up the March to the interior. The proselytizers repeated the New State refrain that modern technology had taken the risk out of the pioneer life: "Let us hurl ourselves into the work of Brazil. Contemporary man can now put his hands on concrete, dynamite, electricity, steam motors, and combustion engines to battle against Nature."⁴²

Yet the DIP did not condone haphazard settlement of the interior. In *CP*, Artur Hehl Neiva identified an "indispensable [need] to fill Brazil and distribute more equitably the masses" through a policy of population concentration.⁴³

To inform the public of these goals, the agency published a pamphlet entitled *The National Agricultural Colonies and the Valorization of the Brazilian Worker* (*As colônias agrícolas nacionais e a valorização do trabalhador brasileiro*). Echoing other Vargas propaganda, the booklet identified settlements along Brazil's western frontier as crucial for national security. The DIP appealed to the patriotism of its readers by affirming that "each Brazilian citizen [transplanted to border areas] would be a vigilant sentinel, a permanent guardian of our defense and sovereignty."⁴⁴ Promising that the colonies, supplied with domestically produced industrial goods and new infrastructure, would "attain an enviable level of

prosperity,"⁴⁵ the pamphlet painted an unrealistically rosy picture of life in the wilderness.

The DIP cynically claimed that the New State had decided to eliminate large land holdings in the West. Recalling the president's remarks in Belém in 1940 (see Chapter Seven), the booklet maintained that "the determination to exterminate the vast latifundia" guided Estado Novo policy.⁴⁶ The pamphlet formed part of an elaborate charade to hide Vargas' collusion with the ranchers and landowners of the interior-- rather than "progressively reducing great properties. . . [which] make excessive fortunes for just one person,"⁴⁷ the president and his administration sought to transfer the landless to uncultivated and inhospitable areas of the West.

These "abandoned lands [and] immense unused tracts"⁴⁸ already supported a population, one viewed with hostility by the DIP. One magazine article described the caboclo as a twisted figure, less than human, "the riverine pariah, that mix of man and vegetable, that live plasma."⁴⁹ Another reached back into Greek mythology to call the inhabitant of the interior "the modern centaur, half man, half dugout canoe."⁵⁰

In a number of publications, Vargas propagandists blamed the lifestyle and behavior of the caboclos for the backwardness of the West. The DIP, reviving the rhetoric of the president and Telésforo de Lobo, attacked "the nomadism of the rubber tappers, the solitary labor of the sporadic exploiter confronting nature in the isolation of the forest, the melancholy passivity of . . . living from hunting and

fishing" as responsible for the paltry productivity of Amazonia.⁵¹ (Ironically, in the early 1990s, the Brazilian government under Fernando Collor de Mello would tout exactly such activities, labeled "sustainable development," as a workable compromise to save the region from environmental degradation.)⁵²

The mixed-race caboclos might occasionally garner some sympathy as "the white slaves of the twentieth century,"⁵³ but the DIP scarcely considered the indigenous populations of the West. The formulation of "rich and abandoned lands"⁵⁴ waiting for waves of urban transplants conveniently ignored the presence of dozens of tribes, many of whom had no exposure to the modern world. Since "[t]he prophets of an industrialized Amazon saw no role for native Indians in their utopia,"⁵⁵ the DIP never treated the oldest Brazilians as anything but savages. Such callous ignorance would fuel many massacres in the following decades.

The references of the DIP to the people of the interior echo nineteenth century North American observations about rural farmers. Henry Nash Smith has identified a "class bias" towards the already resident population of the western United States,⁵⁶ an attitude which resonated in Brazil among the coastal elites. The contrast in the American rejection of the "agricultural West," whose inhabitants belonged to a despised social class," and embrace of the "Wild West, an exhilarating region of adventure and comradeship in the open air,"⁵⁷ has a strong parallel in the Brazilian deprecation of the caboclo and celebration of the bandeirante. Championed by Yale

president Timothy Dwight and others in the United States, an "Eastern belief in frontier depravity"⁵⁸ also colored the Vargas administration's rhetoric about the residents of Amazônia and the Planalto Central. A linguistic quirk exacerbated this perception in Brazil. In Portuguese, by what Armando Dias Mendes has termed "semantic treachery," the word "forest" (*selva*) is easily associated with the word "savage" (*selvagem*), "an easy transposition when the European preconceptions transplanted to the New World are accepted without question."⁵⁹ Vargas resurrected the myths of the early explorers to rail against the denizens of the Oeste as retrograde subhumans in need of redemption.

The excoriation of nomadism also meshed with the president's more general campaign to glorify the Brazilian worker and encourage greater productivity. In Estado Novo propaganda, the industrial laborer "was, in truth, the great hero. . . . His life was illustrated by the ideal of ascension through work, which dignifies man and makes possible a better standard of living."⁶⁰ The March to the West wanted to turn the wandering, independent extractivists of the interior into a version of the urban manufacturing proletariat regimented by the factory and controlled by the Estado Novo union structure. The New State hoped to create a New Man of the interior, but sought to hedge its bets by importing more pliable coastal residents. Either way, "the uncultivated and primitive [westerner] would not be an obstacle to the rapid systematization of agro-industry."⁶¹

To extend government control over the inhabitants and territory of the West, the DIP advocated the militarization of the frontier. Articles warned of the "appetites for absorption" and "venturesome greed of foreigners attracted by the dream of usurping land" in Brazil.⁶² The DIP insisted that only one institution could bring Brazilians to discover and secure the interior: "The most appropriate organ. . . to undertake this sacred mission is the army. Instead of the barracks, the sertão; instead of the cannon, the spade, the plow, the tractor."⁶³ Propagandists made historical parallels between the heroic Rondon Telegraph Commission and the colonial Portuguese forts, and the military initiatives of the Estado Novo. According to *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã*, the Army Air Mail and frontier garrisons stationed by Defense Minister Dutra in Mato Grosso and Goiás served "to stimulate the development of the interior of the Republic."⁶⁴ Such an emphasis on the role of the armed forces in westward expansion and colonization would continue into the 1950s and 1960s. Since Vargas had relied on "the muscles and the brain of the army"⁶⁵ to carry out his March to the West, when the military attained power it would keep the conquest of the Oeste as a high priority.

One event combined all the other themes underlined by the regime's publications: the Rubber Battle. As *Panflêto* magazine explained in 1947, "America required 60,000 tons of rubber and Getúlio Vargas needed propaganda. Thus, the fanfares of the DIP started up. . . ."⁶⁶ Almost every month *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e*

de amanhã included a glowing, positive article on the progress of the drive in Amazonia. The magazine told its readers of the patriotic duty to move to Amazonia to tap rubber, "subordinated to the rules of technology and discipline."⁶⁷

The DIP at this time also disseminated the Black Legend of Henry Wickham, one of the main themes of New State Amazonian propaganda. Francisco Galvão, writing in *CP*, repeatedly distorted the historical record by claiming that the Englishman, who exported rubber seeds from Belém to Kew Gardens, "tore down the entire commercial system of Amazonia" by himself.⁶⁸ After a dismissive description of the botanist as "a strange man with a straw hat and nostalgic pipe. . . [and] the countenance of a Protestant pastor," Galvão concluded, "there has never been another tourist more damaging to the Brazilian economy."⁶⁹ The DIP assuaged national pride by iterating that Getúlio Vargas would never allow such monstrous treachery to occur, as the republican leaders had while "feasting on patronage, bundled lazily on chaise-lounges."⁷⁰

The DIP took great pains to convince the public that the end of the Second World War would not cause a similar collapse in the latex market. Magazines printed soothing articles with messages such as, "Even after the war, the production of rubber will not suffer. . . since it will be used by domestic industry. . . [and there is] no motive for apprehension that the former disaster will be repeated. . . ."⁷¹ The irony is that, despite the DIP's aggressive propaganda that presented the Rubber Battle as the convergence of reversing the rural out-

migration, colonizing new lands, and militarizing the West, the effort still failed.

iii: Textbooks to Win Hearts and Minds

Through the long decades, myth materialized, concretized itself, sunk a foundation, and an entire monument of mystery, with a capital "M," was erected by the fantasy of the masses.⁷²

-- Willy Aureli

One of the most important aspects of the DIP's propaganda was a campaign to indoctrinate students about the March to the West. The New State, following Euclides da Cunha's advice to send the teachers after the cannons at Canudos, aimed to use education to "reintegrate" the West into the rest of Brazil.⁷³ By 1940, the Ministry of Education was vetting all primary and secondary school curricula, and a presidential commission reviewed texts to ensure the "correct" teaching of Brazilian history. Under the heavy regime of DIP censorship, writers had to submit their manuscripts for approval prior to publication.⁷⁴

While General Góes Monteiro had presented a pedagogical blueprint for the New State in 1938 (see Chapter Eight), the bureaucracy did not implement a program of instruction about the March to the West until three years later. The first anniversary of Vargas' much-heralded "Amazon River Speech" (see Chapter Six) provided an opportunity for the state to create the scholastic syllabus of propaganda.

In October of 1941, the Secretariat of Education and Culture (*Secretaria de Educação e Cultura*) instructed its various departments to devise special lessons involving the anniversary. This new curriculum covered the state-run primary, nationalist (university), and techno-professional institutions, extending into every public classroom and lecture hall in Brazil.

For each level of schooling, teachers were to have a list of study topics for their students. The Estado Novo catechism stressed the physical aspects of Amazonia; the inhabitants of the interior; regional customs and folklore; and Cult of History figures, including the bandeirantes, Plácido de Castro, and Rio Branco.⁷⁵ Above all, however, the guidelines aimed to drill youngsters in Estado Novo policy by inculcating "[t]he current reawakening [of the West] through the action of President Vargas" and the "responsibility of peopling and civilizing that extensive territory to better take advantage of its riches."⁷⁶ An exercise in ideological spoon-feeding, the memorandum ordered instructors to assign to their pupils "research papers and essays destined to complement the memorable thoughts of the presidential speech."⁷⁷

In addition to conditioning children and teenagers to respond to the March to the West, the DIP also exposed industrial workers and those serving in the Brazilian armed forces to the same ideas. During the early 1940s, the agency bought stacks of books that reflected the Estado Novo viewpoint on westward expansion and distributed them to the fourteen Unity Libraries (*Bibliotecas de*

Unidade) located in high schools, military bases, factories, and hospitals. When Brazilian troops travelled to the Italian front in 1944, the DIP-stocked Combatants' Library (*Biblioteca do Combatente*) accompanied them as well. Among the titles in the collections were many that extolled the March, including Lysias Rodrigues' *Itinerary on the Tocantins*; Ricardo's *March West*, da Cunha's *Rebellion in the Backlands*; Francisco de Paula Achilles' *Brazil on the March* ; and Bandeira Duarte's biography of Rondon.⁷⁸ Since the DIP passed out 104,000 copies of these texts in 1943 and 1944 to soldiers, laborers, and students,⁷⁹ one can presume that a broad sector of Brazilian society gained an introduction to the ideology of the March to the West. That men in uniform, especially those who served in Europe, had access to these ideas has a particular significance, since many of them would go on to hold key positions in the dictatorship of the 1960s and 1970s, the regime which finally carried out Vargas' plans in the interior.

The nationalist bible *Brazil and Its Riches* (*O Brasil e suas riquezas*), by Waldemiro Potsch, was the book most widely disseminated by the Vargas administration. Potsch's volume, published in its sixteenth edition by the Ministry of Agriculture and distributed free-of-charge by the state, had 145,000 copies in print by 1941.⁸⁰ Targeted at a mostly rural, young audience of secondary school students and inductees into the armed forces, the text was used in fifteen states and the Federal District and handed out to navy and army personnel.⁸¹ The primer, while written well before the

March to the West, nevertheless endorsed both militarism and "the expansion of riches and economic development"⁸² encouraged by Vargas' state-sponsored campaign. For example, a verse in the book proclaimed, "It is necessary now/ for the government to give a hand/ to those who work/ our land."⁸³

The DIP itself printed another textbook that played up the message of western expansion in more detail. *The Brazil That President Getúlio Vargas Is Constructing* (*O Brasil que o Presidente Getúlio Vargas está construindo*), by Olmio Barros Vidal, congratulated Vargas for rearing "a generation of landowners in the borderlands, [who] scatter thousands of Brazilians on their plots."⁸⁴ According to the author, only an influx of colonists, a "breeze of nationalism" can "safeguard" the West "from foreign influence."⁸⁵ Pitching his message at a high-school-age audience, Vidal encourages youngsters to leave the cities and take up the "March to the Frontiers" as "farmer-soldiers, who will be at the same time advanced sentinels of our progress and the defense of our Fatherland."⁸⁶ This vision of a corps of latter-day Cincinnati, ready to drop their plowshares and defend the borders, held little appeal to the urban youth of the 1940s. Only the next generation would heed Vidal's call.

The Rubber Battle forced the DIP to bring out several new textbooks. Francisco Galvão's *The Guidelines of the New State* (*As diretrizes do Estado Novo*) speaks directly to da Cunha and presents a sanitized image of the interior. To convince readers that Vargas had

overcome the obstacles of the West, the book affirms, "The Estado Novo has vanquished the desert," and "Euclides, if he were alive and crossed the sertão again, would have to take notice."⁸⁷

To boost the morale of those Brazilians laboring in the seringais, the DIP branch in Amazonas (DEIP) distributed to the tappers a weighty collection of articles and speeches by interventor Alvaro Maia. Entitled *In the Vanguard of the Rearguard* (*Na vanguarda da retaguarda*), the book consists of inspirational exhortations and aphorisms directed at the "soldiers of the Rubber Battle."⁸⁸ Maia calls the laborers "amphibian-workers," the frogmen of the home front, who "with rifle and courage remain serene in the face of danger."⁸⁹ Given the high illiteracy rate among the migrants brought to Amazonia by SEMTA, most copies of Maia's masterwork probably went unread.

With the creation of four new federal Territories, also in 1943, the government began to disseminate information about them to the public. Many Brazilians knew little if anything about far-away Amapá or Guaporé, so the National Press published a series of popular, mass-market books about the West that blended science, politics, and legend. Often very basic, illustrated texts aimed at adolescents, these volumes carried the message that the border reaches of the nation "possess[ed] the necessary conditions to transform themselves into highly productive region[s], useful to the whole Brazilian community."⁹⁰ Distributed by the National Institute of the Book (*Instituto Nacional do Livro*) of the Ministry of Education

to libraries and civic organization, titles such as Aurelio Pinheiro's *Along the Banks of the Amazon* (*À margem do Amazonas*) introduced many readers to the West for the first time.⁹¹

Enchantments of the West: A Piece of Brazil Where Man Identifies with the Nation (*Encantos do Oeste: um pedaço do Brasil onde o homem se identifica com a natureza*), by Agenor Couto de Magalhães, typifies these state-published picture books. Written by a descendant of one of the Estado Novo's heroes of the Cult of the Past, this handsome coffee-table volume humanizes and reduces the immensity of the Oeste to comprehensible size. Couto de Magalhães documents a 1939 expedition through Goiás and Mato Grosso with soft and grainy black-and-white photographs of frontier scenery. Beneath captions such as "Bucolic Life," portraits of caboclo families, landscapes, ranches, river traffic, indigenous tribespeople, and wildlife idealize the West as a place of "magic and fascinating spectacles in the solitude of a silent land."⁹² In describing the interior, Couto de Magalhães also recalls another frontier experience: he expresses an opinion, fervently promoted by the Estado Novo in the 1940s, that Vargas' March would "play the same role in the . . . social evolution of Brazil as the Far West did [in the United States]" in leading the nation to greatness.⁹³

At the same time that the DIP and the Ministry of Education were engineering the inclusion of the subject of westward expansion in public school curricula, private educational efforts with the same goal sprang up in southern Brazil. The March to the West figured

prominently in a teachers' manual written by Thiago M. Würth, the head of the Pestalozzi Institute (*Instituto Pestalozzi*), a school for the "weak or slow" in Canoas, Rio Grande do Sul.⁹⁴ Based on the principles of scouting, Brazilian Youth (*Juventude Brasileira*) implores youngsters to "orient themselves towards the occupation of [the interior] and march West."⁹⁵

A similar "Western Movement" (*Movimento Oesteano*) was founded in São Paulo in 1941 to interest the youth of Brazil's largest metropolis in the topic of the interior. Headed by professor Sergio Ferreira of Mackensie College, the organization dedicated itself "to turn the attention of patriotic young people to the Central region of Brazil."⁹⁶ Ferreira called upon his students, "vanguardists of obedience" to join the president's "historic mission."⁹⁷

Private publishing houses also contributed to the dissemination of the March to the West, some at the direct request of the state propaganda apparatus. In 1938, DIP chief Lourival Fontes began this trend by personally selecting José Olympio Editora of Rio to print *The New Politics of Brazil* (*A Nova Política do Brasil*), an eleven-volume collection of Vargas' speeches and writings, including all of his pronouncements on the West.⁹⁸ Soon other companies were publishing *de facto* government propaganda, tomes that reflected the Estado Novo party line. Strict DIP censorship guaranteed that all books took at least a sympathetic, and often a wildly enthusiastic, attitude towards the dictatorship.

São Paulo-based National Publishing Company (*Companhia Editora Nacional*-- CEN) became the largest private-sector purveyor of March to the West literature. Through its Brazilian Pedagogical Library (*Biblioteca Pedagógica Brasileira*) imprint, the company produced a long list of titles aimed at a school-age audience.

One of the most popular editions of this collection was Raymundo Moraes' *In the Amazon Valley* (*Na planície amazônica*). In 1939, CEN reissued the best-seller, originally published in 1925, to coincide with growing public interest in the Oeste. Hyperbole and high-flying nationalistic prose made the book engaging reading for a generation of Brazilian students. Moraes, more than any other modern author, popularized the notion of the interior as a "Green Paradise"⁹⁹ instead of Rangel's "Green Hell." In his myth-making, he appropriates the romantic imagery of Hollywood westerns to describe the frontier as an alluring and adventurous place: "The first time visitor to Pôrto Velho has the sensation of stepping into one of those cinematographic cities, constructed, stocked, and inhabited by all the goods and all the people of the Far West of the great Republic. . . ."¹⁰⁰ How many readers believed that Rondônia actually resembled the stomping grounds of Gary Cooper and the other celluloid heroes from the North is open to question; far more accepted that the end result of westward expansion in the United States and Brazil would be the same.

Western adventures had a large audience, and after the rehabilitation of Rondon, the explorer's treks especially captured the attention of Brazilian publishers. CEN re-printed both anthropologist

Edgard Roquette-Pinto's *Rondônia*, an account of a journey with the Telegraph Commission, and a new edition, spruced up with photographs, of the exhaustive memoirs of the general's top lieutenant, Botelho de Magalhães.¹⁰¹ The crown jewel of CEN's Rondon collection, however, was the first Portuguese-language edition of Theodore Roosevelt's *Through the Brazilian Wilderness*, the international best-selling chronicle of the legendary 1913-1914 expedition.

Just as Roosevelt had enhanced Rondon's reputation around the globe, the Pedagogical Library published translations of European and North American authors who endorsed westward expansion in Brazil. *Conquest of Brazil*, by U.S. geographer Roy Nash, underscored the importance of developing the interior. Validating a theme embraced by so many Brazilian authors, Nash sets an explicit parallel between the North American experience and the Oeste: "North America has a perfect analogy in the conquest of the Brazilian West."¹⁰² The book endorses state action and group effort rather than American-style individual pioneering to subdue the frontier: "The Amazon demands social action instead of individual. . . . Modern collectivism constitutes the only weapon that will prove useful to the Brazilian in vanquishing the savage. . . ."¹⁰³ Nash was such an effective spokesman for a corporatist March to the West that the DIP brought him to Brazil in 1944 to lecture at the Ministry of Foreign Relations in Rio. He glamorized life in the interior and encouraged young cariocas to move West: "If I were young, I would prefer to establish myself in Goiás rather than Rio de Janeiro."¹⁰⁴

Another foreign testimonial for Vargas' March came from German theater professor Wolfgang Hoffman-Harnisch. The Portuguese-language edition of *The Brazil That I Saw* (*O Brasil que eu vi*) received the full imprimatur of the Estado Novo, including a preface written by Lourival Fontes. Based on a 1938 visit to Brazil, Hoffman-Harnisch's account bought into and perpetuated many of the DIP-generated myths about the West. In making the now *de rigueur* comparisons between the expansionism of Brazil and the United States, the German applauded Vargas for leading a peaceful conquest: "Brazil, more fortunate [than North America], has not initiated a bloody march to the West. . . [T]he wave of conquest has not shaken the nation, which has its pacific evolution guaranteed."¹⁰⁵ A more pliant pitchman for Vargas' development policies could not be found. Insulated from reality by his Estado Novo hosts, Hoffman-Harnisch blithely ignored the brewing conflicts between settlers, landowners, and Indians that had already begun to stain the soil of the Oeste.

The Pedagogical Library also re-printed many of the classic accounts of nineteenth century explorations in Amazonia, many out of print for over fifty years. In line with Cult of History policy, the works of Tavares Bastos reappeared on the market for the first time since the 1860s, including a compilation of pseudonymous letters to the *Correio Mercantil* newspaper in Rio.¹⁰⁶ The centennial of the epic journeys of Spix and von Martius provided an opportunity for the publication of an annotated, four-volume edition of *Voyage Through Brazil* (*Viagem pelo*

Brasil), and the state of São Paulo released the first Portuguese translation of the journals of Karl von den Steinen.¹⁰⁷

Finally, the reach of the DIP even extended into fiction. In 1944, at the height of the rubber battle, an obscure novel called *Mysterious Amazonia* (*Amazônia Misteriosa*), by Gastão Cruls, reappeared after a decade out of print. Eerily prophetic, the plot concerns a German doctor who comes to the Brazilian rain forest to conduct genetic experiments on an indigenous tribe.¹⁰⁸ Amid the atmosphere of paranoia over Nazi U-boat attacks off of the coast of Pará and the fanfare over Brazilian troops in Europe, the book caused a sensation and remained in print for three decades.¹⁰⁹

One even more blatant case of government manipulation of fiction deserves mention. Lauro Palhano, in his second edition of *O Gororoba*, a novel about Northeastern migrants in Amazonia around the turn of the century, included a prefatory note that praised the March to the West. Published in 1943, the short addition credits Vargas with eliminating the conditions that the story describes in the rain forest: "The Amazonia of Gororoba was a vast mining camp. Today, under the auspices of the Estado Novo, it is transformed into a factory, a resplendent forge of profitable and useful work."¹¹⁰

iv: Cinema and the Visual Arts

Cinema will be the book of luminous images in which our beachcombing and rural populations will learn to love Brazil, gathering confidence in the destiny of the Fatherland.¹¹¹

-- Getúlio Vargas

While the DIP's magazines and books shaped the opinions of the educated classes in Brazil, their impact on the majority was negligible. In a country with at least half of its population illiterate, no tool had greater success in spreading the gospel of the March to the West than cinema. Vargas shrewdly appropriated the most accessible and viscerally powerful means of communication to promote the agenda in the interior. Under the Estado Novo, for the first time Brazilians actually saw (carefully manipulated) images of the West, and the message of DIP filmstrips would color the nation's perception of its hinterland to the present day.

Very early on in his administration, Vargas grasped the power of film and moved to regulate it. Decree 21.240 of 4 April 1932 established state censorship of the cinema. The law mandated that movie houses had to show films deemed "educational" by the Censorship Commission (*Comissão de Censura*), a measure that guaranteed screen time for government-produced propaganda shorts or "documentaries."¹¹²

In subsequent years, Vargas gradually created a cinematic bureaucracy. The Department of Propaganda and Cultural Broadcasting (*Departamento de Propaganda e Difusão Cultural*— DPDC), founded in

1934, oversaw filmstrips and radio broadcasts under the aegis of the Ministry of Justice. In 1937, the president turned his attention to the youth market by chartering the National Institute of Educational Cinema (*Instituto Nacional de Cinema Educativo*-- INCE). As well as filming sixteen millimeter shorts and distributing them to schools, INCE also produced thirty-five millimeter features, including adaptations of works of Brazilian literature and historical epics.¹¹³

In 1939, the DIP absorbed all of the functions of both INCE and the DPDC, and the Estado Novo's film propaganda campaign accelerated markedly. On 29 December Vargas authorized an official government newsreel (*Cinejornal Brasileiro*-- CJB), "with sound, filmed all over Brazil, [and] on Brazilian topics" for weekly, nationwide distribution.¹¹⁴ The CJB eventually reached 278 towns and cities on a total of 608 screens by June 1944.¹¹⁵ With such coverage, a wide swath of the Brazilian public received their indoctrination about the policies of the New State, particularly the March to the West, through this medium.

The CJB played a crucial role in how the New State presented itself to the Brazilian public. Fontes and his staff "through the newsreels looked systematically to disseminate the image that the Estado Novo wanted of itself."¹¹⁶ Vargas' propagandists harnessed the properties of the new medium, its linkage of moving images and sound, to create "the impression of dynamism, achievement, and modernity."¹¹⁷ Through unprecedented aerial footage and never-before-seen vistas of the interior, the new art form "spread the doctrine of the 'great nation,'"¹¹⁸ and especially the central tenet of that doctrine, the March to the West.

As J.C. Bernardet reminds viewers, the DIP films were never intended as literal documentation of any event or place-- falsification and manipulation of the images make them the first visual contribution to political mythology in Brazilian history.¹¹⁹

In 1940, when Vargas toured the interior, the DIP's cameras went along, and the propaganda agency produced its first films dedicated to the theme of westward expansion. The opening title of the newsreel of the presidential visit to Goiânia, called *The March to the West*, proclaimed the dictator's heroism in "initiating an excursion through the regions in which Brazil still guards its primitive forest."¹²⁰ Under a happy, upbeat, brassy march score, the film shows Vargas arrive at the airport and tour the buildings of the new state capital, views of the accomplishments of the March that most Brazilians had never seen before. The narrator, casting the dictator as the savior of the hinterland, assures the audience, "The presence of the Chief of the Nation gives to the scattered populations of the most vast territory the certainty that they are not abandoned."¹²¹ According to the soundtrack, Vargas has come to the West not just to restore the region's economic health, but to readjust Brazil's mental picture of itself: "In this way are interrupted centuries of psychological decentralization that condemned immense and rich areas. . . to obscurity and isolation."¹²² This indoctrination would mark all of the DIP's films about the March to the West-- the propaganda agency would work to modify the attitude of urban

Brazilians toward the interior through the combination of carefully crafted images, authoritative narration, and inspirational music.

In September, the DIP's cameras followed the president on his trip to Belém and Manuas, giving Brazilians their first on-screen glimpse of Amazonia. As Vargas boards his plane for the flight to Pará, the narrator emphasizes the leader's heart-felt concern and hands-on management in undertaking "yet another voyage. . . to verify in person the necessities of the region."¹²³ The newsreel continues with scenes of the president's reviewing children on parade, touring a water treatment plant, inspecting the military police, and dining with the "conservative classes." Every frame reinforces an image of order and security in the West, the product of the firm and compassionate direction of Getúlio Vargas.

The opening title of the next newsreel of the trip jogs viewers' memories of Vargas' first visit to the region. The lettering insists that the dictator has not forgotten his proclamation: "The resurrection of Amazonia , which President Getúlio Vargas announced seven years ago, is not a circumstantial promise: the process of rebirth in the valley is on the march. . . ."¹²⁴ Over shots of Vargas on a steamer in the Amazon River, the narration reverently informs the audience of the many "stimulating benefits of economic progress that the sons [of Amazonia] are harvesting."¹²⁵ Though the CJB shows Vargas as he disembarks in Manaus to great acclaim and greets the adoring crowds, the real star of the film is the rain forest. Aerial pictures of the unbroken foliage stretching to the horizon gave

viewers a sense for the first time of the immense scope and potential of the West. The sight of that ostensibly unoccupied land, waiting to be conquered by the forces of civilization has scarcely lost its power even after the passage of fifty years.

Aside from inculcating a deceptive feeling of freedom and possibility about the interior, the newsreel of Vargas' journey in Amazonia also pushed the prospects of economic development in the region. The film trails the president to a shipyard and the Agronomical Institute of the North (*Instituto Agrônomo do Norte*) in Manaus, for example. Most important, however, are images of the dictator at the Ford plantation at Belterra. Clad in a white double-breasted suit and pith helmet, Getúlio meets the workers and tours the operation, presented as a model of safety, sanitation, and efficiency.¹²⁶ No picture could better convey the Estado Novo's industrial agenda for the West.

The DIP similarly underscored the industrial aspect of the March to the West in its films of Vargas' visit to Mato Grosso in 1941. After the obligatory shots of cheering crowds and an entourage of local sycophants at the airport in Corumbá, one newsreel focuses on the inauguration of the railroad link with Bolivia.¹²⁷ Over triumphant music, another crowds, "new works attest to the progress achieved every day," and features images of water tanks and houses photographed from a moving train.¹²⁸

These Mato Grosso newsreels also devote much of their running time to the participation of the armed forces in the March to the

West. The Corumbá film spends several minutes on Vargas' stops at military barracks and the naval base on the Paraguay River.¹²⁹ To reinforce this message of the military as the vanguard of the frontier, another newsreel highlights the president's meeting with officers in Cuiabá even more than his banquet speech to the local elites.¹³⁰

The CJB proved a valuable tool during the Rubber Battle as well. A filmstrip entitled *The National Rubber Month (O Mês Nacional da Borracha)* documents Valentim Bouças and his team on an inspection tour of groves in Mato Grosso.¹³¹ Probably the first view of the seringais for the vast majority of Brazilians, the newsreel sought to familiarize the audience with the vital industry of the West. Like the earlier film on Vargas' visit to Manaus, this short subject features many aerial vistas of the impenetrable forest, this time to play up the heroism of the tappers as well as demonstrate the majesty and power of the hinterland. The camera tracks Bouças, his team, and their omnipresent military escort on a steamship river cruise. Revealing the secrets of latex to the general public, the newsreel walks the audience through each step in the rubber process, from tapping to pressing the gum into sheets. In perhaps an unintentional irony, Bouças' aides, outfitted in suits and panama hats, contrast grimly with the miserable quarters of the workers, whose families are shown living out of hammocks.

Another film on the Rubber Battle more explicitly appeals to the patriotism of the audience. The 1944 short *Brazil's War Effort (O Esforço da guerra do Brasil)* presents the Amazonian rubber drive as

Brazil's largest contribution to the Allied campaign.¹³² After the obligatory aerial photography of the rain forest, this edition of the CJB quickly turns into a cinematic recruiting pitch for SEMTA. The filmstrip follows a "Victory March" of happy, straw-hatted seringueiros, who parade around in the back of a truck. Grateful and smiling, the tappers beckon viewers to join them on their perilous journey into the isolated groves.

The Roncador-Xingú expedition of 1944-1945 also provided an excellent photo opportunity for the DIP cameramen. *Over the Land of the Xavantes* (*Sobre a Terra dos Chavantes*) follows Vargas on his trip to inspect the work of the FBC in western Goiás.¹³³ Under welling, pseudo-indigenous dramatic music (reminiscent of the themes played when the Apaches appear on screen in Hollywood Westerns), the film opens with scenes of the presidential airplane as it flies over the wilds of Central Brazil. Accompanied by Defense Minister Dutra, João Alberto, and a pith-helmeted Pedro Ludovico, the president is shown glad-handing the explorers and military officials at one of the expedition camps. The newsreel also trails the dictator as he visits FBC construction sites and workshops.

After this suspenseful stint in the territory of the savage Xavantes, the film has Vargas safely return to the civilization of the planned city of Aragarças. The narrator announces, over shots of the touch-down of Vargas' plane on the dirt FBC airstrip, "The president of the Republic once again visits the expanses of Central Brazil" as part of his campaign to bring about "at once its definitive

subjugation and systematic colonization."¹³⁴ A place "blessed," according to the CJB, "with a birth under fortunate signs," Aragarças symbolizes for the DIP the resumption "once more, of the path to the West, the traditional path to construct [Brazilian] civilization."¹³⁵ Viewers come away with the message that, even as an infant city, Aragarças is steeped in three hundred years of history that presage a prosperous future.

As an adjunct to the CJB newsreels on the March to the West, INCE produced a "documentary" aimed at schoolchildren. Directed by Humberto Mauro and written by Roquette Pinto, *Bandeirantes* re-enacts one interpretation of the colonial explorations.¹³⁶ This low-budget production uses dioramas, paintings, and dubiously acted recreations to illustrate the exploits of the Paulista heroes. Mauro shows the distinctly European-featured bandeirantes, the mirror images of modern pioneers, hack their way through the forest to allow missionaries to bring civilization and the catechism to indigenous tribespeople. In the movie's climactic scenes, an actor playing Raposo Tavares (looking like a twisted Pilgrim in a puffy shirt, broad-brimmed hat, and bushy false beard) thwarts an indigenous attack with superior firepower.¹³⁷ After the Raposo Tavares segment, a shot fills the screen that explicitly recalls the graphics of Vargas' March to the West campaign. A map of Brazil, colored white only to the Tordesillas Line, slowly fills in, east to west, until the country is one color.

Local businesses in western cities also sponsored private short subjects on the March. A marriage of civic boosterism and Estado Novo propaganda, these films were extended commercials for the growing settlements of the hinterland.

Focused on Campo Grande, *March to the West #3* tries, by showing the advantages and comforts of frontier life, to induce coastal Brazilians to migrate to Mato Grosso.¹³⁸ The film cuts among various scenes of the burgeoning new city, including shots of road crews at work, the new telephone switchboard, the post office, and migrants as they arrive by bus and open-bed truck. Stressing the modernity and normality of Campo Grande, the short film demonstrates to viewers on the littoral that life in Mato Grosso is just like their lives at home. Since the infectious diseases endemic in the region deterred many potential settlers, "March to the West #3" devotes much time on the city's sanitation system. In the film, crews lay water lines, children play in and drink from an open tap, and a water tower looms from every conceivable angle. Civic fathers made sure that they appeared on screen to inspect the progress: in one scene, a supercilious, waxed-mustachioed politician in a natty suit pulls up in a car to wave to cheerful construction workers.¹³⁹

Another such celluloid advertisement, *March to the West #5: Corumbá*, examined the pace of development in the Paraguay River port.¹⁴⁰ Like the short subject on Campo Grande, this film, sponsored by local brewing and milling interests, appealed to potential migrants by showing the West as reassuringly normal. Shots of houses,

schools, and industry (including long looks at the brewery and wheat mill), resonate with a message of similarity to life in São Paulo or Rio. *March to the West #5: Corumbá* also underlines the transportation revolution in the interior-- river traffic, the Brazil-Bolivia Railroad, and the new airfield all get significant screen time. The movie comforts the audience that the opening of the West is not chaotic, but orderly and scientific, and the territory itself not savage but much like the world the audience knows.

Even the commercial elite of far-off Guaporé scraped together enough capital to back a propaganda film. *Get to Know Amazonia #1* (*Conheça a Amazônia, Nº 1: O Território do Guaporé*), reinforces the same themes as the sixteen millimeter commercials for Campo Grande and Corumbá, especially technology and transport.¹⁴¹ Yet the most striking aspect of the film is a pan past a construction site where the homes look exactly like the bungalows of Copacabana. The film does not address the killer malaria that might have made Pôrto Velho a less attractive place to live than the beaches of Guanabara Bay.

In addition to the films, the DIP printed propaganda in other visual media to promote the March to the West. In 1939, the agency held a national poster contest, and the winner portrayed western expansion. Paulistano Elmano Henrique's design featured a huge sword, superimposed over an outline of Brazil, with the hilt resting over the Southeast and the blade pointing towards the western Amazon. A globe circled by the Brazilian national motto, "Order and

Progress," occupied the middle of the map, while the lettering at the bottom read, "Brazilians! Let us guard what is ours with all our might."¹⁴² The DIP also widely distributed posters for the commemoration of the "Amazon River Speech."¹⁴³

Yet the most fascinating DIP graphic publication is a series of postcards entitled "New Brazil: 1930-1940" (*Novo Brasil: 1930-1940*), issued on the tenth anniversary of Vargas' ascension to power. Two of the cards from the collection directly depict the March to the West. One, focused on transport, displayed a photo montage of the president, outfitted as usual in a crisp suit and boater, as he examined road graders, bulldozers, and earth movers at a highway project. DIP technicians crudely doctored one of the photos, gluing Vargas' body in the picture in the style of a supermarket tabloid cover.¹⁴⁴

The second card, an even more comical montage, shows Vargas among the tribes of Bananal. On the bottom half, the sartorial president is posed, in a double-breasted grey wool suit with pocket square and white pith helmet, next to a Carajá chief dressed in full ceremonial regalia. Naked children surround the two leader, although censors tastefully cropped the photo to remove any offensive body parts. On the top of the card, Vargas proudly stands by as a bewildered Carajá stares, slack-jawed, out of the window of the presidential airplane.¹⁴⁵ Perhaps the tribesman could see the changes that the DIP propaganda would soon help wreak in his homeland.

V: The March to the West on the Air

Radio is the most powerful instrument in the hands of rulers which technology has ever created.¹⁴⁶

-- Benito Mussolini

Radio revolutionized the art of propaganda in the 1930s. As Fabregat Cúneo has remarked, "For the first time an agent of publicity was invisible."¹⁴⁷ The power of this "sonorous omnipresence" enabled governments to project themselves into the deadly lives of citizens with greater ease than ever before.¹⁴⁸

Brazilian radio propaganda began later than in the fascist states of Europe. In 1934, Ronald de Carvalho urged Vargas to expand the National Department of Culture and Radio Broadcasting, then mainly devoted to movies. In a letter, Carvalho advocated that his boss imitate Hitler in the field of radio: "Your excellency could transform it into a lively force of nationality, converting it into an organism of culture, in the Germanic sense."¹⁴⁹

Oswaldo Aranha also pushed the president to invest more resources in broadcasting. He complained from Washington, where he could tune into the smooth delivery of Walter Winchell every day, "[Brazilian] radio is idiotic. . . and, Getúlio, in radio resides an efficiency without peer. All you have to do is organize it."¹⁵⁰

With the creation of the DIP, the Vargas administration finally directed its attention to the airwaves. Lourival Fontes recognized the "vast possibilities offered by the modern technology" of

broadcasting,¹⁵¹ and he harnessed them for the Estado Novo. All of the other DIP media could only reach a fraction of the audience that radio could. As one New State official admitted, "Given the immensity of [Brazil's] territory, the percentage of illiterates in the interior, [and] the backwardness of the rural population," only broadcasts could sell the March to the West to the masses and insert the message of westward expansion into popular culture.¹⁵²

Beginning in 1939, the DIP obliged all radio stations to carry a daily hour of government programming. Presented from seven to eight in the evening, the "Brazilian Hour" (*Hora do Brasil*) broadcast Estado Novo propaganda in prime time all across the country.¹⁵³ Not even those poor people who did not own receivers could escape the program: the DIP sent sound trucks up into the hillside shantytowns, or *morros*, in Rio to ensure that the *povão* got the message.¹⁵⁴ Given the ubiquity of the Hour, *A Manhã* called the bulletin the one hour each day when "Brazil converses with itself."¹⁵⁵

Under the direction of Ilca Labarthe, the Hour operated under very strict guidelines and aimed at a mostly rural audience. In cooperation with the state DEIPs, each of which had its own broadcast, the Hour controlled the flow of information to outlying communities: "the resident of the hinterland will tune his radio. . . to receive general news, securely filtered, and information that will appeal to curiosity and culture."¹⁵⁶ The program ensured that Brazilians in the countryside were exposed to the party line. The DIP mandated that, along with current events and music, each episode contain "a chronicle

that treats a Brazilian theme, whose broadcast might be a matter of collective interest."¹⁵⁷ Radio played a key role in the Cult of History as well. Labarthe devoted part of each Hour to "look in the remembrances of our past [for] the motives of exaltation and enthusiasm that should stimulate our people to perform the work of the present."¹⁵⁸ Propaganda for westward expansion often fulfilled both of these programming requisites.

Because the Vargas administration wanted to keep migrants from moving to the coastal cities, the DIP directed much of this programming at rural (particularly Northeastern) listeners. Beginning in 1939, the Ministry of Agriculture sponsored a series of lectures during the Hour entitled "March to the West."¹⁵⁹ The programs ran for five years, and mixed agronomy and technical advice with messages that glorified migration to the Oeste. In a typical edition, called "The Battle of the Land" (*A Batalha da Terra*), broadcast in September 1943, Harold Daltro called upon his countrymen to follow the paths of their ancestors into the wilderness, this time with a new purpose. "Let us today not be the bandeirantes. . . of gold and precious stones," he said, "But those of cultivation, for our might and economic liberation."¹⁶⁰

The DIP also used its broadcasts to indoctrinate rural teachers (*magistério municipal*) in the mythology of the March. In December of 1941, the Ministry of Education and Culture created an Amazonian Study Course (*Curso de Estudos da Amazônia*) to train educators how to instruct their students about the vast basin and its "exoticism and secrets."¹⁶¹

During the Rubber Battle of 1943-1945, the Estado Novo turned to radio to recruit workers and to maintain morale among the rubber tappers deep in the forest. In conjunction with a blitz in the print media, the DIP used the Hour to read Vargas' appeal for volunteers to the listening nation.¹⁶² SEMTA later set up a network of eight stations in Rio, the Northeast, and Pará for communication and the broadcast of propaganda to workers and potential enlistees. Lonely *seringueiros*, who sent personal messages, some "even containing unseemly phrases," often subverted the official purposes of Radio SEMTA, however.¹⁶³

Even in urban areas, however, the DIP guaranteed a wide audience for the *Hora do Brasil* (in sharp contrast to the current *Voz do Brasil*) by enlisting top popular singers such as Chico Alves to perform on the program. Labarthe sandwiched the propaganda between the sambas, and willing listeners who had tuned in to hear their favorite stars absorbed dogma along the way. Heavy censorship even allowed the DIP to "suggest" approved topics to composers, particularly themes of hard work and conformity. As critic Antônio Tota has written, radio thus "mediated the relationship between two lovers, the president of the Republic and Brazilian popular music."¹⁶⁴

While the writing of songs to glorify the industrial working class is better known, Vargas' campaign to appropriate popular music for his propaganda purposes also inserted the topic of westward expansion into the so-called "sambas of legitimacy" (*sambas da legitimidade*).¹⁶⁵ In perhaps the most notable case, one of the themes (*marchas*) of Carnaval of 1939 was a composition by João de Barro and Alberto

Ribeiro called "March to the West." Recorded by Carlos Galhardo and his Orchestra in October of 1938 and released by Victor Brasileira in December,¹⁶⁶ the samba became a hit during the following weeks. In the song an optimistic pioneer says goodbye to his lover in the city and promises to return rich:

(I go. . . (oo. . .)
(To the West
(Goodbye. . . (bye. . .)
(My love
(The kiss that you gave me
(I will carry wherever I go

I carry your kiss with me
Locked in my heart.

But, when I come back
I will give you
A million for your kiss.

Your sweet dreams of today
Will be reality.
When I come back
To pay for
Your million-dollar kiss.¹⁶⁷

The protagonist is the prototype of the New State *bandeirante*, the urban Brazilian drawn into the Oeste by the government's promises of fortune. Thousands more would imitate the character in this paean over the course of the 1940s.

Another samba that reflected the March to the West in part was "Brazilian Brazil!" (*Brasil Brasileiro!*), written by Sebastião Lima and Henrique de Almeida. Also recorded by Galhardo (with Passos and His Orchestra), and released by Victor in 1942, the tune formed part of a DIP-inspired movement of "nationalist compositions," or "exaltation sambas."¹⁶⁸ In a play on the Estado Novo rhetoric about the awaking of Amazonia from a "centuries-long sleep," the song proclaimed, "Brazil!

My Brazil of the green sea/ Giant which awakes/ From a centuries-long sleep."¹⁶⁹

Through the music and conversation of the "Brazilian Hour," the DIP created an "illusion of participation" with the regime among the masses, particularly in rural areas.¹⁷⁰ Radio also worked in combination with the police apparatus to maintain a tight lid on the country, to squelch dissent and protest, since the airwaves carried no opinions except the official position of the dictatorship. Because the Estado Novo broadcast standardized propaganda at the same time all over the country, the state created an "imaginary homogeneity," a message that all Brazilians shared the same values and goals.¹⁷¹ The March to the West formed a crucial portion of this official national system of values, and the government radio programs helped to root the mythology of westward expansion in the national consciousness for two generations.

Yet the Estado Novo never assumed a totalitarian omnipresence akin to that of the contemporary fascist regimes in Europe. One of the difficulties of a dissertation such as this one lies in determining what Roland Barthes calls "the social geography" of New State mythology.¹⁷² Charting the "isoglosses" of New State propaganda, the "lines which limit the social region where it is spoken,"¹⁷³ cannot be done with pinpoint accuracy, given the lack of ratings or audience composition data.

The reach of Vargas' propaganda had its limits, and how seriously the Brazilian people took the flood of verbiage emanating from the DIP

studios and presses is open to question. Urban Brazilians, naturally skeptical and wry, often sidestepped the government's information control apparatus. Many arrived at the cinema ten minutes late to miss the CJB newsreels, for example. The radio programs were even easier to skip: The popular nickname for the "Hora do Brasil," in a play on its official slogan, was "the speaks-alone" (*o fala sozinho*), since savvy listeners simply turned off their receivers from seven to eight at night.¹⁷⁴ While the Estado Novo attempted to generate media-based participatory organizations, such as the Direction West Crusade, the DIP manipulation of the airwaves did not provide for listener interaction on the same scale as the soap operas (*rádionovelas*) broadcast by the commercial National Radio (*Rádio Nacional*) in the 1940s and 1950s.¹⁷⁵

Despite this passive resistance in the cities to the government's propaganda, evidence suggests that the DIP had a greater influence in the countryside, where access to information was much more limited. As one citizen from Acre wrote to Vargas, Brazilians in the Northeast and the interior had a restricted relationship to the outside world, "which we know only through reading the journals and publications of the DIP."¹⁷⁶ Rather than in theater attendance or in testimonials of from the 1940s, however, the success of the March to the West propaganda ultimately can be judged by the programs of Juscelino Kubitschek and the military regimes and the survival to this day of the basic ideology of westward expansion among ordinary Brazilians.

-
- 1 Venerando de Freitas, "Goiânia," In *Goiânia*, 59. de Freitas was the mayor of Goiânia.
 - 2 Hunnicutt, 47.
 - 3 Velloso, "O mito," 5.
 - 4 "Realizando administração, construindo Goiânia e incrementando a exploração das riquezas do Goiaz, o interventor Pedro Ludovico realiza uma das mais notáveis obras do Estado Novo," *A Manhã*, 13 August 1942, 5.
 - 5 Ribeiro da Silva, 10.
 - 6 *A Manhã* was never technically a daily, since it did not publish on Mondays.
 - 7 Velloso, "O mito," 15.
 - 8 "Marcha para o Oeste," *A Manhã*, 10 August 1941, 8.
 - 9 Antônio Pedro Tota, "A glória artística nos tempos de Getúlio," *Isto É* 2 January 1980, 46.
 - 10 "Marcha," 9 August 1941, 8.
 - 11 "Marcha," 21 October 1941, 9.
 - 12 Ibid. *A Manhã* occasionally printed the graphic over other articles, c.f. Carlos Mendonça's "Marcha para o Oeste: Os Estados Unidos e o Vale do Guaporé," *A Manhã*, 15 December 1944, 6.
 - 13 "Marcha," 28 October 1941, 9.
 - 14 "Marcha," 3 September 1941, 8.
 - 15 "Marcha," 29 September 1942, 10.
 - 16 Dioclécio Duarte, "As consequências do êxodo rural," *A Manhã*, 3 February 1942, 9. Duarte also recommended the placement of military units throughout the countryside to keep draftees closer to home and prevent them from staying on in large cities when their period of service expired. Duarte, "Cause do êxodo rural no Brasil," *A Manhã*, 7 February 1942, 9.
 - 17 "Goiás no ritmo do Brasil Novo," *A Manhã*, 13 August 1941, 8.
 - 18 Duarte, "Getúlio Vargas, o grande amigo do sertão," *A Manhã*, 22 April 1942, 10.
 - 19 A. Bastos Morbach, "O Rio Tocantins," *A Manhã*, 11 November 1941, 9.
 - 20 *A Manhã* broadened this stance to include all of the economy. The newspaper editorialized, "[T]he facts demand more and more the interference of the public sector [and] the intervention of the state in the direction of the economy." "Instituto Nacional da Borracha," *A Manhã*, 9 May 1942, 4.
 - 21 Benival de Oliveira, "O preconceito anti-geográfico," *A Manhã*, 7 August 1942, 4.
 - 22 "Ressurgimento da Amazônia," *A Manhã*, 27 March 1943, 4.
 - 23 "O Estado Nacional e o Sertão," *A Manhã*, 13 November 1941, 13. As with much of the political rhetoric of the Estado Novo, the phrase "open road" has resurfaced in Brazilian politics. During the administration of president Itamar Franco, a 1993-1994 civic propaganda campaign called "Brazil: Union of All" (*Brasil: União de Todos*) used the line "the future is an open road" (*o futuro é uma estrada aberta*) in its themesong.
 - 24 "Marcha," 21 October 1941, 9.
 - 25 "O exemplo norte-americano," *A Manhã*, 19 December 1941, 9.
 - 26 Ibid.

-
- 27 One of the most popular U.S. authors was Waldo Frank. *A Manhã* ran a translation by Vinicius de Moraes of excerpts of Frank's book *Our America* in 1941. Waldo Frank, "A Terra do Pioneiro," Trans. by Vinicius de Moraes, *A Manhã*, 6 November 1941, 7.
- 28 "A hora da Amazônia," *A Manhã*, 18 March 1942, 4.
- 29 "O progresso de Goiás," *A Manhã*, 20 December 1941, 4.
- 30 Eugen Hadamovsky, *Propaganda and National Power*, Trans. by Alice Mavrogordato and Ilse de Witt (New York: Arno Press, Inc., 1972), 1.
- 31 Velloso, "configuração," 92.
- 32 Amaral, *Novas Diretrizes*, November 1938, 2.
- 33 Virgílio Correia Filho, "Devassamento e ocupação da hinterlândia brasileira," *Cultura Política*, December 1942, 95.
- 34 Nélio Reis, as quoted by Pinheiro, 189.
- 35 "Os novos Territórios federais," *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã*, 30 September 1943, 11.
- 36 Carleton Beals, "Quote-- and Unquote," *Brazil Today*, March-May 1941, 14.
- 37 "Densidade demográfica," *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã*, 31 January 1942, 19.
- 38 Beneval de Oliveira, "As populações brasileiras e seus movimentos," *Cultura Política*, June 1943, 71.
- 39 *Ibid.*, 72-73.
- 40 "A Marcha para o Oeste," *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã*, 31 July 1940, 22.
- 41 Bouças, "Condições presentes e perspectivas futuras da borracha brasileira," *O Estado de São Paulo*, 4 November 1943, 5.
- 42 Valverde, 73.
- 43 Artur Hehl Neiva, "A imigração e a colonização no governo Vargas," *Cultura Política*, November 1942, 236.
- 44 Brazil, Presidência da República, DIP, *As colônias agrícolas nacionais e a valorização do trabalhador brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: DIP, 1941), 18-19. In a re-circulation of propaganda, much of the booklet consisted of a reprinting of laudatory editorials and articles from Rio newspapers. The pamphlet employed tactics from the Cult of History by opening with two long quotes from nationalist Alberto Torres.
- 45 *Ibid.*, 29.
- 46 *Ibid.*, 17.
- 47 *Ibid.*
- 48 *Ibid.*, 31.
- 49 Ramayana de Chevalier, "A revalorização da Amazônia," *Estudos e conferências*, December 1941, 39. The article is excerpted from an address delivered 21 October 1941 at Tiradentes Palace in Rio.
- 50 de Chevalier, "A ressonância de um instante eterno," *Estudos e conferências*, December 1941, 22. The article is a reprint of a speech given 10 October 1941 at the Tiradentes Palace in Rio during the commemoration of the first anniversary of the "Amazon River Speech." This point of view fit squarely

within the mainstream of Brazilian sociological thought at the time. Nelson Werneck Sodré also faulted "nomadism" for poverty on the frontier. Werneck Sodré, 85.

51 "A oração de Manaus," *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã*, 31 October 1940, 1.

52 See Margolis, 217-229.

53 Rodrigues, "Necessidade," 1.

54 Péricles Melo Carvalho, "A concretização da 'Marcha para o Oeste,'" *Cultura Política*, October 1941, 15.

55 Hemming, *Amazon Frontier: The Defeat of the Brazilian Indians* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 243.

56 Smith, 52.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid., 216.

59 Dias Mendes, 32.

60 Angela Maria de Castro Gomes, "O Trabalhador Brasileiro," In Oliveira, *Estado Novo*, 164.

61 L. Penna Teixeira, "Amazônia ignota," *Correio da Manhã*, 16 October 1941, 4.

62 "A oração," 1-2.

63 Lima Figueiredo, "Getúlio Vargas e a Conquista do Sertão," *Ciência Política*, November 1941, 50.

64 "O 'Rumo ao Oeste' e o Exército," *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã*, February 1941, 24.

65 Lima Figueiredo, "Getúlio Vargas," 50.

66 Amorim, "30.000 cóvas," 14 September 1947, 21.

67 "O que se realiza na Amazônia," *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã*, 31 January 1943, 6.

68 Galvão, "Observações sobre a borracha brasileira," *Cultura Política*, September 1942, 64. Galvão erroneously reported that Wickham "[t]ook a steamship and brought no more and no less than 70,000 rubber seeds to Asia." Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 "A borracha e sua utilização após guerra," *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã*, 31 March 1943, 13.

72 Aureli, *Roncador*, 9.

73 Pinheiro, "O papel da escola na obra do aproveitamento da Amazônia," *Cultura Política*, December 1941, 76.

74 Sharp, 10.

75 "O Discurso do Rio Amazonas: circular do secretário de Educação aos chefes de Departamento e do Instituto de Educação, determinando providências para sua comemoração condigna," *A Manhã*, 3 October 1941, 3.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

-
- 78 "Atividades do Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda," *Cultura Política*, December 1944, 155-156. Among other books also handed out by the DIP were *West (Oeste)*, by Nelson Werneck Sodré; *Remembrances of the Baron of Rio Branco (Reminiscências do Barão do Rio Branco)*, by Raúl do Rio Branco; Manoilescu's *Century of Corporativism*; Vargas' *The New Politics of Brazil (A Nova Política do Brasil)*; *The Sertão and the Center (O Sertão e o Centro)*, by João Duarte Filho; and *Profile of Euclides and Other Profiles (Perfil de Euclides e outros perfis)*, by Gilberto Freyre.
- 79 *Ibid.*, 156.
- 80 Waldemiro Potsch, *O Brasil e suas riquezas: leitura pátria*, 16^a Edição (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério da Agricultura, Serviço de Informação Agrícola, 1941), vii. The Combatants' Library also distributed Potsch's book.
- 81 *Ibid.*, v.
- 82 *Ibid.*, 3-42.
- 83 Belmiro Braga, "A nossa terra," In *Ibid.*, 352.
- 84 Olmio Barros Vidal, *O Brasil que o Presidente Getúlio Vargas está construindo* (Rio de Janeiro: DIP, 1940), 53.
- 85 *Ibid.*, 51.
- 86 *Ibid.*, 55.
- 87 Galvão, 132.
- 88 Maia, *Na vanguarda*, 355.
- 89 *Ibid.*, 71. Maia coins the term *operário-anfíbio* in Portuguese.
- 90 Artur de Miranda Bastos, *Uma excursão ao Amapá* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1947), 75.
- 91 Pinheiro warned of international designs on the Brazilian West: "[S]ooner or later, the strong nations will extend their greedy talons to this abandoned, isolated, undefended region crammed between the frontiers of five countries." Pinheiro, *A Margem do Amazonas*, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Universal, 1945), 37.
- 92 Agenor Couto de Magalhães, *Encantos do Oeste: um pedaço do Brasil onde o homem se identifica com a natureza* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1945), 167. This quote runs below a photo of a nude Carajá Indian girl lying on a beach on Bananal Island.
- 93 *Ibid.*, 3-4.
- 94 Thiago M. Würth, *Juventude Brasileira* (Canôas, RG: Instituto Pestalozzi, 1943), 12.
- 95 *Ibid.*
- 96 "Fundado em São Paulo o 'Movimento Oesteano,'" *A Manhã*, 4 September 1941, 8.
- 97 *Ibid.*
- 98 Vargas, *Nova Política*, I:1. *A Nova Política* turned into a financial disaster for José Olympio Pereira Filho. A young publisher just beginning his career, he printed a large run on the agreement that interventors would order copies in bulk to distribute in their states. Several states (Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná, and Santa Catarina) never did so, despite instructions from the office of the president, while others (Bahia, Paraíba, Ceará) did not pay for their orders. Stuck with 12,000 unsold copies and fearing that his inventory could climb to 30,000, José Olympio wrote to Vargas in 1939 to beg the president

could climb to 30,000, José Olympio wrote to Vargas in 1939 to beg the president to make good on the promises of the DIP. The publisher claimed that he faced bankruptcy if the backlog was not sold, and remarked bitterly, "I agreed to edit your book because I thought I was doing my country. . . a great service by publicizing the ideas of the man who governs us. Was I wrong in this?" José Olympio Pereira Filho to Vargas, 9 February 1939, 2-3, FGV, CPDOC, Acervo Getúlio Vargas, Rolo 6. José Olympio Editora did survive the fiasco, and went on to profit from its close connection to the Estado Novo.

⁹⁹ Raymundo Moraes, *Na planície amazônica*, 5ª Edição (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1939), 148.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 170. This comparison to the world of the silver screen is not Moraes' only flight of fancy: he also maintains that livestock raising in the West will "leave the Argentine Pampas behind," and lends credence to Fawcett's theory that Mato Grosso was the location for the lost civilization of Atlantis. Ibid., 157, 188.

¹⁰¹ Edgard Roquette-Pinto, *Rondônia*, 4ª Edição (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938); Botelho de Magalhães, *Pelos Sertões do Brasil*, 2ª Edição (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1941).

¹⁰² Nash, 493.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Nash, *O Brasil em 2044: um tarefa para a mocidade brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Casa do Estudante do Brasil, 1944), 64. The Students' House (*Casa do Estudante do Brasil*) publication was distributed to university students.

¹⁰⁵ Wolfgang Hoffman-Harnisch, *O Brasil que eu vi: retrato de uma potência tropical*, Trans. by Huberto Augusto (São Paulo: Companhia Melhoramentos, 1940), 159. Hoffman-Harnisch's book also formed part of the Combatants' Library.

¹⁰⁶ Tavares Bastos, *Cartas*.

¹⁰⁷ J.B. von Spix and C.F.P. von Martius, *Viagem pelo Brasil*, 4 vols., Ed. by B.F. Ramiz Galvão and Basilio de Magalhães, Trans. by Lúcia Furquim Lahmeyer (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1938); Karl von den Steinen, *Entre os aborígenes do Brasil Central*, Trans. by Egon Schaden (N.P.: n.p., 1894; reprint ed., São Paulo: Departamento de Cultura, 1940), 6.

¹⁰⁸ Cruls, *A Amazônia misteriosa: romance*, 5ª Edição (Rio de Janeiro: Zélio Valverde, 1944), 53.

¹⁰⁹ The military regime in the early 1970s published a comic book version of *Mysterious Amazonia*, a highly effective propaganda tool among illiterate and semi-literate citizens. Cruls, *A Amazônia misteriosa* (Brasília: INL, 1977). Cruls, a physician, had never actually been to the rain forest when he wrote the book. He did later make the trip to participate on Rondon's frontier Reconnaissance Commission. Cruls, *A Amazônia que eu vi*, 3ª Edição (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1945).

¹¹⁰ Lauro Palhano, *O Gororoba*, 2ª Edição (Rio de Janeiro: Irmãos Pongetti Editores, 1943), 9.

¹¹¹ As quoted by Barreto Filho, 135.

¹¹² Medleg Rodrigues, 99. In 1946, Vargas' successor, Gen. Eurico Dutra, tightened the rules by ordering that a domestically produced movie of "good quality," shot in Brazil, had to accompany any sequence of films of over one

-
- thousand total meters in length. In practical terms, state propaganda newsreels therefore proceeded every feature-length film in the country.
- 113 Barreto Filho, 148.
- 114 Ibid., 152.
- 115 "Atividades do DIP," 160. Brazil had 1600 movie houses at the time, so thirty-eight percent of them showed the CJB, most in major urban areas.
- 116 Jean-Claude Bernardet and Alcides Freire Ramos, *Cinema e história do Brasil* (São Paulo: Editora Contexto, 1988), 39.
- 117 Flávio Villela Ahmed, *Revolução dos espelhos: escritos sobre imagem, cinema e cultura no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica MEC Editora, 1990), 74.
- 118 Ibid.
- 119 Bernardet, 40. The author cites a Potemkin Village episode at the National Technical School (*Escola Técnica Nacional*) in which the DIP filmed trainees "operating" machines which they had no clue how to run.
- 120 *A Marcha para o Oeste, Cinejornal Brasileiro* I/133, DIP, 1940, CB.
- 121 Ibid.
- 122 Ibid.
- 123 *A excursão do Chefe do Governo ao Estado do Pará, Cinejornal Brasileiro* I/150, DIP, 1940, CB.
- 124 *O Chefe do Governo no Amazonas, Cinejornal Brasileiro* I/153, DIP, 1940, CB.
- 125 Ibid.
- 126 Ibid.
- 127 *A Marcha para o Oeste, Cinejornal Brasileiro* II/51, DIP, 1941, CB.
- 128 *A viagem do Presidente Getúlio Vargas ao Oeste, Cinejornal Brasileiro* II/55, DIP, 1941.
- 129 *CJB* II/51.
- 130 *O Presidente Getúlio Vargas no Oeste, Cinejornal Brasileiro* II/56, DIP, 1941, CB (silent).
- 131 *O Mês Nacional da Borracha, Cinejornal Brasileiro* III/8, DIP, 1943, CB (silent).
- 132 *O Esforço da guerra do Brasil, Cinejornal Brasileiro* III/92, DIP, 1944, CB.
- 133 *Sobre a Terra dos Chavantes, Cinejornal Brasileiro* IV/33, DIP, 1944, CB.
- 134 Ibid.
- 135 Ibid.
- 136 *Bandeirantes*, Dir. by Humberto Mauro, Ministério de Educação e Cultura, INCE, n.d., CB. The film is based on the work of Affonso de Taunay.
- 137 The most poorly acted scenes in *Bandeirantes* involve a depiction of the death of the slave raider Dias Paes. As the twitching bandeirante expires, a ghostly, smiling face is superimposed on the landscape (much like the one Brazilian television networks placed in the corner of the screen during Formula One champion Ayrton Senna's funeral in 1994).
- 138 *Marcha para o Oeste, Nº 3*, Text by Gioia Júnior, Michel Saddi Produções, n.d., CB (silent). Gioia Júnior now produces and serves as an on-air commentator for the Brazilian sensationalist news program *Aqui Agora* on the SBT network.

-
- 139 The progress documented in the film apparently stalled later. The municipal administration did not extend sewerage to the whole city until 1994, a long-awaited achievement met with much fanfare as part of the "New Century, New Capital" campaign.
- 140 *Marcha p o Oeste, Nº 5: Corumbá*, Michel Saddi Produções, n.d., CB (silent).
- 141 *Conheça a Amazônia , Nº 1: o Território do Guaporé*, William Schurz, n.d., CB (silent).
- 142 Elmano Henrique, "Brasileiros! Guardemos o que é nosso com todas as nossas forças," Poster.
- 143 Brazil, Presidência da República, DIP, *Relatório* (Rio de Janeiro: DIP, 1941), 6.
- 144 "Brasil Novo: 1930-1940," Collection of picture postcards, DIP, 1940, FGV, CPDOC, Subsetor Audiovisual.
- 145 Ibid..
- 146 Hadamovsky, 55
- 147 Fabregat Cúneo, 81.
- 148 Ibid.
- 149 Carvalho to Vargas, 8 December 1934, 3, FGV, CPDOC, Acervo Getúlio Vargas, Rolo 4.
- 150 Aranha to Vargas 9 April 1935, 6-7, FGV, CPDOC, Acervo Getúlio Vargas, Rolo 4.
- 151 Fontes to Vargas, 13 December 1940, AN, Arquivo Agência Nacional, Correspondência Geral, Lata 185.
- 152 R. Fernandes e Silva, "O Serviço de Rádiodifusão Rural," *Cultura Política*, March-May 1945, 271.
- 153 Eventually, the *Hora do Brasil* did not run every day. The DIP broadcast three hundred and one episodes in 1943 and two hundred and fifty-three in the first ten months of 1944. "Atividades do DIP," 178. The program survives to this day under the name "Brazil's Voice" (*Voz do Brasil*), still popularly known as *Hora do Brasil* and carried at the same time, five days a week.
- 154 Photographs from May 1941 show a soundtrack on the morro of Salgueiro. The crowd gathered to listen is entirely Afro-Brazilian or mixed-race (*pardo*).
- 155 "A 'Hora do Brasil' é a hora da unidade nacional," *A Manhã*, 13 October 1942, 3.
- 156 Maia, *Na vanguarda*, 117.
- 157 Barreto Filho, 167.
- 158 "Atividades do DIP," 178.
- 159 Brazil, Ministério da Agricultura, Serviço de Informação Agrícola, *Marcha para o Oeste (Conferências Culturais), 1ª Série*, Ed. by Harold Daltro (Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia São Benedicto, 1940). Edited by Harold Daltro, the lectures were published beginning in 1940. The last edition was published in 1944. Brazil, Ministério da Agricultura, Serviço de Informação Agrícola, *Marcha para o Oeste (Conferências Culturais), 5ª Série*, Ed. by Harold Daltro (Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia São Benedicto, 1944).
- 160 Harold Daltro, "A Batalha da Terra," 27 September 1943, In *Marcha, 5ª Série*, 6.
- 161 "A instalação do Curso de Estudos da Amazônia," *A Manhã*, 11 December 1941, 11.
- 162 "Inicia-se o 'Mês Nacional da Borracha," *A Manhã*, 1 June 1943, 2.
- 163 An angry Assis Ribeiro reprimanded the Chief of the Radio Division by telegram. The SEMTA head ordered that his subordinate put an end to the

-
- transmission of "such jokes" and immediately fire the person responsible.
 Hyder Corrêia Lima, Retransmission of a telegram from Assis Ribeiro, 17 May 1943, AN, Arquivo Particular Assis Ribeiro, Caixa 04.
- 164 Tota, 46.
- 165 Velloso, *Os intelectuais*, 34.
- 166 "Marcha para o Oeste" was recorded on 6 October 1938, and released as Victor Disco #34388-b in December of that year. Jairo Severiano, *Getúlio Vargas e a Música Popular* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora da Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1983), 28-29.
- 167 Ibid. The original lyrics run as follows:
- | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------|
| (Eu vou. . . (ô. . .) | Mas, ao voltar |
| (Para o Oeste | Hei de te dar |
| (Adeus. . . (eus. . .) | Em troca de um beijo, um milhão. |
| (Meu amor | |
| (O beijo que me deste | Teus lindos sonhos de agora |
| (Levarei para onde for | Realidade serão |
| | Quando eu voltar |
| Levo o teu beijo comigo | Para pagar |
| Guardado em meu coração. | Teu beijo que vale um milhão. |
- 168 "Brasil Brasileiro!" was recorded in June 1942 and released in August as Victor Disco #34951-a. Ibid., 33.
- 169 Ibid., 33.
- 170 Lenharo, *Sacralização*, 1.
- 171 Ibid.
- 172 Barthes, 149.
- 173 Ibid.
- 174 Lenharo, *Sacralização*, 40.
- 175 DIP programs never approached the mass market influence of the soap operas, which featured the participatory element of fan clubs. For an examination of pre-television commercial media in Brazil, see Goldfeder.
- 176 Alves de Oliveira to Ludovico, 4 August 1942, APL.

Chapter Eleven: "After Amazonia, I Don't Know. . ." ¹

[It is] not to be wondered at that myth and magic have still such an overwhelming influence in political thought and action. Small groups try to enforce their wishes and fantastic ideas on whole nations and the whole of the body politic. They may succeed for a while; they may even achieve great triumphs. But their triumph will always be ephemeral.²

-- Ernst Cassirer

If it is a crime to pursue ambitiously the greatness of one's country, then I plead guilty.³

-- Juscelino Kubitschek

Logically, the state cannot perform miracles.⁴

-- Beneval de Oliveira

From 1930 to 1945, Getúlio Vargas re-kindled the colonial "sense of the West,"⁵ the legacy of the bandeirantes and Portuguese clerics who traversed South America, and married it to European-style corporatism. Along with the soldier, the bureaucrat replaced the priest of the colonial period as the chief pioneer of this reinvigorated crusade. The resultant state-sponsored ideology, the March to the West, has influenced Brazilian policy-makers for five decades.

Vargas and his team of planners and propagandists, following upon Euclides da Cunha, conceived of their country as two distinct entities, one coastal and one interior, and they sought to unite the disparate regions into a whole through a campaign of westward

expansion and the implantation of capitalism. Getúlio moved from the policy of defining territory and defending resources in the West that Rio Branco had established to one of occupying territory and using resources. The March to the West resembles the work of U.S. historian Frederick Jackson Turner in its quest to use the frontier as a mythic representation of renewal, "regeneration, and rebirth,"⁶ and the Estado Novo looked to the North American Manifest Destiny movement of the nineteenth century as a model.

Yet the mythology of the March to the West in Brazil had another, more sinister function that Turner's writings did not. Coming under Alaôr Caffé Alves' rubric of "ideology as illusion," the New State drive to develop the Brazilian hinterland served "to avoid reforms that would result in the destruction of the privileges of the dominant classes."⁷ The March to the West, as a central part of Vargas' bonapartist strategy of governance, offered benefits to each partner in the Estado Novo coalition while avoiding profound, structural change in the Brazilian economy or society. Rural landowners received cheap labor and increased land values, urban capitalists saw the internal market expanded, and the working classes were seduced by the promise of security and material improvement in the interior. The president used his western policies to bolster a new landed elite, centered particularly in Goiás and Mato Grosso and focused on domestic production, as a counterweight to the traditional, export-oriented, monocultural agricultural elites of the Northeast and Southeast. As economist Américo L. Barbosa de

Oliveira noted in 1946, the New State did not aim the rhetoric of the March at migrants as much as at "all the latifundiários and speculators of the nation-- those of the West, who counted on the possible boost in value of their patrimonies, and those of the East, who acquired the certainty of the preservation of the *status quo*."8

On a political level, the March to the West met its goals. Aside from a few empty promises made at public rallies, Vargas avoided the question of agrarian reform for his entire fifteen-year term. At the same time, the ubiquitous propaganda campaign did encourage hundreds of thousands of Brazilians to move into the interior, and the states and territories of the West posted impressive population gains from 1940 to 1950. The March also helped Vargas to undercut the regional power bases of the traditional coronels by pushing rural residents to switch their allegiance from what Otávio Guilherme Velho calls "the paternalistic image of the concrete patron to the ultimate, mythic patron, the government."9 By promoting the values of "fraternity[,] solidarity,"10 and land ownership, the campaign also acted as a counterweight to the radicalism of the Prestes Column, another march which had passed through the same areas in the 1920s.

The March to the West was a calculated, authoritarian scheme designed to fix the growing population of Brazil in areas more easily controlled by the state and the military than urban shantytowns. As Nelson Werneck Sodré recognized as early as 1941, the tragedy of land distribution in Brazil meant that "free land in this most ample

region [of the West] is, by a singular coincidence, a myth."¹¹ Instead of breaking up the latifundia, Vargas turned the landless into "pioneers" by pushing them onto marginal land farther West, a tactic adopted on a larger scale by the military regime in the 1960s and 1970s.

This dissertation agrees with Neidi Esterici that the March was a parallel strategy to the industrial labor laws and government-controlled unions that Vargas instituted, a cooptation of possibly unstable or unruly groups through state intervention.¹² Just as the Estado Novo skillfully created the impression that it empowered the urban working classes while actually muzzling them, the March to the West used the false promise of land reform to rein in growth in the cities by shipping migrants to the interior.

Yet, for all its sophisticated propaganda, the March to the West under the Estado Novo achieved few material victories. The most conspicuous failure of the program was its inability to halt the exodus from rural areas into the coastal cities. Like King Canute ordering back the tide, Vargas vainly tried to prevent millions of Brazilians from abandoning the land for the "mirage of the megalopolis."¹³ The March to the West made no impact on the rural-to-urban migration, and the pace of demographic change actually accelerated during the 1940s. Brazilians ignored the ubiquitous government publicity and continued to stream into the cities. In 1950, twenty percent of the nation's population lived in urban communities larger than 20,000 people, up from sixteen percent a decade before.¹⁴ Rio de Janeiro

doubled in size over the decade, to 3,025,000 people.¹⁵ São Paulo, meanwhile, in the 1940s began its trend of explosive growth that has not abated: the city ballooned to 2,198,096 inhabitants by 1950 and its population was increasing at an annual rate of five percent.¹⁶

While the Estado Novo fell in 1945, and the March to the West did not keep Brazil a rural nation, future governments maintained Vargas' vision of the Brazilian West. The dictator concocted a new mythology about the interior, to replace the "savage fables"¹⁷ that the caboclos created for themselves and to support his ideology of western expansion. As current Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso has written, the March themes of "external greed, abundant riches, and. . . poverty and overcrowding in other regions"¹⁸ have dominated the nation's discourse about the Oeste since the New State. Getúlio bequeathed to his successors an "infallible demagogic pretext"¹⁹ that has driven domestic policies for over four decades.

In the early 1950s, Vargas accelerated the nationalization plans that he had begun under the Estado Novo, and he folded the March to the West into this more general campaign during his second administration. The discovery of huge deposits of manganese and iron ore in Amapá in 1945 gave state-led development of the West a new urgency, since policy-makers considered these riches far too important to be left in private hands.

Just as he expropriated the petroleum, coal, and electrical power sectors during his term, Vargas established the SPVEA to

nationalize Amazonia. The question was no longer if El Dorado existed in the rain forest, but how the state would tap the great wealth. Government planners used the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States as a model, a program run by a small group of technicians that could rally public support to the project of developing the West.²⁰

In the new Cold War atmosphere, the perceived strategic importance of the region also revived the traditional nationalistic and xenophobic rhetoric about the West. In the early 1950s, however, the enemy was no longer the Americans or the Japanese, but the Soviets. Former president Arthur Bernardes and a vocal group of extreme nationalists and military officers scuttled Brazil's participation in the Treaty of Iquitos, a pact that would have created an international scientific institute in Manaus to study the rain forest under the auspices of the United Nations. Despite strong backing from Rondon and politicians in Western states, opponents successfully portrayed the agreement as an international communist conspiracy to abscond with the riches of Amazonia, steal Brazilian territory, and destabilize Brazilian democracy. Such paranoia, reminiscent of the "muse of terror"²¹ that Tavares Bastos had denounced a century earlier in the debate over navigation on the Amazon, has continued to color Brazilians' perceptions of the West, especially among the armed forces. Since the 1950s, therefore, Brazilian politicians and military leaders have suspiciously interpreted any initiative backed by the international community or

presented as "for the good of mankind" as a Trojan Horse for the imperialist intentions of the First World.

Thanks in part to the relentless propaganda of the DIP, Brazil in the 1950s also experienced a rise in interest in the interior among intellectuals and the general public, a movement called *sertanegismo*.²² Yet president Juscelino Kubitschek subtracted the romanticism of the nineteenth century from the equation: amid the massive, hurried construction in the West, Brazil in the jet age would have no room for the pastoral.

Kubitschek appropriated Vargas' slogans and declared "a new March to the West."²³ The physician-turned-politician from Minas resurrected many of the incomplete Estado Novo projects in the West. Where the FBC and the Rubber Battle had failed Kubitschek would succeed through sheer will and inflationary spending. Surpassing Vargas' travel record, the athletic, telegenic president jetted across the western skies to inaugurate public works, fell trees, and operate bulldozers. These trips would prove by far the most effective propaganda about the West, for a generation of Brazilians grew up watching their leader attack the forces of nature in person.

Kubitschek increased the centralization and bureaucratization of the March that Vargas had begun. By the 1950s, the concept of planned economic development had won wide acceptance in Brazil, and the president created during his term a "state technostructure"²⁴ of agencies to plot the course of progress in the West along a rationalized course. The SPVEA grew in size, and the bureaucracy

advocated industrialization along with resource extraction in the interior. Kubitschek also imitated Vargas in welcoming foreign capital into the West. Where the Estado Novo had tolerated Ford in the rain forest without closely cooperating with the company, beginning in the 1950s the state served as an active facilitator and even partner for multinational corporations in the West, a strategy called "development with interdependence."²⁵

On a political level, the revival of the March to the West cemented the same alliance under Kubitschek as it had under Vargas. Only one issue, western development, could knit together "the interests of the commercial bourgeoisie, the [new] rural oligarchy, and the traditional [urban] middle classes" into the coalition known as *Juscelinismo*.²⁶ This pact depended upon increasing exports, the preservation of the status quo on the land, a certain socio-economic mobility for workers,²⁷ and the expansion of the internal market through the inclusion of "non-consumers."²⁸ Only a renewed (and more successful) March to the West could meet all four of these goals. Like the inflationary spiral touched off during the same period, western development became "an almost miraculous way of temporising a situation in which [social forces], by playing an elaborate, largely nonviolent game, in which everybody won sham victories,. . . avoided a collision course."²⁹

Instead of relying on a number of small, dispersed projects as Vargas had, the president employed one "radical expression"³⁰ to encapsulate the March to the West: the construction of Brasília. In

the 1950s, Brazil forever ceased to be a rural society, and the new capital represented this "victory of the city over the countryside."³¹ Brasília ensured that the urbanized "culture of the city" would influence development in even the remote interior.³²

Without Goiânia and the FBC, however, Brasília would never have been politically or practically possible. The same emerging agro-industrial elite that had supported Ludovico and Vargas rallied behind the proposition of moving the capital to Goiás. Goiânia had demonstrated that the Planalto could support rapid urbanization, and the accompanying propaganda sold Brazilians on the idea of life in the interior. Furthermore, the construction of the new city came about only because of the centralized federal apparatus created by Vargas; only the expanded bureaucracy had control of the fiscal resources and boasted a structure equal to carrying out the idea.³³

With the building of Brasília, the March to the West became a commercial enterprise. Expanding on the model of the Direction West Crusade and the ICN under Vargas, the new capital was a huge money-maker for banks and large corporations. The construction turned into a patronage sump vast enough to persuade even those initially opposed to the move that the possibilities for enrichment outweighed any ideological qualms or partisan quarrels. Furthermore, the shift increased both the wealth and political power of the fazendeiros of the Center West.³⁴ Like the March to the West under Vargas, the movement of the capital "depended on predominant clientelistic and paternalistic relationships"³⁵ and

further postponed the structural socio-economic reforms that the nation needed.

Designed as a calculated confidence booster, Brasília (along with the World Cup victories of 1958 and 1962) changed the national mood to euphoria. Kubitschek himself recognized the symbolic power of the gesture: "A mystique was created. A psychological state. A collective consciousness."³⁶ Brasília seized the public imagination as no project under Vargas ever had: none of the magazines, posters, radio broadcasts, or news reels of the DIP sold the idea of the West as the new capital did.

The new city served as a "magic trampoline"³⁷ for further westward expansion. Kubitschek accomplished what the Estado Novo could not, as tens of thousands of Brazilians abandoned the coast for the frontier during the 1950s. The president accompanied his enormous triumph with a crash program of road-building in the interior. While Vargas' FBC had managed to cut only a few hundred kilometers' worth of highway through the forest, in three years Kubitschek's engineers slashed roads thousands of kilometers in length from Brasília to Belém and Acre. Rondon had advocated laying down rails to open up the Oeste, but Kubitschek ignored this advice and simply widened the explorer's telegraph paths to accomodate caravans of trucks.

During the 1950s, changes within the Brazilian armed forces also affected the March to the West. As Henry Nash Smith has written about the United States, Brazil has at least since the

nineteenth century seen itself as "a continental nation,"³⁸ and the Second World War confirmed for officers that their country stood unchallenged as the regional superpower in South America. By the 1950s, a generation "originating in the tenente movement, active in the Revolt of 1930 and the Estado Novo, and profoundly marked by service in the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB)" had risen to prominence in the military command.³⁹ These officers, centered at the Superior War College (*Escola Superior da Guerra*-- ESG), invented their own ideology, the National Security Doctrine, influenced by geopolitical thought and steeped in the atmosphere of the Cold War. The doctrine reevaluated the role of the military in society and gave its adherents a certainty that the armed forces were "the instrument of a strategic vision."⁴⁰

The development and settlement of the West became one of the tenets of this National Security Doctrine. Just as Vargas had fallen in 1945 because the military had become restless with dictatorship at home after defending liberty abroad, so the war led the armed forces to believe that Brazil had to defend her sovereignty on the frontier after sending troops to liberate Europe. The Second World War convinced military thinkers of the danger of leaving large swaths of the country unoccupied. ESG manuals declared "territorial integrity" one of the armed forces' "permanent national objectives" and labeled the Oeste one of the "Strategic Areas" of Brazil.⁴¹ Military ideologues decried the continuing "disorderly rural exodus"⁴² as dangerous to national security and maintained that "the

peopling of the interior is the gravest geopolitical question for Brazil today."⁴³

Kubitschek urged the armed forces to take up the cause of development, and the officers did so with a passion after seizing power in 1964. The March to the West found its fullest expression under the generals. As part of a broader process that Mônica Pimenta Velloso has termed "historical recycling,"⁴⁴ the military regime appropriated the rhetoric of westward expansion as its own agenda.

While Vargas often emphasized that western development was a long-term undertaking with future benefits, the generals proclaimed that the future in the interior had arrived. Military technocrats, in combination with the bureaucracy, resurrected many projects begun or proposed by the Estado Novo and expanded them. Obsessed by the gigantic, the state planners implemented mammoth development schemes in the West, such as the Transamazônica Highway and the National Integration Plan, based on models from the 1930s and 1940s. The generals were confident that the discovery of new resources could indefinitely obscure the need for reform and redistribution.

Accelerating the pattern begun by Kubitschek, after 1966 the military also opened the way for the entrance of large-scale national and multinational capital into the West. By the end of the 1960s, the dictatorship viewed corporate know-how and the "entrepreneurial spirit" as "essential" for the conquest of the interior.⁴⁵ The Vargas

model of maintaining support through patronage politics in the West widened to include corporate clients from around the world.

An even more graphic change in the March to the West under the military concerned migration. Vargas and his apologists hoped that Brazilians would be "seized by the sacred and exalting power of the events recollected"⁴⁶ in the Estado Novo pioneer mythology, but a limited number lived the myths by moving into the interior. The military, however, used its totalitarian control, in the words of ESG ideologue Gen. Golbery do Couto e Silva, "to stimulate towards the Northwest a wave of colonists"⁴⁷ through various incentives and resettlement programs.

Furthermore, after 1970 coffee-destroying frosts in São Paulo and Paraná and greater mechanization and efficiency in agriculture created a large population of landless migrants. In the 1970s and early 1980s, engineers paved over the track of Rondon's old telegraph line and hacked other roads through the forest, which became "roaring expressways to Amazonia,"⁴⁸ jammed with hundreds of thousands desperate to believe the government propaganda about the El Dorado in the West. The schemes wreaked ecological havoc on a landscape unprepared for sudden demographic transformation.

This booming exodus, a "spatial reorganization of misery and poverty in Brazil,"⁴⁹ continues without pause. American geographer Roy Nash opined in 1925 that "the very character of [the West] decrees that this frontier might be social rather than individual."⁵⁰

Despite fifty years of effort on the part of Brazilian governments to make the conquest of the interior collective or corporativist, the individual sacrifices of pioneers at Serra Pelada, in Rondônia, and in Roraima are the real story of the March to the West. In a tragic irony, the very programs designed to slow the rural-to-urban migration and tie people to the land by encouraging them to settle in the Oeste have born a bitter fruit: the cities of the West, Belém, Manaus, Pôrto Velho, are now experiencing their own influx of displaced and hopeless, the sons, daughters, and grandchildren of the original migrants. As Barbosa de Oliveira prophesied in 1946, "the descendants of the legendary bandeirantes of other eras [have been] shipwrecked by civilization."⁵¹

A happier legacy of the March to the West than the gaunt and weathered faces of the failed colonists in Amazonia can be seen in the wheat, cotton, and soya fields of the Center-West. Fifty years of experimentation have produced one of the world's most remarkable and richest agricultural frontiers on the *cerrado* of Goiás, Mato Grosso, and Mato Grosso do Sul.⁵² Just as Henry Nash Smith has written about the United States, where "[t]he forces which were to control the future did not originate in the picturesque Wild West beyond the agricultural frontier, but in the domesticated West that lay behind it,"⁵³ so in Brazil the Center West is now the new economic and political power center around which the states farther out, Rondônia, Acre, and Amazonas, now orbit.

Over the past five decades, the March to the West has comprised part of an ideological device in Brazilian politics that historian Marilena Chauí has termed the "dramaturgy of crisis."⁵⁴ This recurring idea of a structural crisis in Brazilian society, an imminent peril from which the nation must save itself by rallying around a particular cause, undergirded the nationalistic and mythic rhetoric of the Estado Novo. Every subsequent government has adopted the tactic. Designed "paradoxically" to "enumerate political and social conflicts in order to better hide them," the strategy of the manufactured crisis allows a regime to present a policy or set of policies as "a panacea for all ills" without undertaking structural reforms.⁵⁵ The March to the West, with its warnings of the imminent perils of foreign encroachment and urban overcrowding, has been one of the primary stage sets for this dramatization in Brazil. Recalling a phenomenon common to other twentieth century authoritarian societies, the "crisis" of the Brazilian West "has sustained the creation of heroic origin myths, destined to legitimize scarcely heroic bourgeois,"⁵⁶ such as Vargas and João Alberto.

Though the propaganda of the Getúlio Vargas' March to the West ended in 1945, the campaign lives on in Brazil. The political philosopher Henri Lefebvre has indicated that "the most completely elaborated ideological representations find their way into language, become a permanent part of it. They supply vocabularies [and] turns of thought which are also turns of phrase."⁵⁷ The March to the West fits this definition, for the rhetoric of Vargas and his apologists

survives among bureaucrats, military officials, and politicians in Brazil even in the 1990s.

More important, however, the central notions of the March to the West have become incorporated into the dreams and conventional wisdom of the general Brazilian public. Like the circularity between the culture of the dominant classes and that of the subdominant classes that Carlo Ginzburg has found in early modern Italy, in Brazil the people absorbed Vargas' presentation of the March but at the same time reinterpreted those concepts in accordance with their own culture (even subconsciously) so that the ideas met their personal needs and goals. The real genius of the March to the West under Vargas was not that it completed any particular project, but that it held a mirror up to the nation and permitted a generation of Brazilians to see its reflection in the frontier. All of those pioneers who uprooted themselves for Amazonia and the Center-West in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s are proof of the campaign's long-term influence. The March to the West, in the words of *A Manhã*, remains "a brilliant metaphor in service to the national imagination."⁵⁸

A. Bartlett Giamatti, lamenting the loss of the Renaissance sensibilities captured by the epic poets, once declared, "We have lost the earthly paradise once again, not simply as a state of joy, but also as an object of hope."⁵⁹ With the March to the West, Getúlio Vargas resurrected the idea of paradise on earth and restored it as a beacon

of hope for millions. Brazil has waited for the fulfillment of that promise ever since.

-
- 1 Ricardo, *Marcha*, 4ª Edição, 644.
 - 2 Cassirer, "Technique," 266.
 - 3 Juscelino Kubitschek, *Quatro Anos* (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1960), 30. The book is a reprint of a speech Kubitschek gave on the fourth anniversary of his inauguration, 1 February 1960.
 - 4 Beneval de Oliveira, "Fases da economia destrutiva e o problema da ocupação do solo," *Cultura Política*, April 1943, 50.
 - 5 Tocantins, *Rio Branco*, 39.
 - 6 Smith, 253.
 - 7 Caffé Alves, 46.
 - 8 Américo L. Barbosa de Oliveira, *O desenvolvimento planejado da economia brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1946), 64.
 - 9 Velho, *Frentes de expansão*, 130.
 - 10 Lenharo, *Sacralização*, 73.
 - 11 Werneck Sodré, *Oeste*, 128.
 - 12 Esterici, "O mito," 88.
 - 13 Dom Carlos Carmelo Vasconcelos Mota, "Brasília: impulso unificador e civilizador do Brasil," *Brasília*, July 1957, 15.
 - 14 Wilkie, 89.
 - 15 *Ibid.*, 96.
 - 16 Richard M. Morse, *From Community to Metropolis: A Biography of São Paulo* (New York: Octagon Books, 1974), 338.
 - 17 Peregrino Júnior, 21.
 - 18 Cardoso, 193.
 - 19 Rosário Fusco, "História e Passado," In *O Pensamento Político*, 115.
 - 20 SPVEA bureaucrats particularly admired the TVA for its "ample campaign of psychological preparation among the North American people, who shortly saw themselves, without knowing how, as interested in the progress [of the TVA] as if it were a company in which they owned stock." Adriano Menezes, *O problema de colonização da Amazônia* (Rio de Janeiro: SPVEA, 1958), 19. Menezes continued, "When the same has happened in Brazil regarding the economic valorization of Amazonia, then we will have our work completed."
 - 21 Pontes, 199.
 - 22 Freyre, 12.
 - 23 Kubitschek, *Discursos proferidos no terceiro ano do mandato presidencial, 1958* (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1958), 17.
 - 24 Ianni, 315.
 - 25 *Ibid.*, 190.
 - 26 Maria Victoria Benevides, "O governo Kubitschek: a esperança como fator de desenvolvimento," in Angela de Castro Gomes, Ed., *O Brasil de JK* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora da Fundação Getúlio Vargas/CPDOC, 1991), 12.
 - 27 Marcelo Penteado Coelho, "Brasília e a Ideologia do Desenvolvimento," *Dissertação do Mestrado*, [Universidade de Brasília], n.d., 147. Coelho calls the Kubitschek coalition a "temporal asymmetry" whose discrete elements depended upon one another.

-
- 28 Medleg Rodrigues, 4.
- 29 Celso Lafer, "The Planning Process and the Political System in Brazil: A Study of Kubitschek's Target Plan (1956-1961)," Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 1970, 215.
- 30 Coelho, 77.
- 31 Ianni, 177.
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 José William Vesentini, *A capital da geopolítica* (São Paulo: Editora Ática S/A, 1986), 95.
- 34 Center-West large-scale farmers and ranchers remain one of the strongest blocs in the Brazilian Congress, powerful enough in 1994 to push a bill through the Chamber of Deputies that forgave all farm debts as far back as 1979!
- 35 Medleg Rodrigues, 197.
- 36 Kubitschek, *Por que construí Brasília* (Rio de Janeiro: Bloch Editores S/A, 1975), 102.
- 37 Vasconcelos, 15.
- 38 Smith, 4.
- 39 Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira, "A doutrina de segurança nacional: pensamento político e projeto estratégico," In Rizzo de Oliveira, Ed., *Militares: pensamento e ação política* (Campinas, SP: Papirus, 1987), 64-65.
- 40 Ibid.
- 41 Antônio de Arruda, *A Escola Superior de Guerra: história de sua doutrina*, 2ª Edição (São Paulo: Edições GRD, 1983), 80, 282.
- 42 Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1967), 48. Although not published until the 1960s, the contents of the book were divulged as lectures and essays in the 1950s, especially from 1952 to 1955, when General Couto e Silva taught at the ESG. Couto e Silva, the most influential of the ESG ideologues, had a career path typical of the military leaders of the 1964-1985 dictatorship: he participated in the quelling of the 1932 Paulista Rebellion, served in the FEB, worked in the army high command (Estado Maior) in the 1950s, and spent a year as the chief-of-staff to the head of the National Security Council in the early 1960s. After the coup he was the first head of the National Intelligence Service (*Serviço Nacional de Inteligência*-- SNI), the regime's secret police.
- 43 Poli Djalma Coelho, *Aspectos Fundamentais do problema da mudança da capital para o Planalto Central* (Rio de Janeiro: Comissão de Estudos para a localização da nova capital, 1947), 19.
- 44 Velloso, *Os intelectuais*, 50.
- 45 Cardoso, 156.
- 46 Eliade, 19.
- 47 Couto e Silva, 48.
- 48 Margolis, 125.
- 49 Milton Hatoum, *Amazonas: palavras e imagens de um rio entre ruínas* (São Paulo: Livraria Diadorim, 1979), 38.

-
- 50 Nash, "Será conquistável a Amazônia?," *Boletim da União Panamericana*, October 1925, 717.
- 51 Barbosa de Oliveira, 67.
- 52 See Margolis, 230-254 for a trenchant exposition of the agricultural miracle in the Centro-Oeste.
- 53 Smith, 123.
- 54 Chauí, 148.
- 55 Ibid., 127-128. Chauí explains, "The crisis is used so that there emerges among social groups a sense of a danger that threatens everyone equally, gives them a sense of community of interests and destiny, and leads them to accept the flag of salvation of a supposedly homogeneous society." Ibid., 129.
- 56 Randolph Stern, "Metamorphoses d'une notion," *Communications Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales* (Paris: n.p., n.d.), 7, as quoted in Chauí, 148.
- 57 Lefebvre, 72.
- 58 "Uma admirável administração que traduz o sentido renovador do atual regime brasileiro," *A Manhã*, 19 April 1944, 17.
- 59 A. Bartlett Giamatti, *The Earthly Paradise and the Renaissance Epic* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 360.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Material

1. Arquivo Histórico Estadual de Goiás (AHEGO), Goiânia
 - I- Arquivo do Governo de Pedro Ludovico Teixeira
 - II- Arquivo do Departamento de Propaganda e Expansão Econômico
2. Arquivo do Itamarati (AI), Rio de Janeiro
 - I- Arquivo Histórico
 - A) Parte I: Correspondência
 - a) Ministérios e Repartições Federais
Ministério da Viação
Telegramas, 1913-1925
Maço 305 3 9
 - b) Diversos no Interior
Agências de Publicidade
Ofícios Recibidos e Expedidos
Maço 313 1 20
 - B) Documentos Históricos, 2ª Série
 - a) Navegação Fluvial
Rio Amazonas
Lata 256
 - C) Arquivo Particular do Barão do Rio Branco
 - a) Diversos
Discursos
Lata 876
3. Arquivo Nacional (AN), Rio de Janeiro
 - I- Arquivo Agência Nacional
 - A) Correspondência Geral
Lata 185
 - II- Arquivo Particular Afonso Pena
 - A) Excursão Presidencial
 - a) Correspondência Ativa
Caixa 6
 - III- Arquivo Particular M.A. Teixeira de Freitas
Caixas 4, 18, 19, 49, 58

- IV- Arquivo Particular Paulo Assis Ribeiro
Caixas 04, 05
- V- Fundo Secretaria da Presidência da República (SPR)
 - A) Governos Estaduais
Latas 14, 19, 21-22, 97-99, 181-183, 325, 390, 460
- VI- Seção Iconográfica
 - A) Albuns Fotográficos
- 4. Arquivo Pedro Ludovico (APL), Goiânia
 - I- Pastas 1930-1945
 - II- Acervo Fotográfico
- 5. Arquivo Público do Distrito Federal (APDF), Brasília
 - I- Projeto "Memória da Construção de Brasília"
 - A) Depoimentos
- 6. Cinemateca Brasileira (CB), São Paulo
 - I- Cinejornal Brasileiro
Vols. I-IV
 - II- Curtametragens Nacionais
- 7. Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV), Rio de Janeiro
 - I- Centro para a Preservação de Documentos Históricos (CPDOC)
 - A) Acervo Getúlio Vargas
Rolos 2-7
 - B) Subsetor História Oral
Depoimentos
 - C) Subsetor Audiovisual
Cartões Postais
- 8. Library of Congress (LC), Washington, D.C.
 - I- Manuscript Division
 - A) Matthew Fontaine Maury Collection
Container IV
 - B) Microform Collection
Latin American and Iberian Pamphlets I: 1802-1950
Group III, Brazil
Reel 44

9. Museu da República (MdaR), Rio de Janeiro
I- Albuns Fotográficos

Newspapers

Brasil-Portugal (Rio de Janeiro), 1944
Correio da Manhã (São Paulo), 1940-1941
Correio Paulistano (São Paulo), 1927
Diário da Assembléia (Rio de Janeiro), 1946
Diário de Notícias (Rio de Janeiro), 1943
Diário Oficial, 1943
Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro), 1941-1945
Jornal do Comércio (Manaus), 1905
Jornal do Comércio (Rio de Janeiro), 1922-1930
O Estado do Pará (Belém), 1938
O Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo), 1943
A Manhã (Rio de Janeiro), 1941-1945
New York Times, 1995
O Radical (Rio de Janeiro), 1940

Magazines

Boletim do Ministério da Agricultura, 1940
Boletim da União Panamericana, 1925
O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã, 1940-1945
Brazil Today, 1941
Ciência Política, 1941
Cultura Política, 1941-1945
Estudos e Conferências, 1941-1944
Novas Diretrizes, 1938.
Oeste, 1941-1944
Panflêto, 1947
Revista Brasileira de Geografia, 1939-1942
Revista de Imigração e Colonização, 1942
Revista dos Estados, 1940
Vamos Ler, 1940

Works Cited

- Abreu, José Coelho da Gama e. Barão de Marajó. *A Amazônia: as províncias do Pará e Amazonas e o governo central do Brazil*. Lisbon: Typographia Minerva, 1883.
- . *As regiões Amazônicas: estudos chorographicos dos Estados do Gram Pará e Amazonas*. Lisbon: Imprensa de Libanio da Silva, 1895.
- Achilles, Francisco de Paula. *O Brasil em March*. 2ª Edição. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1943.
- Agassiz, Elizabeth Cary, Ed. *Louis Agassiz: His Life and Correspondence*. 2 vols. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Company, 1885.
- Agassiz, Louis. *A Journey in Brazil*. Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1868; reprint ed., New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969).
- Ahmed, Flávio Villela. *Revolução dos espelhos: escritos sobre imagem, cinema e cultura no Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica MEC Editora, 1990.
- Alberdi, Juan Bautista. *El Brasil ante la democracia de América*. Buenos Aires: n.p., 1866; reprint ed., Ediciones ELE, 1946.
- Alcântara Machado de Oliveira, José de. *Vida e morte do bandeirante*. 5ª Edição. São Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora S/A, 1972.
- Alliança Liberal. *Documentos da campanha presidencial*. Rio de Janeiro: Officinas Graphics Alba, 1930.
- Almeida, José Américo de. *A palavra e o tempo*. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1965.
- Almeida, Martins de. *Brasil errado*. 2ª Edição. Rio de Janeiro:

- Organização Simões, 1953.
- Altheide, David L. *Bureaucratic Propaganda*. Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 1980.
- Alves, Alaôr Caffé. *Estado e ideologia: aparência e realidade*. São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense S/A, 1987.
- Alves de Lima, José Custodio. *Recordações de homens e cousas do meu tempo*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Leite Ribeiro, 1926.
- Amado, Gilberto. *Rio-Branco*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1947.
- Amaral, Anselmo F. *Getúlio Vargas: continuador de uma idéia*. Porto Alegre: Martins Livreiro, 1984.
- Amaral, Azevedo. *O estado autoritário e a realidade nacional*. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1938.
- _____. *Getúlio Vargas: estadista*. Rio de Janeiro: Irmãos Pongetti, 1941.
- Andrade, Almir de. *Contribuição à história administrativa do Brasil*. 2 vols. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1950.
- Andrade, Jorge. *Panorama economico-financeiro do Amazonas*. Manaus: Imprensa Publica, 1939.
- Andrade, Onofre de. *Amazonia: esboço historico, geographia physica, geographia humana e ethnographia dp Rio Juruá*. Maceió: Casa Ramalho, 1937.
- Andrade, Teófilo de. *O Rio Paraná no roteiro da Marcha para o Oeste*. Rio de Janeiro: Irmãos Pongetti, 1941.
- Aranha, Oswaldo. *Fronteiras e limites (a política do Brasil)*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1940.
- Araújo de Lima, José Francisco. *Amazônia: a terra e o homem*. 2ª

- Edição. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1937.
- _____. *A situação economica do Amazonas, especialmente em face das pretensões americanas*. Rio de Janeiro: Typographia do *Jornal do Comércio*, 1923.
- Araújo Lima, Cláudio de. *Mito e realidade de Vargas*. 2ª Edição. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira S/A, 1955.
- Arruda, Antônio de. *A Escola Superior de Guerra: história de sua doutrina*. 2ª Edição. São Paulo: Edições GRD, 1983.
- Artiaga, Zoroastro. *Monografia corográfica e histórica da nova Capital de Goiaz*. Goiânia: Typografia e Encadernação Escola Tecnica de Goiânia, 1946.
- Ascensão, Vera Lúcia da, et. al., Ed. *A Revolução de 30: textos e documentos*. Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1982.
- Asmar, José. *Câmara Filho: o revoltoso que promoveu Goiás*. Goiânia: *O Popular*, 1989.
- Aureli, Willy. *Roncador: expedição da "Bandeira Piratininga."* Rio de Janeiro: Edições Cultura Brasileira S/A, 1939.
- _____. *Terra sem sombra*. São Paulo: Saraiva S/A, 1952.
- Azevedo, Raúl de. *No Amazonas: a viagem do Presidente Dr. Affonso Penna*. Manaus: M. Silva & C., 1906.
- Backheuser, Everardo. *A geopolítica geral e do Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1948.
- _____. *Problemas do Brasil: estrutura geopolítica*. Rio de Janeiro: Grupo Editor Omnia, 1933.
- Bandeira Duarte Filho, Oto Carlos. *Rondon: o bandeirante do século XX*. 2ª Edição. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Zelio Valverde, 1945.
- Barbosa de Oliveira, Américo L. *O desenvolvimento planificado da*

- economia brasileira*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1946.
- Barreto Filho, Mello. *Anchieta e Getúlio Vargas*. Rio de Janeiro: DIP, 1941.
- Barros, João Alberto Lins de. *Memórias de um revolucionário*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira S/A, 1953.
- _____. *Memórias de um revolucionário*. 2ª Edição (Editora Civilização Brasileira S/A, 1954).
- Barroso, Gustavo. *Espírito do século XX*. 2ª Edição. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira S/A, 1937.
- Barthes, Roland. *Mythologies*. Ed. and Trans. by Annette Lavers. New York: Hill and Wang, 1972.
- Bastos, Artur de Miranda. *Uma excursão ao Amapá*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1947.
- Bates, Henry Walter. *The Naturalist on the River Amazons*. London: J. Murray, 1863; reprint ed., New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1989.
- Bell, Whitfield J. Jr. "The Relation of Herndon and Gibbon's Exploration of the Amazon to North American Slavery, 1850-1855." *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. XIX, No. 4 (November 1939: 494-503).
- Benevides, Maria Victoria. "O governo Kubitschek: a esperança como fator de desenvolvimento." in Angela de Castro Gomes, Ed. *O Brasil de JK*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora da Fundação Getúlio Vargas/CPDOC, 1991: 9-22.
- Bernardet, Jean-Claude and Alcides Freire Ramos. *Cinema e História do Brasil*. São Paulo: Editora Contexto, 1988.
- Boff, Clodovis. "Sobre ideologia." In Clarêncio Neotti, Ed. *Comunicação e ideologia*. São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 1980: 29-32.

- Bomilcar, Álvaro. *A política no Brasil ou o Nacionalismo Radical*. Rio de Janeiro: Editores Leite Ribeiro & Maurillo, 1921.
- Borges, Durval Rosa. *Rio Araguaia: corpo e alma*. São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, 1987.
- Botelho de Magalhães, Amilcar Armando. *Impressões da Comissão Rondon*. 5ª Edição. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1942.
- _____. *Pelos Sertões do Brasil*. 2ª Edição. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1941.
- _____. *Rondon: uma relíquia da Pátria*. Curitiba, PA: Editora Guaíra Ltda, 1942.
- Bouças, Valentim F. "Prefácio" In Licurgo Ramos Costa. *Cidadão do Mundo*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora José Olympio, 1943: 7-26.
- Bourne, Richard. *Getulio Vargas of Brazil, 1883-1954: Sphinx of the Pampas*. London: Charles Knight & Co., Ltd., 1974.
- Braga, Belmiro. "A nossa terra." In Waldemiro Potsch. *O Brasil e suas riquezas: leitura pátria*. 16ª Edição. Rio de Janeiro: Ministério da Agricultura, Serviço de Informação Agrícola, 1941: 352.
- Brazil. Comissão de Linhas Telegráficas Estratégicas de Mato Grosso ao Amazonas. *Missão Rondon*. Rio de Janeiro: Typographia do *Jornal do Commercio*, 1916.
- _____. Comissão de Linhas Telegraphicas Estrategicas de Matto Grosso ao Amazonas. Serviço Sanitário. *Relatório*. By João Florentino Meira de Faria. Rio de Janeiro: Comissão de Linhas Telegraphicas Estrategicas de Matto Grosso ao Amazonas, 1916.
- _____. Congresso. Senado. *A concessão de Terras Amazonenses a japoneses*. Rio de Janeiro: A. Coelho Branco Filho Editor, 1937.

- _____. Congresso. Senado. Comissão de Constituição, Justiça, Educação, Cultura e Saúde Pública. *Parecer Nº 64 de 1936*. In Brazil. Congresso. Senado. *A concessão de Terras Amazonenses a japoneses*. Rio de Janeiro: A. Coelho Branco Filho Editor, 1937: 149-186.
- _____. Departamento da Guerra. *Relatório dos trabalhos realizados de 1900-1906*. By Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1949.
- _____. Estado de Goiás. Arquivo Histórico Estadual. *Decretos: Governo Pedro Ludovico Teixeira (Mudança da Capital), 1932-1933-1934-1935*. Goiânia: [Arquivo Histórico Estadual], n.d.
- _____. Estado de Goiás. Interventoria Federal. 1930-1933: *Relatório apresentado ao Ex.^{mo} S.^{nr} D.^r Getúlio Vargas, D.D. Chefe do Governo Provisório, e ao povo Goiano, pelo D.^r Pedro Ludovico Teixeira, Interventor Federal no Estado de Goiaz*. Goiaz: Imprensa Oficial, 1933.
- _____. Estado de Goiás. Interventoria Federal. *Goiânia: idealizada e fundada pelo Interventor Pedro Ludovico Teixeira; fotos dos atos oficiais e comemorativos da inauguração da cidade, 5-7-1942*. Photo Album. Goiânia: n.p., 1942.
- _____. Estado do Pará. Conselho Estadual de Cultura. *Paulino de Brito: obra comemorativa*. 2 vols. Belém, PA: Conselho Estadual de Cultura, 1970.
- _____. Estado do Pará. Interventoria Federal. *Interventoria Federal do Para*. Photo Album. Belém: n.p., 1943.
- _____. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. Conselho Nacional de Geografia. *Goiânia*. Rio de Janeiro: Serviço Gráfico do IBGE, 1942.
- _____. Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro. *General Couto de Magalhães*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1938.

- _____. Ministério da Agricultura. Serviço de Informação Agrícola. *Marcha para o Oeste (Conferências Culturais)*, 1ª Série. Ed. by Harold Daltro. Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia São Benedicto, 1940.
- _____. Ministério da Agricultura. Serviço de Informação Agrícola. *Marcha para o Oeste (Conferências Culturais)*, 5ª Série. Ed. by Harold Daltro. Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia São Benedicto, 1944.
- _____. Ministério da Viação. Directoria Geral dos Telegraphos; Departamento da Guerra. Divisão Geral da Engenharia. *Relatório*. By Rondon. 5 vols. Rio de Janeiro: Papelaria Luiz Macedo, 1912.
- _____. Municipalidade de Belém do Pará. Prefeitura Municipal. *A Amazônia agradecida: lembrança da visita do Presidente Getúlio Vargas a Belém do Pará em outubro do 1940*. Album of photos presented to Getúlio Vargas in March 1941. Belém, PA: Prefeitura Municipal de Belém do Pará, 1941.
- _____. Presidência da República. Coordenação da Mobilização Económica. Serviço Especial da Mobilização de Trabalhadores para a Amazônia. *Rumo à Amazônia, terra da fartura*. São Luiz, MA: Typografia Minerva, 1943.
- _____. Presidência da República. Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda. *As colônias agrícolas nacionais e a valorização do trabalhador brasileiro*. Rio de Janeiro: DIP, 1941.
- _____. Presidência da República. Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda. *Os Grandes Dias do Brasil Novo*. Rio de Janeiro: DIP, 1939.
- _____. Presidência da República. Fundação Brasil Central. *Fundação Brasil Central*. By João Alberto Lins de Barros. Rio de Janeiro: FBC, 1944.
- _____. Presidência da República. Fundação Brasil Central. *Aragarças: Plano de Urbanização*. [Rio de Janeiro]: [FBC], n.d.

- _____. Presidente, 1930-1945 (Getúlio Vargas). *Mensagens Presidenciais 1933-1937, Getúlio Vargas*. Brasília: Câmara dos Deputados, 1978.
- Brito, Paulino de. "O japiim: conto amazônico." In Brazil. Estado do Pará. Conselho Estadual de Cultura. *Paulino de Brito: obra comemorativa*. 2 vols. Belém, PA: Conselho Estadual de Cultura, 1970: 165-171.
- Buarque de Holanda, Sérgio, Gen. Ed. *Historia da Civilização Brasileira*. 3 Partes. Parte II: *O Brasil Republicano*. Ed. by Boris Fausto. 3 vols. vol. 2: *Sociedade e instituições*. 2^a Edição. São Paulo: DIFEL, 1990.
- _____. *Visão do Paraíso: os motivos edênicos no descobrimento e colonização de Brasil*. 4^a Edição. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1985.
- Burns, E. Bradford. *A History of Brazil*. 2nd Edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.
- _____. *Nationalism in Brazil: A Historical Survey*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968.
- Câmara, Jamie. *Os tempos da mudança*. Goiânia: n.p., 1967.
- Camargo, Aspásia A. de, et. al. *O golpe silencioso: as origens da república corporativa*. Rio de Janeiro: Rio Fundo Editora, 1989.
- Campos, Francisco. *O Estado Nacional e suas diretrizes*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1937.
- _____. *Os problemas do Brasil e as grandes soluções do novo regime*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1938).
- _____. "O Sentido Renovador da Revolução." In Brazil. Presidência da República. Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda. *Os Grandes Dias do Brasil Novo*. Rio de Janeiro: DIP, 1939: 35-56.

- Campos, Francisco Itami. *Coronelismo em Goiás*. Goiânia, GO: Editora da Universidade Federal de Goiás, 1983.
- Cardoso, Fernando Henrique and Geraldo Müller. *Amazônia: expansão do capitalismo*. São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1977.
- Carone, Edgard. *A República Nova (1930-1937)*. São Paulo: DIFEL, 1974.
- Carrazzoni, André. *Getúlio Vargas*. 2ª Edição. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1939.
- Cassirer, Ernst. *Symbol, Myth, and Culture*. Ed. by Donald P. Verene. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979.
- . "The Technique of Our Modern Political Myths." In Cassirer. *Symbol, Myth, and Culture*. Ed. by Donald P. Verene. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979: 242-267.
- Celso, Affonso. "José Vieira Couto de Magalhães: subsidios para uma biografia." In Brazil. IHGB. *General Couto de Magalhães*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1938.
- Chauí, Marilena. "Apontamentos para uma crítica da Ação Integralista Brasileira." In Marilena Chauí and Maria Sylvia Carvalho Franco. *Ideologia e mobilização popular*. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra/CEDEC, 1978: 17-150.
- . and Maria Sylvia Carvalho Franco. *Ideologia e mobilização popular*. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra/CEDEC, 1978.
- Chaul, Nasr N. Fayad. *A construção de Goiânia e a transferencia da capital*. Goiânia: Centro Editorial e Gráfico da Universidade Federal de Goiás, 1988.
- Coelho, Marcelo Penteado. "Brasília e a Ideologia do Desenvolvimento." Dissertação do Mestrado. [Universidade de Brasília], n.d.

- Corrêa, Luiz de Miranda. *A borracha da Amazônia e a II Guerra Mundial*. Manaus: Edições Governo do Estado do Amazonas, 1967.
- Corrêa Lima, José Octavio. *Em memória de Attilio Corrêa Lima*. Rio de Janeiro: Estúdio de Artes Gráficas C. Mendes Júnior, 1948.
- Costa, João Craveiro. *A conquista do deserto occidental*. 2ª Edição. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional; Brasília: Instituto Nacional do Livro, 1973.
- Costa, Emilia Viotti da. *The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985.
- Couto, Miguel. *Seleção social: campanha antinipônica*. Rio de Janeiro: n.p., 1930; reprint ed., Irmãos Pongetti Editores, 1942.
- Couto de Magalhães, Agenor. *Encantos do Oeste: um pedaço do Brasil onde o homem se identifica com a natureza*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1945.
- Couto de Magalhães, José Vieira. *O selvagem*. Rio: n.p., 1876; edição comemorativa do centenário da 1ª edição. São Paulo: Editora da USP, 1975.
- _____. *Viagem ao Araguaia*. 5ª Edição. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1946.
- Couto e Silva, Golbery do. *Geopolítica do Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1967.
- Cruls, Gastão. *A Amazônia misteriosa: romance*. 5ª Edição. Rio de Janeiro: Zélio Valverde, 1944.
- _____. *A Amazônia misteriosa*. Brasília: INL, 1977.
- _____. *A Amazônia que eu vi*. 3ª Edição. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1945.
- Cunha, Euclides da. *À margem da história*. Rio de Janeiro, n.p., 1909;

reprint ed., São Paulo: Editora Cultrix; Brasília: Instituto Nacional do Livro, 1975.

_____. *Um Paraíso Perdido: ensaios, estudos e pronunciamentos sobre a Amazônia*. Ed. by Leandro Tocantins. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio; Rio Branco: Fundação de Recursos Humanos da Cultura e do Desporto do Governo do Estado do Acre, 1986.

_____. *Rebellion in the Backlands*. Trans. by Samuel Putnam. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1944.

Daltro, Harold. "A Batalha da Terra," 27 September 1943. In Brazil. Ministério da Agricultura. Serviço de Informação Agrícola. *Marcha para o Oeste (Conferências Culturais)*, 5ª Série. Ed. by Harold Daltro. Rio de Janeiro: Tipografia São Benedicto, 1944: 10-12.

Dias Mendes, Armando. *A invenção da Amazônia*. Belém, PA: Universidade Federal do Pará, 1974.

Djalma Coelho, Poli. *Aspectos Fundamentais do problema da mudança da capital para o Planalto Central*. Rio de Janeiro: Comissão de Estudos para a Localização da Nova Capital, 1947.

Domenach, Jean-Marie. *La propagande politique*. Septième Édition. Paris: Pressés Universitaires de France, 1973.

Dos Passos, John. *Brazil on the Move*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963.

Dulles, John W.F. *Vargas of Brazil: A Political Biography*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1967.

Eco, Umberto. *Apocalittici e integrati: Comunicazioni di massa e teorie della cultura di massa*. II Edizione. Milan: Bompiani, 1965.

Eliade, Mircea. *Myth and Reality*. Trans. by Willard R. Trask. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963.

Ellis Júnior, Alfredo. *O bandeirismo paulista e o récuo do meridiano*. 3ª Edição. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938.

Espejo, Juan McBride. *Belaunde y la Amazonia Peruana*. Lima: n.p., 1966.

Esterci, Neide. "O mito da democracia no País das bandeiras: análise simbólica dos discursos sobre imigração e colonização do Estado Novo." Dissertação de Mestrado. Departamento de Antropologia do Museu Nacional. Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. 1972.

Fabregat Cúneo, Roberto. *Propaganda y sociedad*. Mexico City: Biblioteca de Ensayos Sociológicos, Universidad Nacional, 1961.

Fausto, Boris. *A Revolução de 1930: historiografia e história*. 13ª Edição. São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1991.

Ferreira Filho, Cosme. *A borracha na economia Amazônica*. Manaus: n.p., 1952.

Figueiredo, Huascar de. "A ditadura do deserto." In Aderson Magalhães, et. al. *Artigos de jornal*. Rio de Janeiro: SPVEA, 1959: 13-19.

Fonseca, Pedro Cezar Dutra. *Vargas: o capitalismo em construção, 1906-1954*. São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1989.

Fontes, Lourival. *Homens e multidões*. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1950.

_____. "Prefácio." In Wolfgang Hoffman-Harnisch. *O Brasil que eu vi: retrato de uma potência tropical*. Trans. by Huberto Augusto. São Paulo: Companhia Melhoramentos, 1940: v-x.

_____. and Glauco Carneiro. *A face final de Vargas: os bilhetes de Getúlio*. Rio de Janeiro: Edições O Cruzeiro, 1966.

Foresta, Ronald A. *Amazon Conservation in the Age of Development*. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1991.

Freitas, Venerando de. "Goiânia." In Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. Conselho Nacional de Geografia. *Goiânia*. Rio de Janeiro: Serviço Gráfico do IBGE, 1942: 57-66.

Fusco, Rosário. "História e Passado." In *O Pensamento Político do Presidente*. Rio de Janeiro: *Cultura Política*, 1943: 112-117.

Giamatti, A. Bartlett. *The Earthly Paradise and the Renaissance Epic*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).

Godói, Armando Augusto de. "Relatório apresentado ao Dr. Pedro Ludovico, Interventor no Estado de Goiás, sobre a mudança da atual capital para Campinas." In Godói. *A urbs e os seus problemas*. Rio de Janeiro: *Jornal do Comércio*, 1943: 209-230.

_____. *A urbs e os seus problemas*. Rio de Janeiro: *Jornal do Comércio*, 1943.

Goldfeder, Miriam. *Por trás das ondas da Rádio Nacional*. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1980.

Gomes, Angela Maria de Castro. "O Trabalhador Brasileiro." In Lúcia Lippi Oliveira, et. al. *Estado Novo: ideologia e poder*. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1982: 151-166.

_____. Ed. *O Brasil de JK*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora da Fundação Getúlio Vargas/CPDOC, 1991.

Gonçalves, Augusto César Lopes. *O Amazonas: esboço histórico, chorográfico e estatístico até o ano de 1903*. New York: Hugo J. Hanf, 1904.

Goycochêa, Luis Felipe de Castilhos. *O espírito militar na Questão Acreana*. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1941; reprint ed., Rio de Janeiro: Companhia Brasileira de Artes Gráficas, 1973.

_____. *Fronteiras e Fronteiros*. São Paulo: Companhia Editora

- Nacional, 1943.
- Gusmão, Clovis de. *Rondon*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora José Olympio, 1942.
- Hadamovsky, Eugen. *Propaganda and National Power*. Trans. by Alice Mavrogordato and Ilse de Witt. New York: Arno Press, Inc., 1972.
- Harrison, John P. "Science and Politics: Origins and Objectives of Mid-Nineteenth Century Government Expeditions to Latin America." *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. XXXV, No. 2 (May 1955): 175-202.
- Hatoum, Milton. *Amazonas: palavras e imagens de um rio entre ruínas*. São Paulo: Livraria Diadorim, 1979.
- Hemming, John. *Amazon Frontier: The Defeat of the Brazilian Indians*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987.
- _____. *Red Gold: The Conquest of the Brazilian Indians, 1500-1760*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979.
- Hennessy, Alistair. *The Frontier in Latin American History*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978.
- Henriques, Affonso. *Vargas, o maquiavélico*. São Paulo: Palácio do Livro, 1961.
- Herndon, William Lewis. *Exploration of the Valley of the Amazon*. Ed. by Hamilton Basso. Reprint ed., New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952.
- Hirschman Albert O. *Journeys Toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.
- Hoffman-Harnisch, Wolfgang. *O Brasil que eu vi: retrato de uma potência tropical*. Trans. by Huberto Augusto. São Paulo: Companhia Melhoramentos, 1940.

- Hooper, John. *The Spaniards: A Portrait of the New Spain*. London: Penguin, 1987.
- Humboldt, Alexander von. *Personal Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctial Regions of America, During the Years 1799-1804*. 3 vols. Trans. and Ed. by Thomasina Ross. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1852.
- Hummel, William C. and Keith Huntress. *The Analysis of Propaganda*. New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., n.d.
- Hunnicutt, Benjamin H. *Brazil Looks Forward*. Rio de Janeiro: Serviço Gráfico do IBGE, 1945.
- Ianni, Octávio. *Estado e planejamento econômico no Brasil*. 4ª Edição. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira S/A, 1986.
- Jaguaribe, Domingos. *Mudança da Capital Federal do Brasil*. São Paulo: Typographia de O Município, 1896.
- Jahr Garcia, Nelson. *Sadismo, sedução e silêncio: propaganda e controle ideológico no Brasil, 1964-1980*. São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 1990.
- Jobim, Anísio. *O Amazonas: sua história*. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1957.
- Johnson, Randal, Ed. *Tropical Paths: Essays on Modern Brazilian Literature*. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1993.
- Josefsohn, Leon. *Getúlio, este desconhecido: o aspecto humano da grande obra de Getúlio Vargas*. Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica Tupy Ltda., 1957.
- Katzman, Martin T. "The Brazilian Frontier in Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (July 1975): 266-285.
- Kubitschek, Juscelino. *Discursos proferidos no terceiro ano do*

- mandato presidencial, 1958.* Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1958.
- . *Por que construí Brasília.* Rio de Janeiro: Bloch Editores S/A, 1975.
- . *Quatro Anos.* Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1960.
- Ladislau, Alfredo. *Terra Immatura.* 3ª Edição. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira S/A, 1933.
- Lafer, Celso. "The Planing Process and the Political System in Brazil: A Study of Kubitschek's Target Plan (1956-1961)." Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. Cornell University, 1970.
- Lamounier, Bolivar. "Formação de um pensamento político autoritário na primeira república, uma interpretação." In Buarque de Holanda, Gen. Ed. *Historia da Civilização Brasileira.* 3 Partes. Parte II: *O Brasil Republicano.* Ed. by Boris Fausto. 3 vols. vol. 2: *Sociedade e instituições.* 2ª Edição. São Paulo: DIFEL, 1990.
- Lauerhass, Ludwig Jr. *Getúlio Vargas e o triunfo do nacionalismo brasileiro.* São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, 1986.
- Leach, E.R. *Genesis as Myth and Other Essays.* London: Jonathan Cape, 1969.
- . *Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure.* 3rd Edition. London: The Athlone Press, 1970.
- Lee, Alfred McClung. *How to Understand Propaganda.* New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc, 1952.
- Lefebvre, Henri. *The Sociology of Marx.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

Leff, Nathaniel. "Economic Development and Regional Inequality: Origins of the Brazilian Case." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 86 (May 1972).

Leite, Aureliano. *O Brigadeiro Couto de Magalhães: sentido nacionalista da sua obra*. Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica Sauer, 1936.

Lenharo, Alcir. "A Marcha para o Azul." *Anais do Museu Paulista*, Tomo XXXIII (1984): 7-16.

_____. *Sacralização da Política*. Campinas, SP: Papirus, 1986.

Lerner, Max. *Ideas Are Weapons: The History and Uses of Ideas*. New York: Viking Press, 1939.

Levine, Robert M. *The Vargas Regime: The Critical Years, 1934-1938*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).

Lobato Filho, João Bernardo. *Avançae para o Jamarí!: uma tragédia na Comissão Rondon*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Henrique Velho, 1944.

Lobo, Telésforo de Souza. *O Brasil confederado*. São Paulo: Escolas Profissionais do Lyceu Coração de Jesus, 1933.

Ludovico Teixeira, Pedro. "Como e porque construí Goiânia." In Peixoto da Silveira, José. *Belo Horizonte e Goiânia*. N.p.: n.p., 1956: 46-67.

_____. *Pedro Ludovico (depoimento, 1976)*. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas/CPDOC-- História Oral, 1979.

_____. *Memórias*. 2ª Edição. Goiânia: Editora Cultura Goiana, 1973.

Ludwig, Armin K. *Brazil: A Handbook of Historical Statistics*. Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1985.

Machado, Maria Cristina Teixeira. *Pedro Ludovico: um tempo, um*

- carisma, uma historia*. Goiânia: Centro Editorial e Gráfico da Universidade Federal de Goiás, 1990.
- Magalhães, Aderson, et. al. *Artigos de jornal*. Rio de Janeiro: SPVEA, 1959.
- Magalhães Barata, Joaquim. *Discurso proferido por ocasião do banquete que lhe foi oferecido, a 25 de fevereiro de 1944, em homenagem ao transcurso do primeiro aniversário da sua reinvestidura no governo do Estado*. Belém, PA: DEIP, 1944.
- Maia, Álvaro. *Na vanguarda da retaguarda: campanha da produção da borracha*. Manaus: Divulgação do DEIP, 1943.
- Malatian, Teresa Maria. *O Estado Novo (1930-1945)*. Franca, SP: Faculdade de História, Direito e Serviço Social, 1986.
- Maligo, Pedro. "Political Literature in Amazonia: Márcio Souza and His Predecessors." In Randal Johnson, Ed. *Tropical Paths: Essays on Modern Brazilian Literature*. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1993: 53-75.
- Malinowski, Bronislaw. *Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1948.
- Manoïlesco, Mihaïl. *O Século do Corporativismo*. Trans. by Azevedo Amaral. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1938.
- Margolis, Mac. *The Last New World: The Conquest of the Amazon Frontier*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992.
- Maués, Raymundo Herald. "Amazônias: identidade e integração." Paper presented at the 17ª Reunião Brasileira de Antropologia, Florianópolis, SC, 8-11 April 1990.
- Mauro Marini, Ruy. *Subdesarrollo y revolución*. Mexico City: Siglo XXI Editores, S.A., 1969.
- Medeiros, Fernando Saboia. *A liberdade de navegação do Amazonas*. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938.

- Medeiros, Jarbas. *Ideologia autoritária no Brasil, 1930-1945*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora da FGV, 1978.
- Medeiros, Océlio de. *In Memoriam: Governador Magalhães Barata*. Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1959.
- Medleg Rodrigues, Georgete. "Ideologia, propaganda e imaginário social nas construção de Brasília." Dissertação de Mestrado. Departamento de História, Instituto de Ciências Humanas, Universidade de Brasília, 1990.
- Meira Penna, José Osvaldo de. *Utopia brasileira*. Belo Horizonte: Editora Itatiaia Ltda, 1988.
- Mello, Antonio Vieira de. *A mobilização das consciências*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora A Noite, 1942.
- Menezes, Adriano. *O problema de colonização da Amazônia*. Rio de Janeiro: SPVEA, 1958.
- Monbeig, Pierre. "Goiânia." In Brazil. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. Conselho Nacional de Geografia. *Goiânia*. Rio de Janeiro: Serviço Gráfico do IBGE, 1942: 76-81.
- Monteiro, Elviro. *Breves considerações sobre a fisionomia política-social do Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: DIP, 1941.
- Monteiro, Ofelia Socrates do Nascimento. *Como nasceu Goiânia*. São Paulo: Empresa Gráfica da Revista dos Tribunais, 1938.
- Moraes, Raymundo. *Amphiteatro Amazonico*. São Paulo: Companhia Melhoramentos de São Paulo, 1936.
- _____. *Na planície amazônica*. 5ª Edição. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1939.
- Morais, Carlos de Souza. *A ofensiva japonesa no Brasil*. 2ª Edição. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Globo, 1942.

- Morais, Péricles. *Os intérpretes da Amazônia*. Rio de Janeiro: n.p., 1935; reprint ed., Rio de Janeiro: Serviço de Documentação Agência da SPVEA, 1959.
- Morse, Richard M. *From Community to Metropolis: A Biography of São Paulo* (New York: Octagon Books, 1974).
- Nash, Roy. *O Brasil em 2044: um tarefa para a mocidade brasileira*. Rio de Janeiro: Casa do Estudante do Brasil, 1944.
- Neiva, Arthur. *Daqui e de longe . . . : chronicas nacionaes e de viagem*. São Paulo: Companhia Melhoramentos de São Paulo, 1927.
- _____. and Belisario Penna. *Viagem científica pelo Norte da Bahia, sudoeste de Pernambuco, sul do Piauí e do norte a sul de Goiás*. Rio de Janeiro: Manguinhos, 1918.
- Neotti, Clarêncio, Ed. *Comunicação e ideologia*. São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 1980.
- New American Bible*. New York: P.J. Kennedy, 1970.
- Oliveira, Lúcia Lippi. "O pensamento de Azevedo Amaral." In Lippi Oliveira, et. al. *Estado Novo: ideologia e poder*. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1982: 48-70.
- _____, et. al. *Estado Novo: ideologia e poder*. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1982.
- Oliveira, Xavier de. *O problema imigratório na América Latina: o sentido político-militar da colonização japonesa nos países do Novo Mundo*. 2ª Edição. Rio de Janeiro: A. Coelho Branco Filho Editor, 1942.
- _____. *Redivisão política e territorial do Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1946.
- Orico, Osvaldo. *Brasil, capital Brasília*. 2ª Edição. Lucas, D.F.: Serviço Gráfico do IBGE, 1960.

- Otávio Filho, Rodrigo. *Figuras do Império e da República*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Zelio Valverde, 1944.
- Othon Sidou, J.M. *O sentido socio-econômico da Madeira-Mamoré*. Recife: Sociedade Editora Cambio Ltd., 1950.
- Padilha, Leão. *O Brasil na posse de si mesmo*. Rio de Janeiro: DIP, 1941.
- Palhano, Lauro. *O Gororoba*. 2ª Edição. Rio de Janeiro: Irmãos Pongetti Editores, 1943.
- Paranaguá, Joaquim Nogueira. *Carta aberta ao Excelentíssimo Sr. Presidente da República e membros do Congresso Nacional*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1911.
- Peixoto, Sílvio. *Aspectos históricos do Estado Novo*. Rio de Janeiro: DIP, 1940.
- Peixoto da Silveira, José. *Belo Horizonte e Goiânia*. N.p.: n.p., 1956.
- O Pensamento Político do Presidente*. Rio de Janeiro: Cultura Política, 1943.
- Peregrino Júnior, João. *Panorama cultural da Amazônia*. Salvador: Publicações da Universidade da Bahia, 1960.
- Pereira, Osni Duarte. *Desnacionalização da Amazônia: um chamamento à consciência dos brasileiros*. 2ª Edição. São Paulo: Editora Fulgor Ltda, 1958.
- Pereira da Silva, Gastão. *Getúlio Vargas e a psicanálise das multidões*. Rio de Janeiro: Zelio Valverde, 1940.
- Péres, Leopoldo. *Getúlio Vargas: o homem e o chefe*. Rio de Janeiro: Empresa Gráfica O Cruzeiro S/A, 1944.
- _____. *Política e Espírito do Regime*. Rio de Janeiro: Empresa A Noite, 1941.

- Pimenta, Francisco Netto. *Anais do Batismo Cultural de Goiânia, 1942*. Goiânia: Prefeitura Municipal de Goiânia, Secretaria Municipal de Cultura, Esporte e Turismo, Núcleo de Patrimônio Histórico e Artístico, 1993.
- Pinheiro, Raimundo. *À Margem do Amazonas*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Universal, 1945.
- _____. "À margem do 'Discurso do Rio Amazonas.'" In *O Pensamento Político do Presidente*. Rio de Janeiro: *Cultura Política*, 1943: 187-198.
- Pontes, Carlos. *Tavares Bastos*. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1939.
- Pordeus, Ismael. *Raízes históricas de Brasília: datas e documentos*. Fortaleza: Imprensa Oficial, 1960.
- Porto, Aníbal. *Em defesa da Amazônia (1906-1915)*. Rio de Janeiro: Typographia do *Jornal do Comércio*, 1915.
- Potsch, Waldemiro. *O Brasil e suas riquezas: leitura pátria*. 16ª Edição. Rio de Janeiro: Ministério da Agricultura, Serviço de Informação Agrícola, 1941.
- Prado, Eduardo. *A ilusão americana*. 4ª Edição. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira S/A, 1933.
- Promessas e realizações: a solução das grandes theses jurídicas, políticas e sociaes no governo Getúlio Vargas*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1938.
- Ramos Caiado, Leolídio di. *Expedição sertaneja Araguaia-Xingú (1945)*. Goiânia: Bolsa de Publicações Hugo de Carvalho Ramos, 1952.
- Ramos Costa, Licurgo. *Cidadão do Mundo*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora José Olympio, 1943.

- Rangel, Alberto. *A bacia do mar doce*. Rio de Janeiro: n.p., 1934; reprint ed., Rio de Janeiro: Serviço de Documentação, Agência da SPVEA, 1960.
- _____. *Inferno Verde: scenas e scenarios do Amazonas*. 2ª Edição. Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Minerva, 1914.
- _____. *Rumos e perspectivas*. 2ª Edição. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1934.
- Reis, Artur César Ferreira. *Aspectos econômicos da dominação lusitana na Amazônia*. Rio de Janeiro: Serviço de Documentação, Agência da SPVEA, 1961.
- _____. *A Amazônia e a cobiça internacional* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1960), 94.
- _____. *História do Amazonas* (Manaus: Augusto Reis, 1931).
- _____. *Panorama econômico-financeiro do Segundo Reinado: navegação fluvial, especialmente a do Amazonas*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1942.
- Reis, Marques dos. "Sob a inspiração do dever." In Presidência da República. Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda. *Os Grandes Dias do Brasil Novo*. Rio de Janeiro: DIP, 1939: 19-33.
- Ribeiro, João. *As nossas fronteiras*. Rio de Janeiro: Officina Industrial Graphica, 1930.
- Ribeiro da Silva, Hermano. *Garimpos de Mato Grosso*. São Paulo: n.p., 1936; reprint ed., São Paulo: Saraiva, 1954.
- Ricardo, Cassiano. *Marcha para Oeste: a influência da 'Bandeira' na formação social e política do Brasil*. 2 vols. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1940.
- _____. *Marcha para o Oeste*. 4ª Edição. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora; São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, 1970.

- Rizzo de Oliveira, Eliézer. "A doutrina de segurança nacional: pensamento político e projeto estratégico." In Eliézar Rizzo de Oliveira, Ed. *Militares: pensamento e ação política*. Campinas, SP: Papirus, 1987: 53-86.
- _____. Ed. *Militares: pensamento e ação política*. Campinas, SP: Papirus, 1987.
- Rodrigues, Lysias Augusto. *Roteiro do Tocantins*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora José Olympio, 1943.
- Rondon, Cândido Mariano da Silva. *Discurso pronunciado. . . na sessão cívica organizada pelo Ministro das Relações Exteriores Dr. Oswaldo Aranha para comemorar o seu regresso da Presidência da Comissão Mixta Internacional Perú-Colômbia*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1938.
- _____. *Mensagem à Associação dos Geógrafos Brasileiros*. Cuiabá, MT: Imprensa Oficial do Estado de Mato Grosso, 1953.
- Rondon, Frederico. *Na Rondônia Ocidental*. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938.
- _____. "Pelo Brasil Central." *Revista da Escola Militar*, December 1934. In Frederico Rondon, *Pelo Brasil Central*, 2ª Edição. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938.
- _____. *Pelo Brasil Central*. 2ª Edição. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938.
- _____. *Uaupés: hidrografia, demografia, geopolítica*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Militar, 1945.
- Rondon, Joaquim Vicente. *O Índio como sentinela das nossas fronteiras*. Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1949.
- Roosevelt, Theodore. *Through the Brazilian Wilderness*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914.

- Roquette-Pinto, Edgard. *Rondônia*. 4ª Edição. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938.
- Sá Carvalho, J.R. de. *Brazilian El Dorado*. Ed. by C.R. Enock. London: Blackie & Son Limited, 1938.
- Salgado, Plínio. *Literatura e Política*. In *Obras Completas*. 20 vols. Vol. 19. São Paulo: Editôra das Américas, 1956.
- _____. *Obras Completas*. 20 vols. São Paulo: Editôra das Américas, 1956.
- Santos, Wanderley Guilherme dos. "Raízes da imaginação política brasileira." *Dados*, Nº 7 (1970): 137-161.
- Schurz, William L. *Brazil: The Infinite Country*. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1961.
- Severiano, Jairo. *Getúlio Vargas e a Música Popular*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora da Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1983.
- Sharp, Walter R. "Brazil 1940-- Whither the 'New State'?" *The Inter-American Quarterly*, October 1940: 5-7.
- Silva, Alvimar. *O Novo Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1939.
- Silva, Hélio. *1935: A Revolta Vermelha*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira S/A, 1969.
- Skidmore, Thomas E. *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Smith, Henry Nash. *Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950.
- Smith, Peter Seaborn. "Bolivian Oil and Brazilian Economic Nationalism." *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April 1971): 166-181.

- Souza Lima, Antonio Carlos de. "O santo soldado." Unpublished paper. Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Museu Nacional, Programa de Pós-graduação em Antropologia Social, 1988.
- Spix, J.B. von and C.F.P. von Martius. *Viagem pelo Brasil*. 4 vols. Ed. by B.F. Ramiz Galvão and Basilio de Magalhães. Trans. by Lúcia Furquim Lahmeyer. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1938.
- Steinen, Karl von den. *Entre os aborígenes do Brasil Central*. Trans. by Egon Schaden. Berlin: n.p., 1894; reprint ed., São Paulo: Departamento de Cultura, 1940.
- Steiner, George. "Franco's Games." *The New Yorker*, 17 October, 1994.
- Stern, Randolph. "Metamorphoses d'une notion." *Communications Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales*. Paris: n.p., n.d.
- Szulc, Tad. *Twilight of the Tyrants*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1959.
- Tavares Bastos, Aureliano Cândido. *Cartas do solitário*. 3ª Edição. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938.
- . *O Valle do Amazonas*. 2ª Edição. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1937.
- Teles, José Mendonça. *A imprensa matutina*. Goiânia: CERNE, 1989.
- Tocantins, Leandro. *Acre, Rio Branco e espírito luso*. Rio de Janeiro: Serviço de Documentação, Agência da SPVEA, 1962.
- Torres, João Camillo de Oliveira. *A propaganda política*. Belo Horizonte: Imprensa da Universidade de Minas Gerais, 1959.
- Tota, Antônio Pedro. "A glória artística nos tempos de Getúlio." *Isto É*, 2 January 1980: 46-47.
- Travassos, Mário. *Projeção continental do Brasil*. 2ª Edição. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1938.

- Trevisan, Leonardo. *O que todo cidadão precisa saber sobre o pensamento militar brasileiro*. São Paulo: Global Editora, 1985.
- Uricoechea, Fernando. *The Patrimonial Foundations of the Brazilian Bureaucratic State*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980.
- U.S. Congress. Senate. *Exploration of the Valley of the Amazon, Made Under Direction of the Navy Department*. 2 Parts. By William Lewis Herndon and Lardner Gibbon. S. Report 36. *Executive Documents*. 32nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1853. Washington: Robert Armstrong, Public Printer, 1853.
- Vargas, Gétúlio. *De 1929 a 1934*. Rio de Janeiro: Calvino Filho, 1934.
- _____. *As diretrizes da Nova Política do Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1942.
- _____. *Documentos históricos*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, Serviço de Publicidade, 1934.
- _____. *O Estado Novo e o Momento Brasileiro*. Rio de Janeiro: I. Amorim & Cia., Ltda, 1939.
- _____. *A Nova Política do Brasil*. 10 vols. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1938-1944.
- _____. *Ordem e democracia*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1936.
- _____. "Plataforma." In *Alliança Liberal. Documentos da campanha presidencial*. Rio de Janeiro: Oficinas Graphics Alba, 1930: 89-134.
- _____. *A política nacionalista do petróleo no Brasil*. Ed. by Alfredo Marques Vianna. Rio de Janeiro: Edições Tempo Brasileiro Ltda., 1964.
- _____. *Ponte das Bandeiras*. São Paulo: Imprensa Comercial,

1940.

Velho, Otávio Guilherme. *Capitalismo autoritário e campesinato*. São Paulo: DIFEL, 1976.

Velloso, Mônica Pimenta. "Uma configuração do campo intelectual." In Lúcia Lippi Oliveira, et. al. *Estado Novo: ideologia e poder*. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1982: 71-108.

_____. *Os intelectuais e a política cultural do Estado Novo*. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC, 1987.

_____. "O mito da originalidade brasileira; a trajetória intelectual de Cassiano Ricardo (dos anos 20 ao Estado Novo)." Dissertação de Mestrado. Departamento de Filosofia, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, 1983.

Venancio Filho, Francisco. *Euclides da Cunha e a Amazônia*. Rio de Janeiro: Serviço Gráfico do IGBE, 1949.

Vesentini, José William. *A capital da geopolítica*. São Paulo: Editora Ática S/A, 1986.

Vidal, Olmio Barros. *O Brasil que o Presidente Getúlio Vargas está construindo*. Rio de Janeiro: DIP, 1940.

Vieira, Luiz. *Getúlio Vargas: estadista e sociólogo*. Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1951.

Viveiros, Esther de. *Rondon conta sua vida*. Rio de Janeiro: Cooperativa Cultural dos Esperantistas, 1969.

Vygotsky, Lev. *Thought and Language*. Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press, 1986.

Wagley, Charles. "The Brazilian Amazon: The Case of an Underdeveloped Area." In Charles Wagley, et. al. *Four Papers Presented in the Institute for Brazilian Studies of Vanderbilt University*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1951: 9-31.

- _____, et. al. *Four Papers Presented in the Institute for Brazilian Studies of Vanderbilt University*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1951.
- Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary*. Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, Inc., 1986.
- Weffort, Francisco C. "Estados e massas no Brasil" *Revista Civilização Brasileira*, Ano I, Nº 7, (May 1966): 137-158.
- Werneck, Maria Lúcia Teixeira. *Getúlio Vargas*. São Paulo: Editora Três, 1974.
- Werneck Sodré, Nelson. *Oeste: ensaio sobre a grande propriedade pastoril*. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1941.
- Wilkie, James W., Ed. *Statistical Abstract of Latin America*, Vol. 21. Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center, 1981.
- Wilkins, Mira and Frank Ernest Hill. *American Business Abroad: Ford on Six Continents*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964.
- Williams, George Hunston. *Wilderness and Paradise in Christian Thought*. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1962.
- Würth, Thiago M. *Juventude Brasileira*. Canôas, RG: Instituto Pestalozzi, 1943.
- Young, Jordan M. *Brazil: Emerging World Power*. 2nd Edition. Melbourne, FL: Krieger Publishing Co., 1991.